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COMMENTAKIES 


THE    LAW 


OF 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


BY 


JOHN    F.   DILLON,    LL.D. 

Ill 

PKOFKSSOR  OF   REAL   F.STATE  AND   EQUITY   JURISPRUDENCE  IN    COLUMBIA    COLLEGE 

L.\W   SCHOOL  ;     late    circuit    judge    of  the    united    STATES    FOR   THE 

EIGHTH   judicial  CIRCUIT,    AND   FORMERLY    CHIEF  JUSTICE  OF 

THE  SUPREME   COURT   OF  IOWA. 


THIRD  EDITION,  REVISED  AND  ENLARGED. 


Vol.  I. 


BOSTON: 
LITTLE,   BROWN,   AND    COMPANY. 

1881. 


J 


J"^!  i^^^ 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  j'ear  1881, 

By  John  F.  Dillon, 
In  tlie  Otfice  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 

T 


University  Press: 
John  Wilson  and  Son,  Cambridge. 


TO    THE 


HONORABLE    SAMUEL   F.   MILLER,   LL.D. 

ASSOCIATE   JUSTICE   OF   THE   SUPREME   COURT 
OF   THE  UNITED   STATES. 


WHETHER    I   SHARE   IX    THE 

GENERAL    ADMIRATION   OF   YOUR   JUDICIAL    TALENTS, 

OR    LISTEN    TO    THE    MORE    PERSUASIVE    SUGGESTIONS    OF    A    VOICE 

THAT   COMES    TO    ME    FROM 

LONG    ASSOCIATION   AT    THE    BAR   AND    UPON   THE   BENCH, 

THERE    IS    NO    ONE    TO   WHOM    I    CAN   INSCRIBE, 

SO    FITTINGLY   AS    TO    YOURSELF, 

A    WORK 

RELATING    TO   AN    IMPORTANT    BRANCH   OF    THAT    SCIENCE 

WHICH    YOU    HAVE    STUDIED    SO    DEEPLY 

AND    UNDERSTAND   SO   WELL. 


PEEFAOE  TO  THIRD  EDITIOK 


A  EE VISION  of  this  Treatise  has  for  some  time  been 
needed,  but  the  pressure  of  other  duties  has,  until  re- 
cently, prevented  its  preparation.  During  the  seven  years 
that  have  elapsed  since  the  last  edition  an  unusual  number 
of  cases  has  been  decided  upon  the  various  topics  em- 
braced in  the  work.  The  reported  decisions  to  December 
1,  1880,  have  all  been  diligently  examined,  and  the  results 
of  such  examination  wrought  into  the  texture  of  the  pres- 
ent edition.  This  has  necessarily  increased  its  size,  and 
correspondingly,  it  is  hoped,  its  value.  More  than  two 
hundred  new  sections  have  been  written,  and  over  three 
thousand  additional  cases  cited.  Every  part  has  been 
gone  over  with  conscientious  care,  and  there  is  scarcely  a 
section  in  which,  either  in  the  text  or  the  notes,  additions 
and  changes  have  not  been  made.  It  has  been  necessary 
to  sectionize  the  work  anew,  but  the  numbers  of  the  former 
sections  are  enclosed  in  parentheses. 

In  consulting  the  Reports  the  author  has  been  surprised 
and  pleased  to  see  the  extent  to  which  this  Treatise  has 
been  used  by  lawyers  and  judges  as  an  aid  to  their  labors  ; 
and  in  again  presenting  it,  in  its  new  and  altered  shape,  he 
gladly  expresses  once  more  his  sincere  and  profound  grat- 
ification for  the  favor  with  which  it  has  been  received. 

J.   F.   D. 

Columbia  College  Law  School,  New  York, 
January  1,  1881. 


7iiS41B 


PREFACE    TO    SECOND    EDITION. 


The  favor  accorded  to  this  treatise  by  the  profession  is 
gratifying  to  the  author  and  compensates  for  the  great 
Labor  of  its  preparation.  Nothing  can  be  more  pleasing 
to  an  author  than  the  knowledge  that  the  studious  care 
given  to  a  work  is  appreciated  by  those  for  whom  it  was 
written :  their  approving  opinion  is  the  reward  he  covets 
and  enjoys. 

The  First  Edition,  published  about  twelve  months  ago, 
and  of  nearly  double  the  usual  size,  has  been  exhausted, 
and  at  the  request  of -the  publishers  the  Second  Edition 
has  been  prepared.  As  before,  this  has  been  the  personal 
labor  of  the  author.  All  reported  cases,  decided  since  the 
first  publication,  have  been  examined  and  the  text  and 
notes  prepared  without  the  assistance  of  others.  While 
this  edition  embraces  a  summary  of  recent  cases  to  the 
latest  date  and  contains  substantial  additions,  the  structure 
of  the  work  is  unaltered.  Some  new  sections  have  been 
added  and  others  re-written.  The  principal  changes  have 
been  made  in  the  chapters  which  treat  of  Municipal 
Securities,  Taxes,  and  Assessments.  The  amount  of  nego- 
tiable bonds  of  municipalities  largely  exceeds  the  sum  of 
the  indebtedness  of  all  the  states,  and  it  has  been  the 
earnest  endeavor  herein  to  exhibit  accurately  the  American 
law  upon  this  important  subject. 


Viii  '  PREFACE   TO   SECOND   EDITION. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  deemed  fitting  to  express  to  the 
Bench  and  Bar  of  the  country  a  sincerely  grateful  appre- 
ciation of  the  favorable  judgment  already  pronounced,  and 
a  hope  that  the  same,  upon  further  examination  of  the 
work,  may  be  neither  reversed  nor  modified. 

J.  F.  D. 

Davenpokt,  Iowa,  1873. 


PREFACE    TO    FIRST    EDITIOK 


The  necessity  for  a  work  upon  Municipal  Corporations 
was  so  seriously  felt  by  the  author  when  holding  a  seat  on 
the  Supreme  Bench  of  a  state  where  questions  relating  to 
the  powers,  duties,  and  liabilities  of  municij)alities  were 
presented  at  almost  every  turn,  that  he  resolved,  eight 
years  ago  and  more,  to  endeavor  to  supply  the  want. 
Although  the  subject  is  one  of  unsurpassed  practical  im- 
portance, since  nearly  every  considerable  city  and  town  in 
the  United  States  is  incorporated,  no  American  work  upon 
it  has  ever  appeared.  A  careful  examination  of  the  Eng- 
lish treatises  satisfied  the  author  that  they  were,  in  a  great 
measure,  inapplicable  here,  and  that  they  fail  to  cover  a 
large  portion  of  the  existing  field  of  the  law  upon  the 
subject  as  enlarged  by  American  legislation  and  practice. 
True,  our  municipal  system,  like  the  body  of  our  jurispru- 
dence, was  derived  from  England,  but  it  is  remarkable  how 
many  changes  were  necessary  to  adapt  it  to  our  system  of 
government  and  mode  of  administration,  and  to  the  wants 
and  situation  of  our  people.  Accordingly,  if  the  munici- 
palities of  the  one  country  be  closely  compared  with  those 
of  the  other,  it  will  be  found  that,  in  their  structure,  powers, 
and  workings,  they  present  quite  as  many  points  of  differ- 
ence as  of  similarity. 

We  have  popularized  and  made  use  of  municipal  insti- 
tutions to  such  an  extent  as  to  constitute  one  of  the  most 
striking  features  of  our  government.  It  owes  to  them, 
indeed,  in  a  great  degree,  its  decentralized  character. 
When  the  English  Municipal  Corporations  Reform  Act  of 


X  PREFACE   TO   FIKST  EDITION. 

1835  was  passed,  there  were  in  England  and  Wales,  ex- 
cluding London,  only  two  hundred  and  forty-six  places 
exercising  municipal  functions ;  and  their  aggregate  popu- 
lation did  not  exceed  two  millions  of  people.  In  this 
country  our  municipal  corporations  are  numbered  by  thou- 
sands, and  the  inhabitants  subjected  to  their  rule  by 
millions. 

Our  municipalities  are  habitually  clothed  by  the  legis- 
latures with  extensive,  important,  and  diversified  powers, 
and  consequently  possess  a  much  more  composite  character 
than  in  England  or  elsewhere.  Strictly,  a  municipal  cor- 
poration is  an  institution  designed  to  regulate  and  admin- 
ister the  mere  local  or  internal  concerns  of  the  incorporated 
place  in  matters  pertaining  to  it,  and  not  relating  directly 
to  the  people  of  the  state  at  large.  But  in  this  country, 
much  more  generally  than  in  England,  it  is  the  practice  to 
make  use  of  the  municipality,  or  of  its  officers,  as  agencies 
of  the  state,  for  the  exercise,  on  its  behalf,  of  public,  in 
addition  to  corporate,  duties  and  functions.  From  the 
difference  between  these  two  classes  of  powers  the  Amer- 
ican courts  have  deduced  consequences  so  important  that 
it  is  as  necessary  as  it  is  oftentimes  difficult  to  distinguish 
between  them.  Besides,  it  has  unfortunately  become 
quite  too  common  with  us  to  confer  upon  our  corporations 
extraordinary  powers,  such  as  the  authority  to  aid  in  the 
construction  of  railways,  or  like  undertakings,  which  are 
better  left  exclusively  to  private  capital  and  enterprise,  and 
to  create,  in  their  corporate  capacity,  indebtedness  therefor, 
enforceable  by  actions  in  the  courts,  and  which  must  be 
paid  by  taxation. 

Invested,  also,  within  certain  limits,  with  delegated  legis- 
lative authority  concerning  the  property  and  conduct  of 
their  inhabitants ;  with  powder,  more  or  less  extensive,  to 
acquire  and  dispose  of  property  ;  with  the  power  to  elect 
their  own  officers  ;  to  make  contracts  ;  to  incur  liabilities ; 
to  exercise  Eminent  Domain;  and  the  more  momentous 
powder  to  levy  and  collect  taxes,  general  and  special,  —  these 
corporate  agencies  are  thus  brought  into  intimate  and  daily 


PREFACE   TO    FIRST   EDITION.  XI 

contact  with  the  most  important  rights  and  interests  of 
their  inhabitants,  and  as  a  result  we  have  an  amount  and 
variety  of  Utigation  not  to  be  found  in  the  tribunals  of 
other  countries.  In  no  EngHsh  treatise  on  Municipal  Cor- 
porations is  there  a  chapter  upon  the  subject  of  civil  actions 
and  liabilities,  and  no  discussion  of  the  question  as  to  their 
amenabihty  to  respond  civilly  in  damages  to  individuals  for 
acts  of  misfeasance,  or  for  neglect  of  duty ;  and,  for  reasons 
not  material  to  be  here  stated,  the  occurrence  of  questions 
of  this  kind  in  the  English  tribunals  has  been  compara- 
tively infrequent.  The  American  Reports,  however,  teem 
Avith  cases  on  this  subject,  and  the  civil  liabiUty  of  muni- 
cipal corporations  upon  contracts  and  for  torts,  and  the 
mode  of  enforcing  it,  are  with  us  the  most  important 
practical  topics  requiring  treatment  in  a  work  of  this 
character. 

There  being  no  American  work  on  this  branch  of  the 
law,  and  the  decisions  in  this  country  relating  to  it  being 
scattered  through  the  reports  of  the  federal  courts,  and 
those  of  thirty-seven  states,  there  was  little  to  guide  the 
author,  either  as  to  the  arrangement  of  his  subject,  or  as 
to  what  had  been  decided  by  the  courts  concerning  it. 
Accordingly  he  had  no  resource  except  to  delve  laboriously 
for  his  materials  among  hundreds  of  volumes ;  but  these 
have,  one  by  one,  been  examined  by  him  with  a  view  to 
find  all  that  could  be  advantageously  used  to  illustrate  the 
subject;  and  the  result  is  given,  either  in  the  text  or  notes, 
as  fully  as  it  was  practicable  within  the  compass  of  a  single 
volume.  Nor  has  he  overlooked  the  aid  to  be  derived  from 
other  sources.  Every  English  publication  relating  to  the 
subject  in  its  legal  or  practical  relations  has  been  subjected 
to  examination  ;  books  which  could  not  otherwise  be  had 
have  been  specially  procured  from  abroad.  And,  through- 
out the  present  volume,  no  inconsiderable  pains  have  been 
taken  to  set  forth  wherein  the  English  and  American 
municipalities  differ,  so  that  the  applicability  and  precise 
legal  value  of  the  judicial  decisions  of  the  former  country 
would  be  better  understood. 


XII  PREFACE   TO   FIRST   EDITION. 

When  the  work  was  resolved  upon,  the  author  hoped  to 
proceed  with  the  leisurely  care  that  would  enable  him  to 
avoid  the  faults  which  thorough  deliberation  might  result 
in  correcting.  This  hope  has  not  been  as  fully  realized  as 
he  desired,  for  year  by  year  his  official  duties  have  more 
and  more  encroached  upon  his  time,  leaving  for  this  work 
only  the  diminishing  intervals  between  courts.  In  its 
preparation  he  has  often  envied  the  author  by  profession 
the  opportunity  for  continuous  and  unbroken  labor,  and  he 
cannot  but  feel  that  if  his  work  had  not  been  prepared  in 
fragments,  it  would  not  have  fallen  both  so  far  below  his 
ideal,  and  what,  under  more  auspicious  circumstances,  he 
himself  might  have  made  it.  It  is  hoped,  however,  if  it 
shall  lack  the  symmetry  and  finish  such  an  author  would 
have  given  it,  that  it  may  have  compensating  advantages 
in  its  thoroughly  practical  character ;  and  these  it  will 
surely  owe  to  that  experience  to  which  the  mere  student 
or  professional  writer  must  ever  be  a  stranger,  and  which 
can  be  had  only  upon  the  Bench  or  at  the  Bar. 

Some  peculiarities  in  the  Planner  of  its  preparation  will 
be  observed.  The  aim  throughout  has  been  to  make  a 
work  which  will  be  useful  to  the  profession.  Aware  that 
in  most  cases  access  to  complete  law  libraries  cannot  be 
had,  the  author  has  endeavored,  as  far  as  practicable,  to 
supply  this  want,  and  to  make  the  text  and  notes  exhibit 
the  substance  of  the  adjudications.  This  explains  why  so 
much  care  has  been  taken  to  cite  the  cases  bearing  upon 
the  subjects  discussed,  and  accounts  for  the  fulness  of 
proofs  and  illustrations  to  be  found  in  the  notes. 

He  trustfully  submits  the  work,  which  fills  up  the  inter- 
stices between  judicial  duties  for  nearly  nine  years,  to  the 
profession  for  whose  assistance  it  is  designed,  and  whose 
final  judgment  on  it  will  not  be  otherwise  than  just.  If 
he  could  be  assured  that  it  has  a  value  at  all  proportioned 
to  the  labor  first  and  last  bestowed  upon  it,  he  would  ven- 
ture to  hope  for  a  judgment  not  altogether  unfavorable. 

Davenport,  Iowa,  1872. 


CONTENTS    OF  YOLUME    I. 


CHAPTER  I. 

MUNICIPAL   INSTITUTIONS  —  INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  AND  GENERAL  VIEW. 

Ancient  cities.  Grecian  cities.  Roman  municipalities.  State  of  towns  in 
Europe  after  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire.  Mediaeval  charters.  Charters 
of  community  in  France.  Modifications  of  Roman  municipal  system.  En- 
franchisement of  towns  in  Spain,  and  its  causes.  Municipal  system  of  Great 
Britain.  Historical  sketch  of  boroughs :  their  incorporation  and  distinctive 
features.  Origin  of  popular  representation.  London  and  its  municipal  his- 
tory and  charters.  Corruption  and  abuses  in  the  English  municipal  corpo- 
rations. Reform  Act  of  1835.  Lord  Brougham's  services  in  promoting 
municipal  reform.  American  municipal  system.  Its  early  origin.  Decen- 
tralized character.  Operation  and  efi"ects.  Corruption  and  abuses.  Reme- 
dies suggested.     Results  summed  up §§1-17 

CHAPTER  II. 

CORPORATIONS   DEFINED   AND   CLASSIFIED. 

General  definition.  Municipal  corporations  defined.  Different  kinds  and  grades 
of  public  corporations.  Quasi  corporations.  New  England  towns :  powers 
and  mode  of  government.  City  governments.  The  state  as  a  public  cor- 
poration   §§  18-31 

CHAPTER  IIL 

CREATION   AND   SEVERAL   KINDS   OF    MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 

In  England. — Royal  and  parliamentary  corporations.  The  old  English  muni- 
cipal corporations.  Their  diverse  character.  Integral  parts.  Abuses  in 
municipal  rule.  Municipal  Refomi  Corporations  Act  of  1835.  Abstract  of 
its  leading  provisions.  Constitutes  the  English  corporations  upon  an  uniform 
model. 

In  the  United  States.  —  Created  only  by  state  legislative  enactment.  Their 
great  numbers.     Creation  by  territorial  legislatures.      Special  charters  and 


XIV  CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 

general  incorporating  acts.  Outline  of  ordinary  municipal  charter.  Ad- 
vantage of  general  incorporating  acts.  Creation  by  implication.  Accep- 
tance of  charter.  Submission  to  vote  of  inhabitants.  Local  option  laws. 
Special  constitutional  provisions  and  their  construction.  General  and  special 
acts.  liestriction  on  municipal  powers.  Title  of  incorporating  charter  or 
acts §§  32-51 

CHAPTER  IV. 

PUBLIC  AND   PRIVATE   CORPORATIONS   DISTINGUISHED. — LEGISLATIVE  POWER 
AND    ITS   LIMITATIONS. 

Importance  of  the  distinction  between  piihlic  and  private  corporations.  Differ- 
ence defined.  Scope  of  legislative  authority.  Complex  character  of  ordinary 
municipalities.  Distinction  between  public  or  state  and  municijjal  or  local 
powers.  Legislative  authority  over  coi-porate  funds  and  revenues.  Limita- 
tion in  favor  of  creditors.  Power  over  corporate  boundaries  and  public  prop- 
erty. Whether  municipal  corporations  are  in  any  respect  private.  Cases 
cited  and  criticised.  Public  powers  and  rights  held  at  the  will  of  the  legis- 
lature. Creditor's  rights  cannot  be  impaired.  Illustrations  from  decided 
cases.  Extent  of  legislative  power  over  the  private  property  of  municipal 
corporations  discussed.  May  be  compelled  by  the  legislature  to  pay  debts  not 
legally  binding ;  and  to  incur  debts  against  their  will.  Power  over  trust 
property H  52-80 

CHAPTER  V. 

MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 

General  Municipal  Poicers.  —  Their  Nature  and  Construction. 

Charters  defined.  Judicially  noticed.  Proof  of  corporate  existence ;  user ;  leg- 
islative recognition.  Repeals  and  amendments.  General  laws  .and  special 
charters  ;  conflict ;   constructions. 

Extent  of  power;  limitations;  canons  of  construction.  Z/sff/jre  as  affecting  mu- 
nicipal powers.  Discretionary  powers  not  subject  to  judicial  control.  Public 
powers  and  trusts  not  capable  of  delegation.  Legislative  powers  incapable  of 
surrender.  Mandatory  and  discretionary  powers;  difference  defined  and  illus- 
trated.    Revenues  exempt  from  judicial  seizure.     Garnishment.  §§i  81-101 

CHAPTER  VL 

MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS    (CONTINUED). 

Special  Powers  and  Special  Limitations. 

1 .  Wharves. 

2.  Ferries. 

3.  Borrowing  money. 

4.  Limitation  on  power  to  become  indebted. 


CONTENTS    OF   VOLUME   I.  XV 

5.  Rewards  for  offenders. 

6.  Public  buildings. 

7.  Police  powers  and  regulations. 

8.  Prevention  of  fires. 

9.  Quarantine  and  health. 

10.  Indemnifying  of  officers. 

11.  Furnishing  entertainments. 

12.  Impounding  animals. 

13.  Party  walls. 

14.  Public  defence. 

15.  Aid  to  railway  companies,  and  herein  of  the  constitutional  power  of  the 

legislature ;    cases  cited.     Power  must  be  express.     Construction  of 
special  grants  of  power ;  cases  cited §§102-164 

CHAPTER  VII. 

DISSOLUTION   OF   MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 

In  England:  1.  By  act  of  parliament.  2.  By  loss  of  integral  part.  3.  By  sur- 
render. 4.  By  forfeiture.  These  modes,  except  the  first,  not  applicable  in 
this  country.  Effect  of  dissolution  on  property  and  debts.  Authorities  re- 
viewed.    Revival  of  corporation  and  it3  effect §§  165-174 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

CORPORATE   NAME,    BOUNDARIES,    AND   SEAL. 

Corporate  name.  Name  as  respects  grants  and  contracts.  Name  as  respects 
suits.  Corporate  boundaries.  Legislative  enlargement  of  territorial  limits. 
Territorial  division  —  its  effect  on  property  and  rights.  Corporate  seal ; 
proof  of. ^  175-192 

CHAPTER  IX. 

MUNICIPAL   ELECTIONS   AND   OFFICERS. 

1.  Municipal  popular  elections. 

2.  Special  tribunal  to  determine  election  contests  for  municipal  offices. 

3.  Power  to  create  and  appoint  municipal  officers. 

4.  Oath  and  official  bond. 

5.  Duration  of  official  term. 

6.  Vacancies  in  municipal  offices. 

7.  Refusal  to  serve  in  office. 

8.  Resignation  of  municipal  office. 

9.  Compensation  of  municipal  officers. 

10.  Liability  of  the  corporation  to  the  officer. 

11.  Liability  of  the  officer  to  the  corporation  and  to  others. 

12.  Amotion  and  disfranchisement §§  193-256 


Xvi  CONTENTS   OF   VOLUME   I. 

CHAPTER  X. 

CORPORATE  MEETINGS. 

1.  Common-law  requisites  of  a  valid  corporate  meeting. 

2.  Notice  of  corporate  meetings  at  common  law  and  under  the  English 

Municipal  Corporations  Act. 

3.  New  England  town  meetings ;  requisities  of  notice  and  power  of  ad- 

journment. 

4.  Constitution  and  meetings  of  councils  or  of  select  governing  bodies ;  and 

herein  of  quorums  and  majorities;  of  integral  parts;  and  of  stated, 
special,  and  adjourned  meetings. 

5.  Mode  of  proceeding  when  convened §§2.57-292 

CHAPTER  XI. 

CORPORATE   RECORDS   AND   DOCUMENTS. 

Means  of  evidence.  Clerk  pro  tern.  Power  to  amend  records.  Admissibility  of 
parol  evidence.  Remedy  to  compel  delivery  of  books  and  records.  Manda- 
mus. Replevin.  Inspection  of  corporate  documents  and  records.  Records 
as  evidence.     Originals  and  authenticated  copies H  293-305 

CHAPTER  XII. 

MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


1.  Definition,  general  nature,  and  common-law  requisites  of  ordinances. 

2.  Signing,  publication,  and  recording. 

3.  Power  to  impose  fines,  penalties,  and  forfeitures. 

4.  On  whom  binding,  and  notice  thereof. 

5.  Ordinances  relating  to  the  licensing,  regulating,  and  taxhig  of  amuse- 

ments and  occupations,  including  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors. 

6.  Ordinances  relating  to  pubhc  offences. 

7.  Ordinances  relating  to  the  public  health,  safety,  and  convenience ;  herein 

of  hospitals,  cemeteries,  and  burials  ;  nuisances  ;  markets  and  inspec- 
tion regulations;  dangerous  occupations  and  practices;  and  of  the 
pohce  powers  and  general  welfare  clause  in  charters. 

8.  Mode  of  enforcing  ordinances;  herein  of  actions  and  prosecutions  and 

their  nature ;  mode  of  pleading  ordinances ;  requisites  of  complaints  to 
enforce  ordinances  ;  construction  ;  defences ;  evidence,  etc. 

§§  306-423 

CHAPTER   XIII. 

MUNICIPAL   COURTS. 

In  England,  and  at  common  law.    American  corporation  courts.    Constitutional 
provisions.     Constructions.     Right  to  jury  trial.     Competency  of  citizens  to 


CONTENTS   OF  VOLUME  I.  XVU 

be  local  judges,  jurors,  and  witnesses.  Summary  convictions,  when  valid. 
Indictable  offences.  Distinctions.  Extent  of  jurisdiction.  Jury  on  appeal. 
Eeview  by  Superior  Courts H  424-441 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

CONTRACTS. 

1.  Extent  of  power  to  contract,  and  bow  conferred. 

2.  Mode  of  exercising  the  power. 

3.  Seal  not  necessary  unless   required;    may  be  concluded  by  vote  or 

ordinance. 

4.  When  bound  by  contracts  made  by  agents  ;  mode  of  execution. 

5.  Contracts  beyond  corporate  powers  void ;  ultra  vires  a  defence. 

6.  Implied  contracts ;  when  deducible. 

7.  Ratification  of  unauthorized  contracts. 

8.  Provisions  requiring  letting  to  the  lowest  bidder. 

9.  Contract  of  suretyship. 

10.  Rights  and  liabilities  as  respects  authorized  contracts ;  cases  mentioned. 

Power  to  settle  disputed  claims ;  to  give  extra  compensation  ;  to  em- 
ploy attorneys. 

11.  Contracts  for  public  works  ;  rights  of  contractors. 

12.  Same  :  corporate  control  under  stipulation. 

13.  E\'idences  of  indebtedness ;  negotiable  bonds. 

14.  Ordinary  warrants  or  orders ;  their  legal  nature. 

15.  Liabihty  of  indorsers  thereof. 

16.  Payment  and  cancellation  of  orders  and  waiTants. 

17.  Rights  and  remedies  of  holders  thereof. 

18.  Defences  thereto  ;  ultra  vires  ;  fraud  ;  want  of  consideration. 

19.  Orders  payable  out  of  particular  fund. 

20.  Interest  on  corporate  indebtedness. 

21.  Railroad  aid  bonds  ;  course  of  decision  in  United  States  Supreme  Court. 

22.  Leading  cases  in  the  National  Supreme  Court  on  the  subject  noticed. 

23.  Decision  in  State  Courts  referred  to.     Author's  conclusions  stated. 

§§442-555 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


962 
815 
1022 
684 
455 
297 


Abbott  V.  Herman  (7  Me.  118)  4(j2 

V.  Mills  (3  Vt.  521)  632,  635,  642,  658 

V.  Yost  (2  Denio,  N.  Y.  86)  264 

Abby  V.  BiUups  (35  Miss.  618)      219,  445 

Aberdeen  Railroad  Co.    v.  Blaikee 

(1  Macq.  A.  C.  461)  437 

V.    Saunderson,  (16  Miss.  663)  85, 106 

Abernethy  v.  Dennis  (49  Mo.  468)        667 

Acliley's  Case  (4  Abb.  Pr.  Rep.  35)    236, 

240,  290 
Adair  v.  City,  etc.  (27  U.  C.  C.  P.  126) 

1049 
Adams  v.  Bank  (1  Me.  861) 
V.  Beale  (19  Iowa,  61) 
V.  Carlisle  (21  Pick.  146) 
V.  Emerson  (6  Pick.  Mass.  57) 
V.  Farnsworth  (15  Grav,  423) 
V.  Hill  (16  Me.  215) 
V.  Lancasliire,  etc.  Railway  Co. 

(L.  R.  4C.  P.  739)  1051 

V.  Lindeil  (5  Mo.  A  pp.  197)  807 

V.  Mack  (3  X.  H.  493)  316 

V.  Mayor  (2  Head,  Tenn.  363)        769 
V.  Mavor  (29  Ga.  56)  332,  340 

V.  Minneapolis  (20  Minn.  484)        203 
V.  Natick  (13  Allen,  429) 
V.  Newfane  (8  Vt.  271) 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (11  Barb.  414) 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (10  N.  Y.  .328) 
V.  Railroad   Co.    (2   Coldw.  645) 

551,  574 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (18  Minn.  260)  704 
V.  Railway  Co.  (2  M.  &  G.  118) 
V.  Rivers  (11  Barb.  N.  Y.  393) 
V.  Rome  (-59  Ga.  765) 
V.  Walker  (34  Conn.  466) 
V.  Whittlesey  (3  Conn  -560) 
Addis  V.  Pittsburg  (85  Pa.  389)  443,  464 
Adley  v.  Reeves  (2  M.  &  S.  60)  349,  3.54, 

404 
Adolph  V.  Railroad  Co.  (65  N.  Y.  554)  712 
Adriance  v.  New  York  (1  Barb.  19)  013 
Adsit  v.  Brady  (4  Hill,  N.  Y.  630) 
^tna  Mills  v.  Waltham  (126  ilass. 

122) 
African  Soc.  v.  Varick  (13  Johns.  38) 

206,208 
Agawam  Bank  v.  South  Hadley  (128 

Mass)  939 

V.  South  Hadley  (21  Alb.  L.  J. 

616)  939 


1018 
604 
703 
597 


914 

686 

675 

1068 

263 


265 


974 


Aiken  v.  Railroad  Co.  (20  N.  Y.  370)   143 
Akron  v.  Chamberlain  (34  Ohio  St. 

328)  1002 

Albany  St.  in  re  (6  Abb.  Pr.  R.  273)    125 

(11  Wend.  148)  585.  586, 

592.  748 

Albany  v.  Cunliff  (2  N.  Y.  165)    451,  972 

Albright  v.  Town   Council  (9  Rich. 

Law,  399)  439 

Albrittin  v.  Huntsville  (60  Ala.  486)    109, 

1037,  1039,  1040,  1052 

Alcorn  v.  Horner  (38  Miss.  652)  748 

V.  Philadelphia  (44  Pa.  St.  348)  979, 

984 

Alden  v.  Alameda  (43  Cal.  270)     839,  937 

V.  Minneapolis  (24  Minn.  254)      1001 

1-.  Pinney  (12Fla.  348)  660 

V.  RounsvlUe  (7  Met.  219)  217 

Alderman  v.  Fuiley  (5  Eng.  Ark.  423)  109 

Aldrich  v.  Drury  (8  R.  I.  554)  684 

V.  Howard  ( 7  R.  1. 87, 199)  379,  383, 402 

V.  Londonderry  (5  Vt.  441)  938 

V.  Pelliam  (1  Gray,  510)  1025 

V.  Tripp  (11  R.  L  141)    968,  971,  978, 

988,  991 

Alexander  v.  Baltimore  (5  Gill  (Md), 

383)  596,  60-5,  610,  614,  732,  747, 
899 
V.  Bennett  (60  N.  Y.  204)  431 

V.  Bethlehem  (5  Dutch.  375)  410 

V.  Helber  (35  Mo.  3.34)  811 

V.  Hoyt  (7  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  89)  264 
V.  McDowell  (67  North  Car.  330)  8-58 
V.  Milwaukee  (16  Wis.  247)  996,1002 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (3  Strob.  S.  C.  L. 

594)  133 

I".  Town  Council  (-54  Miss.  659)     402 
Alexandria  v.  Alexandria  (5  Cranch, 

'2)  114 

V.  Fairfax  (95  U.  S.  774)  1049 

Alger  V.  Lowell  (3  Allen,  402)  1018,  1019, 

102.3,  1041 

Allaire  v.  Hartshorne   (21   N.  J.  L. 

665)  500 

Alleghany  City's  Appeal  (41  Pa.  St. 

60)  814 

Alleghany  City  u.  :McChirken  (14  Pa. 

St.  81)  451,453,4.58,481 

Alleghany  County  v.  Gibson  (20  Alb. 

L.  .J.  42'J)  958 

V.  Shaw  (34  Pa.  St.  301)  963 


XX 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Alleghany  i-.  Van  Campen  (3  "Wend. 

4y)  242 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (2tJ  Pa.  St.  355)    G80, 

702 
Allegheny  r.  Zimmerman  (10  Pitts. 

L.  J.  1(38)  379 

Allen  I'.  Brooklyn  (4  Fisher,  Pat.  Cas. 

508)  9G8 

V.  BurlinsTton  (45  Vt.  202)  942 

V.  Cameron  (3  Dill.  175)  510 

V.  Cooper  (22  Mc.  1:53)  297,  462 

V.  Decatur  (24  III.  332)  974 

i;.  Galveston  (51  Tex.  302)     116,  443, 
767,  778,  810,  813 
V.  Jay  (60  Me.  124)  187,  491,  588,  595, 

728 
V.  Jones  (47  Ind.  438)     501,  592,  596, 

612 
V.  McKean  (1  Sumn.  276)  75,  259 
V.  Taunton  (19  Pick.  485)  41,  42,  171 
V.  Turner  (11  Gray,  420)  915 

V.  Willard  (57  Pa.  St.  374)  1058 

Allentown  i'.  Kramer  (73  Pa.  St.  406) 

1038,  1068 
V.  Saeger  (20  Pa.  St.  421)      941,  942, 
943,  946 
AUer  V.  Cameron  (3  Dillon  C.  C.  R. 

198)  522 

Alletson  v.  Chichester  (L.  R.  10  C.  P. 

319)  1053 

Alley  V.  Adams  County  (76  III.  101)     192 
Allison   I'.  Juniata   Co.    (50  Pa.    St. 

351)  484, 488 

V.  V.  L.  H.  etc.  Co.  (10  Bush,  1)    181 
V.  Railway  Co.  (9  Bush,  247)  105,911 
All  Saints'  Church  v.  Lovett  ( 1  Hall, 

191)  204 

Altemus  v.  Mayor  (6  Duer,  446)  467 

Alton  V.  Hope  (68  111.  167)  950.  1000,  1038, 

1068 

V.  Kirsch  (68  III.  261)  406,  409 

V.  Madison  Co.  (21  III.  115)  938 

V.  MuUedy  (21  III.  76)  445,  455 

V.  Transportation  Co.  (12  III.  60)  559, 

671,  643,  646,  647 

Alvis  V.  Henderson  (16  B.  Mon.  131)  570, 

617,  667,  673 

Alvord  V.  Ashley  (17  III.  363)  626 

V.  Barrett  (16  Wis.  175)  265 

Amboy  v.  Sleeper  (31  III.  499)  868 

Ambrose  v.  State  (6  Ind.  351)  371 

Amelung  v.  Seekamp  (9  G.  &  J.  (Md.) 

468)  659 

American  Bible  Soc.  v.  Marshall  (15 

Ohio  St.  537)  561 

American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oakley  (9  Paige, 

496)  455 

American  Pavement  Co.  v.  Elizabeth 

City  (4  Fisher,  Pat.  Cas.  189)  968 
American  Print  Works  v.  Lawrence 

(23  N.  J.  L.  590)  265,  954 

American,  etc.  Co.  v.  Buffalo  (20  N. 

Y.  381)  770 

American  Railway,  etc.  Co.  v.  Haven 

(101  Mass  398)  855 


American  U.  Ex.  Co.  v.  St.  Joseph 

(66  Mo.  675)  739,  741 

Ames  V.  County  (11  Mich.  139)  168 

V.  Lake,   etc.    Railroad   Co.    (21 

Minn.  241)  612,  614 

Amesbury  v.  Ins.  Co.  (6  Gray,  596)      414 
Amey  v.  Alleghany  City   (24   How. 

365)    165,  180,  190,  341,  343,  482, 
651,  768 
Amite  City  v.  Clements  (24  La.  An. 

27)  77,  79,  812 

Amos  V.  Fond  du  Lac  (46  Wis.  695)  1055 
Amrine  v.  K.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  (7  Kan. 

178)  921 

Amy  V.  Supervisors  (11  Wall.  136)     265, 

820,  849,  851,  1075 

Anderson  In  re  (60  N.  Y.  457)  324 

V.  Commonwealth  (14  Bush.  171)     63 

V.  Draining  Co.  (14  Ind.  199)         592 

V.  Kern's  Drain  Co.  (14  Ind.  201)  358 

V.  St.  Louis  (47  Mo.  479)       597,  605, 

922 

V.  State  (23  Miss.  459)     773,  915,  958 

Andover  v.  Gould  (6  Mass.  40)    683,  1005 

V.  Grafton  (7  N.  H.  298)    41,  449,  480 

?;.  Sutton  (12  Met.  182)  721 

Andrews  v.   Insurance  Co.    (37  Me. 

256)  329 

V.  Pratt  (44  Cal.  309)  257,  570 

V.  United  States  (2  Story,  C.  C. 

203)  254,  256 

Annapolis  v.  Harwood  (32  Md.  471)     812 
V.  State  (30  Md.  212)  71 

Anthony  St.  in  re  (20  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

618)  601,  602 

Anthony  v.  Adams  (1  Met.  284)       40,  42, 
970,  972,  974,  994 
V.  Brecon,  etc.  Co.  (L.  R.  2  Ex. 

167)  377 

u.  Cleveland  (12  Ohio,  375)  451 

V.  Halderman  (7  Kan.  50)  229 

V.  Inhabitants   (1  Met.   (Mass.) 

286)  486 

V.  Jasper  Co.  (101  U.  S.  693)        510, 
538,  539 
V.  Jasper  Co.  (3  Cent.  Law  Jour. 

321)  538 

Ansley  v.  Wilson  (50  Ga.  418)  813 

An  tones  u.Eslava  (9  Port.  (Ala.)  527)  627, 

629,  645 
Appleby  v.  Mayor  (15  How.  Pr.  428)  451. 

463 
Applegate  v.  Ernst  (3  Bush,  648)  787 

Arbegust  v.  Louisville  (2  Bush,  271)    790 
Arents  v.  Commonwealth  (18  Gratt. 

750)  553 

Argenti   v.   San  Francisco   (16   Cal. 

255)  118,  444,  453,  456,  458,  467, 
476,  487,  610,  751 
Argus  Co.  V.  Albany  (55  N.  Y.  495)     444 
Arimond  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  Co.  (31 

Wis.  316)  1005,  1072 

Arkwright  v.   Cantrell  (7  Ad.  &  E. 

565)  251 

Arlington  v.  Merrick  (2  Saund.  403)    243 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


XX  i 


Armington  v.  Barnett  (15  Vt.  745)       580 
Armstrong  County  v.  Clarion  County 

(G6  Pa.  St.  218)  939 

Armstrong     v.     Commissioners      (4 

Blackf.  208)  76 

V.  Dalton  (4  Dev.  (N.  C.)  568)      668, 

673 
V.  St.  Louis  (69  Mo.  309)  605 

Armsworth  v.  Southeastern  Railway 

Co.  (11  Jur.  760)  1042 

Arnold  v.  Blaker  (L.  R.  0  Q  B.  433)    627 
V.  Bridge   Co.    (1  Duvall  (Ky.), 

372)  5S8,  621 

V.   Cambridge  (lOG  Mass.    352)    796, 


V.  Holbrooke  (L.  R.  8Q.  B.96) 


921 
376, 


627,  1025 

V.  Poole  (4  M.  &  G.  860)  175 

V.  Sliields  (5  Dana(Ky.),  18)  606,  929 

Arnot  V.  McCIure  (4  Denio,  45)  599 

Arnott  V.  Bradley  (23  U.  C.  C.  P.  1)    238 

Arnoult  v.  New  Orleans  (11  La.  An. 

54)  71,  213 

Arrowsmith  v.  New  Orleans  (24  La. 

An.  194)  629,  638 

Ashbrook  v.  Commonwealth  (1  Busli, 

139)  172 

Ash  V.  People  (11  Mich.  347)  143,  357,  359 
385,  388,  389 
Ashbury  v.  Roche  (L.  R.  7  H.  L.  C. 

653)  461 

Ashley  v.  Port  Huron  (35  Mich.  296)  974, 
996,  1005,  1071,  1072,  1074 
V.  Port   Huron    (15   Alb.   L.   J. 

81)  1069 

V.  Reynolds  (2  Stra.  916)  942 

Ashton  V.  Ellsworth  (48  III.  299)  322,  347 

Ashville  v.  Means  (7  Ired.  Law,  406)  399, 

703,  764 

Askew  V.  Hale  Co.  (54  Ala.  639)     29,  31, 

89,  961,  1009 

V.  Manning  (38  U.  C.  Q.  B.  345)   882 

Askinr.  London  (lU.C.  Q.  B.  292)     254 

Aspinwall  v.  Knox  County  (21  How. 

(U.  S.)  539)  549 

V.  Jo  Davie.ss  County  (22  How. 

364)     05,  184.  189,  523,  529,  532, 

533,  542,  550,  765,  843 

Assault  I).  Austin  (36  Cal.  691)  418 

Assessors  v.  Commissioners  (3  Brews. 

333)  190 

Aster  in  re  (50  N.  Y.  363)  71 

Astor  (J.  J.)  V.  New  York  (62  N.  Y. 

580)  128,  795 

Astor  (W.  B.)  V.  New  York  (62  N.  Y. 

567)  128,  297 

Atchison,  etc.  v.  Garside  (10  Kan.  552)  698, 

700,  705 
Atchison,  etc.  Co.  v.  Maquillon   (12 

Kan.  301)  105 

V.  Bartholow  (4  Kan.  124)  65,  66,  67 
V.  Butclicr  (3  Kan.  104)  105,  188,  524 
V.  Byrnes  (22  Kan.  65)  47(i 

V.  ChalUs  (9  Kan.  603)      1068,  1072, 
1073,  1078 


Atchison   v.  Jansen   (21    Kan.   560) 

1009,  1029,  1039 

V.  King  (9  Kan.  550)   342,  1021,  1037, 

1041,  1047 

V.  Twine  (9  Kan.  350)  957 

Athearn  v.  District  (33  la.  105)  314 

Atkms  V.  Randolph  (31  Vt.  226)        96,  97, 

823 
Atkinson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (15  Ohio  St. 

21)  66,  67 

Atlanta  v.  Perdue  (53  Ga.  607)  1029, 

1051,  1052 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (59  Ga.  251)  896 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (53  Ga.  120)  590 

V.  White  (33  Ga.  229)  385 

V.  Wilson  (59  Ga.  544)  _     1018 

Atlantic,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Cleino 

(2  Dillon  C.  C.  175)  919 

Attorney-General?;.  Aspinwall (2  M.  & 

C.  613)        176,230,432,900,901 
I'.  Benzie  (34  Midi.  211)  166 

V.  Birmingham  (4  K.  &  J.  528)^      381 
V.  Birmingham  (3  Law  Rep.  Eq. 

552)  903 

V.  Birmingham,  etc.  (4  De  G.  & 

Sm.  490)  914 

V.  Boston  (123  Mass.  469)      829,  856, 

859,  860,  888,  897,  900,  906,  914 

V.  Boston  (123  Mass.  460)  855 

V.  Boulton  (21  Grant  (Can.),  598)  631 


V.  Bowman  (2  B.  &  P.  532) 
V.  Bradford  (L.  R.  2  Eq.  71 
V.  Bradley  (36  Mich.  447) 
V.  Brown  (1  Swanst.  265) 
V.  Brown  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  89) 
V.  Colney  (L.  R.  4  Ch.  146) 
V.  Detroit  (41  Mich.  224) 
V.  Detroit  (2  Mich.  C.  C.  235) 
V.  Davis  (44  Mo.  131) 
V.  Dublin  (1  Bligh,  N.  R.  312 


n, 


428 
381 
213 
903 
383 
381 
465,  466 
905 
272 
899, 
914 
278 
225 
903 


903 


V.  Earl  Clarendon  (17  Ves.  491) 

V.  Ely  (4  Wis.  420) 

I'.  Exeter  (51  Eng.  Ch.  507) 

V.  Gooderich    (5   Grant    (Can.), 

Rep.  402)  631,050 

V.  Gower  (9  Mod.  226)  197 

V.  Hackney,  etc.    (L.  R.  20  Eq. 

626)  1070 

V.  Heelis  (2  Sim.  &  St.  67)  900,  903 
V.  Heishon  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  410)  655,  656, 

657 
V.  Holihan  (29  Mich.  116)  213 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (9  Paige,Ch.  470)  482 
V.  Kerr  (2  Beav.  420)  205 

V.  Lake  County  (33  Mich.  289)  166 
V.  Lathrop  (24  Mich.  235)  462 

t'.  Leeds  (L.  R.  5  Ch.  App.  583)  1070 
V.  Leicester  (9  Boav.  546)  205,  903 
V.  Litchfield  (13  Sim.  547)  146,  901 
r.  Litchfield    (11    Beav.  120)         230, 

903 

V.  Liverpool  (13  Eng.  Ch.  343)      899, 

902,  914 

V.  Lock  (3  Atk.  164)  127 


xxu 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Attornov-General  r.  Mayor,  etc.   of 

'New  York  (3  Duer.  ll'J)  126 
V.  Miiyor  (2  M.  &  C.  40t))  17G,  473 
i:  JNIotropolitiin  Railroad  Co.  (125 

JNIass.  515)  715 

V.  INIolson  (10  Grant  (Can.),  436)  031 
I'.  Nepeau    Uoail    Co.    (2    Grant 

(Can.),  ()26)  G61 

V.  Norwich  (2  My.  &Cr.  406)  174,  176 
V.  Norwich  (10  Sim.  225)  SWl 

V.  Parker  (3  Atk.  570)  22:j 

V.  Paterson  (1  Stock.  (N.  J.)  G24)  600, 

8U0 
V.  Plank  Road  Co.  (11  Wis.  42)  782 
V.  Plvniouth  (9  Hoav.  67)  8^7,  903 
V.  Poole  (4  My.  &  Cr.  17)  230,  4:52 
900,  001 
V.  Radloff  (10  Exchq.  84)  427 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  530)  702 
V.  Railroad  Co  (10  N.  J.  Eq.  586)  702 
1-.  Railroad  Co.  (35  Wis.  425)  65 

V.  Reynolds  (1  Eq.  Cas.  Ab.  131)  914 
V.  Rye  (7  Taunt.  546)  207 

V.  Salem  (103  Mass.  138)   888, 900, 914 
V.  Shrewsbury  (6  Beav.  220)         194, 
562,  567 
V.  Siddam  (IC.  &J.  220)  428 

V.  Steward  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  415)  379 
V.  Sullivan  (32  L.  J.  E.x.  92)  428 

V.  Tudor  Ice  Co.  (104  Mass.  239)  914 
V.  Uticalns.  Co.  (2Johns.  Cli.  371)879 
V.  Wigan  (34  Ensi.  Ch.  52)  902 

V.  Witson  (9  Sim.^50)  205, 897, 900, 002 
V.  Worcester  (2  Phil.  3)  205 

Atwater  v.  Baltimore  (31  Md.  402)       980 
Auckland  v.  Westminster,  etc.  ( L.  R. 

7Ch.  597)  950 

Auditor  V.  Davies  (2  Pike  (Ark.),  494)    43 

Augusta  Bk.  v.  Augusta  (49  Me.  507)  180 

Augusta  ;;.  Dunbar  (50  Ga.  387)  704, 

783,  788,  812 

r.  Hafers  (59Ga.  151)  1060 

V.  Leadbetter  (16  Me.  45)  41,  471,  934 

V.  Perkins  (3  B.  Mon.  437)  647 

V.  Perkins  (8  B.  Mon.  207)     038,  644, 

050 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (20  Ga.  651 )  787 

V.  Sweeney  (44  Ga.  403)  255 

Aully.  Lexington  (18  Mo.  401)  373 

Aurora  v.  Colshire  (55  Ind.  484)  1020 

V.  Gillett  (56  111.  132)  1000,  1008,  1071 

V.  HiUman  (90  111.  01)  1049 

V.  Love  (93  111.  521)  1066 

V.  Pulfer  (50  111.  270)  1019,  1020,  1022, 

1040,  1068 

V.  Reed  (57  111.  29)      683,  1000,  1008, 

1070,  1071 

r.  Reed  (11  Am.  Rep.  1)  1075 

V.  West  (9  Ind.  74)    76,  132,  179,  189 

V.  West  (22  Ind.  88)        179,  188,  479, 

524,  526,  540 

Austin's  Case  (1  Ventr.  183)  1033 

Austin?;.  Coggeshall  (12R.  I.  329)  88,  17() 

V.  Colony  (51  Iowa,  102)  147 

V.  French  (7  Met.  126)  243 


Austin  r.  Guardians,  etc.  (L.  R.  9  C. 
P.  01) 
V.  Murray  (16  Pick.  126)        108, 
374,  394, 
V.  Santa  Ee  (45  Tex.  27) 
Avery  r.  Springport  (14  Blatchf.  272) 
Aycr  V.  Norwicii  (39  Conn.  376)  1022, 
Averidge  v.  Commissioners  (60  Ga. 

404) 
Ayers  v.  Lawrence  (59  N.  Y.  192) 

906 


459 
338, 
413 

778 

542 

1027 


904, 
913 


Bab  r.  Clerk  (Moore,  411)  353 

Babbit  v.  Savoy  (3  Cush.  530)  174 

Babcock  v.  Buttalo  (50  N.  Y.  268)  122,  379 

V.  Goodrich  (47  Cal.  488)       159,  440, 

482,  840 

Babson  v.  Rockport  (101  Mass.  93)     1018 

Baby  i'.  Baby  (5  U.  C.  Q.  B.  510)         441 

V.  Baby  (8  U.  C.  Q.  B.  70)  242 

Bacheller  ;-.  Pinkham  (68  Me.  253)      204 

Bacher's  Case  (20  Pa.  St.  425)  276 

Packman  v.  Charlestown  (42  N.  H. 

125)  454,  460 

Backus  V.  Lebanon  (11  N.  H.  19)         582 

Bacon  v.  Boston  (3  Cush.  (Mass.)  174)  720, 

1014,  1024,  1025,  1029,  1030 

V.  Robertson  (18  How.  480)    194,  195. 

198,  199 

Badger  v.  United  States  (93  U.  S.  599)  250, 

878 
Badgley  v.  Bender  (3  U.  C.  Q.  B.  0.  S. 

221)  631 

Baes  V.  Hewitt  (20  Wis.  460)  499 

Bagg's  Case  (11  Coke,  93)     268,  273,  275 

(2  Kyd,  52)  266 

Bagg  V.  Detroit  (5  Mich.  336)  717,  749,  915 

Bagley  v.  People  (5  N.  W.  R.  415)       658 

Bagot's  Case  (7  Edw.  IV.  29)  59 

Bailey's  Case  (2  Denio,  433)  1054 

Bailey  in  re  (2  Cow.  479)  825 

V.  Fairfield  (Brayt.  (Vt.)  126)      1042 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.  (2  Denio, 

433)  978,  984,  1054 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.  (3  Hill,  531)  89, 

90,  264,  957,  968,  988,  991, 

992,  993 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Harring.  (Del.) 

389)  652,  605 

V.  Woburn  (126  Mass.  416)  974 

Baileyville  r.  Lowell  (20  Me.  178)        471 

Bailiffs  of  Bridgenorth  (2  Stra.  808)     870 

Bainbridge  v.  Sherlock  (29  Ind.  364)    137 

Baird  v.  Bank  (11  Serg.  &  Rawle,  411)  570 

r.  Rice  (63  Pa.  St.  489)  625,  643,  645, 

652,  665 

Baker  v.  Boston  (12  Pick.  184)    121,  122, 

167,  394,  970,  985 

V.  Chambles  (4  Greene  (la.),  428)  446 

V.  Cincinnati  (11  Oliio  St.  534)     738, 

739,  943,  944 

V.  Commonwealth  (19  Pa.  St.  412)  657 

V.  Gartside  (86  Pa.  St.  498)  807 

V.  Johnson  Co.  (33  Iowa,  151)       445, 

480,  486,  667 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED, 


XXUl 


Baker  v.  Johnson  (41  Me.  15)       821,  822 

V.  Johnston  (21  Mich.  319)    625,  620, 

630,  631,  638,  639,  640,  642,  64.ji, 

644 

V.  Pittsburg  (4  Pa.  St.  49)  255 

V.  Portland  (58  Me.  199)      323,  1023, 

1041 
V.  Savage  (45  N.  Y.  191)      675,  102-5, 

1029 
V.  Shephard  (24  N.  H.  212) 


261, 
288 
265,  327 
625,  626 
254,476 
175,  310 
282 


V.  State  (27  Ind.  485) 

r.  St.  Paul  (8  Minn.  491) 

r.  Utica  (19N.  Y.  326) 

V.  Windliam  (13  Me.  74) 

W.Young  (12  Gratt.  303) 
Balch  V.  Commissioners  (103  Mass. 

106) 
Baldwin  v.  Bangor  (36  Me.  518) 

r.  Buffalo  (35  N.  Y.  375) 

V.  Calkins  (10  AVend.  166) 

V.  Dealers  (42  Ga.  325) 

V.  Green  (10  Mo.  410) 

V.  Murphy  (82  111.  485) 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (40  Conn.  238)   1022, 

1035 
Balfe  V.  Bell  (40  Ind.  337) 
Ball  V.  Armstrong  (10  Ind.  181) 

i;.  Balfe  (41  Ind.  221) 

V.  Brigham  (5  Mass.  406) 

V.  Fagg  (67  Mo.  481) 

V.  Lappius  (3  Oreg.  65) 

r.  Ray  (L.  R.  8Ch.467) 

V.  Winchester  (32  N.  H.  443)  960,  962, 

1074 
Ballard  v.  Davis  (31  Miss.  525)  297 

Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Police  (15  Md. 

376)         65,  77,  83,  237,  481,  765 

V.  Bouldin  (23  Md.  328)  599,  800 

V.  Brannan  (14  Md.  227)     1025,  1037 

V.  Cemetery  Co.  (7  Md.  517)  775 

V.  Chase  (2  Gill  &  J.  376)        811,  812 

V.  Clunet  (23  Md.  449)  324,  412,  585, 
587,  605 

V.  Eschback  (18  Md.  276)   441,  598, 
797,  970,  973 

V.  Gill  (31  Md.  375)    121,  158,  909, 
910,  916 

V.  Horn  (26  Md.  194)   103,  587,  900, 

916 

V.  Lefferman  (4  Gill  (Md 


598 
604 
631 
924 
363 
115,  677 
363 


725,  1059 
806 
923 
115,  677 
819 
376 


V.  Marriott  (9  Md.  160) 
V.  Musgrave  (48  Md.  272) 


425)    942, 

944 

825,  1021, 

1037 

441,  002, 

603 

17.  Pennington  (15  Md.  12)  1037, 1046, 

1054 
V.  Porter  (18  Md.  284)    103,  900,  910, 
916,  918,  920 
V.  Poultney  (25  Md.  18, 107)  281, 296, 
455  957 
V.  Radecke  (49  Md.)  334^  346 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (21  Md.  50)  236,  896, 

899 


Baltimore  v.  Railroad  Co.(6  Gill  (Md.), 

288)  787 

V.  Reynolds  (20  Md.  1)  441,442,  443, 

462 
V.  Root  (8  Md.  102)  130,  131 

V.  St.  Agnes,  etc.  (48  Md.  419)      609, 

974 

V.  State  (15  Md.  376)  70,  773 

V.  Turnpike  (5  Binn.  484)  298 

V.  White  (2  Gill,  444)     134,  135,  136, 

137,  139,  140 

Bamford  v.  Turnley  (3  B.  &  S.  62)       376 

Banbury's  Case  (10  Mod.  346)  194 

Bancroft   t'.   Cambridge   (126  Mass. 

438)  108 

V.  Lynnfield  (18  Pick.  566)     40,  174. 

175 
Banet  v.  Henderson  (4  Bush  (Ky.), 

255)  770 

Bangan  v.  Mann  (59  111.  492)  633 

Bangor  r.  Lansil  (51  Me.  521)  1068 

Bangs  V.  Snow  (1  Mass.  181)  117 

Bank  v.  Bank  (5  Wheat.  326)  446 

V.  Bank  (92  U.  S.  122)  934 

Bank,  etc.  v.  Boget  (51  Tex.  354)        787 

V.  Bridges  (30  N.  J.  L.  112)    113,  114 

V.  Brown  (26  N.  Y.  467)      62.  63,  327 

V.  Chillicothe  (7  Ohio,  Pt.  2,  31)  118, 

145,  146,  149,  155 

V.  City  Council  (3  Rich.  Law,  .342)  787 

V.  Dandridge  (12  Wheat.  64)  240,  241, 

242,  443,  455 

V.  Davis  (1  McCart.  Ch.  286)         114 

V.  Dibrell  (3  Sneed,  379)  130 

V.  Earle  (13  Pet.  519)  560 

V.  Farmington  (41  N.  H.  32)  480,  483 

V.  Frankhn  Co.  (65  Mo.  105)  481 

V.  Gottschalk  (14  Pet.  19)  446 

f.  nines  (3  Ohio  St.  1)  738 

V.  Kirby  (108  Mass.  497)  500 

V.  Lockwood  (2  Earring.  8)  200 

V.  Mayor  (43  N.  Y.  189)  940,  941,  944, 

976,  977,  985 

V.  Mayor  (Dudley,  130)  787 

V.  Navigation  Co.  (3  La.  An.  294)  480 

r.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An.  42)     942 

V.  Niles  (1  Doug.  401)  658,570 

f.  Ogden  (2  Wall.  57)  026 

V.  Patterson  (7  Cranch,  299)  220,430, 

440,  447,  450,  455,  460,  483 

V.  Pet  way   (3   Humph.    (Tenn.) 

6221  247 

V.  Poitiaux  (3  Rand.  136)  570 

t;.  Railroad  Co.  (13  N.  Y.  599)       479 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (30  Vt.  159)  218 

V.  School  Dist.  (.39  Iowa,  490)        101 
V.  Seton  (1  Pet.  299)  302 

r.  Skelby  (1  Black,  430)  774 

V.  Smedes  (3  Cowen,  602)  441 

V.  Supervisors  (25  N.  Y.  312)        895, 

919 
V.  Supervisors  (5  Denio,  517)  174 
V.  Town  Council  (10  Rich.  104)  787 
V.  United  States  (1  Greene  (la.), 

558)  326 


XXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Bank,  etc.  v.  United  States  (5  How. 

U.  S.  213)  893 

V.  Wister  (2  Pet.  318)  220 

Bank  of  Irolatul  r.  Evans  (33  E.  L.  & 

Eq.  3o)  218 

Bank  of  Rome  v.  Rome  (18  N.  Y.  38)   63, 

70,  155,  179,  180,  188 

Bank  of  Rome  v.  Rome  (19  N.  Y.  20)  647 

Bankhead  v.  Brown  (25  Iowa,  540)     693, 

695 
Banks  i'.  Billings  (4  Pet.  514)  774 

Banton  r.  Wilson  (4  Tex.  400)  835 

Baptist  Churcli  v.  McAtee  (8  Bush 

(Ivy.),  508)  747,  775 

I'.  Railroad  Co.  (0  Barb.  213)  053 

Barber  v.  Essex  (27  Vt.  (32)  1064 

V.  Pelson  (2  Lev.  252)  408 

v.  Rollinson  (1  C.  &M.  330)  238 

V.  Roraback  (SG  Mich.  399)  654 

V.   Roxbury   (11  Allen    (Mass.), 

318)  1016,  1017,  1028,  1031,  1033 

Barbour  v.  Ellsworth  (67  Me.  294)       973 

Barbour  Co.  v.  Horn  (48  Ala.  566)       961, 

1009,  1041 

Barclay  in  re  (11  U.  C.  Q.  B.  470)         205 

V.  Howell,  etc.  (6  Pet.  (U.  S.)  498)  629, 

632,  633,  635,  636,  637,  638, 

639,  050,  656,  666,  686 

Barclay  v.  Levee  Commrs.  (93  U.  S. 

258)  200,  201,  202,  214 

Bard  well  v.  Jamaica  (15  Vt.  438)  719 

Barlow  in  re  (30  L.  J.  Q.  B.  271)  822 

V.  Norman  (2  W.  Bl.  959)  178 

Barbate  v.  Shortridge  (5  Clark.  H.  L. 

297)  510 

Barker  v.  Commonwealth  (19  Pa.  St. 

412)  723 

V.  Loomis  (6  Hill,  463)  146 

V.  State  (18  Ohio,  514)  793 

Barling  v.  West  (29  Wis.  307)     332,  336, 

337 
Barnes  v.  Barnes  (6  Vt.  388)  110 

r.  Beloit  (19  Wis.  93)  920 

V.  Dist.  of   Columbia  (91  U.  S. 

540)     34,  678,  979,  991,  1026, 

1037,  1044,  1045 

V.  Newton  (46  Iowa,  567)  1029,  1052 

V.  Pennell  (2  II.  of  L.  Cas.  497)  262 

V.  Ward  (9  C.  B.  392)  1059 

Barnet  v.  Jefferson  County  (9  Watts, 

166)  217 

V.  Newark  (28  111.  62)  340 

Barney  v.  Busli  (0  Ala.  345)  261 

V.  Keokuk  (94  U.  S.  324)       133,  134, 

137,  138,  633,  6-39,  652,  657,  662, 

688,  696,  698;  (4  Dill.  593) 

134,  137,  138,  662,  688,  698 
Barnwell  i'.  McGrath  (McMuUen  (S. 

C.)  174)  668 

Barny  v.  Lowell  (98  Mass.  570)  985 

Barr  v.  Deniston  (19  N.  H.  170)    912,  918 

r.  Jackson  (1  Phillips,  582)  881 

Barraclough  v.  Johnson  (8  A.  &  E. 

99)  627 

Barre  v.  Greenwich  (1  Pick.  120)  223 


Barrett  v.  Brooks  (21  Iowa,  144)  18,  675, 

076,  721 
V.  County  Court  (44  Mo.  201)  544 
V.  Henderson  (4  Bush.  255)  781 

V.  New  Orleans  (13  La.  An.  105)  668 
V.  Schuyler  Co.  (44  Mo.  197)         479 
Barron  i\  Baltimore  (7  Pet.  248)  580; 

(2  Am.  Jur.  203)  138,  1066,  1076 
V.  Davis  (46  Mo.  394)  007,  911 

Barry  v.  Lowell  (8  Allen  (Mass.),  127) 

1068,  1073,  1076 
V.  Mer.  Ex.  Co.  (1    Sandf.  Ch. 

280)  145,  155 

V.  St.  Louis  (17  Mo.  121)   1054,  1056, 

1057 
Barter  v.  Commonwealth  (3  Pa.  253) 

345,  353,  368,  405,  421,  425,  430, 

669,  680,  687 

Bartho  v.  Salter  (Latch,  54)  257 

Bartle  v.  Des  Moines  (38  Iowa,  414)  164 

Bartlett  v.  Amherstberg   (14  U.  C. 

Q.  B. 152)  459 

V.  Bangor  (67  Me.  460)  620 

V.  Boston  Gas  Co.    (117    Mass. 

533)  1061 

V.  Crosier  (17  Johns.  439)      264,  720, 

850,  962 

V.  Kittery  (68  Me.  358)       1028,  1048, 

1053 
Barto  V.  Himrod  (4  Seld.  483)         63, 180 
Barton  v.  Montpelier  (30  Vt.  650)       1021 
V.  New  Orleans  (16  La.  An.  317) 

25.3  254  373 

V   Syracuse  (36  N.  Y.  54)  986,  io49, 

1052, 1053, 1067, 1074, 1076, 1077, 

1078 

Baskins  v.  Robinson  (53  Ga.  613)         389 

Bass  V.  Columbus  (30  Ga.  845)  540 

V.  Fontleroy  (11  Tex.  698)  83,  91, 106 

Bassett  y.  Barbur  (11  La.  An.  672)       838 

V.  Porter  (4  Cush.  487)  110 

V.  St.  Joseph  (63  Mo.  290)  .383,  1018, 

1022,  1025,  1035,  1048 

Bassford  in  re  (50  N.  Y.  509)  341 

Bateman  v.  Bluck  (14  E.  L.  &  Eq.  69)  631 

V.  Hamilton  (33U.C.  Q.  B.251)  1053 

V.  Mayor  (3  H.  &  N.  322)        436,  441 

V.  Megowan  (1  Met.  (Ky.)  533) 

229,  432 
V.  Mid  Wales  Railroad  Co.  (L.  R. 

etc.  1  C.  P.  510)       144,  146, 152, 

165,  469,  489 

Bates  V.  Mobile  (46  Ala.  158)        784,  788 

V.  Plymouth  (14  Gray,  163)  314, 

837,  856 

V.  Winters  (97  U.  S.  83)  535 

Bath  V.  County  Commrs.  (36  Me.  74)  311 

Baton  Rouge  v.  Deering  (15  La.  Au. 

208)  419 

Battersby  v.  New  York  (7  Daly,  16)  1020 
Battle  V.  Mobile  (9  Ala.  234)  731,  784 
Batty  V.  Duxbury  (24  Vt.  155)  1027, 

1063, 1064 
Baudier  v.  Cape  Girardeau  (11  C.  L. 

J.  15)  1025,  1039 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XXV 


Bauer  v.  Franklin  Co.  (51  Mo.  205)      485 
Bauman  v.  St.  Pancreas  (L.  R.  2  Q. 

B.  528)  726 

Baumgard  v.  Mayor  (9  La.  An.  119)    973 
Baxendale    v.   London,  etc.   Co.  (10 

Exch.  35)  1062 

Baxter  v.  Commonwealth  (3  Pa.  253)  349 

V.  Kerr  (23  Grant  (Can.)  367)        902 

V.  Providence  (12  R.  I.  310)  1068, 1070 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (22  Vt.  114)         684, 

962,  1015 

Bayergue  v.  San  Francisco  (1   Mc- 

AU.  175)  487 

Bayley  v.  Jameson  (L.  R.  1  C.  P.  329)  631 

V.  Taber  (5  Mass.  286)  538 

Bayne  v.  Jenkins  (66  N.  C.  356)  809 

Beach  v.  Frankenberger  (4  W.  Va. 

712)  1062 

j;.  Haynes  (12  Vt.  15)      559,  562,  570 

r.  Leahy  (11  Kan.  23)  29,31,66 

Beachy  v.  Lamkin  (1  Idaho,  48)   866,  872 

Beals  V.  Amador  Co.  (35  Cal.  624)        752 

V.  Rubber  Co.  (11  R.  L  381)  775 

Beamair  v.  Board  of  Police  (42  Miss. 

238;  15  Wall.  566)  146 

Bean  v.  Jay  (23  Me.  117)  471 

r.  Thompson  (19  N.  H.  290)  261 

Bearce  v.  Fossett  (34  Me.  575)  286 

Beard  v.  Brooklyn  (31  Barb.  142)  475,  476 

Beardslee  i>.  French  (7  Conn.  125)        670 

Beardsley  v.  Bank  (31  Barb.  619)        788 

V.  Smith  (16  Conn.  308)  572,  838,  841, 

960,  961,  962 

Beatty  v.  Gilmore  (16  Pa.  St.  463)      657, 

1040,  1041,  1055,  1059 

V.  Knowles  (4  Pet.  152)  763 

V.  Kurtz  (2  Pet.  566)  629,  645 

Beauchamp  v.  Supervisors  (45  111.  274)  911 

Beaufort   v.  Duncan  (1   Jones  Law, 

234)  5-58,  577 

Beaver  Dam  v.  Frings  (17  Wis.  398)    559 
Bechtel  v.  Carslake  (3  Stockt.  (N.  J. 

Eq.)  500)  659 

Beck  V.  Hanscom  (29  N.  H.  213)  247,  299 
Beckett  v.  Midland  R.  W.  Co.  (L.  R. 

3  C.  P.  82)  1005 

Beckwith  v.  Racine  (7  Biss.  142)  202 

V.  Philby  (6  B.  &  C.  635)  238 

Bedford   Union   v.   Commrs.    etc.  (7 

Exch.  777)  742,  756,  775 

Beecher  v.  Bridge  Co.  (24  Conn.  491) 

1041,  1042 
V.  People  (38  Mich.  289)  680 

Beekman  Street  in  re  (4  Bradf.  503)     374 
Beekman  v.  Railroad  Co.   (3  Paige, 

Ch.  R.  45)  609,  614 

Beers  r.  Arkansas  (20  How.  527)  43 

V.  Beers  (4  Conn.  535)  431,  614 

V.  Botsford  (3  Day  (Conn.)  159)    961 

V.  Phoenix   Glass   Co.   (14  Barb. 

358)  145 

Beesman  v.  Peoria  (16  111.  484)     417,  418 
Beggar  in  re  (34  C.  Q.  B.  144)  882 

Belcher  v.  Farrer  (8  Allen,  325)  373 

Belknap  v.  Rheinhart  (2  Wend.  375)    263 


Bell  County  v.  Alexander  (22  Tex. 

350)  562,  567 

Bell  in  re  (2  Up.  Can.  Com.  Pleas  Rep. 

507)  174,  175 

(3  Up.  Can.  Com.  Pleas  Rep.  400)  174, 

175 
V.  Foutch  (21  Iowa,  119)  675,  676,  721 
V.  Gough  (23  N.  J.  L.  624)  558 

V.  Pierce  (51  N.  Y.  12)  783 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (25  Pa.  St.  161)      649 
Bellfontaine  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hunter 

(33  Ind.  335)  1051 

Bellinger  v.  Gray  (51  N.  Y.  610)  943 

V.  N.  Y.,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (23  N.  Y. 

42)  995 

Belmont   v    Railroad  Co.  (47  Barb. 

314)  788 

Bellmyer  v.  Marshalltown  (44  Iowa, 

564)  445 

Bellows  V.  Bank  (2  Mason  C.  C.  43)     203 
Bellville  v.  Stokey  (23  111.  441)  626 

Beloit  V.  Morgan  (7  Wall.  619)      480,  548 
Belton  V.  Baxter  (54  N.  Y.  245)  675, 

1020,  1022 
Bemis  r.  Becket  (1  Kan.  226)  213 

Benbow  v.  Iowa  City  (7  Wall.  313)     842, 

844 
Benedict  v.  Denton  (Walk.  Ch.  336)    219 
V.  Fond  du  Lac  (44   Wis.   495) 

10.50,  1051 
V.  Goit  (3  Barb.  459)  661,  998 

Benefield  v.  Hines  (13  La.  An.  420)  363 
Beniteau  v.  Detroit  (41  ]Mich.  116)  464 
Benjamin  v.  Wheeler  (8  Gray,  409)  122, 
995,  998,  1005 
Bennett  v.  Birmingham  (31  Pa.  St.  15) 

357,  701,  789 
V.  Buffalo  (17  N.  Y.  383)  815,  940,  977 
V.  Fisher  (26  Iowa,  497)        -  587 

V.  New  Orleans  (14  La.  An.  120) 

9-50,  979,  995,  1068 

V.  People  (30  III.  389)  357 

Bennington  v.  Smith  (29  Vt.  254)         677 

Benoist  v.  Carondelet  (8  Mo.  240)         220 

i;.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  068)  793 

V.  St.  Louis  (19  Mo.  179)         768,  769 

Benoit  v.  Conway  (10  Allen,  525)  120, 155 

V.  Wayne  Countv  (20  jNIich.  170)  259 

Benson  r.  Albany  (24  Barb.  248)  547 

V.  Carmel  (8  Me.  112)  484 

V.  Mayor  (24  Barb.  248)  70 

(10  Barb.  223)  143 

V.  Monroe  (7  Cush.  125)  942,  946 

Bentley  i-.  Armstrong  (8  W.  &  S.  40)  1070 

V.  County  Commrs.,  etc.  (25  Minn. 

2.59)  116,  443,  456 

V.  Phelps  (27  Barb.  624)  259 

Benton  St.  Case  (9  La.  An.  446)  739 

Benton  v.  Jackson  (2  Johns.  C.  H.  .325)     60 

Bentz  V.  Armstrong  (8  W.  &  S.  (Pa.) 

40)  1069 

Berdsall  v,  Russell  (29  N.  Y.  220)  552 

Bergen  v.  Clarkson  (1  Halst.  352)  166, 301, 

349,  353,  559,812 

V.  State  (32  N.  J.  L.  490)  412 


XXVI 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED, 


Berks  Co.  r.  Mvers  (6  Serg.  &  Rawle, 

1-2)       '  208 

Berlin  v.  Gorliam  (34  N.  H.  266)       62,  75 
Berliner  r.  Waterloo  (14  Wis.  378)      638, 

648 
Berrvnian  i\  Port  Burwell  Har.  (24 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  34)  141 

r.  Wise  (4  Term  U.  .366)  261 

Bestor  c.  Towers  (7  111.  126)  220 

Bethune  r.  Hutihes  (28  Ga.  5G0)   385,  380 
V.  Turner  (1  .Me.  Ill)  646 

Betts  r.  Williamsburg  (18  Pa.  St.  26)  010 
Beurojolm  r.  Mayor  (27  Ala.  58)  375 

Beveriilije  v.  Creelman  (42  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

^^29)  627 

Beverly  v.  Barlow  (10  U.  C.  C.  P. 

178)  206,  244 

V.  Barlow  (7  U.  C.  C.  P.  117)         244 
Beygeh  v.  Chicago  (4  Chi.  Leg.  News, 

121)  808 

Bibb  Co.  V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Ga.  646)   787 

Bicklle  V.  Shippen  (1  Dallas,  19)  625 

V.  Willard  (10  Ind.  63)  247,  827 

Bietry  v.  New  Orleans  (24  La.  An.  21)  478 

Bigelow  V.  Chicago  (90  111.  49)  706 

V.  Hillman  (37  Me.  58)  303,  327 

I'.  Louisville  (3  Fish.  Pat.   Cas. 

602)  466,  969 

V.  Perth  Amboy  (1  Dutch.  297)  312, 
313,  471 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Head,  624)  51)8 
V.  Randolph  (14  Gray,  541)  964,  965, 
982,  993,  1033 
V.  Rutland  (4  Cush.  (Mass.)  247)  1023 
V.  West  Wisconsin,  etc.  Co.  (27 

Wis.  478)  620 

f.  Weston  (3  Pick.  (Mass.)  267)  1027 

Big  Grove  v.  Wells  (65  111.  263)  482 

Bigg  V.  London  (L.  R.  15  Eq.  376)      1005 

Bigler  v.  New  York  (5  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

51)  464,  476 

Bilbie  V.  Lumlev  (2  East.  469)  946 

Billinger  r.  Gray  (51  N.  Y.  610)  778 

Bills  V.  Belknap  (36  Iowa,  583)  663 

V.  Kinson  (21  N.  H.  448)  177 

r.  Stanton  (69  111.  51)  552 

Bingham  y.  Camden  (29  N.  J.Eq.464)  230 
Bird  V.  Wasco  Co.  (3  Orcg.  282)  253 

Birdsall  v.  Clark  (73  N.  Y.  73)       123,  124 
Birmingham  v.  Anderson  (40  Pa.  St. 

506)  635 

Biscoe  V.  Coulter  (18  Ark.  423)  773 

Bisher  t-.  Richards  (9  Ohio  St.  495)      720 

Bishop  V.  Cone  (3  N.  H.  613)  808 

V.  Macon  (7  Ga.  200)  954 

Bissell  V.  Collins  (28  Mich.  277)     684,  687 

V.  Jeffersonville  (24  How.  87)       105, 

302,  501,  509,  516,  624,  540,  644, 

647,  548,  549 

V.  Kankakee  (64  111.  249)        187,  843 

V.  N.  Y.  etc.  R.R.  Co.  (23  N.  Y.  61 ) 

632,  662,  697 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (22  N.  Y.  258)       454 

V.  Saxton  (77  N.  Y.  191)  243 

Black  in  re  (1  Ohio  St.  30)  827 


Black  );.  Baltimore  (50  Md.  236)  603 

V.  Cohen  (53  Ga.  621)       71,  481,  510, 

640,  651 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (58  Pa.  St.  249)    658, 

690,  700 

Blackborougli  v.  Davis  (1  Peere  Wms. 

48)  859 

Blackburn  in  re  (5  Ark.  21)  928 

V.  Walpole  (9  Pick.  97)  288 

Blackerby  v.  People  (10  111.  266)  872 

Blackett  r.  Blizzard  (9  B.  &  C.  851)      282 
Blackstono  v.  Taft  (4  Gray,  250)  214,216 
I'.  White  (41  Pa.  St.  330)  110 

Blackwell  v.  Toronto  St.  R.  W.  Co. 

(38  U.  C.  Q.  B.  172)  1051 

Bladen  v.  Philadelphia    (60    Pa.    St. 

464)  161,  253,  444 

Blagrave's  Case  (2  Sid.  6,  49)  277 

Blair  v.  Forehand  (100  Mass.  136)        177 

Blaisdell  v.  Portland  (39  Me.  113)       1018 

Blake  v.  Buffalo  (56  N.  Y.  485)  243 

V.  Ferris  (6  N.  Y.48)  1055, 1056, 1067 

V.  Macon  (53  Ga.  172)  468,  911 

V.  Newfield  (4  Gray,  Mass.  365)   1028 

V.  Railway  Co.  (18  Q.  B.  93)        1042 

V.  St.  Louis  (40  Mo.  669)     1037, 1039, 

1054,  1056 

V.  Sturdevant  (12  N.  H.  673)  261 

Blakie  v.  Staples  (13  Grant  (Can.)  67)  902 

Blanc  V.  Mayor  (1  Martin  (N.  S.)  65)   781 

Blanchard  v.  Bissell  (11  Ohio  St.  96)  211, 

212,  321,  341 

V.  Blackstone  (102  Mass.  343)        446 

I'.  Porter  (11  Ohio,  138)  139 

Blanding  v.  Burr  (13  Cal.  343)  6.3,76, 101, 

102,  749,  752,  765 

Bleeker  v.  Ballou  (3  Wend.  263)  775 

Bleu  V.  Bear  River  (20  Cal.  602)  460 

Bliss  V.  Ball  (99  Mass.  597)  632,  662,  663, 

686 
V.  Brooklyn  (4  Fisher  Pat.  Cas. 

696)  968 

V.  Krauss  (leOhioSt.  64)  748 

Block  V.  Jacksonville  (36  111.  301)  342,  365 

V.  Commrs.  (99  U.  S.  686)  499 

Blodgett  V.  Boston  (8  Allen,  237)  594,  964, 

1015 
V.  Royalston  (17  Vt.  40)  640 

Bloodgood  V.  Mohawk,   etc.   Co.    (18 

Wend.  9)  187,586,692,596,609 
Bloom  V.  Xenia  (32  Ohio  St.  469)  305 
Bloomer  v.  Stolley  (5  McLean,  168)  327 
Bloomfield  &  Co.  v.  Calkins  (62N.  Y. 

386)  690,  713 

Blooming  Valley  in  re   (66  Pa.   St. 

66)  ■•  i  211,213 

Bloomington  v.  Bay  t4arBl.  503)       1037, 

1047,  1048,  1052 

V.  Brokaw  (77  111.  194)  572,  573,  600, 

999,  1067,  1068,  1071 

V.  Wahl  (46  111.  489)  389 

Blufflon  I'.  Silver  (63  Ind.  262)      928,  929 

Blythe  v.  Birmingham,  etc.  Works  (4 

Exch.  H.  and  G.  781)  694 

Board  v.  Boyle  (9  Ind.  296)  455 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xxvu 


Board  v.  Day  (19  Ind.  450)  146,  575 

V.  Edson  (18  Oliio  St.  221)      647,  650 

V.  Fonda  (77  N.  Y.  350)  242 

V.  Grant  (17  Miss.  77)  839,  869 

V.  McComb  (92  U.  S.  531)        818,  827 

V.  Municipality  (6  La.  An.  21)         79 

V.  Neidenberger  (78  III.  58)  573 

V.  Patterson  (56  111.  Ill)  570 

i;.  Pooley  (11  La.  An.  743)  355 

17.  Saunders  (17  Ind.  437)  146 

V.  Schroeder  (58  111.  353)  354,433,951 

V.  Sellers  (99  U.  S.  624)  876 

V.  Sliields  (62  Mo.  247)  68 

V.  Strader  (3  Harris  (N.  J.),  108)  719 

Boardman  i:  Hayne  (29  la.  339)    261,  265 

Boaz  V.  Tate  (43  Ind.  60)  238,  239 

Bob  v.  State  (2  Yerg.  173)  923 

Bobbett  V.  Dresher  (10  Kan.  9)  856 

Bodine  v.  Trenton  (3(3  N.  J.  L.  198)      125 

Bodkins  u.  Robinson  (53  Ga.  613)         385 

Bodman  v.  Am.  Tract  Soc.  (9  Allen, 

447)  208 

Bodwic  V.  Fennell  (1  Wils.  233)  404,  410, 

411 
Bogart  V.  Mavor  (7  Cow.  158)  928 

Bogert  V.  Elizabeth  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  295)  896 
V.  Indianapolis  (13  Ind.  134)  374,  375 
Boggs  V.  Hamilton  (2  Const.  R.  381)    265 
Boileau  in  re  (2  Par.  (Pa.)  505)  226 

Boiling  V.  Petersburg  (8  Leigh,  224)      571 
V.  Petersburg  (3  Rand.  ( Va.)  563)  662, 

664 
Bolte  y.  New  Orleans  (10  La.  An.  321)  346 
Bolton  V.  Crowther  (2  Dowl.  &  Ryl. 

195  264 

Bond  V.  Hiestand  (20  La.  An.  139)  113,  811 

V.  Hoyt  (13  Pet.  266)  947 

t;.  Kenosha  (17  Wis.  284)        740,774 

777,  778,  920 

V.  Newark  (19  X.  J.  Eq.  376)  475,  477, 

478,  806,  896 

V.  St.  George  (L.  R.  6  C.  P.  312)    223 

Bonesteel  l\  Mayor  (22  N.  Y.  162)      446, 

463,  464,  477 

Bonner  o.  State  (7  Ga.  473)  833,  834 

Boom  V.  Utica  (2  Barb.  104)  378,  451,  972 

Boom  Co.  V.  Patterson  (98  U.  S.  403)  616, 

617 

Booth  V.  State  (4  Conn.  65)  402 

V.  Woodbury  (32  Conn.  118)  178 

Boothroyd  in  re  (15  M.  &  W.  1)     344,  405 

Boren  v.  Commissioners  (21  Ohio  St. 

311)  826 

Boring  v.  Williams  (17  Ala.  510)  430 

Boro  V.  Phillips  Co.  (4  Dill.  216)  486 

Borough  of  Little  Meadows  in  re  (35 

Pa.  St.  335)  213 

Borough  of  Tintagel  in  re  (2   Stra. 

1003)  834 

Borough  of   Yarmouth  (2  Brown.  & 

Goldsb.  292)  60 

Borough  of  York  v.  Forscht  (23  Pa. 

St.  391)  368 

Borough  V  Shortz  (61  Pa.  St  399)      742, 

802 


Borrowraan  v.  Mitchell  (3  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

135)  632 

Bosley  v.  Da  vies  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  94)      383 

Boston  V.  Lecraw  (17  How.  426)    137,  634 

V.  Monroe  (7  Cush.  125)  941,  946 

V.  Richardson  (13  Allen,  152)  632,662, 

684,  686,  687,  690,  709 

V.  Bobbins  (126  Mass.  384)  607 

V.  Schaffer  (9  Pick.  415)  318,  359,360, 

764 

V.  Shaw  (1  Met.  130)      338,  683,  795, 

803, 1005 

r.  Worthington  (10  Gray,  496)    1062, 

1063 
Boston  Beer  Co.  v.  Massachusetts  (97 

U.  S.  25)  168,  170 

Boston  Glass   Co.  v.  Boston  (4  Met. 

(Mass.)  181)  941,  943,  946 

Boston  Glass  Co.  v.  Langdon  (24  Pick. 

49)  195 

Boston  Mill  Co.  v.  Newman  (12  Pick. 

476)  593 

Boston,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  in  re  (53  N.Y. 

574)  581,  582 

Boston  Society  v.  Boston  (116  Mass.  181) 
610,  747,  756,  775,  776 
Boston  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Pomfret  (20 

Conn.  590)  307,  309,  312 

Boston  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Boston  (9 

Met.  (Mass.)  199)  941 

Boston  Water  Co.  v.  Boston  (22  Alb.L. 

J.  376)  774 

Boswell  V.  Laird  (8  Cal.  469)  1054 

Bosworth  V.  Budgen  (7  Mod.  461)         416 

V.  New  Orleans  (26  La.  An.  494)    253 

Boucher   v.  New  Haven    (40  Conn. 

456)  1029,  1051,  1052,  1053 

Boughner  v.  Clarksburgh  ( 15  W.  Va. 

394)  629,  630,  898 

Bouldin  v.  Baltimore  (15  Md.  13)  365,  767, 

797,  798 
Boulton  V.  Crowther  (2  Barn.  &  C. 

703)  1001, 1007 

Bound  V.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Wis.  543)    533 

911 

Bouton  V.  Brooklyn  (15  Barb.  375)       642 

V.  Supervisors  (5  C  L.  J.  105)         573 

Bow  V.  AUentown  (34  N.  H.  351)     16,  60, 

61,  110,557 

Bowditch  V.  Boston  (101  U.  S.  16)       954, 

955,  980,  981 

Bowdoinham  v.  Richmond  (6  Me.  112)  217 

Bowen  v.  Morris  (2  Taunt.  374)  448 

t;.  Team    (6  Rich.    (S.   C.)  Law 

298)  668,  671,  673 

Bower  v.  State  Bank  (5  Ark.  234)  206 
Bowerbank  v.  Islovns  ( Wall.  C.  C.  R. 

118)  259 

Bowery   Bank    v.   Mavor,  etc.    (63 

N.  Y.  336)       '  477 

Bowie  V.  Kansas  City  (51  Mo.  454)  109 
Bowland  v  Ilildreth  (26  Cal.  101)  226 
Bowlin  V.  Furman  (28  Mo.  427)  570 

Bowling  Green  v.  Carson    (10  Bush, 

64)  389 


xxviu 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Bowlsbv  I'.  Spear  (31  N.  J.  L.  nSl)     1070 
Bowiium  r.  Boston  (5  Cusli.  1)    640,  1018 
V.  St.  John  (47  111.  337)  347 

Bovce  I'.  Kussoll  (2  Cow.  444)  821,  822 
Bovil  V.  Kennedy  (oS  N.  J.  L.  146)  553 
Bovdon  V.  Brooklinc  (8  Vt.  284)  254 

Bover  c.  State  (IG  Ind.  451)  636 

Borland  V.  Mayor  (1  Sandf.  27)  451,  972, 

973,  979 

Bovle  V.  Brooklyn  (71  N.  Y.  1)     797,  890 

'  r.  Dundas  (25  U.  C.  C.  P.  420)  1024, 

1034 
!•.  Dundas  (27  U.  C.  C.  P.  129)     1049 
Boylston  Market  v.  Boston  (113  Mass. 

528)  116,  615 

Boyter   v.   Dodsworth    (6   Term   R. 

681)  250 

Bozant  v.  Campbell  (9  Rob.  La.  411)  334, 

373 
Brabliam  v.  Hinds  Co.  (54  Miss.  863)  959, 

961 

Bradford  v.  Chicago  (25  111.  411)  941,  945 

Bradley  v.  Ballard  (-55  111.  413)  935 

V.  Brown  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B.  463)      1023 

V.  Franklin  Co.  (58  Mo.  038)  540 

V.  McAtee  (7  Bush  (Ky.),  667)     731, 

747 
V.  Railroad,  etc.  Co.   (21   Conn. 

294)  1000 

V.  Richmond  (6  Vt.  121)  130 

Bradshaw  v.  Omaha  (1  Neb.  16)  793 

Bradstreet  ('/;  re  (7  Pet.  634)  819 

Brady   v.  Insurance   Co.   (11   Mich. 

425)  400,  402 

V.  Lowell  (3  Cush.  121)      1014,  1015, 

1029,  1053 

V.  Mayor  (20  N.  Y.  312)  451,  460,  461, 

403,  485 

V.  Supervisors  (2  Sandf.  S.  C.  R. 

400)  473 

V.  Weeks  (3  Barb.  157)  170 

Brailey   v.    Soutliborough    (6    Cush. 

(Mass.)  141)  1014 

Brainard   o.  Railroad   Co.   (7   Cush. 

(Mass.)  506)  702 

Braintrec  c.  Battles  '(6  Vt.  395)  110 

Braniah  r.  Roberts  (3  Bing.  (N.  C.) 

963)  152 

Bramford  v.  Isles  (3  Exch.  380)  243 

Brander  r.  Judges,  etc.  (5  Call.  548)  828 
Branham  v.  San  Jose  (24  Cal.  585)      441, 

647,  665 
BrandrifF  v.  Harrison  Co.  (50  Iowa, 

164)  558,  907 

Brandt  v.  Craddock  (27  L.  J.  Exch. 

314)  2.38 

Brashear  v.  Mason  (6  How.  97)  826 

Bray  v.  Wallingford  (20  Conn.  416)    131, 

962 
Brayton  v.  Pali  River  (113  Mass.  218)  1-38, 

378,  1076 
Bread  Co.  v.  Gregg  (L.  R.  8  Q.  B. 

355)  350 

Breaux's  Bridge  in  re   (30  La.   An. 

1105)  341 


Brecoster  v.  Newark  (3  Stockt.  114)     801 

Breed  i>.  Cunningham  (2  Cal.  368)        638 

V.  Lynn  (12()  Mass.  367)  381 

Breevort  v.  Detroit  (24  Mich.   322)   464, 

808 
Brewer  Brick  Co.  v.  Brewer  (62  Me. 

62)  187,  728 

V.  Gloucester  (14  Mass.  216)  961 

V.  Otoe  Co.  (1  Neb.  373)  486 

V.  Springfield  (97  Mass.  152)  805 

Brewster  v.  Harwich  (4  Mass.  278)  214, 

216 

V.  Newark  (3  Stockt.  114)  800 

V.  Syracuse  (19  N.  Y.  116)  101,  102, 

729,  744 

Brick  Church  m  re  (3  Edw.  Ch.  Rep. 

155)  374 

Bridge  v.  Cage  (Cro.  Jac.  103)  166 

V.  Grand  Junction  R.  AV.  Co.  (3 

M.  &  W.  244)      .  1023 

V.  Lincoln  (14  Mass.  367)  265 

Bridge  Co.  v.  Clarksville  (1  Sneed, 

176)  580 

V.  Dubuque  (32  Iowa,  427)  740,  770, 

787 
V.  Foote  (9  Bush  (Ky.),  264)  1001 
r.  Frankfort  (18  B.  Mon.  41)  459 

V.  Land  Co.  (2  Beasl.  524)  958 

V.  Lowell  (4  Gray,  474)  580 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (17  Conn.  40)         580 
v.  Ring  (58  Mo.  491)  620 

V.  Wyandotte  (10  Kan.  331)  856 

Bridgeport  v.  N.  Y.,  etc.  Co.  (36  Conn. 

255)  749,  776 

w.RailroadCo.  (15Conn.475)104,105, 

118,  121,  179,  188,  441,  451,  453 

Bridges  V.  Griffin  (33  Ga.  113)  788 

V.  North  London   R.  W.  Co.  (L. 

R.  6  Q.  B.  377)  1024,  1051 

Brieswick  v.  Brunswick'  (51  Ga.  639)    72, 

353 

Briggs  V.  Boat  (7  Allen,  287)  393 

0.  Murdock  (13  Pick.  305)  286 

V.  Whipple  (6  Vt.  95)  174,  175 

V.  Whipple  (7  Vt.  15)  109 

Briglit  V.  Hewes  (19  La.  An.  666)         473 

V.  McCulIough  (27  Ind.  223)  358 

!'.  Supervisors  (18  Johns.  242)        257 

Brightman  v.  Bristol  (65  Me.  426)  378,  957 

V.  Kirner  (22  Wis.  54)  740,  776 

Brimmer  v.  Boston  (102  Mass.  19)       116, 

125,  615 
Brine  v.  Railway  Co.  (110  Eng.  Com. 

Law,  402)    995,  1068,  1069,  1071, 
1078 
Brinkmeyer  v.   Evansville   (29   Ind. 

187)  171,  982 

Briscoe  v.  Bank  (11  Peters,  257)  42 

V.  Drought  (11  Ir.  C.  L.  R.  250)  1065 

Bristol  ?'.  Newchester  (3  N.  H.  532)  62,  214 

British  Plate  Co.  v.  Meredith  (4  D.  & 

E.  794)  1007 

Brittain  v.  Newland  (2  D.  &  B.  363)     208 
Britton   v.  Cummington    (107  Mass. 

347)  1015,  1018 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


XXIX 


Britton  v.  Mayor  (21  How.  Pr.  251)  125 
V.  riiiladelphia  (32  Pa.  St.  1587)  815 
V.  Platte  City  (2  Dillon  C.  C.  1)    842, 

848 

V.  Steber  (62  Mo.  370)  81,  82 

Broadnac's  Case  (1  Vent.  196)  408 

Broad  well  v.  Cliapin  (2  111.  App.  511)  203 

Brock  Dist.  v.  Bovveu  (7  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

471)  206 

Broder  v.  Saillard  (L.  R.  2  Ch.  692)  370 
Brodliead  v.  Milwaukee  (19  Wis.  652)  178 
Brodie  &  Bowmanville  (3  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

580)  383 

Brodnax  ik  Groom    (64  North   Car. 

244)  899,  918 

Bronson  v.  Kinsie  (1  How.  316)  93 

Brookline  v.  Westminster  (4  Vt.  224)  210 
Brooklyn  v.  Bresiin  (57  N.  Y.  591)      123, 
124,  338,  339,  356,  680,  761 
V.  City  R.  R.  (47  N.  Y.  475)    126,  709, 
711,  713,  1055,  10G2,  1063 
V.  Patchen  (8  Wend.  47)  613 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (32  Barb.  358)      699, 
711,  712 
V.  Toynbee  (31  Barb.  282)      368,  370 
Brooklyn    Park    Commrs.    v.   Arm- 
strong (45  N.  Y.  234)  93,  94,  583, 
587,  590,  594,  640,  647,  648 
Brooklyn,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn   (78 

N.  Y.  524)  696 

Brooklyn,  etc.  Co.  v.  Coney  Island 

R.  R.  Co.  (35  Barb.  364)         699 
Brooks  I'.  Baltimore  (48  Md.  265)         748 
V.  Mitcliell  (9  M.  &  W.  15)  499 

V.  New  Durham  (55  N.  H.  559)     450 
V.  Riding  (46  Ind.  15)      666,  671,  674 
V.  Somerville  (106  Mass.  271)       1046 
Brophy  In  re  (26  U.  C.  C.  P.  290)  205 

V.  Landman  (28  Ohio  St.  542)       767, 

799 
Broughton  v.  Bristol  (65  Me.  426)        379 
V.  Manchester,  etc.   Co.  (3  B.  & 

A.  1)  152 

V.  Pensacola  (93  U.  S.  266)    112, 199, 

200,  202,  214 

Brower  v.  Appleby  (1  Sandf.  158)  62,  110 

y.  New  York  (3  Barb.  254)     913,  992 

Brown  v.  Beatty  (34  Miss.  227)     607,  60.9 

V.  Belleville  (30  U.  C.  Q.  B.  373)    458 

V.  Brown  (7  Oregon,  285)  561 

V.  Crego  (32  Iowa,  498)  838 

V.  Cuppin  (4  H.  &  M.  173)  819 

V.  Duplessis  (14  La.  An.  842)         710 

V.  Gates  (15  W.  Va.  131)        28,  128, 

130,  571,  572,  838,  841,  842,  845 

V.  Glasgow  (57  Mo.  156)     1022,  102-5, 

1035,  1036 

r.  Heath  (45  N.  H.  168)  131 

V.  Hunn  (27  Conn.  332)  402 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (3  La.  An.  177)  195 

V.  Jefferson  Co.  ( 16  Iowa,  339)    1038, 

1051 
V.  Lindsay  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  509)    4-39, 

458 
V.  Lowell  (8  Met.  (Mass.)  172)  683, 998 


Brown  v.  Manning  (6  Ohio,  298)   626, 633, 

635,  642,  650,  659,  915 

V.  Maryland  (12  Wheat.  449)  734,  788 

j;.  Mayor  (63  N.  Y.  239)    103,  401,  808 

V.  Mayor  (9  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  726)         94 

r.  Nicliolson  (5C.B.  (N.  S.)  468)    405 

V.  Painter  (44  Iowa,  368)  946 

r.  Rundlett  (15  N.  H.  360)  363 

V.  Sarnia  (11  U.  C.  Q.  B.  87)        935 

1069,  1071 

V.  Utica  (2  Barb.  104)  486 

V.  Vinalhaven  (05  Me.  402)    108,  973, 

979,  983 

V.  Watson  (47  Me.  161)  10-12 

Browning  v.  Owen  Co.  (44  Ind.  11)     970, 

972,  973 
i;.  Railroad  Co.  (3  Green,  Ch.  47)  606 
V.  Springfield  (17  111.  143)    1009,  1037 
Brownlow  v.  Metropolitan,  etc.  (13  C. 

B.  N.  S.  768)  994 

Brownsville  v.  Cook  (4  Neb.  101)  367,  368, 

370,  422 

Bruce  v.  Bruce  (2  B.  &  P.  229)     223,  316 

V.  Cromar  (22  U.  C.  Q.  B.  321)      206 

V.  U.  S.  (11  How.  447)  243 

Brumagin  v.  TiUinghast  (18  Cal.  256)  943 

Bruner  v.  Bryan  (50  Ala.  523)  259 

Brunnette  v.  Mayor  (9  La.  An.  430)     301 

Brunswick  c.  Fahm  (60  Ga.  109)  258 

V.  Litchfield  (2  Me.  28)  97 

Bryan  y.  Bates  (15  111.  87)  238,409 

V.  Catteil  (15  Iowa,  538)  252. 253,  818 

827,  856,  857 

V.  Chicago  (60  111.  507)  778 

V.  Page  (51  Tex.  532)     116,  441,  443, 

444,  455,  461 

Bryant  v.  McCandless  (7  Ohio,  pt.  2, 

135)  508,  629 

Bryson  v.  Philadelphia   (47  Pa.  St. 

329)  125 

Buccleuch    v.    Metropolitan    Board, 

etc.  (L.  R.  5  H.  L.  C.  418)    1005 
Buchanan  v.  Curtis  (25  Wis.  99)  635 

Buck  V.  Danzebacker   (37  N.  J.  L. 

359)  4.33 

V.  Lockport  (6  Lans.  250)  841 

Buckbee  v.  Brown  (21  Wend.  110)        141 

Bucker  r.  Augusta  (1  A.  K.  Marsh.  9)  647 

Bucknall  v.  Story  (46  Cal.  589)  944 

Buckner  in  re  (9  Ark.  73)  924,  925 

V.  Story  (.36  Cal.  67)  764,  813 

Buell  i:  Ball  (20  Iowa,  282)  826,  793 

V.  Buckingham  (16  Iowa,  284)      282, 

294   295  297 

Buffalo  V.  Bettinger  (76  N.  Y.  393)    '  934 

Buffalo,  etc.  Co.  v.  Buffalo  (58  N.  Y. 

639)  974,  975 

V.  Buffalo  (46  N.  Y.  503)  775 

V.  Halloway  (7  N.  Y.  493)    475,  1049, 

1055 

V.  Lc  Couteaux  (15  N.  Y.  451)       770 

V.  Webster  (10  Wend.  100)   338,  354, 

355,  385,  388 

Buffette  V.  Railroad  Co.   (40  N.  Y. 

168)  935 


XXX 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


Builer  v.  Supervisors  (20  Mich.  22)       800 
Biilkley  c.  Eckert  (Ij  l':i.  St.  oIkS)  130 

Bull  V.  Reiul  (13  Griitt.  78)       G2,  731,  'JlS 
f.  Sims  (23  N.  Y.  670)     481,  483,  487 
Biiller,  N.  V.  203  273,  275 

Bullock  V.  Currv  (2  Mot.  (Ky.)  171)     5«0 

r.  Geomble  (45  111.  218) 
Bullwinklc   V.    Guttenberg    (17  Wis. 

585) 
Bulow  >\  City  Council  (1  N.  &  Mc- 

Cora,  527) 
Buncombe  v.  McCarson  (1  D.  &  B. 

30t)) 
Bunkmever   v.   Evansville    (29    Ind. 

"187) 
Bunnell's  Appeal  (GO  Pa.  St.  69) 
Burbank  v.  Fay  (05  N.  Y.  57) 


352 
937 

787 

883 

978 

659 

659,  669, 

670 

Burchw.  Hardwicke  (30  Gratt.  24)      81, 
83,  237,  980 
Burckholter    v.   MeConnelsville    (20 

Oiiio  St.  308)  363 

Burden  v.  Stein  (27  Ala.  104)  589 

Burdett  V.  Swenson  (17  Tex. 489)  376,  379 
BurgenhotFer    v.    Martin    (3    Yates, 

479)  881 

Burgess  v.  Jefferson  (21  La.  An.  143)  465 

V.  Pue  (2  Gill  (Md.),  254)      261,  300. 

731 

Burke  in  re  (62  N.  Y.  224)  779,  794 

V.  Elliot  ( 1  Ired.  Law,  355)  883 

V.  Jeffries  (20  Iowa,  145)  57 

Burlington  v.  Beaslev  (94  U.  S.  310)    494 

V.  B.  &  M.  R.  R.  Co.  (41  Iowa, 

134)  668,  673,  810,  812,  813 

V.  Gilbert  (31  Iowa,  356)        797,  798, 

1001 

i;.  Kellar  (18  Iowa,  59)  35-3,363 

V.  Quick  (47  Iowa,  222)  610,  814 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (49  Iowa,  144)       717 

Burlington,  etc.  Co.  v.  Davis  (48  Iowa, 

133)  142 

V.  Woodward  (49  Iowa,  58)  163 

Burmeister  in  re  (56  How.  Pr.  416)        801 

(76  N.  Y.  174)  779 

Burnes  u.  Atchison  (2  Kan.  454)      54,  63, 

188,  190,  763,  764,  768,  907,  915 

Burnett  in  re  (30  Ala.  461)    117,  353,  364, 

365,  399 
V.  Abbott  (51  Ind.  254)  409 

r.  Auditor  (12  Ohio,  57)  840 

V.  Buffalo  ( 17  N.  Y.  383)         598,  763 
V.  Sacramento  (12  Cal.  76)      752,  797 
Burnham  v.  Boston  (10  Allen  (Mass.), 

290)  1018,  1062 

j;.  Brown  (23  Me.  400)  499 

V.  Chicago  (24  III.  496)  794 

V.  Fond  du  Lac  ( 15  Wis.  193)  ISO- 

Burns  V.  Baltimore  (48  Md.  ]:>o)  806 

I'.  Clarion  Co.  (02  Pa.  St.  422)  77 

V.  Harper  (59  III.  21)  131 

V.  La  Grange  (17  Tex.  415)    429,  924 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (9  Wis.  4-50)  587 

V.  Toronto  (42  U.  C.  Q.  B.  560)  1024, 

1034 


Burr  V.  Carbondale  (70  III.  455)     158,  551 

737 

^^  Leicester  (121  Mass.  241)  684 

Burr's  Trial,  355  271 

Burrill  c.  Boston  (2  Cliff.  590)         41,  446, 

448,  449,  451,  458,  460 

Burritt  v.  New  Haven  (42  Conn.  174)  703, 

707,719,  1000,  1015 

Burt  a.  Boston  (122  Mass.  223)  1061 

V.  Merciiants'  Ins.  Co.  (106  Mass. 

350)  590 

Burton  v.  Patten  (2  Jones  (N.   C), 

Law,  124)  883,  892 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Harring.  (Del.) 

252)  713 

Bush  V.  Beavan  (1  Hurl.  &  C.  500)         822 

V.  Carbondale  (78  III.  74)         121,  470 

V.  Johnston  (23  Pa.  St.  209)        636. 

1058 

V.  Seabury  (8  Johns.  418)  388 

V.  Shipman  (5  111.  190)  76,  84 

V.  Whitney.  (1  Chip.  309)  576 

Bushnell  v.  Beloit ,( 10  Wis.  195)  482 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (15  S.  &  R.  176)     53 

Bussier  v.  Pray  (7  S.  &  R.  447)      256,  257 

Butcher  v.  Camden  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  478)  230, 

255 
Butchers'  Benefit  Assoc.  (35  Pa.  St. 

151)  274,275 

Butchers'  Co.  v.  Bullock  (3  B.  &  Pul. 

434)  347, 411 

(•.  Mercy  (1  H.  Bl.  370)  354 

Butler  '•.  Bangor  (67  Me.  388)   1026,  1054 

V.  Charlestown  (7  Gray,  12)  444,  449, 

473 
V.  Chicago  (56  III.  341)  800 

V.  Commrs.  (39  N.  J.  L.  005)  603 

V.  Commrs.  (L.  R.  11  Ir.  C.  L.  K. 

181)  1053 

V.  Dunham  (27  III.  474)  179,  525,  544, 

548 

V.  Hunter  (7  H.  &  N.  826)  1058 

V.  Milwaukee  (15  Wis.  493)  473 

V.  Muscatine  (11  Iowa,  433)  792 

V.  Neosho  Co.  (15  Kan.  178)    257,  938 

V.  Nevin  (88  III.  575)        110,  443,  767, 

808,  810 

V.  Toledo  (5  Ohio  St.  225)  808 

Butler's  Appeal  (73  Pa.  448)  731 

Butman  v.  Fowler  (17  Ohio,  101)  677 

Butolph  V.  Blast  (5  Lans.  84)  410 

Butterfield  r.  Forrester  (11  East,  60)  1023 

Buttrick  v.  Lowell  (1  Allen,  172)    89,  168, 

237,  461,  473,  957,  978,  980,  981, 

988 

Butts  V.  Wood  (.37  N.  Y.  317)  437 

Butz  I'.  Muscatine  (8  Wall.  575)  67,  93,  95, 

164,  190,  501,  502,  503,  504,  551. 

705,  768,  838,  848,  853 

Byars  v.  Mt.  Vernon  (77  III.  467)  341 

Byers  v.  Commonwealth   (42  Pa.  St. 

89)      398,  399,  406,  424,  425 

V.  Olney  (10  III.  35)  363 

V.  Trustees  (16  III.  35)         365 

Byrnes  v.  Cohoes  (07  N.  Y.  204)    1070 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


XXXI 


Cabot  V.  Britt  (36  Vt.  349)  311 

V.  Rome  (28  Ga.  60)  436 

Cadden  i;.  Est  wick  (1  Salk.  143)  315 

Cady  V.  Watertown  (18  Wis.  322)         445 
Cahaba  v.  Burnett  (34  Ala.  400)  946 

Cahiil  V.  Ins.  Co.  (2  Doug.  124)  110 

Cairo  v.  Allen  (3  111.  App.  398)     572,  573 
Calais  v.  Dyer  (7  Me.  155)  721 

Calaveras  Co.  v.  Brockway  (30  Cal. 

325)  820 

Calderu.  Pilling  (14  M.  &  W.  76)        363 
Caldwell  v.  Alton  (33  111.  416)      117,  384, 

386,  389 

V.  Boone  (51  Iowa,  687)  980,  981 

V.  Harrison  (11  Ala.  755)  298 

V.  Justices  (4  Jones  Eq.  323)     16,  17, 

180,  189,  731 

V.  Rupert  (10  Bush,  179)  456,  747,  762 

California  v.  Wells  (15  Cal.  336)  5-52 

Calkins  v.  Baldwin  (4  Wend.  667)         265 

V.  Hartford  (33  Conn.  57)  1028 

Call  V.  Chadbourne  (46  Me.  206)  62 

Callahan  v.  Hallett  (1  Caines  (N.  Y.), 

104)  257 

i;.  New  York  (66  N.  Y.  656)  417 

Callanan  v.  Madison  (45  Iowa,  561)      946 

Callender  v.  Marsh  (1  Pick.  416)  683,  684, 

995,  998,  1000,  1001,  1004,  1005,  1007 

Calloway  Co.  v.  Foster  (93  U.  S.  567)   510, 

536 
V.  Milledgville  (48  Ga.  309)  940 

Cambridge  v.  Cambridge  R.  R.  Co. 

(10  Allen,  50)  717 

V,  Middlesex  Co.  Commrs.  (125 

Mass.  519)  998 

I'.  Railroad  Co.  (7  Met.  70)     930,  932 
Cambridge  Unii^rslty  v.  Crofts  (10 

Mod.  208)  "  208 

Camden  v.  Allen  (2  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 

398)  491,  810,  812 

V.  Mulford  (2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  49)   604, 

797,  924,  926 

Cameron  in  re  (13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  190)      325 

(50  N.  Y.  502)  477 

V.  Stephenson  (69  Mo.  372)  729 

Campan  v.  Detroit  (14  Mich.  276)       604, 

613,  615 

Campbell  v.  Elma  (13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  296)  441 

V.  Kenosha  (5  Wall.  194)   70,  94,  463, 

501,  540 

V.  Montgomery  Co.  (53  Ala.  527)  949, 

951,  957,  963,  973,  978,  1017,  1037 

V.  Polk  Co.  (3  Iowa,  467)      481,  483, 

484,  486,  487,  822 

V.  Race  (7  Cush.  408)  1024 

Canaan  v.  Derush  (47  N.  IT.  211)  455 

V.  Hanover  (49  N.  H.  415)  262 

Canada,  etc.  v.  Oxford  (9  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

567)  325 

Canal  Bank  v.  Supervisors  (5  Denio, 

517)  146,  156,  484,  486 

Canal  Co.  v.  Commonwealth  (7  B. 

Mon.  (Ky.)  160)  773 

V.  Graham  (63  Pa.  St.  290)         1010, 

1041, 1048 


Canal  Co.  v.  Hall  (1  M.  &  G.  R.  393)  634 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  G.  &  J.  1)  114,  195 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (11  Leigli,  42)  362 
V.  Swan  (5  How.  (U.  8.)  83)  472 

Canal  Street  in  re  (U  Wend.  155)  601,  602 
(12  N.  Y.  406)  432 

Canal   Trustees  v.   Havens   (11   111. 

554)  629,  664 

V.  People  (12  111.  254)  854 

Canning   v.  Williamstown  (1   Cush. 

(Mass.)  451)  1042 

Cannon  v.  Janvier  (3  Houston,  27)  856 
V.  New  Orleans  (20  Wall.  577)       133 

Canton  v.  Nist  (9  Ohio  St.  439) 

Card  V.  Ellsworth  (65  Me.  547) 


Cardigan  v.  Page  (6  N.  H.  182) 
Carleton  v.  Bath  (22  N.  H.  559) 
V.  Iron  Co.  (99  Mass.  216) 
V.  People  (10  Mich.  250) 
Carlisle  v.  Blamire  (8  East,  487) 
Carlton  v.  Salem  (103  Mass.  141) 


340 
1022. 
1027 
286 
41 
987 
293 
206 
903, 
914 
304 


Carlton  Street  in  re  (16  Hun,  497) 
Carman  v.  Steubenville  R.  R.  (4  Ohio 

St.  339)  1056,  1058 

Carne  v.  Brigham  (39  Me.  39)  482 

Carondelet   v.  McPherson   (20    Mo. 

192)  649 

Carpenter  v.  Cohoes  (21  Alb.  L.  J. 

374)  1009,  1010 

V.  Commissioners  (21  Pick.  258)    855 

V.  Ely  (4  Wis.  420)  832 

V.  Jennings  (77  111.  250)  610 

V.  Lathrop  (51  Mo.  483)  f09,  546 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (24  N.  Y.  655)  663, 697 

Carpenter's  Case  (2  Par.  (Pa.)  537)     226 

(Raym.  439)  802 

Carr  v.  Northern  Liberties  (35  Pa.  St. 

324)  950,  999,  1068,  1072, 

1073,  1078 
V.  St.  Louis  (9  Mo.  190)  255,  332 

Carrick  v.  Johnston  (26  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

65)  1025 

Carriger     v.     Morristown     (1     Lea 

(Tenn.),  116)  793 

Carroll  v.  Board  of  Police  (28  Miss. 

38)  486,  839,  855,  958 

V.  Mayor  (12  Ala.  173)  356,  789,  923, 

925 
V.  Perry  (4  McLean,  25)  729 

V.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  App.  191)        975 
r.  St.  Louis  (12  Mo.  44)  2.57 

V.  Siebenthaler  (37  Cal.  193)  259 

V.  Tuscaloosa  ( 12  Ala.  N.  S.  173)    357 
r.  Tyler  (2  Harr.  &  Gill,  54)  257 

Carrolton  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Winthrop  (5 

La.  An.  36)  558 

Carron  v.  Martin  (2  Dutch.  594)   116,  443, 

797,  799,  896,  924,  926 

Carson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (35  Cal.  325)     697 

Carter    v.   Bridge    Proprietors    ( 104 

Mass.  236)  100,  101 

V.  Chicago  (67  III.  283)  628,  656,  898, 

917 


xxxn 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


1034 

945 
1075 

428 
240 
25(5 


187 

289 
590 

716 


Carter  v.  Dow  (10  Wis.  208)  358,  3G0,  740 

V.  Harrison  (o  liiacltf.  lo»)  2G5 

Gary  v.  Tekiii  (88  111.  151)  793 

Case  r.  Hall  (21  111.  G32)  351,  399 

V.  Mobile  (30  Ala.  538)    109,  408,  410 

V.  Waverly  (;5(j  Iowa,  545)  1052 

Casey  v.  Inloes  (I  Gill  (Md.),  510)  009,  974 

V.  Leavenworth  (17  Kan.  189)      474, 

475 

Cass  V.  Bellows  (31  N.  H.  501)  307 

V.  Dillon  (2  (Jhio  St.  007)  164, 179,  536 

Cass  Co.  V.  Gillette  (100  U.  S.  585)      500, 

534,  535,  536 

r.  Johnson  (95  U.  S.  360)       501,  541 

V.  Koss  (46  Ind.  404)  473 

Cassedy  v.  Stockbridge  (21  Vt.  391)  1023, 

1034 
Castleton  v.  Langdon  (19  Vt.  210)  559, 561 
Castor  V.  Uxbridge  (39  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

113)  1018,  1023,  1027, 1033,  1034, 

1049,  1052 

Caswell  V.  Plank  Road  Co.  (28  U.  C 

Q. B.  247) 
Catholic  Soc.  v.  New  Orleans  (10  La 

An.  73) 
Cator  V.  Lewisham  (5  B.  &  S.  115) 
Cattel  V.  Ireson  (E.  B.  &  E.  91) 
Caulfiekl  v.  State  (1  S.  C.  461) 
Caverly  r.  Lowell  (1  Allen,  289) 
Cemetery  Ass.  v.  Meineger  (14  Kan. 

312)  595,  637 

V.  New  Haven  (43  Conn.  234)  374,  596 

Central  v.  Wilcoxsen  (3  Col.  566)         484 

Central  Branch,  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith  (23 

Kan.  745) 
Central    Bridge    Co.   v.  Lowell   (15 

Gray,  106) 
Central  Park  in  -e  (16  Abb.  Pr.  56) 
Central  Railroa.^  Co.  v.  City  Railroad 

Co.  (32  Barb.  358) 
Centralia  v.  Krouse  (64111. 19)  1040, 1048 
I'.  Scott  (59  111.  129)  1037 

CentreviUe  v.  Woods  (57  Ind.  192)  1037, 
1030,  1041 
Cerro  Gordo  v.  Wright  (50  Iowa,  439)  937 
Chad  V.  Tilsed  (5  J.  B.  Moore,  185)  119 
Chadbourne  v.  Is^ewcastle    (48  N.  H. 

196)  957 

Chaddock  v.  Wilbraham  (5C.B.645)  405 
Chad  wick  v.  Colfax  (51  Iowa,  70)        573 
V.  Melvin  (68  Pa.  St.  333)  222 

Chaffee  v.  Granger  (6  Mich.  51)  436,  915 
Chahoon's  Case  (21  Gratt.  (Va.)  822)  418 
Challis  I'.  R.  R.  Co.  (16  Kan.  117)  583 
Chamberlain  v.  Burlington  (19  Iowa, 

.395)  189, 468 

V.  Cleveland  (34  Ohio  St.  551)       748 
V.  Dover  (13  Me.  466)    287,  288,  308, 

311 
V.  Engfield  (43  N.  H.  356)  1028 

V.  Sibley  (4  Minn.  309)  827 

Chambers  v.  Green  (L.  R.  20 Eq.  552)  856 
V.  St.  Louis  (29  Mo.  543)        106,  555, 
557,  558,  560,  561,  562,  567, 569 
V.  Satterlee  (40  Cal.  497)      752,  1004 


Chambers,  etc.  i'.   Clews   (21   Wall. 

317)  494,  506,  522 

Chance  v.  Temple  (1  Iowa,  179)  860,  861, 

862,  872 
Chandler  v.  Bay  St.  Louin  (57  Miss. 

327)  481,484,951,973 

i;.  Boston  (112  Mass.  200)       213,  215 

V.  Bradish  (23  Vt.  416)  245 

Chapin  v.  Osborn  (29  Ind.  99)  824 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Gray,  575)         479 

V.  School  Dist.  (35  N.  H.  445)  208,  668 

V.  Sullivan  R.  K.  (39  N.  II.  564)     684 

V.  Worcester  (124  Mass.  464)  610 

Chaplin  v.  Hill  (24  Vt.  628)  461 

Chapman  v.  Brooklyn  (40  N.  Y.  372)  744 

V.  Gates  (54  N.  Y.  132)  608 

V.  Gordon  (29  Ga.  250)  645,  660 

V.  Lowell  (4  Cush.  378)  477 

V.  Miller  (2  Spcers,  769)  133 

Chariton  v.  Barker  (11  C.  L.  J.  358)     329 

Charity  Hospital  r.  Stickney  (2  La. 

An.  550)  356,  740 

Charles  v.  Hoboken  (3  Dutch.  N.  J. 

203)  271,276,296,297 

Charles     River   Bridge    v.    Warren 

Bridge  (11  Pet.  420)        141,  541, 
774,  1004 
Charleston  v.  Chur  (2  Bailey,  164)  410, 414 
Charlton  v.  Allegheny  City  (1  Grant 

(Pa.)  Cas.  208)  099 

Chase  v.  Lowell  (7  Gray,  33)         240,  256 
i;.  Merrimack    Bank     (19    Pick. 

(Mass.)  564)  838,  961 

Chaslain  v.  Town    Council    (29    Ga. 

333)  363 

Chatfield  v.  Wilson  (28  Vt.  49)  995 

Chattanooga  v.  State  (5  Sneed  (Tenn.), 

578)  930 

Cheany  v.  Hooser  (9  B.  Mon.  330)  75,  213, 
731,  790,  957 
Cheatham  v.  Shearn  (1  Swan,  213)  379 
Cheeney  v.  Brookfield  (60  Mo.  53)  451, 
458,  481,  485,  486,  935 
Cheesbrough  in  re  (17  Hun,  561)  592 

Cheetham  v.  Hampson  (4  D.&E.318)  1061 
Cheever  v.  Shedd  (13  Blatch.  258)  998 
Chegaray  v.  Jenkins  (5  N.  Y.  376)  264 
Chelmsford  Co.r.Deniarest  (7  Gray.l)  243 
Chemung   Bank   v.  Supervisors    (5 

Denio,  517)  442 

Chenery  v.  Waltham  (8  Cush.  327)  212 
Cheney  v.  Shelby ville  (18  Ind.  84)  357 
Cherokee  Ins.  Co.  v.  Justices  (28  Ga. 

121)  787 

Chess  V.  Birmingham  (1  Grant  (Pa.), 

Cas.  438)  761 

Chestnut  Ave.  in  re  (68  Pa.  St.  81)        796 

Chestnutwood  v.  Hood  (68  111.  132)       911 

Chicago  V.  Allcock  (86  111.  384)  488 

V.  Baer  (41  111.  306)  749,  796 

V.  Bixby  (84  111.  82)  1019,  1021 

i;.  Colby  (20  111.  614)  776 

V.  Crooker  (2  111.  App.279)  1029, 1052 

V.  Dermody  (61  111.  431)  264,  980, 1056 

i;.  Douglass  (52111.  256)  1041 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XX  XI 11 


Chicago  V.  Edwards  (58  111.  252)  256,  273 
I'.  Evans  (24  111.  52)  323,  716,  882 
V.  Fowler  (60  111.  322)  1032,  1037 

1048 
V.  Gallagher  (44  111.  295)  1018,  1037 
V.  Halsfv  (25  III.  595)  130,  572,  841 
V.  Hesincr  (83  111.  204)  1010,  1016 

V.  Hislop  (01  III.  86)  1019,  1020 

V.  Hoy  (7-3  111.  530)  1027 

V.  Iluenbein  (85  111.  694)  1067 

V.  Johnson  (53  III.  91)  1037,  1049 

V.  Jonev  (00  111.  383)  264,  080, 1056 
I'.  Langlass  (52  III.  256)  1041,  1042 
I'.  Langlass  (66  III.  361)      1029, 1051, 

1052 
V.  Earned  (34  111.  203)     610,  754,  755, 

776 
V.  McCarthy  (75  111.  602)  1029,  1051, 

1052 
V.  McGinn  (51  111.  266)  719 

V.  McGivern  (78  III.  347)  1020,  1051 
V.  McGraw  (75  111.' 566)  971 

V.  Major  (18  111.  349)  1019,  1046 

V.  Martin  (49  III.  241)  1041,  1042 

V.  O'Brennan  (65  III.  160)  965,  1061 
V.  People  (56  111.  327)  474,  488,  809 
V.  People  (48  111.  416)  474,  475 

V.  Powers  (42  III.  169)  719,  720,  721 
V.  Quimby  (38  III.  274)  348,  392 

V.  Kobbins  (2  Black  (U.  S.),  424)  696, 
099,  980,  1037,  1044,  1054,  1055, 
1056,  10.58,  1059,  1061,  1062, 1063 
V.  Rumph  (45  III.  90)       142,  334,  301 
V.  Runisey  (87  111.  348)  654 

V.  Rumsey  (19  Chicago  L.N.  333)1008 
V.  Saffein  (49  111.  172)  379 

V.  Sansum  (87  III.  182)  842,  858 

V.  Sheldon  (9  Wall.  50)  501,  503 

r.  Starr  (42  111.  174)  1046 

I'.  Ward  (36  111.  9)  808 

V.  Wheeler  (25  111.  478)  600,  602,  603 
V.  Wright  (32  111.  192)     763,  764,  767, 

813 

I'.  Wright  (68  III.  586)  721 

V.  Wright  (69  111.  318)      81,  594,  629, 

630,  632,  661,  671 

Chicago  Packing  Co.  v.  Chicago  (88 

111.221)  212,3.55,359 

Chicago,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Adlcr 

(56  111.  344)  76,  80 

V.  Banker  (44  111.  26)  625 

V.Elgin  (91  111.  251)  674,696 

V.  Fort  Howard  (21  Wis.  44)  919 

V.  Smith  (62  111.  268)  179 

V.  Young  (62  111.  238)  713 

Chicago,  B.,  &  Q.  R.  R  v.  Haggerty 

(67  111.113)  706 

V.  Iowa  (94  U.  S.  155)  73 

V.  Payne  (59  III.  534)  703 

V.  Siders  (88  111.  321)  907 

Chicago,  M.,  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ack- 

ley  (94  U.  S.  179)  73 

Chicago,  R.  I.,  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Joliet 

(79  111.  40)  073,  674 

u.Reidy  (66  111.  43)  706 


Chicopee  Bank  v.   Chapin   (8  Met. 

(Mass.)  40)  500 

Chidsey  v.  Canton  (17  Conn.  475)       962, 

964,  1015,  1033,  1042 

Child  y. Boston  (4  Allen  (Mass.),  41,)  978, 

994,  1072,  1073,  1074,  1075,  1076, 

1077 

V.  Hudson's  Bay  Co.  (2  P.  Wms. 

207)  329 

Childress  v.  Mayor  (3  Sneed.  347)         381 
Chilton  V.  Railroad  Co.  (16  M.  &  W. 

212)  353 

Chilvers  v.  People  (11  Mich.  43)  143, 

359 
Choquette  v.  Barada  (33  Mo.  249)  576 
Christ  V.  Polk  Co.  (48  Iowa,  302)  254 

Christ's  Church  v.  Woodward  (21  Me. 

172)  286 

Christopher  v.  Mayor,  etc.  (13  Barb. 

567)  463,  913 

Christy's  Adm'rs  v.  St.  Louis  (20  Mo. 

143)  944 

Church  V.  Baltimore  (6  Gill.  391)  330 

V.  Ellis  (38  Ind.  3)  773,  774 

V.  Cherry  field  (33  Me.  460)  1017, 1028 

V.  City,  etc.  (5  Cow.  538)  323 

V.  Ft.  Wayne  (36  Ind.  338)     760,  777 

V.  McAtee  (8  Bush  (Ivy.),  508)      747 

V.  Milwaukee  (31  Wis.  512)  1003 

V.  Scholtze  (2  Iowa,  27)  645 

Church  Case  (5  Robt.  649)  294 

Cincinnati  v.  Bryson  (15  Ohio,  625)    356, 

358,  764 

V.  Buckingham  (10  Ohio,  257)      349, 

351,  358,  385,  764 

V.  Cameron  (33  Ohio  St.  336)  87 

V.  Commissioners  (7  Ohio,  pt.  1, 

88)  626 

r.  Coombs  (16  Ohio,  181)  597,599 
w.  Evans  (5  Ohio  St.  594)  667,673 
V.  Gwynne  (10  Ohio,  192)  121,  322, 
340,  430 
v.  Hamilton  Co.  (7  Ohio,  pt.  1, 

88)  635 

V.  Morgan  (3  Wall.  275)  510,  524 

V.  Penny  (21  Ohio  St.  499)     686,  689, 

1002 
V.  Rice  (15  Ohio,  225)  397 

V.  Rosenthal  (55  111.  85)  736 

V.  Stone  (5  Ohio  St.  38)      1046,  1056, 

1057 

V.  Walls  (1  Ohio  St.  222)  139 

V.  White  (6  Pet.  435)     626,  628,  630, 

634,  636,  642,  663,  686 

Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan 

(32  Ohio  St.  152)  707 

Cincinnati  College  v.  State  (19  Ohio, 

110)  774 

Cisco  V.  Roberts  (36  N.  Y.  292)  133 

City  V.  Alexander  (23  Mo.  483)  179 

V.  Bergen  (50  Pa.  St.  539)  799 

V.  Clutch  (6  Iowa,  546)  356 

V.  Ferry  Co.  (27  Ind.  100)  143 

V.  Gilmartin  (71  Pa.  St.  140)  980 

I'.  Given  (60  Pa.  St.  136)         242,  259 


XXXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


City  V.  Lamson  (9  Wall.  477)    70,  94, 145,  | 

479,  486,  501,  50;J,  540 

V.  AVister  (35  Pa.  St.  427)  791» 

City  Council  v.  Ahrens  (4  Strob.  241)  332, 

337,  357,  304,  735 

V.  Baptist  Church  (4  Strob.  300)  189, 

337,  305,  374 

V.  Benjamin  (2  Strob.  608)     332,  397 

V.  Hlvthc"  (2  Ind.  75)  371 

r.  BoVd  (1  Const.  Kep.  352)  373 

V.  Church  (1  McMuU.  (S.C.)  Eq. 

139)  771 

V.  Condy  (4  Rich.  Law,  254)  771 

V.  Corlies  (2  Bailey,  189)  411 

V.  Dunbar  (50  Ga.  387)  772 

r.  Dunn  (1  McCord,  333)  411 

f.  Eltbrd  (1  McMuU.  234)  400 

V.  Fechman  (3  Rich.  Law,  385)  411 
V.  Gilmer  (33  Ala.  IIG)  995,  1068, 
1072,  1074,  1078 
V.  Goldsmith  (2  Speers,  435)  332,  391 
V.  Goldsmith  (12  Rich.  Law,  470)  361 
V.  King  (4  McCord,  487)  354,  423 
I'.  Moorehead  (2  Rich.  Law,  430)  218, 

219 
V.  Payne  (2  N.  &  McC.  475)  168,  238 
V.  Pepper  ( 1  Rich.  Law,  364)  .354, 359, 
422,  423 
V.  Pinckney  (1  Const.  42)  779,  928 
V.  Plank-road  Co.  (31  Ala.  7G)  117, 
396,  397,  441,  453,  454 
r.  Seeba  (4  Strob.  319)  400 

V.  Smidt  (11  Rich.  Law,  343)         411 
V.  State  (2  Speers  (S.  C.),  Law, 

719)  771,  788,  789 

V.  Van  Dorn  (41  Ala.  505)  131 

City  of  Boston  v.  Schaffer  (9  Pick. 

415)  356 

City  of  Brooklyn  v.  Cleves  (Hill  & 

Denio,  Suppl.  231)  390 

City  of  Buffalo  in  re  (64  N.  Y.  547)      583 

(78N.  Y.  362)     597 

City  of  Central  v.  Sears  (2  Col.  588)  253, 

.      254,  321 

City  of  Davenport  v.  Davenport,  etc. 

R.  R.  Co.  (38  Iowa,  99)  700 

City  of  Delphi  v.  Evans  (3G  Ind.  90)    305 
City  of  Lexington  y.  Butler  (14  Wall. 

284)  524,  527 

City  of  London   (3   Hargr.   St.  Tr. 

545)  893 

V.  Vanacker  (1  Ld.  Raym.  496)     248 
V.  Vanacker  (Carth.  482)  248 

r.  Vanacker  (12  Mod.  272)     248,  3-55 
v.  Vanacker  (1  Salk.  142)  248 

City  of  London  in  re  (8  Howe,  St. 

Tr.  1040)  887 

City  of  Louisiana  v.  Wood  (Oct.  T. 

S.  C.  1880)  476 

City  of  Louisville  v.  Nevin  (10  Bush, 

549)  456 

City    of    Lowell    v.   Wheelock    (11 

Cush.  391)  312 

City    of    Madison    v.    Hatcher     (8 

Blackf.  (Ind.)  341)  371 


City  of  Bella  v.  Scholte  (24  Iowa,  283)  673 
City  of  Peoria  r.  Jolmston  (50111.  45)  673 
City  of  Philadelphia  r.  I'iiil.  &  Read. 

H.  K. (58  Penn.  263)  672 

City  of  Richmond  v.  Daniel  (14  Gratt. 

(Va.)387)  763 

V.  Poe  (24  Gratt.  (Va.)  149)  673 

City  of  Shawneetown  v.  Baker  (85 

111.  503)  472 

City   of    Somerville  v.  O'Neil   (114 

Mass.  353)  654 

Citv  of  St.  Louis  v.  Armstrong  (56 

Mo.  298)  462 

y.  Shields  (02  Mo.  247)  510 

City  of  Toronto  v.  Bowes  (4  Grant 

( Canada),  504 )    437,  439, 489,  905 
City  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corlies  (21  Wend. 

(N.  Y.)  367)  955 

City  Gas  Co.  v.  Thurber  (2  R.  I.  15)  785 
City  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  R.  R.  Co. 

(20  N.  J.  Eq.  61)       701,711,712 
714,  716,  719 
V.  Memphis   (4  Coldvv.  (Tenn.) 

406)  709,  711 

City  Railway   Co.   v.  Louisville   (8 

Bush,  415)  440,  711 

V.  Louisville  (4  Bush,  478)    711,  712, 

785,  786 

Claflin  jj.Hopkinton  (4  Gray,  502)  176,910 

V.  Iowa  City  (12  Iowa,  284)  131 

Clague  V.  New  Orleans  (13  La.  An. 

275)  981 

Claiborne  Street  in  re  (4  La.  An.  7)    596, 

598,  602 

Clancy  v.  Byrne  (56  N.  Y.  129)  1032 

Clapp  V.  Cedar  County  (5  Iowa,  15)     479 

V.  Hartford  (35  Conn.  66)      109,  610, 

743,  804,  805 

V.  Walker  (25  Iowa,  315)  131 

Clarence  v.  Auburn  (66  N.  Y.  334)       950 

Clarky.  Barrington  (41  N.  11.44)  1017,1023 

V.  Blackmar  (47  N.  Y.  150)    697,  700, 

701 
V.  Board  (27  111.  310)  191,  222 

V.  Canal  Co.  (6  A.  &  E.  N.  S.  898)  856 
f.  City  (10  Wis.  136)  180 

V.  Common wealtli  (14  Bush,  166)  675 
r.  Corinth  (41  Vt.  449)  1017 

V.  Cuckficld  Union  (llEng.  Law 

&Eq.  442)  4.50 

V.  Davenport  (4  Iowa,  494)    117,  190, 

768,  848 

V.  Dayton  (6  Neb.  192)  464 

V.  Des  Moines  (19  Iowa,  199)        156, 

189,  451,  468,  479,  480,  481,  482, 

485,  486,  487,  523,  676,  721 

V.  Dutcher  (9  Cow.  674)  942,  945,  946 

V.  Ferry  Co.  (35  N.  Y.  485)  987 

V.  Fry  (8  Oliio  St.  358)  722,  1058 

D.  Halleck  (16  Wend.  607)  264 

V.  Hancock  Co.  (27  111.  305)  482 

V.  Iowa  City  (20  Wall.  583)    479,  480 

t>.  Janes ville  fl  Biss.  98)  552 

V.  Janes ville  (10  Wis.  136)    145,  164, 

341,  479 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XXXV 


Clark  V.  Jersey  City  (42  N.  J.  L.  94)    842 
V.  Lewis  (35  111.  417)  177,  352 

V.  Locltport  (49  Barb.  580)  1051 

V.  Lyon  Co.  (8  Nev.  181)         460,  472 
V.  McCartiiy  (1  Cal.  45:$)  679 

V.  .\Lnyor  (13  Barb.  32)    378,  379,  808 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (4  Comst.  (N.  Y.) 


338)  478 

r.  Mobile  (36  Ala.  621)  130 

V.  Newport  (5  R.  I.  333)  602 

V.  Norton  (49  N.  Y.  243)  264 

r.  People  (15  III.  213)  271,884 

V.  Polk  Co.  (19  Iowa,  248)     451,  480, 
481,  48G 
r.  Potter  Co.  (1  Pa.  St.  163)  208 

V.  Pratt  (47  Me.  55)  576 

V.  Saline  Co.  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  378)    938 
V.  Saline  Co.  (7  Neb.  516)  937 

r.  Saybrook  (21  Conn.  313)  1000 

V.  School  Commrs.  (36  Ala.  621)    131 
V.  School  Dist.  (78  111.474)  147 

V.  School  Dist.  (3  R.  L  199)  145,  146, 
481,  482 
V.  Syracuse  (13  Barb.  32)  383 

V.  Tuckett  (2  Vent.  182)  414 

V.  Utica  (18  Barb.  451)  615 

V.  Waltham  (Mass.  Sup.  C.  1880)  1062 
V.  Washington  (12  Wheat.  40)      124, 

445 
V.  Wilmington   (5   Harr.    (Del.) 

243)  1070 

Clark  Co.  v.  Lawrence  (63  111.  32)        178 

V.  State  (61  Ind.  75)  866 

Clarke's  Case  (5  Co.  64)  353 

Clark's  Case  (2  Cro.  506)  275 

Clark's  Case  (2  Par.  521)  225 

V.  Blackmar  (47  N.  Y.  150)     097,  700 

V.  Dutcher  (9  Cow.  674)  942 

V.  Farmers',  etc.  Co.  (15  Wend. 

256)  220 

r.  Lyon  Co.  (8  Nev.  181)  460 

V.  Rochester  (28  N.  Y.  605)  63 

V.  Rochester  (5  Abb.  Pr.  107)         195 
V.  Rochester   24  Barb.  446)     56,  70, 

179 

Clason  V.  Milwaukee  (30  Wis.  316)     331, 

337,  338,  436 

Clay  V.  County  (4  Bush,  154)        190,  548 

Clay  Co.  (■.  Simonsen  (1  Dak.  Ter. 

403)  262 

Clayards  v.  Dethick  (12  Q.  B.  439)     1050 
Clayburgh  v.  Chicago  (25  III.  535)      456, 

986 
Clayton  v.  Heidelbergh  (17  Miss.  023)  928, 

929 
Clear  Lake,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lake  Co.  (45 

Cal.  90)  058 

Clegg  V.  Richardson  Co.  (8  Neb.  178)  66 
Cleghorn  v.  I'ostlethwaite  (43  111.  428)  800 
Cleino  v.  R.  R.  Co.  (2  Dillon,  175, 1873)  774 
Clemence  v.  Auburn  (66  N.  Y.  334)  998, 
1037,  1075 
Clemens  v.  Anderson  (46  Miss.  581)    668, 

673 
Clerk  V.  Tucker  (2  Vent.  132)  812 


Clerke  v.  Tucker  (3  Lev.  281)       349,  354 

Cleveland  v.  Gas  Co.  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  203)  379 

r.  Jersey  City  (39  N.  J.  L.  629)    821, 

H()9 

V.  St.  Paul  (18  Minn.  279)  1038,  1018 

Cleveland  v.  Wick  (18  Ohio  St.  303)  610, 

612,  748 

Clifton  V.  Cook  (7  Ala.  114)  225,  22(1 

Cline  V.  Cornwall  (21  Grant,  142)  722 

V.  Cornwall  (21  Grant,  129)    723,  724 

Clinton  V.  Howard  (42  Conn.  294)       1022 

*;.  Phillips  (58  111.  102)  331 

V.  llailroad  Co.  (24  Iowa,  455)  75,  95, 

632,  652,  653,  696,  697,  701,  702, 

703,  711,  716 

V.  Strong  (9  Johns.  370)  041 

Clinton ville  v.  Keating  (4  Denio,  341)  114, 

365 
Clothier  v.  Webster  (12  C.  B.  N.  S. 

790)  1074 

Clough  u.  Hart  (8  Kan.  487)  472,  473 

r.  Unity  (18  N.  H.  75)  601 

Coast  Line,  etc.  v.  Cohen  (50  Ga.  451)  659. 

711 
Coates  V.  Canaan  (51  Vt.  131)  1019,  1026, 

1051 
V.  New  York  (7  Cowen,585)  168, 170, 
374,  405,  410 
Cobb  V.  Boston  (112  Mass.  181)  167 

V.  Dalton  (53  Ga.  426)  949 

V.  Kingman  (15  Mass.  197)  216 

V.  Portland  (65  Me.  381)  981 

V.  Standish  (14  Me.  198)    1023,  1040, 

1048 
Cobbett  V.  Slowman  (9  Exch.  633)  428 
Coburn  v.  Ellen  wood  (4  N.  H.  99)  577 
Cochran  v.  McCleary  (22  Iowa,  75)  233, 
236,  278,  290,  291,  293,  833,  879. 
881,  882 
Cockburn  v.  Bank  (13  La.  An.  289)    315, 

316 

Cocke  V.  Halsey  (16  Pet.  71)  247 

Cocking  V.  Baldwin  (4  Wend.  667)       609 

Codd  V.  Cabe  (13  Cox,  202)  238,  239 

Codding  V.  Mansfield  (7  Gray,  272)       166 

Coe  V.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Ohio  St.  372)  788 

?;.  Wise  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  711)  141 

r.  Wise  (7B.  &  S.  831)  1074 

V.  Wise  (5  B.  &  S.  440)  989 

Coffin  V.  Field  (7  Cush.  355)  177 

V.  Nantucket  (5  Cush.  269)    124,  290, 

955 

V.  Plymouth  (49  N.  H.  173)  262 

V.  State  (7  Ind.  157)  253 

Cofran  v.  Cochran  (5  N.  H.  458)  577 

Coggeshall  v.  New  Rochelle  (7  Johns. 

Ch.  292)  568 

Coghlan  v.  Ottawa  (1  App.  R.  54)      1075 
Cogshall  V.  Pelton  (7  Johns.  Ch.  292)  561, 

567 
Cogswell  V.  Lexington  (4  Cush.  307)  1024, 
^  1027,  1034 

Cohen  v.  Wigfall  (8  Rich.  L.  237)        222 
Coit  V.  Society  (32  Conn.  173)  727 

Coker  v.  Birge  (10  Ga.  336)  379 


XXXVl 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


Colbeck  V.  Brantford  (21  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

27())  1010,  1028, 1049 

Colburn?;.  Cliattanooga  (17  Am.  Law 

Reg.  N.  S.  I'.tl)  486,012 

Colby  r.  Beaver  Dam    (34  Wis.  285)   102G 

Colchester  v.  Brooke  (7  Q.  B.  ;383)       194, 

l'J5,  197,  203 

V.  Goodwin  (Carter,  121)  414 

V.  Lawton  (1  Ves.  &  B.  226)  570 

V.  Seaber  (3  Burr.  1870)         194,  195, 

197,  199,  203,  208 

Coldspring  v.  Tolland  (9  Cash.  492)    209, 

210 
Cold  water  r.  Tucker  (36  Mich.  474)     209, 

440,  1078 
Cole  V.  Drew  (44  Vt.  49)  684 

I'.  Green  (25  111.  104)  572 

V.  Medina  (27  Barb.  218)  949 

V.  Muscatine  (14  Iowa,  296)         1001, 
1003,  1005 
V.  Nashville  (4    Sneed   (Tenn.), 

162)  752,  973 

V.  Newburyport  (23  Alb.  L.J.  3)  981, 

1043 

Coleman  ;•.  Neal  (8  Ga.  560)  840 

V.  R:iilroadCo.  (38  N.  Y  201)         708 

Coles  V.  Madison  Co.  (1  III.  120)       76,  80 

V.  Williamsburg  (10  Wend.  658)  282, 

295  305 

Coles  Co.  V.  Allison  (23  111.  383)  225,' 299, 

412 
Colgrove  v.  Breed  (2  Denio,  125)  261 

Colking  V.  Baldwin  (4  Wend.  667)         607 
Collector  v.  Day  (11  Wall.  113)  772 

V.  Hubbard  (12  Wall.  1)  458,  940,  948 
College  iK  Crowell  (10  Kan.  442)  774 

V.  Shawnee  Co.  (8  Kan.  344)  774 

Colley  V.  Inhabitants  (2  Am.  Rep.  30) 

1053 

V.  Westbrook  (57  Me.  181)  10-52 

Collins  y.  Camden  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  293)    921 

V.  Council  Bluffs  (32  Iowa,  324)  1021, 

1041,  1042 

V.  Dorchester  (6  Cush.  396)  318, 

1028 
V.  Hatch  (18  Ohio,  523)    118,  329,  332 

340 

V.  Louisville  (2  B.  Mon.  134)        356, 

392,  764,  767 

V.  State  (8  Ind.  344)  248 

V.  Swindle  (6  Grant,  282)  439 

Colton  V.  Haneiiott  (13  111.  615)    121,  G76, 

721,  911 

V.  Rossi  (9  Cal.  595)  609 

Columbia  v.  Duke  (2  Strob.  530)  397 

V.  Harrison  (2  Const.  213)       404,  411 

V.  Hunt  (5  Rich.  550)       346,  763,  764 

Columbia   Bridge  i'.  Kline    (Bright. 

320)  562 

Columbia  Co.   v.   Bryson   (13   Fla. 

281)  871,  907 

r.  King  (13  Fla.  451)       501,  838,  84-5, 

862,  877 

Columbus  V.  Arnold  (30  Ga.  517)         410 

V.  Dahn  (36  Ind.  330)  630,  639 


Columbus  V.  Grey  (2  Bush,  476)  1.39,  140 
V.  Jacques  (30  Ga.  6U6)  643,  656,  657 
V.  Storv  (35  Ind.  9/)  767 

V.  Woollen  Mill  Co.  (33  Ind.  435) 

1005,  1077 

Colwell  (;.  Pidon  (3  Watts  (Pa.),  327)  942 

Comer  v.  Folsom  (13  Minn.  219)  178 

Comman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (5Jur.  N.  S. 
657) 

Commercial  Bank  v.  lola  (2  Dill.  353)    67, 

187,  188,  189,  190,  504,  737 

V.  lola  (20  Wall.  655)       187,  188,  190 

Commissioners  r.  Block  (99  U.  S.  686)  499 
V.  Bowie  (34  Ala.  461)  609 

V.  Boyd  (1  Ired.  Law,  194)  661 

I'.  Bright  (18  Ind.  93)  479 

V.  Butt  (2  Ohio,  348)  963 

V.  Chandler  (96  U.  S.  205)  494,  495 
V.  County  (20  Md.  449)  859 

V.  Cox  (6  Ind.  403)  193,  198,  451,  486 
V.  Day  (19  Ind.  450)  481,  485 

V.  Duckett  (20  Md.  468)    89,  327,  825 
V.  Gas  Co.  (12  Pa.  St.  318)    331,  332, 
6.:  2,  665 
V.  Harper  (38  111.  103)  924 

V.  Harris  (7  Jones  (Law),  281)      347, 
368,  371 
V.  Hearn  (59  Ala.  371)  310 

v.  Hudson  (2  Beasl.  420)  694 

r.  January  (94  U.  S.  202)  510 

V.  Keller  (6  Kan.  510)  481,  485,  486 
v.  Land  Co.  (23  Kan.  196)  944 

V.  Lecky  (6  S.  &  R.  166)  298 

V.  Lynch  (2  McCord,  170)  821,  824 
V.  Martin  (4  Mich.  657)  962 

V.  Mason  (9  Ind.  97)  487 

V.  Mighels  (7  Ohio,  109)  117,  962 

V.  Miller  (7  Kan.  479)  165 

V.  Neill  (3  Yeates,  54)  139 

V.  Nesbitt  (11  G.  &  J.  50)  265 

V.  Nichols  (14  Oiiio  St.  260)  516,  524 
V.  Patterson  (8  Jones,  Law,  182),  789 
V.  People  (38  111.  347)  862 

V.  Perry  (5  Ohio,  57)  261 

V.  Powe  (6  Jones,  Law,  134)  373 

V.  Russell  (44  Ind.  509)  437 

r.  Sandusky  Co.  (1  Ohio  St.  149)  828 
V.  Sellew  (99  U.  S.  624)  871,  872 

V.  Supervisors  (27  111.  140)  924 

V.  Tarver  (21  Ala.  661)  298,  867,  868 
V.  Taylor  (2  Bay,  282)  641,  671 

V.  Van  Sickle  (Bright.  (Pa.)  69)  >379 
V.  Wood  (10  Pa.  St.  93)  999,  1068,  1077 

Commissioners'  Court  v.  Rather   (48 

Ala.  434)  845 

Commissioners  of  Albany  in  re  (56  N. 

Y.  144)  601 

Commissioners,  etc.  of  Brooklyn  in  re 

(N.  Y.)  653 

Commissioners  of  Central  Park  in  re 

(50N.  Y.  493)  113 

Commissioners   of    Douglas    Co.    v. 

Bolles(94  U.  S.l04)  509 

Commissioners    of    Johnson    Co.    v. 

Thayer  (94  U.  S.  631)  610 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xxxvu 


Commissioners  of  Knox  Co.  v.  Aspin- 

wall  {'21  How.  539)  ;307,  508 

Commissioners  of  Warren  Co.  v.  State 

(15  Ind.  250)  824 

Commonwealth  v.  Adams  (114  Mass. 

32.3;  3!)4,  1041 

V.  Alburger  (1  Wliart.  (Pa.)  4(iU)  625, 

630,  635,  639,  643,  647,  669 

V.  Alger  (7  Cusli.  53)       133,  13(3,  167 

V.  Allegliany  Co.  (37  Pa.  St.  237, 

277)  572,  817,  838,  845,  855,  857, 
858,  867,  868 
V.  Alleghany  Co.  (32  Pa.  St.  218)  818, 
819.  820,  838 
V.  America  Bank  (10  Phil.  156)     891 
I'.  Arrison  (15  S.  &  R.  130)  290 

V.  Athern  (3  Mass.  285)  314,  892 

V.  Bacon  (6  S.  &  R.  322)  254,  255 
V.  Bank  (28  Pa.  St.  289)  291 

V.  Ba.xter  (35  Pa.  St.  263)  229,  232, 882 
V.  Bean  (14  Gray,  52)  333,  399,  409 
V.  Bean  (Thach.  Crim.  Cas.  85)  409 
V.  Beklen  (13  Met.  10)  636,  640,  G41 
r.  Binns  (17  S.  &11.  219)  252 

V.  Rlaisdell  (107  Mass.  234)  658,  726 
V.  Borden  (61  Pa  St.  272)  410 

V.  Boston  (97  Mass.  555)  694 

V.  Bowman  (3  Pa.  St.  203)     387,  643, 
644,  645 
V.  Breed  (4  Pick.  463)  595 

i;.  Price  (22  Pa.  St.  211)  963 

V.  Bridge    Proprietors   (2    Gray, 

339)  9.30 

V.  Brooks  (99  Mass.  434)  678 

i;.  Biimm  (lOPhil,  162)  890 

i;.  Bussie  (5  S.  &  R.  451)  269 

V.  C.  P.  Railway  Co.  (52  Pa.  St. 

506)  711,879,887 

V.  Cambridge  (7  Mass.  166)  589 

I'.  Central  Railway    (52  Pa.  St. 

506)  711 

V.  Charleston  (1  Pick.  180)  596,  641 
V.  Chase  (6  Cush.  248)  317 

V.  Cluley  (56  Pa.  St.  270)  224, 879, 883, 

890 
V.  Cole  (26  Pa.  St.  187) 
V.  Commrs.  (16  S.  &  R.  317 
V.  Commrs.  (2  Whart.  (Pa.' 


V.  Commrs.  (5  Rawlc,  75) 

V.  Commrs.  (37  Pa.  237) 

V.  Commrs.  (9  Watts,  466) 

V.  Conely  (4  Pa.  St.  372) 

V.  Cullen  (1  Harris  (Pa.),  133)       195 


636 
840 
286)  609, 
840 
225,  836 
524,  860 
298 
263 


V.  Curtis  (9  Allen,  2()t 
V.  Dallas  (3  Yeates,  300) 
V.  Dcerfield  (6  Allen,  449) 
V.  Dennison  (24  How.  66) 
V.  Dow  (10  Met.  382) 
V.  Dugan  (12  Met.  2.33) 
V.  Duquet  (2  Yeates,  493) 
V  Ellis  (11  Mass.  465) 
V.  Emery  (11  Cush.  406) 
V.  Fahey  (5  Cush.  408)  374,  407,  409, 

411 


399,  679 
235,  419 
719 
818 
364,  414 
237 
?,■?:?. 


923 
4.30 


Commonwealth  v.  Ford  (5  Pa.  67)  252 
V.  Fowler  (10  Mass.  290)  886,  893 
V.  Garrigues  (28  Pa.  St.  9)  232,  882 
V.  Gas  ("o.  (12  Pa.  St.  318)  338 

V.  Gay  (5  Pick.  44)  407,  409 

V.  Genther  (17  S.  &  R.  135)  260 

V.  German   Society  (15  Pa.   St. 

251)  276,278 

V.  Gill  (3  Whart.  228)  884 

V.  Goodrich  ( 13  Allen,  545)  335,  374, 


.  Guardians  (15  Pa.  St.  6  S.  &  R. 

469)  269, 

,  Hall  (7  Watts,  290) 
.    Hampden   Sessions  (2  Pick. 

414) 
.  Hastings  (9  Met.    259)     237, 

,  Hawks  (123  Mass.  525)       250, 

,  Henry  (49  Pa.  St.  530)        825, 

,  Hitching  (5  Gray,  482) 

.  Hopkins ville  (7  B.  Mon.  38) 

,  Horn  (10  Phil.  164) 

,  Huhn  (70  Pa.  St.  465) 

,  Ipswich  (2  Pick.  70) 

,  Johnson  (2  Binney, 275) 

,  Jones  (12  Pa.  St.  365)  222,  879, 

Judges  (8  Pa,  St.  391) 

Justices  (2  Va.  Cas.  9) 
.  Kepner  (lOPhil.  510) 

King  (13  Met.  115) 
,  Lancaster  (5  Watts.  152)    302, 
,  Leech  (44  Pa.  St.  332)  228,  229, 
232, 
.  Low  (3  Pick.  408)  636, 

,  Lowell  Gas  Co.  (12  Allen,  75) 
.  Lyndall  (2  Brewster,  425) 
.  Mann  (5  W.  &  S.  418) 
,  Markham  (7  Bush,  486)      357, 
.  McCloskey    (2    Rawle,   369) 

432,  881, 
.  McDonald  (16  S.  &  R.  390)  639, 
,  McDonald  (16  S.  &  R.  401) 
.  McWilliams  (11  Pa.  St.  61) 
.  Meeser  (44  Pa.  St.  341)  229, 
882, 
,  Miliman  (13  S.  &  R.  408) 
.  Milton  (12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  212) 
.  Montrose  (52  Pa.  St.  391) 
.  Newbury  (2  Pick.  51) 
.  Noxon  ("l21  Mass.  42) 
.  Painter  (10  Pa.  St.  214) 
.Park  (10  Phil.  444) 
.  Passmore  (1  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  217) 

.Patch  (97  Mass.  221)  3-33, 

.  Pennsylvania  Institute  (2  S.  & 
R.  141)  276, 

.  Perkins  (43  Pa.  St.  400)  179, 

.  Perkins  (47  Pa.  St.  189) 
.  Philadelphia  (29  Pa.  St.  497) 
.  Philadelphia  (7  Am.  Law  Reg. 
N.  S.  362) 


274 
963 

855 
238 
239 
420 
826 
413 
931 
890 
230 
294 
822 

890, 
893 
63 
819 
290 
723 
840 

231, 
882 
641 
786 
868 
255 
766 

229, 
882 

,669 
672 
179 

231, 
890 
657 
736 
58 
627 
684 
62 
825 

699, 
722 

,338 

277 
572, 
838 
179 
946 

241 


XXXVIU 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Commonwealth  v.  Philadelphia  Soc. 

(o  Hinii.  481))  276 

r.  Pindar  (11  Met.  5o!))  430 

V.  Pittsburgh  {34  Pa.  St.  496)        146. 

134,  155,  IIH),  482,  768,  817,  820, 

825,  837,  838,  844,  845,  848,  8(51, 

862,  864,  867,  868 

V.  Pittsburgh  (41  Pa.  St.  278)       140, 

482 

r.  Pittsburgh  (14  Pa.  St.  177)       239, 

302,  887 

V.  Pittsburgh  (88  Pa.  St.  66)  840,  842 

r.  Pittsburgh  (43  Pa.  St.  391)        551 

I'.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Gray,  54)  930 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Gray,  22)  930 

i;.  Railroad  Co.  (14  Gray,  93)         703 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (27  Pa.  St.  339)    680, 

690.  099,  702,  703,  709 

V.  RailroadCo.(6Whart.(Pa.)25)  699 

y.  Read  (1  Gray,  475)  422 

V.  Rice  (9  Met.  253)  391 

v.  Roark  (8Cush.  210)  430 

V.  Robertson  (5  Cush.  438)    331,  338, 

394,412 

?;.  Roxbury  (9  Gray,  451)  16,  36,  137, 

i:U>,  197,  198 

V.  Rush  (14  Pa.  St.  186)  387,  642.  643, 

647,  655,  656 

V.  Rvan  (5  Mass.  90)  422,  423 

V.  Savintis  Bank  (98  Mass.  12)       552 

V.  Savvin  (2  Pick.  547)  588 

V.  Siiaver  (3  VV.  &  S.  338)  270 

V.  Sliaw  (1  Pittsburg  (Pa.),  492)    420 

V.  Shei.p(10  Pliila.  518)  890 

V.  Slierrnan  (18  Pa.  St.  343)  587 

V.  Small  (27  Pa.  St.  31)  833 

r.  Si, lead  (11  Mass.  74)  893 

V.  S.Mith  (45  Pa.  St.  59)  892 

r.  Springtield  (7  Mass.  9)  1014 

I'.  Stiffee  (7  Busli,  161)  331 

r.  Stodder  (2  Cusli.  562)         .336,  -338, 

357,  359,  360,  361,  .372,  .394,  413 

V.  St.  Patrick's  Soc.  (2  Binn.  441)  266, 

269,  270, 274 

V.  Sutherland  (3  S.  &  R.  145)        209, 

270  273 

V.  Tavlor  (36  Pa.  St.  263)  '  870 

r.  Temple  (14  Gray,  69)  712,715 

V.  Tewksbury  (11  Met.  55)  167 

V.  Turner  (1  Cush.  493)  117,  321,  329, 

332,  364 

V.  Union  Ins.  Co.  (5  Mass.  230)      195 

V.  Wentworth  (Bright.  (Pa.)  318)  657 

i;.  Wilder  (127  Mass.  1)  570 

V.  Wilmington  (105  Mass.  599)     1018 

r.  Woelper  (3  S.  &  R.  29)  222 

V.  Wolbert  (6  Binney,  292)  242 

V.  Wood  (10  Pa.  St.  93)  625 

V.  Woods  (44  Pa.  St.  113)  610 

V.  Worcester  (3  Pick.  462)    112,  338, 

394,  407,  409 

Company  v.  State  (24  N.  J.  L.  62)        720 

Conboy  v.  Iowa  City  (2  Iowa,  90)        841, 

408,  432 
Concord  v.  Boscawen  (17  N.  H.  465)    560 


Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Bank  (92  U. 

S.  625)  95,  521,  522,  529,  630,  532, 
533 
Concord  Railroad  Co.  v.  Greeley  (17 

N.  11.  47)  595 

Cone  V.  Hartford  (28  Conn.  .363)  610,  688, 

749,  802,  803,  804 

Congdon  v.  Norwich  (37  Conn.  414)  1020 

Congot  I'.  New  Orleans  (16  La.  An. 

21)  385,  388 

Congregational    Soc.   v.   Sperry   (10 

Conn.  200)  246,  286 

Congreve  v.  Morgan  (5  Duer,  495)     1027 

V.  Morgan  (18  N.  Y.  84)       1059,  1060 

V.  Smith  (18  N.  Y.  79)  1059 

Conklin  v.  Fellmore  Co.  (13  Minn. 

454)  915 

V.  School  Dist.  (22  Kan.  521)  31 

Connden  v.  Gierke  (Hobart,  32)  207 

Connelly  y.Griswold  (7  Iowa,  416)  606,  614 

Conner  v.  Bent  (1  Mo.  235)  80 

V.  Mayor  (5  N.  Y.  285)  253,  255 

V.  New  Albany  (1  Blackf.  43)         143 

Connersville  v.  Bank  ( 16  Ind.  105)         787 

Connor  v.  Morris  (23  Cal.  447)  840 

Conrad  v.  Itiiaca  (16  N.  Y.  158)    128,  964, 

986,  1026, 1037,  1046,  1078 

V.  Trustees  (16  N.  Y.  158)  984 

Conservators  v.  Asii  (10  B.  &  C.  349)  60,  61 

Constables  of  Hipperholm  in  re  (5  D. 

&  L.  79)  927 

Converse  v.  Ft.  Scott  (92  U.  S.  503)     537 

r.  United  Slates  (21  How.  463)      257 

Con^^ell  '••  Kmrie  (4  Ind  200)  264 

Cook  ;;.  Boston  (9  Allen,  393)       941,  942, 

943,  944 
V.  Buffalo  (1  Clinton  Dig.  Buffalo, 

§  2)  158 

V.  Burlington  (30  Iowa,  94)  631,  633, 
638,  647, 660,  689,  701 
V.  Charlestown  (98  Mass.  80)  1022 
V.  Charlestown  (13  Allen,  190)  1028 
V.  Freeholders  (2  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 

326)  945 

V.  Harris  (61  N.  Y.  448)  626,  629 

V.  Hillsdale  (7  Mich.  115)        637,  639 
V.  Macon  (54  Ga.  460)  980 

V.  Manufacturing  Co.  (1   Sneed, 

698)  188,  189 

V.  Milwaukee  (24  Wis.  270)  1020, 1021 
V.  Milwaukee  (27  Wis.  191)  1020 

V.  Racine  (5  N.  W.  R   352)  465 

V.  Shipman  (24  III.  614)  453 

V.  South  Park  Commrs.  (61  III. 

115)  488 

Cook  Co.  V.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (35  111. 

460)  907 

V.  McCrea  (93  111.  236)  115,  116 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (35  111.  465)  919 

Cooley  V.  Board  of  Wardens  (12  How. 

296)  1.33 

V.  Essex  (3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  415)      930 
w.  Freeholders  (3  Dutch.  (N.J.) 

415)  719,  1009 

V.  Granville  (10  Cush.  56)        41,  117 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


XXXIX 


Cooley  V.  Westbrook  (57  Me.  181)  1052 
Coolidge  i;.  Learned  (8  Pick.  504)  646 
Coombs  V.  Purrington  (42  Me.  332)  1025, 
1029,  1040 
Cooper  V.  Alden  (Harr.  Ch.  72)    643,  659, 

660 
V.  Atlanta  (53  Ga.  6.38)  971 

V.  Dismal  Swamp  Co.  (2  Murphy 

(N.  C),  195)  818 

V.  Gosling  (9  L.  T.  N.  S.  77)  606 

V.  Lampeter  (8  Watts,  128)  298 

V.  Eeansbey  (8  Watts,  128)  298 

V.  Savannali  (4  Ga.  68)  811 

«.  Smith  (9  S.  &  R.26)  662 

Cope  V.  Thames,  etc.  Co.  (3  Excii.  841)  175 

Copeland  v.  Packard  (16  Pick.  217)     588 

Copes  V.  Charleston  (10  Rich.  491)      180, 

189,  540 
V.  Mathews  (18  Miss.  .398)       263,  264 
Coppy.  Neal  (7N.  H.  275)  577 

Corbin  i-.  American  Mills  (27   Conn. 

274)  1057 

Corby  v.  Hill  (4  C.  B.  N.  S.  556)  1028 
Corder  v.  Commissioners  ( 16  Oiiio  St. 

353)  208 

Cordiell  i-.  Frizzell  (1  Nev.  130)  246 

Corey  o.  Rice  (4  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  141)  721 
Corfield  v.  Coryell  (4  Wash.  C.  C.  380)  735 
Cornell  v.  Barnes  (1  Denio,  35)  242 

V.  Guilford  (1  Denio,  510)       59,  176, 
261,441,  451 
Cornell  College  v.  Iowa  Co.  (32  Iowa, 

520)  915 

Corning  v.  Green  (23  Barb.  33)  64,  68 
Cornish  y.  Pease  (18  Me.  184)'  288 

V.  Toronto   Street   Railway   Co. 

(23  U.  C.  C.  P.  355)  1051 

Cornman  v.  East.  Co.  Railroad  (5  Jur. 

N.  S.  657)  713 

V.  Eastern  Counties  Railway  Co. 

(4H.  &N.  781)  1021 

Cornwell  i'.  Emerie  (2  Ind.  35)  954 

V.  ML'tropolitan  Commrs.,  etc.  (10 

Ex.771)  1018,1059 

Corporati(m  of  Banbury  (10  Mod.  346)  246 

Corporation  of  Newcastle  in  re  (12  CI. 

&  F.  402)  562 

V.  Scott  (1  Caines,  543)  139 

Corporation,  etc.  in  re  (19  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

450)  472 

tnre  (6  U.  C.  L.  J.  207)  472 

Corporation,  etc.  of  Ciiinguacousy  (25 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  01)  1073 

Correll  v.  B.  C.  R.  &  M.  Railroad  Co. 

(38  Iowa,  120)  706 

Corrigan  v.  Gage  (68  Mo.  541)  331 

Corwein  v.  Hames  (11  Johns.  76)  423 

Corwin  v.  Wallace  (17  Iowa,  334)  461 
Cosby  V.  R.  R.  Co.  (10  Bush, 288)656,660, 
696,  700.  705,  711 
Costar  V.  Brush  (25  Wend.  628)  126,  142 
Costello  V.  Mavor,  etc.  (63  N.  Y.  48)  234 
Coster  V.  New  York  (43  N.  Y.  399)  665,  666 
Cotes  V.  Davenport  (9  Iowa,  227)  1001, 
1070,  1071 


Cotter  I'.  Doty  (5  Ohio,  394)         .345,  -349, 

3-33 
Cotton  V.  County   Commrs.  (6  Ela. 

610)  179 

V.  Ellis   (8  Jones  (N.  C),  Law. 

545)  253,  827 

V.  Price  (50  Ala.  424)  259 

V.  Railway  Co.  (14  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

87)  607 

V.  Wood  (8  C.B.  N.  S.  568)  713,  1021 

Coulson  v.  Portland   (Deady,481)       121, 

163,  605,  910,  918,  919,  942,  943 

Coulter  I'.  Robertson  (24  Miss.  278)      198, 

199 
Council  Bluffs  v.  Stewart  (51  Iowa, 

385)  161 

County  v.  American  Aid  Society  (93 

U.  S.  124)  558 

i;.  Amy  (14  Wall.  244)  847,850 

V.  Brinthall  (29  Pa.  St.  38)  668 

V.  Brinton  (47  Pa.  St.  367)      183,  190 
i;.  County  (12  111.  1)  85 

V.  Dike  (20  Minn.  363)  827 

V.  Newport  (12  B.  Mon.  538)  638,644. 

650 
V.  Quarter  Sessions  (8  Pa.  St.  395)  62 
?;.  State  (11  111.  202)  85 

County  Commrs.    v.   Carter  (2  Kan. 

115)  482 

V.  Chitowood  (8  Ind.  504)  314 

V.  Cox  (6  Ind.  403)  193,  198,  199 

V.  Dayton  (17  Minn.  260)  642 

V.  Duckett  (20  Md.  468)  1038 

V.  Gibson  (36  Md.  229)  9.58,  1038 

V.  Holcomb  (7  Ohio,  pt.  1,  232)      721 
V.  Jones  (7  Ind.  3)  298 

V.  Lathrop  (9  Kan.  453)  626,  642,  648, 
649,  660 
County   Court  v.  County  Court    (3 

Bush,  93)  214 

V.  Griswold  (58  Mo.  175)  82,  208,-583, 

591,  594,  .595 

V.  Simmons  (10  111.  516)  262,  942,  945 

V.  Sparks  (10  Mo.  117)  ^    833 

Countv  of  Cass  v.  Johnson   (95  U.  S. 

360)  510 

County  of  Cliarles  v.  Powell   (22  Mo. 

525)  673 

County  of  Henry  v.  Nicolay  (95  U.  S. 

619)  536 

Countv  of  Leavpnworth  v.  Barnes  (94 

U.  S.  70)  509 

County  of  Randolph  v.  Post  (93  U.  S. 

502)  509 

Cousins  V.  State  (-50  Ala.  113)  789 

Coventry's  Case  (2  Salk.  429)  871 

Covin  v'.  Phv  (26  111.  432)  431 

Covington  v.  Boyle  (6  Bush,  204)         325, 

747 

V.  Bryant  (7  Bush  (Ky.),  248)       1038 

1046,  1062 

V.   Casey  (3  Bush  (Ky.),  698)     797, 

798 

V.  East  St.  Louis  (78  111.  548)  57,  213, 

322,  335 


xl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Covington  v.  Ludlow  (1  Met.  295)  307,  310, 

311,325 
r.  Mabcrry  (9  Bush,  304)  257 

Covington,  etc.  Co.  v.  Barren  Co.  (10 

Bush,  G04)  05 

V.  Covington  (9  Bush,  127)    125,  700, 

708 
Covington  County  v,   Dunklcin    (52 

Ahi.  28)  840 

t'.  Kiiuiey  (45  Ala.  176)  1009 

Covington  Street,  etc.  v.  Parker  (9 

Bush,  455)  713 

Cowan's  Case  (1  Overton,  311)  675 

Cowan  V.  Fulton  (23  Gratt.  579)  819 

Cowdin  V.  Huff  (lOInd.  83)  253 

Cowen  V.  West  Troy  (43  Barb.  48)     332, 
461,  599,  800 
Cowles  V.  Brittain  (2  Hawks  (N.  C), 

Law  &  Eq.  204)  735 

v.  Gray  (14  Iowa,  1)  639,647 

V.  Mercer  Co.  (7  Wall.  118)  935 

Cowley  V.  RushviUe  (60  Ind.  327)         364 

V.  Sunderland  (6  H.  &  N.  565)       980, 

987,  989,  991,  1078 

Cox  V.  Burlington  (43  Iowa,  612)  255 

V.  Griffin  ( 18  Ga.  728)  646,  656 

V.  Louisville,  etc.    Co.    (48   Ind. 

178)  609.  626,  632,  705 

V.  St.  Louis  (11  Mo.  431)  408 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (33  Barb.  414)    1024 

Coy  V.  Lyons  (17  Iowa,  1)     839,  841,  842, 

848 
Craft  V.  Jackson  Co.  (5  Kan.  518)  915 
Crafter  v.  Metropolitan  R.  W.  Co.  (L. 

R.  1  C.  P.  300)  1018,  1021 

Craig  V.  Burnett  (32  Ala.  728)  265 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (39  N.  Y.  404)        714 

V.  Sedalia  (63  Mo.  417)       1025,  1035, 

1040 

V.  Vicksburg  (31  Miss.  216)  479 

Cramer  v.  Burlington  (45  Iowa,  627)  1051 

Crandall  v.  Amador  (20  Cal.  72)  821 

V.  Nevada  (6  Wall.  35)  733 

Crane  m  re  (5  Pet.  190)  819 

V.  Des  Moines  (47  Iowa,  105)         255 

V.  Fond  du  Lac  ( 16  Wis.  196)  572,  839 

V.  Janesville  (20  Wis.  305)  767 

V.  Urbanna  (2  111.  App.  559)   476,  482 

Crangle  v.  Harrisburg  (1  Pa.  St.  132)  609 

Cranston  v.  Augusta  (61  Ga.  572)         167 

Crawford  v.  Burrell  (53  Pa.  St.  219)     773 

V.  Delaware  (7  Ohio  St.  459)  705,  716, 

1002 
Crawford  Co.  v.  Iowa  Co.  (2  Chand. 

14)  214 

V.  Wilson  (7  Ark.  214)  481,  484 

Crawshaw  v.  Roxbury  (7  Gray,  374)  165, 

460 
Craycraft  v.  Selvage  (10  Bush,  696)    441, 
456,  475,  476,  743,  790,  810 
Creal  v.  Keokuk  (4  Greene  (Iowa), 

47)  683,  1001 

Creamer  v.  Bates  (49  Mo.  523)  475 

Creighton  v.  Manson  (27  Cal.  613)        752 

i;.  Piper  (14  Ind.  182)  235 


Creighton  v.  San  Francisco  (42  Cal. 

446)  77,  102,  104,  823 

V.  Scott  (14  Ohio  St.  438)       748,  794, 

796 
V.  Toledo  (18  Oiiio  St.  447)  475 

Crepps  V.  Darden  (Cowp.  640)  348 

Cresson's  Appeal  (30  I'a.  St.  437)  563 
Cressy  v.  Hestonville  (75  Pa.  St.  83)  1027 
Crist  V.  Trustees  (10  Ind.  452)  298 

Crockett  i>.  Boston  (5  Cush.  182)  589,630 
Croft  V.  Peterborough  (5  U.  C.  C.  P. 

35)  325,  1069 

Cromarty  v.  Boston  (127  Mass  329)  1029 
Crommett  r.  Pearson  (18  Me.  344)  297, 311 
Crompton  v.  Zabriskie  (101  U.  S.  601)  909, 

916 
Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.  (96  U.  S.  51)   499, 

500 
Cronan  v.   Municipality   (5  La.   An. 

537)  474 

Cronin  v.  Jersey  City  (38  N.  J.L.  410)  743 

Cronins  v.  People  (22  Alb.  L.  J.  430)    372 

Crosby  r.  New  London  (26  Conn.  121)  552 

c.  Warren  (1  Rich.  Law,  385)         346 

352,  375 

Cross  V.  Mayor,  etc.  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  311)  672 

V.  Morristown  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  305)    114 

322,  463,  663,  667,  670,  676,  767, 

896 

V.  Plvmonth  Co.  (125  Mass.  557)    621 

Crossvett  i:  Janesville   (28  Wis.  420)   9u8 

974.  1004,  1005 

Crowder  v.  Tinkler  (19  Ves.  617)  379 

Crowell  V.  Sonoma  Co.  (25  Cal.  313)    958, 

961,  963 
Croxall  V.  Sheerd  (5  Wall.  268)  541 

Croydon  Hospital  v.  Farley  (6  Taunt. 

467)  207 

Cruger  v.  Railroad  Co.  (12  N.  Y.  190)  599, 

613,  615 
Cruikshanks  v.  City  Council  (1  Mc- 

C:;ord,  360)  610,  749,  779 

Crump  V.  Supervisors  (52  Miss.  107)  455 
Cuckfield  Burying  Board  in  re  (19 

Beav.  153)  606 

Cuff  V.  Newark  (35  N.  J.  L.  17)  1056 

Culbertson    v.    Cincinnati    (16  Ohio, 

579)  .  915 

Cumberland   v.   Magruder    (34    Md. 

381)  113,164,190 

V.  Willison  (50  Md.  138)  980,  992,  994, 
995,  1005,  1065,  1066 
Camming  v.  Mayor  (R.  M.  Cliarlt. 

(Ga.)  26)  788 

V.  Mayor  (11  Paige,  596)  254, 476, 610, 

805 

V.  Police  Jury  (9  La.  An.  503)        739 

V.  Prang  (24  Mich.  523)  687 

Cummings  v.  Saux  (30  La.  An.  207)     439 

Cunningiiam  v.  Almonte  (21  U.  C.  C. 

P.  459)  827 

V.  Squires  (2  W.  Va.  422)  432,  924, 

925 
Curran  v.  Arkansas  (15  How.  312)      198, 

199 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


xli 


Curran  v.  Shattuck  (24  Cal.  427)  608 

Currier  v.  Lowell  (16  Pick.  Mass.  17)  1063, 

1064 

Curry  v.  Bank  (8  Port.  .301)  21'J 

r.  Mt.  Sterling  (15  111.  320)     596,  5yi> 

I'.  Savannah  (Ga.  1879)  572,  573 

V.  Stewart  (8  Bush,  560)  252 

Curtis  V.  Butler  Co.  (24  How.  435)       189, 

298,  4ti2 

V.  Fiedler  (2  Black  (U.  S.),  478)    458 

V.  Hope  (19  Conn.  154)  640 

«;.  Keesler  (14  Barb.  521)  626 

V.  Leavitt  (15  N.  Y.  9)     145,  146,  155 

V.  Portland  (59  Me.  483)  447 

V.  St.  Paul,  etc.  Co.  (20  Minn.  28)  621 

V.  Whipple  (24  Wis.  350)         187,  491 

Curwen  v.  Salkeld  (3  East,  538)  386 

Cushing  V.  Adams  (18  Pick.  110)  723 

I'.  Bedford  (125  Mass.  526)  1022,  1027 

V.  Frankfort  (57  Me.  541)        279,  293 

Cushman  i\  Smith  (34  Me.  247)  607 

Cusick  V.  Norwich  (40  Conn.  376)  686, 1052 

Cutiibert  (.-.  Conley  (32  Ga.  211J  363 

V.  Lewis  (0  Ala.  262)  840 

Cutler  V.  Board,  etc.  (56  Miss.  115)       501 

Cutliffy.  Albany  (60  Ga.  597)  740 

Cutting  V.  Stone  (7  Vt.  471)  209 

in  re  (94  U.  S.  14)  819 

Cuyler  v.  Rochester  (12  Wend.  165)    451, 

487,  973 

Daily  v.  Columbus  (49  Ind.  169)  146 

V.  St.  Paul  (7  Mhin.  890)  82 

Daist  V.  People  (51  111.  286)  351 

Dale  County  v.  Gunter  (46  Ala.  118)  957 
Dallam  i'.  Oliver  (3  Gill  (Md.),  44.5)  814 
Dalrymple   v.   Whittingham   (26   Vt. 

345)  480,  481 

Dalton  V.  North  Hampton  (19  N.  H. 

302)  614 

V.  Southeastern  Ry.  Co.  (4  C.  B. 

N.  S.  296)  1042 

Dalzell  V.  Davenport  (12  Iowa,  437)  1005 

Dameron  v.  Irwin  (8  Ired.  Law,  421 J    234 

Damoa  v.  Granby  (2  Pick.  345)      64,  282, 

294,  296,  297,  298,  303,  447,  450, 

483 

V.  Scituate  (119  Mass.  05)  1040 

V.  Scituate  (20  Am.  Rep.  315)       1051 

Damodhar  Gordhani  r.  Deoran  Kanji 

(L.  R.  1  App.  Div.  332)  58 

Damour  v.  Lyons  City  (44  Iowa,  276)  633, 
711,  970,  1071 
Dana  v.  Jackson  St.  Wharf  Co.  (31 

Cal.  118)  136,  558 

V.  San  Francisco  (19  Cal.  486)       481 
Danbury,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  i'.  Norwalk 

(37  Conn.  109)  1075 

Dane  v.  Derby  (54  Me.  05)  868,  879 

Danforth  v.  Schoiiarie  Turnpike  Co. 

(12  Jolms.  227)  455 

Daniel  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Memphis  (11 

Humph.  582)  106,  HI,  472 

V.  New  Orleans  (26  La.  An.  1)       740, 

797 


642 

767 

487 

704 


Daniel  v.  North  (11  East,  375)  661 

V.  Potter  (4  C.  &  P.  262)  1059 

Danielly  v.  Cabaniss  (52  Ga.  211)  105, 121, 

147,  551 
Daniels  v.  Burford  (10  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

481)  260,  325,  902 

p.  Denver  (2  Colorado,  669)  1073 

?'.  Hilgard  (77  111.  640)  171 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (35  Iowa,  129)        607 

V.  Wilson  (27  Wis.  492) 

D'Antignac  r.  Augusta  (31  Ga.  700) 

Danville  v.  Sutherlin  (20  Gratt.  555) 

Danville,  etc.  Co.  i'.  Commonwealth 

(73  Pa.  St.  38) 
Danville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Parks  (88  111.  463)  788 
Danzeiser  v.  Cook  (40  Ind.  65)  1048 

Darby  v.  Crowland  (38  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

338)  325,  935,  1075 

Dargan  v.  Mobile  (31  Ala.  469)      981,  983 

V.  Waddell  (9  Ired.  244)  379 

Darling  v.  Gunu  (50  III.  424)  800 

V.  St.  Paul  (li»  Minn.  389)       123,  357 

V.  Westmoreland  (52  N.  H.  401)  1028 

Darlington  v.  Commonwealth  (41  Pa. 

St.  68)    314,  343,  .599,  635,  638 

V.  Jackson  Co.  ( 101  U.  S.  688)   510 

V.  New  York  (31  N.  Y.  164)  76,  90,  91, 

92,  95,  96,  838,  957,  991 

Darst  V.  People  (62111.  306)  230,  378,  882 

Dart  V.  Houston  (22  Ga.  .506)  83 

Dartmouth  College  v.  Woodward  (4 

Wheat.  518)  26,  74,  75,  92 

Dashielly.  Atty.-Gen.  (5  H.  &  J.  392)  566 

Davenport  v.  Bird  (34  Iowa,  524)        368, 

405,  406,  421 

V.  Hallowell  (10  Me.  317)       441,  447 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (17  Iowa,  276)    220, 

455,  571,  572 

V.  Kelly  (7  Iowa,  102)  388,  389 

V.  Lord  (9  Wall.  409)  864,  865 

V.  Mayor  (37  N.  Y.  568)  1030 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (16  Iowa,  348)      727, 

740,  770,  787 

V.  Ruckman  (37  N.  Y.  568)  1024, 1037. 

1039,  1040,  1047.  1051,  10-59 

V.  Ruckman  (10  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 

20)  1059 

V.  Stevenson  (34  Iowa,  225)    697,  704 
Davenport  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Daven- 
port, etc.  Co.  (43  Iowa,  301) 
Davenport  Gas  Co.  v.  Davenport  (13 

Iowa,  229) 
Davidson  v.  New  Orleans  (96  U.  S. 
97) 
V.  Portland  (69  Me.  116) 
V.  Ramsey  Co.  (18  Minn.  482) 
Davies  v.  Stephens  (7  C.  &  P.  .570) 
Daviess  Co.  v.  Huidekoper  (98  U.  S 

98) 
Davis  V.  Bangor  (42  Me.  522)       655, 

931,  1017,  1027,  1028,  1034 
y.  Bath  (17  Mo.  241)  41 

V.  City  Council  (.51  Ala.  139)  949 
V.  Clinton  (50  Iowa,  .585)  687,  689 
V.  Dudley  (4  Allen,  557)      1022,  1035 


709 

162 

751 

1041 

180 

627 

510 
657, 


xlii 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Davis  r.  Graves  (38  N.  J.  L.  104)  131 

i:  Hill  (41  N.  11.  ;]-J!))  1018 

V.  Lainoilio  I'laiik  Uoad  Co.  (27 

Vt.  002)  1052 

r.  Leominster  (1  Allen,  182)         lOtii 
V.  Lowtlen  (Carth.  2U)  347 

V.  Mavor  (14  N.  Y.50G)  12G,  323,  057, 
05'.),  007,  707,  708,  710,  013 
r.  Mayor,  etc.  (2  Diier,  003)  904 

V.  Montgomery  (51  Ala.  130)        051, 
983,  1037 
V.  Proprietor  (8  Met.  321)  145 

V.  Read  (05  N.  Y.  506)  778,  779 

I'.  Russell  (5  Bing.  .•]55)  238 

V.  Sabita  (03  Pa.  St.  00)  638 

V.  School  District  (24  Me.  349)     461, 

462 
I'.  State  (7  Mil.  151)  71 

V.  State  (4  Stew.  &  P.  8.3)  808 

V.  Winslow  (51  Me.  204)  72.3 

»;.  Woolnough  (0  Iowa,  104)      71,  417 
Davison  College  c  Cliarabers  (3  Jones 

Eq.  253)  557,  558,  569 

Dawes  i*.  Hawkins  (4  Law  T.  N.  S. 

288)  632 

Daws  I'n  re  (8  A.  &  E.  736)  927 

Dawson  v.  Ins.  Co.  (15  Minn.  136)        915 

V.  Thurston  (2  H.  &  M.  132)  819 

Dawson  Co.  v.  McNamara  (4  N.  "W. 

R.  991)  147,496 

Day  V.  Green  (4  Cush.  4.33)  124,  296.  357, 

395,  977 

r.  Kent  (1  Oreg.  123)  226 

V.  Milford  (5  Allen,  08)        1030,  1031 

V.  Schroeder  (46  Iowa,  546)    650,  660 

Dayton  v.  Pease  (4  Ohio  St.  80)  950,  984, 

1046,  1066 

V.  Quigley  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  77)   331,  333 

V.  Rutland  (84  111.  279)  640 

Dean  v.  Borchenius  (30  Wis.  2.36)       465, 

795,  808,  826 

V.  Charlton  (23  Wis.  590)      465,  466, 

006 
V.  Gleason  (16  Wis.  1)     740,  763,774, 
778,  920 
V.  Jay  (23  Me.  117)  288 

V.  Madison  (7  Wis.  688)  165 

V.  New  Milford  Township  (5  W. 

&  S.  545)  984,  1038 

Deane  v.  Todd  (22  Mo.  90)      121,  911,  919 
Deans ville  Cemetery  Ass.   in  re  (66 

N.  Y.  569)  375,  588,  595 

(5  Ilun,  482)  375 

De  Armas  r.  Mayor  (5  La.  132)  649 

Deaton  v.  Polk  Co.  (9  Iowa,  594)  621 

De  Baum  v.  Mayor  (10  Barb.  392)        913 
De  Ben  r.  Girard  (4  La.  An.  30)  334 

Debolt  V.  Cincinnati  (7  Ohio  St.  237)   257 
V.   Insurance   Co.    (1    Ohio    St. 

564)  126 

Decatur  v.  Fisher  (53  111.407)  1037,  1041, 

1042,  1048 

V.  Paulding  (14  Pet.  407)  826 

V.  Vermillion  (77  III.  315)       256,  258 

Decker  v.  Hughes  (68  111.  33)        189,  548 


Decorah  v.  Bullis  (25  Iowa,  12)     292,  293 
V.  Dunston  (38  Iowa,  00)  357 

V.  Gillis  (10  Iowa,  234)  412 

De  Cordova   v.    Galveston    (4    Tex. 

470)  480, 486 

Dedham  Bank  ?>.  Chickering  (3  Pick. 

335)  248 

Deeds  v.  Sanborn  (20  Iowa,  419)  793 

Deeflir;;.  Bowen  (61  Ind.  29)  907 

Deford  v.  Mercer  (24  Iowa,  118)  687 

De  Grave  v.  Monmoutii  (4  C.  &  P. 

411 ;    19  Eng.  C.   L.  300)     293, 
460 
De  Groot  !>i  re  (6  W^all.  497)  826 

Deiman  v.  Port  Madison   (30  Iowa, 

541)  793 

Delabigarre   v.  Municipjility   (3  La. 

An.  230)  649,  670 

Delacey  v.  Neuse,  etc.  Co.  (1  Hawks, 

274)  277,  836 

Delafield  v.  Ulinois  (2  Hill,  159)    42,  155, 
442,  460,  462 
Delahanty  v.  Warner  (75  111.  185)  278,  836 
Delancey  In  re  (52  N.  Y.  80)  944 

Delaney  in  re  (43  Cal.  478)  403 

Delaware  Co.  v.  McClintock  (51  Ind. 

325)  549 

Deleplaine  v.  Railway   Co.  (42  Wis. 

214)  136 

Delmonico  v.  New  Y''ork   (1   Sandf. 

222)  985,  1075 

Delphi  V.  Bowen  (61  Ind.  29)  731,  918,  919 

V.  Evans   (36  Ind.  90)  304,  310,  312, 

314,  682,  683,  687,  707,  797,  999, 

1004 

Demarest  v.  New  Barbadoes  (40  N.  J. 

L.  604)  257 

y.  New  York  (74N.  YM61)      75,111 

V.  New  York  (11  Hun,  19)  75 

V.  Wickham  (63  N.  Y.  320)  291,  292, 

829,  881,  913 

Den  V.  Judges  (3  H.  &  M.  (Va.)  1)       836 

V.  Vreelandt  (2  Halst.  352)  219 

Denning  v.  Roome  (6  Wend.  651 )  304,  316, 

317,  630,  992 

Dennis  v.  Hughes  (8  U.  C.  Q.  B.  444)  £98 

v.  Maynard  (15  111.  477)  85 

Denniston  v.  Clark  (125  Mass.  216)     683, 

687 

Denton  v.  Jackson  (2  Johns.  Ch.  320)    59, 

550,  560,  915 

Denver  i-.  Capelli  (4  Col.  25)    1073,  1074, 

1077 
Denver,  etc.  Railroad  v.  Denver  (2 

Col.  673)  657,  661,  709,  712 

De  Pauw  v.  New  Albany   (22  Ind. 

204)  729 

De  Pere  v.  Bellevue  (31  Wis.  120)  216 
Derby  v.  Ailing  (40  Conn.  410)  627,  638 
Derecourt  v.  Corbishley  (5  E.  &  B. 

188)  238 

Dermont  v.  Detroit  (4  Mich.  435)      1073, 

1074,  1077 

De  Russy  v.  Davis  (13  La.  An.  468)     117 

Des  Moines  v.  Casady  (21  Iowa,  670)  815 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xliii 


Des  Moines  v.  C,  R.  I.,  &  P.  Railroad 

Co.  (41  Iowa,  569)  786 

V.  Hall  (24  Iowa,  234)    625,  627,  632, 

G40,  664,  689 

v.  Layman  (21  Iowa,  153)  613 

Des  Moines   Gas   Co.  v.  Des  Moines 

(44  Iowa,  505)  121,  323,  693 

Desmond  v.  MuCartv  (17  Iowa,  525)    315 

Detroit  v.  Beckman  (34  Mich.  125)      968. 

969,  992,  995,  998,  1046 

V.  Blakeby  (21  Mich.  84)        968,  969, 

1009,    1012,     1015,    1031,    1038. 

1046,  1047 

V.  Corey  (0  Mich.  165)       88,  89,  934, 

1046,  1053,  1058,  1075,  1077 

V.  Detroit  P.   R.   Co.   (37  Mich. 

558)  654 

V.  Jackson  (1  Doug.  106)  445,  460 
I'.  Martin  (34  Mich.  170)  942,  943,  944 
V.  Plank  Road  Co.  ( 12  Midi.  333)  654, 

677 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (23  Mich.  173)      625, 
633,  635,  636,  638,  640,  661 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (39  Ind.  598)  286 

V.  Redfleld  (19  Mich.  376)       256,  257 
V.  Whittemore  (27  Mich.  281)        473 
De  Varaigne  v.  Vox  (2  Blatch.  C.  C. 

95)  583 

De  Vaux   v.   Detroit    (Harring.    Ch. 

Mich.  98)  666 

Deverill  v.  Grand  Trunk  Railway  Co. 

(25  U.  C.  Q.  B.  517)  1021 

Devlin  v.  New  York  (63  N.  Y.  8)  71,  436, 

934 
Devor  v.  McClintock  (9  Watts  &  S. 

80)  217 

Devore's  Appeal  (56  Pa.  St.  163)  211,  213 

De  Voss  V.  Richmond  ( 18  Gratt.  338)      89, 

154,  155,  479,  523,  936 

Devoy  v.  New  York  (39  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

169)  253 

Dew  I'.  Parsons  (18  Eng.  Com.  Law 

87)  942 

Dew's  Case  (3  H.  &  M.  (Va.)  1)  835 

Dewey  v.  Detroit  (15  Mich.  307)  949, 

1048,  10.52 

V.  Supervisors  (62  N.  Y.  294)         940 

Dewitt  V.  Duncan  (46  Cal.  342)  683 

V.  San  Francisco  (2  Cal.  289)  166,  559 

Dey  V.  Jersey  City  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  412)  281, 

290,  296,  341,  443 

V.  Lee  (4  Jones,  238)  264,  803 

De  Zeng  v.  Beekman  (2  Hill,  489)       576, 

577 

Diamond  v.  Cain  (21  La.  An.  309)  83 

V.  Lawrence  Co.  (37  Pa.  St.  353)  479, 

552 
Dickenson  v.   Fitchburg    (13   Gray, 

546)  619 

V.  Poughkeepsie  (74  N.  Y.  65)      456, 

464 

Dickey  ;;.  Ilurlburt  (5  Cal.  343)  225 

r.  Reed  (78  III.  261 )         230,  232,  882 

V.  Telegraph  Co.  (46  Me.  483)      1025 

Dickinson  v.  AVorcester  (7  Allen,  19)  1068 


Dietz  I'.  Central  City  (1  Col.  323)  54,  363, 

365 

Diggsfnre  (52Ala.  381)  835 

Digiiton's  Case  (1  Vent.  82)  245 

Dill  r.  Inhabitants  (7  Met.  438)  441 

V.  Roberts  (30  Wis.  178)  808 

V.  Wareham  (7  Met.  438)        40,  451, 

454,  938,  977 

Dillard  v.  Webb  (55  Ala.  468)  883 

Dillingliam  v.  Snow  (5  Mass.  547)  41,  110 

Dimes  ('.  Petley  (15  Q.  B.  276)  376 

Dimock  v.  Suffield  (30  Conn.  129)       1028 

Dingley  v.  Boston  (100  Mass.  544)       167, 

375,  583,  592 

Dingman  v.  People  (51  111.  277)  125 

Dishon  v.  Smith  ( 10  Iowa,  212)  225 

District  of  Columbia  v.  Saville  ( 1  Mc- 

Arthur,  581)  333 

Dively  v.  Cedar  Falls  (21  Iowa,  565)    481 

V.  Cedar  Falls  (27  Iowa,  227)  102,  721 

Diveny  v.  Elmira  (51  N.  Y.  506)  423, 1037, 

1040,  1047 
Divine  v.  Harvie  (7  J.  J.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

439)  827 

Dix  V.  Dummerston  (19  Vt.  263)  472 

Dixon  V.  Baker  (65  111.  518)      1000,  1071, 

1074 

V.  Cincinnati  (14  Ohio,  240)   604,  924 

V.  Robinson  (3  Mod.  108)  386 

Doan  V.  Mayor,  etc.  (62  N.  Y.  472)       798 

Dodd  V.  Hartford  (25  Conn.  232)  121,  919 

V.  Miller  (14  Ind.  433)  43 

Dodge  I'.  B.  C.  R.  &  M.  Railroad  Co. 

(34  Iowa,  276)  706 

V.  Commissioners  (3  Met.  380)      607, 

609 
V.  Gridlev  (10  Ohio,  173)  354 

V.  Williams  (46  Wis.  70)  557 

Dodson  V.  Cincinnati  (34  Ohio  St. 

276)  1002 

Doe  V.  Attica  (7  Ind.  641)     626,  6-38,  642 

V.  Barnes  (8  Q.  B.  1043)  293 

V.  Chunn  (1  Blackford,  336)  813 

V.  Jones  (11  Ala.  63)      138,  629,  633, 

637,  649 

V.  Norton  (11  M.  &  W.  913)  205 

I'.  Railway  Co.  (14  M.  &  W.  687)   607 

Doering  v.  State  (49  Ind.  56)         237,  238 

,  Doherty  i-.  Waltham  (4  Gray,  596)    1018, 

i  1027 

I  Dolan  V.Baltimore  (4 Gill  (Md.),394)   775 

V.  Mayor  (68  N.  Y.  27»)  259 

V.  Mayor  (4  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S.  397)    465 

Dollar  Savings  Bank  i'.  United  States 

(19  Wall.  277)  810 

Donnaher  v.  State  (16  Miss.  649)  696,  706 

Donahue  i'.  New  York  (3  Daly,  165)  1075 

Donaldson  v.  Boston  (16  Gray,  508)  1052 

Dona  van  v.  New  York  (33  N.  Y.  291)  4-51 

!  v.  Springfield  (12  Mass.  371)  621 

V.  Vicksburg  (29  Miss.  247)    349,  351 

!  Donnelly  v.  Tripp  (12  R.  I.  97)     973,  976 

Donvin  v.  Strickland  (57  N.  Y.  492)     264 

Dooley  v.  Meriden  (44  Conn.  117)      1020 

,  Doolittle  V.  Railroad  Co.  (14  111.  381)  924 


xliv 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Doolittle  V.  Supervisors  (18  N.  Y.   155) 
8!»8,  904,  yiO,  U18 
Donitliy  V.  Cliicago  (53  111.  7U)  806 

Dorchester  i\  Wentworth   (31  N.  11. 

451)  004,924 

Dore  V.  Gvtw  {2  T.  K.  358)  748 

V.  Milwaukee  (42  Wis.  18)    116,  44;J, 

1004 
Dorgan  c.  Boston  (12  Allen,  223)  431,  (ilO, 

747 

I-.  Mobile  (31  Ala.  409)  980 

Dorlon  v.  Brooklyn  (40  Barb.  504)     1048 

Dorman  v.  Jacksonville  (13  Fla.  538)  998, 

1000,  1005 

Dorrosan  v.  Iluttner  (48  Ga.  133)         950 

Dorsey  r.  Smitli  (28  Cal.  21)  259 

Dougherty  c.  Hitchcock  (35  Cal.  512)  767 

Doughty  r.  Hope  (3  Denio,  249)   476,  599 

V.  Kailroad  Co.  (21  N.  J.  L.  442)   698 

Douglass  in  re  (40  N.  Y.  42)  324 

Douglass  in  re  (3  Q.  B.  825)  377 

r.  Branch    Bank   (19  Ala  659)     200 

V.  Chatham  (41  Conn.  211)    179,  192, 

825 
V.  Commonwealth  (2  Bawle,202)  400 
V.  Esse.x  (38  N.  J.  L.  214)  234,  832 
V.  Harrisonville  (9  W.  Va.  162)  895, 
918,  919 
V.  PlacerviUe  (18  Cal.  643)    118,  909, 

912 
V.  Pike  Co.  (101  U.  S.  677)    510,  541. 

552 

V.  State  (31  Ind.  479)  259 

V.  Virginia  City  (5  Nev.  147)        146, 

155,  436,  469 

Douglasville  v.  Jones  (60  Ga.  423)        941 

Doulson  v.  Clinton   City   (33   Iowa, 

397)  1048 

Dovaston  i'.   Payne  (2   Smith  L.  C. 

142,  185)  625,  663 

Dover  v.  Fox  (9  B.  Men.  (Ky.)  200)   026, 

629,  642 

r.  Twombly  (42  N.  H.  59)  243 

Street  in  re  (18  Johns.  ,500)  601 

Dow  V.  Bullock  (13  Gray  (Mass.),  1-36)  240 

V.  Humbert  (91  U.  S.  294)  265 

Dowdney  v.  Xew  York  (54  N.  Y.  180)  815 

Downer  v.  Boston  (0  Cush.  277)   795,  803 

Downing  v.  Marshall  (23  N.  Y.  300)     561 

V.  Rugar  (21  AVend.  178)  264,  298,  300 

Dows  V.  Chicago  (11  Wall.  108)  895,  907, 

919 
Doyle  V.  Austin  (47  Cal.  353)       728,  752, 
771,  772,  774 
V.  Continental  Ins.  Co.  (94  U.  S. 

5.35)  736 

V.  Falconer  (1  Priv.  Council  App. 

329)  271 

Draining    Co.'s   Case    (11   La.   An. 

338)  592,  611,  740,  752,  777 

Drake  u.  Lowell   (13   Mete     (Mass.) 

292)         1024,  1030,  1031,  1032 
V.  Phillips  (40  111.  388)   764,  909,  911. 

912 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (7  Barb.  508)  703,  704 


Draper  v.  Ironton  (42  Wis.  606)  1050, 1051 
Dreher  r.  Fitchburg  (22  Wis.  675)  1035 
Drew  V.  New  River  Co.   (6  C.  &  P. 

754)  1074 

Driver  v.  Railroad  Co.  (32  Wis.  569)  018, 

618,  620 
Drogheda  in  re  (1  O'M.  &  H.  252)  226 
Droneberger  v.  Reed  (11  Ind.  420)  009 
Drury  v.  Natick  (10  Allen   (Mass.), 

169)  914 

r. Worcester  (21  Pick.  (Mass.)44)  1018 
Duane  v.  McDonald  (41  Conn.  517)  833 
Duanesburgh  v.  Jenkins    (57  N.   Y. 

177)  104,  540,  823 

V.  Jenkins  (40  Barb.  674)  188,  548 
Dublin  V.  Mayor,  etc.  (1  Martin  (La.), 

184)  656 

Dublin  Case  (38  N.  H.  450)  569 

Dubois  V.  Augusta  (Dudley  Rep.  30)  329, 

332,  372 

V.  Budlong  (10  Bosw.  700)  379 

V.  Campau  (24  Mich.  360)  813 

V.  Canal  Co.  (4  Wend.  285)  448 

Dubordieu  v.  Butler  (49  Cal.  512)         822 

Dubuque  v.  Benson  (23  Iowa,  248)      627, 

632,  089 
V.  Harrison  (34  Iowa,  163)  812 

V.  III.  Cent.  R.  R.  (39  Iowa,  56)  705, 
787,  788,  810,  811,  812 
V.  Insurance  Co.  (29  Iowa,9)  781,788 
V.  Maloney  (9  Iowa,  450)  629,  032, 
638,  656,  089 
V.  Miller  (11  Iowa,  583)  385,  391 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (4Greene  (Iowa),  1) 

1  165,  180 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (37  Iowa,  95)         788 
V.  Rebman  (1  Iowa,  444)  432 

V.  Stout  (32  Iowa,  47,  80)       138,  140 
V.  Wooton  (28  Iowa,  571)      324,  599, 

801 
Dubuque    College    v.   Dubuque    (13 

Iowa,  555)  462 

V.  Township  (13  Iowa,  55)  400 

Ducat  V.  Chicago  (10  Wall.  410)  736 

V.  Chicago  (48  111.  172)  736 

Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case  (20  How. 

St.  Tr."  355)  881 

Ducker  v.  Hurlbnt  (5  Cal.  343)  221 

Ducksworth  v.  Johnson  (4  H.  &  N. 

653)  1042 

Duckwall  V.  New  Albany  (25 Ind.  283)  143 
Dudley  v.  Trustees  of  Frankfort  (12 

B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  010)  667,  673,  678, 

898,  899 

r.  Weston  (1  Met.  477)  318 

V.  Weston  (3  N.  Y.  9)  881 

Duffey  V.  Tilton  (14  La.  An.  283j         659 

Duffield  V.  Detroit  (15  Mich.  474)         604 

Dufflelds  in  re  (Bright,  Elec.  Cas.  640)  836 

Duffy   V.    Baltimore    (Taney,    C.   C. 

200)  967 

Dugan  V.  Baltimore  (5  G.  &  J.  357)      139 

V.  Baltimore  (1  G.  &  J.  499)  811,  812 

V.  United  States  (3  Wheat.  172)    240 

Duggenr.McGruder(l  Miss.  112)      928 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


xlv 


Dugro  in  re  (50  N.  Y.  513)  465 

Duke  V.  Rome  (20  Ga.  035)  952 

V.  Navigation  Co.  (10  Ala.  372)      883 
Dumesnil   v.    Dupont    (18    B.   Mon. 

(Ky.)  800)  379,  383 

Dummer  v.  Jersey  City  (1  Spencer, 

N.  J.  86)  629,  645,  056,  661 

Dunbar  i'.  San  Francisco  (1  Cal.  355)  954 

Duncan  v.  Haves  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  25)       379 

V.  Louisville  (8  Busli,  98)       601,  602, 

823 
V.  Niles  (32  111.  532)  264 

Duncombe  u.  Fort  Dodge  (38  Iowa, 

281)  444,440 

Dundy  v.  Richardson  Co.  (8  Neb.  508)  66 

Dunham  v.  Ciiicago  (55  III.  357)  775 

V.  Hyde  Park  (75  111.  371)  682 

V.  Rochester  (5  Cow.  462)      331,  3.38, 

349,  357,  360,  361,  388,  389 

Dunion  v.  People  (17  111.  416)  626 

Dunlap   V.   York    (16  Grant   (Can.), 

216)  606 

Dunleith  v.  Reynolds  (53  111.  45)  783 

Dunn    V.  Charleston   (Harper,  Law, 

189)  585,  593 

r.  Rector  (14  Johns.  118)  455 

Dunning  v.  Aurora  (40  111.  481)  659 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Ind.  437)  110 

Dunnovan  v.  Green  (57  111.  63)      96,  165, 

190,  548,  754,  922 

Dunsmore's  Appeal  (52  Pa.  St.  374)    76, 

90,  214,  218,  406,  425 

Du  Page  Co.  v.  Jenks  (65  111.  275)        907 

Durach's  Appeal  (62  Pa.  St.  491)    77,  84, 

790 
Durant  v.  Carter  (L.  R.  9  C.  P.  261)    223 
V.  Iowa  Co.  (1  Woolw.  69)  500 

I'.  Jersey  City  (1  Dutch.  309)         801 
V.  Kauti'man  (34  Iowa,  194)  791 

V.  Palmer  (5  Dutch.  544)    1038,  1059, 

1061 

V.  Supervisors  (26  Wend.  66)         810 

Durfey  v.  Hoag  (1  Aiken,  286)  311 

Durgin  r.  Lowell  (3  Allen,  3[)8)  637 

Durkee  v.  Janesville  (28  Wis.  464)      764, 

815,  1055 

Durkin  v.  Troy  (61  Barb.  437)  1020,  1021, 

1022,  1040 

Durr  V.  Howard  (6  Ark.  461)  428 

Dusenberry  r.  Newark  (io  N.  J.  Eq. 

295)  921 

Dusseau  v.  Municipality  (6  La.  An. 

575)  605,  928 

Dutchess,  etc.   Co.  v.  Hatchfield   (1 

Hun,  675)  553 

Dutton  V.  Strong  (1  Black,  23)     134,  135, 

136,  382 

D wight  V.  Commrs.  (11  Cash.  201)      619 

i;.  Springfield  (4  Gray,  107)  604,  924, 

926,  927 

Dwight  Printing  Co.  v.  Boston  (122 

Mass.  583)  590 

Dyckman  v.  Mayor  (5  N.  Y.  434)        592, 

597,  598,  763 

Dyer  u.  Chase  (52  Cal.  440)  794 


Dyer  v.  Wightman  (60  Pa.  St.  425)      622 
Dygert  v.  Sclienck  (23  Wend.  446)      720, 

1059 

Eager  in  re  (46  N.  Y.  100)  464,  465, 7  7,  794 
Earle's  Case  (Carth.  174)  275 

Earle  v.  New  Brunswick  (38  N.  J.  L. 

47)  633 

East  Anglian  R.  Co.  v.  Eastern  Coun- 
ties R.  Co.  (11  C.  B.  775,  21 
L.  J.  (N.  S.)  C.  P.  23)  935 

East  Hartford  v.  Hartford  Bridge  Co. 

(10  How.  511)       79,  90,  141,  143 
East  Hartford  v.  Hartford  Bridge  Co. 

(17  Conn.  80)  214 

East  Kingston  v.  Towle  (48  N.  PI.  57)  177 
Lincoln  v.  Davenport  (94  U.  S. 

801)  510 

Lincolnshire  in  re  (1  Sim.  N.  S. 

260)  606 

East  Nissouri  v.  Horseman  (16  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  588)  260,  902 

V.  Horseman  (9  U.  C.  C.  P.  191)    902 
East  River  Bank  v.  Butterworth  (51 

940,  941 
App. 

1057 

596,  597 

1057 

123 

357,  363, 

778 

824 

484 

39, 


N.  Y.  637) 
East  St.  Louis  v.  Giblin  (3  111. 

219) 
V.  St.  John  (47  111.  463) 
V.  Klug  (3  111.  App.  90) 
V.  Wehrung  (50  111.  28) 
t'.  Wehrung   (46    III.  392) 


V.  Wider  (46111.  351) 
East  Union  v.  Ryan  (86  Pa.  St.  459) 
Eastman  v.  Meredith  (36  N.  H.  284) 

44,  141,  960,  962,  963,  964,  982, 
984,  985,  992,  1015,  1075 
Easton    v.    Callender,    Road   in   (11 

Wend.  90)  264 

Easton's  Case  (12  A.  &  E.  645)  428 

Eaton  V.  Boston,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  (51 

N.  H.  504)  1002,  1004, 1007, 1072 
V.  Manitowoc    (44  Wis.  489)  27,  68, 

814 

V.  State  (7  Blackf.  65)  890,  893 

f.  Woburn  (127  Mass.  270)  1026 

Eaves  v.  Sbattuck  (35  N.  H.  189)  41 

Ebbw  ValeCo.  (L.  R.  8  Eq.  14)  935 

Ecclesiastical    Commrs.    v.    Clerken- 

well  (4  L.  T.  N.  S.  599)  726 

Edenton  v.  Wool  (65  No.  Car.  379)  419 
Edey  v.  Shreveport  (26  La.  An.  636)  558 
Edgar  v.  Dodge  (11  Mass.  670)  923 

Edgarton  v.  Huflr(26  Ind.  35)  584,  597 
Edgerton  r.  Municipality  (1  La.  An. 


435) 


79,  129 
213 

L. 
808 
192 


Edmunds  v.  Gookin  (20  Ind.  477) 
Edwards  r.  Jersey  City  (40  N.  J 
170) 
V.  People  (88  111.  340) 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (1  Myl.  &  Cr.  659)  318 
V.  Vesey    (Cas.    Temp.    Hardw. 

128)  316 

Ege  V.  Koontz  (8  Pa.  St.  109)        942,  946 
Egginton  in?-e  (2E.  &B.  717)  428 


xlvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Egleston  v.  City  Council  (1  Const.  S. 

C.  45)  417 

Egreniont  c.  Ronjamin  (1*25  Mass.  15)  202 
Euvptian  Levee  Co.  i:  Hardin  (27  Mo. 

41)5)  010,  776 

Ecvpt  St.  in  re  (2  Grant  (Ta.),  Cas. 

455)  113 

Eideniiller  c.  Wyandotte  City  (2  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  37G)  605 
Eikenberry  i:  Bazaar  (22  Kan.  55G)  903 
1-.  Bazaar  (21  Kan.  04'J)  1001) 
Eilert  r.  ()sliko.>ili  (14  Wis.  637)  707 
Ela  V.  Smitli  (5  Gray  (Mass.),  121)  236 
Elder  v.  J3wiglit  Manuf'gCo.  (4  Gray, 

201 )  430 

Eldred  v.  Seaton  (5  Ohio,  216)  201 

Eldridse  r.  Smitii  (34  Vt.  484)  593 

Elgin  V.  Eaton  (83  111.  535)  999, 1005, 1008 
V.  Kimball  (90  111.  356)  1071 

Elias  r.  Nightingale  (8  E.  &  B.  698)  377 
Elizabeth  v.  Force  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  587)  552 
Elkins  V.  Athearn  (2  Denio,  191)  825 

Elkton  Land  Co.  v.  Ayres  (62  Ala. 

413)  907 

Ellerman  v.  McMains  (30  La.  An.  190)    87, 

134 

Elliott  V.  Concord(27  N.  H.  204)  1003,1064 

V.  Pliiladelphia  (75  Pa.  342)    980,  982 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (32  Conn.  579)        714 

V.  Swartout  (10  Pet.  137)       266,  941, 

942,  947 

Elliott  Co.  V.  Kitchen  (14  Bush,  289)    845 

Ellis  V.  Bridgenorth  (4  L.  T.  N.  S. 

112)  386 

V.  Iowa  City  (29  Iowa,  229)         1001, 
1037,  1008 
V.  Sheffield   Gas  Co.    (23    L.   J. 

Q.  B.  42)  690 

y.  State  (4Ind.  1)  43 

V.  Washoe  Co.  (7  Nev.  291)  472 

Ellison  In  re  (20  Gratt.  (Va.)  10)  232,929 

Ellwell  V.  Prop.,  etc.   (3  H.  L.  Cas. 

812)  670 

Elmendorf  y.  Albany  (17  Hun,  81)        749 

V.  Ewen  (2  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  85)     196, 

236 

V.  Mayor  (25  Wend.  693)       196,  209, 

217,  245,  304,  341,  928 

Elmore  Co.  v.  Long  (52  Ala.  277)  8.39 

Elrod  r.  Bernadotte  (53  111.  .368)     572,  573 

Elston  i:  Ciiicago  (40  111.  514)       942,  943 

!.-.  Crawfordsville  (20  Ind.  272)        213 

Elwell  V.  Greenwood  (26  Iowa,  377)     659 

Elwood  c.  Bullock  (6  Q.  B.  383)  362,  414 

Ely  (;.  Rochester  (26  Barb.  133)  166 

V.  Supervisors  (36  N.  Y.  297)  381,  957 

Embury  c.  Connor  (3  Comst.  511)       583, 

585,  586,  596,  599 

Emerson  v.  Blairsville  (2  Pitt   (Pa.), 

Rep.  39)  157 

V.  Lexington  (69  Mo.  157)  995 

1-.  Newberry  (13  Pick.  377)  460 

I'.  Saltmarsh  (7  A.  &  E.  266)  748 

Emery  v.  Gas  Co.  (28  Cal.  345)    610,  751, 

763,  776,  806 


Emery  v.  Lowell  (127  Mass.  138)  941,  944 
V.  Lowell  (104  Mass.  13)       994,  1074, 

1078 
V.  Mariaville  (56  Me.  315)  481 

V.  Washington  (1  Bray  ton  (Vt.), 

128)  640 

Emigrant  Co.  v.  Wright  Co.  (99  U.  S. 

339)  437 

Emmerton  v.  Mathews  (7  H.  &  N.  586)  392 

Empire  v.  Darlington  (101  U.  S.  87)     535 

Emporia  v.  Bates  (16  Kan.  495)     808,  809 

V.  Norton  ( 1.3  Kan.  569,  1874)         105 

('.  Norton  (16  Kan.  236)  .342 

t'.  Voimer  (12  Kan.  622)       358,  407, 

408,  409,  431 

England  v.  Davidson  (11  A.  &  E.  856)   166 

Englisii  V.  Cliicot  County   (26  Ark. 

454)  188,  189 

Episcopal,    etc.    Soc.    v.    Episcopal 

Cliurch  (1  Pick.  372)        206,  460 

Erd  V.  St.  Paul  (22  Minn.  443)  1053 

Erie  v.  Canal  Co.  (59  Pa.  St.  174)  70,  100 

V.  Caulkins  (85  Pa.  247)     1054,  1056, 

1058 

V.  Knapp  (29  Pa.  St.  173)  130 

V.  Schwingle  (22  Pa.  St.  384)        984, 

1037,  1041 

Ernst  V.  Kunkle  (5  Ohio  St.  520)         1005 

Erskine  v.  Van  Arsdale  (15  Wall.  75)  948 

Eschback  v.  Pitts  (6  Md.  71)  811,  814 

Essex  V.  Park  (11  E.x.  C.  C.  P.  473)     244 

V.  Stronu-  (8  U.  C.  L.  J.  15)  244 

V.  Strong  (21  U.  C.  Q.  B.  149)       244 

Estabrook  v.  State  (6  Ala.  653)  731 

Estep  V.  Keokuk  Co.  (18  Iowa,  199)     451 

Estes  v.  Scliool  District  (33  Me.  170)      41 

Estey  V.  Westminster  (97  Mass.  324)  462 

Estwick  V.  London  (Sty.  43)  862 

Etherington  c.  Wilson  (L.  R.  1  Chy. 

Div.  160)  223 

Ethridge  v.  Hill  (7  Port.  (Ala.)  47)       894 
Eureka  v.  Davis  (21  Kan.  578)  305 

Eustace  v.  Johns  (38  Cal.  3)      1021,  1029 
Evan  V.  Avon  (29  Beav.  44)  901 

Evans  v.  Erie  Co.  (66  Pa.  St.  222)       667, 

668,  069 
V.  Evansville  (23  Ind.  229)  635,  638 
V.  Job  (8  Nev.  322)  08 

V.  Pliiladelphia  Club  (50  Pa.  St. 

107)  260,269,274,275 

V.  Trenton  (24  N.  J.  L.  766)  256,  257, 

263 

V.  Utica  (09  N.  Y.  106)   1020,  1021, 

1022,  1040 

Evansville  v.  Evans  (37  Ind.  229)         630 

y.  Hall  (14  Ind.  27)  784,787 

I'.  Martin  (41  Ind.  145)  381 

P.  Paige  (23  Ind.  525)  630 

r.  Pfisterer  (34  Ind.  36)  921 

Everett  v.  Council  Bluffs  (46  Iowa, 

66)  378,  663 

V.  Grapes  (3  L.  T.  N.  S.  669)  376,  380 
Evertson  v.  National  Bank  of  New- 
port (66  N.  Y.  14)  552,  553 
Every  v.  Smith  (26  L.  J.  Exchq.  344)  632 


TABLE   OF   CASES  CITED. 


xlvii 


Ewbanks  v.  Ashley  (36  111.  177)  343,  405, 

4U(J,  421 

Ewing  V.  Filley  (43  Pa.  St.  384)  220,  228, 

232,  42.5,  432 

V.  St.  Louis  (5  Wall.  413)       605,  89G, 

919,  920.  922,  924,  925,  927 

V.  Thompson  (43  Pa.  St.  384)         231 

Exchange  Alley  in  re  (4  La.  An.  4)  596,  598 

Exchange    Bank  v.   Hines    (3   Ohio 

St.  1)  782 

Exeter  v.  Clyde  (4  Mod.  37)  277 

Exon  V.  Starre  (2  Show.  159)  248,  411 
Express  Co.  v.  EUyson  (28  Iowa,  370)  740 
Eyman  v.  People  (6  111.  8)  932 

Facey  v.  Fuller  (23  Mich.  527)  291 

Factors,  etc.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans  (25 

La.  An.  454)  945 

Fahey  v.  Harvard  (62  III.  28)  1048,  1055 
Fair  v.  London  &  N.  W.  Railway  Co. 

(21  L.  T.  N.  S.  326)  1042 

V.  Moore  (3  U.  C.  C.  P.  484)  236,  447 
V.  Philadelphia  (88  Pa.  St.  309)   1068 
Fairbanks  I'.  Kerr  (70  Pa.  86)  657 

Fairchild  v.  Ogdensburgh,  etc.  Rail- 
road Co.  (15  N.  Y.  .337)   481,  483 
Fairfield  i-.  People  (94  111.  244)  741 

V.  Ratcliff  (20  Iowa,  396)        763,  764 
Fallen  v.  Boston  (3  Allen,  38)  1040 

Fallick  V.  Barber  (1  M.  &  S.  108)  166 
Falls  1-.  Cairo  (58  111.  403)  941,  942, 944, 945 
Falmouth  v.  Watson  (5  Bush  (Ky.), 

660)  766 

Fane's  Case  (Doug.  153)  268 

Fanning  v.  Gregoire  (16  How.  524)     143, 

445 
Faribault  v.  Misener  (20  Minn.  396)    762, 

812 
Farmers'  Loan,  etc.  Co.  v.  Carroll  (5 

Barb.  613)  568 

Farmington     v.  Co.    Commrs.    (112 

Mass.  206)  927 

Farnsworth    v.   Boston    (121    Mass. 

173)  601,  603,  859 

Farnum  v.  Concord  (2  N.  H.  392)        962, 

1015,  1040 

Farrar  v.  Greene  (32  Me.  574)    1022,  1023 

Farrell  v.  Bridgeport  (45  Conn.  191)  237, 

258 
V.  King  (41  Conn.  448)  309 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  London  (12  U. 

C.  Q.  B.  343)  934,  935,  986, 1073, 
1074 
r.  Oldtown  (09  Me.  72)        1028,  1052 
Farrelly    v.    Cincinnati    (2    Disney 

(Ohio),  516)  1041 

Farwell  v.  Cambridge  (11  Gray,  413)  619 
y.  Smith  (1  Harr.  1.33)  410 

Fash  V.  Third  Avenue  Railroad  Co. 

(1  Daly,  148)  713 

Fauntleroy  v.  Hannibal  (1  Dill.  118)  109 
Fauvia  v.  New  Orleans  (20  La.  An. 

410)  957 

Fawcett  v.  Charles  (13  Wend.  473)     269, 

273 


Fay  in  re  (15  Pick.  243)  121, 143, 924,  926, 

927 

y.  Noble  (12  Cush.  1)  145 

Fayette  v.  Shafroth  (25  Mo.  445)  431 

Fazakerly  v.  Wiltshire  (1  Stra.  469)  345, 

354,  414 
V.  Wiltshire  (11  Mod.  353)  414 

Fearing  v.  Irwin  (55  N.  Y.  480)  665,  606 
Feital  v.  jMiddlesex  Railway  Co.  (12 

Am.  Rep.  720)  1028 

,Feiten  i-.  Milwaukee  (47  Wis.  494)       602 
I  Felly.  State  (42  Md.  71)  63,350 

I  Fellows  V.  Oilman  (4  Wend.  414)  242 

I  V.  School  Dist.  (39  Me.  559)  942 

Fellowes  v.  New   Haven   (44  'Conn. 

240)  998 

Feltmakers  v.  Davis  (1  Bos.  &  P.  98)  331, 

410,  411 
Felts  V.  Mayor  (2  Head,  263)  559 

Fenelon's  Petition  (7  Pa.  St.  175)  745 
Fennel  in  re  (24  U.  C.  Q.  B.  238)  344,  347 
Fennimore  v.  New  Orleans  (20  La. 

An.  124)  987 

Ferguson  v.  Chittenden   Co.  (6  Ark. 

479)  305 

V.  Earl  of  Kinnoul   (9  CI.  &  F. 

289)  278 

V.  Selma  (43  Ala.  398)  373 

Fernald  v.  Boston  (12  Cush.  (Mass.) 

574)  1005 

V.  Lewis  (6  Me.  264)  961 

Fertilizing   Co.    v.   Hyde  Park    (98 

U.  S.  659)  168,  169,  170 

Fetterly  v.  Russell  (14  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

433)  459 

Field  V.  Carr  (59  III.  198)626,630,  638,639 

V.  Commonwealth  (32  Pa.  St.  478)  259, 

273,  833 

V.  Des  Moines  (39  Iowa,  575)  9-54,  974 

V.  Girard  College  (54  Pa.  St.  233)  234, 

273 
Fifth  Street  in  re  (17  Wend.  667)  998 

Filbey  I'.  Combe  (2M.  &  W.  677)  171 
Finch  V.  Board,  etc.  (30  Ohio  St.  37)     29, 

959,  965 
V.  Temaha  Co.  (29  Cal.  455)  782 

Findler   v.   San  Francisco    (13  Cal. 

534)  576 

Fink  V.  Milwaukee  (17  Wis.  26)  407,  409, 

421 
V.  Newark  (40  N.  J.  L.  11 )  608 

V.  St.  Louis  (23  Alb.  L.  J.  77)     1054, 

1065 

Finley  v.  Dietrick  (12  Iowa,  516)  213 

V.  Philadelphia  (32  Pa.  St.  381)     783 

FinneFl  v.  Kates  (19  Ohio  St.  405)       800, 

806 
Finney  v.  Oshkosh  (18  Wis.  220)  475,  767 
Fire  Department  v.  Helfenstein   (16 

Wis.  136)  358,  740 

V.  Kip  (10  Wend.  267)  62,110 

V.  Wright  (3.E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y), 

478)  734 

First,  etc.  Church  v.  Ft.  Wayne  (36 

Ind.  338)  777 


xlviii 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


First,  etc.  Church  r.  Uticn,  etc.  Hail- 

roiul  Co.  (tl  Barb.  313)  G54 

First  Cong.  Soc.  r.  Atwater  {2:)  Conn. 

34)  r>67 

r.  Hartford  (38  Conn.  274)  941 

First  Nat.  Hk.,  oto.  i-.  Cook  (77  111. 

(i-.'-J)  907 

First  Parisli  v.  Stearns  (21  Pick.  148)  227, 

294,  299 
Fish  V.  Mavor,  etc.  (G  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

2(JH)  684 

V.   Weatiierwax    (2  Johns.    Ca.s. 

217)  252,  830 

Fisher  v.  Beanl  (40  Iowa,  025)  642 

V.  Beard  (32  Iowa,  346)  6-30,  638 

V.  Boston  (104  Mass.  87)         171,  954, 
956,  979,  982,  984 
V.  Graham  (1  Cin.  (O.)  113)  341 

V.  Ilarrisburgli  (2  Grant   Cases, 

201)  331,338,345,688,802 

V.  McGirr  (1  Gray,  1 )       167,  380,  413 
V.  Prowse  (2  Best  &  S.  770;  110 
Eng.  Com.  Law,  770)     627,  630, 
1061 
V.  St.  Louis  (44  Mo.  482)  456 

V.  School  District  (4  Cush.  494)    296, 

461 
V.  Thirkell  (21  Mich.  1)       696,  1060, 

1061 
V.  Val  de  Travers   Asphalt  Co. 

(L.  R.  1  C.  P.  Div.  511)        1062 

r.  Vaughn  (10  U.  C.  Q.B.  492)    205, 

324,  331 

Fisk  V.  Havana  (88  111.  208)  634 

Fiske  V.  Hazzard  (7  11.  I.  438)  178 

Fitch  V.  Pinckard  (5  111.  76)  110, 117,  411, 

767,  781 
Fitz  V.  Boston  (4  Cush.  365)  1034 

Fitzgibbon  v.  Toronto  (25  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

137)  661 

Fitzhugh  u.  Custer  (4  Tex.  391)  861 

Flagg  V.  Palmyra  (33  Mo.  440)     524,  546, 

838,  845 
V.  Worcester  (13  Gray,  601)  995, 

1005,  106.5,  1068,  1069,  1073, 1078 
Flanagan's  Admr.  in  re  v.  Wilmington 

(4  Houst.  548)  937 

Flatbush  Avenue  In  re  (1  Barb.  286)     748 
Flatbush,  Town  of,  in  re  (60  N.   Y. 

398)  86,  100,  823 

Fleckner  v.  U.   S.  Bank  (8  AVheat. 

U.  S.  .3.38)  445 

Fleishel  v.  Hightower  (62  Ga.  324)       573 
Fleming  in  re  (4  Hill,  581)  818 

y.  Mershon  (37  Iowa,  413)  912,  918 
Fleming's  Appeal  (05  Pa.  St.  444)  '  173 
Flemingsburg    v.    Wilson    (1   Bush, 

203)  656 

Fletcher  v.  Auburn,  etc.  Railroad  Co. 

(25  Wend.  462)         663,  697,  704 

V.Lowell  (15  Gray,  103)  236 

V.  Oshkosh  (18  Wis.  229)  767 

V.  Peck  (6  Cranch,  87)  326 

Flewellyn   v.   Webster   (6  Ohio   St. 

586)  205 


Fhnt  V.  Clinton  Co.  (12  N.  H.  43)         576 
V.  Russell  (5  Dillon,  151)         379,  384 
Flint  River    Steamboat  v.  Foster  (5 

Ga.  194)  406 

Flori  V.  St.  Louis  (69  Mo.  341)     959,  961, 

965 
Flournoy   v.  Jeffersonville   (17   Ind. 

169)  475,  808,  810 

Flower  t'.  Adams  (2  Taunt.  314)  1023 
Floyd  V.  Commrs.  (14  Ga.  354)     400,  418, 

421,  424 

V.  Gilheath  (27  Ark.  675)  907 

V.  Turner  (23  Tex.  293)  007 

Floyd  Acceptances  (7  Wall.  666)  480,  620, 

523,  551 

Flynn  v.  Canton  Co.  (40  Md.  312)        950, 

1021,  1029 

Fogg  V.  Nahant  (98  Mass.  578)  1022,  1035 

V.  Nahant  (106  Mass.  278)  1022,  1040 

Follett  V.  People  (12  N.  Y.  273)  720 

Folley  V.  Passaic  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  216)      896 

Folmer  v.  Nuckolls  (6  Neb.  204)    464,  911 

Folsoni  in  re  (56  N.  Y.  60)  779 

V.  School  Directors  (91  111.  402)     147 

V.  Underbill  (36  Vt.  580)       640,  1051 

Fonda  v.  Canal  Appraisers  (1  Wend. 

288)  925 

Foot  V.  Bronson  (4  Lans.  47)  1069 

V.  Prowse  (1  Str.  625)      244,  245,  246 

V.  Prowse  (3  Bro.  P.  C.  169)  244 

Foote  V.  Cincinnati  (11  Ohio,  408)  63 

V.  Johnson  County  (5  Dill.  208, 

281)  501,541,552 

V.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  270)   475,  920 

V.  Pike  Co.  (101  U.  S.  688)  510 

I.'.  Salem  (14  Allen,  487)  165 

Force  v.  Batavia  (61  111.  99)  191,  222,  225, 

542 

Ford  in  re  (6  Lans.  92)  777,  800 

V.  Clough  (8  Me.  334)  41 

V.  Hart"'(L.  R.  9  C.  P.  273)  223 

V.  Mayor  of  New  York  (63  N.  Y. 

640)  442 

u.  Pye  (L.  R.  9C.  P.  269)  223 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (14  Wis.  609)  697,  701, 

704,  714 

V.  Williams  (13  N.  Y.  577)  448 

Foreman  v.  Canterbury  (Law  Rep.  6 

Q.  B.  214)  985,  1027,  1038, 1047 
Forristal  v.  People  (3  111.  App.  470)  247 
Forster  u.  Forster  (4  B.  &  S.  187)  856 
Forsyth  v.  Atlanta  (45  Ga.  152)  952 

Forsythe  v.  Hooper  (11  Allen,  419)  1057 
Fort  Dodge  v.  Moore  (37  Iowa,  388)  771 
Fort  Edward,  etc.  Co.  v.  Payne  (17 

Barb.  567)  661 

Fort  Wayne  v.  Cody  (43  Ind.  197)  683 
?;.  Dewitt  (47Ind.  391)  1037,1049 
y.  Jackson  (7  Blackf.  36)  208 

Fortune  v.  St.  Louis  (23  Mo.  539)  130 
Forward  v.  Bartels  (7  U.  C.  C  P.  533)  223 
Fosdick  ?'.  Perrysburg   (14  Ohio  St. 

472)  189,  190,  768 

Foss  V.  Chicago  (56  111.  354)  778 

Fosse tt  V.  Bearce  (29  Me.  523)  286 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


xlix 


Foster  v.  Callaway  Co.  (3  Dillon,  C. 

C.  K.  201)  536 

V.  Coleman  ( 10  Cal.  278)  485 

V.  Fowler  (60  Pa.  St.  27)  73,  572,  573 

V.  Kenoslia  (12  Wis.  616)    70,  94,  501 

«.  Lane  (10  Fost.  305)  31 

V.  McKibben  (14  Pa.  St.  168)         265 

V.  Khoads  (19  Johns.  191)  355 

V.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  App.  564)      1000 

V.  Scarf  (15  Ohio  St.  535)  222 

i;.  Shaw  (7  S.&  R.  163)  219 

Fourth  Avenue  In  re  (4  Wenrl.  452)     748 

Fowle  V.  Alexandria  (3  Peters,  398)     112, 

951,  952,  963 

Fowler  in  re  (53  N.  Y.  60)  594,  688 

V.  Pierce  (2  Cal.  165)  827,  868 

u.  St.  Joseph  (37  Mo.  228)  922 

V.  Strickland  (107  Mass.  552)         500 

Fox  V.  Glastenburv  (29  Conn.  204)     1051 

D.  Hart  (UOliio,  414)  671 

V.  Northern    Liberties    (3  Watts 

&  S.  (Pa.)  103)  976 

v.Eockford  (38  111.  451)  676 

V.  Sackett  ( 10  Allen,  535)  1051 

V.  State  (5  How.  410)  371 

Francis  v.  Cockrell   (L.  R.  5  Q.  B. 

184)  141 

V.  Troy  (74  N.  Y.  338)     116,  443,  444 

Franey  v.  Miller  (11  Pa.  St,  435)  625 

Frank  in  re  (52  Cal.  606)       117,  331,  333, 

335,  338,  358,  735 

V.  San  Francisco  (21  Cal.  668)      112, 

842 
Frankfort  R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  (58 

Pa.  St.  119)  359,  711,  712 

Frankfort  Bridge   Co.   v.  Frankfort 

(18B.  Mon.  41)  4.55 

Franklin  v.  Fisk  ( 13  Allen,  211 )  1068 

V.  Southeastern  Railway  Co.   (3 

H.  &N.  211)  1042 

Franklin,  etc.  Co.  v.  Portland  (67  Me. 

46)  138,  378,  723,  986.  1076 

Frazier  v.  Warfield  (13  Md.  279)  120,  393 
Frederick  v.  Augusta  (5  Ga.  561)  105,  190, 
400,  782,  918 
V.  Groshen  (20  Md.  436)  910 

Freedom  v.  Ward  (40  Me.  383)  721 

Freeholders  v.  Barber  (2  Halst.  64)     357, 

766 

V.  Strader  (3  Harrison,  N.  J.  108)  720, 

930,  958,  962,  963,  1009,  1038 

Freeland  v.  Hastings  (10  Allen,  570)    178, 

187 

V.  Muscatine  (9  Iowa,  461)  1005 

Freeman  v.  Cornwall  ( 10  Johns.  470)    264 

Freeport  v.  Bristol  (9  Pick.  46)  588 

V.  Isbell  (83  111.  440)  1018,  1026 

V.  Marks  (59  Pa.  St.  253)        326,327 

Freese  v.  Benton  (37  N.  J.  L.  139)        774 

Fremont  Assoc,  v.  Sherwin  (6  Neb. 

48)  494 

French  v.  Brunswick  (21  Me.  29)       1028, 

1034 
?;.  Burlington  (42  Iowa,  614)  161,  164 
V.  Commissioners  (12  Mich.  267)  604 

VOL.  I.  d 


French  v.  Edwards  (13  Wall.  511)  286 
V.  Milwaukee  (6  N.  W.  R.  244)  1003 
V.  Quincy  (3  Allen,  9)  166,  561,  571, 
642,  650 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (2  La.  An.  80)  646 
V.  Teschemaker  (24  Cal.  518)  188 
Frewin  v.  Lewis  (18  Eng.  Ch.  249)      900, 

916,  917 
Friday  v.  Floyd  (63  111.  50)  177,  352 

Frend  v.  Dennett  (4  C.  B.  N.  S.  576)  373, 

443 
Frith  V.  Dubuque  (45  Iowa,  406)  704 

Fritsch  v.  City  of  Alleghany  ( Pa.  1879, 

20A.  L.  J.  373)  1027,1038 

Fritz  ?;.  Hobson   (19  Am.  Law  Reg. 

615)  377,  724 

Frolichstein  v.  Mobile  (40  Ala.  725)  397 
Frommer  v.   Richmond   (31   Grattan 

(Va.),  646)  360 

Frost  V.  Belmont  (6  Allen,  Mass.  152)  902, 

913 
u.  Chester  (5  E.  &B.  531)  246,832 
V.  Waltham  (12  Allen,  85)  1024, 1040, 

1051 

Fry  V.  Booth  (19  Ohio  St.  25)  226 

Fry's  Election  (71  Pa.  302)  224 

Fry's  Election  (10  Am.  Rep.  698)         224 

FuUam  v.  Brookfield  (9  Allen,  1)  447,  450 

Fuller  in  re  (25  Ark.  261 )  856 

y.  Chicago  (89  111.  282)  163 

V.  Edings  (11  Rich.  L.  239)  134 

V.  Groton  (14  Gray,  340)  174 

V.  Heath  (89  111.  296)  163,  164 

Fulton  V.  Davenport  (17  Iowa,  404)    791, 

793 
V.  Lincoln  (9  Neb.  358)  116,  44,3,  466, 

767 
V.  Mehrenfield  (8  Ohio  St.  440)    625, 

626 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (21  111.  273)  191 

Fulweiler  v.  St.  Louis  (61  Mo.  479)      424 

Furman  v.  Knapp  (19  Johns.  218)         769 

V.  New  York  (5  Sandf.  16)  139 

V.  NichoU  (8  Wall.  44)  93 

Furman  St.  in  re  (17  Wend.  649)  210,  617, 

618,  639,  682 

Furnell  v.  Cotes  (19  Ohio  St.  405)        599 

V.  St.  Paul  (20  Minn.  117)  1029,  1038, 

10.39,  1048,  1049,  1052 

Gabler  v.  Elizabeth  (42  N.  J.  L.  79)  842 
Gabriel  v.  Clark  (Cro.  Car.  1-38)  250 

Gachet  r.  McCall  (50  Ala.  307)  944 

Gaddis  v.  Richland  Co.  (92  111.  119)     188, 

191 

GafFney  v.  Gough  (36  Cal.  104)  815 

Gage  V.  Chicago  (2  111.  App.  332)  241 

V.  Graham  (57  III.  144)  736 

Gahagan  v.  Railroad    Co.   (1   Allen 

(Mass.),  187)  707 

Gaillard  v.  Laxton  (2  B.  &  S.  363)  238 
Galbreath  v.  Armour  (4  Bell  App.  C. 

374)  690,  697, 709 

Gale  V.  Kalamazoo  (23  Mich.  344)       124, 

125,  361,  362,  386,  388,  446,  952 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Gale  I'.  Mead  (2  Dcnio,  160)  264 

V.  South  Berwick  (51  Me.  174)      165 

Galeua  v.  Amy  (5  Wall.  705)       502,  838, 

842,  848 
I'.  Corwith  (48  III.  423)  154,  165,  158, 

435 
Galesburg  v.  Hawkinson  (75  111.  152)    27, 

210 

i\  Hi?ley  (01  111.  287)  1055 

Gall  V.  Cincinnati  (18  Ohio  St.  563)  385, 

38G,  C34,  083 

Gallia   County  i'.    Holcom   (7    Ohio 

(pt.  1)  232)  117 

Galloway  v.  London  (L.  R.  1  H.  L.  34)  559 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (03  N.  Car.  147)  918 
Galhip  V.  Tracy  (25  Conn.  10)  208 

Galveston  v.  Menard  (23  Tex.  349)  136, 
138,  139,  667,  671,  673 
Gamble  v.  St.  Louis  (12  Mo.  617)  637 
Gannon  v.  Har^adon  (10  Allen,  100)  1008 
Gano  i:  State  '( 10  Ohio  St.  2-37)  894 

Gardiner  v.   Boston    Railroad    Corp. 

(9Cush.  (Mass.)  1)  702 

Gardiner,  etc.  Co.  v.  Gardiner  (5  Me. 

133)  784 

Gardner  v.  Boston  (106  Mass.  549)       802 

V.  Newburg  (2  Johns.  Ch.  162)     580, 

593,  605,  1066 

V.  Ogden  (22  N.  Y.  332)  437 

y.  State  (21  N.J.  L.  557)        770,787 

Garland  v.  Towne  (55  N.  H.  55)  657, 

1021,  1032 

Gamier  v.  St.  Louis  (37  Mo.  554)         253 

Garrett  v.  St.  Louis  (25  Mo.  505)         611, 

753,  776 
Garrigus  r.  Parke  Co.  (39  Ind.  66)  192 
Garrison  v.  Chicago  (7  Biss.  480)         122, 

159,  691 
V.  New  York  (21  Wall.  196)  601,  602, 

603 
Gartside  v.  East  St.  Louis  (43  111.  47)  680, 

896 
Garvey  In  re  (77  N.  Y.  523)  116,  443,  781 
Garvin  v.  Wells  (8  Iowa,  286)  408 

Gas  Co.  V.  County  (30  Pa.  St.  2-32)  785,786 
V.  San  Francisco  (9  Cal.  453)    89,  459 
V.  San  Francisco  (6  Cal.  190)  321,  341 
Gaskil  V.  Dudley  (6  Met.  (Mass.)  546)  838, 

961 
Gaskin's  Case  (8  T.  R.  209)  273 

Gass  f.  State  (34  Ind.  425)  225,  229 

Gassett  v.  Andover  (25  Vt.  342)  455 

Gates  V.  Delaware  County  (12  Iowa, 

405)  249,251 

V.  Hancock  (45  N.  H.  528)  463 

Gault's  Appeal  (34  Pa.  St.  95)  815 

Gaunt  V.  Finney  (L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap.  8)    376 

Gause  v.  Clarksville  (5  Dill.  165)  151, 1.5.3, 

154,  155,  935,  939 

Gay  V.  Bradstreet  (.39  Me.  580)  604 

V.  Cadbv  (L.  R.  2  C.P.  Div.  391)  171 

Gearhart  v.  Dixon  (1  Pa.  St.  224)       312, 

316,  768 
Gebhardt  v.  Reeves  (75111.  301)  625,  632. 

650 


Gedge  v.  Commonwealth,  (9  Bush, 

61)  640,641 

Gee  V.  Lancashire,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (6  H. 

&N.  211)  1042 

V.  Metropolitan  R.  W.  (L    R.  8 

Q.  B.  177)  1023,1051 

V.  Wilden  (Lutw.  1320)  403 

Geiger  v.  Filor  (8  Flor.  325)  134,  696,  699 
Gelpcke   v.    Dubuque    (1  Wall.  175, 

221)   156,  180,  189,  199,  479,  499, 
501,  603,  509,  622,  524,  525,  540, 
648 
Geneva  v.  Cole  (61  III.  397)  61,  811 

Genois  ?;.  Lockett  (13  La.  545)  898 

Gentile  v.  State  (29  Ind.  409)  68 

George  v.  Oxford  Township  (16  Kan. 

72)  225 

Gerberling  v.  Wunnenberg  (51  Iowa, 

125)  6.37 

Gerard  v.  Cook  (2  Bos.  &  P.  109)         726 
Germania  v.  State  (7  Md.  1)  356,  789 

Gerry  v.  Stoneman  (1  Allen,  319)  176,  286 
Ghenn  v.   Provincetown  (105   Mass. 

313)  1027,  1039,  1048 

Gibbon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (36  Ala.  410)  165, 

179 
Gibbons  v.  Sheppard  (65  Pa.  St.  20)  925 
Gibbs  V.  Liverpool  Docks  (3  H.  &  N. 

164)  141 

Giboney  v.  Girardeau  (58  Mo.  141)      213, 

793 
Gibson  v.  Bailey  (9  N.  H.  168)      307,  308 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  I'reston  (L.  R. 

5  Q.  B.  218)  994 

Giesy  v.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Ohio  St.  308)  594, 

618,  621 
Gifford  V.  Railroad  Co.  (10  N.  J.  Eq. 

171)  909 

Gilbert  v.  New  Haven  (40  Conn.  102)  312, 

455 
V.  Roxbury  (100  Mass.  185)  1020 

V.  Sliowerman  (23  Mich.  448)         379 
Gilbert  Elevated  Railroad  Co.  in  re 

(70N.  Y.  301)  322,709 

Gilchrist  v.  Garden  (26  U.  C.  C.  P.  1)  1018 
V.  Little  Rock  (1  Dillon,  C.  C  R. 

261)  497,551 

V.  Schmidling  (12  Kan.  263)  352 

Giles's  Case  (2  Stra.  881)  825 

Giles  V.  School  District  (31  N.  H.  304)    31, 

223  286 
Gilham  v.  Wells  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  319)  '  364 
Gilkerson  v.  Justices  (13  Gratt.  (Va.) 

577)  740,  747,  789 

Gill  V.  Brown  (12  Johns.  385)  263 

Gillett    V.    Commrs.   Lyon    Co.    (18 

Kan.  410)  964 

Gillette  v.  Hartford  (31  Conn.  351)       793 
Gilman  v.  Deerfield  (15  Gray  (Mass.), 

577)  1040 

V.  Laconia  (55  N.  H.  130)      960,  962, 

1066,  1074 

V.  Sheboygan  (2  Black,  510)   94,  731, 

740,  765,  782 

V.  Waterville  (59  Me.  491)  941 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED, 


Gilmer  v.  Lime  Point  (18  Cal.  229)      590 


V.  Lime  roint  (19  Cal.  47) 
Gilmore  r.  Fox  ( lU  Kan.  509) 
V.  Holt  (1  Pick.  25«) 
V.  Lewis  (12  Ohio,  281) 


598 
920 
177 
166,  256, 
258 
67 
261 


V.  Norton  (10  Kan.  491) 
V.  Pope  (5  Mass.  491) 
Glrard  v.  New  Orleans  (2  La.  An.  897)  560, 

562,  566 

V.  Pliiladelpliia  (7  Wall.  1)  75,  86,  87, 

106,  111,  198,  20:3,  206,  213,  557, 

663,  564 

Girard  Will  Case  (2  How.  127)  568 

Girardeau  v.  Riley  (52  Mo.  424)  325 

Glasby  v.  Morris  ( 18  N.  J.  Eq.  72) 


689 
739 
428 
942 


Glasgow  V.  Rowse  (43  Mo.  479) 
Glashan  in  re  (29  U.  C.  Q.  B.  81) 
Glass  Co.  V.  Boston  (4  Met.  181) 
Glastenbury   v.   McDonald    (44    Vt. 

450)  486 

Glencoe  v.  People  (78  111.  382)     221.  825, 
829,  856,  864,  865 
Gless  V.  White  (5  Sneed,  475)  769 

Glidden  v.  Unity  (30  N.  H.  104)  128 

V.  Unity  (33  N.  H.  571)  262 

Glovers ville  v.  Howell  (70  N.  Y.  287)   63, 

322 
Goddard  in  re  (16  Pick.  504)  114,  395,  407, 

421 

V.  Jacksonville  (15  111.  588)    363,  365 

V.  Smithett  (3  Gray,  116)  879 

Goddin  v.  Crump  (7  Leigh,  120)    179,  731 

Godfrey  i-.  Alton  (12  111.  29)  026,  633,  646 

Goldersleve  v.  Alexander  (2  Speer, 

298)  222 

Goldschmidc  v.  New  Orleans  (5  La. 

An.  436)  484 

Goldsmith   v.   New   Orleans  (31  La. 

646)  365 

Goldthwaite  v.  East  Bridgewater  (5 

Gray  (Mass.),  61)  1034 

V.  Montgomery  (50  Ala.  486)        409, 

433,  789 

Gooch  V.  Gregory  (65  N.  C.  142)  572,  573 

Goodale  u.  Fennell  (27  Ohio  St.  426)  93,  94 

V.  Tuttle  (29  N.  Y.  459)       1065,  1070 

Goodall  V.  Milwaukee  (5  Wis.  32)       683, 

1002 
Goodel  V.  Baker  (8  Cow.  286)  288 

Goodell  in  re  ( 14  Johns.  325)  824 

Goodenovv  n.  Buttrick  (7  Mass.  140)  112 
Goodloe  V.  Cincinnati  (4  Ohio,  500)  1002 
Goodnough  v.  Oshkosh  (24  Wis.  549)  1052 
Goodman  r.  Harvey  (4  A.  &  E.  870)  499 
V.  Simonds  (20  How.  343)  500 

Goodnow  r.  Commissioners  (11  Minn. 

31)  480,482 

Goodrell  v.  Jackson  (20  Johns.  706)     5-56 

Goodrich  ?;.  Brown  (30  Iowa,  291)  408,  431 

V.  Chicago  (20  111.  445)  122,  127,  825, 

950 

V.  Detroit  (12  Mich.  279)       161,  4.36, 

475,  476 


Goodrich  v.  Milwaukee  (24  Wis.  422)  1002 
Goodtitle  v.  Alker  (1  Bnrr.  153)  632,  663, 

684 
V.  Alker  (1  Kenyon,  427)  684 

Goodwin  in  re  (U.  C.  C.  P.  254)  206 

I'.  Cincinnati,  etc.   Co.  (18  Ohio 

St.  169)  617 

V.  Des  Moines  (23  Alb.  Law  Jour. 

76)  1062 

V.  McGehee  (15  Ala.  233)  574 

V.  Robarts  (L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  476)  499 
Gordon  v.  Appeal  Tax  (3  How.  U.  S. 

133)  787 

V.  Baltimore  (5  Gill  (Md.),  231)    774, 

787,  811,  941,  944; 

V.  Dearborn  Co.  (52  Ind.  322)         469 

V.  Farrer  (2  Doug.  411)  265 

V.  Preston  ( 1  Watts,  385)  574 

f.  Taunton  (126  Mass.  349)  974 

Gorgier  v.  MierviUe  (3  B.  &  C.  45)       499 

Gorham  v.  Campbell  (2  Cal.  135)  226 

V.  Cooperstown  (59  N.  Y.  660)    1027, 

1048 
V.  Springfield  (21  Me.  58)  62,  213,  216 
Gorman  v.  Low  (2  Edw.  Ch.  324)         353 
Goshen  v.  Croxton  (.34  Ind.  237)  407,  409 
V.  Kern  (63  Ind.  468)  358,  396 

Goshorn  v.  County  (1  W.  Va.  308)  189 
GosUng  V.  Veley  (19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S. 

135)  323 

Goss  V.  Corporation  (4  Sneed  (Tenn.), 

62)  393 

Gosseliuk  v.  Campbell  (4  Iowa,  296)  352, 

355 
Goszler  v.  Georgetown  (6  Wlieat.  593)  125, 
168,  681,  682,  999,  1001 
Goudier  r.  Cormack  (2  E.  D.  Smith 

254)  1058 

Gould  V.  Atlanta  (60  Ga.  164)  975 

V.  Booth  (66  N.  Y.  62)        1065,  1066, 

1068,  1070,  1077 

V.  Gapper  (5  East,  345)  929 

V.  Sterling  (23  N.  Y.  439)      180,  188. 

191,  479,  501,  516,  523,  547,  549 

V.  Tavlor  Orphan    Asylum    (46 

Wis.  106)  557 

Goundie  v.  Water  Co.  (7  Pa.  St.  233)  569 
Gourley  v.  Allen  (5  Cow.  644)       825,  829 
V.  Hawkins  (2  Iowa,  75)  576 

Govan  v.  Jackson  (.32  Ark.  553)  228 

Governor  v.  Allen  (8  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

176)  42 

u.  Justices  (19  Ga.  97)  963 

V.  McEwen  (5  Humph.  241)  76 

V.  Meredith  (4  Term  Rep.  790)     168, 
953,  995,  1001 
V.  Plummer  (2  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

500)  42 

Goyne  v.  Ashley  Co.  (31  Ark.  552)  485 
Graff  (.'.  Baltimore  (10  Md.  544)  602,  603 
Graffins  v.  Commonwealth  (3  P.  &  W. 

502)  262 

Graham  v.  Carondelet  (33  Mo.  262)     290, 

310,  341 
V.  Parham  (32  Ark.  676)  849 


Hi 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Grahaniv.  Stnte  (1  Ark.  171)  418 

Granby  v.  Thurston  (2o  Conn.  416)     210, 

214,  215 
Grand,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hall  (1  M.  &  G. 

392)  670 

Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar  (15  Wall. 

355)    494,  509,  622,  524,  525,  626 
Grand  Rapids  v.  Bhikely   (40  Mich. 

367)  040 

r.  Gray  (38  Mich.  461)  419 

V.  Hughes  (15  Midi.  54)  346,433,678 
Granger  r.  Averv  (64  Me.  292)  210 

V.  Buffalo  (6  Abb.  N.  Cas.  238)     732 
r.  Fulaski  County  (26  Ark.  37)     961, 

1009 
Grant  i:  Brooklyn  (41   Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

381)  1046,  1075 

V.  Commrs.  (L.  R.  11  Ir.  C.  L.  R. 

190)  1053 

V.  Courter  (24  Barb.  2.32)  70 

V.  Davenport  (18  Iowa,  179)  135, 136, 

138,  139,  677,  639,  647 

V.  Davenport  (36  Iowa,  390)  161,162, 

436,  091,  786,909,  912 

V.  Erie  (69  Pa.  420)  127, 171,  950,  982, 

106a,  1073 

V.  Fancher  (5  Cow.  309)  261 

Grassick  v.  Toronto  (39  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

306)  1033 

Graves  v.  Colby  (9  Ad.  &E.  356)  410,  411 

z;.  Otis  (2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  466)  998 

V.  Shattuck  (35  N.  H.  257)  723 

Gray  v.  Brooklyn  (10  Abb.  Pr.  N.  S. 

186)  76,  84.  90,  957 

V.  Hubble  (32  L.  J.  Rep.  N.  S.)    1057 
V.  Iowa  Land  Co.  (26  Iowa,  387)  652, 
665,  666 
V.  Pullen  (5  B.  &  S.  970)  1049 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (13  Minn.  315)       697 
V.  Rollingsford  (-58  N.  H.)  262 

V.  Sheldon  (8  Vt.  402)  209 

V.  State  (2  Harring.  76)  417,  430 

Grayville  v.  Whittaker  (85  111.  439)    1010 
Great  Western  Railway  Co.  &  North 
Cayuga  in  re  (23  U.  C  C  P. 
28)   .  327 

Greaves  v.  Newfoundland  (23  L.  T. 

53)  606 

Greeley  v.  People  (60  111.  19)  42,  610 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (53  Me.  200)         1068 

Green  v.  Canaan  (29  Conn.  157)  634 

V.  Cape  May  (41  N.  J.  L.  45)       116, 

117,  461 

V.  Cheek  (5  Ind.  105)  209 

u.  Danbv  (12  Vt.  338)  1021,1034 

i;.  Durham  (1  Burr.  131)  291 

V.  IndianapoUs  (25  Ind.  490)    68,  318, 

409 
V.  Marks  (24  III.  221)  572 

V.  Mayor  (R.  M.  Charlt.  368)  71,  430, 


V.  Mayor  (5  Abb.  Pr.  503)  76,  476 

V.  Miller  (6  Johns.  39)  297 

V.  Mumford  (5  R.  I.  472)  919 

V.  Oaks  (17  111.  249)  636 


Green  v.  Portland  (32  Me.  431)  704 

V.  Reading  (9  Watts,  382)      683,  696, 
998,'  1007 
V.  Rutherford  (1  Ves.  462)  '  562 

V.  Savannah  (6  Geo.  1)    168,  379,  380 
V.  State  (8  Ohio,  310)  314 

V.  Swift  (47  Cal.  536)  168 

I'.  Underwood  (42  N.  Y.  140)  379 

Green  Township,  Case  of  (9  Watts 

&  S.  22)  195 

Greencastle  r.  Allen  (43  Ind.  347)  457 
Greene  v.  Mayor  (60  N.  Y.  303)  464,  467 
Greenough  v.  Wakefield   (127  Mass. 

275)  176 

Greensboro  v.  Mullens  (13  Ala.  841)   357, 

369 
Greensburg  v.  Young  (53  Pa.  St.  280)  745 
Greenville  v.  Mason  (53  N.  H.  515)      107, 

215 
Greenwich  v.  R.  R.  Co.  (24  N.  J.  Eq. 

217)  661 

V.  R.  R.  Co.  (25N.  J.  Eq.  565)        661 
Greenwood   v.  Louisville   (13  Bush, 

226)  980,  982 

Gregory  v.  Adams  (14  Gray,  242)      1014, 

1017,1048 
V.  Bridgeport  (41  Conn.  76)  126, 174, 

175 

r.  Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  890)     4.36 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (40  N.  Y.  273)        372 

Gribble  v.  Sioux  City  (38  Iowa,  390)  1040 

Gridley  v.  Bloomington  (68  111.  47)      095, 

1059,  1061 

V.  Bloomington  (88  III.  554)    395,  764 

Grier  t-.  Shackleford  (3  Brev.  491)        232 

V.  Shackleford  (Const.  Rep.  642)  229, 

432 
V.  Taylor  (4  McCord  (S.  C),  206)  882 
Grierson  v.  Ontario  (9  U.   C.   Q.  B. 

623)  324,  831 

Griffin  v.  Coleman  (4  H.  &  N.  265)       238 

V.  Martin  (7  Barb.  298)  686 

V.  Willow  (43  Wis.  509)  1051 

V.  Mayor  (5  Martin  (La.),  279)       388 

V.  Mayor  (9  N.  Y.  456)  949,  950, 1037, 

1040,  1047,  1048,  1052,  1001 

V.  Rising  (2  Cush.  75)         600 

V.  Steele  (1  Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  505)     872 

Griffing  v.  Pintard  (29  Miss.  173)  815 

Griffith  V.  EoUett  (20  Barb.  G30)  265 

V.  Harries  (2  M.  &  W.  335)  405 

Griggs  i^.  Foote  (4  Allen,  195)      608,  935, 

978,  998 
Grim  v.  School  District   (57  Pa.   St. 

433)  943 

Grimes  v.  Keene  (52  N.  H.  330)   262,  985, 

1053 
Grimshaw  v.  Railway  Co.  (19  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  493)  607 

Grindley  v.  Barker  (1  Bosw.  &P.  236) 

297,  298 
Grinham  v.  Willey  (4  H.  &  N.  496)  238 
Griswold  V.  Bay  City  (35  Mich.  452)  687, 


V.  Pelton  (34  Ohio  St.  482) 


919 


TABLE   OF  CASES  CITED. 


liii 


Griswold  v.  Stonington  (5  Conn.  367)  472 
Grocers'  Co.  i'.  Donne  (3  Bing.  N.  C. 

34)  1074 

Groenvelt  v.  Burwell   (1  Ld.   Raym. 

454)  922 

Grogan  v.  San  Francisco  (18  Cal.  590)    76, 
92,  102,  463,  574,  649,  938 
Groton  v.  Haines  (36  N.  H.  388)  1066 

Grove  v.  Fort  Wavne  (45  Intl.  429)     962, 
1011,  1030,  1031 
Grube  v.  Nichols  (36  111.  93)  G34,  637 

Grumbine  i-.  Washington  (2  McArthur, 

578)  979, 980 

Guardians,  etc.  v.  Vestry,  etc.  (L.  R. 

2  Q.  B.  Div.  145)  171 

Guelph  V.  Canada  Co.  (4  Grant  (Can.), 

632)  631 

Guerin  v.  Reese  (30  Cal.  292)        810,  815 
Guernsey  ;,'.  Burlington  (4  Dill.  372)    494, 

595 
Guest  V.  Brooklyn  (69  N.  Y.  506)  605,  757 
Guilder  v.  Otsego  (20  Minn.  74)  100 

Guilford  v.  Supervisors  (13N.  Y.  143)  101, 
102,  744,  898 
Guillotte  I'.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An. 

432)  350,  393 

GulfR.  R.  Co.  V.  Morris  (7  Kan.  210)  921 
Gulic  V.  New  (14  Ind.  93)  224,  418 

Gulick  V.  Connely  (42  Ind.  134)  477 

Gunn  I'.  County  (3  Ark.  427)  825,  839 
Gunnarssohn  v.  Sterling  (92  111.  569)  363 
Gurner  v.  Chicago  (40  111.  165)  780,  808 
Guthrie  v.  Armstrong  (5  B.  &  A.  G28)  297 
V.  New  Haven  (31  Conn.  308)        640, 

677 
Gutzweller  v.  People  (14  111.  142)  76,  85 
Guy  I.'.  Baltimore  (100  U.  S.  434)  7.34,  735 
Gwynne  v.  Cincinnati  (3  Ohio,  25)     588, 

634 
V.  Rees  (2  U.  C.  P.  R.  282)  205 

Haag  V.  Board  of  Commrs.,  etc.  (60 

Ind.  511)    140,378,971,972,973 
Hackett  v.  Ottawa  (99  U.  S.  86)  510 

Hackettstown     ads.     Schwackliaraer 

(.37N.  J.  L.  191)      144,149,154, 

155,  481 

Hackney  Election  (31  L.  T.  N.  S.  60)  226 

Haddock's  Case  (T.  Raym.  439)  274,  416 

Hadley  v.  Chamberlain  (11  Vt.  618)     309 

V.  Mayor  (33  N.  Y.  003)  229,  2-32,  2.59, 

276 
V.  Peabody  (13  Gray,  200)  130 

y.  Taylor  (L.  R.  1  C.  P.  53)  1059 

Ilafford  V.  New   Bedford    (10   Gray, 

297)   954,  956,  978,  980,  982,  984. 

988 

Ilagar  ;;.  Yolo  Co.  (47  Cal.  222)  727 

Hagen  v.  Campbell  (8  Port.  (Ala.)  9)  136 

linger  v.  Burlington  (42  Iowa,  661)     767, 

797 
Hagerstown  v.  Dechert  (32  Md.  369)  419, 

957 
Hagner  u.  Heyberger  (7  Watts  &  S. 

104)  233,  291,  882 


Hague  V.  Philadelphia  (48  Pa.  St.  527)  21, 

442,  446,  451,  461,  462,  464,  485 

Haight  V.  Keokuk  (4  Iowa,  199)  689 

Haines  v.  School  District  (41  Me.  246)  941 

Halbert  v.  State  (22  Ind.  125)        202,  263 

Hale  V.  Cusliman  (6  Met.  425)  913 

V.  Houghton  (8  Mich.  458)  173 

V.  Kenosha  (29  Wis.  599)       740,  774, 

778  783 

V.  People  (87  111.  72)  '  176 

Haley  v.  Philadelphia  (68  Pa.  St.  45)  608 

Haliburton   v.   Frankford    (14   Mass. 

214)  449 

Hall  V.  Chippewa  Falls  (47  Wis.  207)  767 
V.  City  of  Kansas  (54  Mo.  598)  1022 
V.  Cockrell  (28  Ala.  507)  263,  264 
V.  Hougliton  (8  Mich.  458)  4.36 

V.  Lowell  (10  Cush.  (Mass.)  260)  1020, 

1053 
V.  McCaughey  (51  Pa.  St.  43)  658 
V.  Manchester  (30  N.  H.  295)  261 

V.  Manchester  (40  N.H.410)  1021,1027 
V.  Marysville  (19  Cal.  391)  771 

V.  People  (87  111.  72)  736,  737 

V.  People  (57  111.  307)  856,  857 

V.  Railway  Co.  ( 14  L.  T.  N.  S.  351)  606 
V.  Selectmen  (39  N.  H.  511)  819 

V.  Smith  (2  Blng.  156)  264 

V.  State  (20  Ohio,  8)  654 

V.  Supervisors  (20  Cal.  591)  824 

Hallenbeck  v.  Hahn  (2  Neb.  377)  180 

V.  Winnebago   Co.  (N.  W.  Rep. 

1  111.  Sup.  578)  961,  962 

Halliday  v.  St.  Leonards,  etc.  (11  C. 

B.  N.  S.  192)  1075 

Hallo  well  Bank  v.  Hamlin  (14  Mass. 

178)  318,  414 

Halstead  v.  Mayor  (3  N.  Y.  430)  174,  451, 

4.53,  473,  480,  484,  486 

V.  Mayor  (5  Barb.  218)  174,  453 

Ham  V.  Mayor,  etc.  (70  N.  Y.  459)        978 

V.  Miller  (20  Iowa,  450)  812 

V.  Salem  (10  Mass.  350)  589 

Hamar  v.  Covington  (3  Met.  494)         931 

Haniden  v.  Railroad  Co.   (27  Conn. 

158)  702 

V.  Rice  (24  Conn.  350)  567 

Hamerick  i-.  Rouse  (17  Ga.  56)  899 

Hamerslev  v.   New   York  (56  N.  Y. 

533)  601 

Hamilton  v.  Carthage  (24  111.  22)  412 

V.  Columbus  (52  Ga.  4-35)  1074 

V.  Dubuque  (50  Iowa,  213)  946 

V.  Fort  Wayne  (40  Ind.  491)  739,  740 
V.  McNeil  (13  Gratt.  389)  209,  212 
V.  Mighels  (7  Ohio  St.  109)  29,  30, 
968,  1009 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (9  Ind.  359)  445,  576 
t'.  Railroad  Co.  (9  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

171)  704 

?;.  State  (3  Ind.  452)        825,856,918 

V.  State  (3  Tex.  App.  643)  369 

Hamlin  v.  Dingman  (5  Lans.  61)  293 

Ilammar  i\  Covington  (3  Met.  (Kv.) 

494)  202,  828 


liv 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Hamniarskold  v.  Bull  (11  Rich.  Law, 

490)  _  263 

Hammersloiiffh  i-.   Kansas  City   (57 

Mo.'^21!))  605 

Haniraett  r.  Philadelpliia  (65  Pa.  St. 

140)  740,  744,  745,  740,  747,  748, 

751),  780 

Hammond  v.  Haines  (25  Md.  541)  63,  113, 

363 
V.  IMcLachlan  (1  Sandf.  323)  ^      032 
Hampshire  c.  Franklin  (1()  Mass.  70) 

yi,214,  210,  217 
Ilamsdon  i:  lliee  (24  Conn.  3u0)  501 

Hamsworth  v.  Boston  (121  Mass.  173)  829 
Hancock  c.  Bowman  (49  Cal.  413)       814 
V.  Chicot  Co.  (32  Ark.  575)  548 

r.  Hazzard  (12  Cush.  112)  200 

Hancock  County  r.  Clark  (27  111.  305)  191 
Hand  V.  Brookline  (120  Mass.  324)  987 
Hanger  v.  Des  Moines  (9  C.  L.  J.  478)  105 
Ilanlon  v.  Keokuk  (7  Iowa,  477)  1051 
Hanna  v.  Allen  Co.  (8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 

352)  729 

Hannewinkle  v.  Georgetown  (15  Wall. 

548)  605,  890,  919 

Hannibal  v.  Draper  (15  Mo.  034)  620,  038, 

645,  661 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (49  Mo.  480)  678,  703 
V.  Wincheli  (54  Mo.  172)        138,  078, 

703 

Hannon  v.  St.  Louis  (02  Mo.  313)  33,  904, 

908,  978,  993 

Hanover  v.  Eaton  (3  N.  H.  38)  449 

Hanson  v.  Eastman  (21  Minn.  509)      031, 

639 

V.  Vernon  (27  Iowa,  28)  78,  180,  183, 

189,  491,  595,  728,  730,  731 

Harbaugh  v.  Monmouth  (74  111.  371)    303 

Harbeck  v.  Toledo  (11  Ohio  St.  219)  596, 

597,  598,  599 

Harbor  Master   v.   Southerland    (47 

Ala.  511)  133 

Hardcastle  v.  Railroad  Co.   (32  Md. 

32)  820 

V.  South  Yorkshire  Railway,  etc. 

(4  H.  &  N.  07)  1059,  1061 

V.  State  (3  Dutch.  352)  280 

Harding  v.  Hale  (01  111.  192)         634,  637 
V.  Rockford,etc.  Railroad  Co.  (65 

111.  90)        191,  192,  225,  482,  549 

V.  Vandewater  (40  Cal.  77)  300 

Hardy  v.  Keene  (52  N.  H.  370)  1014,  1017, 

1021,  1032 

V.  Waltham  (3  Met.  163)  41,  171 

Harker  v.  Mayor  (17  Wend.  199)         408 

Harkins  v.  Sencerbox  (2  Minn.  344)     869 

Harlem,  etc.  v.  Mayor  of  New  York 

(33  N.  Y.  309)  463,  406,  906 

Harlow  v.  Humiston  (6  Cow.  189)     1059, 

1061 
Harman  v.  Tappenden  (1  East,  555)     278 
V.  Tappenden  (3  Espin.  278)  278 

Harmon  v.  Brotherson  (1  Denio,  537)  265 
Harness  v.  Canal  Co.  (1  Md.  Ch.  248)  606 
Harney  v.  Ind.  (32  Ind.  244)  910,  911 


Harpending  i-.  Ilaight  (39  Cal.  189)     827 

Harper  v.  Elhcrton  (23  Ga.  566)  781 

V.  Milwaukee  (30  Wis.  305)  378,  992, 

1015, 1026,  1040,  1050.  1071,  1074 

Harpswell    i\  Phippsburgh    (29  Me. 

313)  262 

Harrington  i'.  Railroad  Co.  (17  Minn. 

215)  697 

V.  Co.  Commrs.  (22  Pick.  263)       601 
V.  Miles  (11  Kan.  80)  358 

V.  School  District  (30  Vt.  155)      262, 

473 

Harris  in  re  (52  Ala.  87)  819,  821,  833 

V.  Atlanta  (62  Ga.  290)  980 

V.  Baker  (4  M.  &  S.  27)  264 

17.  Elliott  (10  Pet.  25)  650,666 

V. Intendant  (28  Ala.  577)       118,  363 

V.  Nesbit  (24  Ala  398)  143,  888 

V.  People  (59  N.  Y.  599)  71 

V.  School  District  (28  N.  H.  58)      81, 

307,  400 

V.  Wakeman  (Say.  225)  411 

V.  Watson  (Peake,  72)  100 

V.  Whitcomb  (4  Grav,  433)  312 

Harrisburg  v.  Saylor  (87  Pa.  St.  216)  1050 

Harrison  v.  Baltimore  (1  Gill,  204)      121, 

172,  173,  983 

V.  Bridgeton  (16  Mass.  10)      106,  216 

V.  Brook  (20  Geo.  537)  379 

V.  Collins  (86  Pa.  153)         1050,  1057 

V.  Emmorson     (2    Leigh    (Va.), 

164)  819 

V.  Godman  (1  Burr.  12)  362 

V.  Good  (L.  R.  11  Eq.  Cas.  338)     376 
V.  Parker  (6  East,  154)  632 

V.  State  (9  Mo.  526)  142,  143 

V.  Vicksburg  (11  Miss.  581)    731,  735 
V.  Williams  (3  B.  &  C.  162)      28,  315 
Harrold  v.  Simcoe  Co.  (10  U.  C.  C. 

P.  43)  1011,1033,1053 

V.  Simcoe  Co.  (18  U.  C.  C.  P.  9)  1033, 

1053 
Harshman  v.  Bates  Co.  (92  U.  S.  509)  493, 

533  536 
V.  Bates  Co.  (3  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.' 

150)  493  ,529,  534,  536 

Hart  V.  Brooklyn  (36  Barb.  226)  679, 

1024,  1048,  1052 

V.  Burnett  (15  Cal.  580)  047,  649 

i;.  Gaven  (12  Cal.  476)  751 

V.  Mayor  (9  Wend.  671)  136, 139,  345, 

348,  352,  382,  992 

V.  Stone  (30  Conn.  94)  576 

t;.  Township  (15  Ind.  220)  638 

Hartford   v.  West   Middle  Dist.   (45 

Conn. 462)  776 

Hartford  Bridge  Co.  r.  East  Hartford 

(16  Conn.  149)  143,  214,  215,216 
V.  East  Hartford  (10  How.  511)     215, 

216 
V.  Ferry  Co.  (29  Conn.  210)  142 

Hartlepool  Collieries  Co.  v.  Gibb  (L. 

R.  5  Ch.  Div.  713)  723 

Hartley  in  re  (31  L.  J.  M.  C.  232)  392 

Hartshorn  v.  PotiorfE  (89  111.  509)        587 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


Iv 


Hartwell  v.  Littleton  (13  Pick.  229)      308 
Harvard  College  v.  Boston  (104  Mass. 

470)  116,  615,  747,  773 

Harvey  v.  Olnev  (42  111.  336)         941,  942 

!;.  Rocliester  (35  Barb.  177)  970 

Harvy  v.  Dermody  (18  Ark.  252)  380 

V.  W.  P.  S.Co.  (1  Doug.  (Mich.) 

193)  481 

Harward  v.  Levee  Co.  (51  111.  130)       918 
Harwood  i'.  Lowell  (4  Cush.  310)       1015, 

1042 
V.  Marshall  (9  Md.  83)  834,  872 

V.  Marshall  (10  Md.  451)         861,  868 
Hasbrouck   v.   Milwaukee    (21    Wis. 

217)  102,446,463,465 

V.  Milwaukee  (25  Wis.  122)  838 

Hascard  v.  Somany  (Freem.  504)  576 

Hasdell  V.  Hancock  (3  Gray,  526)  174,  288 

Haskell  i'.  Burlington  (30  Iowa,  232)    812 

V.  New  Bedford  (108  Mass.  208)    138, 

381,  994,  1076 

V.  New  Gloucester  (70  Me.  305)  1018, 

1050 
V.  Penn  Yan  (5  L.  (Sup.  Ct.)  N. 

Y.  43)  1038,  1061 

Hasscn  r.  Rochester  (65  N.  Y.  516)       774 
Hastings's  Case  (1  Mod.  24)  233 

Hastings  v.  Thome  (8  Neb.  160)  937 

Hatcli  V.  Barr  (1  Ohio,  300)  446 

V.  Buffalo  (38  N.  Y.  276)         605,  919 
r.  Mann  (15  Wend.  44)  257 

Hathaway  v.  Cincinnatus  (62  N.  Y. 

434)  937 

Ilavemeyer  v.  Iowa  Co.  (3  Wall.  294)  200, 

501,  503 
Haveyreyer  v.  Supervisors  (22  Wis 

396) 
Haven  v.  Asylum  (13  N.  H.  532) 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (38  Conn.  422) 
Hawk  V.  Marion  Co.  (48  Iowa,  472) 
Hawkes  v.  Kennebec  (7  Mass.  461) 
Hawkins  v.  Commrs.  (14  Ind.  521) 


866 
318 
921 
165 
838 
819, 
824, 


V.  Governor  (1  Pike  (Ark.),  570)  827 
V.  Huron,  etc.  (2  U.  C.  C.  P.  72)  205 
V.  Rochester  (1  Wend.  54)  601 

Hawks  V.  Charleniont  (107  Mass.  414)  974 

Hawley  v.  Baltimore  (33  Md.  270)  638 
V.  Harrall  (19  Conn.  142)        587,  679 

Hawthorne  i'.  Hoboken   (32  N.J.  L. 

172)  109 

V.  St.  Louis  (11  Mo.  50)  130 

Hay  V.  Cohoes  Co.  (2  N.  Y.  159)  1058, 1071 
V.  Davidson  (13  Minn.  523)  1058 

Hayden  v.  Attleborough  (7  Gray,  .338)  641, 

1018,  1024,  10.34 

V.  Madison  (7  Greenl.  (Me.)  79)    462 

V.  Noyes  (5  Conn.  391)    209,  288,  337 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (10  Mass.  397)      262 

Hayes  v.  Appleton  (24  Wis.  544)  117,  336 
V.  New  York  (74  N.  Y.  264)  1050, 
V.  Oshkosh  (33  Wis.  314)        982,  987 

1052 
V.  Washington  Co.  (19  111.  66)        225 

Ilayford  v.  Belfast  (69  Me.  63)  941 


Haygood  v.  Justices  (20  Ga.  845)  963 

Haynes  v.  Burlington  (38  Vt.  350)  1066 
V.  Covington  (21  Miss.  408)  261,  441 
V.  Municipality  (5  La.  An.  760)  79 
V.  Thomas  (7  Ind.  38)  630,  658,  660, 
66ii,  705 
V.  Pacific  Steamship  Co.  (17  How. 

(U.S.)  598)  784,785 

V.  State  (8  Ind.  425)  625 

Hay  ward  v.  Davidson  (41  Ind.  212)    469, 

559 
V.  School  Dist.  (2  Cush.  419)        286, 

462 
Haywood  i'.  Mayor  of  Savannah  (12 

Ga.  404)  113,  330,  332 

Hayzlett  i-.  Mt.  Vernon  (33  Iowa,  229)  775 
Hazard's  Case  (2  Roll.  11)  249,  275 

Hazen  v.  Essex  County  (12  Cush.  477)  595 
V.  Strong  (2  Vt.  427)  373 

Hazlehurst,  etc.  v.  Freeman,  etc.  (52 

Ga.  245)  702 

Heacock  v.  Sherman  (14  Wend.  58)  720 
Headu.  Insurance  Co.  (2  Cranch,  127)  117, 

443,  483 
Healey  v.  Batley  (L.  R.  19  Eq.  375)    627, 

1032 
Health  Dept.  v.  Knoll  (70  N.  Y.  530)  373 
Heard  v.  Brooklyn  (60  N.  Y.  242)  583,  699 
Hearne  v.  Gorton  (2  E.  &  E.  06)  428 

Heath  in  re  (3  Hill,  42)  226,  229,  431,  832, 

835,  881 
V.  Barmore  (50  N.  Y.  302)  583,  699 
V.  State  (36  Ala.  273)  884 

Hebel  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.   (33  Mich. 

407)  130 

Hebert  v.  Le  Valle  (27  111.  448)  649 

Hebrew  Society  in  re  (70  N.  Y.  476)  777 
Heckel  v.  Sandford  (40  N.  J.  L.  180)  203 
Heckerman  v.  Hummel  (19  Pa.  St.) 

64)  655,  656,  658 

Hedges  v.  Madison  Co.  (6  111.  567)      720, 

958,  962,  963,  1009 

Heeney  v.  Heeney  (2Denio,  625)  135,  136 

V.  Sprague  (11  R.  I.  456)       127,  32.3, 

950,  1021,  1029 

Heffner  v.  Commonwealth  (28  Pa.  St. 

108)  857 

Heidelberg  School  Dist.  v.  Horst  (62 

Pa.  St.  301)  447 

Heine  v.   Levee   Commrs.   (19  Wall. 

655)   202,762,814,818,838,842, 
846,  852,  875 
Heirs  of  Reynolds  v.  Commrs.,  etc.  (5 

Ohio,  204)  557,  562,  583,  642,  645 
Heise  v.  Town  Council  (6  Rich.  Law, 

404)  345,  348,  349,  351 

Heisembrittle  v.  Charlestown  (2  Mc- 

Mull.  233)  829,  332,  364 

Heland  v.  Lowell  (3  Allen,  407)   323,  354, 

1041 
Helen  v.  Noe  (3  Ired,  493)  352 

Helena  v.  Thompson  (29  Ark.  569)     967, 

968,  986 

Heller  v.  Sedalia  (53  Mo.  159)  982 

V.  Stremmel  (52  Mo.  309)  27,  33 


Ivi 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


Hempliill  v.  Boston  (8  Cush.  195)  640,  641 
Hempstead  v.  Dos  Moines  (3  North 

W.  Kep.  123)  1004 

Henback  v.  State  (50  Ala.  523)  330 

Henchman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (17  N.  J. 

Eq.  75)  6.59 

Hendee  v.  Pinkerton  (14  Allen,  381)  218 
Hendersliott  v.  Ottumwa  (46  Iowa, 

658)  1001 

Henderson  v.  Baltimore  (8  Md.  352)    763, 

767,  795,  797 

V.  Barnes  (32  U.  0.  Q.  B.  176)      1021 

V.  Coviii-lon  ( 14  Bush,  312)  118 

V.  Lambert  (8  Bush,  007)  790 

17.  Lambert  (14  Bush,  24)  807 

V.  Mavor  (3  La.  5()o)  236 

V.  Railway  Co.  (25  L.  T.  N.  S. 

881)  1004 

Hendrick   i'.   West   Springfield    (107 

Mass.  541)  476 

Henly  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Lyme  (2  CI. 

&F.  331)  987,990,1030 

Hennennire  (13Pet.  230)  259,273 

Henry  v.  Atkinson  (50  Mo.  266)  676 

r.  Chester  (15  Vt.  460)  763 

V.  Pittsburg  Bridge  Co.  (8  Watts 

&  S.  (Pa.)  85)  696,908 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Iowa,  540)       600 

Hensalt  v.  Petersburg  (63  III.  Ill)        409 

Henshaw  v.  Hunting  (1  Gray,  203)      633, 

671 
Hentz  I'.  Long  Is.  R.  R.  Co.  (13  Barb. 

646)  654,  706 

Hepburn  v.  Griswold  (8  Wall.  603)  156 
Herbert  v.  Benson  (2  La.  An.  770)       655, 

656,  660 
Herman  v.  Crete  (9  Neb.  350)  937 

Hersey  v.  Supervisors  (16  Wis.  185)     774 
Herzo'i;.  San  Francisco  (33  Cal.  134)  336, 
454,  574,  938 
Hesketh  v.  Brad  (3  Burr.  1847)    405,  411, 

416,  423 
Heslep  V.  Sacramento  (2  Cal.  580)  257 
Hess  (.'.  Pegg  (7  Nev.  23)  485 

Hester's  Case  (2  Watts  &  S.  416)  840 

Hewes  v,  Reis  (40  Cal.  255)  767,  800,  806 
Hewett  V.  School  Dist.  (94  111.  528)  482 
Hewison  v.  New  Haven  (39  Conn.  475)  980, 

1015 
V.  New  Haven  (34  Conn.  136)     1033, 

1034 

Hey  V.  Philadelphia  (81  Pa.  44)         1018, 

1019,  1035,  10.37 

Heyneman  v.  Blake  (19  Cal.  579)  597,  614 

Hey  ward  v.  Mayor,  etc.  (7  N.  Y.  314)  559, 

562,  583 
Hey  wood  v.  Buffalo  (14  N.  Y.  5.34)      89.5, 
896,  907,  919,  920,  925 
Hibbard  i-.  People  (4  Mich.  126)  380 

Hiblett  V.  Nashville  (12  Heisk.  684)  378 
Hickerson  v.  Mexico  (58  Mo.  61)  636,  973 
Hickman  v.  O'Neal  (10  Cal.  294)  418 

Hickok  V.  Plattsburg  (15  Barb.  427)     128 
V.  Plattsburg  (16  N.  Y.  161)  986, 1047 
Hickox  V.  Cleveland  (8  Ohio,  643)      1002 


Hicks  V.  Dorn  (42  N.  Y.  47)  995 

V.  Launcelot  (1  Rol.  Abr.  613)       247 
Hiestand  v.  New  Orleans  (14  La.  An. 

330)  256 

Higbee  v.  Railroad  Co.  (20  N.  J.  Eq. 

435)  659 

Higert  v.  Greencastle  (43  Ind.  574)    1029, 

1030, 1037, 1040,  1047, 1051 

Higgins  V.  Chicago  (18  III.  276)    600,  601, 

602,  003,  008,  814 

V.  Livingston  (4  Dow,  341)  264 

V.  Princeton  (4  Halst.  Ch.  300)       387 

Higginson  v.  Nahant  (11  Allen,  530)    593, 

594,  1015 
High  V.  Shoemaker  (22  Cal.  363)  752 

Highland  Turnpike  v.   McKean    (10 

Johns.  154)  110 

Hight  V.  Board,  etc.  of  Monroe   Co. 

(68  Ind.  570)  469,  473 

Hightomcr  v.  Staton  (54  Ga.  108)  130 
Iligley  V.  Bunce  (10  Conn.  435,  507)  341 
Hilbish  V.  Catherman  (64  Pa.  St.  154)  178, 

179,  728 
Hildreth  v.  Lowell  (11  Gray,  345)       591, 
801,  804,  974,  975,  994 
Hildreth's   Heirs    v.    Mclntire's    De- 
visees (1  J.  J.  Marsh.  206)       293 
Hill  V.  Boston  (122  Mass.  344)    10,  34,  35, 
36,  38,  39,  88,  171,  838,  960,  961, 
965,  966,  967,  974,  979,  983,  988, 
992,  994,  1009,  1013,  1014,  1015, 
1033,  1044,  1047 
V.  Charlotte  (72  N.  C.  55)  949 

V.  Decatur  (22  Ga.  203)  71,  322,  363 
V.  Forsythe  Count v  (67  N.  C.  367)  180 
V.  Higdon  (5  Ohio  St.  243)  70,  738, 
739,  748,  777 
V.  Livingston  (12  N.  Y.  52)  719,  720 
V.  Oneida  Co.  (19  Johns.  259)  829 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (U  Wis.  214)  788 
V.  State  (4  Sneed  (Tenn.),  443)    930, 

931 

HilUard  v.  Richardson  (3  Gray,  349)    980, 

1055,  1056,  1057 

Hilsdorf  v.  St.  Louis  (45  Mo.  94)  979 

Himmelmann  tJ.  Bvrne  (41  Cal.  500)    806 

V.  Cofran  (36  Cal.  411)     800,  808,  824 

r.  Danos  (35Cal.  441)  767 

V.  Hoadley  (44  Cal.  213)  682 

V.  Oliver  (34  Cal.  246)  767,  800 

V.  Spanagel  (39  Cal.  389)        806,  814 

Hinchman  r.  Detroit  (9  Mich.  103)        665 

V.  Horse  R.  R.  Co.  (17  N.  J.  Eq. 

75)697,701,705,  709.711,714,715 

Hincks  v.  Milwaukee  (46  Wis.  559)    1055 

Hinde  v.  Navigation  Co.  (15  111.  73)      979 

Hinds  V.  Hinds  (1  Iowa,  36)  223 

Hine  v.  K.  &  D.  M.  R.  Co.   (42  Iowa, 

636)  696 

V.  New  Haven  (40  Conn.  478)         401 

Hines  v.  Leavenworth  (3  Kan.  186)     753, 

808 
r.  Lockport    (50   N.    Y.   236 ;  41 

How.  Pr.  Rep.  435)       794,  10.38, 
1077 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ivii 


Hines  v.  Lockport  (5  Lans.  17)  1038 

Hinson  r.  Lott  (8  Wall.  151)  734 

Hinton  v.  Lindsav  (:^OGa.  74G)  217 

Hitchcock  r.  Galveston  (90  U.  S.  841)  125, 
156,  159,  443,  452,  778,  779,  798, 
803 
Hite  V.  Goodman  (1  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq. 

SOI)  264 

Hixon  V.  Lowell  (13  Gray,  59)  1014,  1015, 

101(3,  1017,  1031,  1032,  1033,  1034 

Iloag  V.  Durfev  (1  Aiken,  280)  308 

V.  Lamont"(B0  N.  Y.  96)  431 

Iloagland  y.  SacrarntMito  (52  Cal.  142)   102 

Ilobart  '■.  Detroit  (17  Mich.  246)  465 

V.  Detroit  (7  Midi.  246)  906 

V.  Milwaukee  (27  Wis.  194)    711,  714 

V.  Supervisors  (17  Cal.  23)  62 

Hobbs  (;.  Lowell  (19  Pick.  415)  640 

Hoblyn  v.  Regem  (6  Bro.  P.  C.  520)     291 

Hoboken  u.  Gear  (3  Dutch.  265)  25.5,  258, 

269,  273,  341,  342 

Hoboken  Land  Co.  v.   Hoboken  (36 

N.  J.  L.  540)         661,  665 

V.  Harrison  (30  N.  J.  L.  73)    233,  243 

Hotlgden  V.  De.xter  (1  Cranch,  145)      263 

Hodges  V.  Buffalo  (2  Denio,  110)  117, 166, 

176,  441,  442,  451,  454,  400,  401, 

463,  486,  910 

i;.  Mayor  (2  Humph.  61)  360 

V.  Schuler  (22  N.  Y.  114)  483 

Hodgman  >>.  Chicago  K.  W.  Co.  (20 

Minn.  48)  915 

HofiEuian  v.  Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L. 

172)  234,  340 

V.  San  Joaquin  Co.  (21  Cal.  426)   958 

V.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  051)       682,  1000 

V.  Van  Nostrand  (42  Barb.  174)     203 

Hogdon  V.  Lincoln  (68  Me.  226)  924 

Hogg  V.  Ward  (3  H.  &  N.  417)  238 

Hohl  V.  Westford  (33  Wis.  324)  822 

Hoke  V.  Henderson  (4  Dev.  1)       253,  258 

Holberg  V.  Macon  (55  Miss.  112)  740,  924 

Holbrook  V.  Dickenson  (46  III.  285)      813 

Holdane  v.   Cold   Spring  (21   N.    Y. 

474)  630,  631 

Holdswortli  ('.  Dartmouth  (11  A.   & 

E.  490)  219 

Holl  r.  Manchester  (40  N.  H.  410)  1017 
Holladay  v.  March  (3  Wend.  142)  355 
Holland  v.  Baltimore  (11  Md.  186)  114, 
121,  795,  797,  798,  920 
V.  San  Francisco  (7  Cal.  361)  106 
Holland's  Case  (11  Md.  186)  900,  916 

HoUiday  ».  frisbie  (15  Cal.  631)  559,  570, 

571,  572 
V.  People  (10  111.  216)  76,  80 

IloUingsworth  v.  Detroit  (3  McLean, 

472)  487 

Ilollister  l:  Union  Co.  (9  Conn.  436)  1000 

Holman  in  re  (28  Iowa,  88)  842,  851 

V.  Townsend  (13  Met.  297)  1022 

Holmes  v.  Finklenburg  (.54  111.  203)      417 

V.  Jersey  City  ( 1  Beasl.   ( N.  J. ) 

299)   610,640,    896,898,924,926 
V.  Wilson  (10  A.  &  E.  503)  377 


Holroyd  v.  Pumphrey  (18  How.  (U. 

S.)  69)  813 

Home  V.  Earl  Camden  (2  H.  Bl.  633)  929 
V.  Rouse  (8  Wall.  430)  126 

Home  Ins.  Co   c.  City  Council  (93  U. 

S.  116)  85 

Homersham  v.  Wol.  etc.  Co.  (4  Eng. 

Law  &  Eq.  426)  443 

Hood  V.  Lynn  (1  Allen,  103)  120,  176 

Hooker  v.  New  Haven  Co.  (14  Conn. 

146)  083,  1000 

Hooksett  V.  Amoskeag,  etc.  Co.  (44 

N.  H.  105)  679,  721 

Hoole  V.  Attorney-General  (22  Ala. 

190)  3f;3,  633,  630 

Hooper  v.   Bridgewater   (102    Mass. 

512)  927 

V.  Ely  (46  Mo.  505)  909 

V.  Emery  (14  Me.  375)  41 

Hope  V.  Deaderick  ( 8  Humph.  ( Tenn. )  1 ) 

731 

Hopkins  i-.  Mason  (61  Barb.  469)  802 

j;.  Mayor  (4  M.  &  W.  621)  323 

V.  Mehaffy  (11  S.  &  R.  120)  446 

V.  Whitesides  (1  Head,  31)  200 

Hopkinson  v.  Marquis  of  E.xeter  (L. 

R.  5  Eq.  63)  266 

Hopkinton  v.  Springfield    (12  N.  H. 

328)  •  262 

Horn  V.  Baltimore  (30  Md.  218)   441,  442, 

973 

V.  Whittier  (6  N.  H.  88)  243 

Hornbeckf.  Westbrook  (9  Johns.  73)  556, 

568 
Hornblower  /'.  Dunden  (35  Cal.  644)  472 
Horner  v.  Coffey  (25  Miss.  434)  572,  841 
Horney  v.  Sloan  (1  Smith,  136)  354 

Ilorustein  v.  Railroad  (51  Pa.  St.  87)  621, 

1008 
Horse  Railroad  Co.  v.  Deitz  (50  111. 

210)  713 

Horst  V.  Moses  (48  Ala.  129)  691 

Horton  v.    Grand   Haven    (24  Mich. 

465)  615 

V.  Ipswich  (12  Cush.  488)  1020,  1022, 
1040,  1051 
V.  Mobile    School   Comra'rs    (43 

Ala.  598)  69 

V.  Taunton  (97  Mass.  266)  1028 

V.  Thompson  (71  N.  Y.  513)  180,  461, 

552,  823 

Hospital  V.  Higgins  (15  III.  185)  840 

Hotchin  v.  Kent  (8  Mich.  526)  462 

Hotchkiss   V.   Nat.    Bank   (21    Wall. 

354)  499 

Houck  V.  Whitney  (14  Grant,  671)        459 

Houfe  r.  Fulton  (34  Wis.  60)  720 

V.  Fulton  (29  Wis.  296)        661,  1018, 

1035 
V.  Fulton  (31  Wis.  608)  1026 

Houghton's   Case  (Sir  R.  T.  Boyd, 

215)  377 

Houghton  V.  Davenport  (23  Pick.  235)  286 
Hounsel  ''.  Smyth  (7  Com.  B.  (N.  S.) 

729)  1061 


Iviii 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


House  ('.  rouiitv  Conim'rs   (GO  Iml. 

r.M>)      ■  962 

V.  Montgomery  Co.  (60  Ind.  580)  902, 

1011,  1030 

IIouso  of  Lords  Cases,  312  903 

Houston  c.  Cliiv  Count V  (18  Ind.  390)   2G4 

Hovcy  r.  Mayo  (43  Me.  322)         121,  122, 

G8;3,  085,  087 

V.  Mayor  (43  Me.  322)  683,  1000, 1005 

Ilowartl    (,'.    Britlfxo water    (16    Pick. 

(.Mass.)  189)         931,  1022,  1024, 
1025,  1034 
V.  Churcli  (18  Md.  451)   454,  010,  748 
V.  Draiuage'  Co.  (51  111.  130)     96,  730 
V.  Gage  (6  .Mass.  402)  835,  892 

V.  ProvidencL'  (6  R.  I.  514)  619 

V.  Rodcers  (4  Har.  &  Johns.  278)  038 
V.  San  Francisco  (51  Cal.  52)  982 
V.  Savannali  (T.  Cliarlt.  R.  173)  832 
1-.  Shields  (16  Ohio  St.  184)  226 

V.  Shoemaker  (35  Ind.  Ill)   235,  236, 

419 

Howard's  Case  (Hutton,  87)  194 

Howe  in  re  (1  Paige,  214)  568 

V.  Boston  (7  Cash.  273)  941 

V.  Crawford  Co   (47  Pa.  St.  361)    828 

1-.  Freeman  (14  Gray,  566)  788 

r.  Keeler  (27  Conn.  538)  460 

V.  Lowell  (101  Mass.  99)      1048,  1052 

V.  Mayor  (12  La.  An.  481)  89 

V.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An.  481)   957 

1032,  1059,  1061 

V.  Norris  (12  Allen,  82)  392 

V.  Plaiufield  (41  N.  H.  135)  1017, 

1052 

V.  Plainfield  (37  N.  J.  L.  145)  63,  368, 

419,  424 

Howell !'.  Bristol  (8  Bush,  493)     743,  747 

V.  Buffalo  (37  N.  Y.  267)  744,  808,  809 

V.  Bufifalo  (15  N.  Y.  512)  763,  937,  940, 

970,  973,  976,  977 

V.  Peoria  (90  111.  104)  912 

V.  Philadelphia  (38  Pa.  St.  471)     814 

V.  State  (3  Gill,  14)  785 

Howerton  v.  Tate  (66  N.  C.  231)  833 

Howes  r.  Racine  (21  Wis.  514)      910,  920 

Howland  r.  Luce  (16  Johns.  135)  252 

V.  Vincent  (10  Met.  (Mass.)  371)  1061 

Hoxie  V.  Commrs.  (25  Me.  333)  854 

Hoyle  V.  Railroad  Co.  (54  N.  Y.  314)    788 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (23  La.  An.  535)    699 

Hoyt  in  re  (13  Pet.  279)  819 

V.  Commrs.  of  Ta.xes  (23  N.   Y. 

228)  783,  784 

V.  East  Saginaw  (19  Mich.  39)      330, 

743,  746,  749,  750,  805 

V.  Hudson   (27  Wis.  656)   1065,  1068, 

1070,  1071 

V.  Thomson  (19  N.  Y.  207)  460 

Hubbard  v.  Concord  (35  N.  H.  52)    1017, 

1021,  1025, 1027,  1029,  1048,  1052 

V.  Fayette  (70  Me.  121)  1041 

V.  Lyndon  (28  Wis.  674)  481 

y.  Winsor  (ISMich.  146)  288 

Hubbell  V.  Waterloo  (Wis.  Cir.  C)      852 


Huber  v.  Gazly  (18  Ohio,  18)  638,  642,  659 
Hubert  v.  People  (49  N.  Y.  132)  71 

Huddleson  v.  Ruffin  (6  Ohio  St.  004)  340, 

353 

Hudson  V.  Geary  (4  R.  I.  485)       397,  398 

V.  Hoboken  (41  N.  J.  L.  71;  358 

f.  Thorne  (7  Paige,  261)  338 

Hudson  Co.  v.  Seymour  (35  N.  J.  L. 

47)  83,  88 

V.  State  (24  N.  J.  L.  718)  62,  300,  301, 
302,  801 
Hudson,  etc.  Co.  v.  Patterson  (74  N. 

Y.  365)  785 

Huff  I'.  Knapp  (5  N.  Y.  65)  850 

Huffman  v.  Greenwood  Co.  (23  Kan. 

281)  257 

V.  San  Joaquin  Co.  (21  Cal.  426)  720, 

1009 

Hugg  V.  Camden  (29  N.  J.  Eq.  6)  472 

V.  Camden  (39  N.  J.  L.  620)    824,  869 

Hughes  V.  Cairo  (92  111.  339)  736 

V.  Kline  (30  Pa.  St.  227)  919 

V.  Parker  (20  N.  H.  58)  233,  291 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (2  R.  I.  493)  653,  703 

Huidekoper  v.  Dallas  Co.  (3  Dillon, 

C.  C.  R.  171)  536 

Hull  V.  County  (12  Iowa,  142)  482 

V.  Kansas  City  (54  Mo.  601)         1035 

V.  Richmond  (2  W.  &  M.  337)      1034 

V.  Supervisors  (19  Johns.  259)       825 

Hullin  V.  Municipality  (11  Rob.  (La.) 

97)  601,  602 

Hullman  v.  Honcomp  (5  Ohio,  237)     291, 

833 

Humbolt  V.  Long  (92  U.  S.  642)  498,  499, 

510,  514,  618 

V.  McCoy  (23  Kan.  249)  68 

Hume  V.  New  York  (47  N.  Y.  639)    1048, 

1049,  1050 

V.  NewYork  (74  N.  Y.  264)  1030, 1032 

Humes    v.   Mayor,   etc.    (1   Humph. 

(Tenn.)403)  683,1000 

Hummell  v.  Brown  (24  Pa.  St.  311)     488 
Hummer     v.    Hummer    (3     Greene 

(Iowa),  42)  229,  432,  881 

Humphreys  in  re  (10  Wend.  612)  299 

V.  County  (56  Pa.  St.  204)  719,  1040, 

1050 

V.  Mears  (1  M.  &  R.  187)  264 

Huneman  v.  Fire  District  (37  Vt.  40)  171 

Hunnewell  v.  Boston  (106  Mass.  350)  922 

Hunnewinkle     v.     Georgetown     (15 

Wall.  547)  907 

Hunt  V.   Ambruster    (17   N.    J.   Eq. 

208)  178 

V.  Boonville  (65  Mo.  620)       778,  973, 

974,  975,  976,  1000,  1041 

V.  Philadelphia  (35  Pa.  St.  277)      361 

V.  Pownal  (9  Vt.  418)  1022,  1023, 1035 

V.  Rousmaniere  (1  Pet.  15)  946 

V.  School  District  (14  Vt.  300)      286, 

287,  288 

V.  Utica  (18  N.  Y.  442)  475,  598 

Hunter  v.  Chandler  (45  Mo.  452)  259,  892, 

893 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


lix 


Hunter  V.  Chandler  (10  Am.  L.  R.  440)  259 
V.  FieKl  (20  Oliio,  340)  261 

V.  Middleton  (13  111.  50)  Gt54 

V.  Newport  (5  K.  I.  o25)  596 

V.  Trustees  of  Sandy  Hill  (6  Hill 

(N.  Y.),  407)    625,  G26,  629,  636, 

645,  663 

V.  Winsor  (24  Vt.  327)  985 

Huntley  v.  Commrs.  (67  111.  559)  755 

V.  Lusoombe  (2  B.  &  P.  530)  428 

Ilurber  c.  Brangle  (43  Iowa,  514)         350 

Ilurford  v.  Omaha  (4  Neb.  336)    116,  127, 

443,  731,  753,  767,  778,  lOOG 

Ilurlburt  v.  Litchfield  (1  Root  (Conn.), 

520)  985 

Huron  i,'.  London  (4  U.  C.  Q.  B.  302)  934 

Ilussen  r.  Rochester  (65  N.  Y.  516)      610 

llutchinirs  V.  Scott  (4  Halst.  218)    418,  430 

Ilutchins  V.  Littleton  (124  Mass.  289)  1053 

Hutchinson  v.  Pratt  (II  Vt.  402)  307,  308, 

313,  643,  644 

Hutson  V.  Mayor,  etc.  (9  N.  Y.  163)  1030, 

1037,  1047,  1049 

Hutton  V.  Camden  (39  N.  J.  L.  122)     373 

V.  Windsor  (34 U.  C.  Q.  B.  487)  1024, 

1034,  1051 

Huvison  V.   New    Haven    (36   Conn. 

136)  1032 

Hyde  in  re  (15  Hun  (N.  Y.),  477)  808 

V.  Franklin  (28  Vt.  185)  480,  481 

V.  Jamaica  (27  Vt.  442)        640,  1015, 

1040 
Hyde  Park  v.  Borden  (94  111.  26)  666,  764, 

921 

V.  Intralls  (87  111.  II)  922 

Hydes  v.  Joyes  (4  Busli,  464)        123,.779 

Hymes  v.  Aydelott  (26  Ind.  431)  614 

Illinois  Central  Railroad  Co.  v.  Bloom- 

ington  (76  111.  447)  714 

Illinois   Insurance   Co.  v.  Littlefield 

(67  111.  368)      632,  634,  635,  636, 
640 
IlUnois,  etc.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  (2  Dill. 

Rep.  70)  125,  133,  134,  138 

Imlay  ;;.  Railroad  Co.  (26  Conn.  249)  714 

Imler  v.  Springfield  (55  Mo.  119)         683, 

1000,  1065,  1008,  1071,  1077 

Imperial  Land  Co.  in  re  (L.  R.  11  Eq. 

478)  510 

Inchibald  v.  Robinson   (L.  R.  4  Ch. 

App.  338)  378 

Independence  v.  Moore  (32  Mo.  392)   368, 

399 

Indiana  v.  Woram  (6  Hill,  33)  42 

Indianapolis  v.  Blythe  (2  Ind.  75)         371 

V.  Croas  (7  Ind.  9)  630,  635,  660,  665, 

675,  676 

V.  Imberry  (17  Ind.  175)  312,  314,  767 

V.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.    (66  Ind. 

390)   111,  112,  117,  123,  125,  199, 
32.3,  329,  436,  441,  469,  470,  690, 
691 
V.  Indianapolis    Home,    etc.    (50 

Ind.  213)  85 


Indianapolis  v.  Lawyer  (38  Ind.  348)  778, 

1066 
V.  McCIure  (2  Ind.  147)  720 

V.  McLean  (8  Ind.  328)  773 

V.  Mansur  (15  Ind.  112)  749,  799 

V.  Skeen  (17  Ind.  628)  445 

Indianapolis,    etc.    Railroad    Co.    v. 

Hartley  (67  111.  439)       653,  697, 

()98,  705,  706,  1065 

V.  Lawrenceburg  (34  Ind.  304)       701 

I'.  State  (37  Ind.  489)  820,  1064 

Indianola  v.  Jones  (29  Iowa,  282)  304 

Industrial    School   v.    Whitehead   (2 

Beasl.  290)  113 

Ingham  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.    (34 

Iowa,  249)  700 

Ingle  r.  Jones  (43  Iowa,  286)  109 

Inglis  V.  Hughes  (61  Ind.  212)  31 

V.  Railway  Co.   (16  E.  L.  &  Eq. 

55)  807,  341 

V.  State  (61  Ind.  212)  262 

Ingraham  in  re  (64  N.  Y.  310)  802 

V.  Chicago,  D.  &  M.  Railroad  Co. 

34  Iowa,  249)  697 

Ingram  v.  Police  Jury  (20  La.  An. 

226)  670 

Inhabitants  v.  Cole  (3  Pick.  232)  297,  561 
V.  Connecticut  River  Railroad  (4 

Cush.  (Mass.)  63)  715 

V.  County  Commrs.  (7  Cush.  394)  604 

V.  Eaton  (13  Mass.  371)  561,  570 

V.  New  Orleans  (14  La.  An.  452)   122 

V.  String  (5  Halst.  323)  206 

V.  Weir  (9  Ind.  224)         156,  451,  480 

V.  Wilmot  (2  Root,  288)  073 

V.  Wood  (13  Mass.  193)  61 

Inliabitants  of  Ipswich  (13  Pick.  431)  210 

Inman  v.  Tripp  (11  R.I.520)  999, 1067, 1068 

Innes  v.  Wylie  (1  Carr.  &  K.  257)  275,  277 

Insane  Asylum  v.  Iliggins  ( 15  111.  185)  208 

Insurance  v.  Adams  (9  Pet.  571)  819 

Insurance  Co.  v.  PoUok  (75  111.  292)     788 

V.  Sanders  (.36  N.  II.  252)  300 

V.  Sortwell  (8  Allen,  217)        302,  305 

V.  State  (9  Kan.  210)  865 

V.  Wheelwright  (7  Wheat.  534)     872 

V.  Wilson's  Heirs  (8  Pet.  291)  819,  855 

Intendant  v.  Chandler  (6  Ala.  899)       118, 

365,  604,  731,  923,  924 

V.  Pippin  (31  Ala.  542)  896 

Iowa  R.  R.,  etc.  Co.  v.  Co.  of  Sac  (39 

Iowa.  124)  848 

Iowa  City  v.  Foster  (10  Iowa,  189)       255 
Ipswich  Mills  V.  Commrs.  (108  Mass. 

363)  589,  974 

I.  P.  &  C.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Ross  (47  Ind. 

25)  670 

Irish  V.  Webster  (5  Greenl.  171)  261 

Iron  Co.  in  re  (7  Cow.  240)  557 

Iron  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ironton    (19  Ohio, 

299)  1.S4 

Irvin  V.  Devors  (65  Mo.  625)  824 

V.  Railroad  C6.  (94  111.  105)  784 

Irvine  v.  Wood  (51  N.  Y.  224)      695,  726, 

1059,  1060,  1061 


k 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Irwin  V.  Bradford  (22  U.  C.  C.  P.  19)  1027 

V.  Dixiou  ('.»  How.  10)      033,  034,  030 

V.  Mariposa  (22  U.  C.  C.  V.  307)    175 

V.  Mobile  (57  Ala.  0)  TM 

Isley  r.  Stubbs  (5  Mass.  283)  177 

Isoiu  r.  Railroad  Co.  (30  Miss.  300)       021 

Israel  V.  Jafksoiiville  (2  111.  21)0)  405 

('.  Jewett  (29  Iowa,  475)  021 

Ives  r.  Ilulet  (12  Vt.  314)  204 

Iviuson  V.  liaiice  (1  VVy.  Ter.  270)        147 

Jackson  v.  Applewhite  (62  Ind.  404)   409, 

938 
V.  Bellevieu  (30  Wis.  250)  1022 

V.  Bowman  (39  Miss.  071)       126,  441 
V.  Brush  (77  111.  59)  123,  499 

V.  Cory  (8  Johns.  385)  550,  568 

V.  Hartwell  (8  Johns.  422)      656,  562, 

568 

V.  Hathaway  (15  Johns.  447)         632, 

684,  680 

V.  Hyde  (28  U.  C.  Q.  B.  294)        1021 

V.  Le  Boy  (5  Cow.  397)  557 

V.  Morris  (1  Denio,  199)  177 

V.  People  (9  Mich.  Ill)  380,  432,433, 

078,  923,  924,  927 

I'.  Pike  (9  Cow.  01)  501 

r.  Pratt  (10  Johns.  381)  219 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (48  Me.  147)  479 

V.  Vioksburg  Co.  (2  Woods,  141)  552 

Jackson  Co.  r.  Briisii  (77  III.  59)   192,909 

V.  McClintock  (51  Ind.  325)  911 

Jacksonport  v.  Watson  (33  Ark.  701)   181, 

189,  910 
Jacksonville  v.  Lambert  (62  111.  519)  1071, 

1078 

V.  Kailway  Co.  (07  111.  540)   626,  643, 

046,  647,  648 

Jacob  V.  Louisville  (9  Dana,  114)  621 

Jacobs  V.  Bangor  (16  Me.  187)  1051 

V.  Hamilton  Co.   (4  Fisher,  Pat. 

Cases,  81)  31,968 

Jager  v.  Doherty  (61  Ind  528)  911 

James  v.  Milwaukee  (16  Wall.  159)     190, 

527 
V.  Portage  (5  N.  W.  R   31)  1026 

V.  Putney  (Cro.  Car.  498)  411 

V.  San  Francisco  (6  Cal.  528)      1051, 

1054 
James   River'  Co.    v.    Anderson    (12 

Leigh  (Va.),  276)  090 

Jameson  i-.  People  (10  111.  257)      110,  111 
Jamison  v.  Fopiana  (43  Mo.  565)  676 

V.  Springfield  (53  Mo.  224)  607,  621 
Janesville  v.  Markoe  (18  Wis.  350)  114 
Janey's  Executors  v.  Latane  (4  Leigh, 

327)  567 

Jansen  v.  Atchison  (16  Kan.  3-58)       1021, 

1029,  1037,  10.38,  1055,  1063 

V.  Ostrander  (1  Cow.  670)  261 

January  v  Johnson  Co.  (3  Dill.  C.  C. 

R.  3!)2)  539 

Janvrin  v.  Exeter  (48  N.  H.  83)  165 

Jarman  v.  Patterson  (7  B.  Mon.  647)    351 
Jarrett  i-.  Moberly  (5  Dill.  253)  536 


Jarvis  v.  Barnard  (30  Vt.  492)  985 

V.  Dean  (3  Bing.  447)  629 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (2  N.  Y.  390)    259,  278 

V.  Slielby  (02  Ind.  257)  476 

Jay's  Case  ( I  A^ent.  302)  207,  279 

Jeti'erson  v.  Courtmire  (9  Mo.  683)      368, 

398 
Jefferson  City  i-.  Opel  (49  Mo.  190)  774 
Jefferson  Co.  v.  Arrighi  (54  Miss.  668)  460, 

485 
V.  People  (5  Neb.  136)  100 

V.  Slagle  (06  Pa.  St.  202)  298 

Jeffersonville  v.  Ferry  Co.   (27  Ind. 

100)  137,  141, 

V.  Ferry  Co.  (35  Ind.  19)  133, 137, 141, 

455 

V.  Patterson  (32  Ind.  140)  236, 810, 907 

V.  Weems  (5  Ind.  547)  213 

Jeffreys  v.  Garr  (2  B.  &  Ad.  841)  61 

Jeffries  v.  Ankeney  (11  Ohio,  374)        265 

V.  Lawrence  (42  Iowa,  498)     532,  702 

Jenkins  v.  Andover  (103  Mass.  94)      187, 

491,  737,  899 

V.  Cheyenne  (1  Wy.  Ter.  287)       405 

V.  ThomasviUe  (35  Ga.  145)  425 

V.  Waldron  (11  Johns.  114)  205 

Jenks  V.  Chicago  (50  III.  397)  778 

V.  Chicago  (48  111.  296)  800 

V.  Lima  Township  (17  Ind.  326)    941, 

943 

t;.  Township  (45  Iowa,  554)  131 

V.  Wilbraham  (11  Gray,  142)        1023 

Jenner  v.  JoUiffe  (9  Johns.  382)  265 

Jenning's  Case  (12  Mod.  402)        249,  250 

Jennings  in  re  (0  Cow.  518)  857,  869 

,i;.  Tisbury  (5  Gray,  73)  040,  041 

V.  Verbarg  (03  Ind.  107)  409 

Jersey  City  v.  Callahan  (4  N.  J.  L. 

.349)  945 

I'.  Dummer  (Spence  (N.  J.),  106)  633 

V.  Fitzpatrick  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  97)      662 

V.  Horton  (38  N.  J.  L.  88)  131 

V.  Hudson  (2  Beasl.  Ch.  420)  383 

v.  H.  R.  Co.  (20N.  J.  Eq.  01)         715 

V.  Lembeck  (31  N.  J.  Eq.  255)        890 

V.  Morris  Canal  Co.  ( 1  Beasl.  547)  631, 

633,  669,671 

V.  Quaife  (2  Dutch.  63)  254 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  360)    75, 

114,  697,  709 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (21  N.  J.  Eq.  5-50)  699 

i;.  Riker  (38N.  J.  L.  225)        941,945 

V.  State  (30  N.  J.  L.  521)       303,  640, 

665,  667,  670,  072,  926 

Jewett  V.  New  Haven  (38  Conn.  308)  982 

John  V.  Cincinnati,  etc.   R.  Co.    (35 

Ind.  539)  184 

John  &  Cherry  St.   in  re  (19  Wend. 

6.59) '  583,  586,  032,  648 

Johns  V.  Nicholls  (2  Dall.  184)  209 

Johnson  v.  Allen  (02  Ind.  57)  798 

y.  Almeda  (14  Cal.  106)  608 

i;.  Americus  (46  Ga.  80)  238,  239,  424 
V.  Barclay  (1  Harr.  1)  424 

V.  Becker  (0  N.  W.  R.  37)  768 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


Ixi 


Johnson  v.  Boston  (118  Mass.  44)  1026 
i;.  Charleston  (3  S.  C.  232)  233,  1061 
V.  Commissioners  (67  N.  C.  101)  871 
i\  Common  Council  (16Ind.  227)  475 
V.  Drummond  (20  Gratt.  410)  785 
V.  Haverhill  (35  N.  H.  74)  1017,  1034, 

1039 
V.  Hudson  River  Railroad  Co.  (6 

Duer,  634)  1043 

V.  Indianapolis  (16  Ind.  227)  206 

V.  Irasburgh  (47  Vt.  28)  1041 

V.  Irwin  (3  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  291)  667 
V.  Jacqui  (27  N.  J.  Eq.  552)  694 

V.  Lampton  (40  U.  C.  Q.  B.  297)  226 
V.  Lexington  (14  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 

048)  788 

V.  Milwaukee  (40  Wis.  315)  743 

V.  Milwaukee  (46  Wis.  568)         1026, 

1050,  1052 

V.  Municipality  (5  La.  An.  100)     976, 

981 
V.  Norway  (Winch,  37)  198 

V.  Oregon  City  (2  Oreg.  327)  788 

V.  Philadelphia  (69  Pa.  St.  445)  125, 
357,  359 
V.  Philadelphia  (47  Pa.  St.  382)  161 
V.  Simonton  (43  Cal.  342)  172,  323, 
324,  372,  396 
V.  Stanley  (1  Root,  245)  265 

V.  Stark  Co.  (24  111.  75)  479,  488 

V.  Steadman  (3  Ohio,  94)  261 

V.  Thorndike  (56  Me.  32)  915 

V.  Whitefield  (18  Me.  286)  1025,  1027 
V.  Wilson  (2  N.  H.  202)  261,  288 

Johnson  Co.  v.  Hicks  (2  Ind.  527)         821 

Johnston  v.  Bovie  (8  U.  C.  Q.  B.  142)  627 
V.  Charleston  (1  Bav,  441)  227 

I'.  Charleston  (3  S.  C.  232)  10.55 

V.  Macon  (62  Ga.  645)  778 

r.  Scott  (11  Mich.  232)  626 

Joliet  1-.  Harwood  (86  III.  110)  1056 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (23  III.  202)  599 

V.  Seward  (86  111.  402)  1056 

V.  Verley  (35  111.  58)       127,  720,  950, 

1022,  1037 

Jonas  V.  Cincinnati  (18  Ohio,  318)        161, 

763,  764 

Jones  in  re  (7  Exch.  586)  238 

V.  Andover  (9  Pick.  146)        288,  297, 
298,  641 
V.  Bird  (5  B.  &  Al.  837)  1074 

V.  Boston  ( 104  .Mass.  461)  604, 896,  923 
V.  Boston  (104  Mass.  75)  1031,  1034 
V.  Carmarthen  (8  M.  &  W.  805)  254 
V.  Columbus  (62  Ind.  422)  731 

V.  Lancaster  (4  Pick.  149)  4.56 

V.  Little  Rock  (25  Ark.  301)  481 

V.  Loving  (.55  Miss.  109)  265,  327 

V.  Mayor  (25  Ga.  610)  188 

V.  Mersey  Docks  (11  H.  L.  Cases, 

443)  990 

V.  New  Haven  (34  Conn.  1)  89,  984, 

1015,  1032,  1074,  1075 

r.  Railway  Co.  (L.  R.  4  P.  C.  98)  007 

V.  Richmond  (18  Gratt.  517)  486 


Jones  V.  Robbing  (8  Gray,  329)  431 

V.  Schuhnever  (39  Ind.  119)  815 

i;.  Soulard  \2i  How.  41)  210 

V.  State  Auditor  (4  Ohio  St.  493)  862 
V.  Waltham  (4  Cush.  299)  1018 

V.  Williams  (Ambl.  651)  914 

Jones   River   Co.    v.    Anderson    (12 

Leigh  (Va.),  270)  652 

Jordan  v.  Cass  Co.  (3  Dill.  C.  C.  R. 

185)  493,  536,  853 

V.  School  District  (38  Me.  164)     262, 

286,  314,  461,  462 

Judge  V.  Meriden  (38  Conn.  9o)   383,  985, 

1073,  1078 

V.  Sherbourne  (11  M.  &  W.  374)    499 

Judkins  i:  Hill  (50  N.  H.  140)  227 

Judson  V.  Bridgeport  (25  Conn.  426)   597, 

600 
V.  Reardon  (16  Minn.  431)  410 

Jukes  i\  Commonwealth  (20  Pa.  484)  221 
Jimction  Railroad  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 

(88  Pa.  424)  745 

Junkins  v-  Union  School  District  (39 

Me.  220)  297,  447 

Justices  V.  Munday   (2  Leigh  (Va.), 

168)  819,  820,  821 

r.  Orr  (12Ga.  137)  481,486 

V.Paris,  etc.  Turnpike    Co.   (11 

B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  143)  533 

V.  Plank-road  Co.  (9  Ga.  475)  897 
V.  Plank-road  Co.  (15  Ga.  39)  897 
V.  Stalnaker  (13  Gratt.  523)  819 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (11  B.  Mon.  143)  869 
Justices,  Opinion  of  (6  Cush.  580)      213, 

215,  216 

Kaine  v.  Harty  (4  Mo.  App.  357)  327 

Kaiser  v.  Weise,  (85  Pa.  366)  793 

Kaist  V.  St.  Paul,  etc.   Railroad   Co. 

(22  Minn. 118)  1001 

Kalbier  v.  Leonard  (34  Ind.  497)  793 

Kane  v.  Baltimore  (15  Md.  240)  583,  589, 

597 

V.  People  (4  Neb.  509)  229 

Kansas  r.  Clark  (68  Mo.  588)  327 

V.  Flanaean  (69  Mo.  22)  116,  409,  443 

i;.  White  (69  Mo.  261)  327 

Kansas,  etc.   Railroad   Co.   v.  Akler- 

man,  etc.  (47  Mo.  349)  536 

Karst  V.  St.    Paul,  etc.   Railroad  Co. 

(22  Minn.  118)  126,683,703 

Karwisch  v.  Atlanta  (44  Ga.  204)  397 

Kathman  v.  New  Orleans  (II  La.  An. 

145)  71 

Kavanaugh  v.  Sanders  (SGreenl.  442)  243 
Kayser  v.  Trustees  (16  Mo.  88)  58,  211 
Kean  l'.  Asch  (27  X.  J.  Eq.  57)  599 

Kearnev  in  re  (7  Wheat.  38)  271 

V.  Andrews  (2  Stockt.  70)  234.  241, 413 
V.  Covington  (1  Met.  (Ky.)  339)  475, 

476 
V.  London,  etc.  Railway  Co.  (L. 

R.  5Q.  B.  411)  1028 

Keasy  i'.  Louisville   (4  Dana   (Ky.), 

154)  1001 


Ixii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Keating  v.  Sparrow  (1  Ball  &  Beat. 

3(37)  353 

Keckely  v.  C'oninirs.  of  Roads  (4  Mc- 

Cord,  257)  856 

Keeler  v.  Frost  (22  Barb.  400)  2y8 

1-.  Millodge  (24  N.  J.  L.  142)  406,408, 

409,  433 

Keen  v.  Lyncli  (I  Hob.  (Va.)  186)        629 

Keene  v.  firistol  (2()  Pa.  St.  46)  609 

Kccney  r.  Hudson  (3  Dutch.  302)  450 

Keith  i:  Easton  (2  AUon,  552)  1017,  1024, 

1025,  1028,  1031 

Keithsburg  v.  Frick  (34  111.  405)  540,  541, 

548 
Kellar  v.  Savage  (17  Me.  444  ;  20  Me. 

199)  201,  808,  311 

Keller  v.  Corpus  Christi  (50  Tex.  614)  954, 

956 
I'.  Hicks  (22  Cal.  457)  483 

V.  Hyde  (20  Cal.  593)  840 

I'.  State  (31  Iowa,  102)  789 

V.  State  (U  Md.  525)  735,  789 

Kelley  v.  Lindsay  (7  Gray,  287)  939 

V.  Mavor  of  Brooklyn,    (4   Hill, 

263)    154,  156,  444,  481,  482,  487 
Kellinger  v.  Street  Railroad   Co.  (50 

N.  Y.  206)        664,  665,  666,  717 

Kellogg  V.  Ely  (15  Ohio  St.  64)     797,  945 

V.  Nortiiampton  (8  Gray,  504)     1018, 

1024,  1034 

V.  Northampton  (4  Gray,  65)        1024, 

1025,  1027,  1034 

V.  Thompson  (C6  N.  Y.  88)  671,  1065, 

1066 
Kelly's  Case  (8  Gratt.  (Va.)  632)  640 
Kelly's  Lessee  v.  Greenfield  (2  H.  & 

M.  (Md.)  132)  667,673 

Kelly  V.  Cliicago  (62  111.  279)       466,  826, 

915 
V.  Cleveland  (34  Ohio  St.  468)  749 
V.  Fond  du  Lac  (31  Wis.  179)  1026 
V.  Madison  (43  Wis.  688)  937 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  (11 

N.  Y.  432)  105(),  1057,  1058 

V.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  83)     121,  122, 

950 

V.  Pittsburg  (85  Pa.  170)         790,  793 

V.  Toronto  (23  U.  C.  Q.  B.  420)     390 

Kelsey  v.  Glover  (15  Vt.  708)  1034 

V.  King  (.32  Barb.  410)  687,  694 

V.  King  (33  How.  (Pr.)  39)  629 

V.  Wright  (1  Root,  83)  245,  246 

Kemper  v.  Louisville  (14  Bush,  87)     1001 

Keinpner  v.  Commonwealth   (40  Pa. 

St.  124)  322 

Kendall  v.  King  (17  C.  B.  483)      146,  219 

V.  Post  (8  Oregon,  14)  614,  685 

V.  Stokes  (3  How.  87)     260,  818,  857 

V.  United  States  (12  Pet.  524)       818, 

826,  8.50,  874 

Kenicottr.  Supervisors  (16  Wall.  425)  510, 

522 
Kennard  r.  Cass  Co.  (3  Dillon,  C.  C. 

R.  147)  494 

V.  Morgan  (92  U.  S.  480)  751 


Kennedy  v.  Board  of  Health   (2  Pa. 

St.  366)  379 

V.  Covhigton  (8  Dana,  60)     138,  570, 

647 
V.  Covington  (17  B.  Mon.  507)  139 
V.  Mayor  (7:5  N.  Y.  365)  987,  1019 
V.  Municipality  (10  La.  An.  64)  658 
V.  Newman  (1  SandL  187)  599 

V.  Phelps  (10  La.  An.  227)     376,  379, 
380,  383 
V.  Sowden  (1  McMulI.  328)    346,  352, 

354 
V.  Troy  (77  N.  Y.  493)  925 

V.  Washington   (3  Cranch,  C.  C. 

595)  826 

Kenosha  i-.  Lamson  (9  Wall.  477)        480 

Kent  I'.  Dickerson  (25  Gratt.  817)         819 

V.  Walton  (7  Wend.  25(i)  443 

Kentticky  v.  Dennison  (24  How. 

(U.  S.)  66)  43 

Kentucky  Seminary  v.  Wallace   (15 

B.  Mon.  35)  200,  208 

Keokuk  v.  Dressell  (47  Iowa,  697)        404 

V.  Keokuk  (5  N.  W.  Rep.  508)    1021, 

1029 
V.  Packet  Co.  (45  Iowa,  196)  13.3,  136, 

140 
V.  Packet  Co.  (95  U.  S.  80)  133 

Kepner  v.  Commonwealth  (40  Pa.  St. 

124)  290,  341 

Kerlin  v.  Campbell  (15  Pa.  St.  500)      559 
Kerr  v.  Preston    (L.  R.  0  Ch.  Div. 

463)  956 

V.  Trego  (47  Pa.  292)     231,  233,  291, 

292,  831,  832,  883 

Ketchura  v.  Buffalo  (14  N.  Y.  .356)      146, 

155,  158,  386,  386,  482,  567,  657, 

913 

Kettering  v.  Jacksonville  (50  111.  39)  363, 

412 
Kettinger  v.  Street  Railroad  Co.  (60 

N.  Y.  206)  716 

Kettle  V.  Freemont  (1  Neb.  329)  660,  665 

Keyes  v.  Tait  (19  Iowa,  123)  636 

r.Westford  (17  Pick.  273)  117, 297, 447 

Keyser  v.  School  District  (36  N.  H. 

477)  297,  460,  461 

Kidder  v.  Peoria  (29  111.  77)  5'.)8,  599 

Kieffer  v.  Elder  (18  Pa.  St.  388)  500 

Kiernan  in  re  (62  N.  Y.  457)  797,  798 

Kilbourno  v.  St.  John  (59  N.  Y.  21)      913 
Kile  V.  Yeliowhead  (80  III.  208)  687 

Killenger  v.  Street  Railroad  Co.   (-50 

N.  Y.  206)  711 

Killey  v.  Craynor  (61  Mo.  541)  308 

V.  Forsee  (57  Mo.  390)  240,  330 

V.  Kansas  City  (69  Mo.  102)  383 

Kimball  v.  Boston  (1  Allen,  417)  978,  980 
V.  Cushman  (103  Mass.  194)  1026 
V.  Kenosha  (4  Wis.  .321)  583,  665 

i;.  Lamprey  (19  N.  H.  215)     289,314, 

V.  Marshall  (44  N.  H.  466)      288,  290 
V.  Rosendale  (42  Wis.  407)      66,  640, 

1055 


TABLE   OF  CASES  CITED. 


Ixiii 


Kimble  v.  Canal  Co.  (1  Ind.285)  607,  609 

Kincaid  v.  Hardin  (5  N.  W.  R.  590)    959, 

961,  962,  963 

Kineaid's  Appeal  (66  Pa.  St.  411)         374 

Kinder  v.  Gillespie  (63  111.  88)       351,  352 

King  r.  Asliwell  (12  East,  22)  327 

V.  Atliins  (3  Burr.  1706)  377 

V.  Barrett  (1  Salk.  383)  405 

y.  Bird  (13  East,  379)  327 

V.  Boston  (3  T.  R.  592)  297,  298 

V.  Brecknock,  etc.  Co.  (3  A.  &  E. 

217)  860 

V.  Broughton  (o  Burr.  2700)  1032 
I'.  Butler  (15  Jolins.  281)  263 

V.  Butler  (8  East,  388)  299 

V.  Carlile  (6  C.  &  P.  636)  723 

V.  Chase  (15  N.  H.  1)  1063 

i;.  Clark  (1  East,  38)  881 

V.  Commrs.  (1  B  &  Add.  232)  176 
u.  Cotterill  (IB.  &  Aid.  67)  386 

V.  Crake  (Cowp.  29)  206 

V.  Cross  (2  C.  &  P.  483)  376 

V.  Cross  (3  Camp.  224)  723 

V.  Curry  (4  B.  &  C.  961)  316 

V.  Davey  (5  Esp.  217)  376 

i;.  Devon  (Ry.  &  M.  144)  720 

V.  Dimpsey  (2  T.  &  R.  96)  344 

V.  Dock  Co.  (13  E.  C.  L.  1-39)  829 
V.  Duke  of  Bedford  (6  T.  R.  560)  223 
V.  East  India  Co.  (4  B.  &  A.  530)  860 
V.  Eastrinston  (5  A.  &  E.  765)  1032 
r.  Ecclesfield  (1  B.  &  Al.  348)  1032 
V.  Essex  (4  T.  R.  591)  175,  178 

V.  Foxwell  (1  R.  3  Ch.  Div.  518)  223 

112 

318 
302 
324 
377 


Grant  (1  B.  &  Ad.  104) 

V.  Hard  wick  (11  East,  578) 

V.  Harris  (1  B.  &  Ad.  936) 

V.  Harrison  (3  Burr.  1328) 

V.  Incledon  (13  East,  164) 

V.  Inhabitants  of  N.  Curry  (4  B. 

&  C.  959) 
V.  Ingram  (1  W.  Bl.  50) 
I'.  Jacksonville  (3  111.  .306) 
V.  Johnson  (1  Wils.  325) 
I'.  Jones  (3  Camp.  229) 
V.  Leake  (5  B.  &  Ad.  469) 
V.  Lindsey  (14  East,  317) 
V.  Lisle  (Andrews,  163) 
V.  Liverpool  (3  East,  86) 
V.  Lloyd  (4  Esp.  200) 
V.  Longworth  (7  Ohio,  585) 
V.  Madison  (17  Ind.  48) 
V.  Marquis,  etc.  (4  Camp.  189) 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (6  Vin.  Abr.  296) 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (2  Term  R.  182) 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (1  Str.  385) 
V.  Merchant  Tailors'  Co.  (2  Lev. 

200) 
V.  Middlesex  (3  A.  &  E.  615) 
V.  Miller  (7  T.  R.  278) 
V.  Milverton  (3  A.  &  E.  284) 
V.  Mitchell  (10  East,  511)         228,316 
u.  Moore  (3B.  &H.  184)  378 

V.  Neil!  (2  C.  &  P.  485)  370 

V.  Neville  (1  Peak,  92)  376 


223 
314 
405 
377 

382,  723 

1032 

720 

246 

1032 

870,  377 
231 
787 
720 
246 
258 
301 

353 
860 
299 
800 


King  V.  Newdigate  (Comb.  10)  377 

V.  Norris  (1  Ld.  Raym.  337)  206 

V.  Norris  (1  Barn.  K.  B.  385)  299 

V.  Northampton  (2  M.  &  S.   262)  661, 

720 
V.  Oxfordshire  (1  B.  &  Ad.  289)  720 
V.  Oxfordshire  (4  B.  &  C.  194)  1032 
I'.  Penderryn  (2  T.  R,  513)  1032 

V.  Priest  (6  T.  R.  538)  314 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (06  N.  Y.  181)  1056 
V.  Railway  Co.  (2  Barn.  &  A.  646)  856 
V.  Richards  (8  T.  R.  634)  377 

V.  Richmond  (6  T.  R.  560)  310 

V.  Round  (4  Ad.  &  El.  139)  314 

V.  Russell  (6  B.  &  C.  566)  723 

V.  Russell  (6  East,  427)  382,  723 

V.  Russell  (3  E.  &  B.  942)  377 

V.  Sadler  (4  C.  &  P.  218)  .377 

r.  Salop  (13  East,  95)  720 

V.  Sankey  (5  A.  &  E.  423)  175 

V.  Sargent  (5  T.  R.  466)  223 

V.  Secile  (8  East,  573)  344,  405 

V.  Sergeant  (5  T.  &  R.  466)  316 

V.  Smith  (5  M.  &  S.  133)  344 

V.  Stead  (8  T.  R.  142)  377 

r.  Stoor  (3Burr,  1698)  377 

r.  Symonds  (1  East,  189)  344 

V.  Taylor  (2  Str.  1167)  379 

V.  Thompson  (2  T.  R.  18)  405 

V.  Trafford  (1  B.  &  A.  874)  377,  720 
V.  Ward  (4  A.  &  E.  384)  723 

i;.  Watts  (.M.  &  M.  281)  376 

I'.  AVest  Riding  (2  East,  342)  719,  720 
V.  West  Yorkshire  (5  Burr.  2594)  661 
V.  White  (1  Burr.  333)  376 

V.  Wiiitney  (3  A.  &  E.  69)  720 

f.  Williams  (1  Russ.  321)  379 

r.  Williams  (2  M.  &S.  141)  299 

V.  Williams  (1  W.  Black.  93)  892 
V.  Wilson  (1  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  555)  180, 
497,  503,  504,  851,  918 
V.  Wyatt  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1478)  344 
V.  Yorkshire  (7  T.  R.  467)  377 

Kingman  i:  County  Commrs.  (6  Cush. 

306)  604 

Kingsberry  v.  Pettis  Co.  (48  Mo.  207)  487 

Kingsbury  v.  Dedham  (13  Allen,  186) 

1028 

V.  School  Dist.  (12  Met.  99)  282,  287, 

288,  296,  297,  447 

Kingsley    v.    Brooklyn    (5  Abb.   N. 

Cas.  1)  467 

Kingston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Decker  (33  Barb. 

196)  248 

Kinnie  v.  AVaverley  (42  Iowa,  437)       474 
I'.  Zimpleman  (36  Tex.  554)  731 

Kinzie  v.  Chicago  (2  Scam.  (111.)  188)  220 

Kip  V.  Patterson  (2  Dutch.  298)  331,  357, 
391,  406,  408,  409,  421,  766,  924 

Kirby  v.  Boylston  Market  Ass.  (14 

Gray,  249)  395,  1021,  1025,  1029, 

1060,  1001 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (48  Md.  168)  804 

V.  Shaw  (19  Pa.  258)  729, 740, 744,757, 

791 


Lxiv 


TABLE   OF  CASES  CITED. 


Kirk  I'.  Kinrr  {^  Barr,  4,3G)  567 

.;.  Nowill  (1  T.  K.  118)  345,  348,  349, 

.-554 
Kirkman  v.  Handv  (11  Ilumpli.  400)  o79 
Kirtlaml  v.  Uotclikiss  (100  U.  S.4!)l)  784, 

788 
Kitredjre  v.  Milwaukee  (20  Wis.  4('))    1015, 
10-i(j,  1004 
Kitterlng  i;.  Jacksonville  (50  III.  oU)    414 
Kittle  V.  Pfeiffer  (22  Cal.  490)  038 

Klein  v.  New  Orleans  (99  U.  S.  149)   572, 

573 
V.  Smith  Co.  (54  Miss.  254)   830,  842, 

855 
V.  Warren  Co.  (51  Miss.  578)  839, 842, 

855 
Klinkcner  v.  School  District  (1  Jones 

(Pa.),  444)  629,645,601 

Knapp  V.  Grant  (27  Wis.  147)  540 

y.  Hoboken  (38  N.  J.  L.  371 ;  39 

N.  J.  L.  394)  154,841 

Kneeland  y.  Milwaukee  (15  Wis.  454)  774, 

790 

Knibbs  v.  Hall  (1  Esp.  279)  946 

Kiiider  r.  Gillespie  (03  111.  88)  399 

Knight  r.  lleatoii  (22  Vt.  480)       669,  673 

V.  Nash  (22  Minn.  4-52)  131 

V.  Kailroad  Co.  (9  La.  An.  284)     700 

V.  Wells  (1  Ld.  Pvaym.  80)  204 

I'.  Wells  (1  Lut.  519)  197 

Kniperi-.  Louisville  (7  Bush,  599)  356,357, 

702 

Knowles  v.  Muscatine  (20  Iowa,  248)  677 

V.  Yates  (31  Cal.  82)  222 

Knowlton  r.  Supervisors  (9  Wis.  410)  782 

Knox  V.  Lee  (12  Wall.  457)  150 

V.  Peterson  (21  Wis.  247)        707,  814 

Knox  Co.  V.  Aspinwall  (24  How.  370)  844, 

845,  851,  869 

V.  Aspinwall  (21  How.  539)   180,  479, 

501,  509,  512,  513,  510,  523,  524, 

526,  544,  540,  547,  548 

V.  McComb  (19  Ohio,  320)  570 

Kobs  V.  Minneapolis  (22  Minn.  159)    984, 

985,  1006,  1074,  1077 

Koehler  v.  Iron  Co.  (2  Black  (U.  S.), 

715)  218 

Koester  v.  Ottumwa  (34  Iowa,  41)  1018, 
1038,  1048 
Kohl  V.  United  States  (91  U.  S.  367)  590 
Koppicus  ('.  Conimrs.  (10  Cal.  248)  614 
Koraii  V.  Ottawa  (32  111.  121)  079,  720,  721 
Kountze  v.  Omaha  (5  Dillon,  C.  C.  11. 

443)  793 

Krause  v.  Sacramento  (48  Cal.  221)    1054 
Kreitih  v.  Chicago  (80  111.  407)  67c 

Krickle  ;;.  Commonwealth  (1  B.  Mon. 

(Ky.)361)  410,413 

Kucheman  v.  Kailroad  Co.  (46  Iowa 

3C6)  698 

Kunkle  v.  Franklin  (13  Minn.  127)       178 
Kupper   V.  South   Parish   (12   Mass. 

185)  297 

Kyle  V.  Malin  (8  lad.  34)  146,  598,  703, 

797 


Kynaston   f.    Shrewsbury    (2    Stra. 

1051)  284 

Labourdette  v.  Municipality   (2  La. 

An.  527)  282,  296 

Lackland  r.  Railroad  Co.  (31  Mo.  180)  646, 

690,  703,  705 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (34  Mo.  259)  703,  705 

Lacon  v.  Page  (48  111.  499)         1022,  1029 

Laconia  u.  (iilman  (55  N.  II.  127)  079 

Lacour  v.  New  York  (3  Duer,  406)      949, 

980,  992, 1075 

Lade  i'.  Shepherd  (2  Stra.  1004)    029,  032 

Lafayette  v.  Blood  (40  Ind.  02)  10.39 

V.  Bush  ( 19  Ind.  326)  (iO.^,  009,  683,  999 

r.  Cox  (5Ind.  38)  117,118, 140,157,189 

V.  Fowler  (34  Ind.  140)  683,  74(5,  740, 

780,  790,  800,  920,  999 

V.  Jenners  (10  Ind.  74)        58,  05,  675 

V.  Male  Orphan  Asylum  (4  La. 

An.  1)  776 

V.  Spencer  (14  Ind.  399)  999 

V.  Shultz  (44  Ind.  97)  601,  603 

Lafayette,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Geiger 

(.34  Ind.  185)  62,  184 

Lafon  V.  Dufrocq  (9  La.  An.  350)  71,  418 
La   Grange   v.    State   Treasurer    (24 

Mich.  466)  315 

Lake  v.  Aberdeen  (57  Miss.  260)  379 

V.  Decatur  (91  111.  596)  796 

V.  Kennedy  (13  Ohio  St.  42)  673 

V.  Trustees  of  Williamsburg  (4 

Denio,  .520)        150,  486,  487,  806 

Lake  View  c.  Letz  (44  111.  81)  375 

Lakin  v.  Ames  (10  Cush.  198)       214,  216 

Lamar  Co.  v.  Clements  (49  Tex.  347)  634, 

635,  638,  639,  642 

Lamb  v.  Lane  (4  Ohio  St.  167)  012 

V.  Lynd  (44  Pa.  St.  336)  232,  252,  829, 

830,  831 

V.  ShayE  (14  Iowa,  567)  572 

Lambar  v.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  610)       1068 

Lamborn    v.    Co.    Commissioners    of 

Dickinson  Co.  (97  U.  S.  181)  941, 
942,  910,  947 
Lamoille,  etc.   Railroad   v.  Fairfield 

(51  Vt.  257)  500,  530,  549 

Lancaster   i\  Parnaby    (11  A.  &  E. 

222)  989 

V.  Richardson  (4  Lans.  136)  398 

V.  Walsh  (4  M.  &  W.  16)  106 

Lancey  v.  Bryant  (30  Me.  400)  318 

Land  v.  Hoffman  (50  Mo.  243)  509 

Lander  v.  McMillan  (8  Jones  (North 

Car.),  Law,  174)  867 

V.  School  District  (.33  Me.  239)      286 
Landers  v.  Staten  Island,  etc.  Co.  (53 

N.  Y.  4.50)  418,  431 

Landolt  v.  Norwich  (87  Conn.  015)     1020 
V.  Norwich  (6  Am.   Law  Reg.  N. 

S.  383)  1039 

Lane  v.  Boston  (125  Mass.  519)  998 

V.  Cotton  (1  Salk.  17)  204 

V.  Crombie  (12  Pick.  177)  1024 

V.  Kennedy  (13  Ohio  St.  42)  666,  667 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


Ixv 


Lane  v.  Schaulp  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  82)  898 
V.  School  District  (10  Met.  462)  461 
r.  Sewell  (1  Cliitty,  175)  257 

Lane  Co.  v.  Oregon  (7  Wall.  71)  729,  810 
Lanfear  y.  Mayor  (4  La.  97)  350 

Langdon  v.  Castleton  (30  Vt.  285)       254, 

473,  487 
V.  Fire  Department    (17   Wend. 

234)  709 

Langhorn    v.    Robinson    (20    Gratt. 

(Va.)Gai)  729 

Langley  v.  Gallipolis  (2  Ohio  St.  107)  643, 

644 
Langsdale  v.  Bonton  (12  Ind.  467)      312, 

313,  314 

Langworthy  v.  Dubuque  (13  Iowa,  86)  792 

y.  Dubuque  (16  Iowa,  271)     791,793 

Lanier  v.  Macon  (59  Ga.  187)  790 

Lansing  v.  Smith  (4  Wend.  9)       135,  139 

V.  Toolan  (37  Mich.  1-52)  968,9'J2,  1018 

r.  Treasurer  (1  Dillon,  522)     93,200, 

765,  851,  871,  875 

r.  Van  Gorder  (24  Mich.  456)  476,  822 

La  Pointe  v.  O'Maliey  (46  Wis.  35)      243 

Laramie  Co.  v.  Albany  Co.  (92  U.  S. 

307)    76,  213,  215,  216,  218,  1045 
Larkin  v.  Saginaw  (11  Mich.  88)  958,  962, 
968,  992,  1009 
Lame  v.  Farren  Hotel  Co.  (116  Mass. 

67)  1061 

La  Rosa  v.  Mayor  (4  La.  An.  24)  388 

Larrabee  v.  Peabody  (22  Alb.  L.  J. 

83)  1062 

Larrison  v.  Peoria,  etc.  Eailroad  Co. 

(77  III.  11)  903 

Lasala  i;.  Holbrook  (4  Paige,  169)       1003 
Lates  V.  Briirgs  (64  N.  Y.  404)  805 

Lathrop  v.  Bank  (8  Dana,  114)  219 

Lauwenstein  v.  Fond  du  Lac  (28  Wis. 

336)  124,  559 

Lavalle  v.  People  (68  111.  252)  893 

Laver  v.  McLaughlin  (28  Wis.  364)      293 
Law  V.  Crombie   (12  Pick.    (Mass.) 

176)  1041 

V.  People  (87  111.  395)  163,  912 

Lawhorne  in  re  (18  Gratt.  85)  246 

Lawrence  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Rail- 
road Co.  (94  U.  S.  164)  73 
V.  Fairhaven  (5  Gray,  110)  994,  1066 
V.  Great  North  Railroad  Co.  (16 

Q.  B.  653)  995 

V.  Hedger  (3  Taunt.  14)  238 

V.  Kellam  (11  Kan.  499)  155,436,439, 

794 
Lawrenceburg  v.  West  (16  Ind.  337)   357, 

371 
Lawson  v.  Railway  Co.  (30  Wis.  597)  180, 

923 

V.  Scott  (1  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  92)        023 

Lawton  v.  Commrs.  (2  Caines,  179)     431, 

881 
V.  Erwin  (9  Wend.  233)  242 

Lay  V.  Wissman  (36  Iowa,  305)  500 

Layton  r.  New  Orleans   (12  La.  An. 

515)  86,  213,  218 

VOL.  I. 


Lazarus  v.  Toronto  (19  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

13)  394 

Lea  V.  Hernandez  (10  Tex.  137)  195 

Leach  i-.  Cargill  (60  Mo.  316)  767,  799 
Learned  v.  Burlington  (2  Am.  L.  R. 

N.  S.  394)  190,  768 

Leavenworth  v.  Booth  (15  Kan.  627)  357, 

358,  736,  739 

V.  Casey  (McCahon  (Kan.),  124)  1068, 

1072 
V.  Kinney  (99  U.  S.  623)  876 

V.  Lang  (6  Kan.  274)  778 

V.  Mills  (6  Kan.  288)  474,  475 

V.  Norton  (1  Kan.  432)  190,  763,  764, 
768,  915 
V.  Rankin  (2  Kan.  357)  441,  448,  451, 

475 
V.  Stille  (13  Kan.  539)  475 

Leavenworth  Co.  v.  Brewer  (9  Kan. 

307)  257 

V.  Miller  (7  Kan.  479)  179 

Leazure  v.  Hillegas  (7  S.  &  R.  313)     569, 

570 
Lebanon  r.  Commrs.  (9  Ohio,  80)  635,  642 
V.  Heath  (47  N.  H.  353)  455 

V.  Ohio  &  M.   Railroad    (77   111. 

539)  731,  907 

Le  Claires.  Davenport  (13 Iowa,  210)  385, 
387,  389,  952 
Le  Clercq  v.  Gallipolis  (7  Ohio,  pt.  1, 

218)  583,  642,  650,  658,  659 

Le  Couteulx  v.  Buffalo  (33  N.  Y.  333)   117, 

558   561 

Ledwich  i-.  McKim  (53  N.  Y.  307)      '  552 

Lee  V.  Flemingburg  (7  Dana,  59)  165 

V.  Lake  (14  Mich.  12)      630,  633,  635 

V.  Minneapolis  (22  Minn.  13)        1001 

V.  Sandy  Hill  (40  N.  Y.  442)  631,  974, 

975 
V.  Templeton  (13  Gray,  476)  941 

V.  Thomas  (49  Mo.  112)  774 

V.  Walls  (1  Kenyon,  292)       349,  354, 

414 
Lee  County  v.  Rogers  (7  Wall.  181)  93, 501, 

503,  851 
Leeds  In  re  (53  N.  Y.  400)  464 

Leftwich  v.  Mayor  (14  La.  An.  152)  644 
Legrand  v.  The  College  (5  Munf.  324)  220 
Lehigh  Co.  v.  Kleckner  (5   W.  &  S. 

(Pa.)  181)  938 

Lehrman  v.  Robinson  (59  Ala.  219)  800 
Leicester  v.  Pittsford  (6  Vt.  245)        1017, 

1039 
Leitch  V.  Wells  (48  N.  Y.  586)  500 

Leland  v.  Portland  (2  Oreg.  46)  633 

Leman  v.  New   York  (5   Bosw.   (N. 

Y.)  414)  970 

Lemington  v.  Blodgett  (37  Vt.  215)  937 
Lemon  v.  Havden  (13  Wis.  1.59)  6-32 

Le  Neve  v.  Mile  End  (8  E.  &  B.  1054)  627 
Lennon  v.  New  York  (55  N.  Y.  365)   103, 
412,  599,  653,  808 
Leominster  Canalc.  Shrewsbury,  etc. 

Railwav  (3  K.  &  J.  6.54)  914 

Leonard  v.  Brooklyn  (71  N.  Y.  498)     572 


Ixvi 


TABLE   OF  CASES  CITED. 


Leonard  v.  Canton  (35  Miss.  189)  118, 365, 

942 

V.  Storcr  (115  Mass.  80)      1032,  lOGl 

Lerov  r.  Mayor  (20  Jolins.  430)    'J24,  925 

V.  SprinirfieKi  (81  111.  114)  674 

Les  Bois  r.  BramcU  (4  How.  449)  649 

Lesley  v.  White  (1  Speers,  31)     263,  455, 

958 

Leslie  v.  St.  Louis  (47  Mo.  474)   597,  605, 

911  919  922 

Lessee  v.  Churcli  (8  Ohio,  298)   '        '  667 

V.  Sauiidcrs  (1  Bay  (S.  C),  30)      667 

Lester  I'.  Baltimore  (29  Md.  415)  946 

V.  Pittsford  (7  Vt.  158)  1028 

Lethridge  v.  Whiter  (1  Caiiipb.  263)     627 

Levasser    v.    Washburn    (11    Gratt. 

(Va.)  572)  673 

Levee  Co.  v.  Harding  (27  Mo.  495)       741 

Levering  v.  Mayor  (7  Humph.  553)      219 

Levison  v.  New  York  (55  N.  Y.  361)     587 

Levy  in  re  (63  N.  Y.  637)  779 

c.  New  York  (1  Sandf.  465)  950 

Lewenthal  v.  New  York  (5  Lans.  532)  1075 

Lewis  in  re  (2  Gall.  483)  137 

V.  Elizabeth  ( 25  N.  J.  Eq.  298)  896,  897 

V.  Henley  (2  Ind.  332)  918 

V.  Litchfield  (2  Root  (Conn.),  43G)  720 

V.  Marshall  Co.  (16  Kan.  102)        829 

r.  Mayor  (9  Com.  B.  N.  S.  401)     473 

V.  Oliver  (4  Abb.  Pr.  li.  121)  251,  833 

r.  Rochester  (9  C.  B.  N.  S.  401)     174 

V.  San  Antonio  (7  Tex.  288)  637,  671 

V.  Slireveport  (3  Wood,  C.  C.  205)  188, 

540 
V.  State  (21  Ark.  211)  428 

V.  Toronto  (39  U.  C.  Q.  B.  343)    325, 

935 
V.  United  States  (Morris  (Iowa), 

199)  361 
Lewiston  v.  Proctor  (27  III.  414)  405,  406, 

421 
Lewisville  v.  Zanone  (1  Met.  (Ky.) 

151)  942 

Lexington  v.  Butler  (14  Wall.  282)      479, 

480,  499,  509 

V.  Headley  (5  Bush,  508)       310,  311, 

325,  767,  797 

V.  McQuillan's   Heirs    (9    Dana, 

513)  610.  743,  747,  753 

V.  Mulliken  (7  Gray  (Mass.),  280)  838, 

841 
Libby  v.  Downey  (5  Allen,  299)  392 

Liddy  v.  St.  Louis  Railroad  Co.  (40 

Mo.  506)  713 

Liebstein  v.  Newark  (24  N.  J.  Eq. 

200)  806,  896,  921 
Life  Association  v.   Board,   etc.    (49 

Mo.  512)  774 

Ligonier  v.  Ackerraan  (46  Ind.  552)    941, 

943,  944,  945 

Lincoln  v.  Hapgood  (11  Mass.  350)       265 

V.  Smith  (27  Vt.  354)  380 

V.  Worcester  (8  Cush.  55)  940 

Lindholm  v.  St.  Paul  (19  Minn.  245)  1033, 

1052 


Linden  v.  Alameda  Co.  (45  Cal.  6)  857 
Lindsay  v.  Rottaken  (32  Ark.  619)  481 
Lindsey  v.  Luckett  (20  Tex.  616)        247, 

834,  835 
Linegar  v.  Ilittenhouse  (94  III.  208)     202, 

229 

Linningr.  Charleston  (1  McCord,345)  783 

Linton  v.  Ashbury  (41  Cal.  525)    96,  102, 

104,  597,  653,  654 

V.  Athens  (53  Ga.  588)  792 

Lipp  V.  Philadelphia  (38  Pa.  St.  503)   805 

Lippincott  v.  Pana  (92  111.  24)  147,  191, 542 

V.  Smythe  (2  L.  T.  N.  S.  79)  606 

Liquidators  v.  Coleman,  etc.  (L.  R.  6 

H.  L.  C.  189)  437 

V.  Municipality  (6  La.  An.  21)  93 

Litchfield  v.  Polk  County  (18  Iowa, 

70)  920 

V.  Vernon  (41  N.  Y.  123)  652,  729,  731, 

744,  797,  810 

V.  Wilmot  (2  Root  (Conn.),  288)  670, 

671 

Little  V.  Madison  (11  C.  L.  Jour.  55)    981 

V.  Madison  (42  Wis.  643)       723,  981, 

1043 

V.  MerriU  (10  Pick.  543)  264,  286,  288, 

V.  Union,  etc.  (40  N.  J.  L.  397)  86,  475 

Littlefield  v.  Maxwell  (31  Me.  134)       646 

V.  Norwich  (40  Conn.  406)    993,  1052 

Little  Meadows  in  re  (35  Pa.  St.  335)  213 

Little  Rock  v.  Barton  (33  Ark.  436)    168, 

790 
V.  National  Bank  (98  U.  S.  308)   442. 

482 

V.  State  Bank  (8  Ark.  227)  483 

V.  Willis  (27  Ark.  572)  1065 

Littleton  v.  Richardson  (34N.H.I179)  1063, 

1064 
Livaudais  t-.  Municipality  (16  La.  512, 

5  La.  An.  8)  639,  645 

Liverpool  Ins.  Co.  v.  Massachusetts 

(10  Wall.  566)  736 

Livingston  v.  Albany  (41  Ga.  21)  783 

V.  Mayor  (8  Wend.  85)    610,  614,  638 

V.  McDonald  (21  Iowa,  160)  1069, 1070 

V.  Pippin  (31  Ala.  542)  173,  452 

V.  Weider  (64  111.  427)  736,  911 

V.  Wider  (53  III.  302)  919 

Lloyd  V.  New  York  (5  N.  Y.  369)  949,  985, 

986,  1037,  1046,  1075 

V.  New  York  (7  Abb.  Pr.  248)  76 

Loan  I'.  Boston  (106  Mass.  450)  1017, 1022, 

1029 
Loan  Assoc,  v.  Topeka  (20  Wall.  655)  491, 

542,  728 
Lobdell  V.  New  Bedford  (1  Mass.  153)  720 
Lock  V.  LexinsTton  (122  Mass.  290)  927 
Locke  V.  Central  (4  Col.  65)  254 

V.  Rochester  (5  Lans.  11)        287,  303 
Locke's  Appeal  (72  Pa.  St.  491)  63 

Lockhart  v.  Troy  (48  Ala.  579)      72,  105, 

293,  884 
Lockport  V.  Gaylord  (61  III.  276)  71,  156 
Lock  wood  V.  Mayor  (2  Hilton  (N.  Y.), 

66)  1056 


TABLE   OF   CASES  CITED. 


Ixvii 


Lockwood  V.  St.  Louis  (24  Mo.  20)      121, 
610,  741,  776,  919,  922 
LofRnk  V.  Alleghany  (5  Weekly  Note 

Cases,  3)  814 

Logan  y.Pyne(43lo\va,524)  119,142,360, 

362 
Logan  Co.  v.  Lincoln  (81  111.  1-56)  412,  674 
Logansport  v.  Blackemore   (17  Ind. 

818)  44.5,  5.33 

V.  Crockett  (64  Ind.  319)  307,  309,  310, 

412 
V.  Dick  (22  Alb.  L.  J.  183)  1055 

V.  Dunn  (8  Ind.  378)  633, 634, 638, 645 
V.  Legg  (20  Ind.  315)  295,  305 

V.  Pollard  (50  Ind.  151)  999 

V.  Wright  (25  Ind.  512)  1074,  1075 
Lohrun  v.  Eyerman  (5  Mo.  App.  481)  806 
Loker  v.  Brookline  (13  Pick.  343)  451, 4-56, 

1020 
V.  Damon  (17  Pick.  (Mass.)  284)  1018 
Lombard  v.  Clieaver  (Morris  (Iowa), 

473)  361 

London  v.  Barnardston  (1  Lev.  16)       411 
London,  City  of    (3  Ilargr.    St.    Tr. 

545)  893 

V.  Vanacre  (1  Ld.  Ravm.  499)  248, 331, 

354 

V.  Wood  (12  Mod.  674)  416 

Londonderry  v.  Andover  (28  Vt.  416)  110, 

111 

V.  Derry  (8  N.  H.  320)  214 

Long  V.  Battle  Creek  (.39  Mich'.  323)  311, 

630 
V.  Fuller  (68  Pa.  St.  170)  609 

V.  O'Rourke  (10  Phila.  129)  799 

Longmore  v.  G.  W.  Railroad  Co.  (35 

L.  .1.  C.  P.  135)  141 

Longworth  v.  Cincinnati  (34  Ohio  St. 

101)  610 

V.  EvansviUe  (32  Ind.  322)  68 

Loomis  V.  Moffitt  (5  Ohio,  358)  827 

V.  Spencer  (1  Ohio  St.  1-50)  264,  266 
Lord  V.  Bigelovv  (0  Vt.  465)  61 

V.  Governor  (2  Pliill.  740)  291 

V.  Mayor  (3  Hill,  426)  955 

V.  Oconto  (47  Wis.  386)  116,  124, 125, 

570 

V.  Oconto  (68  Mo.  115)  778 

Lord  Bruce's  Case  (2  Stra.  819)  267,  268, 

275 
Lord  Colchester  v.  Kewney  (Law  R. 

lExch.  368)  773 

Lord  Hawley's  Case  (1  Vent.  146)        275 

Lorillard  v.  Monroe  (11  N.  Y.  392)         58, 

898,  951,  962,  976,  985 

Loring  v.  Small  (50  Iowa,  271)  573 

Lot  i\  Ross  (38  Ala.  1.5G)        763,  767,  771 

Lott  V.  Co.\  (43  Ala.  697)  785 

V.  Insuran(-e  Co.  (.54  Ala.  499)       907 

Loud  V.  Charlestown  (103  Mass.  278)   783 

V.  Charlestown  (99  Mass.  208)       921 

Louis  County  Courts.  Sparks  (10 Mo. 

117)  833 

Louisiana  v.  Wood  (5  Dillon,  122)      4-58, 

935 


Louisiana  State  Bank  v.  Orleans  Nav. 

Co.  (3  La.  An.  294)  117,  15-5,468 
Louisville  v.  Bank  (3  B.  Mon.  138)       686 
V.  Bank  (3  Met.  148)  811 

V.  Commonwealth  ( 1  Duvall.  295)    76, 
89,  557,  571,  772 
V.  Henderson  (5  Bush,  515)  475 

V.  Henning  (1  Bush,  381)        788,  945 
V.  IHgdon  (2  Met.  520)  246 

r.  Hyatt  (2  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  177)     747, 

797 

V.  Kean  (18  B.  Mon.  9)  864 

V.  McKean  (18  B.  Mon.  9)     113,  363, 

864,  865,  871,  872 

V.  McKegney  (7  Bush,  651)  307,  312, 

314 
V.  Nevin  (10  Bush,  549)  374,  375,  775 
V.  Osborn  (10  Bush,  226)  688 

V.  Rolling  xMill  Co.  (3  Bush,  416)  683, 

1001 
V.  University   of  Louisville    (15 

B.  Mon.  642)    83,  89,  95,  97,  106 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Letson  (2  How. 

497)  935 

V.  Louisville  (8  Bush,  415)    125,  126, 
396,  655,  688,  700,  708,  711, 
Loute  V.  Allegheny  Countv  (10  Pitts. 

L.  J.  241)  842,844,867,870 

Love  V.  Hinkley  (Abb.  Adm.  436)        120 

V.  Jersey  City  (40  N.  J.  L.  456)     2-35 

V.  Ramsour  (12  Ired.  L.  328)     85,  214 

V.  Schenck  (12  Ired.  L.  304)      85,  214 

Loveland  v.  Detroit  (41  Mich.  367)       165 

Lovell  V.  St.  Paul  (10  Minn.  290)  474 

Lovett   V.   Railroad   Co.    (9   Allen 

(Mass.),  557)  713 

V.   Steam,   etc.    Association,    (6 

Paige,  54)  576 

Low   V.   Commissioners   of  Pilotage 

(R.  M.  Charlt.  .302)  239,  406,  430 
u.  Dodd  (1  Exch.  845)  171 

V.  Evans  (16  Ind.  486)  2-39 

V  Lewis  (46  Cal.  549)  771 

i>.  Pettingill  (12  X.  H.  340)  .307 

V.  Towns,  etc.  (8  Ga.  360)       827,  883 
Lowber  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York 

(5  Abb.  Pr.  325;  7  Id.  248)  56,  76, 

195 

Lowden  v.  Cincinnati  (2  Disnev,  203)  474 

Lowell  r.  Boston  (111  Mass.  463}  186,  491, 

737 

V.  B.  &  L.  R.  R.  Co.  (23  Pick.  24)  702. 

10.58,  1062,  1064 

V.  Commissioners  (3  Allen,  550)    782 

V.  French  (6  Cush.  (Mass.)  223)    806 

V.  Ohver  (8  Allen,  247)  178 

V.  Short  (4  Cush.  (Mass.)  275)      1032, 

1061,  1064 

V.  Simpson  (10  Allen  (Mass.),  88)  725 

t.'.  Spaulding  (4  Cush.  275)  726,  1024, 

1029,  1061,  1064 

V.  Wentworth   (6  Cush.  (Mass.) 

221)  800,  806 

V.  Wheelock  (11  Cush.   (Mass.) 

391)  806,  80" 


Ixviii 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Lowell  V.  Wyman  (12  Cush.  (Mass.) 

27;5)  80(5,  '.(56,  957 

Lower  ISIaruiigie  v.  ^ferklioffer   (77 

Pa.  286)  1018 

Loweree  r.  Newark  (38  N.  J.  L.  151)  (509 
Loworv  r.  Dflplii  (.')r)  Tnd.  '250)  1010 

Lowlor  V.  Mayor  (5  Ai)l).  Pr.  II.  325)  56 
Lowndes  Vo.'r.  llmiter  (49  Ala.  507)  963 
Lownsilale  r.  I'ortland  (Heady,  139)  (533 
Lowry  v.  Rainwater  (21  Alb.  L.J.  72)  380 
Loze  I'.  Mayor  (2  La.  427)  413 

Lucas  V.  Hoard  (44  Ind.  524)  85 

I'.  New  York   (21  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

245)  1042 

r.  Pitney  (3  Dutch.  221)   144,145,481, 

482 

V.  San  Francisco  (7  Cal.  463)  474 

V.  Tippecanoe  Co.  (44  Ind.  524)  77,84 

Ludlow  V.  Tyler  (7  C.  &  P.  537)  205 

Luehrman  v.  Taxing  District  (2  Lea 

(Tenn.),42.3)     16,47,71,77,87, 

197,  235 

Lumbard  v.  Aldrich  (8  N.  H.  31)  818,  414 

Lumsden  v.  Cross  (10  Wis.  282)  777 

V.  Milwaukee  (8  Wis.  485)  614 

Lund  v.  Tvnesboro'  (11  Cush.  563)    1022, 

1028 
Lutterloh  v.  Commissioners  (65  No. 

Car.  403)  869 

Lycoming  ;•.  Union  (15  Pa.  St.  16G)     102 

Lyman  r.  Amherst  (107  Mass.  339)    1040 

V.  Bridge  Co.  (2  Aiken  ( Vt.),  255)  979 

V.  Burlington  (22  Vt.  131)  604 

V.  Edgarton  (29  Vt.  305)  985 

Lynch  m  re  (2  Hill,  45)  822 

V.  Alexandria  (9  La.  An.  498)        789 

V.  Laffland  (4  Coldw.  96)         245,  247 

V.  Mayor  (76  N.  Y.  60)        1068,  10G9 

V.  People  (16  Midi.  472)  410 

V.  Smith  (104  Mass.  52)  1040 

Lynchburg  v.  Norvell  (20  Gratt.  601)  487 

Lynde    v.    Winnebago    County    (16 

Wall.  6)    1.50,  190,  479,  489,  499, 

510,  513,  .522,  527,  551 

Lynden  r.  Stanbridge  (2  H.  &  N.  45)    171 

Lynne  Regis  in  re  (10  Co.  122)  206 

Lyon  V.  Adamson  (7  Iowa,  509)  446 

V.  Common wealtli  (3  Bibb.  4.30)    223 

V.  Fislinionger  Co.  (1  L.  R.  1  App. 

Cas.  6(52)  136,  724 

V.  Rice  (41  Conn.  245)  857 

Lyons  v.  Coolidgo  (89  III.  529)  842 

V.  Desolette  (124  Mass.  387)         1041 

V.  Munson  (99  U.  S.  684)  510 

Maas  t'.  Missouri  R.  R.  (11  Hun,  8)  552 
Macbeth    v.   Haldeman   (1  Tenn  R. 

172)  263 

Macey  v.  Titcombe  (19  Ind.  153)  453 

Machell  v.  Nevinson   (2  Ld.  Raym. 

1355)  301 

Macomber    v.    Godfrey    (108  Mass. 

219)  1065 

V.  Godfrey  (11  Am.  Rep.  349)  1065 
V.  Nichols  (34  Mich.  212)        681,  723 


Macon  v.  Franklin  (12  Ga.  239)   629,  630, 

634 
r.  Huff  (6Ga.  221)  437,439 

V.  Macon  (5  Ga.  (548)  778 

V.  Macon  Savings  Bank  (60  Ga. 

133)  778,  787 

V.  Patty  (9  Rep.  618)  1(58 

V.  Shores  (97  U.  S.  272)  499,  510,  536 

Macon  Co.  Case  (99  U.  S.  582)  838 

Macy  V.  Indianapolis  (17  Ind.  267)      682, 

683,  999 
McAden  v.  Jenkins  (64  N.  C.  796)  905 
McAlister  r.  Clark  (33  Conn.  91)  381 

McBean  v.  Chandler  (9  Heisk.  349)     394, 
755,  756,  761,  775,  776 
McCabe  i'.  Fountain  Co.  (46  Ind.  380)  469, 

473,  474 
McCafferty  v.  Spuvten  Duyvil,  etc. 

Co.  (61  N."Y.  178)  1058 

V.  Spuyten  Duvvil,  etc.  Co.  (19 

Am.  Rep.  267)  1058 

McCall    V.   Byram    Manf'g    Co.    (6 

Conn.  428)  246 

McCalla  v.  County  (3  Ore.  424)  1010 

McCann  v.  County  (7  Cal.  121)     608,  609 

V.  Otoe  Co.  (9  Neb.  324)  116,  615,  616 

McCartee  v.  Orphans'  Soc.   (9  Cow. 

437)  557,  558,  561 

McCarthy  v.  Bauer  (3  Kan.  237)  984 

V.  Chicago  (53  III.  38)  240,  725 

V.  Met.  Board,  etc.  (L.  R.  7  C.  P. 

508)  1005 

i;.  Portland  (67  Me.  167)  1015 

V.  St.  Paul  (22  Minn.  527)  1001 

V.  Syracuse  (46  N.  Y.  194)  696,  1048, 
1067,  1072,  1073,  1075,  1077 
V.  Village  of  Oshawa  (19  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  245)  1011,  1025 

McCaughey  v.  Providence  (12  R.  I. 

449)  991 

McCline  v.  Oxford  (94  U.  S.  429)        585 
McClung  V.  Silliman  (6  Wheat.  598)  826, 

850 

V.  St.  Paul  (14  Minn.  420)  254 

McCIure  v.  Bennett  (1  Blackf  189)       156 

McCluskey  v.  Cromwell  (11  N.  Y.  598)  248 

McCoraber  v.  Taunton  (100  Mass.  255) 

1027 
McCombs  I'.  Akron  (15  Ohio,  474)      1002 
I'.  Akron  (18  Ohio,  229)  1002 

McConnel  v.  Lexington   (12  Wheat. 

582)  629 

McConnell  o.  Dewey  (5Neb.  385)  264, 265, 

960,  963 
V.  Hamm  (16  Kan.  228)  187 

McConvill  V.  Jersey  City  (39  N.  J.  L. 

38)  419 

McCord  V.  Ochiltree  (8  Blackf  15)        568 
McCormick    v.  Bay    City  (23  Mich. 

457)  263,304,325 

V.  Kansas  City,  etc. (57  Mo.  433)    995 

r.  Lafayette  (1  Ind.  48)  609 

V.  Patchin  (53  Mo.  33)     682,  779,  780 

McCoy  V.  Brant  (53  Cal.  247)  188, 441, 443, 

909 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixix 


McCoy  V.  Chillicothe  (3  Ohio,  370)    264, 

266 
V.  Harnett  (4  Jones  (N.  C.)  Law, 

180)  867 

McCrackin  r.  San  Francisco  (16  Cal. 

5'Jl)  164,  2'J5,  a05,  444,  454,  456, 
461,  463,  574,  938 
McCready    i-.  Guardians   (9  S.  &  R. 

9'J)  298 

McCrickart  v.  Pittsburg  (88  Pa.  St. 

ia3)  946 

McCrory  (-.  Griswold  (7  Iowa;  248)  604 
McCubhin  V.  Atcbison  (12  Kan.  166)  476 
MoCulloc'h  V.  State  (11  Ind.  424)  326 

McCullom  V.  County  (21  Iowa,  409)    676, 

677,  1037 
McCullousb  V.  Board  of  Education 

(51  Cal.  418)  645 

V.  Maryland  (4  Wheat.  316)    54,  727, 

730,  733 

V.  Mayor  (23  Wend.  458)  487, 821,  986 

V.  Moss  (5  Denio,  567)  482,  489 

McCunn's  Case  (19  N.  Y.  188)  250 

McCurdy  v.  Tappan  (26  Wis.  664)        728 

McCutchen   in   re    (22  U.   C.    Q.    B. 

613)  1073 

i;.  Horner  (11   C.  L.  J.  16;  5N. 

W.  R. 668)  968,  1009 

McDermett  c.  Kingston  (57  How.  Pr. 

196)  1047 

McDennond     i'.     Kennedy    (Bright. 

(Pa.)  332)  765 

McDermott  v.  Met.  Police  Board  (5 

Abb.  Pr.  422)  237,  323 

McDon.ald  r.  Elfe  (1  Nott&McC.  410)  928 

V.  Murphree  (45  Miss.  705)  907 

j;.  New  York  (68  N.  Y.  23)    160,  443, 

451,  458,  459,  461 

V.  Red  Wing  (13  Minn   38)  954 

V.  Scbell  (6  S.  &  R.  240)         431,  614 

V.  Schneider  (27  Mo.  405)  576 

McDonough  V.  Nevada  City  (6  Nev. 

90)  1038 

McDonough,   Succession  of    (8  La. 

An.  171)  562 

McDonough  Will  Case  (15  How.  367)  43, 
554,  560,  561,562,565 
McDougal   I'.   Supervisors   (4  Minn. 

184)  130 

McEwen  v.  Tavlor  (4  Greene,  532)  142 
McFarland  v.  Kerr  (10  Bosw.  249)      558, 

671 
V  Railroad  Co.  (2  Beasl.  Ch.  (N. 

J.)  17,561)  711 

McFarlane  v.  Ins.  Co.  (4  Denio,  392)  316 
McFee  v.  Greenfield  (62  Ind.  21)  364 

McGaffin  v.  Cohoes  (74  N.  Y.  387)  937 
McGary  v.  Lafayette  (12  Rob.  668)     975, 

1041 
V.  Lafayette  (4  La.  An.  440)  975,  976, 

1041 
McGear  r. Woodruff,  Treas.  of  Bridsje- 

ton  (33  N.  J.  L.  213)         410,424 
McGehee  v.  Mathis  (21  Ark.  40)  610,  738, 

749 


McGinity  v.  New  York  (6  Duer,  674)  1048, 
1052,  1061 
McGlue   V.  Pliiladelphia    (10    Pliila. 

(Pa.)  348)  476 

McGonigle  v.  Allegheny  (44  Pa.  St. 

118)  744,  796 

McGraft  v.   Brock  (13  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

629)  587 

McGregors.  Boyle  (34  Iowa, 268)  658, 687, 

1074,  1078 

f.  Calcutt  (18U.  C.  C.  P.  39)         631 

McGuinn  v.  Peri  (16  La.  An.  326)         797 

Mclnerny  v.  Reed  (23  Iowa,  410)  778,  812, 

813,  814 
Mclntire  v.  School  Trustees   (3  111. 

App.  77)  243 

V.  State  (5  Blackf.  .384)  621 

Mclntyre  v.  Railroad  Co.   (26  N.  J. 

Eq.  425)  599 

V.  Wood  (7  Cranch,  504)  850 

McKay  v.  Plank  Road  Co.  (2  Mich. 

138)  677 

McKean  v.  Louisville   (18  B.   Mon. 

(Ky.)  9)  825 

McKee  v.  Bidwell  (74  Pa.  St.  218)  1027 
V.  Brown  (23  La.  An.  306)  797 

V.  Huron,  etc.    (1   U.   C.   Q.   B. 

368)  214 

j;.  McKee  (8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  433)  351, 

352,  399 

V.  Perchment  (69  Pa.  St.  342)  635, 637, 

6?  8 

I'.  St.  Louis  (17.  Mo.  184)        629,  635 

V.  Town  Council  (Rice,  Law, 24)  361, 

928,  940,  941 

V.  Vernon  (3  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  210)  499 

McKenna  v.  Commissioners  (Harper 

(S.  C),  Law,  381)  638 

McKinney  v.  O'Connor  (26  Tex.  5)  226 
McKniglit   V.   New   Orleans  (24   La. 

An.  412)  436 

V.  Parish  of  Grant   (30  La.  An. 

361) ■  573 

McLaughlin  v.  Cluley  (56  Pa.  St.  270)  224 
V.  Corry  (77  Pa.  St.  109)  1021,  1038 
V.  Corry  (18  Am.  Rep.  432)  1021 

V.  Municipahty  (5  La.  An.  504)    601, 
602,  986 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (5  Rich.  (S.  C.) 

Law,  583)  658,  705 

V.  Stevens  (18  Ohio,  94)  139,  639 

V.  Stevens   (2   Cranch,   C.  C.  R. 

148)  368 

McLean  v.  Brantford  (16  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

347)  459 

i;.  Flagg  (46N.  Y.  401)  744,823 

t;.  Railway  Co.  (33  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

198)  607 

McLellan  v.  Young  (54  Ga.  399)  130 

McLott  V.  Davenport  (17  Iowa,  379)  919 
McMahon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (5  Ind.  413)  621 
McMasters     v.     Commonwealth     (3 

Watts,  292)  610,  745 

McMangh  v.  Milwaukee  (32  Wis.  200)  1051 
McMeeken  v.  Cincinnati  (4  Ohio,  394)  699 


Ixx 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


McMillen  v.  Boyles  (0  Iowa,  304)  105,  540 
McMuUeii   1".  City  Council    (1  Bay, 

4(5)  346,  431 

McNamara  v.  Estes  (22  Iowa,  246)      7i)4, 

795 
McPherson  v.  Foster  (43  Iowa,  48)      161, 
102,  542,  843 
McPike  V.  Parr  (51  Mo.  03)  286 

McKae  v.  O'Lain  (1  McMuUen,  328)  352 
McSpedon  i-.  Mayor  (7  Busw.  001)      450, 

475 
McWhorter  v.  People  (05  III.  290)       192, 

482 
Mc Williams  v.  Morgan  (61  111.  89)  645 
Mackinnon  v.  Pensoii  (25  Eng.  Law 

&  Eq.  457)  900 

Maddox  r.  Graham  (2  Met.  (Ky.)  56)  179, 

441,  444,  479,  487,  551,  838,  845, 

857,  858,  860,  864,  868,  871,  877 

Madison  v.  Bartlett  (2  111.  67)  488 

V.  Kelso  (32  Ind.  79)  255 

V.  Korbly  (32  Ind.  74)     239,  270,  276 

V  Uoss  (3  Ind.  230)  1060 
V.  Whitney  (18  Ind.  33)  784 
V.  Whitney  (21  Ind.  261)        784,  787 

Madison  County  v.  Ale.xander  (1  Miss. 

523)  839 

Magee  v.  Commonwealth  (46  Pa.  St. 

8.58)  668,  744 

V  State  (4  Ind.  302)  327 
V.  Supervisors  (10  Cal.  370)  826,  831 

Magill  V.  Kauffman  (4  S.  &  R.  317)  455 
Magruder  r.  Swann  (25  Md.  173)  827 
Maguire  v.  Smoek  (42  Ind.  1)  243, 454,  799 
Maher  v.  Chicago  (38  111.  206)     453,  455, 

474 

Mahon  v.  Halsted  (39  N.  J.  L.  640)       001 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (24  N.  Y.  658)     663, 

097 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (Hill  &  D.  Suppl. 

(N.  Y.)  150)  704 

Mahoney  v.  Bank  (4  Ark.  620)  69 

Mahony  v.  Railroad  Co.    (104  Mass. 

73)  1040 

Main  v.  McCarty  (15  III.  442)  238,  409 
Major  V.  Randolph  (4  W.  &  S.  (Pa.) 

514)  836 

Malchus  V.  Highlands  (4  Bush  (Ky.), 

547)  754 

Maleverer  v.  Spink  (1  Dyer,  36)  953 

Malloch  V.  Anderson  (4  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

481)  601 

Mallory  v.  Mallett  (6  Jones  Eq.  345)    200 
V.  Supervisors  (2  Cowen,  531)        257 
Malone  v.  Murphy  (2  Kan.  250)  430 

V.  Toledo  (28  Ohio  St.  643)  584 

Maloy  V.  Marietta  (11  Ohio,  636)  70 

Maltus  V.  Shields  (2  Met.  553)  790 

Manchester   v.   Hartford    (30   Conn. 

118)  1025,  1029,  1048,  1052 

V.  Herrington  (10  N.  Y.  104)  261 

Mandershid  i'.    Dubuque    (29   Iowa, 

73)  635,  630,  637,  641,  719,  1022, 

1039,  1061 

V.  Dubuque  (25  Iowa,  108)  1022,  1026 


Mangan  v.  Atterton   (L.  R.   1  Ex. 

239)  1023 

Manice  v.  Mayor  (8  N.  Y.  120)      476,  763 
Mankato  v.  Meagher  ( 17  Minn.  205]    634, 

647 
V.  Warren  (20  Minn.  144)  031 

V.  Willard  (13  ^liiin.  13)  656 

Manko  i*.  Chanibersburg    (25   N.  J. 

Eq.  168)  669,  071 

Manley  v.  Gibson  (13  111.  312)      627,  628, 

632 
V.  St.  Helen's  Canal  Co.  (2  H.  & 

N.  840)  995 

Mann  v.  Pentz  (2  Sandf.  Ch.  257)         219 
Manning  v.  Eifth  Parish  (6  Pick.  6)    311, 

318 
V.  Manning  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  223)  223 
Manns  v.  Given  (7  Leigh,  689)  819 

Manny  in  re  (14  How.  24)  819 

Manrose  v.  Parker  (90  111.  581)  637 

Mansfield  v.  Fuller  (50  Mo.  338)  841 

Manufacturing     Co.     v.    Davis     (14 

Joiuis.  238)  204 

Marant  v.  Chamberlain   (6  H.  &  N. 

541)  627 

Marble  v.  Worcester  (4  Gray,  395)    1019, 

1022,  1028 

Marbury  v.  Madison  (1  Cranch,  137)  241, 

857,  874 
March  y.  Commonwealth  (12  B.  Mon. 

25)  ■  330,  368 

Marchant  v.  Langworthy  (6  Hill,  046)  287 

Marcy  v.  Oswego  (92  U.  S.  637)  510,  513, 

514,  517,  518 

i».  Taylor  (19  111.  634)  637 

Marietta  v.  Fearing  (4  Ohio,  427)  76,  332, 

339,  354 
Market  v.  St.  Louis  (50  Mo.  189)        1029, 

1051,  1052 
Alarkham  v.  Mayor  (23  Ga.  402)  082,  999 
Markle  v.  Akron  (14  Ohio,  586)  121,  322, 

340,  430 
V.  Wright  (13  Ind.  548)           291,  882 

Marquis,  etc.  v.  Coyney  (7  B.  &  C. 

2-59)  627 

Marr  v.  Enloe  (1  Yerg.  452)  755 

V.  Vienna  (10  U.  C.  L.  J.  275)       223 
Marriage  v.  Lawrence   (3  B.   &  Ad. 

144)  317 

Marriott  v.  Baltimore  (9  Md.  100)         980 
V.  Hampton  (2  Smith's  L.  Cases, 

237)  940,  945,  940 

i;.  Hampton  (2  Esp.  546)        940,  945, 

'.»46 

V.  Stanley  (1  M.  &  G.  568)  1023 

Marsh  v.  Brooklyn  (59  N.  Y.  280)  605,  919 

V.  Fulton  Co.  (10  Wall,  070)  188,  190, 

441,  442,  451,  401,  462,  501,  510, 

523,  524,  536,  542,  544,  548,  550, 

843 

V.  Little  Valley  (64  N.  Y.  112)       841 

Marsh  &  Co.  v.  Van  Keuren  (23  N. 

J.  Eq.  251)  378 

Marshall  v.  Guion  (11  N.  Y.  461)  139 

V.  Kerns  (2  Swan,  68)  222 


TABLE  OF   CASES  CITED. 


Ixxi 


Marshall  v.  Silliman  (61  111.  218)  105,  192, 

225,540,  yil 

V.  Smith  (L.  R.  8  C.  P.  416)  MS 

V.  Vicksburg  (15  Wall.  146)  776 

Marshall  County  v.  Cook  (38  111.  44)  191, 

222,  482,  542,  548 

Martely.East  St.  Louis  (94m.  67)  411,  412 

Martin  in  re  (27  Ark.  467)  332 

u.  Bank  (15  Ala.  587)  570 

V.  Brooklyn  ( 1  Hill,  545)  1075 

V.  Dix  (52  Miss.  53)  76,  790 

V.  Evansville  (32  Ind.  85)        139,  633 

V.  Lemon  (26  Conn.  192)         297,  298 

V.  Mayor  (1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  545)  89,  125, 

264,  451,  601,957,  986 

V.  O'Brien  (34  Miss.  21)  134 

V.  People  (88  111.  390)  363 

v.^an  Francisco  (16  Cal.  285)       487 

Martindale  v.  Palmer  (52  Ind.  411)     235, 

290,  341,  413 

Marungie  v.  Merkhoffer  (77  Pa.  St. 

286)  1019 

Mason  v.  Bristol  (10  N.  II.  36)  449 

V.  Ellsworth  (32  Me.  271)    1042,  1052 
V.  Pearson  (9  How.  248)  127 

V.  Kennebec,  etc.  (31  Me.  215)     1000 
V.  Lancaster  (4  Bush  (Ky.),406)  766, 

789 

V.  Muncaster  (9  Wheat.  445)  556 

«.  Pitt  (21  Mo.  391)  213 

V.  Shawneetown  (77  111.  533)  323 

Mass.  IK   Cuminings    (22  Alb.  L.  J. 

370)  944 

Massing  v.  Ames  (37  Wis.  645)  767 

Master  v.  Fell  (Wilies,  384)  362 

Master  of  the  Rolls  (1  Keen,  513)        900 

Masters  c.  Warren  (27  Conn.  293)      1041 

Matheney  r.  Golden  (5  Ohio  St.  375)  126 

Mather  v.  Brown  (L.  R.  1  C.  P.  596)    226 

Mathews  v.  Alexander  (68  Mo.  115)    123, 

125,  570,  047,  778 

V.  Barraboo  (39  Wis.  674)  1026 

V.  Biddulph  (3  M.  &  G.  390)  238 

V.  Kelsey  (58  Me.  56)  699,  723 

Mathieson  v.  Jersey  City  (26  N.  J. 

Eq.  247)  896 

Matthis  V.  Cameron,  (62  Mo.  504)  480,492 
Mattingly  v.  Dist.  of  Columbia    (99 

U.  S.  687)  105 

Matts  V.  Hawkins  (5  Taunt.  20)  178 

Maupin  v.  Franklin  (67  Mo.  327)  451 

Maurice  v.  New  York  (8  N.  Y.  120)      763 
Maurin  v.  Smith  (8  R.  L  192)  827 

Mavon  v.  Halstead  (39  N.  J.  L.  640)     821 
Maximillian  17.  Mayor,  etc.  (62  N.  Y.) 

160)      89,  968,  978,  981,  982,  984 

May  V.  Detroit  (2  Mich.  C.  C.  230)       464 

u.  Princeton  (11  Met.  442)  1022 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (3  Wis.  219)  613 

Mayberry  v.    Franklin    (6    Humph. 

(Tenn.)  368)  749 

Mayer  in  re  (-50  N.  Y.  504)  71 

V.  New  York  (63  N.  Y.  455)   805,  944 

Mayhew  v.  Gay  Head  (13  Allen,  129)  .304, 

310,311 


Mayo  V.  James  (12  Gratt.  17)  606,  028,  929 
V.  Murchie  (3  Munford,  358)  635 

Mayor  in  re  (23  Wend.  277)  125,  927 

V.  Allaire  (14  Ala.  400)  369 

V.  Althorp  (5  Coldw.  554)  335 

V.  Attorney-General  (3  CI.  &Fin. 

289)  562 

V.  Avenue  Railroad  Co.  (33  N.  Y. 

42;  32  ii.  261)  345,357,360 

V.Bailey  (3  Hill,  531)  990 

V.  Bailey  (2  Denio,  433)  589,  978,  990, 

1066 
V.  Bailey  (37  N.  J.  L.  519)  144 

V.  Bailey  (1  Humph.  232)  769 

V.  Baldwin  (57  Ala.  413)  907 

V.  Bank  of  Tennessee  (1  Swan. 

(Tenn.),  269)  732,  772 

V.  Barton  (47  Ala.  84)  402 

V.  Beasley  (1  Humph.  232)    331,  333, 
357,  764 
V.  Blamire  (8  East,  487) 
V.  Cashman  (10  Joims.  96)  775 

V.  Cincinnati  (1  Ohio  St.  268)  330 
u.  Colgate  (12  N.  Y.  140)  814,815 
v.  Conner  (5  Ind.  171)  291 

V.  Cox  (L.  R.  2  H.  L.  C.  239,  280)  856 
V.  Cimliff  (2  N.  Y.  165)  972 

V.  Dargan  (45  Ala.  310,  322)  731 

V.  Elliott  (3  Rawle,  170)  562,  563,  567 
v.  Ensor  (L.  R.  4  Eq.  335)  386 

y.  Franklin  (12  Ga.  239)  659 

V.  Furze  (3  Hill,  612)      127,  264,  828, 
950,  10.30,  1037,  1077 
V.  Geisel  (19  Ind.  344)  275 

V.  Gill  (31  Md.  375)  121 

V.  Gloucester  (1  H.  L.  Cas.  285)  563 
V.  Graves  (8  T.  R.  592)  316 

V.  Gravier  (5  Mart.  (La.)  662)  655,660 
V.  Hardwicke  (L.  R.  9  Exch.  13)  459 
V.  Hartridge  (8  Ga.  23)  356,  787 

V.  Henly  (12  CI.  &  Fin.  331)  194,  929 
V.  Henly  (3  B.  &  Ad.  77)  929 

V.  Hopkins  (13  La.  An.  326)  95,  649 
V.  Horn  (2  Harring.  190)  243 

V.  Horner  (Cowp.  102)  110 

V.  Howard  (6  Har.  &  J.  383)  811,  812 
V.  Hussey  (21  Ga.  80)  367 

V.  Hyatt  (3  N.  Y.  1.56)  340,  308,  392 
V.  In  man  (57  Ga.  370)  113,  154 

V.  Lefferman  (4  Gill,  425)  943 

w.  Leverich  (13  La.  An.  332)  649 

V.  Lockett  (13  La.  545)  236,  898 

V.  Long  (31  Mo.  369)  318, 422, 423,  597 
V.  Long  (1  Camp.  68)  318 

V.  Lord  (9  Wall.  409)  838,  84-5,  851, 
862,  864,  865,  871 
V.  Lord  (18  Wend.  126)  954,  955,  956 
V.  Lyme  Regis  (1  H.  Bl.  206)  316 
v.  Maherry  (6  Humph.  371)  755 

V.  McKee  (2  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  167)  811 
V.  McWilliams  (52  Ga.  251)  783,  789 
V.  Maggioli  (4  La.  An.  73)  670 

V.  Magner  (4  Mart.  (La.)  1)  673 

V.  Meserole  (26  Wend.  132)  121,  895, 

896 


Ixxii 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Mayor  i».  Morgan   (7  Mart.  La.   (O. 

S.)l)  228,;322,  431 

V.  Morgan  (9  Mart.  La.  {N.  S.) 

381)  228 

V.  Morris  Canal,  etc.  (1  Beasl.  (N. 

J.)  uGl)  073 

V.  Musgrove  (48  Md.  272)  440 

V.  Mutual  Bank  (20  N.  Y.  387)       770 
V.  Muzzv  C-VS  Mich.  Gl)  300 

V.  Newton  (2:5  Ala.  GIJO)  4i)2 

r.  New  York  ((>;)  N.  Y.  455)  476 

V.  NiclioU  (4  Hill,  20U)     332,  340,  3i>2 
V.  Omburg  (22  Ga.  07)  177 

V.  Ordrenaux  (12  Johns.  122)  345,  348, 

349 
V.  Pedley  (4  B.  &  A.  397)  384 

V.  Pentz  (24  Wend.  6(58)  955,  956 

V.  Pentz  (25  Wend.  157)  955 

V.  Peyroux  (0  Mart.  (La.)  155)      388 
V.  Plielps  (27  Ala.  55)  347 

r.  Pilkington  (1  Keb.  597)  267 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (49  N.  Y.  657)     1054, 
1062,  1063 
V.  Randolph  (4  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.) 

514)  683,  995, 1004,  1066 

V.  Ray  (19  Wall.  40S)     149,  154,  155, 

443,  452,  479,  483,  484,  485,  486, 
490,  500 
V.  Regina  (10  Q.  B.  574)  863 

V.  Richardson  ( 1  St.  &  P.  12)  608,  615 
V.  Rood  (Hill  &  Denio,  140)  390 

V.  Rouse  (8  Ala.  515)  369 

V.  Rowland  (20  Ala.  408)  131 

V.  Royal  St.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Ala. 

322)  731 

V.  Rural,  etc.  (L.  R.  1  Exch.  344)  377 
V.  Shaw's  Adm.  (25  Ga.  590)  258 

V.  Shaw  (16Ga.l72)  270,271,924,926 
v.  Shaw  (14  Ga.  162)  928 

V.  Sheffield  (4  Wall.  189)    1037,  1044, 
1046,  1048,  1052 
V.  Shelton  (1  Head,  24)  57 

V.  Simpson  (8  Q.  B.  73)  281 

V.  Slack  (3   Wheel.    C.   R.   Cas. 

237)  374 

V.  State  (15  Md.  370)  214 

V.  State  (4  Ga.  26)  71 

V.  Steamboat  Co.  (R.  M.  Charlt. 

342)  629 

V.  Stuyvesant  (17  N.  Y.  34)    639,  642 

V.  Thompson  (29  Ark.  509)   907,  986, 

1065,  1006 

V.  Thorne  (7  Paige,  261 )  334,  379,  400, 

401,  402 

V.  Tows  (5  Sneed,  186)  84 

r.  Williams  (15  N.  Y.  502)  402 

V.  Winfield  (8  Humph.  767)    331,  333 

V.  Winter  (29  Ala.  651)  453 

V.  Wright  (2  Port.  230)  319 

V.  Wright  (6  Yerg.  497)  646 

v.  Wright  (19  Ind.  346)  275 

V.  Yuilie  (3  Ala.  137)      118,  345,  347, 

349,  350,  352,  356,  361,  393,  704 

Mayor  of  Durham's  Case  (1  Sid.  33)  244, 

836 


Mayor  of  New  York  in  re  (17  -Johns. 

(N.  Y.)  77)  491 

Mays  V.  Cincinnati  (1  Ohio  Si.  268)    117, 

368,  361,  739,  763,  764,  943,  945, 

046 

Maysville  v.  Shultz  (3  Dana,  10)  112 

Maxwell  v.  Stanislaus    Co.   (63   Cal. 

389)  464, 925 

Meacham  v.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Cash. 

291)  619 

Mead  in  re  (74  N.  Y.  216)  653,  808,  913 
V.  New  Haven  (40  Conn.  72)  971,  981 
Meaglier  v.  County  (5  Nev.  244)  253,  419 
Mcaley  v.  St.  Clair  Co.  (3  Dill.  163)  510 
Mealing  i*.  Augusta  (Dudley  (Ga.), 

221)  929 

Mealis  v.  Ilaywards  (48  Ind.  19)  706 

Means  v.  Hendershott  (24  Iowa,  78)     166 

Mears  v.  Graiiam  (8  Blackford,  144)     156 

V.  Wilmington  (9  Ired.  73)  1003,  1070, 

1075 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia (-6  Wheat.  326)  446 
Mechanicsburg  v.  Meredith   (54   III. 

84)  719,  1009 

Medical  Institute  i;.  Patterson  (1  De- 
nio, 61)  61 
Med  way  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Adams   (10 

Mass.  360)  206 

Meech  v.  Buffalo  (29  N.  Y.  198)  471 

Meed  v.  Ballston  (76  N.  Y.  32'J)  986 

Meek  v.  Whitechapel  Board,  etc.  (2 

F.  &  F.  144)  1074 

Meeker  v.  Van  Rensselaer  (15  Wend. 

397)  314,373,878 

Megowan  v.  Commonwealth  (2  Met. 

(Ky.)  3)  364,397 

Mellen  v.  Western  Railroad  Co.   (4 

Gray,  301)  1075 

Melvin  v.  Lisenby  (72  111.  63)        548,  552 
Memphis  v.  Adams(9  Ileisk.  518)  118,  219, 

472,  473 
V.  Battaile  (8  Heisk.  524)  080 

V.  Brown  (97  U.  S.  300)  848 

V.  Brown  (20  Wall.  289)  469,  472, 473, 
474,  475,  500 
V.  Connor  (53  Mo.  468)  409 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (6  Baxter,  527)  732 
y.  Laski  (9  Heisk.  511)  130 

V.  Lasser  (9  Humph.  757)  1075 

V.  Lenore  (6  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  412)  671 
V.  United  States  (87  U.  S.  293)      848 
y.  Woodward  (12  Heisk.  499)         259 
Memphis  Freight  Co.  v.  Memphis  (4 

Coldw.  419)  593,  595 

Memphis  Packet  Co.  v.  Gray  (9  Bush, 

137)  139,638,639 

Menasha  v.  Hazard  (101  U.  S.)  510 

Mendota  v.  Thomson  (20  111.  197)         412 

Mercer  v.  Hubbard  (45  III.  139)  548 

V.  Jackson  (54  111.  397)  1<>57 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (36  Pa.  St.  99)        95, 

596,  6.52,  678,  696,  699 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (27  Pa.  St.  389)     546 

V.  Woodgate  (  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  26)   627 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxiii 


Mercer  County  ?•.  Hackett  (1  Wall. 

83)     154,  1«0,  47'J,  490,  509,  513, 
51(3,  !J2-2,  524,  5:25,  54G,  547,  548 
Merchants'    Bank  t:  Cook   (4   Pick. 

405)  961 

r.  Little  Rock  (5  Dill.  209)  481 

Meriden  r.  Canij)  (4(5  Conn.  284)  747 

Merriani  v.  Moody  (25  Iowa,  ItiJ)  117,  118, 

812,  813 
V.  New  Orleans  (14  La.  An.  318)  356, 
413,  739 
Merrick  c.  Amherst  (12  Allen  (Mass.), 

500)  737,  740 

V.  Baltimore  (43  Md.  219)  003 

V.  Plank-road  Co.  (11  Iowa,  74)     460 
Merrifield  r.   Worcester   ( 1 10   Mass. 

210)  994,  1073,  1076 

Merrill  v.  Abbott  (62  Ind.  540)      798,  799 

V.  Burbank  (23  Me.  538)  576 

V.  Di.xfield  (39  Me.  157)  471 

V.  Hampden  (26  Me.  234)  1034 

V.  Humphrey  (24  Mich.  170)  919,  921 

V.  Plainfield"(45  N.  H.  126)    174.  909, 

910,  912 

V.  Portland  (4  Clifford,  138)  1014, 1015, 

1022, 1023,  1031, 1040, 1050,  1052 

Merritt  v.  Portchester  (71  N.  Y.  309)  763, 

767,  800 
Mersey  Dock  Cases  (11  H.  L.  C.  (■)87)  987, 
989,  995,  998,  1038,  1049,  1078 
Mersey  Docks  v.  Gibbs   ( Law    11.    1 

H.  L.  93) 141,949,  989, 1038,  1049 
V.  Penhallow  (Law  Reg.  1  H.  L. 

93)  949,  1049 

V.  Penhallow  (1  H.  &  N.  439)         949 

V.  Penhallow  (3  H.  &  N.  164)         949 

V.  Peniiallow  (7  H.  &  N.  329)        1049 

Merwin  c.  Chica!,n>  (45  III.  133)     130,  131 

Messenger  c.  Buffalo  (21  N.  Y.  196)    440, 

477 
Metcalf  V.  Hetherington   (11    Exch. 

2.37)  141 

V.  Hetherington  (5  H.  &  N.  719)    141 
V.  St.  Louis  (11  Mo.  103)        322,  373 
Methodist  Church   in   re   (69   N.    Y. 

395)  777 

(6G  N.  Y.  390)  762,  765,  775,  843 

V.   Baltimore  (0  Gill,  391)      122,599. 

605,  G14 

V.  Hoboken  (33  N.  J.  L.  13)  631,  6.39, 

645,  647,  656,  661 

Metropolitan  Board  of  Health  r.  Heis- 

ter  (37  N.  Y.  601 )  18,  237, 372,  052 
Metropolitan   Railroad  Co.  c.  Quincy 

Railroad  Co.  (12  Allen,  262)   716 

Meuser  v.  Risdon  (36  Cal.  239)     123,  778, 

806,  808,  800 

Meyer  v.  Bridgeton   (37  N.  J.  L.  160)  400 

V.  Carolan  (9  Tex.  2.50)  825 

r.  Johnson  (53  Ala.  241)  788 

V.  Lindell  Railway   Co.    (6  Mo. 

App.  27)  713 

V.  Muscatine  (1  Wall.  384)  120,  157, 

180,   189,  468,  479,  482,  487,  501, 

509,  513,  522,  524,  525 


Meyer  v.  Newark  (6  Am.  Law  Review, 

576)  622 

Meyers  v.  People  (26  III.  173)  430 

V.  United  States  (1  McLean,  493)  243 
Michel  V.  Police  Jury  (9  La.  An.  67)  474 
Micliie  hire  (11  U.  C.  C.  P.  379)  121,  797 
Miclijgan  City   v.   Roberts    (34  Ind. 

471)  826,828 

Middleport  i:  iEtna,  etc.  Co.  (82  111. 

562)  147,  191 

Middlesex,  etc.  v.  Davis  (3  Md.  133)  204 
Middlesex  Railroad  Co.  v.  Wakefield 

(103  Mass.  262)  711 

Middletown  v.  Allegheny  Co.  (37  Pa. 

241)  154 

V.  Lowe  (30  Cal.  596)  827 

Middletown    Bank   v.   Dubuque    (15 

Iowa,  394)  574,  576 

Midley  v.  Bloomington  (88  III.  554)  1021 
Milarkey  v.  Foster  (6  Greg.  378)  657,  658 
Milburn  l\  Cedar  Rapids   (12  Iowa, 

246)  689,  716 

V.  Railroad  Co.  ( 12  Iowa,  246 )        701, 

703 

Miles  V.  Bough  (3  Gale  &  D.  119)  307,  341 

V.  Chamberlain  (17  Wis.  440)        345, 

349,  351 

V.  Charleton  (29  Wis.  400)  71 

V.  Duncan  (6  B.  &  C.  671)  942 

Milford  f.  Holbrook  (9  Allen,  17)      1032, 

1001,  1062 

Milford  County  v.  Brush   (10  Ohio, 

111)  207 

Milhau  V.  Sharp  (15  Barb.  210)    690,  694, 

703,  913 

V.  Sharp  (27  N.  Y.  611)  125,  655,  659, 

600,  703,  708 

i.-.  Sharp  (19  Barb.  435)  124 

Military  Parade  Ground  in  re  (60  N.  Y. 

319)  601 

Mill  Dam  Foundry  u.  Hovey  (21  Pick. 

417)  218 

Miller  v.  Board,  etc.  (66  Ind.  162)         146 
y.  Burch  (32  Tex.  209)  378,383 

V.  Corporation,  etc.  (25  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  31)  1011 

I'.  English  (21  N.  J.  L.  317)  222 

V.  Ford  (4  Rich.  Law,  376)  263 

V.  Grundy  (13  Mich.  540)  915 

V.  Hull  (4  Denio,  144)  443 

V.  Iron  Co.  (29  Mo.  122)  963 

V.  Lerch  (1  Wall.  , Jr.  210)  562 

V.  Lvnchburg    (20    Graft.    (Va.) 

'330)  481 

V.  McWilliams  (20  Am.  Rep.  297)  961 
;.'.  McWilliams  (50  Ala.  427)  572,839, 

961 
V.  Milwaukee  (14  Wis.  642)  436 

V.  Mobile  (47  Ala.  163)  605,  600,  797, 
798,  896 
v.  Race  (1  Burr.  452)  499 

V.  Savannah  Fire  Co  (20  Ga.  078)  171 
V.  Stewart  (9  Wheat.  702)  243 

V.  Supervisors  (25  Cal.  93)  249 

V.  Thomson  (3  M.  &  G.  576)  481 


Ixxiv 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Miller  r.  Trustees,  etc.  (88  111.  2G)        923 
MiUianl  c.  Lafayette  (5  La.  An.  112)  GOl, 

01)2 

Millison  r.  Fisk  (4:1  111.  112)  131 

Mill's  C'ase  (T.  Kaviii.  152)  870 

Mills  v.  Brooklyn  (:]2  N.  Y.  489)  950,91)8, 

1000, 1008, 1070, 1072,  1073,  1074, 

1075,  1077 

V.  Brooklvn  (5  Am.  Law  Reg.  N. 

S.  3:J)  1066 

V.  Charlelon  (2',J  Wis.  400)    463,  405, 

808,  809,  920 

V.  Gleason  (11  Wis.  470)        145,  146, 

*      149,  155,  294,  460,  46:} 

V.  Gleason  (8  Am.  Law  Reg.  083)    155 

V.  TliorntoM  (26  111.  300)  783 

V.  Williams  (11  Ired.  (N.  C.)  5.58)  02, 72 

Milne  v.  Davidson  (5  Martin,  586)       322, 

323,  373,  380 

Milner  r.  Mayor  (13  La.  An.  69)  212 

l:  Pensii^ola  (2  Woods  C.  C.  637)  112, 

154 
Milnes  v.  Duncan  (6  B.  &  C.  671)  946 
Milward  v.  Tliatcher  (2  Term  R.  87)  250, 

251 
Milwaukee  v.  Davis  (0  Wis.  377)        1049, 

1051 
V.  Milwaukee  (12  Wis.  93)  216 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (7  Wis.  85)  701 

Milwaukee  Iron  Co.  v.  Hubbard  (29 

Wis.  51)  919 

V.  Schubel  (29  Wis.  444)         925,  928 
Milwaukee  R.  R.  Co.  in  re  (5  Wall. 

1«8)  872 

Miners'    Bank    ?/.    United   States    (5 

How.  U.  S.  213)  893 

Miners'  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbach  (37 

Cal.  543)  73,  442,  570,  935 

Mining  Co.  r.  Guardians  (L.  R.  7  Q. 

B.  90)  775 

Minnesota  ;;.  St.  Paul  (2  Wall.  609)      788 
Minnesota,   etc.,   Co.    r.   Palmer   (20 

Minn.  468)         764,  7G5,  794,  896 

Minns  v.  West  (38  Ga.  18)  500 

Minor  v.  Bank  ( 1  Pet.  46,  69)  260 

Minot  V.  Boston  Asylum  (7  Met.  416)  208 

y.  Curtis  (7  Mass.  441)  216 

v.  West  Roxbury  (112  Mass.  1)  40,  42, 

902 
Minturn  v.  Larue  (23  How.  435)  117,  118, 

142 
Mitchell  V.  Burlington  (4  Wall.  270)     157 
185,  482,  503 
V.  Davenport  (34  Iowa,  194)  791 

V.  Foster  (9  Dowl.  P.  C.  527)         225 
V.  Hav  (.37  Ga.  .581)  824 

V.  Kirtland  (7  Conn.  229)  597 

V.  Lemon  (34  Md.  176)  410 

V.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  92)      464,  920 
V.  Rockland  (41  Me.  363)       262,  873, 

983 
V.  Rockland  (45  Me.  496)  41,  237,  451, 

973 

V.  Rockland  (52  Me.  118)       168,  961, 

963,  973,  979 


Mitchell  V.  Rockland  (52  Me.  122)       168, 

961,  963 
V.  Rome  (49  Ga.  19)  671,  999,  1003 
V.  Rome  (15  Am.  Rep.  669)  1003 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (3  Humph.  456)  607, 

609 
Mix  V.  Ross  (57  Rl.  121)  810,  811,  813,  814, 

815 
Moale  V.  Baltimore  (5  Md.  314) 

638 
Mobile  V.  Baldwin  (57  Ala.  61) 
i,'.  Dargan  (45  Ala.  310) 
V.  Eslava  (9  Port.  577) 
V.  Jones  (42  Ala.  630) 
V.  Moog  (53  Ala.  561) 
V.  Yuille  (3  Ala.  137) 
Mochler  r.  Shaftsbury  (46  Vt.  5E 


581,  610, 

731,  747 

763,  785 

327,  783 

136 

407 

137 

789 

0)    1025, 

1027 

I'.  Shaftsbury  (14  Am.  Rep.  634)   1025 
Mohan  v.  Jackson  (52  Ind.  599)  235 

Moir  1-.  Monday  (Sayer,  181)        412,  413 
Molett  V.  Keenan  (22  Ala.  484)  599 

Monaghan  r.  Philadelphia  (28  Pa.  St. 

207)  840,  844,  928 

Monies  v.  Lynn  (124  Mass.  165)  1053 

Monk  Election  in  re  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B 

147) 
Monmouth  v.  Gardiner  (35  Me.  247) 


Monroe  i'.  Hoffman  (29  La.  An.  651] 
Montague  v.  Horan  (12  Wis.  599) 
Montgomery  v.  Barber  (45  Ala.  237 


225 
720, 
721 
402 
487 
436 
443, 445 

V.  Scott  (34  Wis.  338)  1051 

Montpelier  v.  East  Montpelier  (29  Vt. 

12)  87,  92,  97,  106,  215,  563 

V.  East  Montpelier  (27  Vt.  704)  87,  92, 

100,  215 

Montville  v.  Haughton  (7  Conn.  543)  242 

Moody  V.  Niagara  Co.  (40  Barb.  659)  957 

Mooers  v.  Smedley  (0  Johns  Ch.  28)    895 

Mooney  i'.  Kennctt  (19  Mo.  551)  408 

Moor  V.  Cornville  (13  Me.  293)  462 

V.  Newfield  (4  Greenl.  44)      286,  312, 

318,  414 

Moore  in  re  (62  Ala.  471)  883 

V.  Abbott  (32  Me.  46)  1022, 1023,1024, 

1041 

V.  Chicago  (60  Rl.  243)  778 

V.  Fayetteville  (80  N.  C.  154)         741 

V.  Mayor  (8  N.  Y.  110)  587,  634 

V.  Mayor  (73  N.  Y.  238)         452,  461, 

462,  523,  935,  930,  971 

V.  Minneapolis  (19  Minn.  300)     1029, 

1038,  1049,  1051,  10.52 

V.  New  York  (73  N.  Y.  238)  450 

r.  People  (14  How.  13)  371 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Md.  110)  583 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Gray,  465)         975 

V.  State  (16  Ala.  411)  369 

V.  State  (48  Miss.  147)  370 

Mootry  v.  Danbury  (45  Conn.  550)      383, 

1066,  1008 

Moran  r.  Gleams  (63  Barb.  185)  1068 

V.  Commrs.  (2  Black,  722)  501 


TABLE   OF   CASES  CITED. 


Ixxv 


Moran  v.  Lindell  (52  Mo.  220)  796 

V.  Miami  County  (2  Black,  722)    191, 

479,  499,  509,  513,  524,  549 

r.  Palmer  (13  U.  C.  C.  P.  450)        236 

Morange  v.  Mix  (44  N.  Y.  315)  742 

Morano  v.  Mavor  (2  La.  An.  218)  385,  391 

Morden  v.  Porter  (7  C.  B.  N.  S.  G41)    428 

Morey  v.  Newfane  (8  Barb.  645)     76,  960, 

963,  1033 
Morfonl  v.  Barnes  (8  Yerg.  444)    431,  614 
V.  Unger  (8  Iowa,  82)        71,  213,  792 
Morgan  r.  Beloit  (C.  C.  Wis.  1853)  851,  852 
V.  Tree  (46  Vt.  773)  785 

V.  Dubuque  (28  Iowa,  575)  475 

V.  Hallowell  (57  Me.  375)  1015 

V.  Parliam  (16  Wall.  471)  785 

V.  Quackenbush  (22  Barb.  72)       226, 

232 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (96  U.  S.  716)      630, 

638 
Morley    v.  Great   Western    Railroad 

Co.  (16  U.  C.  Q.  B.  504)        1042 

Morrell  v.  Dixfield  (30  Me.  157)    262,  462 

V.  Sylvester  (1  Greenl.  248)  241 

Morrill  v.  State  (38  Wis.  428)       735,  738, 

740,  789 
Morris  in  re  (11  Gratt.  292)  819,  872 

V.  Baltimore  (5  Gill,  244)  942,  944 
V.  Bowers  (Wriglit  (Ohio),  750)  625 
r.  Brower  (Antfi.  N.  P.  368)  379 

r.  Burdett  (1  Camp.  218)  257 

V.  Chicago  (11  111.  650)  597 

V.  People  (3  Denio,  381)  68,  174 

r.  Rome  (10  Ga.  532)  398 

V.  Underwood  (19  Ga.  559)  892 

Morris,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Newark 

(2  Stockt.  Ch.  (N.  J.)  352)      701 
Morris  Canal  Co.  v.  Fagin  (22  N.  J. 

Eq.  430)  655 

r.  Fisher   (1  Stockt.  Ch.  (N.  J.) 

667)  479 

V.  Jersey  City  (1  Beasl.  252)  633, 896, 

924,  926 

V.  Jersey  City  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  294)  609 

Morrison  v.  Hershire  (32  Iowa,  276)    743, 

796  921 
V.  Hinkson  (87  111.  587)  572,  573,' 694, 

841 

V.  Lawrence  (98  Mass.  219)   304,  30.5, 

311,  312,  973,  978,  979 

v.  McDonald  (21  Me.  550)      235,  419 

Morrow  v.  Wood  (56  Ala.  1)  243 

ilorse  V.  Boston  (109  Mass.  446)  1029 

r.  Haynes  (22  U.  C.  Q.  B.  107)    1073 

V.  Richmond  (41  Vt.  435)  1017,  1022, 

1028 
V,  Richmond    (8  Am.  Law  Reg. 

N.  S.  81)  1017,  1022 

Moses  V.  Fort  Wayne  &  Chicago  Rail- 
road Co.  (21  111.  515)  1065 
V.  Kearney  (".1  Ark.  201)  856 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (21  III.  522)   064,  696, 
697,  CM,  702,  711,  716,  999,  1065 
V.  Risdon  (40  Iowa,  251)  122 
Mosey  v.  Troy  (01  Barb.  580)    1021,  1053 


Mosher  v.  School Dist.  (44  Iowa,  122)  104, 

161 

Mosley  v.  Alston  (1  Phill.  790)  291 

V.  Walker  (7  B.  &  C.  40)  384 

Moss  V.  Cummins  (22  Alb.  L  J.  376)   940 

V.  Harpeth,  etc.  (7  Heisk.  283)       146 

V.  Oakland  (88  111.  109)  342 

V.  Oakley  (2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  265)       481 

Mott  I'.  Hicks  (1  Cow.  513)  263,  446,  455, 

482 

V.  Pa.  Railroad  Co.  (39  Pa.  St.  9)  126 

V.  Reynolds  (27  Vt  206)         307,  309 

V.  Schoolbred  (L.  R.  20  Eq.  22)     723 

Motz  y.  Detroit  (18  Mich.  495)  921 

Moulton  V.  Sandford  (51  Me.  127)      1022, 

1023.  1028,  1035 

Moultrie  v.  Savings  Bank  (92  U.  S. 

631)  510 

Mount  Carmel  v.  Wabash  Co.  (50  111. 

69)  357,  365 

Mount  Morris  Square  (2  Hill,  14)         924 
Mount   Morris  Square  in  re  (2  Hill, 

20)  304,  927,  928 
(1  Hill,  674)  927 

Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beck  with  (100  U. 

S.  514)  94,  203,  214,  216 

V.  Breeze  (11  Iowa,  399)  329,  370,  396 
Mount  Vernon  v.  Hovey  (52  Ind.  563)  179 
Mount  Washington  Co.  in  re  (35N.  H. 

134)  614 

Mouse's  Case  (12  Col.  63)  953 

(12  Col.  13)  953 

Mowatt  V.  Wriglit  (1  Wend.  3.55)  946 

Mowberry  v.  Jeffersonville  (38  Ind. 

198)  767,  797 

Mower  v.  Leicester  (9  Mass.  247)  41,  960, 
963,  964,  1014,  1015 
Mowrey  v.  Central,  etc.  Railroad  (51 

N.  Y.  666)  713 

Moyamensing  Com.  v.  Long  (1  Par. 

(Pa.)  145)  6.56,657 

Mulherrin   v.   Railroad   Co.    (81    Pa. 

St.  366)  745,  749 

Mullarkey  v.  Cedar  Falls  (19  Iowa, 

21)  124,443,721 
Mullen  V.  Commrs.  (85  Pa.  St.  288)      774 

V.  St.  Johns  (57  N.  Y.  567)  1028 

V.  St.  Johns  (15  Am.  Rep.  5.30)    1028 

Mumma  v.  Potomac  Co.  (8  Pet.  281)  198, 

200,  202 
Munger  v.  Railroad  Co.  (4  N.  Y.  849)  1040 
Municipality  v.  Bank  (5  Rob.  (La.) 

151)  769,  774 

V.  Bank  (5  La.  An.  .394)  787 

V.  Blanc  (1  La.  An.  385)  399 

V.  Blineau  (3  La.  An.  688)      334,  388 
V.  Botts  (8  Rob.  (La.)  198)  809 

V.  Caldwell  (3  Rob.  368)  263 

V.  Commrs.  (1  Rob.  (La)  279)       112 
V.  Cotton  Press  Co.  (6  Rob.  (La.) 

411)  769 

V.  Cutting  (4  La.  An.  335)     321,  385, 

887,  391,  405,  406,  413 

V.  Dubois  (10  La.  An.  5C))       3.56,  739 

V.  Duncan  (2  La.  An.  182)      740,  782 


Ixxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Municipality  i'.  T)nnn  (10  La.  An.  57) 

(JU),  740.  743,  7-l(),  753,  780 
r.  Gas  Liglit  Co.  (5  La.  An.  43U)  OT'J 
V.  Guillotte  (14  La.  An.  297)  740,  753, 

807 
V.  Hart  (G  La.  An.  570)  I'i'J 

f.  Johnson  (G  La.  An.  20)  781,  783 
r.  Kirk  (5  La.  An.  34)  610 

I'.  Levee  Co.  (7  La.  An.  270)  GOl,  031 
V.  McDonougli     (2     Kob.    (La.) 

244)  155,  560 

V.  Miclioiid  (0  La.  An.  605)  7^3 

r.  Mor^'un  (1  La.  An.  Ill)  414 

V.  Palfrey  (7  La.  An.  497)  639 

V.  Pance  (6  La.  An.  515)  813 

V.  Pease  (2  La.  An.  538)  133,  140 

V.  Railroad    Co.    (10   Kob.  (La) 

187)  769,  774 

V.  Tiieatre  Co.  (2  Rob.  (La.)  209)  105 
V.  Ursuline  Nuns  (2  La.  An.  611)  793 
r.  Wheeler  (10  La.  An.  745)  741 

V.  White  (9  La.  An.  446)    739,  743,753 
V.  Wilson  (5  La.  An.  747)       367,  371 
Municipality,  etc.  in  re  (12  U.    C.  Q. 

B.  522)  828 

Munn  V.  People  (69  111.  80)  73 

V.  People  (94  U.  S.  313)  73 

V.  Pittsburg  (40  Pa.  St.  864)        1075, 

1077 
Munsell  v.  Temple  (8  111.  96)  361 

Murdock  i-.  Academy  (12  Pick.  244)    276, 

278 

V.  Aiken  (81  N.  Y.  606)  547 

V.  Mempliis  (20  Wall.  590)  113 

V.  Warwick  (4  Gray,  178)   1035,  1041 

V.  Woodson  (2  DiU.  C.  C.  188)  68,  71 

Murfree  v.  Leeper  (1  Overt.  1)  881 

Murpliy  m  re  (7  Cow.  153)  227 

V.  Chicago  (29  111.  279)  696,  704, 

999, 1065 

V.  City  Council  (11  Ala.  586)  135,  137, 

140 

V.  Dean  (101  Mass.  455)  1040 

V.  Gloucester  (105  Mass.  470)      1018, 

1027,  1048 

V.  Louisville  (9  Bush,  189)       76,  443, 

458,  460,  461,  462,  476,  767 

V.  Lowell  (124  Mass.  564)      987,  1056 

V.  People  (2  Cow.  815)  430 

Murray  i'.  Charleston  (96  U.  S.  432)    733, 

784 
V.  Hohoken  Land  Co.  (18  How. 

272)  751 

V.  Lardner  (2  Wall.  110)  479,  500,553 

V.  Tucker  (10  Bush,  240)        763,778, 

779.  806,  807 

Murtaugh  v.  St.  Louis  (44  Mo.  479)     983 

Muscatine  v.  Hershey  (18  Iowa,  39)    139, 

140 
i;.  Packet  Co.  (45  Iowa,  185)  138,  140, 
942  944 
V.  Railroad  Co.   (1  Dillon  C.  c' 

536)  93,  94,  740,  765,  782 

I'.  Steck  (7  Iowa,  505)   285,  418,  432, 

433 


Muscatine  v.  Steck  (2  Iowa,  220)  235 

Muscatine  Turnverein  v.  Funck  (18 

Iowa,  469)  195,  200 

Musgrove  v.  Catholic  Church  (10  La. 

An.  431)  327,374,375 

V.  Nevison  (1  Stra.  584)  284 

V.  Nevison  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1859)       284 

Mussehnan  v.  Manly  (42  Ind.  402)       304, 

810 

Musser  v.  Johnson  (42  Mo.  74)  219 

Muzzy  r.  Shattuck  (1  Dcnio,  233)        262 

Myers  v.  Bank  (20  Oiiio,  283)  54 

i;.  Croft  (13  Wall.  2yl)  569 

V.  Irwin  (2  S.  &  R.  368)  61 

V.  People  (26  III.  173)  417 

V.  Simms  (4  Iowa,  500)  604 

V.  Snyder  (Briehtley  (Pa.),  489)  1055 

Mylert  i'.  Sullivan  Co.  (19  Pa.  St.  181)  942 

Myles  V.  York  Railroad  (43  Me.  -362)    552 

Mvrick  v.  La  Crosse  (17  Wis.  442)      599, 

800,  920 
Mytton  V.  Duck  (26  U.  C.  Q.  B.  61)     626 

Nagle  V.  Augusta  (5  Ga.  546)  680 

Napier  in  re  (18  Q.  B.  695)  820 

Napman  v.  People  (19  Mich.  852)  336,  394, 

409,  414 
Nash  V.  St.  Paul  (11  Minn.  174)  461,  464, 

465,  485 
Nash  &  McCracken  in  re    (38  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  181)  362,876 

Nashville  v.  Althrop  (5  Coldw.  554)      789 

V.  Bank  (1  Swan,  269)  732 

V.  Brown  (9  Heisk.  1)  1054,  1058 

V.  Brown  (24  Am.  Rep.  289)         1054 

V.  Ray  (19  Wall.  468)  494 

V.  Thomas  (5  Coldw.  600)       732,  787 

V.  Weiser  (54  111.  245)  800,  802 

Nason  v.  Boston  (14  Allen,  508)  1020 

National  Bank  v.  Commonwealth  (9 

Wall.  353)  733 

V.  Green  (33  Iowa,  140)  500 

V.  Texas  (20  Wall  72)  500 

Nauvoo  V.  Ritter  (97  U.  S.  389)  510 

Navasota  v.  Pearce  (46  Tex.  525)        1012 

Navigation   Co.  v.  Portland  (2  Oreg. 

81)  763 

Naylor  v.  Galesburg  (56  111.  285)  327 

Neal  V.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Grant,  137)  598 
Neale  i'.  Overseers  (5  Whart.  538)  242 
Neales  v.  State  (10  Mo.  498)  420 

Nealis  V.  Hayward  (48  Ind.  19)  238 

Neall  r.  Hill  (16Cal.  145)  269 

Nebraska  City  v.  Campbell  (2  Black, 

.590)  1018,  1037,  1041,  1044 

V.  Lambkin  (6  Neb.  27)  683,  999, 1006 

V.  Nebraska  (9  Neb.  339)  4G7 

Neely  v.  Yorkville  (10  S.  C.  141)  203,  20(), 

441,  450,  499 

Neenan  v.  Smith  (50  Mo.  525 ;  60  Mo. 

292)  743,  807,  810 

Negus  in  re  ( 10  Wend.  34)  923 

Neiffer  v.  Bank  (1  Head  (Tenn.),  162)  444 
Neilson  v.   Wakefield   (5  N.  W.    R. 

458)  599 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


Ixxvii 


Nelson  in  re  (1  Cow.  417)  822,  825 

V.  Godfrey  (12  III.  22)  600,  t595 

V.  La  Porte  (o3  Inrl.  258)         690,  704 

I'.  Mayor  (63  N.  Y.  535)  458 

V.  Miltorcl  (7  Pick.  18)     174,  175,  471 

Neosho  Co.  v.  Stoddart  (13  Kan.  207)  038 

Neuer  v.  Fallon  ( 18  Mo.  277)  130 

Neuse  River  Co.  c  Commissioners  (6 

Jones  Law, 204)  819,  867 

Nevada  v.  Hampton  (13  Nev.  441)  102 
Nevill  V.  Ross  (22  U.  C.  C.  P.  487)  325 
Neville  v.  Kelly  (12  C.  B.  N.  S.  740)  166 
Nevins  v.  Peoria  (41  111.  502)  9W,  1000, 
1065,  1008,  1009,  1070,  1074 
New  Albany  v.  Meekin  (3  Ind.  481)    783, 

784 
r.  Sweeney  (13  Ind.  245)        474,475 
New   Albanv,   etc.    Railroad    Co.    ;;. 

O'Dailey  (13  Ind.  353)  705 

New  Albany   Bank  v.   Danville   (60 

Ind.  504)  146 

Newark  v.  Elliott  (5  Ohio,  113)     570,  571 

i;.  Funk  (15  Ohio,  402)  131 

V.  Murphy  (40  N.  J.  L.  145)  410 

V.  State  (34  N.  J.  L.  523)  742 

Newark  Bank  v.  Assessor  (30  N.  J. 

L.  22)  109 

Newberry  v.  New  York  (1  Sweeny, 

369)  957 

New  Boston  v.  Dumbarton  (12  N.  H. 

409)  110 

New  Brunswick,  etc.  Co.  v.  Commis- 
sioners (38  N.  J.  L.  190)  760 
Newby  v.  Piatt  County  (25  Mo.  258)   021 
Newcastle  in  re  (12  Clark  &  Fin.  402)  373 
Newcomb  '•.  Police  Jury  (4  La.  An. 

233)  474 

Newell  V.  People  (7  N.  Y.  9)       _  158 

New  England,  etc.  Co.  v.  Robinson 

(25  Ind.  536)  146 

New  Haven  v.  Railroad  Co.  (38  Conn. 

422j  749,  786,  814,  921 

17.  Sargent  (38  Conn.  50)  682,  685,  687 
V.  Whitney  (36  Conn.  373)  795 

New  Haven  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Chatham 

(42  Conn.  465)  192,  307,  524,  825 
New  Jersey  i-.  Yard  (95  U.  S.  112)  109 
New  Jersey,  etc.  Co.  v.  Long  Branch 

(39  N.  J.  L.  28)  678 

Newlin  v.  Davis  (77  Pa.  St.  317)        1019, 

1038 
Newling  v.  Francis  (3  Term  R.  189)  222 
New  London   v.  Brainard  (22  Conn. 

.552)  117,  909,  910,  915 

V.  Montville  (1  Root,  184)       214,  217 
Newman  f.  Justices  (5Sneed  (Tenn.), 

695)  838 

V.  Scott  Co.  (1  Heisk.  787)  8-39 

V.  Sylvester  (42  Ind.  106)       206,  457 
Newmyer  i*.  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  (52  Mo. 

81)  911,  922 

V.  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  (14  Am.  Rep. 
.394)  911 

New  Orleans  v.  Anderson  (9  La.  An. 

323)  354 


New  Orleans  v.  Bank  (10  La.   An. 

735)  739,  787 

t;.  Bank  (15  La.  An.  89)  787 

V.  Becker  (31  La.  An.  644)  907 

r.  Bondu  (14  La.  An.  303)  355,  408 
V.  Clark  (95  U.  S.  6.34)  87,  102,  103, 
104,  10.5,  690 
V.  Costello  (14  La.  An.  37)  346,  35.3, 
402,  417 
V.  Davidson  (30  La.  An.  541)  810 

V.  Eliott  (10  La.  An.  59)  739 

V.  Finnerty  (27  La.  An.  681)  259,  260 
V.  Finnerty  (21  Am.  Rep.  5u9)      259, 

260 
V.  Graihle  (9  La.  An.  561)     226,  811, 

812 
V.  Guillotte  (12  La.  An.  818)  385,  469 
V.  Hill  (30  La.  An.  554)  810 

V.  Hovle  (23  La.  An.  740)  77,  79 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (25  La.  An.  .390)  983 
V.  Insurance  Co.  (23  La.  An.  61)  129, 

571 
V.  Kauffman  (29  La.  An.  283)  739 
V.  Lambert  ( 14  La.  An.  247 )  379 

V.  Magnon  (4  Martin  (La.),  2)  670 
V.  Michoud  (10  La.  An.  763)  793 

V.  Miller  (7  La.  An.  651)  367,  371 
V.  Morris  (3  Woods  C.  C.  103)  571 
V.  New  Orleans  (26  La.  An.  478)  648 
V.  Philipi  (9  La.  An.  44)  329,  332 

V.  Poutz  (14  La.  An.  8-53)  10-5,  741 
V.  South  Bank  (11  La.  An.  41)     739, 

787 
V.  St.  Anna's  Asylum  (31  La.  An. 

292)  774 

f.  Stafford  (27  La.  An.  417)  384 

r.  Staiger  (lOLa.  An.  68)  739 

V.  St.  Louis  Church  (11  La.  An. 

244)  303,  327,  374,  .375,  469 

V.  Turpin  (13  La.  An.  56)       356,  739 

V.  United  States  (10  Pet.  662)  133, 140, 

02-5,  628,  629,  633,  637,  643,  647, 

649,  666,  671 

New  Orleans,  etc.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans 

(26  La.  An.  0l2)     76,  88,  96,  696 

Newport  v.  Taylor  (16  B.  Mon.  699)   138, 

139,  633,  638,  639,  645,  646,  647, 

667 

Newport  Bridge  Co.  v.  Foole  (9  Bush, 

264)  1001 

Newport  Trustees  in  re  (16  Sinn.  346)     61 
Newville  Road  Case  (8  Watts  (Pa.), 

172)  677 

New  York  v.  Furze  (3  Hill,  612)         1071 

V.  R.  R.  Co.  ( 17  Hun  (N.  Y.),  242)  714, 

786 
V.  Sheffield  (4  Wall.  (U.  S.);i89)  1052 
V.  Second  Ave.  Railroad  Co.  (32 

N.  Y.  261)  12.5,  766 

V.  Third  Avenue  R.  R.  Co.  (33 

N.  Y.  42)  711 

New  York  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.  in  re 

(70  N.  Y.  327)  709 

New  York,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Marvin 

11  N.  Y.  276)  432 


Ixxviii 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


New  York  Central,  etc.  R.  R.  v.  Met- 
roi>olitan,  etc.  Co.  (63  N.  Y. 
;VJil)  681,582,692 

New  York  Conference  v.  Clarkson  (4 

Hali^t.  (^h.  541)  206 

New  York  Institute  v.  How  (10  N.  Y. 

84)  208 

New  York,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn  (71 

N.  Y.  580)  978 

V.  New  Haven  (42  Conn.  279)        761 
Niagara,  etc.  Co.  c.  Baclinian  (66  N. 

Y.  2(51)       627,  6:?4,  635,  ()39,  640 
Niblett  V.  Nashville  (12  Heisk.  684)   1019, 

1047 
Nichol    V.    Mayor    of   Nashville    (9 

Humph.  252)       76,  89,  118,  179, 
180,  188 
Nicholls  !•.  Great  Western  R.  Co.  (27 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  382)  1051 

Nichols  in  re  (6  Abb.  N.  Cas.  474)       277, 

1028,  1085,  1048 

r.  Athens  (66  Me.  402)  1035 

V.  Boston  (98  Mass.  39)  236,  262 

V.  Bridgeport  (23  Conn.  189)  597,  598, 

599,  600,  610,  749 

V.  Bridgeport  (23  Conn.  204)  748 

V.  Comptroller  (4  Stew.  &  Port. 

(Ala.)  154)  827 

Nicholson  v.  Bradford  Union  (1  L.  R. 

Q.  B.  620)  459 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (22  Conn.  74)         703 
Nicholson  Pavement  Co.  r.  Painter 

(35  Cal.  699)  465,  466,  767 

Nickerson  v.  Dyer  (105  Mass.  320)       263 
Nicolay  v.  St.  Clair  Co.  (3  Dillon,  C. 

C.  R.  163)  522,  586 

Nicoll  V.  Gardner  (13  Wend.  289)  135 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (12  N.  Y.  121)      557, 

562 
Nightingale  in  re  (11  Pick.  168)  385,  390, 

392,  393 
Niles  Township  v.  Martin  (4  Mich. 

557)  958 

Nill  V.  Jenkinson  (15  Ind.  425)  918 

Nims  V.  Troy  (59  N.  Y.  500)     1067,  1074, 

1077 

Ninth  Ave.  in  re  (45  N.  Y.  729)  583 

Noble  V.  Bullis  (23  Iowa,  559)  945 

I'.  Richmond  (31  Gratt.  271)        1026, 

1052 

Nolan  V.  New  Orleans  (10  La.An.  106)  260 

Nolin  V.  Mayor  (4  Yerg.  163)  380 

Noonan  v.  Albany  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  774)  1070 

Norfleet  v.  Cromwell  (70  N.  C.  634)      592 

Normand  r.  Otoe  Co.  (8  Neb.  18)  909 

Norris  r.  Academy  (7  G.  &  J.  7)     97,  106 

V.  Baltimore  (44  Md.  606)       602,  603 

V.  lingion  (4  Met.  (Mass.)  282)       733 

V.  Litchfield  (-35  N.  H.  271)  1040 

V.  Litchfield  (35  N.  H.  918)  1041 

I?.  Mayor  (1  Swan,  164)  213 

V.  Staps  (Hobart,  210)    329,  408,  410, 

412 

r.  Trustees  (7  G.  &  J.  7)  78 

Norristown  v.  Fitzpatrick  (8  W.  N.  C.)  979 


Norristown  v.  Moyer  (67  Pa  St.  355)  723, 
1030,  1032 
North  Dumfries  v.  Waterloo  (12  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  507)  214 

North  Ilemjistead   v.   Hempstead   (2 

Wend.  109)  69,  61,  215,  216,  556, 
560,  5(58,  667 
North  Hudson,  etc.  Co.  v.  Iloboken 

41N.  J.  L.  71)  360 

North  Lebanon  v.  Arnold  (47  Pa  St. 

488)  961 

North  Missouri  Railroad   Co.  v.  Ma- 

guire  (49  Mo.  490)  101,  729,  732, 
787 
t'.  Maguire  (20  Wall.  46)  727 

North  Whitehall  v.  South  Whitehall 

(3  Serg.  &R.  117)  217 

North  Yarmouth  v.  Skillings  (45  Me. 

133)  75,  106,  214,  216 

Northern   Liberties  v.   St.   John's 

Church  (13  Pa.  St.  104)  776,  815 
Northern  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Connelly  (10 

Ohio  St.  159)  788 

North  wood  v.  Barrington  (9  N.  H.  369)  286 

Norton  v.  Mansfiekr(16  Mass.  48)  40 

V.  Peck  (3  Wis.  714)  27 

Norwich  v.  Breed  (30  Conn.  536)       1048, 

1061 
I'.  Hubbard  (22  Conn.  587)  802,  814 
r.  Story  (25  Conn.  44)  677 

Norwich,  etc.  Co.  v.  Norwich  Gas  Co. 

(25  Conn.  19)  77,  690,  691 

Nott's  Case  (11  Me.  208)  399 

Nottingham  in  re  (1  M.  &  H.  245)  226 

Nowcll  V.  Mayor  (9  Exch.  457)      146,  219 
V.  Worcester  (9  H.  &  G.  456)  486 

V.  Wright  (3  Allen,  166)  265,  979 

Nowlin  V.  State  (49  Ala.  41)  931 

Noyes  v.  Mason  City  (5  N.  W.  R.  595)  117, 

1004 

V.  Morristown  (1  Vt.  357)  1023 

V.  Ward  (19  Conn.  250)  625,  627,  628, 

630,  679 

Nugent  V.  State  (18  Ala.  521)  417 

V.  Supervisors,  etc.  (19  Wall.  241)  533, 

635 

Oakes  v.  Hill  (10  Pick.  333)  16,  56 

Oakland  v.  Carpenter  (13  Cal.  540)      124, 

126,  26-5,  296,  896,  897 

y.  Whipple  (39  Cal.  112)         784,810 

Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Rier  (52  Cal. 

270)  96 

Oakley  v.  Mayor  (1  La.  1)  782 

V.  Williamsburg  (6  Paige,  262)      683 

Gates  V.  Hudson  (5  Eng.  L.  &  p:q.  469)  941 

O'Brien  v.  St.  Paul  (25  Minn.  331)      1068 

V.  St.  Paul  (18  Minn.  176)  1077 

V.  Trenton  (7  U.  C.  C.  P.  246)  631,  661 

O'Brien  Co.  v.  Brown  (1  Dillon,  C.  C. 

R.  588)  897 

O'Conner  v.  Pittsburg  (18  Pa.  St.  187)  652, 
682,  696,  699,  744,  999,  1007 
O'Connor  v.  Otonabee  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

73)  1028 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxix 


Oconto  V.  Hall  (20  Alb.  L.  J.  852)        305 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Wis.  231)         714 

O'Docherty  v.  Archer  (9  Tex.  295)     22y, 

232 

O'Donnel  v.  City  (7  Phil.  (Pa.)  234)      481 

V.  Bailey  (24  Miss.  386)  732,  787 

Odell  V.  Schroeder  (58  111.  353)  980 

Oebricke  i'.  Pittsburg  (7  Am.  L.  R. 

725)  188 

O'Ferrall  v.  Colby  (2  Minn.  180)  832 

Ogden  V.  Raymond  (22  Conn.  379)       264 

Ogg  V.  Lansing  (35  Iowa,  495)      978,  980, 

981,982,  983 

V.  Lansing  ( 14  Am.  Rep.  499)  978, 981, 

982,  983 

O'Hale  V.  Sacramento  (48  Cal.  212)     1054 

O'Hara  v.  New  Orleans  (30  La.  An. 

152)  446,  464 

V.  Portland  (3  Oregon,  525)  76 

Ohio  V.  Commissioners   (6  Ohio  St. 

280)  179 

V.  Gazley  (5  Ohio,  14)  810 

V.  Hibhard  (3  Ohio,  63)  810 

V.  Moffitt  (5  Ohio,  858)  882 

Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Merchants'  Co.  (11 

Humph.  1)  453 

O'Kane  v.  Treat  (25  111.  557)  676 

O'Laughlin  v.  Dubuque  (42  Iowa,  539) 

1025 

Olcott  V.  Supervisors  (16  Wall.  678)      67, 

185,  491,  497,  500,  501,  503,  504, 

541  823 

Old  Colony  Railroad  v.  Miller  (125 

Mass.  1)  608 

Old  South,  etc.  v.  Boston  (127  Mass. 

378)  774 

O'Leary  v.  Mankato  (21  Minn.  65)    1019, 

1038 

V.  Sloo  (7  La.  An.  25)  758,  794 

Oleson  u.  Tolford  (37  Wis.  327)  1051 

O'Linda  v.  Lothrop  (21  Pick.  292)        696, 

722,  726 
Olive  Cemetery  Co.  v.   Philadelphia 

(22  A.  L.  J.  349)  775 

Oliver  v.  Kansas  City  (69  Mo.  79)      1037, 

1047,  1055 

r.  Keightley  (24  Ind.  514)  909 

V.  Washinstton    Mills    (11    Allen 

(Mass.),  208)  735 

V.  Worcester  (102  Mass.  489)    88,  89, 

934,  964,  968,  982,  984,  991,  992, 

1014,  1015,  1062 

V.  Worcester  (3  Am.  Rep.  485)     964, 

968 

Olmsted  v.  Dennis  (77  N.  Y.  .379)  250,  298 

Olney  v.  Harvey  (50  III.  454)        112,  203, 

214,  572,  573,  842 

r.  Pearce  (1  R.  I.  292)  242 

V.  Wickes  (18  Johns.  122)  263 

Omaha  r.  Hammond  (94  U.  S.  98)        47' 

V.  Olmstead  (5  Neb.  446)       424,  1037 

O'Meara  v.  Mayor  (1  Daly,  425)  982 

Oneida  Bank  v.  Ontario  Bank  (21  N. 

Y.  490)  155,4.53 

O'Neill  V.  Hudson  (41  N.  J.  L.  161)      601 


O'Neill  V.  Lowell  (6  Allen,  110)  1020 

V.  New  Orleans  (30  La.  An.  202)  1029 

V.  Police  Jury  (21  La.  An.  586)      143 

Onstott  V.  Murray  (22  Iowa,  466)  635,  636. 

637,  671 
Ontario  Bank  v.  Bunnell  (10  Wend. 

186)  770,  787 

Opelika  v.  Daniel  (59  Ala.  211)  181 

Oregon  v.  McKennon  (8  Oreg.  485)      229 
V.  Pyle  (1  Oreg.  149)  253 

Orleans  v.  Piatt  (99  U.  S.  676)       600,  510 
Orr  V.  Baker  (4  Ind.  86)  774 

Orton  r.  State  (12  Wis.  509)  473 

Osborn  v.  Bank  of  United  States  (9 

Wheat.  738)  54,  733 

V.  Dan  vers  (6  Pick.  98)  941 

V.  Mobile  (16  Wall.  479)  734,  736 

V.  Mobile  (44  Ala.  493)  731 

V.  Tunis  (1  Dutch.  633)  576 

Osgood  V.  Clark  (26  N.  H.  307)     177,  211 

V.  Green  (33  N.  H.  318)  177 

r.  Manhattan  Co.  (3  Cow.  612)      318 

Oswald  V.  Genet  (15  Tex.  118)  639 

Oswego  V.  Oswego  Canal  Co.  (6  N.  Y. 

257)  640 

Otis  V.  Janesville  (47  Wis.  422)  1041 

Ottawa  V.  Macy  (20  111  413)  800 

V.  Nelson  ( 19  Kan.  234)  739 

V.  People  (48  111.  233)       71,  127,  820, 

825,  828,  856,  857 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (25  111.  43)     800,  802, 

925 
y.  Spencer  (36  111.  211)  754 

;;.  Spencer  (40  111.  211)   610,  754,  764, 

776 

V.  Sweely  (65  111.  434)  1041 

V.  Walker  (21  111.  605)  676 

Ottawa  Co.  v.  Caleb  (81  III.  5-56)  788 

Ottawa  Dist.  v.  Low  (6  O.  S.  546)         934 

Ottumwa  V.  Parks  (43  Iowa,  119)       10-58, 

1059,  1061,  1062 

Ould  V.  Richmond  (23  Gratt.  464)  783,  789 

Overacre  v.  Garrett  (5  Lans.  156)  243 

Overing  v.  Foote  (65  N.  Y.  263)  808 

Overman  v.  May  (35  Iowa,  89)  684 

Overseers  v.  Kelly  (18  Johns.  382)        217 

V.  Mayor  ( 18  Johns.  382)  451 

V.  Overseers  (2  Serg.  &  R.  422 J)      217 

V.  Overseers  (18  Johns.  382)  217 

V.  Sears  (22  Pick.  122)  16,  56,  60, 245, 

556 

V.  Supervisors  (15  N.  Y.  .341)  442 

Owen  V.  Smith  (31  Barb.  641)       198,  200 

Owens  V.  Milwaukee  (47  Wis.  401)      767, 

1003 
Owings  V.  Speed  (5  Wheat.  420)  317 

Owners  v.  Albany  (15  Wend.  .374)  590,  642 
Oxford  V.  Society  (55  N.  H.  463)  562 

Oxford  Bank  v.  Wheeler  (72  N.  Y. 

201)  937 

Oxford's  Case  (10  Coke,  44)  207 


Pacific  Hotel  Co.  v.  Lieb  (83  111.  602) 
Pacific  Railroad  v.  Cass  Co.  (53  Mo. 
17) 


788 


Ixxx 


TABLE   OF   C.VSES   CITED, 


Pacific  Railroad  c.  Chrystal  (25  Mo. 

644)  621 

V.  Governor  (23  Mo.  353)        325,  827 

V.  Lincoln  Co.  (I  Dill.  314)  64 

Pack  c.  Mavor  (8  N.  Y.  222)     1056,  1057, 

1058 

Packard  v.  Collins  (23  Barb.  444)         37U 

V.  New  Bodlbrd  (0  Allen,  200)     1017, 

1028 

Packett  r.  Alice  (2  Dill.  479)        133,  13(5 

V.  Atlee  (21  Wall.  :!8!»)  133,  136 

r.  Keokiilv  (!15  U.  S.  80)  133,  785 

r.  St.  Louis  (4  Dillon,  18)      133,  140, 

785 

17.  St.  Louis  (100  U.  S.  423)    133,  785 

V.  St.  Paul  (3  Dill.  454)  133 

Paddletord  ,:  Mavor  (14  Ga.  438)  788 

Paducah  r.  Ctillv  {'.)  Bush,  323)     242,  243 

Page  v.  Allen  (58  Pa.  St.  338)  90!) 

I'.  Baltimore  (34  Md.  558)  134 

f.  Chicago  (UO  111.  441)  778 

I'.  Clopton  (30  Gratt.  415)  819 

V.  Fazakerlv  (3tj  Barb.  392)    392,  393 

V.  Fraiiktbrd  (9  .Me.  155)  174 

V.  Graham  (57  111.  144)  737 

I'.  Hardin  (8  B.  Mon.  648)      259,  273 

V.  State  (11  Ala.  849)  363 

V.  St.  Louis  (20  Mo.  136)         121,  774 

Paige  V.  Heiiiburg  (40  Vt.  81)       557,  562 

Paine  in  re  (1  Hill,  665)  836 

V.  Boston  (124  Mass.  486)  327 

V.  Commrs.  (Ohio  Rep.  417)  667 

V.  Spratley  (5  Kan.  525)  69,  117,  776, 

778,  812,  813,  814 

Painter  v.  Mayor  (46  Pa.  St.  213)      10-56, 

1057 
V.  Pittsburg  (46  Pa.  St.  221)  1054 
V.  Pittsburg   (3  Am.    Law    Rep. 

N.  S.  350)  1054 

Paintor  v.  Worcester  (123  Mass.  311)  694 
Palestine  v.  Barnes  (-30  Tex.  539)  388 
Pallester  v.  Gravesend  (9  C.  B.  744)    146, 

219 

Palmer  v.  Andover  (2  Cush.  600)       1018, 

1022,  1023 

V.  Carroll  (24  N.  H.  314)  260 

V.  Hicks  (6  Johns.  133)  209 

V.  Lincoln  (5  Neb.  136)  1058 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (2  Sand.  318)   256,2-57 

1-.  Portsmouth  (43  N.  H.  265)       1017 

V.  Poultney  (2  Salk.  4-58)  377 

j;.  Stump  (29  Ind.  329)  475 

Palmyra  v.  Morton  (25  Mo.  593)  599,  610, 

741,800,  801,  815 

Pangborn  i\  Westlnke  (-36  Iowa,  546)  625 

Parcel  r.  Barnes  (25  Ark.  2(51)  440 

Paret  i:  Bayonne  (40  N.  J.  L.  333)       608 

Paris  V.  Graham  (33  Mo.  94)  332 

V.  People  (27  111.  74)  262,  931 

Parish  v.  Fiske  (8  Cush.  264)  260 

I'.  Jacobs  (25  L.   T.  R.  (N.  S.) 

800)  632 

Parish  in  Sutton  v.  Cole  (3  Pick.  232)  207, 

569 
V.  Stearns  (21  Pick.  148)         314,  315 


'  Park  in  rr  (-56  N.  Y.  144)  601 

]  Park  Bank  c.  Watson  (42  N.  Y.  490)    500 
[  Park  Commrs.  v.  Williams  (51  111.  57)  590 
Parker  v.  ("ommonwealth  (6  I'a.  St. 

507)  63 

V.  Green  (2  B.  &  S.  299)  428 

V.  Lowell  (11  Gray,  353)      994,  10(56, 

1075 
V.  Macon  (39  Ga.  725)  383, 1032. 1059, 

1001 
V.  New  Brunswick  (30  N.  J.  L. 

3'.»5)  124 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (7  M.  &  G.  253)     943 

V.  Williamsburg  (13  How.  2-50)      473 

Parks  V.  Boston  (8  Pick.  218)       121,  588, 

589,  598,  004,  923,  924,  926,  927 

V.  Newburyport  (10  Gray,  28)      1068 

Parmlee  v.  Chicago  (60  111.  267)    503,  749, 

796 
Parmley  v.  Railroad  Cos.  (3  Dillon, 

25)  907 

Parnaby  v.  Canal  Co.  (11  A.  &  E.  223)  141, 

959 

Parr  v.  Atty-Genl.  (8  CI.  &  F.  409)      230, 

432,  900,  901 

V.  Greenbush  (72  N.  Y.  463)  448 

Parrott  v   Bridgeport  (44  Conn.  180)    821 

V.  Eyre  (10  Bing.  283)  264 

Parry  v.  Berry  (Comyns,  269)  291 

Parsons  v.  Betlinal  Green  (17  L.   T. 

N.  S.  211)  1075 

V.  Brainard  (17  Wend.  522)  290 

V.  Goshen  (11  Pick.  396)     40,  42,  451 
V.  Monmouth  (70  Me.  202)     458,  482, 

937 
V.  Trustees  (44  Ga.  529)  638,  640,  659, 

660 
Passenger,  etc.  Co.  v.  Birmingham  (51 

Pa.  St.  41)  711 

Paston  !'.  Urber  (Hutt.  103)  270 

Pat.  H.  R.  Co.  V.  Patterson  (24  N.  J. 

Eq.  1-58)  717 

Patch  V.  Covington  (17  B.  Mon.  722)    982 
V.  Pendergast  (15  Md.  251)  388 

Paterson  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  Brady  (3 

Dutch.  245)  692 

Patrick  v.  Commrs.  (4  McCord,  540)    585 
Patterson  v.  Boom  Co.  (3  Dill.  465)     580, 

5*^3  618 
V.  Bowes  (4  Grant,  170)  236,  905',  909 
V.  Duluth  (21  Minn.  493)  638,  660 
V.  Society  (24  N.  J.  L.  385)  62,  63,  65, 
75,  77,211,  776,777,  804 
V.  Vail  (42  Iowa,  143)  663 

Patterson,  etc.   Co.   v.  Patterson  (24 

N.  J.  Eq.  158)  696 

Pattison  v.  Supervisors  (13  Cal.  175)    164 

Patton  V.  Springfield  (99  Mass.  627)     803 

V.  Stephens  (14  Bush  (Ky.),  324)    165 

Paul  V.  Coulter  (12  Minn.  41)  322 

V.  Detroit  (32  Mich.  110)  658 

;;.  Kenosha  (22  Wis.  266)      155,  459, 

W.Newark  (S.C.N.  J.)  622 

V.  Virginia  (8  Wall.  177)        734,  736 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxi 


Paulet  V.  Clark  (9  Cranch,  292)  92 

Paxson  V.  Sweet  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  196)     338, 

407,  795 

Payne  v.  Brecon  (3  H.  &  N.  579)  219,  469 

V.  Mayor  (3  H.  &  N.  572)  146 

r.  Tread  Well  (16  Cal.  222)  649 

Peabody  v.  Flint  (6  Allen,  52)  291 

Peace  v.  Augusta  (37  Ga.  597)  788 

Peacliv  V.  Somerset  (1  Str.  447)  353 

Pearce  v.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  32)       1002 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (21  How.  (U.  S.) 

441)  985 

Pearsoll  v.  Post  (20  Wend.  Ill)  642,  645, 

646 

Pease  v.  Cornish  (19  Me.  191)  41,  484,  487 

V.  Dayton  (4  Ohio  St.  80)  1037 

Peay  i-.  Little  Rock  (32  Ark.  31)  610,  738, 

739,  755 
Peck  V.  Austin  (22  Tex.  261)  388 

V.  Austin  (2  Tex.  162)  950 

V.  Booth  (42  Conn.  271)  286 

V.  Ellsworth  (36  Me.  393)  1015 

V.  Fox  Lake  (28  Wis.  583)  919 

V.  Lockwood  (5  Conn.  22)  337 

V.  Providence,  etc.  Co.   (8  R.  I. 

353)  627 

V.  Sherwood  (56  N.  Y.  614)  744 

V.  Smith  (1  Conn.  103)  662,  686 

Pedrick  v.  Bailey  (12  Gray,  161)  236,  3S1, 

832,  679,  1030 

Pees  V.  Leeds  (1  Stra.  640)  862,  866 

Peete  v.  Morgan  (19  Wall.  581)  133 

Pegram  i-.  Commrs.  (65  N.  C.  114)      872, 

877 
V.  County  (64  N.  C.  557)  838 

Pekin  v.  Brereton  (67  111.  477)  1000,  1008 
V.  Newell  (26  111.  320)  972 

V.  Reynolds  (31  111.  529)  488 

V.  Smelzell  (21  111.  464)  363 

PeUa  V.  Scholte  (24  Iowa,  283)     629,  637, 

668,  671 
Pendegast  v.  Peru  (20  III.  51)  342 

Pender  i-.  King  (6  Vin.  Abr.  296)  246 

Pendleburv  i'.  Greenhalgh  (1  Q.  B.  D. 

36)  1047 

Pendleton  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky  (1 

Mon.  177)  206 

V.  Perkins  (49  Mo.  505)  130 

Pendleton  County  v.  Amy  (13  Wall. 

297)    494,509,610,524,528,544 
Peninsular  R.  R.  Co.  i;.  Howard  (20 

Mich.  18)  613 

Pennington  v.  Baehr  (48  Cal.  565)        499 

V.  Taniere  (12  Q.  B.  1011)      450,576 

V.  Willard  (1  R.  I.  93)  634 

Pennoyer  v.  Saginaw  (8  Mich.  534)  1068, 

1072 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Rathget  (32  Ohio 

St.  00)  1020,  1022 

Pennsylvania  District  Election  (2  Par. 

526)  225 

Pennsylvania  Hall  in  re  (5  Pa.  St.  204)  431, 

957 
Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Heister  (8 

Pa.  St.  445)  621 

TOL.    I. 


Pennsylvania  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McCloskey 

(23  Pa.  St.  526)  1042 

V.  Philadelphia  (47  Pa.  St.  193)     183, 
188,  190 
Penny  Pot  Landing  in  re  (16  Pa.  St. 

79)  639,  646,  669 

Penobscot  Boom  Corp.  v.  Lawson  ( 16 

Me.  225)  75 

Penrose  v.  Taniere  (12  Q.  B.  1011)      444 
Pentz  V.  ^tna  Insurance  Co.  (9  Paige, 

568)  955.  956 

People  V.  Adams  (9  Wend.  333)    804,  317, 

373 
V.  Albany  (11  Wend.  539)  141,  992 
V.  Albany  (12  Johns,  414)  829 

V.  Albertson  (55  N.  Y.  5U)  16,  19,  65, 
82,  83,  237,  885 
V.  Assessors  (1  Hill,  620)  42 

V.  Attorney-General    (22  Barb. 

114)  856 

V.  Auditors  (74  N.  Y.  310)    985,  1009 
V.  Auditors  (75  N.  Y.  317)  1009 

V.  Auditors  (13  Mich.  233)  255 

r.  Auditors  (41  Mich.  223)  824 

V.  B.  &  R.  T.  Road   (23  Wend. 

222)  881 

V.  Bacheler  (13  Am.  Rep.  480)      823, 

934 
V.  Bacon  (18  Mich.  247)  866 

V.  Baker  (35  Barb.  105)  854,  867 

V.  Bank,  etc.  (6  Cow.  196)  893 

V.  Bank,  etc.  (1  Douglas,  282)        117 
V.  Baraga  (39  Mich.  554)  441 

V.  Bartlett  (6  Wend.  422)  247,  293 
V.  Batchelor  (53  N.  Y.  128)  100,  934 
V.  Batchelor  (22  N.  Y.  128)  82,  299, 
300,  301 
V.  Bearfield  (.35  Barb.  254)  270,  278 
V.  Bedell  (2  Hill,  196)  234,  239 

V.  Benevolent  Society  (24  How. 

Pr.  216)  277 

1-.  Bennett  (29  Mich.  451)    45,  58,  88, 

211,  21.3,  88,5,  1071 

V.  Benson  (.30  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  24)    690, 

693 
V.  Benzie  Co.  (41  Mich.  6)  166 

i>.  Bissell  (19  111.  229)  827 

V.  Bloomington  (63  111.  207)    828,  865 
V.  Board  (39  N.  Y.  81)  925 

V.  Board  of  Trade  (45  111.  112)     269, 

270 
I'.  Board,  etc.  (64  N.  Y.  627)  841 

V.  Board,  etc.  (72  N.  Y.  445)  272 

r.  Bond  (10  Cal.  563)  94 

V.  Brenham  (3  Cal.  477)  225 

V.  Brennan  (39  Barb.  522,  651)     146, 
826,  840 
V.  Brennan  (45  Barb.  457)  823 

V.  Briggs  (50  N.  Y.  5-53)  71,  89 

V.  Brighton  (20  Mich.  57)     598,  600, 

G04 
V.  Broadway  Wharf  Co.  (31  Cal. 

33)  558 

V.  Brooklyn  (21  Barb.  484)  795 

V.  Brooklyn  (1  Wend.  318)     601,  821 


/ 


Ixxxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


roople 


BrooHy,  (05  N.  Y.  840,     7J3.  |  P-P'e  "■  .t;- ,g^S.'',??'4?li  "°'  1?^ 


1064 

,.  Brooklyn  (-22  Barb.  404)  825  H56 
t,.  BrooklVn  (4  N.  Y.  41'J)  72 »,  <oO, 
73y,74a,744,748,  749  .01  /o3 
754,  7ob,  803 
..Brooklyn  (71  N.Y.  495)  797  808 
V  Bull  (46  N.  Y.  57  »-,  o8d 

r  C   IMi.  K.  Co.  (43  Cal.  398)     734 

;;:  c.  &  a.  r.  k.  Co.  (C?  m.  na)  707 

V.  Cairo  (50  111.  155)  ^42 

r.  Campbell  (72  N.Y.  496)  826 

I,.  Canaduy  (73  N.  C.  198)  1^8- 1| 

V.  Canal  Board  (55  N.  Y.  390)  "'  900 
V.  Canty  (55  III.  33)         234,  736,  7o4 
V.  Carpenter  (24  N.  Y.  86)     200,  211, 
^  217.  291,  885,  886 

V.  Carpenter  (2  Doug.  ( Mich.  )273)  643 
655,  bo8,  .00 
V.  Carrique  (2  Hill,  93)   251,  2.32,  830 
V.  Cass  Co.  (77  lU.  438)  191, 192,  5^48. 

V.  Cassidv  (2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  294)    785 
V.  Chapman  (66  lU.  137)  548 

V.  Chicago  (51  III.  17)  18,90.730,854_, 

oOO 

V  Cicotte  (10  Mich.  283)  227, 228,  233 

V.  Clark  (70  N.  Y.  518)  886 

V.  Clark  (47  Cal.  456)  <78 

V.  Clark  County  (50  111.  213)          841 

V.  Clayton  (88  111.  45)  102 

r.  Clute(52N.  Y.  576)  885,893 
r.  Clute  (50  N.  Y.  451) 
V.  Coleman  (4  Cal.  46) 


82,  224 

i58,  752 


V.  Collins  (19  Wend.  65)  817,  856,  877 


327 
824 

784 
819 

783 
785 


V.  Collins  (3  Mich.  347. 

V.  Collins  (7  Johns.  549) 

V.  Commissioners  (59  N.  Y.  40) 

V.  Commissioners  (88  III.  142) 

V.  Commissioners  (64  N.  Y.  541 

V.  Commissioners  (58  N.  Y.  242, 

V.  Commissioners  (6  Wend.  559)  868 

V.  Commissioners,  etc.  (7  Wend. 

474)  103ii 

V.  Common  Council  (78  N.  Y.  57)  603 

V.  Common  Council  (77  N.  Y.  503)  250 

252,  830,  831,  856 

V.  Common   Council   (28  Mich. 

228)  „    ,      97 

V.  Common  Council,  etc.  (22  Barb. 

404)  824 

V.  Comptroller  (77  N.  Y.  45)  822,  980 
V.  Comptroller  (20  Wend.  595)     269, 


273 
239 
893 


r.  Conover  (17  N.  Y.  64) 

V.  Conover  (6  Abb.  Pr.  R.  220) 

V.  Contracting  Board  (33  N.  Y. 

382) 
V.  Contracting  Board  (46  Barb 

254) 
V.  Contracting  Board   (27  N.  Y 

V.  Cook  \  14  Barb.  2-59)    225,  226,  291 
V.  Cook  (8  N.  Y.  67)  291 


826 

826 
826 


v.  Cooper  (57  How.  I'r.  416)  277 

V.  Cooper  (6  Hill,  516)  720 

V.  Cornell  (47  Barb.  329)  815 

V.  County  (55  111.  33)  96 

r.  County  (11  Cal.  170)  480 

f.  Court  (1  Hill  (N.Y.),  674)  927 
V.  Court  (5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  114)  829 
V.  Covert  (1  Hill,  674)  925,  928 

V.  Croton   Aqueduct  Board   (26 

Barb.  240)  467 

V.  Crotty  (93  III.  180)  819 

V.  Cunningham  (1  Denio,  524)  657,  722 
U.Davidson  (30  Cal.  379)  136 

V.  Dayton  (55  N.  Y.  367)  101,  729 
V.  Denslow  (1  Caines,  177)  654 

r.  Detroit  (40  Mich.  64)  678 

V.  Detroit  (28  Mich.  228)     16,  19,  29, 
33,36,  76,81,82,88,90,92 
V.  Detroit  (18  Mich.  338, 445)  371, 406, 
407,  833,  834 
V.  Doe  (36  Cal.  220)  771 

r.  Draper  (15  N.Y.  532)      19,65,70, 
81,  82,  83,  214,  237,  291,  885 
r.Dutcher  (56  111.  144)  547 

t,.  Dutchess  R.  R.  (58  N.  Y.  152)  702. 
825,  828,  869,  870,  932 
V.  East  Saginaw  (40  Mich.  336)     821 
V.  Eddy  (43  Cal.  333)  774 

V.  Edmunds  (15  Barb.  529)     821,  822 
V.  Everett  (1  Caines,  8)  870 

V.  Fairbury  (51  111.  149)  22.5,  246,  831 


Farnham  (35  III.  562) 
r.  Ferris  (16  Hun,  219) 
u.  Fields  (58  N.  Y.  491) 


111,  212 


y.  Finger  (24  Barb.  341) 
V.  Fitzgerald  (41  Mich.  2) 
u.  FlagglHN.  Y.  "^'^   ' 


85,  89,  93, 
904,  906 
868 
228 
584)  460,  463,  485, 
678,  840 
V.  Flagg  (46  N.  Y.  401)  100 

V.  Flanagan  (66  N. Y.  237)  226,  883 
r.  Fletcher  (3  111.  487)  833 

V.  Fort  Edward  (70  N.  Y.  28)  184 
V.  Fort  Street  Ry.  (41  Mich.  413)  713 
r.  Fulton  Co.  (14  Barb.  56)  455 

V.  Galesburg  (48  III.  485)  882 

r.  Gilbert  (18  Johns.  (N.Y.)  227)  667 


V.  Goodwin  (5  N.  Y.  568) 
V.  Governor  (29  Mich.  320) 
V.  Gray  (23  Cal.  125) 
V.  Green  (64  N.  Y.  606) 
V.  Green  (58  N.  Y.  304) 
V.  Hall  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  484) 
V.  Halsey  (53  Barb.  547) 

V.  Harper  (91  111.357) 

V.  Harper  (67  III.  62) 

V.  Harris  (4  Cal.  9) 

u.  Hartwell(12Mich.  508) 

V.  Hatch  (33  111.  9) 

V.  Hawley  (3  Mich.  330) 

V.  Hayden  (6  Hill  (N.  Y.),359)  608, 609 

V.  Hayt  (66  N.  Y.  606)  855,  861 

V.  Head  (25  III.  325)  834,  837 

u.  Higgins  (3  Mich.  233)  225 


797 
827 
481 
998 
252 

880,  881 

856 

24 

192 

166 

890,  892 
856 
168 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxiii 


888 
1!)2 
882 
242 
293 
29, 


People  r.Hisgins  (15  111.110)  270 

r.  Hill  (7  Cal.  97)  76,86,239 

V.  Hillhouse  (1  Lans.  87)  9La 

V.  HiUiard  (29  III.  413)   834,  837,  854 

V.  Hillsdale,  etc.   Co.   (2  Johns. 

190) 
V.  Holtlen  (91  111.  446) 
V.  HoUlen  (28  Cal.  123) 
V.  Holmes  (2  Wend.  281) 
u.  Hopson  (1  Denio,  574) 
V.  Hurlbut  (24  Mich.  44)      16,  2/ 

65  71,  81,  82,  89,  90,  92,  1(38,  237, 

731 

V.  IngersoU  (58  N.  Y.  1)  85, 89,  93, 9^0^2^ 

V.  Insurance  Co.   (2  Johns.  Ch. 

371)  ■^'^^ 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (15  Johns.  358)  291 
V.  Jackson  (8  Mich.  110)  368,  3/1 
V.  Jackson  (7  Mich.  432)  631,  6o.3 
V.  Jackson  Co.  (92  111.  444)  192,  843 
V.  Johnson  (30  Cal.  98) 
v.JohT  (22  Mich.  461) 
V.  Jones  (6  Mich.  176) 
v.  Judge,  etc.  (111.  Supreme  Ct. 

etc  )  613,  614 

V.  Justices  (74  N.  Y.  406)       424,  425 
V.  Keeling  (4  Col.  127)  22o 

V.  Kelly  (5  Abb.  N.  Cas.  383)  101,  8-50 
V.  Kelsey  (34  Cal.  470)  731 

V.  Kerr  (27  N.  Y.  188)      9.5,  632,  664, 
696,  697,  711,  716,  717 
V.  Kilduff  (15  111.  492)  229,  834,  835, 

837 
V.  Kimball  (4  Mich.  95) 
t;.  Kingman  (24  N.  Y.  545) 
V.  Kip  (4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  383) 
V.  Klopke  (92  111.  134) 
V.  Klumpke  (41  Cal.  263) 
r.  Knigiit  (13  Mich.  424) 
V.  Kniskeen  (54  N.  Y.  52) 
V.  Lambier  (5  Denio,  9) 
V.  La  Salle  Co.  (84  111  303) 
i;.  Law  (34  Barb.  494) 
V.  Lawrence  (6  Hill,  244) 
V.  Lewis  (7  Johns.  73) 
V.  Lieb  (85  111.484) 
V.  Logan  County  (63  111.  384 


345,  407 

243 

626,  640 


615 
631 
833 
481 
639 
225 
597 

633,  638 
829 
697 

174,  850 
260 
819 
191 


Loian  County  (45  111.  139)  547 
Loomis  (8  Wend.  306)     227,  892, 

893 
Love  (19  Cal.  676)  206 

Lowber  (7  Abb.  Pr.  158)  904 

Lowber  (28  Barb.  65)  386 

Lynch  (51  Cal.  15)  18,  81, 102,  104, 

752 
Mahaney  (18  Mich  481)  70,  71,  81, 
83,  228,  253 
Marsh  (2  Cow.  485)  823 

,  Martin  (5  N.  Y.  22)  288,  289,  301 
,  Mathewson  (47  Cal.  442)  22-5 

,  Matteson  (17  111.  167)  226,  833,834 
.  Mauran  (5  Denio,  389)  562 

.  Maynard  (15  Mich.  463)     111,  910 


904 
600 


People  ..Mayor  (2  Hill  (N.Y0.S4«1. 

V.  Mayor  (4  N.  Y.  419)  101,  610,  611, 

V.  Mayor  (10  Wend.  .393)  820',  821 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (25  Wend.  680)  821,  822 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (9  Wend.  508)  822 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (32  Barb.  102)  904 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (10  Abb.  Pr.  144)    904 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (9  Abb.  Pr.  253) 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (63  N.  Y.  291) 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (5  Barb.  43)     240,  476 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (6  Barb.  209)  803 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (8  Barb.  95)  476 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (23  Barb.  390)  476 
V.  McClintock  (45  Cal.  11 )  174,  5-58 
V.  McCreery  (34  Cal.  432)  728,  752, 
772,  774 
V.  McDonald  (69  N.  Y.  362)  18,  83,808 
V.  McKinney  (10  Mich.  54)  261 

V.  McKinney  (52  N.  Y.  374)     82,  241 
V.  McNally  (49  Cal.  478)  63 

V,  McRoberts  (62  111.  38)       614,  1008 

V  Mead  (24  N.  Y.  114)     180,  485,  501 

V  Mead  (36  N.  Y.  224)  516,  523,  525, 
^  547,  .551 

V.  Medical  Society  (24  Barb.  570)  269 
y.Mellen  (32  111.  181)  71 

V.  Metropolitan  Police  Board  (19 

N.  Y. 188)  223,  237 

V.  Metropolitan  Police  Board  (26 


N.  Y.  316) 
V.  Metzker  (47  Cal.  524) 
V.  Miller  (24  Mich.  458) 
V.  Miner  (2  Lans.  396) 
V.  Mitchell  (35  N.  Y.  551 


836,  868 
229 
2-59 
904 
179,  188, 
540 

V.  Morrell  (21  Wend.  563)  65, 217,  2.53 
V.  Morris  (13  Wend.  325)  5,  26, 27,  62, 
75,76,84,88,111 
V.  Morse  (43  Cal.  534)  95 

i'.  Mott(lHow.(N.Y.)247)    315,316 


V.  Murray  (15  Oal.  -321 )_ 
V.  Murray  (73  N.  Y.  535) 
V.  Nearing  (27  N.  Y.  306) 
V.  Nevada  (6  Cal.  143) 

New  York  (7  How.  Pr.  R.  81) 


221 
893 
592 
211 
408 


V.  New  York  (3  Johns.  Cas.  79)    834, 


r.  Niles(35Cal.282) 
V.  North  (72  N.  Y.  124) 
V.  Nostrand  (46  N.  Y.  375) 


231 

252,  293, 

830 

418 


892 
783, 


V.  Nyland  (41  Cal.  129) 

V.  Oakland  Bank  (1  Doug.  (Mich. 

285) 
V.  Ogdensburgh  (48  N.  Y.  390)        ^_ 

V.  Oldtown  (88  111.  202)  191,'  192 

V.  Onondaga  (16  Mich.  254)  101 

V.  Pacheco  (29  Cal.  210)  8.d7 
V.  Palmer  (52  N.  Y.  83)    82,  128,  297 

«.  Pearson  (4  111.  271)  869 

V.  Pease  (27  N.  Y.  81)  ^^3 

V.  Phillips  (1  Denio,  388)  222 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Teoplc  r.  rolieo  Eonr.l  (26  N.  Y.  31G)  250 
V.  Tolire  Hoard  (;W  N.  Y.  500)  025 
V.  Tolico  Justico  (7  Mich.  45l5)  432 
V.  I'orter  (11  Cal.  2(1)  251 

V.  Potter  {35Cal.  110)  109 

V.  Power  (25  111.  187)  85 

c.  Pratt  (30Cal.  22;j)  855 

r.  President  (9  Wend.  351)  62,  110 
V.  Prison  Inspectors  (4  Mich.  187)  856 
V.  Puehlo  Co.  (2  Col.  360)  189 

V.  Kailroad  Co.  (5  Lans.  25)  904 

V.  liailroad  Co.  (38  Cal.  564)  905 

V.  l\ailroad  Co.  (45  Barb.  73)  711 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (12  Mich.  387)  117 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (15  Wend.  114)    719, 

887 

I..  Railroad  Co.  (35  Cal.  606)  752 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (88  111.  573)    598,  889 

I'.  Ransom  (2  N.  Y.  490)         821,  854 

V.  Rector  (48  Barb.  603)  290 

^^  Reynolds  (10  111.  1)  62 

V.  Richardson  (4  Cow.  100)    879,  883, 

887,  893 

V.  Rochester  (21  Barb.  656)    797,  927 

V.  Rochester  (50  N.  Y.  525)  71 

V.  l^ochester  (5  Lans.  142)      301,  808 

I'.  Runkle  (9  Johns.  147)        207,  245, 

246,  247,  293 

V.  Salem  (20  Mich.  462)  183,  187,  497 

V.  Salomon  (51  111.  37)  62,  69,  96,  488, 

736,  771,  819,  820,  827 

V.  Salomon  (46  111.  415)    819,  820,  831 

V.  San  Francisco  (27  Cal.  655)       341, 

445,  867 

856 

225 

380 

217 

857 

834,  835 

227,  883 

810 

857,  868 

771 

82,83 

422,  425, 

429 

547,  925 

594,  596 

189 

468 


V.  San  Francisco  (-36  Cal.  594) 
V.  Santa  Anna  (67  111.  57) 
V.  Sargent  (8  Cow.  139) 
V.  School  Trustees  (86  111.  613) 
V.  Schuyler  (79  N.  Y.  189) 
V.  Scrugham  (20  Barb.  302) 
V.  Seaman  (5  Denio,  409) 
V.  Seymour  (16  Cal.  332) 
V.  Seymour  (6  Cow.  579) 
V.  Shearer  (30  Cal.  645) 
V.  Shepherd  (36  N.  Y.  285) 
V.  Slaughter  (2  Doug.  334) 


V.  Smith  (45  N.  Y.  772) 
V.  Smith  (21  N.  Y.  595) 
V.  Spencer  (55  N.  Y.  1) 
V.  Stephens  (71  N.  Y.  527) 
V.  Stevens  (5  Hill,  616)  226,  247,  203, 
821,  833,  835,  836 
r.  Stilwell  (19N.  Y.  531)  604 

V.  St.  Louis  (10  111.372)  383 

V.  Stout  (23  Barb.  338)    62,  471,  822, 

910 
V.  Sturtevant  (9  N.  Y.  263)  323 

V.  Supervisors  (67  111.  67)  192 

V.  Supervisors  (84  111.  303)  825 

V.  Supervisors  ( 16  Johns.  59)  823 

V.  Supervisors  (43  N.  Y.  10)  71 

V.  Supervisors  (12  Johns.  414)  825, 849 
V.  Supervisors  (34  N.  Y.  516)  155 

V.  Supervisors  (32  N.  Y.  473)         822 


People  i;.  Supervisors  (50  Cal.  561)        85 
V.  Supervisors  (70  N.  Y.  228)  102 

V.  Supervisors  (64  N.  Y.  600)  869 

V.  Supervisors  (28  N.  Y.  112)  868,872 
V.  Sui)ervisors  (16  Mich.  254)  165 
V.  Supervisors  (1  Hill,  195)  924 

V.  Supervisors  (1  Hill,  362)    254,  257, 
452,  822,  825 
I'.  Supervisors  (1  Hill,  50)      720,  825, 

828 
V.  Supervisors  (12  Wend.  257)  257 
V.  Supervisors  (15  Wend.  198)  924 
V.  Supervisors  (27  Cal.  655)  471,  525, 
548,  854 
V.  Supervisors  (20  Mich.  95)  665 

V.  Supervisors  (10  Wend.  363)  819, 
821  823 
V.  Supervisors  (8  N.  Y.  317)  819*  849 
V.  Supervisors  (11  N.  Y.  563)  821,  840 
V.  Supervisors  (12  Barb.  446)  855 

V.  Supervisors  (15  Barb.  607)  855 
V.  Sweeting  (2  Johns.  184)  883,  892 
V.  Swift  (31  Cal.  26)  460 

V.  Syracuse  (63  N.  Y.  291)      128,  297 
V.  Tazwell  County  (22  111.  147)     191, 
488,  547 
V.  Thacher  (55  N.  Y.  525)      231,  233, 

883 
V.  Thompson  (25  Barb.  73)  822 

V.  Thompson  (16  Wend.  655)  879,  892 
V.  Throop  (12  Wend.  183)  331 

V.  Thurber  (13  111.  557)  356,  357 

V.  Tieman  (8  Abb.  Pr.  359)  247 

V.  Tiernan  (.30  Barb.  193)  247,  2-59 
V.  Tracy  (1  Denio,  617)  856 

V.  Treasurer  (4  Mich.  27)  858 

V.  Trustees  (86  111.  613)  819 

V.  Turner  (10  Am.  Law  Reg.  N. 

S.  366)  399 

V.  University  Regents   (4   Mich. 

98)  856 

V.  Utica  Ins.  Co.  (15  Johns.  358)  879, 

880 
V.  Vail  (20  Wend.  12)  836,  883 

V.  Vanderbilt  (26  N.  Y.  287)    91,  136, 

659 
V.  Vanderbilt  (28  N.  Y.  396)  136,  382 
V.  Vanderbilt  (26  N.  Y.  872)  656 

V.  Van  Slyck  (4  Cow.  297)  883,  893 
I'.  Waite  (70  111.  25)  889 

V.  Walker  (9  Mich.  328)  315,  316 

V.  Wall  (49  Cal.  478)  63 

!;.  Warfield  (20  111.  163)  61 

V.  Warren  (5  Hill,  410)  264 

V.  Wayne  Co.  (41  Mich.  4)  255 

V.  Waynesville  (88  111.  469)    192,  535, 

549 
V.  Weant  (48  111.  263)  64,  827 

V.  Webber  (89  111.  347)  116,  234,  443 
«.  Webber  (86  111.  283)  884 

V.  WeLsenbach  (60  N.  Y.  385)         399 
V.  Wetherell  (14  Mich.  48)     229,  2.31, 
247,  891 
V.  Wharf  Co.  (31  Cal.  34)  137 

V.  Whipple  (41  Mich.  548)  819 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxv 


People  V.  Whitcourt  (55  111.  172)  888  , 

V.  Wliite  (24  Wend.  520)  293  j 

V.  White  (54  Barb.  622)  823 

V.  Wliyler  (41  Cal.  351)  752,  774 

V.  Willsea  (60  N.  Y.  507)  71 

V.  Wilson  (15  111.  389)  417,  419 

V.  Winnehammer   (12  How.  Pr. 

200)  954 

V.  Wood  (7  Cal.  579)  94 

V.  Wood  (4  Park.  Cr.  144)  262 

V.  Works  (7  Wend.  486)  355 

V.  Wren  (5  111.  269)      62,  76, 194,  195 
V.  Yates  (40  111.  126)  861 

People's  Railroad  v.  Memphis  Rail- 
road (10  Wall.  38)   125,  444,  699, 
708 
Peoria  v.  Calhoun  (29  111.  317)      337,  339 
V.  Gordon  (82  111.  45)  842 

V.  .Tohnson  (56  III.  45)    630,  637,  656, 
673,  898 
7J.  Kidder  (26  111.  351)  610 

Peoria,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Logan  Co. 

(63  111.  374) 
Peoria  Bridge  Assoc,  v.  Loomis  (20 

III.  235)  1023 

Perdue  v.   Corporation   of  Chingua- 

cousy  (25U.  C.  Q.  B.  61)      935, 

986,  1069,  1071,  1073,  1074 

V.  Ellis  (18  Ga.  586)  322,  332,  363,  365 

Perin  v.  Carey  (24  How.  465)       557,  561, 

562,  564,  .566,  568 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (36  N.  Y.  120)  639,  646 

Perkin  v.  Brereton  (67  III.  477)    705,  1071 

t'.  Winkel  (77  III.  56)  704,  1071 

Pekins  v.  Corbin  (45  Ala.  103)  417 

V.  Fayette  (68  Me.  152)      1022,  1023, 

1025,  1028,  1035,  1052 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (4  Cow.  645)        455 

V.  Milford  (59  Me.  315)  727 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (44  N.  H.  223)      262, 

1028 
V.  Weston  (3  Cush.  549)  314 

Perkinson  v.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  App. 

322)  476 

Parley  v.  Chandler  (6  Mass.  454)  632 

V.  Georgetown  (7  Gray,  464)  970,  975, 

976 
Perrine  v.  Farr  (22  N.  J.  L.  356)  116,  443, 

799 

Perry  v.  Dover  (12  Pick.  206)  286 

V.  Kinnear  (42  111.  160)  911 

V.  New  Orleans  (55  Ala.  413)  628, 631, 

632,  636,  652,  653,  662,  663,  697 

V.  Ontario  (23  U.  C.  Q.  B.  391)      459 

V.  Superior  City  (23  Wis.  04)         451 

V.  Torrence  (8  Ohio,  522)  785 

V.  Tyner  (22  Barb.  137)  298 

V.  Worcester  (6  Gray,  544)    994,  995, 

1066,  1078 

Perryman  v.  Greenville  (51  Ala.  510)  109 

Peru  r.  French  (55  III.  317)        1037,  1041 

Peruvian,  etc.  Co.  v.  Thanes,  etc.  Co. 

(L.  R.  2  Ch.  617)  152 

Pesterfield  v.  Vickers  (3  Coldw.  205)  238, 

332,  981 


Peterborough  v.  Lancaster  f  14  N.  H. 

382)  287 

Peters  v.  London  (2  U.  C.  Q.  B.  543)    344 
V.  State  (9  Ga.  109)  963 

Petersburgh  v.  Applegarth  (28  Gratt. 

321)  378,968,969 

1-.  Mappin  (14  III.  193)  471 

V.  Metzker  (21  III.  205)   117,  346,  368 

Peterson  v.  Mayor  (17  N.  Y.  449)  166,  386. 

455,  461,  463,  557 

Petrie  v.  Doe  (30  Miss.  698)  298 

Pettigrew  v.  Evansville  (25  Wis.  223)  996, 

.1049,  1068,  1069,  1071,  1074 

V.  Evansville  (3  Am.  Rep.  50)       1069 

Pettis  V.  Johnson  (66  Ind.  139)  668 

Petty  V.  Tooker  (21  N.  Y.  267)  222 

Peyser  v.  Mayor  (70  N.  Y.  497)     941,  945 

Peyton  i-.  Hospital  (3  C.  &  P.  363)        318 

Ptau  V.  Reynolds  (53  III.  212)    1046,  1058 

Phebe,  The  (1  Ware,  R.  360)  137 

Phelps  V.  Bank  (13  Wis.  432)  538 

V.  Mankato  (23  Minn.  277)  1026 

Philadelphia  v.  Board,  etc.  (29  Leg. 

Int.  53)  726 

V.  Collector  (5  Wall.  730)  948 

V.  Collins  (68  Pa.  St.  106)  991 

V.  Cooke  (30  Pa.  St.  56)  815,  942 

V.  Dickinson  (38  Pa.  St.  247)  608 

V.  Dyer  (41  Pa.  St.  463)  608 

V.  Eastwick  (35  Pa.  St.  75)  743 

V.  Field  (58  Pa.  St.  320)      76,  88,  96, 
100,  101,  729,  765 
V.  Flanigan  (47  Pa.  St.  21)        19,  21, 
161,  451 
V.  Fox  (64  Pa.  St.  169)       77,  87,  106, 

562 
V.  Germantown  Railroad  Co.  (10 

Pa.  165)  590 

V.  Given  (60  Pa.  St.  136)        253,  259 
V.  Greble  (38  Pa.  St.  339)  814 

V.  Miller  (49  Pa.  St.  40)  800 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (3  Grant,  403)       099, 

711 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (33  Pa.  St.  41)      743, 

745,  749 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (58  Pa.  St.  253)    570, 

667,  669,  678,  700 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (6  Whart.  (Pa.) 

26)  649,  696 

V.  Tryon  (35  Pa.  St.  401)       687,  742, 

744,  745,  804 

V.  Wistar  (35  Pa.  St.  427)  815 

Philadelphia  Assoc,  v.  Wood  (39  Pa. 

St.  73)  791 

Phillips  in  re  (60  N.  Y.  16)     324,  341,  794 

V.  Albany  (28  Wis.  340)  180 

V.  Allen  (41  Pa.  St.  481)  349,  352,  303, 

401 
y.  Bloomington  (1  Greene  (Iowa), 

498)  143 

V.  Bowers  (7  Gray  (Mass.),  21)      684 
V.  Coffee  (17  III.  154)  218 

V.  Commonwealth  (44  Pa.  St.  197)  930 
V.  Jefferson  Co.  (5  Kan.  412)  942 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (1  Hilt.  483)  253 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED, 


rhillips  in  re  v.  Tecumseh  (5  Neb.  305)  363  I 
!•.  Veiizie  (40  Me.  %)  1003 

V.  ^YickllnIU  (1  Paige,  590)    195,  247, 

Phinizey  r.  Augusta  (47  Ga.  260)  10615 
Plivsicians  r.  Salman  (3  Salk.  102)  204 
Piatt  r.  People  ( -ill  111.  64)  226 

Pickering  r.  Shotwell  ( U)  Pa.  St.  27)  562 
Pickett  i:  Hastings  (47  Cal.  200)  647 

V.  Scliool  District  (25  Wis.  551)     305 
Pickhard  v.  Smitli  (10  C.  B.  N.  S. 

470)  1028 

Piemental  v.  San  Francisco  (21  Cal. 

351)  295,  305,  444,  456,  463,  574, 

938 

Pierce  v.  Bartram  (Cowp.  270)     354,  384, 

3S8 
V.  Boston  (3  Met.  620)  810 

V.  Cambridge  (2  Cusli.  611)  774 

V.  Carpenter  (10  Vt.  480)        209,  217 
V.  Emery  (32  N.  II.  484)  788 

V.  Richardson  (37  N.  H.  306)  261,  307, 
308,  552 
V.  Somerworth  (10  N.  H.  369)        206 
Fieri  v.  Sliieldsboro  (42  Miss.  493)      378, 

898 
Pierpont  v.  Harrisonville  (9  W.  Va. 

215)  629,  630 

Pike  V.  Megam  (44  Mo.  491)  327 

V.  Middletown  ( 12  N.  H.  278)  41,  174, 

175 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (94  U.  S.  164)  73 

Pike  County  v.  State  (11  111.  202)  856 

Pilie  V.  New  Orleans  (19  La.  An.  273)  257 
Pillsbury  «.  Brown  (47  Cal.  478)  421 

V.  Springfield  (16  N.  H.  565)  001 

Pirn  V.  Ontario  (9  U.  C.  C.  P.  304)  459 
Pine  Grove,  etc.  v.  Talcott  (19  Wall. 

666)  491,  501 

Piper  V.  Chappell  (14  M.  &  W.  624)    344, 

347,  403,  410 

V.  Singer  (4  S.  &  R.  354)        732,  771 

Pitts  V.  Bonner  (7  Ga.  449)  883 

Pittsburg  «&  Connelsville  Railroad  Co. 

(63  Pa.  St.  126)  530 

Pittsburg,  etc.   Railroad  Co.  v.  Alle- 
ghany Co.  (C.  L.  J.  204)  530 
Pittsburg  V.  Craft  (1  Pitts.  158)             206 
V.  Grier  (22  Pa.  St.  54)      34, 141,  987 
!;.  Scott  (1  Pa.  St.  309)  656 
V.  Walter  (69  Pa.  St.  365)               797 
V.  Wood  (44  Pa.  St.  113)  744 
Pittsburg,  etc.  v.  Pittsburg  (80  Pa. 

St.  72)  1038 

Pittson  V.  Clark  (15  Me.  460)  41 

Pittston  V.  Hart  (89  Pa.  St.  389)        1018, 

1019 
Pitzman  v.  Freeburg  (92  111.  Ill)  188 

Place  V.  Providence  (12  R.  I.  1)  901.  911, 

912,  916 

Placerville  v.  Wilcox  (35  Cal.  21)         781 

Plank-road  Co.  v.  Husted  (3  Ohio,  578)  126 

V.  Ramage  (20  Pa.  St.  95)  661 

V.  Rineman  (20  Pa.  St.  99)  661 

V.  Tliomas  (20  Pa.  St.  91)  661 


Plant  r.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Barb.  26)      703 
Plaquemines  Parish  v.  Foulhouze  (30 

La.  An.  64)  570,  573,  632,  671 
Piatt  V.  Rice  (10  Watts  (I'a.),  352)  773 
Platteville  v.  Bell  (43  Wis.  488)  398 

Player  v.  Jenkins  ( 1  Sid.  284)  384 

Plimpton  i;.  Somerset  (33  Vt.  283)  90,  406, 

425 
Pluin  I'.  Canal  Co.  (2  Stockt.  250)       G83, 

999 
Plunkett  V.  Crawford  (27  Pa.  St.  107)  214 
Plymouth  v.  Jackson  (15  Pa.  St.  44)     76, 

106,  215 

V.  Painter  (17  Conn.  585)  247 

V.  Petti  John  (4  Dev.  Law,  591)     354, 

355,  735 

Police   Commissioners   v.   Louisville 

(3  Bush,  597)  81,  83.  237 

Police  Jury  v.  Britton  (15  Wall.  572)  154, 

155,  190,  443,  452,  483,  489 

V.  Michel  (4  La.  An.  84)  129 

V.  Shreveport  (5  La.  An.  661)    79,  90 

V.  Succession  of  Donough  (8  La. 

An.  341)  179 

V.  Villaviabo  (12  La.  An.  788)       355 
Pollack    V.    San    Francisco    Orphan 

Asylum  (48  Cal.  490)       665,  666 
Pollard  V.  Hagan  (2  How.  212)      133,  136 
V.  Woburn  (104  Mass.  84)  1040 

Pollock  V.  Laurence  Countv  (7  Pitts. 

Legal  Jour.  373)    '  842,  844,  867 
V.  Louisville  (13  Bush,  221)  979,  980, 

981 
Pomeroy  v.  Mills  (2  Vt.  279)  632, 635, 643, 

662 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (16  Wis.  640)  697,  715 
Pomeroy  Salt  Co.  v.  Davis  (21  Ohio 

St.  555)  783 

Pompton  V.  Cooper  Union  (101  U.  S. 

196)  105,  510 

Pond  V.  Negus  (3  Mass.  230)  327 

V.  Parrott  (42  Conn.  13)  824,  827 

Pontiac  v.  Carter  (32  Mich.  164)  684,  968, 

992,  995,  998,  1003 

Pool  V.  Boston  (5  Cush.  219)         166,  258 

Poole  V.  Bentley  (12  East,  168)  576 

V.  Huskinson  (11  M.  &  W.  827)     627 

Pope  V.  Commrs.  12  Rich.(S.  C.)  Law, 

407)  677 

V.  Headen  (5  Ala.  433)  813 

V.  Union  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  282)    638,  640 

Poppen  V.  Holmes  (44  111.  362)      351,  352 

Port  V.  Russell  (36  Ind.  60)  437 

Porter  v.  Blakely  (1  Root,  440)  208 

r.  Ins.  Co.  (76  111.  361)  788 

V.  R.  R.  Co.  (33  Mo.  128)      696,  699, 

703,  705 

y.  Railroad  Co.  (77  111.  561)  907 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (87  Me.  349)  218 

Port  Gibson  v.  Moore  (21  Miss.  157)     200 

Port  Whitby,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitby 

(18  U.  C.  Q.  B.  40)  661 

Portland  v.  Bangor  (65  Me.  120)    399,  425 

V.  Lee  Sam  (7  Oreg.  397)  622 

V.  O'Neill  (1  Oreg.  218)  357,  789 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxvii 


Portland  v.  Richardson  (54  Me.  46)   1061, 

1062,  1003 

V.  Water  Co.  (67  Me.  135)  786 

V.  Whittle  (3  Oreg.  126)         638,  646 

Port  Wardens  v.  Pratt  (10  Rob.  (La.) 

450)  133 

I'.  Ship  (14  La.  An.  280)  133 

Portsmouth,  etc.  Co.  v.  Watson  (10 

Mass.  91)  109 

Posey  V.  Mobile  (50  Ala.  6)  473 

Post  V.  Pearsall  (22  Wend.  425)    629,  645 
Postmaster-General  v.  Rice  (Gilpin, 

554)  242 

Pottawatamie  Co.  v.  Sullivan  (17  ICan. 

58)  621 

Pottery.  Luther  (6  Johns.  431)  261 

V.  Menasha  (30  Wis.  402)        380,  659 
Potts  V.  Henderson  (2  Iiul.  327)  264 

Potts ville  V.  Curry  (32  Pa.  St.  443)      928 
Poulters  Co.  v.  Phillips  (6  Bing.  314)  338, 

412 
Poultney  v.  Wells  (1  Aik.  180)      97,  106, 

455 

Pound  V.  Chippewa  (43  Wis.  63)  767 

Pow  V.  Becker  (3  Ind.  475)  230 

Powel  V.  Madison  (21  Ind.  335)  784 

D.  Madison  (18  Ind.  33)  784 

V.  St.  Joseph  (31  Mo.  347)  704 

Powers  in  re  (25  Vt.  261)  430 

V.  Council  Bluffs  (45  Iowa,  652)    673 

V.  Council  Bluffs  (50  Iowa,  197)  079, 

1049,  1055,  1066 

V.  Sanford  (.39  Me.  183)  941 

V.  Superior  Court  (23  Ga.  65)         179 

V.  Wood  County  (8  Ohio,  285)      213 

Poweshiek  County  v.  Ross  (9  Iowa, 

511)  314 

Powles  V.  Page  (3  Com.  B.  31)  318 

Prather  v.  Lexington  (13  B.  Mon.  559)  057, 

980 

V.  New  Orleans  (24  La.  An.  41)     436 

Pratt  V.  Hilman  (4  B.  &  C.  269)  178 

V.  State  (5  Conn.  .388)  209 

V.  S wanton  (15  Vt.  147)  286,  287,  461 

Pray  v.  Jersey  City  (32  N.  J.  L.  394)  958, 

1009,  1015,  1038 

V.  Northern  Liberties  (31  Pa.  St. 

69)  491,  776 

Preachers'  Aid  Soc.  in  re  (45  Me.  552)  208 
Preble  v.  Portland  (45  Mo.  241)   302,  303, 

604 
Prell  V.  McDonald  (7  Kan.  426)  109,  235, 
2.36,  238,  342,  410 
Presbyterian   Church  v.   Mayor   (5 

Cow.  538)  12.5,  327,  374,  775 

Prescott  V.  Duquesne  (48  Pa.  St.  118)  141, 

818 
V.  Gonser  (34  Iowa,  175)  219,  824, 855 
President  v.  Desouchett  (2  Ind.  587)  1040 
y.  Holland  (19  III.  271)  407 

V.  Indianapolis  (12  Ind.  620)  572,  634, 
645,  647 
V.  Myers  (6  S.  &  R.  12)  207 

V.  O'Malley  (18  111.  407)  307,  342 

V.  Thomson  (20  111.  197)  195 


Preston  v.  Bacon  (4  Conn.  471)  257 

V.  Boston  (12  Pick.  7)  941,  942,  948 
V.  Hall  (23  Gratt.  600)  653 

V.  Nevastota  (34  Tex.  684)  638 

Prettyman  v.  Supervisors  (19  III.  406)  179 
V.  Tazwell  Co.  (19  111.  406)     157,  164 

Price  V.  Baker  (41  Ind.  572)  224 

V.  Baker  (13  Am.  Rep.  346)  224 

V.  Church  (4  Ohio,  514)  650 

V.  Commissioners  (1  Whart.  1)  840 
V.  Harned  (1  Iowa,  473)  861 

V.  Piainfield  (40  N.  J.  L.  608)  642 
V.  Thomson  (48  Mo.  363)  626,  642, 
646,  647,  650,  660 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (13  Ind.  58)  305 

Prideaux  v.  Mineral  Point  (43  Wis. 

513)  1026,  1041,  1051 
Priestly  r.Foulds  (2  Scott  (N.  R.),205)  194 
Prigdeni>. Bannerman  (8  Jones  (N. C), 

53)  604 

Primm  v.  Belleville  (59  111.  142)  732,  7-36, 

754  781  78'' 

V.  Carondelet  (23  Mo.  22)     '        '  272 

Princeton  v.  Gebhart  (61  Ind.  187)         31 

V.  Vierling  (40  Ind.  310)  941,  942 

Princeville  v.  Auten  (77  III.  325)  635,  642, 

645 
Prindle  v.  Fletcher  (39  Vt.  255)  1017, 1025, 

1052 

Pringle  in  re  (10  U.  C.  Q.  B.  2-54)  .      254 

Pritchard  v.  Keefer  (53  111.  117)  264 

V.  People  (6  111.  529)  293 

V.  Stevens  (6  D.  &  E.  522)  177 

Pritz  in  re  (9  Iowa,  30)  68 

Proctor  V.  Lewiston  (25  111.  153)  627 

Proprietors  v.  Horton  (6  Hill,  501)  62, 110 

V.  Lowell  (7  Gray,  223)        994,  1076, 

1078 

V.  Slack  (7  Cush.  226)  314,  315 

Prosser  v.  Ottumwa  (47  Iowa,  509)  10-39, 

1041 
Protzman  v.  Railroad  Co.  (9  Ind.  468)  664, 
697,  704,  70.5,  706,  709,  716 
Providence  Bank  v.  Billings  (4  Pet. 

514)  773 
Providence  v.  Clapp  (17  How.  161)   1013, 

1020,  1034,  1036 
V.  Ins.  Co.  (12  R.  L  435)  788 

V.  Miller  (11  R.  L  272)  449,450 

Providence,  etc.  v.  Thurber  (2  R.  I. 

15)  786 

Pruyn  i-.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  367)       487 
Pryor  v.  Pryor  (26  L.  T.  N.  S.  7-58)      627 
Public  Schools  in  re  (N.  Y.  App.  1872)  806 
V.  Taylor  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  618)  114 

Puffer  V.  Orange  (122  Mass.  389)        1018 
Pulaski  Co.  v.  Lincoln  (9  Ark.  320)     298, 

486 
Piillen  V.  Commissioners  (66  N.  C.  361)  727 
Pumpelly  r.  Green  Bay  Co.  (13  Wall. 

166)  996,  1002,  1005,  1007,  1071, 

1072,  1074 

Pumphrey  v.  Baltimore  (47  Md.  145)  100 

601,  828,  856 

Purdy  V.  People  (4  Hill,  385)  68,  76 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES  CITED. 


rurslov  V.  TTavs  (17  Iowa.  310)  587 

Putnam  r.  Doufjlas  Co.  (tj  Oreg.  318)  1008 
V.  Jolinsoii  (10  Muss.  488)  223 

Putnam  County  v.  Allen  County  (1 

Ohio  St.  322)  840 

Pvm  V.  Groat  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (2  B. 

&S.  759;  4B.  &S.  3%)       1042 

Queen  v.  Atlanta  (59  Ga.  318)  258 

V.  Barnhart  (7  U.  C.  L.  J.  103)  282 
1-.  Board  (L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  227)  213 

1-.  Board,  etc.  (8  L.  T.  N.  S.  383)  1010, 

1028 
V.  Boardman  (30  U.  C.  Q.  B.  553)  428 
V.  Boulton  (15  U.  C.  Q.  B.  272)  OGl 
t'.  Boycott  (14  L.  T.  N.  S.  509)  223 
V.  Bro>vn,  etc.  (13  U.  C.  C.  P.  35(5)  (itJl 
V.  Charlesworth  (IG  Q.  B.  1012)  690 
G97,  709 
r.  Chorley  (12Q.  B.  515)  377 

t;.  County,  etc.  (7  U.  C.  Law  J. 

266)  828 

V.  Cridland  (7  E.  &  B.  853)  405 

V.  Day  is  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  107)  681 
V.  Derbyshire  (2  Q.  B.  745)  720 

V.  Donaldson  (24  U.  C.  C.  P.  148)  627 
V.  Durham  (10  Mod.  146)  246 

V.  East  Mark  (11  Q.  B.  877)  661 

V.  Exeter  (L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  110)  223 
V.  Farrell  (9  Cox,  C.  C.  446)  382 

V.  Fitzgerald  (39  U.  C.  Q.  B.  297)  662, 

1024 
V.  Gas  Co.  (2  E.  &  E.  651)      690,  697, 

709 
V.  Glamorsranshire  (2  East,  356)  661 
V.  Glossop  (4  B.  &  A.  616)  405 

V.  Gloucestershire  (1  C.  &  M.  506)  720 
V.  Gordon  (6  U.  C.  C.  P.  213)  661 
V.  Governors  (8  A.  &  E.  682)  259,  273 
V.  Greenhow  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  Div. 

703)  1053 

V.  Halifax  Road  Trustees  (12  Q. 

B.  442)  855 

V.  Haynes  (7  L.  R.  2)  377 

V.  Holmes  (3  C.  &  K.  860)  382 

V.  Horley  (8  L.  T.  N  S.  382)  1032 
V.  Hyde  (21  L.  J.  M.  C.  94)  405 

V.  Inhabitants,  etc.  (Dears.  C.  C. 

291)  1053 

V.  Ipswich  (2  Ld.  Ravm.  1232)  206 
V.  Jay  (8  E.  &  B.  469)  726 

r.  Jarvis  (3  F.  &  F.  108)  392 

V.  Johnson  (38  U.  C.  Q.  B.  549)  363 
V.  Johnson  (8  Q.  B. 102)  344,  406 

V.  Justices  (8  Ad.  &  E.  173)  225 

V.  Kendall  (1  Q.  B.  366)  859 

V.  Kennett  (L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  567)  350 
t;.  Kitchener  (L.  R.  2  C.  C.  88)  1033 
u.  Light  (27  L.J.  M.  C.  1)  238 

V.  Lincomb  (2  Chit.  214)  377 

V.  Litchfield  (4  A.  &.  E.-N.  S.  897)  174 
V.  Loughton  (3  Smith,  575)  377 

•  V.  Louth  (13  U.  C.  C.  P.  615)  661 
V.  Maybury  (4  F.  &  F.  90)  377 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (10  Mod.  107)  275 


Queen  v.  Monro  (22  U.  C.  Q.  B.  44)  381 

I'.  Murray   (1   U.  C.  L.  J.  N.  S. 

104)  282 

V.  Mutters  (10  Cox,  6)  378 

V.  Oldham  (L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  474)  775 

r.  Orchard  (3  Cox,  248)  382 

V.  Osier  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B.  224)  323 

V.  Owens  (2  E.  &  E.  86)  246 

V.  Paget  (3  F.  &  F.  29)  377 

V.  Paris  (12  U.  C.  C.  P.  445)  661 

V.  Potrie  (4  E.  &  B.  737)  661 

I'.  Plenty  (L.  R.  4  Q.  B  346)  225 

V.  Plunkett  (21  U.  C.  Q.  B.  536)  632 

V.  Rector,  etc.  (8  A.  &  E.  356)  225 

V.  Registrar  (10  Q.  B.  839)  206 

V.  Rice  (L.  R.  1  C.  C.  21)  381 

V.  Roddy  (41  U.  C.  Q.  B.  291)  428 

V.  Rubidge  (25  U.  C.  Q.  B.  299)  631 

V.  St.  Margaret's  (8  A.  &  E.  889)  860 
V.  Sadlers'  Co.   (10  II.  Ld.   Cas. 

404)  277 

V.  Scott  (2  Ld.  Raym.  922)  1032 

V.  Spence  (11  U.  C.  Q.  B.  31)  631, 


V.  Stamford  (6  Q.  B.  433) 
V.  Thalman  (9  Cox,  388) 

United     Kingdom    Telegraph 


661 
175 
382 


Co.  (3  F.  &'F.  74)  "  '  1024 
V.  Walker  (23  L.  J.  M.  C  123)  238 
r.  Ward  (L.  R.  8Q.  B.  210)  225 

V.  Watson  (2  Cox,  C.  C.  876)         382 
V.  Webb  (1  Den.  C.  C.  338)  382 

r.  Wood  (5E.  &  B.  49)  171 

V.  Wood  (L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  559)  350 

V.  YorkviUe  (22  U.  C.  C.  P.  431)  661, 

1083 

Queen's  Bench (11  A.  &  E.  2)       890 

Quin  V.  Moore  (15  N.  Y.  432)  1042 

Quincy  v.  Ballance  (30  III.  185)    405,  406 

V.  Barker  (81  111.  300)  1019, 1020, 1021 

i;.  C.  B.  &  Q.  Railroad  (92  111.  21)  696 

V.  Jones  (76  111.  231)       656,  671,  680, 

998,  999,  1003 

y.  Railroad  Co.  (92  111.  21)  674 

t;.  Warfield  (25  111.  317)  487 

Quinn  v.  Paterson  (3  Dutch.  35)   665,  677, 

798,  999 

Raab  v.  Maryland  (7  Md.  483)  209 

Rabassa  v.  Mavor   (1  Martin  (La.), 

N.  S.  484)  733,  781 

Rackham  v.  Bluck  (9  Q.  B.  691)  428 

RadclifC  v.  Brooklyn  (4  N.  Y.  195)  995, 996, 

998,  999, 1001,  1004,  1071 

Rader  v.  Road  Dist.  (36  N.  J.  L.  273)    76 

Radich  v.  Hudson  (95  U.  S.  210)  943 

Radway  v.  Briggs  (37  N.  Y.  256)  141,  987 

Ragan  v.  McCoy  (29  Mo.  356)        625,  626 

Ragatz  V.  Dubuque  (4  Iowa,  349)  606,  614 

Ragnet  v.  Wade  (4  Ohio,  107)  264 

Railroad  Co.  in  re  (23  U.  C.  C.  P.  281)  327 

(Q.  B.  Div.  26  W.  R.  13)  820 

I'.  Adams  (3  Head  (Tenn.),  596)  696, 

703,  711 

V.  Adler  (56  III.  344)  84 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxix 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Alexandria  (17  Gratt. 

176)     113,114,763,770,774,787 

V.  Applegate  (8  Dana  (Ky.),  289)  097, 

700,  711,  710 

V.  Baltimore  (21  Md.  93)  124,324,  701, 

711 
V.  Ball  (5  Ohio  St.  568)  021 

V.  Barren  Co.  (10  Bush,  604)  533 

V.  Blanchard  (54  111.  240)  911,  918 
V.  Brown  (17  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  763]  700 
V.  Brownell  (24  N.  Y.  345)  652 

V.  Buchanan  County  (39  Mo.  485)  127, 

547 
V.  Buffalo  (5  Hill,  200)  394,  700 

V.  Capps  (67  111.  007)  704,  705,  706 
V.  Cass  Co.  (53  Mo.  17)  773 

V.  Charlestown  (8  Allen,  330)  785 
V.  Chatham  (42  Conn.  445)  307 

V.  Chenoa  (43  111.  20'J)  111,  678,  707 
V.  Chicago  (56  111.  454)  778 

V.  City   Railway  Co.    (2  Duvall, 

175)  716 

V.  Claggett  (Speers  Eq.  562)  439 

V.  Clute    (4   Paige   (N.   Y.).  Ch. 

384)  787 

V.  Coleman  (04  U.  S.  181)  73 

V.  CoUett  (6  Ohio  St.  182)  621 

r.  Commrs.  (1  Ohio  St.  77)  63,179 
V.  Commrs.  (98  U.  S.  541)  944 

V.  Commonwealth  (66  Pa.  73)        729 
V.  Connelly  (10  Ohio  St.  159)  70,  731, 
749,  753,  787,  796 
V.  Connelly  (7  Ind.  32)  607,  609 

V.  Coombs  (10  Bush,  382)      664,  705, 
706,  1041 
V.  Dailey  (13  Ind.  353)  696 

i;.  Dalby  (19  111.  353)  53 

U.Davidson    County    (1    Sneed, 

692)  64 

v.  Davis  (2D.  &B.  451)  583 

u.  Decatur  (33  111.  381)  703,707 

V.  Dodge  County  (98  U.  S.  541)  944 
V.  Doughty  (22  N.  J.  L.  495)  618,  622 
V.  Duquesne  (46  Pa.  St.  223)  677,  720 
V.  Elevator  Co.  (50  Pa.  St.  499)    632, 

662 
V.  Engle  (76  111.  317)  341,  414 

V.  Evansville  (15  Ind.  395)     121,  154, 

155,  157,  189.  482,  487,  516,  524, 
548 
V.  Francis  (70  111.  2.38)  1008 

V.  Galena  (40  111.  344)  678,  707 

V.  Gilmore  (37  N.  H.  410)  788 

V.  Gladmon  (15  Wall.  401)  713,  1041, 

1050 
v.  Gregory  (15  111.  21)  71 

V.  Ilanna  {dH  Ind.  562)  749 

V.  Hartford  (58  Me.  23)  191,  506 

V.  Heath  (9  Ind.  558)  614 

V.  Howard  (21  Wis.  44)  788 

V.  Hunter  (8  Ind.  74)  621 

V.  Iliisen  (95  U.  S.  465)  169 

V.  Ingles  (15  B.  Mon.  637)  262 

V.  Jackson  (7  Wall.  202)  733 

i;.  Joliet(79llI.  39)  412 


Railroad   Co.  v.  Kennedy    (39  Ala. 

307)  580 

V.  Kerr  (45  Barb.  148)  699 

V.  Lafayette  (22  Ind.  262)  787 

V.  Lancaster  Co.  (4  Neb.  293)  701 
V.  Leavenworth  (1  Dill.  C.  C.  R. 

393)  652,099,701,711,716 

V.  Logan  Co.  (63  111.  374)  867,  868 
V.  Longworth  (30  Ohio  St.  108)  622 
V.  McGuire  (20  Wall.  46)  774 

V.  McGuire  (49  Mo.  483)  911 

V.  McShane  (22  Wall.  444)  948 

V.  Marion  County  (30  Mo.  294)     124, 

548 
V.  Marshall  Co.  (3  W.  Va.  319)  773 
r.  Maryland  (10  How.  393)  774 

u.  Mayor  (1  Hilt.  502)  121,125 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (Iowa  S.  C.  1873)  700 
V.  Memphis  ( 10  Wall.  38)  125 

V.  Miller  (30  Ind.  209)  614 

f.  Moore  (4  W.  N.  C.  37)  621 

V.  Morgan  Co.  (14  111.  103)  783,  787 
V.  Moye  (39  Miss.  374)  621 

V.  Mt.  Pleasant  ( 12  Iowa,  112)  794,  920 
V.  Munger  (5  Denio,  255)  1040 

V.  Municipality  (7  La.  An.  148)  139 
V.  Municipality  (1  La.  An.  128)    696, 

700 
V.  Napa  County  (30  Cal.  435)  825 
i;.  Nesbit  (10  How.  395)  603 

V.  Newark  (2  Stockt.  352)  690,700,  701 
V.  Newark  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  515)  699 

V.  New  Haven  (42  Conn.  279)      749. 

776 
V.  New  York  (1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  562)  699. 

711 
V.  Norton  (24  Pa.  465)  745,  749 

V.  Norwalk  (37  Conn.  109)  383 

V.  Oakes  (20  Ind.  9)  607,  609 

V.  Oakland  (43  Cal.  503)  464 

V.  O'Daily  ( 13  Ind.  353)  664,  705,  711, 

716 

V.  Otoe  County  (16  Wall.  677)      185. 

491,  522,  537,  541 

V.  Otoe  County  (1  Dill.  C.  C.  338)  189. 

479 
r.  Owings  (15Md.  199)  606 

V.  Payne  (37  Miss.  100)  607 

V.  Payne  (8  Rich.   (S.  C.)  Law, 

177)  702 

V.  Philadelphia  (88  Pa.  424)  749 

V.  Philadelphia  (47  Pa.  St.  325)  697 
I'.  Philadelphia  (53  Pa.  St.  119)  357 
I'.  Philadelphia  (47  Pa.  St.  314)  652 
V.  Philadelphia  ( 101  U.  S.  528)  786 
V.  Platte  County  (42  Mo.  171)  127,  546 
V.  Plumas  County  (37  Cal.  354)  64, 
111,  858 
V.  Porter  (29  Pa.  St.  105)  598 

V.  Prudden  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  530)  659 
V.  Quigley  (21  How.  202)  970 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Gray,  1)  580 

V.  Uailway  Co.  (9  Exch.  55)  219 

V.  Reed  (41  Cal.  250)      697,  099,  703, 
704,  712 


xc 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Richmond  (96  U.  S. 

6:il)  334 

U.Ross  (47  Ind.  25)  776 

V.  Saco  (00  Uti.  l!)tj)  773 

V.  .St.  r;uii  c-'i  :\iiiiii.,62a)     749, 753 

V.  ISuluinnier  (7  Wall.  272)     136,  633 
V.  Sliacklett  (30  iMo.  550)  773 

V.  Shicls  (33  Ga.  001)  659,  700,  702, 

703 
V.  Smith  (6  Ind.  249)  607,  609 

V.  Smitli  (23  Kan.  745)  187 

V.  Spearman  (12  Iowa,  112)  213,  749, 
776,  787,  793 
f.  State  (3  Head,  523)  930 

V.  State  (25  Ind.  177)  787,  821 

V.  Stale  (37  Ind.  489)  828 

V.  Stciner  (44  Ga.  540)  696,  699 

V.  Stockton  (41  Cal.  147)  728 

V.  Stout  (17  Wall.  657)  1050 

V.  Stout  (2  Dillon,  294)  1050 

I'.  Supervisors  (3  Am.  Law  Reg. 

079)  740 

i;.  Tax  (18  Wall.  206)  773 

V.  Tax  Court  (50  I\Id.  397)  788 

V.  Veeder  (17  Ohio,  385)  477 

V.  Washington  Co.  (30  Gratt.  471)  732, 

763 
V.  Washington  Co.  (3  Neb.  42)      116, 

615 
V.  Washington  Co.  (10  Bush,  564)  548 
V.  Whipple  (22  111.  105)  924 

r.  Wilson  (49  Cal.  396)  597 

V.  Winthrop  (5  La.  An.  36)     136,  138 
V.  Wright  (5  R.  I.  459)  785,  787 

V.  Wyandotte  Co.  (10  Kan.  587)  941, 
942,  944 
Railroad,  etc.  Bank  v.  Lowell  (109 

Mass.  214)  939 

Raleigh  v.  Dougherty  (3  Humph.  11)  369 

V.  Sorrell  (1  Jones  Law,  49)  291,  392, 

393 

Ramsay  v.  Clinton  Co.  (42  111.  225)      674 

V.  District  Council  (4  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

374)  442 

Ramsey  v.  Riley  (13  Ohio,  157)     265,  266 

Ramshey  /«  re  (83  Eng.  C.  L.  174)       259, 

273 

Rand  v.  Townsend  (26  Vt.  670)  604 

V.  Wilder  (11  Cush.  294)        286,  288 

Randall  v.  Elwell  (52  N.  Y.  522)  788 

;;.  Railroad  Co.  (106  Mass.  276)    1026 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Am.  Rep.  327)  1026 

V.  Van  Vechten  (19  Johns.  60)     447, 

450,  455,  460,  483,  678 

Randle  v.  Railroad  Co.  (65  Mo.  325)    704 

Randolph  ik  Bayne  (44  Cal.  366)  810 

V.  Braintree  (4  Mass.  315)  214 

V.  Gawloy  (47  Cal.  458)  778 

Randolph   Co.  v.  Baldwin   (46  Ala. 

3:)7)  839 

Randolph,  etc.  v.  Stalnaker  (13  Gratt. 

523)  819 

Rankin  v.  Beaird  (1  111.  123)  80 

V.  Railroad  Co.   (4  U.   C.  C.  P. 
406)  607 


Ranlett  !■.  Leavenworth  (1  Dill.  C.  R. 

263)  497 

V.  Lowell  (126  Mass.  431)  1073 

Ranncy  v.  Bader  (67  Mo.  476)       552,  912 

Ransom  v.  Boal  (29  Iowa,  68)        570,  647 

V.  New  York  (1  Fisher  Pat.  Cas. 

254)  968 

Raphael  v.  Bank  (17  C.  B.  161)  553 

Raplio  V.  Moore  (68  Pa.  St.  404)  1038, 1048 

i\  Moore  (8  Am.  Rep.  202)  1048,  1049 

Rastrick  v.   Great  AYestern  Railway 

Co.  (27  U.  C.  Q.  B.  396)        1051 
Rathbun  v.  Acker  (18  Barb.  393)  599,  763, 

767,  800 

Ray  V.  Lynes  (10  Ala.  63)  992 

V.  Manchester  (46  N.  H.  59)        1017, 

1027,  1028 

V.  Petrolia  (24  U.  C.  C.  P.  73)     1024, 

1034 

V.  Vansycle  (96  U.  S.  675)  635 

Raymond  v.  Lowell  (6  Cush.  524)      1017, 

1025,  1027,  1029,  1039,  1041 

Read  v.  Buffalo  (74  N.  Y.  463)  488 

V.  Perrett  (L.  R.  1  Ex.  Div.  349)   723 

Reading  v.    Commonwealth    (11  Pa, 

St.  196)  8,  9, 96,  652,  654,  655,  857 

V.  Keppleman  (61  Pa.  St.  233)  111,  998 

V.  Wedder  (60  III.  80)  535 

Ready  v.  Mayor  (6  Ala.  327)  980,  981 

Reardon  v.  St.  Louis  (36  Mo.  555)         962 

Rector  v.  Hart  (8  Mo.  448)  635 

V.  State  (6  Ark.  187)  428 

Red  V.  Augusta  (25  Ga.  386)  303 

Redd  V.  Supervisors  (31  Gratt.  685)      549 

Reddall  v.  Bryan  (14  Md.  444)     589,  590, 

605 

Reddick  v.  Amelia  (1  Mo.  5)  54,  143 

Redfield  v.  Railroad  Co.  (25  Barb.  54)  663 

Reed  v.  Bainbridge  (1  South.  351)         127 

V.  Belfast  (20  Me.  246)  964, 1015, 1041, 

1042 
V.  Hamilton  (5  U.  C.  C.  P.  269)  1069 
r.  Lynn  (126  Mass.  367)  141 

V.  Northfield  (13  Pick.  94)   641,  1027, 
1040,  1048,  1050,  1052 
V.  People  (1  Park.  C.  R.  Rep.  481)  355 
V.  Toledo  (18  Ohio,  161)  600 

V.  Tyler  (50  111.  288)  815 

Reedie  v.  London,  etc.  Co.  (L.  R.  4 

Exch.  244)  1058 

Rees  V.  Chicago  (38  111.  322)  587,  634 

V.  Watertown  (19  Wall.  107)  202,818, 
838,  842,  846,  852,  873,  874,  875 
Reeside  v.  Walker  (11  How.  272)  826 

Reeve  v.  Wood  (5  B.  &  S.  364)  428 

Reeves  v.  Toronto    (21  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

157)         160,  935,  986, 1073,  1075 
V.  Treasurer   Wood    County    (8 

Ohio  St.  333)     592,  738,  777,  805 

Regan  v.  McCoy  (29  Mo.  356)  630 

Regents  v.  Detroit  (12  Mich.  138)         446 

V.  McConnell  (5  Neb.  423)  78,  83,  261 

Regents  of  University  v.  Williams  (9 

G.  &  J.  365)  193,  249,  250 

V.  Williams  (7  G.  &  J.  365)  97 


TABLE   OF  CASES   CITED. 


XCl 


Regents  of  University  v.  Williams  (9 

G.  &  J.  365)  78,  294 

Reggio  V.  Braggiotti  (7  Cush.  166)  1062 
Regina  v.  Anderson  (2  Q.  B.  740)  890 

f.  Archbishop  (11  Q.  B.  678)  856 

i;.  Avery  (18  Q.  B.  570)  227 

V.  Bamber  (5  Q.  B.  279)  1053 

V.  Belmont  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  298)  363 
V.  Bewdley  (1  P.  Wms.  207)  194,  203 
V.  Blizard  (Law  Rep.  2  Q.  B.  634)  891 
V.  Boucher  (2  Q.  B.  644)  46 

V.  Bradburn  (6  U.  C.  P.  R.  308)  225 
V.  Bradley  (3  E.  &  E.  634)  227 

I'.  Bristol  Dock  Co.  (2  Q.  B.  64)  820 
V.  Bristol  Docli  Co.  (4  Q.  B.  162)  858 
V.  Canal  Co.  (8  Dowl.  P.  C.  623)  824 
f.  Canal  Co.  (11  A.  &  E.  316)  855 
t>.  Cliapman  (12Cox,  4)  238,239 

V.  Chapman  (6  Mod.  152)  866 

v.  Chester  (5  El.  &B1.  531)  882 

r.  Conyers  (8  Q.  B.  981)  861,862 
V.  Cottle  (3  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  474)  677 
V.  Councillors,  etc.   (7  Ad.  &  E. 

419)  225 

V.  Cousins  (28  L.  T.  N.  S.  116)  225 
V.  Crawley  (3  F.  &  F.  109)  392 

V.  Cumberlege  (36  L.  T.  N.   S. 

700)  254 

V.  Deighton  (5  Q.  B.  896)  227 

r.  Derby  (7  A.  &  E.  419)  832,  882 
V.  Derbyshire  (2  Q.  B.  745)  719 

V.  Dock  Co.  (2  Eng.  R'y  Cases, 

599)  825 

V.  East,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  (10  A. 

&E.  531)  858 

V.  Eye  (9  A.  &  E.  676)  806,  872 

t;.  Gloucester  (Holt,  R.  450)  250 

V.  Greene  (2  Q.  B.  460)  890 

v.  Grinishaw  (10  Q.  B.  747)  285 

v.  Hammond  (17  Q.  B.  772)  227 

V.  Heathcote  ( 10  Mod.  49)821, 871,  872 
V.  Hedford  (Col.  L.  R.  2  Q.  B. 

590)  882 

V.  Hiorns  (7  Ad.  &  E.  900)  225,  832 
V.  Inhabitants,  etc.  (19  L.  J.  M. 

C.  215)  1032 

V.  Ipswich  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1232)      206, 

208 
V.  Jackson  (40  U.  C.  Q.  B.  290)  377 
V.  Lane  (1  Ld.  Raym.  1304)  250 

r.  Ledgard  (1  Ad.   &  E.   N.   S. 

616)  863 

V.  Ledgard  (1  Q.  B.  620)  863 

V.  Ledyard  (8  Ad.  &  E.  585)  225 

V.  Leeds  (7  A.  &  E.  963)  830 

V.  Leeds  ( 11  A.  &  E.  512)  832,  882 
r.  Lindsay  (C.  Q.  B.  51)  882 

V.  Litchfield  (4  A.  &  E.  N.  S.  891)  152, 

155 
V.  Litchfield  (4  Q.  B.  893)  146,  219 
V.  Liverpool  (9  A.  &  E.  435)  903 

V.  Lloyd  (6  Law  Times  Rep.  (N. 

S.)  610)  886 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (Law   Rep.   3  Q. 

B.  629)  225 


Regina  v.  Mayor,  etc.  (4  Dowl.  P.  C. 

562)  416 

V.  McGowan  ( 12  A.  &  E.  869)  244 
V.  McRae  (5  U.  C.  P.  R.  309)  243 
V.  Mitchell  (4  U.  C.  P.  R.  218)  225 
i;.  Monmouth  (L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  251)  831 
V.  Morton  (4  Q.  B.  146)  249 

V.  Mutter  (Leigh,  Cas.  491)  1058 

V.  Newberry  (1  Q.  B.  751)     267,  275, 

276 
r.  Nott  (4Q.B.  773)  930 

V.  O'Hare  (24  P.  R.  18)  882 

V.  Oxford  (6  Ad.  &  El.  349)  270 

V.  Paramore  (10  A.  &  E.  286)  28,  281 
V.  Pembroke  (8  Dowl.  P.  C.  302)  830 
I.'.  Purdy  (10  U.  C.  Q.  B.  545)  631 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (1  Ell.  &  Bl.  293)  867 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (9  Q.  B.  315)  929 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (3  Ad.  &  Ell.  N. 

S.  223)  930 

V.  Railway  Co.  (32  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

506)  631 

V.  Railway  Co.  (4  H.  L.  Cas.  471)  861 
V.  Registrar  Stock  Co.  (10  Q.  B. 

839)  206 

I'.  Ricketts  (7  Ad.  &  El.  966)  270 

V.  Roberts  (36  L.  T.  R.  690)  261,  293 
V.  Roberts  (Am.  L.  R.  414)  261 

V.  Rogers  (2  Ld.  Ravm.  777)  275 

V.  Rowley  (3  Q.  B.  143)  227 

V.  Rowley  (E.  C.  6  Q.  B.)  227 

V.  Saunders  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  15)  382 
V.  Sheffield  Gas  Co.  (L.  R.  6  Q. 

B.  652)  176 

V.  Sheffield  Gas  Co.  (22  Eng.  Law 

&  Eq.  518)  C90 

i;.  Slatter  (11  A.  &E.  502)  832 

V.  Southampton  (1  Ellis,  B.  &  S. 

5)  867 

V.  Stamford  (1  Ad.  &  E.   N.   S. 

433)  863 

V.  St.  Margarets  (1  P.  &  D.  116)  861 
V.  St.  Martins  (17  Q.  B.  149)  882 

V.  St.  Peters  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1249)  1033 
V.  Stevenson  (3  F.  &  F.  106)  392 

V.  Sutton  (10  Mod.  76)  270 

«.  Tart  (1  E.  &  E.  618)  227 

V.  Telegraph  Co.  (9  Cox  Cr.  Cas. 

174)  694 

V.  Thomas  (8  Ad.  &  El.  183)  285 

V.  Touchburn  (6  U.  C.  P.  R.  344)  225, 

226 

V.  Train  (9  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  180)       690, 

697,  709 

V.  Treasury  (10  Ad.  &  E.  374)       275 

V.  Turnpike  Roads  (12  A.  &  E. 

427)  828 

r.  Whipp  (4  Q.  B.  141)  285 

V.  Wood  (5  Ell.  &  Bl.  55)  395 

V.  York  (2  Q.  B.  850)  28,  281 

Reich  V.  State  (57  Ga.  73)  369 

Reichard  v.  Warren  County  (31  Iowa, 

381)  461 

Reid  in  re  (50  Ala.  439)  833 

Reiflf  V.  Conner  (10  Ark.  241)        303,  327 


XCll 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Reilly  v.  Clioiiqnette  (18  Mo.  220)        GG8 

V.  riiiladelphia  (00  Pii.  St.  407)    46:!, 

474,  475,  7'A  971) 

Ixoiman  r.  Slieiianl  (*27  Iiid.  288)  784 

Koiubotli  V.  I'ittsburg  (41  Pa.  St.  278)  154, 

155 
Reis  V.  Graff  (51  Cal.  86)  116,  443,  800,  809 
Keiteubaugh  r.  Railroad  Co.  (21  Pa. 

St.  100)  .     698 

Remington  v.  Millard  (1  R.  I.  93)  636,  640, 

641 
Reniv  r.  ^lunicipality    (11  La.  An. 

148)  558 

Renthrop  v.  Bonrg  (4  Mart.  (La.)  97)  649 

Reuwick  i:  Hall  (84  III.  162)  886 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (47  Iowa,  511)        180 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (36  N.  Y.  133)      1051 

Reock  V.  Newark  (.'«  N.  J.  L.  129)      127, 

474,  476,  824,  9.52,  1006 

Requa  v.  Rochester  (45  N.  Y.  129)      640, 

720,  1030,  1037,  1040,  1047,  1048 

Respublica  v.  Caldwell  (1  Dal.  150)      382 

V.  Dallas  (3  YcatQS,  316) 

V.  Duquet  (2  Yates,  493) 

V.  Sparhawk  (1  Dallas,  337) 

Reynolds  v.  Baldwin  (1  La.  An.  165 

V.  Shreveport  (13  La.  An.  426) 


V.  Taylor  (43  Ala.  420) 
Rex  I'.  Abingdon  (1  Ld.  Raym.  561) 


i;.  Abington  (2  Salk.  700) 


252 
402 
953 
833 
999, 
1004 
840 
830, 
863 
862,  863, 


,  Allen  (2  U.  C.  Q.  B.  101) 

,  Amery  (2  T.  R.  515)  193, 

,  Amery  (2  Bro.  P.  C.  336) 

,  Andover  (1  Ld.  Ravm.  710) 
,  Andover  (3  Salk.  229) 
,  Ashwell  (12  East,  22)  327, 

,  Atkyns  (4  Mod.  12) 
,  At  wood  (4  B.  &  Ad.  481) 
,  Axbridge  (Cowp.  523)  277,  836, 
,  Axbridge  (2  Term  R.  182) 
,  Babb  (3  T.  R.  579)      315,  316, 
,  Bailiffs  (1  B.  &  C.  86) 
,  Bailiffs  (2D.  &  R.  172) 
Bank  (2  B.  &  Aid.  620) 
,  Bank  of  England  (Doug.  506) 
Bankes  (3  Burr.  1454) 
Barber  Surgeons  ( 1  Ld.  Raym. 

585) 
,  Barker  (3  Burr.  1265)  817, 

,  Barnard  (Comb.  416) 
.Bedford  (1  East,  80) 
.  Bedford  (1  Barnard.  242) 
,  Benchers  of  Gray's  Inn  (Doug. 

339) 
,  Bellringer  (4  Term  R.  810)  281, 
.  Bond  (6  D.  &  R.  333) 
.  Bower  (2  Dowl.  &  R.  761) 
.Bower  (1  B.  &  Cr.  492,  585) 


Bridtrman  (2  Str.  1203) 
Bristol  (1  D.  &  R.  389) 


315, 


631 
199, 
211 
893 
273 
275 
347 
244 
414 
837 
277 
837 
127 
825 
836 
824 
830 

3.30 
818 
233 
832 
880 

822 
,282 
251 
248 
248, 
282 
316 
836 


Rex  V.  Bristol  (5  B.  &  Aid.  731) 
I'.  Brown  ('.)  Term  li.  674) 
V.  Buller  (8  East,  388) 
V.  Bumstead  (2  B.  &  Ad.  699)  222 
V.  Cambridge  (4  Burr.  2008)  223, 

831,  835, 
t'.  Cambridge  (2  T.  R.  461) 
V.  Campion  (1  Sid.  97) 
V.  Campion  (1  Sid.  14) 
V.  Canal  Co.  (1  M.  &  S.  32)     824, 
V.  Canal  Co.  (3  Ad.  &  E.  217) 
V.  Carlisle  (Fortesc.  200) 
V.  Carlisle  (6  Carr  &  P.  636)  657, 
V.  Carmathen  (1  M.  &  S.  697) 
V.  Carter  (Cowp.  59)  281, 

V.  Chalke  (1  Ld.  Raym.  225)  267, 

277,  278, 
V.  Chalke  (Comb.  397) 
r.  Chester  (1  M.  &  S.  101)      120, 
V.  Cliester  (2  Term  R.  665) 
V.  Chitty  (5  Ad.  &  E.  609)     222, 

V.  Clapham  (1  Wils.  305) 
r.  Clarke  (2  Ld.  Raym.  848) 
V.  Colchester  (2  T.  R.  259)      830, 
V.  Commissioners  (2  Keeble,  43) 
V.  Commissioners  ( 1  Term  R.  148) 
I'.  Commissioners,  etc.   (2  T.  R. 

232) 
V.  Company,  etc.  (8  Term  R.  356) 
V.  Cottrell  (1  B.  &  Ad.  67) 
V.  Coventry  ( 1  Ld.  Raym.  391) 
V.  Croke  (Cowp.  29)  206, 

V.  Cross  (3  Campb  226)  657, 

V.  Cusack  (2  Rool.  R.  113) 

(4  Burr.  2279) 

(4  Burr.  2022) 

(Willc.  54) 

1  Str.  539) 


Dawes 

Dawes 

Dawes 

Dean  ( 

Debenham  (2  B.  &  Ad.  187) 

Derby  (C.  T.  Hardw.  155)  274, 

Derby  (7  A.  &  E.  419) 

Derby  (2  Salk.  436)  861, 

Devonshire  (1  B.  &  C.  609) 

Doncaster  (Say.  38)  268, 

Doncaster  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1564) 

276, 
Doncaster  (2  Burr.  738)     267, 

284, 
Downshire  (4  A.  &E.  232) 
Dublin  (1  Stra.  540) 
Durham  (10  Mod.  147) 
Earle  (1  Str.  627) 
Egerly  (3  Salk.  183) 
Everett  (Cas.   Temp.  Hardw. 

261) 
Exeter  (Comb.  197) 
Exeter  (12  Mod.  251) 
E.xeter  (1  Ld.  Raym.  223) 
Feversham  (8  T.  R.  356)   268, 

278, 
Fishermen  (8  Term  R.  356) 
Fowey  (4  D.  &  R.  614)       866, 
Frost  (8  A.  &  E.  822) 
Gaborian  (11  East,  87) 


836 

890 
837 
234 
830, 
863 
867 
837 
870 
855 
858 
274 
722 
277 
282 
276, 
279 
274 
127 
887 
234, 
275 
314 
866 
834 
431 
817 

828 
413 
384 
273 
291 
722 
887 
282 
890 
282 
240 
317 
278 
830 
866 
282 
273 
245, 
279 
277, 
301 
631 
861 
245 
244 
657 

824 
223 

866 
866 
277, 
285 
414 
871 
857 
281 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


XCIU 


Rex  V.  Gloucester  (3  Bulst.  190)  863 

V.  Godwin  (Doug.  383)  250 

V.  Greene  (G  A.  &  E.  549)  837 

V.  Greet  (8  B.  &  C.  363)  282 

V.  Griffiths  (3  B.  &  Aid.  735)  277,  870 
V.  Grimes  (5  Burr.  2001)  277,284 
V.  Grimsliaw  (10  Q.  B.  747)  302 

V.  Grosvenor  (7  Mod.  199)  194 

V.  Grosvenor  (1  Wils.  18;  2  Str. 

1193)  248 

V.  Gwyn  (1  Str.  401)  317 

V.  Harris  (1  B.  &  A.  936)  275,  276, 
277,  285,  301 
V.  Harris  (33  Eng.  C.  L.  117)  891 
V.  Harrison  (3  Burr.  1328)  330,  413 
V.  Hastings  (1  D.  &  R.  148)  825 

V.  Hatfield  Peverel  (14  Q.  B.  298)  927 
V.  Head  (4  Burr.  2521)  291 

r.  Headley  (7  B.  &  C.  496)  282 

V.  Heath  (1  Barnard.  417)  223 

V.  Heaven  (2  T.  R.  772)  267 

«.  Hebden  (Anstr.  391)  282 

V.  Hereford  (2  Salk.  701 )  861,  866 

V.  Hereford  (1  Ld.  Ravm.  559)  863 
V.  Hertford  ( I  Ld.  Raym.  426)  290 
r.  Hill  (4  B.  &C.  441)  284 

V.  Hiorns  (7  A.  &  E.  960)  830 

V.  Hodge  (2  B.  &  A.  344)  890 

r.  Hopkins  (1  Q.  B.  161)  837 

V.  Hughes  (5  B.  &  C.  886)  249,  251 
V.  Hungerford  (11  Mod.  132)  248 

r.  Ingram  (1  W.  Bl.  50)  315 

V.  Inhabitants  (1  Ld.  Raym.  580)  922 
V.  Inhabitants  (5  B.  &  A.  469)       627, 

641 
V.  Inhabitants,  etc.  (4  B.  &  Ad. 

447)  627 

V.  Inhabitants,   etc.    (3    Campb. 

222)  1064 

V.  Ipswich  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1233)      275, 
277,  278,  314,  837,  865,  870 
V.  Ipswich  (2  Salk.  435)  275,  865 

V.  Jones  (3  Campb.  231)  722 

V.  Jones  (6  East,  230)  722 

V.  Kent  (13  East,  220)  194 

V.  Kingston  (8  Mod.  210)  861 

V.  Kingston  (11  Mod.  382)  861 

V.  Kingston  (1  Stra.  578)  861 

w.  Lancashire  (12  East,  366)  855 

V.  Lane  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1304)  249 

V.  Lane  (Fortesc.  275)  275 

V.  Langhorne  (4  Ad.  &  E.  538)  285 
V.  Lediard  (Sayer,  6)  927 

V.  Leicester  (4  Burr.  2089)  277 

V.  Leyland  (3  M.  &  S.  184)    248,  830, 

832 
V.  Liverpool  (2  Burr.  723)      267,  274, 
275,  277,  278,  284,  301 
V.  Liverpool  (1  Barn.  83)  830 

V.  Liverpool  (3  East,  80)  1064 

V.  Lloyd  (Cald.  309)  927 

V.  Lloyd  (1  Campb.  200)  627 

V.  London  (2  Show.  262)  13 

V.  London  (Term  U.  182)  276 

V.  Lord  Gordon  (Doug.  593)  317 


Rex  V.  Lucas  (10  East,  235)  315,  837 

V.  Lyme   Regis   (Doug.  85,  153, 

177)  267,  273,  278 

r.  Maidstone  (3  Burr.  1837)  331 

V.  Mallett  (2  Barnard.  408)  223 

V.  Margate  Bier  Co.  (3  B.  &  Aid. 

221)  854 

V.  Marshall  (2  B.  &  A.  841)  252 

I'.  Marten  (4  Burr.  2120)  890 

V.  Mav  (5  Burr.  2682)  284 

V.  May  (4  B.  &  Ad.  843)  282 

V.  Mayor  (2  Cowp.  523)  258,  836,  870 
V.  Mayor,  etc.(5  B.  &  Aid.  592)     127, 

416 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (9  Mod.  Ill)  293 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (2  Term  R.  181)  836 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (14  East,  348)  929 

v.  Mayor,  etc.  (1  Lev.  291)  273 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (1  M.  &  S.  101)  127 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (7  Mod.  371)  222,  234 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (8  Mod.  114)  879 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (7  Ad.  &  E.  963)  227 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  (1  Ld.  Raym.  563)  249 
V.  Mavor,  etc.  (Cas.   T.  Hardvv. 

147)  284 

V.  Miller  (6  T.  R.  277)  194,  281,  282, 
330,  883 
V.  Monday  (Cowp.  530)  223,  281,  282 
V.  Moore  (3  B.  &  Aid.  184)  722 

V.  Morely  (2  Burr.  1040)  431,  881,  927 
V.  Morris  (3  East,  213)  193 

V.  Morris  (4  East,  26)  281 

I'.  Motherscll  (1  Stra.  93)  307,  317 
V.  Newbury  (1  Q.  B.  751)  267,  862,  864 
t'.  Newburv  (2  Kyd,  50)  267 

V.  Newcastle  (2  Str.  1223)  .  315,  837 
V.  New  Radnor  (2  Ld.  Kenyon's 

N.  498)  891 

V.  Nicholson  (1  Str.  299)  195,  880 
V.  Norwich  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1244)    867, 


V.  Norwich  (1  B.  &  Ad.  310) 
V.  Norwich  (1  Stra.  55)  862 

V.  Norwich  (2  Salk.  436) 
V.  Nott  (6  A.  &  E.  355) 
V.  Nottingham  (1  Sid.  31) 
i^.  Nottingham  (Sayer,  217) 
V.  Ogden  (10  B.  &  C.  210) 
V.  Osbourne  (4  East,  326)        194 
V.  O.xford  (1  Salk.  428) 
I'.  Oxford  (Palm.  455)  275, 

r.  Oxford  (Cas.  T.  Hardw.  178) 
V.  Oxford  (7  East,  345) 
V.  Oxford  (6  Ad.  &  E.  349) 
V.  Oxfordshire  (16  East,  223)  929 
V.  Oxon  (2  Salk.  429) 
V.  Parry  (6  Ad.  &  El.  810) 
?;.  Passmore  (3  T.  R.  241)      193, 
195,  197,  203,  211, 
V.  Patterson  (4  B.  &  Ad.  9)    249, 


V.  Payne  (2  Cliittv,  366) 
V.  Phillips  (1  Str.  394) 
V.  Pigram  (2  Burr.  767) 
V.  Plymouth  (1  Barnard.  81) 


249, 


830 

,865 
867 
820 
315 
825 
890 

,883 
273 
284 
830 
854 
863 

,932 
837 
890 

194, 
246 

250, 
251 
891 
244 
314 
863 


XCIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Rex  V.  Tomfrpt  (10  Mod.  AS) 

r.  ronsoiiby  (1  Ves.  Jr.  1)      207, 

r.  I'oolo  (Cas.  Teinp.  Ilardw.  '2'3) 

V.  l\)\voll  (Saver,  ^o'.t) 

f.  riinu'll  (TWils.  '2i2) 

V.  Qua  vie  (11  A.  &  E.  508) 

V.  Kadford  (1  East,  80) 

V.  Kailroad  Co.  (!)  Car.  &  P.  469) 

t-.  Railway  Co.  (2  B.  &  A.  040) 
V.  Richardson  (1  Burr.  517)  207, 
274,  275,  277, 
V.  Ripen  (1  Ld.  Rayni.  603) 
17.  RoEjors  (2  Ld.  Raym.  778) 
V.  Rowe  (Carth.  1!)U) 
V.  Rowe  (1  Show.  188) 
V.  Russell  (G  B.  &  C.  606) 
V.  Russell  (0  East,  427) 
V.  Salford  (18  Q.  B.  087) 
V.  Salop  ( Buller's  Nisi  Prius,  198) 
V.  Salway  (9  B.  &  C.  424) 
V.  Sandvs  (2  Barnard.  302) 
V.  Sankey  (5  A.  &  E.  423) 
V.  Sargeant  (5  Terra  R.  567) 
w.  Sarmon  (1  Burr.  516)  657, 

V.  Saunders  (3  East,  119)       194, 
884,  885, 
V.  Sawyer  (10  B.  &  C.  486) 
r.  Scarborough  (2  Stra.  1180) 
V.  Shelly  (3  t.  R.  142)    316,  316, 
V.  Shrewsbury  (Cas.  T.  Hardw. 

151) 
r.  Shrewsbury  (7  Mod.  202) 
V.  Slatlbrd  (6  Mod.  366) 
V.  Slythe  (6  B.  &  C.  242) 
V.  Smart  (4  Burr.  2143) 
i;.  Smith  (1  Str.  126) 
V.  Smith  (2  M.  &  S.  598)  862,  863, 
I'.  Spencer  (3  Burr.  1827)        222, 
V.  Stafford  (3  T.  R.  651) 
V.  Stewart  (4  East,  17) 
V.  St.  Martin  (1  T.  R.  149) 
V.  Taylor  (3  Salk.  231)  267,  268, 

V.  Tiieodorick  (8  East,  545)    284. 

V.  Thetford  (12  Vin.  Abr.  90) 

V.  Thetford  (8  East,  270) 

V.  Thornton  (4  East,  308) 

y.  Tidderly  (1  Sid.  14)     249,250, 

V.  Tizzard  (17  Eng.  C.  L.  193) 

V.  Toneboy  (2  Ld.  Raym.  1275) 

V.  Tonebov  (11  Mod.  75) 

V.  Tooley  (12  Mod.  312) 

V.  Totness  (5  D.  &  R.  483) 

V.  Tower  (4  M.  &  S.  162) 

V.  Tregony  (8  Mod.  113)  194,  830 

V.  Treiawney  (3  Burr.  1615) 

V.  Trevenon  (2  B.  &  A.  482) 

V.  Truro  (3  B.  &  A.  592)         274, 

V.  Varls  (Cowp.  250) 

V.  Ward  (31  Eng.  Com.  Law,  180) 

V.  Ward  (4  Ad.  &  El.  405) 

V.  Wardroper  (4  Burr.  1964) 

V.  Warlow  (2  M.  &  S.  76) 

V.  Watson  (2  T.  R.  204) 


867 
892 
247 
891 
315 
890 
830 
929, 
932 
820 
268, 
278 
250 
416 
277 
277 
722 
657 
927 
870 
120 
276 
562 
890 
723 
197, 
886 
832 
830 
837 

277 
277 
837 
890 
281 
317 
865 
234 
820 
193 
830 
275, 
276 
286 
317 
830 
244 
267 
252 
277 
277 
866 
274 
837 
865 
250 
890 
830 
281 
655 
722 
890 
891 
262 


Rex  I'.  Wells  (4  Burr.  1999)  275,  276 

V.  West  Looe  (5  D.  &  R.  410)  274 
V.  West  Looe  (3  B.  &  C.  685)  866 
V.  West  Riding  (7  East,  590)  719 

V.  Westwood  (4  B.  &  C.  721)  291,  395 
V.  Whitwell  (5  Term  R.  86)  248,  892 
V.  Wigan  (3  Burr.  1645)  866 

j;.  Wildman  (2  Strange,  879)  314,  861 
V.  Williams  (1  Burr.  402)  290,  881 
V.  Williams  (2  M.  &  S.  141)  824 

V.  Williams  (1  W.  Black.  95)  891 
V.  Willis  (7  Mod.  262)  801 

V.  Wilton  (6  Mod.  259)  277 

V.  Wilton  (2  Salk.  428)  277 

V.  Winchester  (7  Ad.  &  E.  215)    227, 
830,  832,  834 
V.  Woodrow  (2  Term  R.  732)  248,  830 
1-.  Yates  (8  Mod.  101)  275 

V.  York  (4  T.  R.  609)  830,  832 

V.  York  (6  T.  R.  495)  867 

V.  Yorkshire,  etc.  (1  A.  &E.  563)  822 

Rexford  v.  Knight  (11  N.  Y.  808)         608 

Reynolds  r.  Albany  (8  Barb.  697)         166 

V.  Baldwin  (1  La.  An.  162)      79,  235, 

290,  879,  881,  882 

V.  New  Salem  (6  Met.  340)  286 

V.  Schweinefus  ( 1  S.  C.  Cin.  Rep. 

113)  304 

V.  Shreveport  (13  La.  An.  420)  163 
V.  Stark  Co.  (5  Ohio,  204)  96,  570 
V.  Taylor  (43  Ala.  420)  822 

Rhines  v.  Clark  (51  Pa.  St.  96)     406,  425, 

430 

Rhodes  v.  Cleveland  (10  Ohio,  159)     992, 

1002,  1068 

V.  Dunbar  (57  Pa.  St.  274)  379 

Rice  V.  Austin  (19  Minn.  103)  827 

V.  Des  Moines  (40  Iowa,  638)        164, 
1040,  1052 
V.  Foster  (4  Harr.  (Del.)  479)        327 
V.  Keokuk  (16  Iowa,  679)  105 

r.  Montpelier  (19  Vt.  470)  1034 

V.  Osgood  (9  Mass.  38)  645 

V.  Shuey  (5  N.  W.  R.  435)  166 

V.  Smith  (9  Iowa,  570)  831,  912 

r.  State  (3  Kan.  141)        368,369,430 

Rich  V.  Chicago  (59  111.  286)  304 

Richards  v.  Daggett  (4  Mass.  534)  216,  217 
V.  Enfield  (13  Gray,  344)     1024,  1025 

Richardson  v.  Baltimore  (8  Gill,  433)  605, 

899 
V.  Boston  (24  How.  188)  139,  558 
V.  Boston  (19  How.  270)  1077 

V.  Heydenfeldt  (46  Cal.  68)  778 

V.  Scott  (22  Cal.  160)  448 

V.  Spencer  (6  Ohio,  13)  963 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (6  Vt.  496)  719, 1048 

Richland  County  i'.  Lawrence  County, 

(12  III.  8)  76,  216 

Richmond    v.    Courtney    (32   Gratt. 

792)  1037,  1039,  1041 

V.  Daniel  (14  Gratt.  386)         763,  787 

V.  Judah  (5  Leigh,  305)  944 

U.Long  (17  Gratt.  375)    89,949,908, 

980,  981,  983,  986 


TABLE  OF  CASES   CITED. 


XCV 


Richmond  v.  Municipality  (8  U.  C. 

Q.  B.  5G7)  441 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (21  Gratt.  604)  76,  85, 

732,  774,  787 

V.  Smith  (15  Wall.  429)  436 

V.  State  (5  Ind.  334)  508 

Riclimond  Mayoralty  Case  (19  Gratt. 

678)  81,  418 

Richmond  Gas  Co.  v.  Middletown  (59 

N.  Y.  228)  125,  200,  690,  709 

Richmond  R.R.  Co.  v.  Richmond  (96 

U.  S.  521)  39-1,  699,  701,  706 

V.  Richmond  (10  Chi.  L.  N.  379)    701 
Ricket  V.  Met.  Railroad  Co.  (L.  R.  2 

H.  L.  175)  1005 

Riddle  V.  Bedford  (7  S.  &  R.  386)  242,  2-59 

V.  Locks  &,  Canals  (7  ISIass.  169)  195, 

959.  960,  963,  964,  1033 

Rideout  v.  School  District  (1  Allen, 

232)  286 

Ridge  Ave.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 

(lOPliila.  37)  896 

Ridge  Street  m  re  (29  Pa.  St.  .391)         909 
Ridgway  v.  West  (60  Ind.  371)  370 

Ridley  v.  Lamb  (10  U.  C.  Q.  B.  354)    723 
Riehst  V.  Goshen  (42  Ind.  339)  1040 

Riggs  V.  Board  of  Education  (27  Mich. 

262)  643,  665 

V.  Johnson  County  (6  Wall.  166)  502, 

842,  845.  847,  851,  871 

V.  Rochester  (9  N.  Y.  64)  560 

V.  St.  Joseph  (67  Mo.  491)  808 

V.  Telegraph  Co.  (47  Ind.  5in       907 

Riley    Co.   v.  Ward   (N.    W.   R.'  (1         I 

Ind.  Supp.)  20)  473 

Rindge  v.  Colrain  (11  Gray,  157)         1040 

Ring  V.  Cohoes  (77  N.  Y.  83)     1023,  1035 

V.  Johnson  County  (6  Iowa,  265)  220, 

479 
V.  Schoenberger  (2  Watts,  23)      043, 

669 
Ringland  v.  Toronto  (23  U.  C.  C.  P. 

08)  10.34 

Ripley  v.  Gelston  (9  Johns.  201)  941 

Ripon  V.  Bittel  (30  Wis.  614)     1040,  1041 

V.  Hobart  (3  Mvlne  &  K.  169)         384 

V.  Scliool  District  (17  Wis.  83)       945 

Risley  v.  St.  Louis  (34  Mo.  404)  699,  800, 

801,  807 
V.  Smith  (04  N.  Y.  570)  822 

Ritchie  v.  Franklin  Co.  (22  Wall.  67)  510 
Rivers  v.  Augusta  (23  Alb.  L.  J.  17)  951 
Road  Case  (17  Pa.  St.  71)  303 

Road  Case  (S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  447)  677 

Roa<l  in  Easton  (3  Rawle  (Pa.),  196)  677 
Road  in  Milton  (40  Pa.  St.  300)  677 

Road  in  re  (17  Pa.  St.  71)  327 

Robb  V.  Indianapolis  (.38  Ind.  49)  355 

Robbins  v.  Chicago  (4  Wall.  667)      1057, 

1059 
V.  Chicago  (2  Black,  418)  10-59 

V.  County  Court  (3  Mo.  57)  487 

V.  Le.xington  (8  Ciisli.  292)  927 

Roberts  in  re  (6  Pet.  216)  819 

V.  BoUes  (101  U.  S.  119)         510,  635 


Roberts  in  re  v.  Brown  Co.  (21  Kan. 

247)  621 

V.  Chicago  (26  111.  249)         999,  1004 
r.  Easton  (19  Oliio  St.  78)  711 

V.  Karr  (1  Campb.  262)  627,  637 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (5  Abb.  Pr.  41)        910 
V.  Ogle  (30  IlL  459)   340,  875,  379, 

399 
Robertson  v.  Rockford  (21  111.  451)  179 
Roberson  v.  Lambertville  38  N.  J.  L. 

69) 
Robie  V.  Sedgwick  (35  Barb.  319) 
Robins  /«  re  (7  Dowl.  566) 

V.  Railroad  Co.   (6  Wis.   636) 


410 
110 
820 
619, 
621 
727 
179 
945 
848 
946 
943 
928 
778 
362 
884 


Robinson  in  re  (12  Nev.  263) 
V.  Bidwell  (22  CaJ.  879) 
V.  Burlington  (50  Iowa,  240) 
V.  Butte  Co.  (43  Cal.  3-53) 
V.  Charleston  (2  Ricli.  317)    942, 
V.  City  Council  (2  Ricli.  L.  317) 
V.  County  (6  W.  &  S.  16) 
I'.  Dodge  (18  Johns.  351) 
V.  Groscourt  (5  Mod.  104) 
V.  Hospital  (21  E.  L.  &  Eq.  371) 
V.  Jones  (14  Fla.  254)  889 

V,  Lane  (19  Ga.  387)  200 

V.  ilayor  (1  Humph.  156)  .363 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (48  Cal.  410)  1029 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (27  Barb.  512)  704 
r.  Robinson  (1  Duval,  162)  621 

V.  St.  Louis  (28  Mo.  488j        171,  448 
Roby  V.  Chicago  (64  IlL  477)  412 

Rociiedale  i'.  Radcliffe  (18  Q.  B.  287)  670 
Rochester  i'.  Collins  (12  Barb.  559)       992 
I'.  Lee  (15  Sim.  376)  205 

V.  Pettinger  (17  Wend.  265)  391 

V.  Randall  (105  Mass.  295)  243 

V.  Reg.  (27  Law  J.  Q.  B.  436)  831 
V.  Upman  (19  Minn.  108)  766 

Rochester  White  Lead  Co.  i\  Roch- 
ester (3  N.  Y.  463)  984,  985,  992, 
1066,  1075 
Rochester  Water  Commrs.  in  re  (66 

N.  Y.  413)         580,  682,  589,  692 
Rock  Creek  v.  Strong  (96  U.  S.  271]  510, 

516 

Rockford  v.  Hildebrand  (61  111.  155)  1029, 

1035,  1039,  1040,  1048 

V.  Tripp  (83  111.247)  1019,  1028 

Rodman  v.  Musselman  (12  Bush,  354)  130 

Roffignac  St.  in  re  (4  Rob.  (La.)  357)  601, 

602 
Rogan  V.  Watertown  (30  Wis.  259)  70,180, 

183,  471 
Rogers  in  re  (7  Cow.  526)      282,  297,  300, 

857,  869 
V.  Burlington  (3  Wall.  654)   1-54,  155, 
156,  157,  185,  189,  468,  482,  491, 
501,  503,  509,  624,  643 
V.  Collier  (43  Mo.  359)  124 

V.  Greenbush  (58  Me.  390)  941 

V.  Jones  (5  D.  &  R.  484)  315 

V.  Jones  (1  Wend.  237)  340,  368,  392, 

414 


xevi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Roffors  in  re  v.  Leo  Countv  (1  Dillon, 

C.  C.  K.  r.-J'J)        ■  487 

V.  Poople  (()S  HI.  154)  31,  84'2 

V.  St.  diaries  (r.4  Mo.  229)  G12 

Roll  r.  Augusta  (."4  Ga.  32G)         704,  0!)!), 

1003,  10(;8 

V.  Indianapolis  (52  Ind.  547)  107(5,1077 

Roman  r.  Strauss  (10  Md.  8S))  059 

Roman  ('Mtliolic.  etc.  r.  Baltimore  (6 

(Jill,  :iU4)  324 

Rome  r.  Cabot  (28  Ga.  50)  173 

u.  Jenkins  (30  Ga.  154)  G08 

1-.  Omherji  (28  Ga.  40)  999,  1003 

Rome  Railroad  Co.  v.  Rome  (14  Ga. 

275)  787 

Romeo  II.  Giiapman  (2  Midi.  179)  208 
Roonev  v.  Supervisors  (40  Wis.  23)  1055 
Roosei-t'lt  r.  Draper  (23  N.  Y.  318)      898, 

VUO,  913 

Root  .'.  Shields  (Woolw.  0.  C.  310)      557 

Rose  V.  Groves  (5  M.  &  G.  G13)  724 

V.  St.  Charles  (49  Mo.  609}  10(55 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (3  Walts,  4(3)        196 

Rosebaugii  r.  Saffin  (10  Ohio,  31)  19,349, 

351 
Rosenberp;  v.  Des  Moines  (41   Iowa, 

415)  1052 

Ross  V.  Butler  (19  N.  J.  E(j.  294)  379 

i;.  Clinton  (46  Iowa,  C0())  1071 

17.  Curtis  (31  N.  Y.  dW)  547 

i;.  Madison  (1  Ind. 281)  314,445,100(5. 

1077 

u.  St.  Charles  (49  Mo.  609)    424,  640, 

1005,  1066 

Rossin  V.  Wnlker  (6  Grant  (Can.), 619)  661 

Rossire  v.  Boston  (4  Alien,  57)  558 

Rosvvell  V.  Trior  (1  Salk.  460)  377 

Rounds  r.  Mnnsfield  (38  Me.  58(3)  177,  2(55 

V.  Muniford  (2  li.  I.  154)        412,  995, 

999,  1004 

V.  Stetson  (45  Me.  596)  177 

V.  Stralford  (2(3  U.  C.  C  P.  11)  1027, 

1028 

Roundtree  r.  Gnlvoston  (42  Tex.  626)  778 

Rowan  v.  Portland  (8  B.  Mon.  2321      638, 

660,  667,  671,  673 

Rowe  V.  Addison  (34  N.  H.  306)  985 

v.  Leeds  (13  U.  C.  Q.  B.  575)       1011 

V.  Portsmouth  (22  Am.  Rep. 464)  1005, 

1072,  1074 

V.  Portsmonlh  (56  N.  H.  291 )      1005, 

1072,  1074 

V.  Portsmouth    (3  Am,   Lavif  T. 

482)  1072 

V.  Rochester  (29  U.  C  Q.  B.  690)  935, 

1070 

Rowell  V.  Lowell  (7  Gray,  100)  1018,  1022, 

1024,  1025,  1041 

V.  Montville  (4  Me.  270)  641 

V.  Williams  (29  Iowa,  210)  979,  1037, 

1049, 1055,  1058,  1061 

liowley  V.  London,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (L.  R. 

8  Ex.  221)  1042,1043 

Roxbury   v.  Railroad  Co.   (6   Cusli. 

424  J  702,  1064 


Royal  Bank,  etc.  t-.  Turquand  (6  El. 

&  Bl.  325)  510,  513 

Rubey  v.  Shain  (54  Mo.  207)  911 

Rudolphe  r.  New  Orleans  (11  La.  An. 

242)  983,  1004 

Rugples  r.  Collier  (43  Mo.  359)  123 

V.  Nantucket  (11  Cush.  433)   124,  965 
Rulilman  v.  Commonwealth  (5  Binn. 

26)  604,  923 

Rulison  V.  Post  (79  111.  567)  331 

Humsey  i'.  Campton  (16  N.  11.  567)      223 
Uundle  r.  Baltimore  (28  Md.  356)         928 
V.  Del.  etc.  Co.  (1  Wall.  Jr.  275)      75 
Rung  V.  Shoenberger  (2  Watts  (Pa.), 

•23)  072 

Runnion  v.  Coster's  Lessee  (14  Pet. 

122)  661 

Runyon  v.  Bordine  (2  Green  (N.  J.), 

472)  6.')5,  657,  658 

Ruppert  V.  Baltimore  (23  Md.  184)       475 

Rusch  V.  Davenport  (6  Iowa,  44'!)     1024, 

1037,  1041 

Rush  V.  Des  Moines  County  (1  Woolw. 

C.  C.  313)  21 

Ruskin  v.  St.  Joseph  (11  Am.  Rep. 

463)  1075 

Russ  V.  Mayor  (12  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs. 

38)  334 

Russell  V.  Burlington  (30  Iowa,  262)  1001 

V.  Chicago  (22  III.  285)  239 

I'.  Devon  County  (2T.  Rep.  061)  960, 

963,  1036 

V.  New  York  (2  Denio,  461)  954,  956, 

957,  978 

V.  Steuben  (57  111.  35)         1009,  1038 

V.  The  Swift  (Newb.  R.  653)  137 

Rutherford  v.  Taylor  (38  Mo.  315)      626, 

644,  647,  660 

Rutherford's  Case  (72  Pa.  82)  692 

Rutter  c.  Chiipman  (8  M.  &  W.  1)  46 

Ryan  v.  Copes  (11  Rich.  Law,  217)      378 

t-.  County  (14  111.83)  811 

Ryder  v.  Railroad  Co.  (13  Rl.  523)       110 

Rye  V.  Peterson  (45  Tex.  312)      378,  400, 

402 
Rylands  v.  Fletcher  (8  H,  L.  C.  330)  1070 

Sackett,  etc.  Streets  in  re  (74  N.  Y. 

95)  653,  744 

Sacramento  v.  Crocker  (16  Cal.  119)  752, 

789 
V.  Kirk  (7  Cal.  419)  445,  446,  533 
t;.  Steamer  (4  Cal.  41)  140 

Sadler  c.  Evans  (4  Burr.  1984)  259 

Saffield  V.  Hathaway  (44  Conn.  521)    174 
Safford  v.  Drew  (3  Duer,  627)  1043 

San  Diego  v.  Railroad   Co.  (44  Cal. 

106)  676,  677 

St.  Catharines  v.  Gardner  (20  U.  C.  C. 

P.  107)  601 

St.  Charles  v.  Meyer  (58  Mo.  86)  307,  403, 

413 
V.  Nolle  (51  Mo.  122)      355,  675,  680, 

729 
V.  Powell  (22  Mo.  625)  668 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


XCVU 


St.  Charles  v.  Rogers  (49  Mo.  530)  924 
St.  Clair  Co.  v.  Keller  (85  111.  3'M)  819 
St.  George's  Vestry  v.  Sjjarrow  (16 

C.  B.  N.  S.  209)  726 

St.   Helens   v.   St.   Helens   (L.  R.   I 

Exch.  196)  370 

St.  John  V.  East  St.  Louis  (50  111.  92)  754 

V.  McFarlan  (33  Mich.  72)  400 

V.  New  York  (6  Duer,  315)  885 

V.  New  York  (3  Bosw.  483)    387,  722 

St.  Joseph  ¥.  Anthony  (30  Mo.  537)     807 

St.  Joseph  Asylum  in  re   (09  N.  Y. 

353)  777 

t'.  Hamilton  (43  Mo.  282)  601 

V.  O'Donoghue  (31  Mo.  345)  741,  775 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (39  Mo.  476)  784 

V.  Rogers  (10  Wall.  644)  64,  185, 188, 

499,  504,  509,  514,  524,  540,  512, 

548 

V.  Sayville  (39  Mo.  460)  784 

St.  Louis  V.  Ale.xander  (23  Mo.  483)     63, 

112,  115,  188,  189,  342,  546 

r.  Allen  (13  Mo.  400)  44,  88,213,  793, 

812,  813 

V.  Allen  (53  Mo.  44)         752,  753,  810 

V.  Armstrong  (56  Mo.  298)  462 

V.  Bentz  (11  Mo.  61)        332,  368,  398 

V.  Boatmen's   Ins.    Co.    (47    Mo. 

150)  766 

V.  Boffinger  (10  Mo.  13)  328,  373 

V.  Bucher  (7  Mo.  App.  169)  766 

V.  Cafferata  (24  Mo.  94)  332,  367,  397 
V.  City  Railroad  Co.  (50  Mo.  94)  785 
V.  Cleland  (4  Mo.  84)  455 

V.  Clemens  (52  Mo.  133)  123,  741,  778, 

809 
I'.  Clemens  (48  Mo.  .395)  123 

V.  Clemens  (36  Mo.  467)  742,  796,  797, 
806,  807,  810 
V.  Clements  (49  Mo.  552)        743,  796 
V.  Coons  (37  Mo.  44)  808 

V.  De  Noue  (44  Mo.  136)  807,  810 
V.  Eters  (30  Mo.  4-56)  123 

V.  Ferry  Co.  (11  Wall.  423)  788,  785 
V.  Fitz  (53  Mo.  582)  333,  409 

V.  Foster  (52  Mo.  513)    304,  323,  325, 
342,  343 
V.  Gorman  (29  Mo.  593)  558 

V.  Gas  Co.  (5  Mo.  App.  484)  436 

V.  Green  (7  Mo.  App.  468)  868 

V.  Grove  (46  Mo.  574)  .360 

V.  Gurno  ( 12  Mo.  414)  683, 1000, 1003, 

1071 
V.  Insurance  Co.  (49  Mo.  393)  774 
V.  Insurance  Co.  (47  Mo.  146)  788 
V.  Jackson  (25  Mo.  37)  885,  389 

V.  Laughlin  (49  Mo.  559)  731,  789 
V.  McCoy  (18  Mo.  238)  373 

V.  Merton  (6  Mo.  476)  576 

V.  Newman  (45  Mo.  188)  668 

V.  Russell  (9  Mo.  503)  44.  88,  213, 793, 
812,  813 
V.  Schnuckelburg   (7   Mo.   App. 

536)  022 

V.  Schoeneman  (52  Mo.  348)         809 
VOL.  I.  a 


St.Louisr.  Sliields  (52  Mo.  3-51)  84,05, 139 
V.  Shields  (62  Mo.  247)  61,  62,  69 

V.  Smith  (10  Mo.  43fs)  408,  409 

V.  Smith  (2  Mo.  113)  365 

v.  Steinberg  (4  Mo.  App.  458)        789 
V.  Steinberg  (69  Mo.  289)  739 

V.  Weber  (44  Mo.  547)   333,  338,  385, 

389 
i;.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.  (40  Mo.  580)  783, 

785 
V.  Woodruff  (4  Mo.  App.  169)        359 
St.  Louis  County  Court  v.  Sparks  (10 

Mo.  117)  834 

St.  Louis  Gas  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  (46  Mo. 

141)  213 

St.  Louis   Hospital   v.  Williams    (19 

Mo.  609)  207 

St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  St.  Louis 

(26  Mo.  468)  776 

St.  Luke's  Church  v.  Slack  (7  Cush. 

226)  810,  855 

St.  Mary's  v.  Jacobs  (L.  R.  7  Q.  B. 

53)  627 

St.  Paul  V.  Coulter  (12  Minn.  41)  71,  337, 

338,  339,  385,  389 

V.  Kirby  (8  Minn.  154)  1037 

V.  Laidler  (2  Minn.  190)  389 

V.  Marvin  (16  Minn.  102)  924 

V.  Seitz  (3  Minn.  297)  1037, 1054, 1057 

V.  Treager  (25  Minn.  248)      357,  358, 

361,  .391 

I'.  Troyer  (3Minn.  291)  365 

St.  Peter  v.  Bauer  (19  Minn.  327)  418,  424, 

433 
V.  Dennison  (58  N.  Y.  416)     996,  998 
St.  Peter's  Church  v.  Scott  Co.   (12 

Minn.  395)  773 

Salem  v.  Railroad  Co.  (98  Mass.  431)  167, 

375,  379 
Salem  Mill  Dam  v.  Ropes  (6  Pick.  23)  41 
Saline  Co.  v.  Anderson  (20  Kan.  298)  259 
Salsbury  v.  Herchenroden  (106  Mass. 

458)  10.32 

V.  Philadelphia  (44  Pa.  St.  303)      455 
Salter  v.  Reed  (15  Pa.  St.  260)  815 

Saltonstall  v.  Banker  (8  Gray,  195)       379 
Samis  v.  King  (40  Conn.  298)       226.  239, 
259,  309,  884 
Sampson   v.   Goochland   Justices   (5 

Gratt.  (Va.)  241)  640,720 

Sams  V.  Toronto  (9  U.  C.  Q.  B.  181)    207 

Samuels  v.  Nashville  (3  Sneed,  298)      644 

Samyn  ;;.  McCloskey  (2  Ohio  St.  536)  1061 

San  Antonio  v.  Barnes  (96  U.  S.  315)  510 

V.  Gould  (34  Texas,  76)  455 

V.  Jones  (28  Tex. 19)  180 

V.  Lane  (32  Tex.  405)  499,  551 

V.  Lewis  (15  Tex.  388)  647 

V.  Lewis  (9  Tex.  69)  313,  445 

V.  Mehaffy  (96  U.  S.  312)  510 

Sanborn  v.  Deerfield  (2  N.  H.  253)         41 

Sanbornton  v.  Tilton  (55  N.  H.  608)     216 

r.  Tilton  (53  N.  H.  438)  216 

Sanders  v.  McLin  (llred.  (N.  C.)  Law, 

572)  709 


XCYlll 


TABLK   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Sanderson  v.  Cross  (TO  Wis.  282)         782 
Sant'onl  v.  Aui^usta  (32  Me.  5oG)       1015, 

1042 

V.  Tremlott  (-42  Mo.  384)  220 

Sands  i-.  liiclunond  (31  Gratt.  571)      744, 

747,  750 
San  Francisco  v.  Calderwood  (31  Cal. 

585)  558,  G34 

r.  Canavan  (42  Cal.  541)     75,  86,  93, 
030,  G31,  034,  63G,  647,  823 
V.  Hazen  (5  Cal.  IG'J)  295 

V.  Kinsman  (51  Cal.  92)  809 

V.  O'Neil  (51  Cal.  91)  809 

V.  Real  Estate  (42  Cal.  517)  105 

V.  S.  V.  W.  W.  (48  Cal.  49:3)    66,  G9, 
632,  662,  665 
San  Francisco  Oas.  Co.  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco (9  Cal.  453)  454,  460 
Sangamon  Co.  v.  Sprin^eld  (63111.06)  76, 
84,  85,  92,  214,  450,  937,  938 
Sanger  i\  Commrs.  (25  Me.  291)  856 
San"  Jose  v.  Railroad  Co.  (53  Cal.  476)  789 
Santo  V.  Iowa  (2  Iowa,  165)                   327 
Sargent  v.  Bank  (4  McLean,  339)         026 
V.  Cornish  (54  N.  H.  18)  561,  562,  569 
V.  Railroad   Co.    (1  Handy, 

Ohio,  Sup.  C.  52)  715 

Sarnia  v.  Railway  Co.  (21  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

62)  661,  662 

Sater  i'.  Plank-road  Co.  (1  Iowa,  393)  620, 

621 

Satterlee  v.  Mathewson  (2  Pet.  880)     541 

V.  San  Francisco  (23  Cal.  214)      574, 

933 
Sauk  V.  Philadelphia  (1  Pa.  Leg.  Gaz. 

259)  303 

Saulety.  New  Orleans  (10  La.  An.  81)029, 

637,  639 
Sault  Ste.  Marie  Co.  v.  Van  Deusen 

(40  Mich.  429)  460,  485 

Saunders  v.  Haynes  (13  Cal.  145)  224 

Savacool  v.  Boughton  (5  Wend.  170)  264 

Savage  V.  Bansror  (40  Me.  176)  1021, 1025 

V.  Gulliver  (4  Mass.  178)  923 

Savannah  v.  Charlton  (36  Ga.  460)  356,  357 

i;.  Cullens  (.38  Ga.  334)  993 

V.  Hartridge  (37  Ga.  113)  621 

V.  Hartridije  (8  Ga.  23)  763,  783 

v.  Hussev"(21  Ga.  80)  368,  425 

V.  Savannah  (45  Ga.  602)  696 

V.  State  (4  Ga.  26)  855 

V.  Steamboat  Co.  (R.  M.  Charlt. 

342)  112,  661 

V.  Waldner  (49  Ga.  316)    1032,  1054, 

1056 

V.  Wilson  (49  Ga.  476)  ^    657 

Savings  Assoc,  v.  Topeka  (3  Dill.  376)  68, 

187,  190 
Savings  Bank  v.  Winchester  (8  Allen, 

109)  442 

Savings  Fund  v.  Philadelphia  (31  Pa. 

St.  175)  76,  125 

Saw-mill  Run  Bridge  in  re  (85  Pa.  St. 

163)  746 

Sawyer  v.  Alton  (4  111.  130)  676,  761 


Sawyer  v.  Corse  (17  Gratt.  2-30)  986 

V.  Northlield  (7  Cush.  490)    932,  1064 

r.  Williams  (25  Vt.  311)  217 

Saxton  ('.  Beach  (50  Mo.  488)       292,  324, 

456,  806 

V.  St.  Josepli  (00  Mo.  153)  324 

Saylor  v.  Harrisburg  (87  Pa.  St.  216)  984 

Say  re  i'.  Tompkins  (23  Mo.  443)  907,  911 

Scadding  v.  Lorant  (5  Eng.  Law  & 

Eq.  16)  293,  301 

r.  Lorant  (17  Law  T.  225)  301 

Scales  V.  Chattahoochee  Co.  (31  Ga. 

225)  31 

Scammon  v.  Chicago  (42  III.  192)         796 

V.  Chicago  (25  111.  424)         657,  1055, 

1056,  1057 

V.  Chicago  (40  III.  146)  763,  801 

V.  Scanmion  (28  N.  H.  429)  307 

Seaming  v.  Conger  (3  Leon.  7)  347 

Schaefler  v.  Sandusky   (33  Ohio  St. 

246)  1019,  1020,  1022 
Schaffer  v.  Cadwallader  (36  Pa.  St. 

126)  572,  842 

Schamm  v.  Seymour  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  371)  806 
Schanck  v.  Mayor  (69  N.  Y.  440)  122 

Schattner  i;.  Kansas  City  (53  Mo.  162)  683, 
1000,  1068 
Schenck  v.  Peay  (1  Dill.  C.  C.  R.  267)  298 
V.  Supervisors  (5  Wall.  772)  548 

Schenley  v.  Alleghany  (25  Pa.  St.  128)  610, 

740, 744 

V.  Commonwealth  (36  Pa.  St.  29)  105, 

124,  633,  638,  779,  794,  795,  808, 

809 

Schofield  V.  Lansing  (17  Mich.  437)      778 

School  in  re  (47  N.  Y.  550)  324 

V.  Canal  (9  Ohio,  203)  195 

School  Com.  V.  Dean  (2  Stew.  &  P. 

190)  60 

School  Directors  v.  Anderson  (45  Pa. 

St.  388)  818 

V.  Dunkelberger  (6  Pa.  St.  31)       567 
1-.  Goerges  (50  Mo.  194)  667,  673 

School  District  v.  Atherton  (12  Met. 

105)    246,  286,  288,  308,  311,  312, 
u.  Blakeslee  206,287,310 

V.  Gage  (39  Mich.  328)  130 

V.  Insurance  Co.  (101  U.  S.  707)      66 
r.  Lord  (44  Me.  374)  315 

V.  Richardson  (23  I'ick.  62)  210 

r.  Tapley  (1  Allen,  49)  216 

V.  Thompson  (5  Minn.  280)  480 

V.  Wood  (13  Mass.  193)  41 

Schoonmaker    v.    Churcli    (5    How. 

(N.  Y.)  Pr.  265)  637 

Schott );.  People  (89  III.  195)  415 

Schroder  v.   City  Council  (2  Const. 

Rep.  726)  346,  417 

Schuchardt  l:  New  York  (53  N.  Y.  202)  622 
Schultze  V.  Milwaukee  (5  N.  W.  Rep. 

342)  987 

Schumacher  v.  St.  Louis  (3  Mo.  App. 

297)  1000 

Schumm  v.  Seymour  (24  N.  J.  Eq. 

143)  289, 921 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED, 


XCIX 


Schurraeier  v.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Minn. 

82)  6-25,  626,  628,  664 

Schuster  v.  State  (48  Ala.  199)  380 

Schuyler  v.  Farwell  (25  111.  81)  f42 

Scliuylcr  Co.  v.  People  (15  111.  181)      191 
I'.  Thomas  (98  U.  S.  169)  510 

Scliwab  V.  .Aliidison  (49  Ind.  329)  346 

Schwartz  r.  Flatboats  (14  La.  An.  243)  778 
Scliwucliow  V.  Chicago  (68  111.  444)  303 
Scipio  V.  AVright  (101  U.  S.  665)  18J 

Scircle  v.  Neevis  (47  Ind.  289)  238,  239 
Scofield  V.  School  District  (27  Conn. 

499)  106,  910 

Scotland  Co.  v.  Thomas  (94  U.  S.  682)  510, 

536 

Scott  V.  Chicago  (1  Bissell,  510)    720,  721 

V.  Des  Moines  (34  Iowa,  552)         676 

V.  Frith  (4  F.  &  F.  349)  378 

V.  Manchester  (37  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 

495)  985 

V.  Mancliester  (1  H.  &  N.  59)  985,987, 

989 

V.  Manchester  (2  H.  &  N.  204)      987, 

989  992  995 

Scovil  V.  Cleveland  (1  Ohio  St.  126)  'ill. 

293,  610,  729,  748,  79(5 

V.  Giddings  (7  Ohio,  pt.  2,  211)    1002 

Scralford  v.  Gladwin  Co.   (41   Mich. 

647)  887 

Scranton  v.  Dean  (2  W.  N.  C.  467)  1019 
Scroggie  v.  Guelph  (36  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

534)  1074 

Sciid.ler  r.  Trenton  (Saxt.  694)  596 

Scully  &  O'Leary  in  re  (11  Chicago 

Legal  News,  27)  420 

Seagraves  v.  Alton  (13  111.  371)  456 

Scale  V.  Mitchell  (5  Cai.  403)  418 

Seaman  v.  New  York  (3  Dalv,  147)       141 
V.  New  York  (21  Alb.  L."  J.  273)     950 
Seamen  v.  Patten  (2  Caines,  312)  260 

Seamen's  Hosp.  v.  Liverpool  (4  Exch. 

180)  405 

Sears  v.  Dennis  (105  Mass.  310)  1022 

V.  West  (1  Murph.  291)  356,  789 

Seattle  v.  Tyler  (Wash.  Ty.  1877)  54 

Second  Bank  v.  Danville  (60  Ind.  504)  146 
Secord  v.  Great  Western  Railway  Co. 

(15U.  C.  Q.  B.  631)  1042 

Secretary  v.   McGarrahan    (9   Wall. 

298)  826, 850,  872,  874 

Sedberry  v.  Commrs.  (66  N.  C.  486)    819, 

869,  871 

Sedgwick  Co.  v.  Bailey  (13  Kan.  600)  71, 

y.  Bailey  (11  Kan.  631)  86,214 

Seebold  t:  People  (86  III.  33)  115 

V.  Shitler  (34  Pa.  St.  133)       560,  647 

Seeley  v.  Pittsburgh  (82  Pa.  St.  360)    744. 

746,  757,  758,  759,  804,  805 

Seibricht  v.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An. 

491)  455,409 

Seiple  I'.   Elizabeth   City  (3  Dutch. 

407)  127, 243 

Selectmen  v.  Spaulding  (8  La.  An.  87)  789 
Sellick  i;.  South  Norwalk  (40  Conn. 

359)  229 


Sclma  I'.  Mullen  (46  Ala.  411)  2:4,  445 
Selma,  etc.  Co.  in  re  (45  Ala.  596)  181 
Selma  &  Gidf  Railroad  in  re  (46  Ala. 

230)  823,  827,  868 

Semmes  v.  Columbus  (19  Ga.  471)  470 
Serrot  v.  Omaha  (1  Dillon,  C.  C.  R. 

312)  1047.  1048,  1052 

Serrill  r.  Philadelphia  (38  Pa.  St.  355)  793 

Sessions  v.  Newport  (23  Vt.  9)  1034 

Severin  v.  Eddy  (52  111.  189)      1058,  1061 

Severy  v.  Railroad  Co.  (51  Cal.  194)     660 

Sewall  V.  Cohoes  (75  N.  Y.  45)  1026 

V.  St.  Paul  (20  Minn.  511)      753,  762, 

767,  800,  971,  974,  980 

Seward  v.  Milford  (21  Wis.  485)         1026. 

1039,  1040 

Sexton  V.  Beach  (50  Mo.  488)        475,  477 

V.  St.  Joseph  (60  Mo.  153)     292,  456, 

474,  475,  477,  986 

Seybell  v.  Nat.  Bank  (54  N.  Y.  288)      553 

Seybert  v.  Pittsburg  (1  Wall.  272)       154, 

155,  189,  482,  501 

Shackford  v.  Newington  (46  N.   H. 

415)  178 

Shafer  v.  Mumma  (17  Md.  331)    235,  236. 

369,  381,  398,  406,  418,  419 

Shaffuer  v.  St.  Louis  (31  Mo.  264)       596, 

597,  598,  608 

Shallcross  r.  Jeffersonville   (27  Ind. 

193)  143 

Shannon  v.  O'Bovle  (51  Ind.  565)  470,  570 

V.  Portsmouth  (54  N.  H.  483)         272 

Shapleigh  v.  Pillsbury  (1  Me.  271)       645 

Sharon  Iron  Co.  v.  Erie  (41  Pa.  St. 

341)  571 

Sharp  V.  Dunoven  (17  B.  Mon.  223)     790 

Siiarp  In  re  (56  N.  Y.  257)  797,  798 

v.  Johnson  (4  Hill,  92)     598,  763,  813 

v.  Spier  (4  Hill,  76)  598,  763,775,  813 

Sharpe  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  W.  Co. 

(49  Ind.  296)  662 

Sharpless  v.  Mayor  (21  Pa.  St.  147)    179, 
183.  188,491,728,  791 
1-.  West  Chester  (1  Grant  (Pa.), 

257)  614 

Sharrett's  Road  (8  Pa.  St.  89)  677 

Shartle  v.  Minneapolis  (17  Minn.  308)  040, 

1037,  1041 

Shattuck  V.  Woods  (1  Pick.  175)  257 

Shaver  v.  Starrett  (4  Ohio  St.  494)       612 

Shaw  V.  Charlestown  (3  Allen,  538)     608 

V.  Crocker  (42  Cal.  435)  1001 

V.  Dennis  (10  111.  405)  180,  729 

V.  Hill  (67  111.  455)  236 

V.  Kennedy  (Term  R.  158)  352 

r.  Mayor  ( 19  Ga.  468)     258,  924,  926 

V.  Mayor  (21  Ga.  280)  258 

V.  Norwalk,  etc.  (5  Gray,  180)        541 

r.  Pickett  (26  Vt.  486)  810 

i:  Thompson  (L.  R.  3  Ch.  233)      225 

Shawbut  V.  Railroad  Co.  (21   Minn. 

502)  656,  658,  600 

Shawnee  Co.  v.  Carter  (2  Kan.  115)     403 

Shawneetown  v.  Mason  (82  111.  337)    999, 

1008,  1069,  1071 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Shea  V.  Lowell  (8  Allen,  136)  1020 

V.  Hiiilroiid  Co.  (44  (^al.  414)  712 

Sheafe  r.  IVople  (87  111.  18'))  C;J1 

Shearman  r.  Carr  (8  U.  I.  431)  911 

Sheehan  r.  Gleason  (4(5  Mo.  100)  123 

r.  Good  Samaritan  Hospital  (60 

Mo.  155)  775,  776 

Sheel  V.  Appleton  (3  N.  W.  R.  26)        937 
Sheffield  v.  Andress  (50  Ind.  157)  31,  14(5, 

482 

V.  Watson  (2  Caines,  60)  2(i3 

Sheldon  v.  Kalamazoo  (24  Mich.  383)  !)74, 

980 
I'.  School  District  (25  Conn.  224)  li:l, 

919 
Shelby   County   v.   Railroad   Co.   (5 

Bush,  225)  101,  720 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Bush,  300)  95,  530, 

633 

I'.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Bush.  209)         826 

Shelton  i\  Mobile  (30  Ala.  514)    388,  301, 

414,  670 
Shepherd  v.  Clielsea  (4  Allen,  113)     1022 
V.  Municipality  (6  Rob.  La.  An, 

349)  130 

Shepardson  v.  Colerain  (13  Met.  55)  1024, 

102.^,  10:?4 

Sheridan  v.  Colvin  (78  111.  237)     121,  230 

136, 
137 


Sherlock  r.  Baiubridge  (41  Ind.  35) 


>37) 
Ind. 


V.  Winnetka  (69  111.  389)  902,  911,  917 

I'.  AVinnetka  (68  111.  530)         488,  764 

Sherman  v.  Carr  (8  R.  I.  431)  174 

V.  Granada  (51  Miss.  186)       951,  973 

V.  Kortright  (52  Barb.  267)  1028 

V.  McKeon  (38  N.  Y.  266)  632,662,  603 

Sherbourne  v.  Yuba  Co.  (21  Cal.  113)  961, 

962,  963,  983 

Sherrard  v.  Lafayette  Co.  (3  Dill.  C. 

C.  R.  236)  5.37 

Sherwin  v.  Bugbee  (16  Vt.  439)   110,  111, 

120,  287,  288 

V.  Bugbee  (17  Vt.  337)  28(3 

Sherwood  v.  Hamilton  (37  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  410)       1018,  1023,  1035,  1049 
Shillito  V.  Thonipson  (L.  R.  1  Q.  B. 

112)  392 1 

Shinbone  n.  Randolphe  Co.  (56  Ala.  ' 

183)  840 

Shinkle  v.  Covington  (1  Bush,  617)       141 

Shipley  i'.  Associates  (101  Mass.  261)  1021 

V.   Fifty  Associates    (100    Mass. 

194)  1032,  1061  i 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (34  Md.  336)  621  ^ 

Shipman  v.  State  (43  Wis.  381)  452  : 

Shirk  V.  Pulaski  (4  Dill.  209)  165, 480,  485, 

486,  600  j 
Shirley  v.  Lunenburg  (11  Mass.  379)  430  ( 
Shoalwater  v.  Armstrong  (9  Humph. 

217)  769 

Shoemaker  v.  Commissioners  (36  Ind.         j 
175)  942,  945 

V.  Goshen  (14  Ohio  St.  587)   544,  548 
Shoolbred  v.  Charleston  (2  Bay  (S. 

C),  63)  824 


Short?.'.  New  Orleans  (4  La.  An.  281)  484 
Shorter!;.  Rome  (52  (ia.  621)  510 

Shotwell  V.  Mott  (2  Sand.  Cli.  46)  568 
Shrader  in  re  (33  Cal.  279)  172,  372 

Slirevei)ort  v.  Jones  (20  La.  An.  708)  731 
('.  Levy  (26  La.  An.  071)  397 

V.  Waljiole  (22  La.  An.  526)  670 

Shrewsbury  r.  Brown  (26  Vt.  197)  455 
Sbriver  v.  I'ittsburgh  (0(i  Pa.  St.  446)  788 
Sliuey  V.  U.  S.  (92  U.  S.  73)  l(i5 

Sibley  )'.  Mobile  (3  Woods,  535)  170 

Siebenliauer  in  re  (14  Nev.  365)  113 

Siebreclit  v.  New  Orleans  (12  La.  An. 

490)  436,  451 

Sights  !'.  Yarnalls   (12  Graft.  (Va.) 

292)  7(J6,  825 

Sikes  0.  Hatfield  (13  Gray,  347)    449,  401 

V.  Ransom  (0  Johns.  279)  818 

Sill  V.  Corning  (15  N.  Y.  297)  214,  340, 

431 
V.  Lansiniiburg  (16  Barb.  107)  570,670 
Silliman  v.  Wing  (7  Hill,  169)  941 

Silver  Lake  Bank  c.  North  (4  Johns. 

Ch.  373)  4.53 

Silverthorn  v.  Railroad  Co.  (33  N.  J. 

L.  372)  820 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (83  N.  J.  L.  173)    868 

Simar  v.  Canaday  (63  N.  Y.  298)  687 

Simmons  v.  Camden  (26  Ark.  276)      1000 

V.  Camden  (7  Ara.  Rep.  20)  1000 

V.  Cornell  (1  R.  I.  519)  670,  672 

I'.  Gardner  (0  R.  I.  255)  801 

V.  Muniford  (2  R.  I.  172)  602 

y.  Naliant  (3  Allen,  316)  216 

V.  Providence  ( 12  R.  I.  8)  1002 

i;.  State  (12  Mo.  208)  789 

Siniplot  V.  Dubuque  (49  Iowa,  630)     568, 

6()8,  674 

Simpson  r.  Savage  (1  Mo.  359)  113 

Sims  V.  Butler  Co.  (42  Ala.  110)  1009 

V.  Chattanooga  (1  Lea,  694)  G68,  609, 

670,  071,  674 

V.  Est.  Co.  (14  L.  T.N.  S.  56)        178 

Singleton  v.  Eastern,  etc.  Railway  Co. 

(7  C.  B.  N.  S.  287)  1023 

Si.xth  Ave.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Kerr  (72 

N.  Y.  330)  582 

0.  Kerr  (45  Barb.  63)  711 

Skeen  u.  Lynch  (1  Rob.  (Va.)  186)  637 
Skerritt's  Case  (2  Par.  (Pa.)  516)  226 

Skinkle  v.  Covington  (1  Bush,  617)      987 
Skinner  v.  Bridge  Co.  (29  Conn.  523)  1000 
(;.  Hutton  (33  Mo.  244)  670,  761 

Skinner's  Co.  v.  Irish  Soc.  (12  CI.  & 

F. 487)  900 

Slack  V.  Railroad  Co.  (13  B.  Mon.  1)  121, 

164, 179,  731 

V.  East  St.  Louis  (85  111,  377)        1000 

Slater  ik  Wood  (9  Bosw.  15)  235,  230 

Slatten  v.  Railroad  Co.  (29  Iowa,  148)  699, 

700,  700,  711 

Slattery  in  re  (3  Ark.  484)  418,  428 

Slaughters.  Commonwealth  (13Gratt. 

767)  356,  730,  740 

V.  People  (2  Doug.  334)  370 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CI 


Slaughter  House  Cases  (16  Wall.  36)  363, 

693 
Slee  V.  Bloom  (5  Johns.  Ch.  366)  245 

Sleeper  v.  Bullen  (6  Kan.  SOU)     474,  476, 

920 
V.  Sandowne  (52  N.  H.  244)  1040 

Sloan  V.  McConaliy  (4  Oliio,  157)  568 

t>.  State  (8  Blackford,  361)  76,  111 
Slusser  v.  Burlington  (42  Iowa,  378)  807 
Small  V.  Danville  (51  Me.  359)  89,  979 
Smalley  v.  Railway  Co.   (2  H.  &  N. 

158)  607 

Smead  v.  Railroad  Co.  (11  Ind.  104)    451, 

408 

Smelson  c.  State  (16  Ind.  29)  946 

Smeltzer  v.  Wliite  (92  U.  S.  390)  219 

Smith  In  re  (52  N.  Y.  526)  324,  779 

(Hempstead,  201)  367 

V.  Aberdeen  (25  Miss.  458)    610,  731, 

748 
V.  Adrian  (1  Mich.  495)  214 

V.  Albany  (61  N.  Y.  444)  271,  439 
i;.  Appleton  (19  Wis.  468)  94,  200 
V.  Bank  (17  Mich.  479)  940 

I'.  Barrett  (1  Sid.  162)  570 

V.  Cheshire  (13  Gray,  318)     120,  480, 

481 
V.  Cincinnati  (4  Ohio,  500)  1002 

V.  Clark  Co.  (54  Mo.  58)  510,  536,538 
V.  Commonwealtli  (41  Pa.  St.  335)  253 
V.  County  (54  Mo.  58)  553 

V.  County  (2  Par.  293)  255 

V.  County  Com.  (42  Me.  395)  311 

I'.  Cronkhite  (8  Ind.  134)  241 

V.  Darley  (2  H.  L.  Cases,  789)  284,  300 
t'.  Dedham  (8  Cush.  522j  1014 

V.  Donelly  (03  111.  464)  233 

V.  Fletcher  (3  Eng.  305)  1070 

I'.  Flora  1 04  111.  93)  629 

V.  Gates  (21  Pick.  55)  177 

)'.  Helmer  (7  Barb.  416)  68 

V.  Ht'uston  (6  Oliio,  101)  642,  645,  659 
V.  Iliintington  (3  N.  H.  76)  177 

V.  M'ltchinson  (8  Rich.  Law,  260)  943 
V.  K_Tiu)ciien  (7  How.  198)  114 

l:  Kinard  (2  Hill  (S.  C),  042)  641 
V.  Kno.xville  (3  Head,  245;  332 

V.  Law  (21  N.  Y.  296)  300,  301 

V.  Leavenworth  (15  Kan.  81)  lO'JO 
V.  Lock  (18  Mich.  56)  639 

V.  Lowell  (6  Allen,  39)  1051 

V.  Madison  (7  Ind.  86)  118,  357,  380 
V.  Majourick  (44  Ga.  163)  912 

V.  Marston  (5  Tex.  426)  733 

V.  Mayor  (66  N.  Y.  295)     1066,  1067, 
1068,  1077 
V.  Mayor  (23  Am.  Rep.  53)  1077 

V.  Mayor  dO  N.  Y.  -504)  467 

r.  Mayor  (21  How.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  1)    464 
V.  McCarthy  (56  Pa.  St.  359)    62,  63, 
213,  226,  323,  882 
V.  Metropolitan  Gas  Co.  ( 12  How. 

Pr.  187)  690 

V.  Milwaukee  (18  Wis.  63)   475,  767. 

1049,  1070 


Smith  V.  Moore  (1  C.  B.  438)  166 

V.  Morse  (2  Cal.  524)  93,  102, 124, 12tj, 

158 
V.  Newark  (32  N.  J.  Eq.  1)  896 

V.  Newbern  (70  N.  C.  14)         115,  386 
V.  Ncwburgh  (77  N.  Y.  130)  116,  443, 

461 
V.  New  Orleans  (23  La.  An.  5)  481 
V.  New  York  (66  N.  Y.  295)  1048 

V.  New  York  (37  N.  Y.  518)  228,  253, 

259 
I'.  Philadelphia  (81  Pa.  St.  38)      694, 

953 
V.  Philadelphia  (22  Am.  Rep.  731)  953 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (30  Ala.  050)  204 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (120  Mass.  490)  1041 
V.  Railroad    Co.    (21   Am.    Rep. 

538)  1041 

V.  Redfield  (27  Me.  145)  944 

V.  Rochester  (76  N.  Y.  506)   971,  972, 

982 
V.  Rome  (19  Ga.  89)  684,  687 

y.  Sac  County  (11  Wall.  139)         551 
V.  Sacramento  (13  Cal.  531)  472 

V.  San  Antonio  (17  Te.x.  643)         429 
V.  Sheely  (12  Wall.  35)  569 

V.  Smith  (3  Dessaus.  557)       194,  269 
V.  Smith  (1  Bailev,  70)  257 

V.  Smith  (2  Pick.' 621)  1023 

V.  St.  Joseph  (45  Mo.  449)  1037, 1039, 

1040 

u.  State  (19  Conn.  493)  247 

V.  State  (23  N.  J.  L.  712)  635,  636,  637, 

655,  657,  669 

V.  Turner  (7  How.  (U.  S.)  283)      733 

V.  Warden  (19  Pa.  St.  426)  587 

V.  Washington  (20  How.  135)  682,  684, 

997,  999,  1001,  1007 

V.  Wendell  (7  Cush.  498)    1024,  1025, 

1027,  1029,  1034 

Smith's  Case  (4  Mod.  53)  194,  199 

(12  Mod.  17)  194 

(Skin.  311)  194,  199 

(I  Show.  278)  194 

(8  St.  Tr.  1042)  199 

Smoot  V.  Hart  (33  Ala.  09)  131 

V.  Wetumpka  (24  Ala.  112)  109,719, 

720,  1037 

Snell  m  re  (30  U.  C.  Q.  B.  81)        344,  393 

Snook   V.  Brantford  (14  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

255)  1009 

Snow  V.  Adams  (I  Cush.  443)  1027 

V.  Housatonic    Railroad    Co.    (8 

Allen,  441 )  1051 

Snyder  i\  Lawrence  (8  Kan.  82)  360 

V.  Rockport  (6  Ind.  237)  138,  706,  995, 

999,  1004 

Society  v.  Austin  (46  Cal.  415)  907 

V.  Commonwealth  (52  Pa.  St.  125)  278 

V.  Detroit  (3  Mich.  172)  774 

V.  Musgrove  (44  Mi.ss.  820)  370 

V.  New  London  (29  Conn.  174)      179, 

516,  .525,  538,  548,  551 

V.  Pawlct  (4  Pet.  480)  01,  111 

V.  Van  Dyke  (2  Whart.  309)  277 


cu 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Society  v.  Young  (2  N.  H.  310)  204 

Solberg  v.  Decorali  (41  Iowa,  501)        668 
SoiiKTville  V.  Dickenuau  (127  Mass. 

272)  116,  615 

Sonoma,  etc.  v.  Fairbanks  (52  Cal.  196)  9(3 
Soner  r.  Henry  Countv  (20  Iowa,  2G4),  31 
«J58,  lOO'J,  1037,  1038 
Sorocco  V.  Geary  (3  Cal.  09)  954 

Soulard  v.  St.  Louis  (36  Mo.  540)  974 

boule  r.  Grand  Trunk  Eailway  Co. 

(21  U.  C.  C.  P.  308)      1027,  1028 
V.  New  York  Railroad  (24  Conn. 

575)  1043, 

Soutli  Bav,  etc.  Co.  v.  Gray  (30  Me. 

547)  245 

South  Bend  v.  Paxon  (65  Ind.  228)      1074 
Soutli  Ottawa  v.  Foster  (20  111.  296)    1009 
Southern,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v    Cole- 
man (94  U.  S.  181)  73 
Southern,  etc.  Co.  v.  Mobile  (49  Ala. 

404)  736 

Southgate  v.  Covington  (15  B.  Mon. 

491)  790 

Southampton  v.  Fowler  (52  N  .H.  225)  217 
South  Park  Commrs.  v.  Dunlevy  (91 

111.  49)  488 

South  worth  v.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Mich. 

287)  68 

South  Yarmouth,  etc.   Co.   v.  Great 

Northern,  etc.  Co.  (9  Exch. 

55)  218 

Soutter  V.  Madison  (15  Wis.  30)    93,  200, 
838,  839,  842,  866,  867,  872,  877 
Sower   V.    Philadelphia    (35   Pa.    St. 

231)  321,  600,  605,  607 

Spangler  v.  Jacoby  (14  111.  207)  304 

Sparhawk  v.  Salem  (1  Allen,  30)        1017, 
1018,  1024,  1025 
Sparr  v.  St.  Louis  (4  Mo.  App.  572)   1027 
Spaulding  v.  Andover  (54  N.  H.  38)  84,  85, 

88 

V.  Lowell  (23  Pick.  71)  36,  41,  42, 117, 

119,  120,  122,  451 

Speaker  v.  Glass  (3  P.  C.  App.  560)     271 

Spear  v.  Robinson  (29  Me.  531)     224,  288 

Specht  V.  Commonwealth  (8  Pa.  St. 

312)  397 

V.  Detroit  (20  Mich.  168)  597,  599 
Speed  I'.  Crawford  (3  Met.  (Ky.)  207)  81 
Speer  v.  School  Directors  (50  Pa.  St. 

150)  178 

Speir  V.  Blairsville  (50  Pa.  St.  150)      791 

Spencer  v.  People  (68  111.  510)  736 

V.  School  District  (15  Kan.  259)    915 

Sperry  v.  Horr  (32  Iowa,  184)  178 

Spiegel  V.  Gausberg  (44  Ind.  418)  665,  660 

Spitler  V.  Young  (63  Mo.  42)         352,  355 

Spokes  V.  Banbury  (L.  R.  1  Eq.  42)      381 

Spooner  v.  Holmes  (102  Mass.  503)      652 

Sprague  v.  Coenen  (30  Wis.  309)  814 

V.  Norway  (31  Cal.  173)  226 

V.  Worcester  (13  Gray,  193)  995, 1066, 

1078 
Sprawl  V.  Laurence  (33  Ala.  674)  241 
Spray  v.  Thompson  (9  Iowa,  40)     604,  605 


Springer  v.  Bowdoinham  (7  Me.  442)  102", 

1052 

V.  Clay  Co.  (35  Iowa,  243)  219 

Springfield  v.  Doyle  (76  III.  202)         1048 

V.  Edwards  (84  III.  626)  163,  912 

V.  Edwards  (84  III.  77)  158 

V.  Edwards  (84  111.  266)  911 

v.  Hampden  (10  Pick.  (Mass.)  59)  862 

V.  Harris  (107  Mass.  532)        446,  454 

V.  Le  Claire  (49  111.  470)     1049,  1052, 

1053,  1054,  1056,  10.:.8 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (4  Cush.  63)  696,  702 

V.  Sclunook  (68  Mo.  394)  620 

Stack  V.  East  St.  Louis  (85  111.  377)    653, 

1065,  1066,  1068 

V.  Portsmouth  (52  N.  H.  221)      1018, 

1029,  1047 

Stackpole  ;;.  Healy  (16  Mass.  33)  686 

Stadler  v.  Detroit  (13  Mich.  346)  235,  273. 

276 

Stafford  in  re  (1  O'M.  &  H.  234)  226 

V.  Albany  (7  Johns.  541)  603 

V.  Hamston  (2  B.  &  B.  691)  748 

y.  Providence  (10  R.  I.  567)  618 

Staffordshire,  etc.  v.  Proprietors     (1 

E.  &  I.  App.  254)  670 

Staniland  v.  Hopkins  (9  M.  &  W.  178)  249, 

251 
Stainton  v.  Metropolitan  Board,  etc. 

(23  Beav.  225)  1075 

V.  Metropolitan  Board,  etc.  (3  Jur. 

N.  S.  2.57)  1075 

Stanley  v.  Colt  (5  Wall.  119)  541 

V.  Davenport  (9  C.  L.J.  892)  709,  715, 

1027,  1043 

V.  Perry  (23  Grant.  507)  441 

Stanton  v.  Camp  (4  Barb.  274)  446 

V.  Springfield  (12  Allen,  506)       1013, 

1020,  1053 

Staples  V.   Canton   (69    Mo.   592)    1019, 

1038 
Starin  v.  Genoa  (23  N.  Y.  439)  179,  188, 
191,  501,  516,  523,  546,  547 
Stark  V.  Lancaster  (57  N.  H.  88)  1026 
Starkey  v.  Minneapolis  ( 19  Minn.  203)  444 
Starr  i'.  Burlington  (45  Iowa,  87)  768,800 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (24  N.  J.  L.  592)  681, 

715 
V.  Rochester  (6  Wend.  564)     431,  973 
State  V.  Addison  (2  South  Car.  499)      775 
V.  Allen  (21  Ind.  510)  250,  252 

r.  Ancker  (2  Rich.  245)  249 

V.  Armstrong  (3  Sneed,  634)  57 

V.  Atkinson  (24  Vt.  448)  561,643,655 
V.  Atlantic  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  99)    124, 
342,  599,  699,  749 
V.  Auditor  (36  Mo.  70)  823,  834 

V.  Axtell  (41  N.  J.  L.  117)  774 

V.  Bacon  (6  Neb.  286)  837 

V.  Bailey  (7  Iowa,  390)  818,  831,  854, 
856,  857,  862 
V.  Bank  (2  Houst.  (Del.)  99)  773 

V.  Barksdale  (5  Humph.  154)  930 

V.  Barlow  (48  Mo.  17)  464,  826 

V.  Bartlett  (35  Wis.  387)  1055 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


ClU 


state  V.  Bayonne   (35  N.  J.  L.  335)  321 

o2Z,  oUl 

V  Bell  (34  Ohio  St.  194)  123, 124,413 

V  Beloit  (20  Wis.  79)      572,  839,  842 

V  Bergen  (34  N.  J.  L.  439)  109 
":Berlen(33N.J.L.39)       322,324 

V  Bergen  (5  Dutcli.  (N.  J.)  26(j)  74o 
,;■  Bill  ( 13  Ired.  373)  923,  926,  928 
V.  Binder  (38  Mo.  451)  64, 115, 294,  330 
V.  Blanuhard  (6  La.  An.  515) 
V.  Blundell  (24  N.  J.  L.  402) 
V.  Board  (10  Iowa,  157) 
V.  Board  of  Education  (24  AVis. 


222 
732 
855 

826 
840 


827 


798 
894 
250 
379 
881 
720 


Bollinger  (48  Mo.  475) 
,  Bonner  (Busbee  (N.  C.)  Law, 

.  Bosi'awen  (32  N.  H.  331)    720,  930 
,  Bradbury  (40  Me.  154)      636,  640, 

641 
,  Bradford  (32  Vt.  50)  887 

.  Branin  (23  N.  J.  L.  485)  75, 76, 113, 
^  114,  769 

.  Brassfield  (67  Mo.  331)  541,  552 
.  Brown  (31  N.  J.  L.  355)  885 

.  Bryce  (7  Ohio,  414)    269,  270,  276, 

•^  277,278,883 

.  Buffixlo  (2  Hill,  434)    236,  402,  452 

.  Buffalo  Co.  (6  Neb.  454)  838 

Burbank  (22  La.  An.  318)  838, 844, 

859 

.  Burlington  (36  Vt.  521)     262,  931, 

1015 
.  Burlington  (45  Iowa,  87) 
'.  Burnett  (2  Ala.  140) 
>.  Butz  (9  So.  Car.  156) 
i.  Cadwalader  (36  N.  J.  L.  283) 
>.  Camden  (35  N.  J.  L.  217) 
^  Campton  (2  N.  H.  513) 
..  Canterbury  (28  N.  H.  195)  62,  209, 

720 
;.  Carroll  (12  Am.  Law  Reg.  165)  884 
K  Carroll  (38  Conn.  448)  259,  884 
;.  Carver  (5  Strob.  217)  640,  641 

;.  Cassidy  (22  Minn.  312)  357,  738, 765 
'}.  Catlin  (3  Vt.  530)  629,  630, 635, 642 
i;.  Cavanac  (30  La.  An.  237)  826 

<}.  Chamberlain  (37  N.  J.  L.  388)  414, 

665 
i;.  Chamber   of  Commerce    (20 

Wis.  63)  269,  270,  271 

!>.  Charles  (16  Minn.  474)  370 

V.  Charleston  (12  Rich.  L.  702)  610 
y.  Charleston  ( 1  Const.  R.  36)  879, 888 
y.  Choate  (11  Ohio,  511)  883 

V.  Cincinnati  (20  Ohio  St.  18)  66,  67 
V.  Cincinnati  (19  Ohio,  178)  819 

V.  Cincinnati  Gas   Co.   (18  Ohio 

St.  262)  77, 1-26,  326, 655,  667, 690, 
693,  879,  887,  892,  893 
V.  City  Clerk  (7  Ohio  St.  355)        327 
V.  City  Council  (2  Speers  (Law), 

623)  788 

V.  City  Council  (1  Mill,  Ch.  40)  771 
V.  City  Council  (4  llich.  L.  286)     133  | 


State  V.  City  Council  (5  Rich.  L.  561)  771, 

787 
V.  City  Council  (10  Rich.  L.  240)  735, 

771 
V.  City  Council  (4  Strob.  L.  217)  771 
V.  Clark  (28  N.  H.  170)  322,  329,  364, 

398 
V.  Clarke  (54  Mo.  17)     115,  339,  381, 

414 
V.  Clarke  (1  Dutch.  54)  114,  115,  368 
V.  Clay  County  (46  Mo.  231)  840,  841 
V.  Clegg  (27  Conn.  593)  431 

V.  Cleveland  (3  Rh.  Is.  117)  345 

V.  Clerk  (1  Dutch.  354)  229 

V.  Clunet  (19  Md.  351)  603 

V.  CockreU  (2  Hich.  L.  6)       232,  604, 
926,  928 
V.  Comm'rs  (5  Ohio  St.  497)  857,  915 
V.  Comm'rs  (6  Ohio  St.  280)  845 

V.  Comm'rs  (18  Ohio  St.  386)  826 

V.  Commissioners,  etc.  (23  N.  J. 

L.  510)  657 

V.  Commissioners,  etc.  (23  Kan. 

456)  365 

V.  Commissioners  (1  Const.  R.  55)  879, 

928 
V.  Commissioners  (41  N.  J.  L.  83)  801 
V.  Commissioners  (2  N.  Car.  Law 

617) 
V.  Commissioners  (Walk.  368) 
V.  Commissioners  (2  Dev.  345) 


262 
262 
262, 
931 


424 
63,  349 

778 
1018 


!;.  Common  Council  (9  Wis.  254)  275, 
276,  836 
V.  Conlin  (27  Vt.  318) 
V.  Cooke  (24  Minn.  247) 
V.  Copeland  (3  R.  I.  33) 
V.  Cornvil  (43  Me.  427) 
V.  County  Auditor  (19  Ohio,  116)  840 
V.  County  Court  (50  Mo.  317)  68 

17.  County  Court,  etc.  (48  Mo.  339)  536 
V.  County  Judge  (2  Iowa,  280)  71,  857 
V.  County  Judge  (7  Iowa,  186)  831, 
856,  857,  872 
V.  County  Judge  (5  Iowa,  380)  8-39, 
840,  841 
V.  County  Judge  (12  Iowa,  237)   862, 

870 
V.  Cowen  (29  Mo.  330)   367,  370,  397, 

398 
V.  Crawford  (36  N.  J.  L.  394) 
V.  Crowell  (4  Halst.  390) 
V.  Crummev  (17  Minn.  72) 
V.  Curran  ('12  Ark.  321) 
V.  Custer  (11  Ind.  210)  818,  819,  820 
V.  Cymis  (26  Ohio  St.  400)  358 

V.  Davenport  (12  Iowa  335)  839,  841, 
844,  845 
V.  Dawson  (3  Hill  (S.  C),  100)      585 
V.  Dean  (23  N.  J.  L.  335)  747 

j;.  De  Bar  (58  Mo.  .395)  115,381 

V.  De  Casinova  (1  Tex.  401)  224 

V.  Delesdenier  (7  Tex.  76)  42 

V.  Deliesseline  (1  McCord,  52)      232. 
282,  296,  834,  881 


767 

879 

.369 

62 


CIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


State 


V.  Dews  (R.  M.  Charlt.  397)         83 

,  Diijbv  (5  IJIai-kford,  543)  621 

,  Directors  (5  Oliio  St.  234)  407 

,  Doiltie  Co.  (8  Neb.  129)      737,  748 

,  Don-il.av  (30  N.  J.  L.  404)  286,  !)2() 

.  Douglass  (20  Wis.  428)  253 

,  Douglass  (33  N.  J.  L.  363)  115 

,  Douglass  (50  Mo.  593)  884 

.  Dousman  (28  Wis.  541)  65 

.  Dowling  (50  Mo.  134)  787,  911,  024 

.  Dahuciet  (24  La.  An.  16)    827,  859 

Dunn  (1  Minor  (Ala.),  46)  834 

,  Dunnington  (12  Md.  340)  265 

.  Eastabrooke  (6  Ala.  653)  363 

I<:ast  Orange  (41  N.  J.  L.  127)    334 

Elizabetii  (31  N.  J.  L.  547)         801 

Elizabetii  (32  N.  J.  L.  357)  599,800 

,  Elizabetii  (40  N.  J.  L.  274)         804 

,  Elizabeth  (37  N.  J.  L.  432)         322 

Elizabetii  (30  N.  J.  L.  365)  794,801 

,  Elizabeth  (30  N.  J.  L.  176)         797 

,  Elkinton  (30  N.  J.  L.  335)  806,  869, 

872 
,  Elvins  (32  N.  J.  L.  362) 
,  Elwood  (11  Wis.  17) 
.  Fagan  (42  Conn.  32) 
,  Fai"rcliild  (22  Wis.  110) 
,  Falconer  (44  Ala.  696) 
.  Fenley  (18  Mo.  445) 
.  Ferguson  (33  N.  H.  424) 


71 
862 
246 
800 
833 
481 
328,  329, 
364 

V.  Ferguson  (31  N.  J.  L.  107)  249,  251, 
f.  Findley  (lOOhio,  51)  241 

V.  Fisher  (52  Mo.  174)  337 

V.  Fitzgerald  (44  Mo.  425)     228,  229, 
231,  432,  881 
V.  Flanders  (24  La.  An.  57)  86 

V.  Foley  (31  Iowa,  527)  712,  713 

v.  Foster  (2  Halst.  101)  303 

V.  Freeholders  (23  N.  J.  L.  214)     828 
V.  Freeman  (38  N.  H.  426)     329,  331, 
364,  380,  398 
V.  Frost  (4  Harring.  558)  224 

V.  Fuller  (34  N.  J.  L.  227)         75,  747 
V.  Fullerton  (7  Rob.  (La.)  210)      733 
V.  Funk  (17  Iowa,  365)    229,  231 
?'.  Gaffney  (34  N.  J.  L.  133) 
V.  Oarlock  (14  Iowa,  444) 
V.  Garroute  (67  Mo.  445) 
V.  Gastinel  (20  La.  An.  114) 
V.  Gates  (67  Mo.  139) 
V.  Gates  (22  Wis.  210)  866, 

V.  Georgia  Medical  Soc.  (38  Ga. 

608)  266, 269 

V.  Giles  (1  Chand.  112)  224 

r.  Gilmanton  (14N.  H.  467)  209 

V.  Glasgow  (N.  Car.  C.  R.  186)      262 
V.  Glennon  (3  R.  I.  276) 
V.  Gordon  (60  Mo.  383) 
V.  Gorham  (37  Me.  451)         719, 1064 
V.  Gorham  (34  N.  J.  L.  177)  115 

V.  Governor  (1  Dutch.  331)    229,  827 
V.  Governor,  etc.  (5  Ohio  St.  528)  826, 

827 
V.  Graham  (13  Kan.  136)  883 


432 
771 
303 
535 

224 
262 

872 


35 
370 


State  I'.  Graham  (24  La.  An.  420) 
i;.  Graves  (19  Md.  351)   125,  327 

002,  603,  014,  819, 
r.  Great  Works  Milling  Co.  (20 

Me.  41) 
V.  Green  Co.  (54  Mo.  540) 
V.  Gregg  (2  Hill  (S.  C),  388) 
V.  Grittey  (5  Neb.  161) 
V.  Gummersall  (24  N.  J.  L.  529) 
V.  Guscino  (3  llalst.  136) 
V.  Guttenberg  (38  N.  J.  L.  419) 

743,  763,  821,  838,  839, 

V.  Gutierrez  ( 15  La.  An.  190)  418 

428, 

V.  Habcn  (22  Wis.  060) 

V.  Halifax  (4  Dev.  Law  (N.  C), 

345) 
V.  Hamilton  (6  Ind.  310) 
V.  Hammonton  (38  N.  J.  L.  430) 
V.  Hand  (31  N.  J.  L.  547) 
V.  Hardie  (1  Ired.  42) 
V.  Hardv  (7  Neb.  377) 
V.  Harper  (58  Mo.  531) 
V.  Harper  (6  Ohio  St.  707) 
V.  Harris  (10  Iowa,  441) 
V.  Hartshorn  (17  Ohio,  135) 
V.  Haskell  (20  Iowa,  276) 
V.  Hastings  (10  Wis.  518) 
V.  Hauss  (43  Ind.  105) 
u.  Hauscr  (63  Ind.  155)  123, 

V.  Hay  (29  Me.  457) 
V.  HeltVid  (2  N.  &  McC.  233) 
V.  Helmes  (Penn.  (N.J.)  1050) 
V.  Herod  (29  Iowa,  123)  359,  711, 

V.  Hewett  (31  Me.  396) 
V.  Highland  (25  Minn.  355) 
V.  Hill  (10  Ind.  219) 
V.  Hoboken  (30  N.  J.  L.  225)  677 
V.  Hoboken  (35  N.  J.  L.  205)  696 
V.  Hoboken  (36  N.  J.  L.  291) 
V.  Hoboken  (38  N.  J.  L.  110)  324 
V.  Hoboken  (33  N.  J.  L.  280)  357 
r.  Hoy t  (2  Greg.  246)  252 

V.  Hudson  (32  N.  J.  L.  365)     924 
j;.  Hudson  (3  Dutch.  214) 
V.  Hudson  (5  Dutch.  104)  110, 


,  443 

799 
V.  Hudson  (5  Dutch.  475)  305,  341 

V.  Hudson  (35  N.  J.  L.  269) 
V.  Hud.son  (34  N.J.  L.  531) 
V.  Hudson  Co.  (30  N.  J.  L.  137) 

932 
V.  Hug  (44  Mo.  116)        601,  608 
V.  Huggins  (47  Ind.  586) 
V.  Huggins  (Har.  Law,  94)     232, 

V.  Hull  (32  N.  J.  158) 
V.  Hundehausen  (20  Wis.  432) 
V.  Inhabitants  {?A\  N.  J.  L.  83) 
V.  Jackson  (8  Mich.  110) 
V.  Jacobs  (17  Ohio,  143)  217,247, 
892, 
17.  Jenkins  (46  Wis.  616) 


827 
601, 
855 

931 
536 
641 
227 
893 
867 
190, 
843 
424. 
430 
854 

762 
918 
174 
797 
881 
338 
370 
263 
363 
217 
441 
862 
251 
263 
380 
417 
109 
712, 
785 

1042 
549 
625 

,711 
702 
747 
341 
766 

,303 
926 
597 

,743, 

,  804 
599, 
800 
869 
798 
930. 

,  962 

,  842 
665 
282, 
296 
380 
76 
709 
421 
293, 
893 
894 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cv 


State  V.  Jennings  (27  Ark.  419)         59,  75 

V.  Jersey  City  (24  N.  J.  L.  662)    59n, 

743,  707,  801 

V.  Jersey  City  (1  Dutch.  309)  123, 124, 

259,  300,  302,  597,  767,  801 

V.  Jersey  City  ( 1  Dutch.  530)  136, 210, 

268,  269,  270,  271,  272,  278. 

830 

V.  Jersey  City  (2  Dutcli.  444)  124, 234, 

324,  394,  597,  014,  677,  763,  800, 

801,  802 

V.  Jersey  City  (3  Dutch.  493)  296, 321, 

322,  331,  802 

V.  Jersey  City  (3  Dutch.  530)  303,  800 

V.  Jersey  City  (5  Dutch.  441)  802,804, 

896 

V.  Jersey  City  (5  Dutch.  170)  114, 115, 

375,  706,  711 

V.  Jersey  City  (30  N.  J.  L.  93)      290, 

310,  341 

y.  Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  32)       115, 

138,  323,  678,  801 


1-.  Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  277) 

V.  Jersey  City  (34  N.  J.  L.  390) 
V.  Jersey  City  (35  N.  J.  L.  404) 

V.  Jersey  City  (37  N.  J.  L.  318) 
V.  Jersey  City  (38  N.J  L.  259) 
V.  Jersey  City  (40  N.  J.  L.  483) 

V.  Jersey  City  (41  N.  J.  L.  489) 
V.  Jersey  City  (30  N.  J.  L.  521) 
V.  Jersey  City  (30  N.  J.  L.  148) 


683, 
780 
134 

289, 
800 
678 
858 

635, 
743 
804 
896 

322, 
802 
640 
68 
454 
228,  432 
225 
868 
676 


Johnson  (11  Ired.  Law,  647) 
Johnson  (1  Kan.  178) 
Johnson  (52  Ind.  197) 
Jolinson  (17  Ark.  407) 
Jones  (19  Ind.  356) 
Jones  (10  Iowa,  65) 
Jones  (18  Tex.  874) 
Jones  (llred.  (N.  C.)  129)  822,  801, 

809 

Judge,  etc.  (13  Ala.  805)  832 

Judge,  etc.  (21  La.  An.  741)       872 

Justices  (4  Hawks,  194)  202 

Kaufman  (51  Iowa,  578)  420 

K.  C.  etc.  Co.  (45  Iowa,  139)      637 

Kelly  (34  N.  J.  L.  75)  113 

Keokuk  (9  Iowa,  438)  600,601,608, 

824 

,  Keokuk  (18  Iowa,  388)  862 

,  Kirk  (44  Ind.  401)  235 

Kirk  (15  Am.  Hep.  239)  235 

Kirklcy  (29  Md.  85)     325,  818,  819 

Kirkwood  (14  Iowa,  162)  827 

Kispert  (21  Wis.  387)  871 

,  Kline  (23  Ark.  587)  225 

,  Krollman  (38  X.  J.  L.  323)  774 

.  Lancaster  Bank  (8  Neh.  218)      937 

,  Lafferty  (5  Harring.  491)  409 

.  Laverack  (34  N.  J.  L.  201)  387,  650 

.  Lean  (9  Wis.  279)  860 

.  Ledford  (3  Mo.  102)  368 


State  V.  Leffingwell(54  Mo.  458)  27,  31,33, 
09,  591,  742,  746,  780 
V.  Lehre  (7  Kich.  (S.C.)  322)  858,885 
V.  Leovy  (21  La.  An.  538)  83 

V.  Lewenthall  (55  Miss.  589)  262 

V.  Lieber  (11  Iowa,  407)  385 

V.  Lingo  (26  Mo.  496)      209,  270,  271 
v.  Linn  Co.,  etc.  (44  Mo.  50)  534 

i:  Lockwood  (43  Wis.  403)  420 

y.  Loomis  (5  Oliio,  358)  832 

V.  Ludwig  (21  Minn.  202)  370 

V.  Lyon  (32  N.  J.  L.  300)  774 

V.  Lyons  (31  Iowa,  432)  888 

V.  Macon  Co.  (41  Mo.  453)  536 

V.  Macon  Co.  (68  Mo.  29)        840,  843 
V.  Madison  (7  Wis.  688)  145, 146,479, 

557,  550 
V.  Malov  (20  Kan.  019)  66 

V.  Mansfiehl  (41  Mo.  470)  420 

V.  Marble  (4  Ired.  Law,  318)  630 

V.  Marion  Co.  (21  Kan.  419)  116,  443, 

912 
V.  Marlow  (15  Ohio  St.  114)  229,  232, 

432,  882 
V.  Marston  (0  Kan.  524)  831,  883 

V.  Mavberr}^  (3  Strob.  144)  261 

V.  Maynard  (14  III.  419)  235,  ill,  418, 

419 
V.  Mayor  (30  La.  An.  pt.  I.  705)  842 
V.  Mayor  111  Humph.  217)  103,  262, 
930.  1037 
V.  Mayor  (R.  M.  Cliarlt.  250)  76,  83 
v.  Mayor  (5  Port.  (Ala.)  279)  117 
V.  Mayor  (23  La.  An.  358)  158 

V.  Mayor   4  Neb.  260)  251 

V.  Mayor  (24  Ala.  701)  76,  HI 

V.  Mayor  (37  Mo.  270)  64 

V.  Mayor,   etc.    (14    llich.   Law, 

480)  417 

V.  Mayor  (29  Md.  85)      441,  442,  970, 

973 
V.  McArthur  (13  Wis.  383)  431 

V.  McCriUus  (4  Kan.  250)  821 

v.  McDowell  (Dudley,  346)  381 

V.  McGarry  (21  Wis."  496)  270 

V.  McKilden  (8  Rep.  778)  280 

V.  McLaughlin  (15  Kan.  228)  921 

V.  McReynolds  (61  Mo.  203)    58,  213, 

793,  890 
V.  Merrill  (37  Me.  229)  396,  398 

V.  Merry  (3  Mo.  278)  11'2 

V.  Miller  (07  Mo.  604)  90 

V.  Mills  (34  N.  J.  L.  177)  115 

V.  Milwaukee  (20  Wis.  87)    672,  838, 
839,  842,  845 
V.  Milwaukee  (25  Wis.  122)      93,  838 
V.  Milwaukee  (22  Wis.  397)  861,  862, 

866 
V.  Milwaukee  Gas,  etc.  Co.   (29 

Wis.  454)  77,  691 

V.  Mitchell  (2  Const.  Rep.  (S.  C.) 

703)  822,  824 

V.  Mobile  (24  Ala.  701)  112 

V.  Mobile  (5  Port.  (Ala.)  279)  387, 643, 

656,  657 


CVl 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


State  I'.  Morris  Common  Pleas  (12  Am. 

L.  U.  8-')  G3 

V.  Morristowu  (33  N.  J.  L.  57)      114, 

329,  G7G,  (i78 

V.  Moss  (2  Jones  (Law),  GO)  428 

V.  MouUrieville  (Uice  Law,  158)  347, 

348 
V.  Mount  (20  La.  An.  352)  840 

V.  Newark  ( 1  Dutcli.  309,  25  N.  J. 

L.  290,  341,  801,  89(i,  924,  925 
V.  Newark  (2t)  N.  J.  L.  515)  729,  774 
i;.  Newark  (3  Dutch.  185,  27  N.  J. 

L.)     105,  234,  341,  747,  752,  777, 
767 
V.  Newark  (4  Dutch.  491,  28  N.  J. 


L.) 

Newark  (30  N.  J.  L.  303) 
,  Newark  (34  N.  J.  L.  236) 


127 

341 

71,  412, 

808,  809 

800,  804 

797 


Ocean  (39  N.  J.  L.  75) 
Orange  (31  N.  J.  L.  131) 
Oran.ge  (32  N.  J.  L.  50) 
Osawkce  (14  Kan.  418) 
Palmer  (4  N.  W.  Rep.  966) 
Parker  (25  Minn.  215) 
Parker  (26  Vt.  362) 
,  Parker  (32  N.  J.  L.  426) 
Parsons  (40  N.  J.  L.  1) 
,  Passaic  (27  N.  J.  L.  217) 
.  Passaic  (37  N.  J.  L.  65) 
,  Passaic  (41  N.  J.  L.  90) 


State  V.  Pen.ler  (66  N.  C.  313)  419 

i;.  Perkins  (24  N.  J.  L.  409)  242,  419 
I'.  Perth  Aniboy  (5  Dutch.  259)  599, 
800,  802 
V.  Perth  Amboy  (38  N.J.  L.  425)  767 
V.  Pettis  (7  Rich.  (S.  C)  390)       668, 


Newark  (35  N.  J.  L.  171) 
,  Newark  (36  N.  J.  L.  168) 
.  Newark  (36  N.  J.  L.  478)   751,  776, 

777 
.  Newark  (37  N.  J.  L.  415)  453,  743, 
747,  760,  797,  804,  805 
.  Newark  (38  N.  J.  L.  264)  383 

.  Newark  (40  N.  J.  L.  297)  868 

.  Newark  (40  N.  J.  L.  550)  66 

.  New  Boston  (11  N.H.  413)         641 
.  New  Brunswick  (30  N.  J.  L. 

395)  123,  677,  749,  779 

.  New  Brunswick  (32  N.  J.  L. 

548)  665 

.  New  Orleans  (30  La.  An.  129)  841, 

848 
I.  New  Orleans  (30  La.  An.  82)  841 
r.  New  Orleans  (20  La.  An.  172)  473 
i.  North  (42  Conn.  79)  886 

..  North  (27  Mo.  464)  734,  735 

r.  Norwood  (12  Md.  177)  243 

^  Noyes  (30  N.  H.  292)       16,  19,  63, 
^  731 

881 
828 
599,  797 
186 
111 
885 
778 
773 
68,  893 
677 
743 
116,  443, 
799 

Paterson  (40  N.  J.  L.  186)  472 

Paterson  (40  N.  J.  L.  244)  802 

Paterson  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  158)        t)90 
Paterson  (34  N.  J.  L.  163)  124, 127, 
323 
Paterson  (35  N.  J.  L.  190)  234 

Paterson  (36  N.  J.  L.  159)  599,  801, 
802 
Paterson  (37  N.  J.  L.  380)  747 

Paterson  (38  N.  J.  L.  190)  836 


671 

484 
735 
837 


V.  Pillsbury  (30  La.  An.  705) 
V.  Pinckney  (10  Rich.  L.  474) 
V.  Pilot  (21  La.  An.  336) 
V.  Plainfield  (38  N.  J.  L.  95)  412,  599, 
767,  801,  808 
V.  Phmkett  (3  Harr.  (N.  J.)  5)  363,  368 
V.  Police  Jury  (22  La.  An.  611)  828 
V.  Pollard  (6  R.  I.  290)  368 

V.  Portage  (12  Wis.  562)  610,  740,  749, 
777,  796 
I'.  Porter  (7  Ind.  204)  241 

V.  Powell  (67  Mo.  395)  262 

V.  Pritchard  (36  N.  J.  L.  101)  879 
V.  Putnam  County  (19  Ohio,  415)  842 
V.  Rahway  (33  N.  J.  L.  110)  231,  252, 
830,  831,  832,  833,  856,  858,  860 
V.  Rahway  (39  N.  J.  L.  646)  743 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (27  Vt.  103)  930 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (23  N.  J.  L.  360)  655, 
656,  657,  930 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (29  Conn.  538)  856 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Wis.  579)  879 
V.  Railroad  Co.  ( 12  Gill  &  J.  399)  80 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (3  How.  534)  80,  353, 

676 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (9  Nev.  79)  782 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (10  Nev.  47)  734,  782 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (28  N.  J.  L.  421)  788 
V.  Ramos  (10  La.  An.  420)  270,  833 
I'.  Ramsey  (8  Neb.  286)  858 

V.  Rnymond  (27  N.  II.  388)  930 

V.  Rich  (7  Rich.  (S.  C.)  390)  673 

V.  Richland  (20  Ohio  St.  362)  178, 179 
r.  Richmond  (1  R.  I.  49)  641 

r.  Ricker  (32N.  H.  179)  430 

V.  lliordan  (24  Wis.  484)  65 

V.  Roberts  (68  Mo.  234)  243 

V.  Roberts  (11  G.  &.  J.  506)  356,  357, 

764 
V.  Robinson  (1  Kan.  188)  826 

V.  RoUe  (30  La.  An.  99)  789 

V.  Ruff  (30  La.  An.  497)  354 

r.  Rush  (7  Ind.  221)  261 

V.  Saline  County  (51  Mo.  350)       905, 
911,  922 
V.  Saline  County  (45  Uo.  242)       546, 
548,  858 
V.  Schnierle  (5  Rich.  Law,  299)     233, 

890 
u.  Schlier  (3Heisk.  281)  789 

I'.  School  District  (8  Neb.  92)  858 
V.  School  District  (29  Iowa,  264)  885 
V.  Scott  (17  Mo.  521)  62 

V.  Sellers  (7  Rich.  Law,  368)  261 

V.  Severance  (49  Mo.  401)  ^413 

V.  Severance  (55  Mo.  378)      114,  783, 
787,  812 
V.  Shelby ville  (4  Sneed,  176)  262,  931 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED, 


cvn 


State  V.  Sherman  (20  Mo.  2P>o)  363 

V.  Sherwood  (42  Mo.  179)  259 

V.  Shields  (8  Blackf.  151)  202 

V.  Smith  (22  Minn.  218)  300,  802,  324, 

831 
V.  Smith  (14  Wis.  497)  224 

V.  Soutlierii    Steamship   Co.    (13 

La.  An.  497)  811 

V.  Springfield  (6  Ind.  83)  106 

V.  State  Auditor  (34  Mo.  375)  823 
V.  State  Board  (13  Fla.  55)  230,  862 
V.  State  Canvassers  (3  Kan.  88)  859 
V.  Stearns  (31  N.  H.  106)  407,  421 
«.  Stephens  (4  Tex.  137)  729 

V.  Stewart  (5  Strobh.  L.  29)  604,  923, 

926 
V.  St.  Louis  Co.  Court  (34  Mo. 

546)  76,  82,  84,  168,  911,  963 

V.  St.  Louis  Co.  Court  (62  Mo. 

244)  611,  911 

V.  Stout  (7  Neb.  89)  937 

V.  Sullivan  Co.  (51  Mo.  531)  536 

V.  Supervisors  (16  Wis.  613)  828 

V.  Supervisors,  etc.  (22  Wis.  396)  871 
V.  Swearingen  (12  Ga.  23)  123,  224 
V.  Swift  (1  HiU  (S.  C),  360)  604,  924, 

926 
V.  Swisher  (17  Tex.  441)  778 

V.  Tappan  (29  Wis.  664)  96,  101,  178 
V.  Terrebonne  (30  La.  An.  287)  499 
V.  Thompson  (31  Ohio  St.  360)  890 
V.  Tiedeman  (69  Mo.  306)  572 

V.  Tolan  (33  N.  J.  L.  195)  831,  879, 
883,  890 
V.  Toomer  (7  Rich.  (Law),  216)  241 
V.  Town  Council  (8  Eich.  (S.  C.) 

214)  770 

V.  Town  Council  (12  Rich.  (S.  C.) 

Law,  3.39)  774 

V.  Town  Council  (-30  Ala.  66)  888 
I'.  Township  (28  Ind.  86)  262 

V.  Trask  (6  Vt.  3-35)  642 

V.  Trenton  (42  N.  J.  L.  74)  124 

f.  T'renton  (36  N.  J.  L.  198)  114 

V.  Trenton  (36  N.  J.  L.  499)  322,  801 
V.  Trenton  (36  N.  J.  L.  283)  373,  409 
I'.  Troth  (34  N.  J.  L.  379)  111 

V.  Trustees  (61  Mo.  155)  487,840,841, 

861 

V.  Trustees  (5  Ind.  77)     43,  193,  198, 

199,  269,  270,  276 

V.  Tryon  (39  Conn.  183)  371 

V.  Tupper  (Dudley  (S.  C)  Law, 

135)  706 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (1  N.  J.  9)  879 

V.  T'urnpike  Co.  (8  R.  I.  521)  892 

V.  Union  Townsliip  (8  Ohio,  94)  5.36 
V.  Union  (37  N.  J.  L.  84)  841 

V.  Union  (33  N.  J.  L.  3-50)  71,  412 
V.  University  (4  Humph.  157)  559 
V.  Valle  (41  Mo.  29)  82 

V.  Van  Buskirk  (40  N.  J.  L.  463)  241, 

325 
V.  Van  Home  (7  Ohio  St.  331)      544, 

6491 


State  V.  Van  Winkle  (1  Dutch.  73)       316 

V.  Volktnan  (2U  La.  An.  565)  740 

V.  Wakely  (2  N.  &McCord,  410)  604, 

605,  606,  928 

V.  Wapello    County    (13     Iowa, 

388)  165,  180 

V.  Warmouth  (22  La.  An.  1)  827 

V.  Warren,  etc.  Co.  (32  N.  J.  L. 

439)  821 

V.  Water  Commissioners  (30  N. 

J.  L.  247)  926 

V.  Weatlierly  (45  Mo.  17)  886 

V.  Welch  (36  Conn.  215)  332,  340,  397, 

398 
V.  Welch  (21  Minn.  22)  408 

V.  West  Hoboken   (37  N.   J.   L. 

177)  596 

V.  West  Orange  (40  N.  J.  L.  122)  747 
V.  Whittingham  (7  Vt.  390)  931 

V.  Wilcox  (42  Conn.  364)  63 

V.  Wilcox  (45  Mo.  458)  62 

V.  Wilkesville  (20  Ohio  St.  288)  305 
V.  Wilkinson  (2  Vt.480)  635,636,642, 

655 
V.  Williams  (25  Me.  564)  286,  308 
V.  Wilmington  (3  Harring.  294)  231, 
235,  294,  419,  826 
V.  Wilson  (42  Me.  9)  036,  640,641,  646 
I'.  Wilson  (17  Wis.  687)  842 

V.  Winkelmeier  (35  Mo.  103)  64 

V.  Wister  (62  Mo.  592)  370 

V.  Wood  County  (17  Ohio,  184)     819 
V.  Woodward  (23  Vt.  92)       559,  562, 
570,  634,  635,  643,  655 
V.  Woody  (17  Ga.  612)  899 

V.  Wrotnowski  (17  La.  An.  156)  827 
V.  Young  (3  Kan.  445)  54,  418,  430 
?;.  Young  (17  Kan.  414)  115,365 

v.  Zanesville,  etc.   Co.   (16  Ohio 

St.  308)  857 

V.  Zeigler  (32  N.  J.  L.  262)    345,  347, 
405,  419,  924 
State  Bank  i\  Brackenridge  (7  Blackf. 

395)  558,  787 

V.  Knoop  (16  How.  369)  76 

V.  Madison  (3  Ind.  43)  770,  787 

V.  Navigation  Co.  (3  La.  An.  294)     79 

State  Board  v.  Aberdeen   (56  Miss. 

518)  455,  458 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (47  Ind.  407)  453,  457 
State  Railroad  Tax  Cases  (92  U.  S. 

575)  907,  919,  921 

State  Tax,  Case  of  (15  Wall.  300)  733 
State  Tax,  Case  of  (15  Wall.  232)  733,  734 
Steam  Navigation  Co.  v.  Dandridge 

(8  G.  &.  J.  248)  441,  454 

Steamsliip  Co.  v.  Joliffe  (2  Wall.  450)  133 

r.  Port  Wardens  (6  Wall.  31)         133 

Stebbins  v.  Jennings  (10  Pick.  172)  60,  61 

V.  Merritt  (10  Cush.  27)  218,  307 

Steckert  v.  East  Saginaw  (22  Mich. 

104)  304,  306,  310,  325,  768,  795, 
921 
Steel  V.   Davis    County    (2    Greene 

(Iowa),  409)  484,  487 


CVIU 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Steele  V.  Biioklmrdt  (104  Mass.  50)     1011 
i:  Maiiiii  ((:  Kan.  r.lO)  '228,  8M2 

Steiii  c.  Burden  (^i  Ala.  i;JO)  173 

V.  Mayor  of  Mobile  (24  Ala.  591 ) 

17i),  180,  731,  78G 
V.  Mobile  (17  Ala.  2:U)  780 

V.  Mobile  (4!)  Ala.  302)  786,  790 

Steines  v.  Franklin  County  (48  Mo. 

IQl)   127,  601,  609,  640,  544,  551, 
911,950 
Stephan  v.  Daniels  (27  Ohio  St.  Kep. 

527)  942 

Stephani  r.  Hrown  (40  III.  428)  1001 

Stephens  r.  I'eople  (89  111.  337)     221,  222 
Stephenson  Co.  v.  Manny  (60  111.  100)  940, 

941 

Sterling  in  re  (1  Sid.  340)  861 

1-.  Thomas  (00  111.  204)  1001 

V.  West  (2(3  La.  An.  69)  483 

Sterrett  v.  Houston  (14  Tex.  163)         980 

Stetson  V.  Chicago  Railroad  Co.  (75 

111.  74)  G97 

V.  Fa.xon  (19  Pick.  147)  138,  656,  658, 

1000 

V.  Kempton  (1-3  Mass.  272)  40,41,  42, 

117,  16G,  178,  449,  451,  941 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (75  111.  74)  C20 

Stevens'  Case  (T.  Ravm.  432)  808 

Stevens  v.  IJo.xford  (10  Allen,  98)       1018 

V.  Chicago  (48  111.  498)  414 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (31  Barb.  591)       788 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (29  Vt.  540)  909 

V.  Society  (12  Vt.  688)  286,  313 

Stevens   Co.   v.  Railroad  Co.  (33   N. 

J.  L.  229)  109 

Stevens'  Point  v.  Reilly  (44  Wis  295)   65 
Stewart!;.  Baltimore  (7  Md.  600)  000,605, 

608.  614 
V.  Board  (25  Miss.  479)  599 

V.  Commonwealth  (10  Watts,  307)  402 
V.  Council  Bluffs  (50  Iowa,  068)  602 
V.  Davis  (.3  Murph.  (N  C.)  244)  773 
V.  Jefferson  (3  Harr.  3.35)  731 

V.  Kalamazoo  (30  Mich.  69)  910 

V.  Mayor  (7  Md.  501)  431 

v.  New  Orleans  (9  La.  An.  461)    979, 
981,  983 
V.  Otoe  Co.  (2  Neb.  177)         116,  615 
V.  Polk  County  (.30  Iowa,  1)  180 

V.  Southard  (17  Ohio,  402)  264,  266 
V.  State  (4  Ind.  396)  246,  247 

V.  Stewart  (2  Smith's  Lead.  Cas. 

403)  946 

V.  Stewart  (6  CI.  &  F.  911)  942,  946 
V.  Woodstock,  etc.  Hoad  Co.  (16 

U.  C.  Q.  B.  427)  1020 

Stickford  v.   St.  Louis  (7  Mo.  App. 

217)  1000 

Stickney  v.  Maidstone  (30  Vt.  738)     1022 
1-.  Salem  (3  Allen,  374)  964,  1015 

Stier  V.  Oskaloosa  (41  Iowa,  353)  109 

Stilk  V.  Myrick  (2  Camp.  317)  106 

Stillman  v.  Isliam  (11  Conn.  123)  1-30 

Stillwater  r.  Green  (4  Halst.  59)  217 

Stilson  V.  Lawrence  Co.  (52  Ind.  213)  454 


Stiltz  r.  Indianapolis  (55  Ind.  515)         84 
Stinson  r.  Gardiner  (42  Me.  248)        1015, 

1018 
Stites  V.  Curtis  (4  Conn.  328)  e32,  662 
Stock  V.  State  (0  Ind.  113)  261 

Stockbridgc  i\  West  Stockbridge  (12 

Mass.  400)  110 

Stocking  /).  State  (7  Ind.  326)  248 

Stockton,  etc.  Co.  v.  Stockton  (41  Cal. 

1-17)  180 

Stoddard  v.  Gilman  (22  Vt.  568)  303,  327 
V.  Kimball  (0  Cusli.  469)  500 

Stokes  r.  New  York  (14  Wend.   (N. 

Y.)  87)  348,392,393,408 

Stone  i:  Boston  (2  Met.  220)         604,  920 
V.  Brooks  (35  Cal.  489)'  631,  638 

V.  Cambridge  (6  Cush.  270)  600 

f.  Elliott  (11  Ohio  St.  2.52)  500 

V.  Hubbardston  (100  Mass.  49)    1020, 

1036 
V.  Iluggins  (28  Vt.  617)  264 

V.  Mayor  (20  Wend.  139)  955 

V.  Mayor  (25  Wend.  167)       924,  927, 
955,  960 
;;.  Mobile  (57  Ala.  61)  768,  920 

i".  Railroad  Co.  (08  111.  394)  653,  706, 

1000 

r.  Railroad  Co.  (19  N.  H.  427)      1058 

V.  School  District  (8  Cush.  592)     286 

V.  Wisconsin  (94  U.  S.  181)  73 

Stoneburgh  v.  Brighton  (6  U.  C.  L.  J. 

38)  442,  447 

Stonehouse  r.  Elliott  (6  T.  R.  315)       238 
V.  Eiiniskillen   (82  U.  C.    Q.  B. 

562)  935 

Storm  V.  Odell  (2  Wend.  287)  928 

Stormfeltz  v.  Turnpike  Co.  (13  Pa. 

St.  552)  652,  653 

Storrs  V.  Utica  (17  N.  Y.  104)  476,  10:37, 

1049, 1063, 1054, 1055, 1056,  1057. 

1058 

Stotesbury  v.  Smith  (2  Burr.  921)         166 

Stoudinger  v.  Newark  City  (28  N.  J. 

Eq.  187)  688 

Stover  V.  Blue  Hill  (51  Me.  439)  1042 
Stowell  1-.  Milwaukee  (31  Wis.  523)  1003 
Strahl  in  re  (16  Iowa,  369)  229,  231,  2-33, 
235,  291,  293,  432 
Stratman  in  re  (39  Cal.  617)  418 

Stratton  v.  Allen  (16  N.  J.  Eq.  229)     144, 

145,  489 
V.  Oulton  (28  Cal.  44)  259 

Strauss  v.  Insurance  Co.  (5  Ohio  St. 

59)  435,  469,  482,  489 

V.  Pontiac  (40111.  301  )822,  354,  355, 365 
Street  v.  Comity  Commissioners  ( 1  111, 

25)  836 

r.  Francis  (3  Ohio,  277)  923 

V.  Holyoke  (105  Mass.  82)  1020,  1041 
V.  Holyoke    7  Am.  Rep.  500)      1020, 

1041 

Street  Case  (1  La.  An.  412)  301 

(lOLa.  An.  313)  597 

(20  La.  An.  497)  739,  752 

(16La.  An.  393)         698,797 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CIX 


Street  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  Railroad 

Co.  (2  Duvall  (Ky.),  175)        699 
V.  Cumiiiinsville    (1-4    Ohio    St. 

523)  705,  711,  714,  716 

V.  Smith  (2  Duvall,  556)  713 

Street  Railroad  Co.'s  Appeal  (32  Cal. 

499)  712,717,749,752,785 

Striker  v.  Kelly  (3  Denio,  323)  3U4 

V.  Kelly  (7  Mill,  9)   217,  304.  341,  5y9 
Strickland  i'.  Railroad  Co.  (27  Miss. 

209)  179 

Strohm  v.  Iowa  City  (47  Iowa,  42)  295,  909 

Strong  in  re  (20  Pick.  484)  832,  835 

(Kirby  (Conn.),  345)  819,  824 

V.  Darling  (9  Ohio,  201)  213,  625 

Stroud   V.    Fliiladelphia    (61  Pa.    St. 

255)  610,  742,  745,  802,  804 

Struthers  v.  Railway  Co.  (87  Pa.  St. 

282)  705 

Stuart  V.  Cambridge  (125  Mass.  102)  464, 

478 

V.  Machiasport  (48  Me.  477)         1023 

1-.  Palmer  (74  N.  Y.  183)  800 

Stuber's  Road  (28  Pa.  St.  199)      652,  665 

Studley  v.  Oshkosh  (45  Wis.  380)      1028, 

1052 
Sturgeon  v.  Board  (65  Ind.  302)  575 

Sturtevant  v.  Alton  (3  McLean,  393)  220, 

430,  441 

V.  Liberty  (46  Me.  457)  480 

Stuyvesant  v.  New  York  (7  Cow.  588)  125, 

324,  330 

V.  Woodruff  (I  Mich.  145)  635 

Sublett  V.  Bedwell  (47  Miss.  266)  224 

y.  Bedwell  (12  Am.  Rep.  338)        224 

Submarine  Telegraph  Co.  v.  Dickson 

(15C.  13.  N.  S.  759)  1049 

Succession  of  Cavelier  (2  Rob  La. 

438)  568 

Suffield  V.  Hathaway  (44  Conn.  521)    896 
Sugar  Co.  c.  Jersey  City  (26  N.  J. 

Eq. 247)  678 

Sullivan  v.  Boston  (126  Mass.  540)       965 

V.  McCammon  (51  Ind.  264)  941,  944 

V.  New  York  (53  N.  Y.  652)     71,  234 

Sumner  v.  First  Parish  (4  Pick.  361)    941 

Sunbury,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Cooper 

(7  Am.  Law  Reg.  158)  326 

Sun  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mayor  (8  N.  Y.  241)    729, 

744 
Supervisors  v.  Bates  (17  N.  Y.  242)      442 
V.  Bowen  (4  Lans.  24)  471,  934 

V.  Briggs  (2  Denio,  26)  946 

V.  Briggs  (2  Hill,  135)  946 

V.  Coffiiibury  (1  Mich.  355)  243 

V.  Durant  (9  Wall.  415)  845,  851,  871 
V.  Durant  (9  Wall.  736)  862 

V.  Farwell  (25  111.  181)  482 

V.  Galbraith  (99  U.  S.  214)    499,  510, 

530 
1-.  Gorrcl!  (20  Gratt.  (Va.)  484)  92i> 
V.  Hall  (47  Wis.  208)  305 

V.  Manny  (55  111.  160)  940 

V.  Patterson  (56  III.  Ill)  570 

V.  People  (25  III.  297)  304 


Supervisors  v.  Rogers  (7  Wall.  175)  851, 

875 

V.  Schenck  (5  Wall.  772)  463,  491,499, 

509,  510,  513,  524,  541,  544,  549 

V.  Stimpson  (4  Hill,  136)  261 

V.  United  States  (4  Wall.  435)      825, 

842,  845,  848 

V.  United  States  (18  Wall.  71)      485, 

501,  838,  853 

V.  Weider  (64  111.  427)     551,  736,  754 

Surgi  V.  Snetchman  (11  La.  An.  387)  777 

Sussex  V.  Strader  (3  Harr.  (N.  J.)  108)  719 

Sutton  V.  Board  of  Police  (41  Miss. 

236)  951,  962,  973,  981,  1009 

V.  Clark  (6  Taunt.  28)        1001,  1007, 

1008 

V.  Cole  (3  Pick.  232)  292,  569 

V.  Lou'sviile  (5  Dana,  28)  621 

V.  Wauwatosa  (29  Wis.  21)  1041 

Sutton's  Hospital  Case  (10  Rep.  31)     331 

Suydam  v.  Keys  (13  Johns.  444)  264 

S  wails  v.  State  (4  Ind.  516)  109 

Swain  v.  Comstock  (18  Miss.  463)         111 

Swan  r.  Williams  (2  Mich.  427)    596,  599 

Swann  i\  Buck  (40  Miss.  268)  253 

V.  Cumberland  (8  Gill,  150)  604,  796, 

924,  925 

Swartz  V.  Flatboats  (14  La.  An.  243)    135 

V.  Page  ( 13  Mo.  603)  576,  649 

Sweeny  v.  Port  Burwell  (17  U.  C.  C. 

P.  574)  141 

V.  Spooner  (3  B.  &  S.  329)  428 

Sweet  V.   Carver  County   (16  Minn. 

106)  484 

V.  Wabash  (41  Ind.  7)  357 

Sweetzer  u.  Hay  (2  Gray,  49)  243 

V.  Mead  (5  Mich.  107)  446 

Swift  V.  Berry  (1  Root  (Conn.),  448)    720 

V.  Newport  (7  Bush,  37)  790 

y.  New  York  (17  Hun,  518)  476 

V.  Poughkeepsio  (37  N.  Y.  514)      944 

V.  Williamsburgh  (24  Barb.  427)  442, 

475,  973 

Sykes  v.  Columbus  (55  Miss.  115)       540, 

542,  549,  843 

V.  Lafferty  (27  Ark.  407)  443 

V.  Pawlet  (43  Vt.  446)  1025 

V.  Pawlet  (5  Am.  Rep.  295)  1025 

Symmers  v.  Regem  (Cowp.  502)  273,  279 

Symonds  v.  Board  (71  111.  355)      961,  963 

Tackaberry  v.  Keokuk  (32  Iowa,  155)  770 

Taft  0.  Montague  (14  Mass.  285)  461 

i;.  Pittsford  (28  Vt.  286)  441,  478,  480, 

481 

Tailors  of  Ipswich  (11  Rep.  54)  412 

Tainter  r.  Mayor  (19  N.  J.  L.  46)         898 

V.  Worcester  (123Mas.«.  311)  171,982 

Taintor  v.  Morristown  (19  N.  J.  Eq. 

46)  663 

Talbot  V.  Dent  (OB.  Mon.  526)      64,  179 
V.  Grace  (30  Ind.  389)  137,  036 

(;.  Hudson  (16  Gray,  417)  592,  595 
V.  Queen  Anno  Co.  (50  M.l.  245)  30 
V.  Richmond  (22  Alb,  L.  J.  57)  632, 635 


ex 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Talbot  r.  Wliipplo  (7  Grav,  12'2)        lOGO 
i'lilcou  r.  Pino  Grove  ( 1  15.  &  B.  N. 

S.  60)  4',)7 

Tallahassee  v.  Fortune  (3  Fla.  19)      l()o7, 

1017 
Tallant  v.  Burlington  (39  Iowa,  543)  708, 

940 
Tallman  c.  Janesville  (17  Wis.  71)  741 
Taiman  r.  Butler  Co.  (12  Iowa,  531)  72'J 
Tanner  v.  Albion  (5  Hill,  121)  380 

Tarlton  in  re  (2  Ala.  35)         604,  023,  924 
Tarner  v.  Walker  (L.  K.  1  Q.  B.  641)   166 
V.  Walker  (2  Q.  B.  800)  166 

Tarry  v.  Asliton  (L.  K.  1  Q.  B.  Div. 

314)  1028 

Tarver   v.    Commissioners   (17    Ala. 

527)  868 

Tash  V.  Adams  (10  Gush.  252)  40, 176,  UK) 

Tate  ('.  Missouri  (64  Mo.  UO)  9!)8 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (7  Ind.  470)  665,  696, 

699 

Tatem  v.  Wright  (23  N.  J.  L.  429)        73(1 

Tavener's  Case  (Ravra.  446)  862 

Tax  Court  v.  Railroad  Co.  (50  Md.  417)  788 

Taylor  v.  Americus  (39  Ga.  59)    432,  924 

V.  Board  of  Health  (31  Pa.  St.  73)  943, 

944,  946 

V.  Boulware  (17  Tex.  74)  213 

V.  Cffisar  (11  U.  C.  Q.  B.  461)         223 

i;.  Carondelet  (22  Mo.  105)     323,  349, 

353,  575,  576 

V.  Chandler  (9  Heisk.  349)      754,  755 

V.  Douner  (31  Cal.  480)  763 

V.  Fort  Wayne  (47  Ind.  281)  211,  213, 

626 
V.  Gloucester  (1  Roll.  409)  276 

V.  Gloucester  (3  Bulst.  190)  277 

V.  Greenhalgh    (L.   R.    9    Q.    B. 

487)  1047 

r.  Griswold  (17N.  J.  Eq.  222)       329, 

332,  336,  337 

V.  Henry  (2  Pick.  397)    289,  308,  311, 

313,  314 

V.  Newberne  (2  Jones  Eq.  141)       62, 

180,  189,  731 

V.  Palmer  (31  Cal.  241)  290,  341,  752, 

776,  810 

i;.  Parish,  etc.  (L.  R.  6  C.  P.  309)  223 

V.  Peckham  (8  R.  I.  319)     1032,  1034 

V.  Peckliam  (5  Am.  Rep.  578)      1034 

V.  People  (66  111.  322)  940 

V.  Plymoutli  (8  Met.  462)        9-54,  956 

I'.  Porter  (4  Hill,  140)  586,  595 

V.  School  Commissioners  (5  Jones 

Law,  98)  823 

V.  St.  Louis  (14  Mo.  20)       68-3,  1000. 

1003 
V.  Strong  (3  Wend.  384) 
V.  Taylor  (10  Minn.  112) 
Taylor's  Case  (1  Rol.  5) 
Taymouth  v.  Krohler  (35  Mich.  22) 
Teagarden  v.  McBean  (33  Miss.  283 


Tear  v.  Freebody  (4  C.  B.  C.  B.  228] 


238 
226 
194 
461 
640, 
611 
726 


Tecumseh  v.  Phillips  (5  Neb.  305)  71,  201 


Teft  r.  Size  (10  111.  432)  414 

Telegraph  Co.  v.  Lieb  (76  111.  172)        736 
Temp.  Hall  Ass.  v.  Giles  (o'i  N.  J.  L. 

260)  1059 

Templin  r.  Iowa  City  (14  Iowa,  69)  1070 
Ten  Evck  v.  Canal  Co.  (3  llarr.  200)  78 
Tonnev  r.  Lenz  (16  Wis.  5()6)  358,  360 
r. "Lumber  Co.  (43  N.  II.  343)  281 
Terre  Haute  v.  Lake  (43  Ind.  480)  327,  443, 

446 

V.  Turner  (36  Ind.  522)       G78,   G87. 

767,  998,  999 

Terrett  v.  Sharon  (34  Conn.  105)  909,  910 

I'.  Tavlor  (9  Craneh,  43)  92,  550 

Terry  (\  Bank  (18  Wis.  87)  93 

V.  Mayor,  &c.  of  New  York  (8  Bosw. 

594)  991 

Tesh  I'.  Commonwealth  (4  Dana,  522)  417 

Thatcher  v.  England  (3  C.  B.  254)         166 

V.  Jefferson  Co.  (13  Kan.  182)        472 

Thayer  v.  Boston  (19  Pick.  510)  138,  636, 

704,  970,  974,  976,  979,  985,  991, 

992,  106G 

V.  Montgomery  Co.  (3  Dillon,  C. 

C.  R.  389)  493,  494 

V.  Tyler  (5  Allen,  95)  130 

Theological  Sem.  v.  Childs  (4  Paige, 

418)  501 

Thetford's  Case  (12  Vin.  Abr.  90)         414 
Thicknesse  v.  Canal  Co.  (4  M.  &  W. 

472)  194 

Thillate  v.  Stanley  (14  Ind.  409)  587 

Third  Avenue  Railroad  v.  N.  Y.  (54 

N.  Y.  159)  898 

Thirty -Fourth    Street   iti  re   (10  Pa. 

197)  796 

Thomas  v.  Ashland  (12  Ohio  St.  124)    57, 

168,  430 
V.  Commissioners  (5  Ind.  4)  68 

V.  Dakin  (22  Wend.  9)  60 

V.  Gain  (35  Mich.  150)    748,  758,  760, 
761,  793,  804,  805 
V.  Leland  (24  Wend.  65)  100,  101,  102 
V.  Mt.  Vernon  (9  Ohio,  290)  365,  414, 

422 

V.  Port  Hudson  (27  Mich.  320)      151, 

155,  459 

V.  Richmond  (12  Wall.  349)  118,  156, 

329,  340,  441,  442,  451,  458,  481, 

486 

V.  Ringwood  (L.  R.  0  Eq.  418)        631 

V.  Scotland  Co.  (3  Dill.  C.  C.  R.  7)  535, 

536 

V.  White  (12  Mass.  369)  242,  243 

Thompson  v.  Abbott  (61  Mo.  176)         200 

V.  BoonviUe  (61  Mo.  282)     778,  1000, 

1003 
V.  Bridgewater  (7  Pick.  188)  1024 
V.  Nicholson  (12  Rob.  326)  242 

V.  Northeastern  Ry.  Co.  (3  L.  T. 

N.  S.  618)  1049 

V.  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  (9  Wall. 

579)  64,  734 

V.  Stickney  (0  Ala.  579)  266 

Thomson  in  re  (52  Ala.  98)  821 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXI 


Thomson  v.  Carroll  (•22  How.  422)  320,  781 
V.  Floyd  (2  Jones  (N.  C),  Law 

313)  731 

V.  Gibson  (7  M.  &  W.  546)  377 

V.  Lee  County  (3  Wall.  327)  118,  180, 
188,  199,  479,  501,  503,  540 
V.  Mavor  (11  N.  Y.  115)  137,  139 

V.  Mt."  Vernon  (11  Ohio  St.  688)    340 
V.  Pacific  Kailroad  Co.  (9  Wall. 

579)  54 

V.  People  (23  Wend.  537)  803 

V.  Pittston  (59  Me.  545)  178,  187 

V.  Schermerhorn  (6  N.  Y.  92)  123, 598, 

778 
V.  Sunderland  Gas  Co.  (L .  R.  2 

Ex.  Div.  429)  690 

Thorndike  v.  Boston  (1  Met.  245)         223 

Thornton  v.  Grant  (10  R.  I.  477)  136 

V.  Smith  (1  Wash.  106)  431 

Thorpe  v.  Brumfitt  (L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap. 

650)  723,  724 

Thurlow  V.  Bogart  (15  U.  C.  C.  P.  1)  661, 

6()2 

Tliurston  i'.  Hancock  (12  Mass.  220)  1004 

V.  St.  Joseph  (51  Mo.  519)    640,  1000, 

1005,  1067,  1073,  1074,1076,  1077 

V.  St.  Joseph  (11  Am.  Rep.  463)  1067, 

1074, 1076 

Tidderley's  Case  (1  Sid.  14)  267 

Tidewater  Co.  v.  Coster  (18  N.  J.  Eq. 

618)  594,  746,  748,  760,  804 

Tierney  v.  Dodge  (9  Minn.  166)     64,  114, 
418,  424,  428,  431,  924 
Tiffin  V.  McCormick  (34  Ohio  St.  638)  1058 
Tileson  v.  Newman  (23  Vt.  421)  217 

Tillman  v.  People  (12  Mich.  401)         031, 

610 
Tilmes  v.  Marsh  (67  Pa.  St.  512)  662 

Tilton  V.  Sanbornton  (55  N.  H.  610)     216 
Times  v.  State  (26  Ala.  165)  430 

Timothy  v.   Simpson  (1  C.  M.  &  R. 

757)  238 

Timson  in  re  (L.  R.  5  Exch.  257)  238 

Tinkham  v.  Tapscott  (17  N.  Y.  144)    392 
Tinsman  i*.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Dutch. 

148)  75,  76 

Tipping  V.  St.  Helen's  (4  B.  &  S.  608)  376 
Tisdale  v.  Minnock  (46  111.  9)  412 

V.  Norton  (8  xMetc.  388)        1024,  1025 
Titler  i:  Iowa  Co.  (48  Iowa,  90)  962 

Titus  V.  North  Bridge  (97  Mass.  258)  1035 
Tobacco  Co.  v.  Woodroffe  (7  B.  &  C. 

838)  412 

Tobey  v.  Wareham  (2  Allen,  594)        28il 

Todd  V.  Birdsall  (1  Cow.  260)  2(51 

c.  Perry  (20  U.  C.  Q.  B.  649)         24 1 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (19  Ohio  St.  514)  6.]3, 

645 
V.  Troy  (61  N.  Y.  506)        1021,  1026, 
1040,  1018 
Tolan  i;.  Lansing  (38  Mich.  315)  969 

Toledo,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Jackson- 
ville (07  111.  37)  707 
Tolland  v.  WiiUngton  (26  Conn.  578)   719, 

720,  1018 


Toll  Bridge   Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.  (17 

Conn. 40)  580 

Toll  Co.  V.  Betsworth  (30  Conn.  380)  2ii2 
Tolman  v.  Marlborough  (3  N.  H.  57)  977 
Tomlinson  i-.  Branch  (15  Wall.  400)  774 
Tompert  v.  Lithgow  (1  Bush,  176)      231, 

276,  278 

Toms  V.  Whitby  (35  U.  C.  Q.  B.  195)  1018 

V.  Whitby  (37  U.  C.  Q.  B.  100)  1018, 

1023 
Tone  V.  Mayor  (70  N.  Y.  157)  476,  477 
Toomey  v.  London,  etc.  Railroad  Co. 

(3  C.  B.  N.  S.  146)  1021 

Topeka  v.  Tuttle  (5  Kan.  425)  1037 

Topping  V.  Gray  (7  Hill,  259)  291 

Topsham  i-.  Rogers  (42  V^t.  199)  460 

Torbush  V.  Norwich  (38  Conn.  225)      982 
V.  Norwich  (9  Am.  Kep.  395)  982 

Torry  v.  Milbury  (21  Pick.  64)  41,  288 
Totten  V.  Halligan  (18  U.  C.  C.  P. 

567)  661 

Tottendell  v.  Glazby  (2  Wils.  266)  411 
Touchard  v.  Touchard  (5  Cal.  306)  89 
Tounier  i\  Municipality  (5  La.  An. 

298)  474 

Towle  V.  State  (3  Fla.  202)  827 

Towles  V.  Justices  (14  Ga.  391)  720 

Town  V.  Blackberry  (29  111.  137)  587 

V.  Culver  (19  Wall.  83)  491,  499 

Town   Council   v.  Burnett  (34  Ala. 

400)  944 

1-.  Court  (IE.  &E.  770)  285 

V.  Harbers  (6  Rich.  Law,  96)  363 

V.  Lithgoe  (7  Rich.  Law,  435)        635 

638,  640,  641 

Town  of  Coloma  v.  Eaves  (92  U.  S. 

484)  509,  512 

Town  of  Elmwood  v.  Marcy  (92  U. 

S.  289)  501,  514,  541 

Town  of  Flatbush  (60  N.  Y.  398)  591,  823 
Town  of   Guelph   v.  Canada  Co.  (4 

Grant  (Can.),  6-54)  650 

Town  of  Guelph  in  re  (24  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

238)  390 

Town  of  Guilford  v.  Supervisors,  etc. 

(13N.  Y.  143)  729 

Town  of  Paulet  v.  Clark  (9  Cranch, 

292)  626,  629 

Town  of  Qneensbury  v.  Culver  (19 

Wall.  83)  846 

Town  of  Venice  v.  Breed  (65  Barb. 

597)  501 

V.  Murdock  (92  U.  S.  Sup.  C.  494)  516 

Towns  I'.  Tallahassee  (11  Fla.  130)       S61 

Townsend  in  re  (39  N.  Y.  174)  595 

V.  Des  Moines  (42  Iowa,  057)       1052 

V.  Everett  (4  .Via.  607)  243 

V.  Hoyle  (20  Conn.  1)      454,  506,  676 

Townsliip  V.  Learsley  (94  U.  S.  310)    595 

V.  Carey  (3  N.  J.  L.  377)  265 

V.  Linn  (36  Pa.  St.  431)  265 

V.  Talcott  (19  Wall.  666)         491,  541 

V.  Township  (11  Iowa,  506)  937 

Tracy  i>.  Swartont  (10  Pet.  80)  265 

Trafton  v.  Alfred  (15  Me.  258)  200 


cxu 


TABT.E    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Transportation    Co.   '■.    Cliicago  (00 

U.    S.   (38o)   (Jo3,  (154,  OOti,    1001, 
100:}.  1001,  1007 
Transportation    Co.    v.  Wiiecling   ('J 

\V.  Va.  170)  785 

Transportation  Co.  r.  Wiiecling  (90 

U.  S.  •J7;l)  785 

Trapliagon   r.  Jersey  City  (20  N.  J. 

^Kq.  20li)  088,021 

Trask  v.  McCnire  (18  Wall.  20G)  773 

Treadwav  r.  Sclinauber  (I  Dak.  Ter. 

280)  441 

TreadwcU  r.  Commrs.  (U  Ohio  St. 

100)  31,  523,  524,  549,  962 

V.  Xevv  York  (1  Daly,  123)  902 

Treat  c.  Middieton  (8  Conn.  243)  819,  828 
Trent,  etc.  Co.  v.  Marsiiall  (10  U.  C. 

C.  P.  386)  206 

Trenton    Uailr-iad   in   re   (6   Whart. 

(I'a.)  25)  052,  665 

Trenton,  etc.  Co.  v.  Raff  (36  N.  J.  L. 

335)  909 

Trigally  v.  Memphis  (6  Coldw.  382)    822, 

345,4:]0 
Trigg  V.  Glasgow  (2  Bush,  504)  783 

Trimble  r.  Bucvrus  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  76)  3(59 
Tripp  V.  Lyman  (37  Me.  250)  1021,  1053 
Trippe  r.  Frazier  (4  II.  &  J.  446)  566 

Tromblev  v.  Humphrey  (23  Mich. 471)  500 
Trott  1-.  Warren  (11  Me.  227)  460 

Trowbridiie  c.  Mayor  (7  Hill,  420)        130 
Troy  V.  Kailroad  Co.  ( 13  Kan.  70)  312,  325 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (23  N.  H.  83)  679,  721 
Truax  v.  Pool  (46  Iowa,  256)  213 

Truchelut  v.   City   Council  (IN.  & 

McC.  227)  105,  342,  412,  430 

True  V.  Melvin  (43  N.  H.  503)  855 

Trueheart  v.  Addicks  (2  Tex.  217)       225 

Trumpler  v.  Bemerly  (39  Cal.  490)       597 

Trustees  in  re  (57  How.  Pr.  500)  123 

V.  Aberdeen  (21  Miss  645)  85,  97, 106 

V.  Bradbury  (11  Me.  118)  106 

1-.  Campbell  (16  Ohio  St.  11)  208 

V.  Cherry  (8  Ohio  St.  564)       63,  444, 

451,  486 

V.  Chicago  (12  111.  403)  597 

V.  Davenport  (7  Iowa,  213)  606 

V.  Erie  (31  Pa.  St.  515)    112,  327,  343 

V.  Exeter  (58  N.  H.)  774 

V.  Exeter  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  278)  774 

y.  Hill  (6  Cow.  23)  247,293 

V.  Keeting  (4  Denio,  341)  363 

V.  King  (12  Mass.  546)  562 

V.  Leffler  (23  111.  90)  403 

t:  McConnell  ( 12  111.  140)  117,  774,788 

V.  Osborne  (9  Ind.  4-58)  314,  763 

V.  Parks  (10  Me.  441)  60 

V.  Peaslee  (15  N.  H.  317)       204,  208, 

568 
I'.  People  (63  111.  209)  736 

V.  People  (87  111.  303)  331 

V.  Reneau  (2  Swan,  94)  208 

V.  Schroeder  (58  111.  353)        354,  951 
?;.Tatman  (13  111.  30)  76,79,90 

V.  Taylor  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  613)  114 


Trustees  r.  Walsh  (57  111.  363)      374,  635 
V.  Winstim  (5  S   &  P.  17)  97 

Tucker  v.  Aikin  (7  N.  H.  113)       261,  238 
V.  Eldred  (6  R.  1.  401)  684 

V.  Ileiuiecker  (41  N.  II.  317)  1023 
V.  Justices  ( 13  Ired.  Law,  434)  303 
V.  Randolph  (75  N.  C.  267)  154 

V.  Rochester  (7  Wend.  254)  976 

V.  Tower  (9  Pick.  109)  083 

V.  Virginia  City  (4  Nev.  20)  172, 

373 

Tuffr.  Warman  (2  C.  B.  N.  S.  740)   1023 

r.  Warman  (5  C.  B.  N.  S.  573)     1023 

Tufts  V.  Charlestown  (98  Mass.  583)    800 

Tugman  v.  Chicago  (78  111.  405)  331,  384, 

335,  373 

Tuley  V.  State  (1  Ind.  500)  246 

Tupelo  V.  Board  (56  Miss.  332)  946 

Turner  in  re  (5  Ohio,  542)  818,  825 

V.  Althaus  (6  Neb.  54)    588,  731,  793, 

944 
r.  Brantford    (13  U.    C.    C.    P. 

109)  1011 

V.  Clark  Co.  (67  Mo.  243)  243 

V.  Dartmouth  (13  Allen,  291)        1008 

V.  Omaha  (6  Neb.  54)  731 

Turney  v.  Chamberlain  (15  111.  271)    550, 

671 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Berry  (5  Ind.  280)      719, 

720 
V.  McKean  (10  Johns.  154)  316 

V.  People  (96  U.  S.  63)  677 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (2  Harr.  (N.  J.) 

314)  653 

Turpen  v.  County  Commissioners  (7 

Ind. 172)  253 

Turrill  v.  Grattan  (52  Cal.  97)  797 

Tulill  V.  West  Ham,  etc.  (L.  R.  8  C. 

P.  447)  1024 

Tuttle  V.  Everett  (51  Miss.  27)      940,  943 

V.  Holyoke  (6  Gray,  447)  1022 

V.  State  (4  Conn.  68)  402 

Thirty -Ninth    Street    in  re    (1    Hill, 

189)  638 

Tyler  ;'.  People  (06  111.  322)  771 

Tyler  Exrs.  v.  E.  &  P.  Railroad  Co. 

(9  Bush,  510)  538 

Tyson  v.  School  Directors   (51   Pa. 

St.  9)  187 

Udall  V.  Trustees  (19  Johns.  175)  210 

Ulam  V.  Boyd  (87  Pa.  St.  477)  448 
Underbill   v.  Manchester  (45  N.   H. 

214)  957 

V.  Smith  (Chip.  (Vt.)  81)  813 

i>.  Trustees  (17  Cal.  172)  480 
Underwood     v.     Carney     (1      Cush. 

(Mass.)  285)  726 
V.  Newport  Lyceum  (5  B.  Hon. 

130)  459 

V.  Stuyvesant  (19  Johns.  180)  638 

Union  v.  Crawford  ( 19  Conn.  331)  961 

Union  Bank  v.  State  (9  Yerg.  490)  732 

Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  v.  Colfax 

Co.  (4  Neb.  450)  492 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXIU 


Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  v.  Davis 

County  (0  Kan.  256)  95,  532,  858 
V.  Dodge  (98  U.  8.  5-11)  942,  943,  947 
V.  Hall  (91  U.  S.  343)  856,  857 

V.  Lincoln  ( 1  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  314)  734 
V.  Lincoln  (2  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  297)  907 
V.  Lincoln  County   (3  Dillon,   C. 

C.  R.  300)  506 

V.  Merrick  (3  Dillon,   C.   C.   R. 

359)  o06 

V.  Penniston  (18  Wall.  5)  733 

Union  Railroad  Co.  i\  Cambridge  (11 

Allen,  287)  395 

Uniontown  v.  Commonwealth  (34  Pa. 

St.  293)  828 

United  Brethren  Church  v.  Van  Du- 

sen  (37  Wis.  54)  305 

United  States  v.  Addison    (6   Wall. 

291 )  258,  259 

V.  Addison  (22  How.  (U.  S.)  174)  835, 

872 
V.  Baltimore,   etc.   Railroad    Co. 

(17WalL322)      76.89,100,101, 

129,  772,  773,  1015 

i;.  Bank,  etc.  (21  How.  356)  523 

V.  Barker  (1  Paine,  152)  261 

V.  Boice  (2  McLean,  352)  261 

United  States  v.  Boutwell  (17  Wall. 

604)  873 

V.  Boutwell  (17  WaU.  G04)  860,  872, 
873,  877 
V.  Boyd  (5  How.  50)  243 

I'.  Bradley  (10  Pet.  343)  240,  242 

V.  Bridge  Co.  (6  McLean,  517)  588 
V.  Brown  (9  How.  487)  254 

V.  Chicago  (7  How.  185)  590,  625, 
633,  638,  639 
r.  Clark  Co.  (96  U.S.  211)  843 

V.  Dandridge  (12  Wheat.  64)  242 

V.  Duluth  (1  Dill.  469)  133 

V.  Fanning  (Morris  (Iowa),  348)  143 
V.  Fillebrown  (7  Pet.  28)  313 

V.  Fort  Scott  (99  U.  S.  152)  156,  159 
V.  Guthrie  (17  How.  284)  826 

I'.  Hart  (Pet.  (C.  C.)  390)  657 

V.  Hodsen  (10  Wall.  395)  242 

V.  Hoar  (2  Mason,  C.  C.  R.  134)  667 
V.  Hudson  (7  Cranch,  32)  271 

V.  Keokuk  (6  Wail.  514)  842,  851 

i;.  Kirkpatrick  (9  Wheat.  U.  S. 

735)  667 

I'.  Land  Commissioners  (5  Wall. 

563)  826 

I'.  Lawrence  (3  Dall.  42)  819 

V.  Le  Baron  (19  How.  73)  241 

I'.  Lincoln  Co.  (5  Dillon,  184)  844 
V.  Linn  (15  Pet.  290)  240,  242 

V.  Macon  Co.  (99  U.  S.  582)  843 

V.  McKelden  (3  McArthur)  289 

United  States  v.  McKilden  (8  Rep. 

778)  286 

V.  Memphis  (97  U.  S.  284)  81,  8G,  213, 

790,  848 

V.  Miller  Co.  (4  Dillon,  233)  485 

V.  New  Orleans  (2  Woods,  230)     180 


United  States  v.  New  Orleans  (98  U. 

S.  381)       733,762,838,844,845 
V.  Prescott  (3  How.  578)  262 

V.  Seaman  (17  How.  225)  826 

V.  Silverman  (4  Dill.  224)  851 

V.  Thompson  (98  U.  S.  487)  667 

V.  Tingey  (5  Pet.  114)  240 

V.  Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  (4 

Dillon,  479)  862,  870 

V.  Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  (91 

U.S.  343)  862,870 

V.  Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  (91 

U.  S.  72)  499 

V.  Vernon   Co.    (2    Centr.    Law 

Jour.  771)  854 

V.  Vernon  Co.  (3  Dillon,  281)         854 
V.  Wright  (1  McLean,  509)     249,  251 
University  v.  MauUsby  (8  Ire.  Eq. 

257)  83 

V.  People  (80  III.  33)  774 

u.  Walden  (15  Ala.  655)  255 

V.  Winston  (5  S.  &  P.  17)  83 

Updegraffr.  Crans  (47  Pa.  St.  103)      291 

Updike  V.  Campbell  (4  E.  D.  Smith, 

570)  380 

Upton  V.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Cush.  600)    619 
V.  Starr  (3  Ind.  538)  261 

Urmey  v.  Wooden  (1  Ohio  St.  160)      568 
Utica  V.  Miller  (62  Ind.  230)  476 

Utica  Ins.  Co.  i;.  Scott  (8  Cow.  708)  892, 893 

Vail  V.  Beach  (10  Kan.  214)  774 

Valpey  1-.  Manley  (1  C.  B.  592)  943 

Van  Antwerp  in  re  (56  N.  Y.  261)  72,  727, 

742,  808 
Vanarsdall  v.  State  (65  Ind.  176)  575 

Vanblaricum  v.  State  (7  Blackf.  209)   621 
Vance  v.  Bank  (1  Blackf.  80)  54, 109 

V.  Little  Rock  (30  Ark.  435)   86,  117, 
762,  839 
Vanck  v.  Corp.  of  N.  Y.   (4  Johns. 

(N.  Y.)  53)  673 

Vandalia.  etc.  Co.  v.  Surrell  (88  111. 

535)  788 

Vanderbilt  v.  Adams  (7  Co  wen,  349)  167, 

171,394 
Vandersmith's  Case  (10  Pa.  Law  J. 

523)  660 

VanderviUe  v.  Taylor  (65  N.  Y.  341)  1065. 

1070 
Vandever  v.  Mattock  (3  Ind.  479)  239 
Vandine,  Petitioner  (6  Pick.  187)  338,  371 
Vandyke    v.   Cincinnati    (1    Disney, 

532)  375,  102 1, 1048 

Van  Eppes    v.    Commissioners    (25 

Ala.  460)  96--^ 

Van  Hoffman  v.  Quincy  (4  Wall.  535)    93, 

95,  199,  502,  551,  765,  838,  842, 

845,  846 

Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison  City  (1  Wall. 

291 )  120,  501,  509,  524,  527 

Van  Keuren   v.  Johnson   (3  Denio, 

182)  261 

Van   Ness    v.    Washington    (4   Pet. 

(U.  S.)  232)  648 


CXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Van  Orsdall  v.  Hazard  (3  Hill,  243)     223, 

249,  250 
Van  Pelt  v.  Davenport  (42  Iowa,  oOS)  G7G, 
1049,  1U155,  107;5,  1078 
Vanover  i\  Davis,  etc.  Justices  (27 

Ga.  354)  lOG,  918 

Vansant  v.  Roberts  (3  Md.  119)  208 

Van  Sicklen  v.  Burlington  (27  Vt.  70)    41, 

171 
Van  Swartow  v.  Commonwealth  (24 

Pa.  St.  lol)  418,425,430 

Vantilburgl)   v.   Shann  (24  N.  J.  L. 

740)  801 

Van  Valkenburgh  v.  Milwaukee  (30 

Wis.  :);J8)  639 

Van  Wickle  v.  Railroad  Co.  (17  N.  J. 

Eq.  162)  697 

Van  Wormer  v.  Mayor   (18   Wend. 

109)  373 

Varden  v.  Mount  (15  Bush,  345)  349,  351 
Varick  v.  New  York   (4  Johns.  Ch. 

53)  897,  898 

V.  Smith  (5  Paige,  137)  58G,  592,  594 
Varner  v.  Nobleborough  (2  Me.  121)  484 
Vars  V.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.  Co.  (23  U. 

C.  C.  P.  143)  1028 

Vason  V.  Augusta  (38  Ga.  542)    127,  235, 

369,  424,  425 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (43  Ga.  631)  690 

Vawter  v.  Franklin  College  (53  Ind. 

88)  304,  310 

Veazie  i'.  China  (50  Me.  518)        127,  178 
V.  Fenno  (8  Wall.  533)  729 

V.  Mayo  (45  Me.  560)  702 

V.  Mayo  (49  Me.  156)  702 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (49  Me.  119)  1061, 1062 
v.  Rockland  (68  Me.  511)  937 

Veeder  v.  Lima  (19  Wis.  280)      189,  547, 

548,  549 

Venice  v.  Murdock  (92  U.  S.  494)        601, 

610,  616,  647 

Ventura  v.  Thompson  (51  Cal.  677)     597, 

621 
Vermilye  v.  Adams  Express  Co.  (21 

Wall.  138)  553 

Vernon  Soc.  v.  Hills  (6  Cow.  23)  246 

Vcrrill  v.  Minot  (31  Me.  299)  1042 

Verrior  v.  Sandwich  (1  Sid.  305)  250 

Vespra  v.  Cook  (26  U.  C.  C.  P.  182)     662 
Vick  V.  Vicksburg  (1  Miss.  379)  629 

Vicksburg    v.  Hennessey    (54   Miss. 

363)  1024,  1030 

V.  Lombard  (51  Miss.  125)      154,  501 
V.  Tobin  (100  U.  S.  430)  133 

Vidal  V.  Mayor,  Girard,  etc.  (2  How. 

127)  562,563,564,568,914 

Vinal  V.  Dorchester  (7  Gray,  421)     1014, 

1064 
Vincennes  v.  Richards  (23  Ind.  381)  999 
Vincennes  University  u.  Indiana  (14 

How.  268)  54,  196,  198 

Vincent  v.  Nantucket  (12  Cush.  103)    40, 

117,  175,451 

Vintners  i>.  Passey  (1  Burr.  237)  2-33,248, 

*  338,  410,  412 


Vionet  v.  Municipality  (4  La.  An.  42)  373 
Virginia  City  v.  Mining  Co.  (2  Nev. 

86)  64,  111 

Visitors  r.  State  (15  Md.  330)  83 

Volkenning  in  re  (52  N.  Y.  650)  71 

Von  Hoflinan  v.  Quincy  (4  Wall.  635)  93, 
95,  109,  202 
VonPhul  V.  Hammer  (29  Iowa,  2:^2)  64,  68 

Wabaunsee  v.  Muhlenbacker  (18  Kan, 

129)  365 

?;.  Walker  (8  Kan.  431)  942 

Waco  V.  Powell  (32  Tex.  258)  399 

Waddell  v.  New  York  (8  Barb.  95)  998 
Waddington  v.  St.  Louis  ( 14  Mo.  190)  134 
Wade  V.  Brantford  (19  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

207)  936,971 

V.  Richmond  (18  Gratt.  683)         213, 

909  911 

Wadleigh  v.  Gillman  (12  Me.  403)      'l67, 

171,  329,  400,  402 

Waffle  V.  Railroad  Co.  (58  Barb.  413)  1077 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (53  N.  Y.  11)        1076 

V.  Railroad    Co.     (13  Am.    Rep. 

467)  1076 

Wager  v.  Troy  Railroad  Co.  (25  N.  Y. 

626)  632,  663,  697,  714,  716 

Wahle  V.  Reinbock  (76  111.  322)  379 

Waite  V.  North  Eastern  Railway  Co. 

(E.  B.  &E.  719)  1023 

Wakefield  v.  Pawtucket  (12  R.  I.  75)  999, 

1067 

Walcott  V.  Laurence  Co.  (26  Mo.  272)  938 

i;.  People  (17  Mich.  68)  790 

V.  Swampseott  (I  Allen,  101)  978,  984 

V.  Walcott  (19  Vt.  37)  298 

Waldo  V.  Wallace  (12  Ind.  569)  235,  371, 

418 
Waldraven    v.   Memphis    (4   Coldw. 

431)  239,  255 

Waldron  v.  Berry  (51  N.  H.  136)  265 

V.  Lee  (6  Pick.  323)  217 

Walker  v.  Chicago  (62  III.  286)  778 

V.  Cincinnati  (21  Oliio  St.  14)         183 

V.  City  Council  (1  Bailey,  S.  C. 

Eq.  443)  897 

V.  Commrs.  (17  Wall.  648)  136 

V.  Hallock  (32  Ind.  239)  265 

V.  New  Orleans  (31  La.  An.  828)  360 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (8  Ohio,  38)  606 

v.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  574)  942 

V.  St.  Louis  (15  Mo.  563)  944 

V.  Springfield  (94  111.  364)       736,  740 

V.  Swartout  (12  Johns.  444)  263 

Walkley  v.  Muscatine  (6  Wall.  481)    202, 

818,  838,  842,  845,  846 

Wall  in  re  (48  Cal.  279)  63,  322 

Wallace  v.  Lawyer  (54  Ind.  501)  130 

i;.  Menasha  (IOC.  L.  J.  147)  976 

V.  Menasha  (4  N.  W.  Rep.  101)     987 

V.  Muscatine  (49  Greene,  373)      1071 

V.  San  Jose  (29  Cal.  181)  118,  161,  16-5, 

441 
V.  Shelton  (14  La.  An.  498)  610,  740, 

753 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxv 


"Walling  V.  Mayor  of  Shreveport  (5  La. 

An.  (i60)     602,  972,  1)74,  975,  986 
Walsh  V.  Mattliews  (21)  Cal   123)  752 

17.  People  (5  Chic.  Legal  News, 

541)  930 

Walter  v.  Columbia  (61  Ind.  24)  364 

Waltham  v.  Kemper  (55  111.  .346)  961, 1009 
Walton  V.  Devehn?  (61  111.  201)  230,  882 
Walworth,  etc.  v.  F.  L.  &  T.  Co.  (16 

Wis.  629)  305 

Wamesit  Co.  v.  Allen  (108  Mass.  352)  589 
"Wammacks  v.  HoUoway  (2  Ala.  31)   228, 

432,  881 
Wanstead  v.  Hill  (13  C.  B.N.  S.  479)  379, 

380 

"Wapello  County  (13  Iowa,  405)  728 

Ward  in  re  (52  N.  Y.  395)  743 

i;.  Bartliolomew  (6  Pick.  409)         577 

V.  Hartford    County    (12    Conn. 

404)  130,  963 

V.  Jefferson  (24  Wis.  342)  1017,  1020, 
1021,  1048 
v.  Lee  (7E.  &B.  426)  1074 

V.  Louisville  (10  B.  Mon.  184)        957 
V.  Maryland  (12  Wall.  418)    734,  735, 

766 
V.  Maryland  (31  Md.  279)  735 

V.  Morris  (4  H.  &  McH.  (Md.)  340)  735 
y.  State  (48  Ala.  161)  858 

r.  State  (31  Md.  279)  734 

V.  Turnpike  Co.  (Spencer  (N.  J.), 

323)  959 

Warden  i'.  Supervisors  (14  Wis.  618)   907 

Waring  v.  Mobile  (24  Ala.  701)  214 

Warner  v.  Mower  (11  Vt.  385)  301 

V.  .Myers  (3  Oregon,  218)  882 

V.  People  (2  Denio,  272)  253,  255 

Warnock  v.  Lafayette  (4  La.  An.  419)  295 

Warren  v.  Charlestown  (2  Gray,  104)    36, 

38,  62,  213,  215 

V.  Grand  Haven  (30  Mich.  24)  760,  805 

I'.  Henly  (31  Iowa,  31)    728,  729,  742, 

743,  749,  750,  794,  1001 

V.  Holyoke  (112  Mass.  362)  1018 

V.  Lyons  City  (22  Iowa,  351)  647,  648, 

649,  652,  666 

r.  Marcy  (97  U.  S.  06)  500,  510 

V.  Mayor  (2  Grav,  84)  418,  414 

V.  Portsmouth  (97  U.  S.  110)  500 

V.  Post  (97  U.  S.  110)  500 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (18  Minn.  384)       614 

V.  Wright  (3  111.  App.  602)  1029, 1052 

Warsop  V.  Hastings  (22  Minn.  437)      225 

Wartman  v.  Philadelphia  (33  Pa.  St. 

202)  385,  387,  391 

Warwick  v.  Butterworth  (17  Ind.  129)  455 

V.  Mayo  (15  Gratt  528)  433,  606,  662, 

664,  678,  928 

Washburn  i-.  Cass  Co.  (3  Dillon,  C. 

C.  R.  251)  493,535 

V.  Franklin  (35  Barb.  597)  448 

Washington  v.  Frank  (1  Jones  (Law), 

4.3<))  403 

V.  Harvard  (8  Cusli.  66)  909 

V.  Mays  (1  McArtliur,  63)  358 


Washington  r.  Mayor  of  Nashville  (1 

Swan,  177)  394,  749,  755,  800 
Washington  v.  State  (13  Ark.  752)  731,  738 
Washington  Avenue  in  re  (69  Pa.  St. 

352)  610,  611,  729,  746,  757,  758, 
759,  760,  793,  804,  805 
Washington  University  v.  Rouse  (42 

Mo.  308)  773 

Water  Commissioners  of  Jersey  City 

(31  N.  J.  L.  72)  601 

r.  Ware  (16  Wall.  566)  1058 

Waterman  v.  New  York  (7  Daly,  489)  257 
Waters  v.  Leech  (3  Ark.  110)        831,  397 
V.  People  (13  Mich.  446)  262 

V.  State  ( 1  Gill,  302)  263 

V.  Waterman    (2  Root   (Conn.), 

214)  265 

Watertown  v.  Cady  (20  Wis.  501)        842 

V.  Cowen  (4  Paige,  Ch.  N.Y.  510)  642, 

656 

r.  Fairbanks  (65  N.  Y.  588)      71,  802 

V.  Mayo  (109  Mass.  315)  167,  401 

Waterville  v.  County  (59  Me.  80)         729 

Waterworks   v.  Burkhardt   (41   Ind. 

364)  584,  597 

Watkins  v.  Zwiebusch  (47  Wis.  513)    743 

Watson  y.  Mercer  (8  Pet.  88)  541 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (37  Pa.  St.  469)     621 

V.  South  Kingston  (5  R.  I.  562)     59f. 

D.  Tripp  (11  R.  I.  98)  1054,1064 

V.  Tripp  (23  Am.  Rep.  420)  1054, 1064 

V.  Water  Co.  (36  N.  J.  L.  195)        597 

Wattles  V.  Lapeer  (40  Mich.  624)  769,940 

Watts  V.  Carroll  Parish  (11  La.  An. 

141)  856,  857 

r.  Scott  (1  Dev.  291)  411 

Waugh  V.  Leech  (28  III.  488)  626,  629,  676 
Waupun  V.  Moore  (34  Wia.  450)  401 

Waverly  Works  in  re  (16  Hun,  57)       601 
Wayland  v.  County  Commrs.  (4  Gray, 

500)  589 

Wayne  County  v.  Benoit  (20  Mich. 

176)  272 

V.  Detroit  (17  Mich.  390)  371,  406,  455 

Weaver  v.  Devendorf  (3  Denio,  117)  265, 

327,  925 
V.  State  (39  Ala.  535)  907 

Webb   V.   Commrs.    of   Heme    Bay 

(L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  642)  510,  8-59 

V.  Lafayette  Co.  (67  Mo.  353)        552 
V.  Moler  (8  Ohio,  552)  650 

V.  Neal  (5  Allen,  575)  562 

V.  Port  Bruce  { 19  U.  C.  Q.  B.  626)  141 
Webber  i:  Gray  (24  Wend.  440)  264 

V.  Railroad  Co.  12  Met.  149)  686 

Weber  v.  Lee  County  (6  Wall.  210)    842. 

851 
V.  Harbor  Commrs.  (18  Wall.  57)  138. 
184,  1.36,  187 
V.  Reinliard  (73  Pa.  St.  370)  740,  791 
V.  San  Francisco  (1  Cal.  4.55)  921,945 
V.  Zimmerman  (23  M<1.  45)  868,  870 
Webster  v.  Chicago  (62  III.  302)  754 

V.  Harwinton  (32  Conn.  131)  16,  909, 

910 


CXVl 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


Webster  Co.  v.  T.aylor  (10  Oliio,  117)  486 
Weckler  v.  Chieaiio  (tU  HI.  142)  5'.)8,  010 
Weed  v.  Balston  (TO  N.  Y.  329)  1024,  1038, 

1040 
r.  Greenwicli  (45  Conn.  170)  902,074 
Weeks  v.  Foreman  (1  Harris  (N.  J), 

•237)  405,421,430 

V.  Milwaukee  (10  Wis.  186)  740,  742, 

750,  753,  774,  777,  778,  781,  782, 

1002,  1070 

r.  Shirlev  (33Me.  271)  1012 

Weeman  v.  Smith  (GO  Mo.  292)  706 

Weet  V.  Brockport  (16  N.  Y.  101)  89,  969, 

992,  102G,  1037,  1046 

Wegman  v.  Jefferson  (61  Mo.  55)        1000 

Wehn  V.  Gage  Co.  (5  Neb.  494)       31,  963 

Wcider  v.  East  St.  Louis  (55  111.  133)    754 

Weiglitman  v.  Washington  ( 1  Black, 

39)  89,  960,  902,  982,  1036,  1037, 

1044,  1048.  1052 

Weil  V.  Rieord  (24  N.  J.  Eq.  169)  372,  373 

Weir  V.  Bush  (4  Litt.  433)  246 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (18  Minn.  155)      614 

Weisbrod  v.  Railroad   Co.   (18  Wis. 

35)  630,  631,  637 

Weisenberg  v.  Appleton  (20  Wis.  56) 

1020,  1040,  1042,  1049,  1052 
V.  Appleton  (7  Am.  Rep.  39)        1042, 

1052 
Weismer  v.  Douglas  (64  N.  Y.  91 )  102, 187, 
190,  595,  728,  729,  823,  934 
Weisner  v.  Toledo  (31  Ohio  St.  387)  748 
Weitzel  ».  Concordia  (14  Kan.  446)  407 
Welch  V.  Boston  (126  Mass.  442)  168 

V.  Hotchkiss  (39  Conn.  140)  357,  359, 

402 

V.  Marion  (48  Ala.  291)  943 

V.  People  (2  Doug.  332)  429 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (27  Wis.  108)         620 

V.  Ste.  Genevieve  (1  Dillon,  130)  194, 

195,  196,  199,  200,  290,  292,  293, 

851,  874 

V.  Stowell  (2  Doug.  332)  379,  382,383 

V.  Supervisors  (23  Iowa,  199)         826 

Weld  V.  Proprietors  (6  Greenl.  93)        959 

Welker  v.  Potter  (18  Ohio  St.  85)     58,  65, 

598,  599,  767,  800 

Welland  v.  Railway  Co.  (30  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  147) 

V.  Railway  Co.  (31  U.  C.  Q.  B. 

539) 

Wellcome  v.  Leeds  (51  Me.  313) 

Wellington  v.  Waterloo  (8  U.  C.  C. 

P.  358) 

V.  Wilmot  (17  U.  C.  Q.  B.  82) 

u.  Wilson  (14U.C.C.  P.  299)      662, 

1010,  1033 

V.  Wilson  (16  U.  C.  C.  P.  124)      662, 

1010 
Wells  V.  Atlanta  (43  Ga.  67) 
V.  Battelle  (11  Mass.  477) 
V.  Burbank  (17  N.  H.  393) 
V.  Burnham  (20  Wis.  112) 
V.  McLaughlin  (17  Ohio,  99) 
V.  Weston  (22  Mo.  384) 


607 

607 
702 

214 
214 


121.436 

307,  308 

01 

464,  797 

677 

729 


Wells  Co.  Road,  in  re    (7  Ohio   St. 

16)  613 

Welsford  v.  Weidlein  (23  Kan.  601)    365, 

797 

Wendell  v.  Brooklyn  (29  Barb.  204)     257 

V.  Troy  (39  Barb.  329)        1046,  1047, 

1055 
V.  Troy  (4  Abb.  Ct.  App.  563)     1055 
Wentworth  v.  Hamilton  (34  U.  C.  Q. 

B.  585)  458 

Wertheimer  v.  Mavor  (29  Mo.  254)      433 

West  V.  Bancroft  (32  Vt.  367)        087,  688 

V.  Blake  (4  Blackf.  234)  109,  596 

V.  Greenville  (39  Ala.  69)  363 

V.  Mayor,  (10  Paige,  539)  898 

West,  etc.  V.  Nolan  (48  N.  Y.  513)        925 

Westberry  i\   Kansas  City   (64  Mo. 

493)  272 

Westchester  t-.  Apple  (35  Pa.  St.  284)  1054, 

1063 
West  Covington  v.  Freking  (8  Bush, 

12f)  638,  663 

Westfall  V.  Hunter  (8  Ind.  174)   634,  635, 

644 
Westfield  v.  Mayo  (122  Mass.  100)     1062 
V.  Mayo  (22  Am.  Rep.  292)  1062 

West  Gwillimbury  v.  Hamilton  Rail- 
road Co.  (23  Grant  (Can.), 
383)  909 

West  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix  (6  How. 

183)  596 

V.  Dix  (6  How.  507)  580,  582 

V.  Dix  (6  How.  545)         588,  592,  597 

Westerhaven  v.  Clive  (5  Ohio,  136)      314 

Western    College    i'.    Cleveland    (12 

Ohio  St.  375)      89,  950,  954,  956 
Western    Savings    Fund    Society   v. 

Philadelphia  (31  Pa.  St.  175)  89, 
92,  93,  97,  445.  470,  533,  968,  992 
Weston  V.  Arnold  (L.  R.  8  Ch.  App. 

1084)  178 

V.  Charleston  (2  Pet.  449)      729,  730, 

733 
V.  Syracuse  (17  N.  Y.  110)  158 

Wetmore  v.  Brooklyn  Gas  Co.   (42 

N.  Y. 384)  136 

V.  Story  (22  Barb.  414)  302 

V.  Tracy  (14  Wend.  250)  992 

Weyauwega  t-.  Ayling  (99  U.  S.  112)  510 

Weymouth  v.  Commrs.    (108  Mass. 

142)  84 

Whalen?;.  La  Crosse  (16  Wis.  271)  475,  767 

V.  McComb  (76  111.  49)  194,  407 

Wharf  Case  in  re  (3  Bland.  Ch.  383)  133, 

137 
Wharton  v.  Birmingham  (37  Pa.  St. 

371)  946 

Wheeler  v.  Chicago  (24  111.  105)  456 

V.  Chicago  (57  111.  415)  767 

V.  Cincinnati  ( 19  Ohio  St.  19)  171, 954, 

956,  982,  988 

V.  Cincinnati  (2  Am.  Rep.  368)     982, 

988 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (12  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

227)  787 


TABLE   OF   CASES  CITED. 


CXVll 


Wheeler  v.  Westport  (30  "Wis.  392)  1034, 

1038,  1040 

V.  Worcester  (10  Allen,  591)         994, 

1066,  1075 

Wheeling  V.  Campbell  (12  W.  Va.  36)  672, 

673 
Whicker  i;.  Hume  (14  Beav.  509)  555 

Whidden  v.  Dral^e  (5  N.  H.  13)  131 

Whitaker  v.  West  Boylston  (97  Mass. 

273)  1040,  1051 

Wliitakie  v.  Railroad  Co.  (51  N.  Y. 

666)  713 

Whitby  V.  Flint  (9  U.  C.  C.  P.  449)      244 

V.  Harrison  (18  U.  C.  Q.  B.  603)  206, 

244 
White  V.  Bond  Co.  (58  111.  297)  961,  1009, 

1038 
V.  Charleston  (2  Hill.  571)  956,  903 
V.  County  (58  111.  297)  961,  1038 

V.  Cower  (4  Paige,  510)  638 

V.  Flannigan  (1  Md.  525)        638,  659 
r.  Fuller  (39  Vt.  193)  97,106 

V.  Godfrey  (97  Mass.  472)     632,  662, 
663,  686 
V.  Hindley,  etc.   (L.  R.  10  Q.  B. 

219)  994 

V.  Kent  (11  Ohio  St.  550)      168,  238, 
385,  679 
V.  Lincoln  (5  Neb.  505)  71,  937 

V.   Mayor,  etc.  (4  E.  D.  Smith,  I 

563)  258 

V.  New  Orleans  (15  La.  An.  667)  443, 

464, 
V,  People  (94  III.  604)  742,  753 

V.  Phillipston  (10  Met.  108)    260,  978  ! 
V.  Polk  County  (17  Iowa,  413)       257 
V.  Quincy  (97  Mass.  430)  1064 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (21  How.  575)        479  | 
V.  Stamford  (37  Conn.  587)  70  I 

V.  Tallman  (2  Dutch.  67)       177,  234,  I 
349,  352,  353  ; 
r.  Vermont,  etc.  (21  How.  575)      499 
V.  Washington  (2Cran(;li,  Cir.  C. 

337)  410 

V.  Yazoo  City  (27  Miss.  357)  949,  952, 

1001 
Whitehead  v.  Lowell  (124  Mas.s.  281)  1053 
Wliitehouse  v.  Fellowes  (10  C.  B.  (X.  I 

S.)  765)  994,  995,  998 

Whitely  V.  Lansing  (27  Mich.  131)       808  ' 
Whiteside  v.  People  (26  Wend.  634)    299  j 
Whiting  V.  Boston  (106  Mass.  89)        602, 
604,  896.  922,  923 
V.  Fond  du  Lac  (25  Wis.  167)        491  | 
V.  New  Haven  (45  Conn.  303)         802 
V.  Sheboygan  Railroad   Co.    (25 

Wis.  167)  180,  183 

Whitfield  V.  Longest  (6  Ired.  268)  351, 
352,  354,  355,  735 
Whithorn  u.  Thomas  (7  M.  &G.  1)  316 
AVhitlock  V.  West  (26  Conn.  406) 
Whitney  v.  Clifford  (46  Wis.  138) 
Whitson  V.  Franklin  (34  Ind.  392) 


Whittier  v.  Varney  (10  N.  H.  291) 


413 
1056 
409, 
706 
307 


Whyte  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Nashville  (2 

Swan,  304)        124,  331,  334,  335, 
610,  749,  795,  800 
Wickliffe  v.  Lexington   (11  B.   Mon. 

155)  638 

Wider  v.  East  St.  Louis  (55  111.  133)    736, 

754 
Wier  V.  Railroad  Co.  (18  Minn.  169)  620 
Wiggin  V.  New  York  (9  Paige.  16)  122 
Wiggins  V.  Chicago  (68  111.  372)  735 

V.  McCleary  U^  N.  Y.  -346)  638 

V.  Philadelphia  (2  Brews.  444)       467 
Wilbrund  v.  Avenue  Railroad  Co.  (3 

Bosw.  314)  712 

Wilcox  V.  Smith  (5  Wend.  233)  261 

V.  Deerlodge  Co.  (2  Montana,  £74)  492 

Wild  V.  Deig  (43  Ind.  455)  593 

Wilde  V.  New  Orleans  ( 12  La.  An.  15)  975, 

976 

Wilder  V.  Chicago  (26  111.  182)  239 

Wildy  V.  Washburn  (16  Johns.  49)       923 

Wiley  y.  Board  (11  Minn.  371)  479 

V.  Brimtiekl  (59  111.  306)  191 

V.  Owens  (39  Ind.  429)  789 

r.  Parmer  (14  Ala.  627)  734,735 

V.  Silliman  (62  111.  170)    225,  482,  540 

Wilhelm  v.  Cedar  Co.  (50  Iowa,  254)  461, 

462,  463 

Wilkes  V.  Dinman  (7  How.  89)  265 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  (21  Alb.  L.  J.  32)     944 

Wilkey  V.  Pekin  (19  111.  IGO)  784 

Wilkinson  v.  Albany  (28  N.  H.  9)         373 

V.  Bank  (3  R.  I.  22)  818 

V.  Cheatham  (43  Ga.  258)  728 

V.  Leland  (2  Pet.  627)  541 

r.  Peru  (61  Ind.  1)  510 

Willardu.  Kiliingwortli  (8  Conn.  247)  118, 

288,  337 

V.  Newbury  (22  Vt.  458)      1027,  1064 

V.  Newburyport  (12  Pick.  227)  36,  41, 

42,  117,  120,  297,447 

V.  Presbury  (14  Wall.  676)  742 

Willcocks  in  re  (1  Cow.  402)  294,  295,  297 

WiUey  V.  Greenfield  (30  Me.  452)         484 

William  Street  in  re  (19  Wend.  678)  618, 

748 

Williams  in  re  (4  Ark.  537)  606,  929 

V.  Augusta  (4  Ga.  509)  329,  332,  400, 

406,  421,  424,  4.S0 

V.  Boardman  (9  Allen,  570)  131 

V.  Cammack  (27  :\Iiss.  209)    610,  729, 

748 
V.  Carwadine  (4  B.  &  A.  621)  166 
V.  Church  (1  Ohio  St.  478)    625,  626, 

650 
V.  Clinton  (28  Conn.  264)  1018,  1039, 

1051 
V.  Commrs.  (35  Me.  345)  855 

V.  County  Judge  (27  Mo.  225)        822 
V.  Detroit  (2  Mich.  560)  610,  731,  746, 
749,  764,  779,  790,  794,  795,  800, 
801,  915 
V.  Dunkirk  (3  Lans.  44)  977 

V.  Kenney  (98  Mass.  142)  131 

V.  Larkin  (3  Denio,  114)  287 


CXVIU 


TAP.LE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


Williiuns  r.  Luncnburfij  (21  Tick.  75)  280, 

V.  New  Orleans  (23  La.  An.  507)  957 
V.  New  York.  etc.   Hailroad  Co. 

(10  N.  Y.  !)7)     m:],  0U7,  G'J9,  716 
V.  Pinnev  (25  Iowa,  43i))  007 

V.  I'lank-roa.l  Co.  (21  Mo.  580)  6!)7 
V.  Hailroad  Co.  (3U  Conn.  500)  «34 
V.  Richards  (3  C.  &  K.  8)  713 

f.  Roberts  (88  HI.  13)       191,  192,  542 
V.  School  District  (21  Pick.  75)     203, 
808,  774,  041 
V.  Stein  (38  Ind.  89)  222 

V.  Stein  (10  Am.  Rep.  97)  222 

V.  Smith  (2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  301)         500 
Williamson  t-.  Cass  Co.  (84  111.  3(31)      613 
I'.  Commonwealth    (4    B.    Mon. 

(Ky.)  14G)  405,  410,  421,  425,  420 
t'.  Keokuk  (44  Iowa,  88)   72,  542,  813 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  311)  788 
Williamsport  v.  Commonwealth   (84 

Pa.  St.  487)      145,  147,  154,  687, 
804 
V.  Kent  (14  Ind.  306)  708 

Willimantic  Soc.  v.  School  Soc.  (14 

Conn.  457)  214 

Willis  V.  Booneville  (28  Mo.  543)  431 

V.  Leans  (45  111.  289)  352 

Willoughby  V.  Jenkins  (20  Wend.  96)  632 

Wilminsjton  v.   Rohy  (8  Ired.  Law, 

^250)  731,  735 

Wilson  V.  Atlanta  (60  Ga.  473)  1018 

V.  Berkstresser  (45  Mo.  283)  824 

V.  Charlestown  (8  Allen,  137)     1020, 
1022,  1040,  1051 
V.  Commrs.  (7  W.  &  S.  197)   573,  840 
V.  Goodman  (4  Hare,  54)  264 

V.  Granby  (47  Conn.  S.  C.  22  Alb. 

L.  J.  416)  1015 

V.  Halifax  (L.  R.  3  Ex.  114)  1018 
r.  Hardesty  (1  Md.  Ch.  66)  541 

V.  luloes  (11  G.  &  J.  351)      134,  1.37, 

139 

720,  061, 

963 

r.  Marsh  Co.  (2  Pet.  251)  _      590 

V.  Mayor  of  New  York  (1  Denio, 

595)  127,  260,  040,  050,  098,  1008, 
1070,  1071, 1072,  1074,  1075,  1077 
v.  New  Bedford  (108  Mass.  26; 

s.  c.  11  Am.  Rep.  352)  992 

V.  Payton's  Lessee  (4  Wheat.  77)  440 

V.  Poole  (33  Ind.  443)  806 

r.  Salamanca  (99  U.  S.  499)  510 

V.  School  District  (32  N.  H.  118)    31, 

460,  461 

r   Sexon  (27  Iowa,  15)  635,  637 

Wilton  V.  Falmouth  (3  Shep.  476)        223 

V.  Missouri  (91  U.  S.  275)  734 

Winbigler  ?:.  Los  Angeles    (45  Cal. 

36)  959,  1015 

Winch  V.  Conservators  (L.  R.  7  C.  P. 

471)  141 

Winckler  v.  Great  Western  Railway 

Co.  (18  U.  C.  C.  P.  250)        1051 


V.  JefTerson  (13  Iowa,  181) 


Windham  v.  Portland  (4  Mass.  381)    214, 

216,217 
Wingate  ?'.  Enniskillen  Oil,  etc.  Co. 

(14  U.  C.  C.  P.  379)  459 

Winn  V.  Lowell  (1  Allen,  177)  1024, 1027, 

1029,  1040 

V.  Macon  (21  Ga.  275)  105,  463 

Winona  o.  Hurt"  (11  Minn.  119)    625,  629, 

•  638,  642,  656,  661 

V.  St.  Peter,  etc.  Co.   (94  U.  S. 

181)  73 

Winpenny  r.  Philadelphia  (65  Pa.  St. 

135)  141 

Winsboro  v.  Smart  (11   Rich.   Law, 

551)  389 

Winship  v.  Enfield  (42  N.  II.  197)      1022, 
1023,  1028,  1034,  1035 
AVinslow  V.  Commissioners  (64  N.  C. 

218)  572,  573,  934 

Winston  v.  Mosebey  (35  Mo.  146)  823,  833 

V.  Westfeldt  (22  Ala.  760)  600 

Winthrop  v.  Farrar  (11  Allen,  898)      401 

Wisby  V.  Boutc  (19  Ohio  St.  238)  625,  626, 

629,  640 

Wisconsin  v.  Duluth  (2  Dill.  406)  43 

y.  Lyons  (30  Wis.  61)  130 

Wiston  V.  Philadelphia  (80  Pa.  505)     746, 

759 

V.  Philadelphia  (80  Pa.  112)  781 

Wiswall  V.  Hall  (3  Paige,  313)  137 

Withelm  V.  Cedar  Co.  (50  Iowa,  524)   473 

Witherley  v.  Regent's  Canal  Co.  ( 12 

C.  B.  N.  S.  2)  1023 

Withers  v.  Buckley  (20  How.  84)  580 
Withorn  v.  Thomas  (7  M.  &  G.  1)  223 
Woelpper  v.  Philadelphia  (38  Pa.  St. 

203)  391 

Wolf  V.  Keokuk  (48  Iowa,  120)  743 

Wolfe  V.   Railroad  Co.  (15  B.  Mon. 

(Kv.)  404)  609,  700,  711 

Wood  V.  Bartling  (16  Kan.  109)  224 

V.  Brooklyn  ( 14  Barb.  425)  340 

V.  Draper  (24  Barb.  187)  911 

i;.  Jefferson  Co.  Bank   (0   Cow. 

194)  62,  110,  317 

V.  Louisiana  (5  Dillon,  C.  C.  R. 

122)  539,  939 

V.  Lynn  (1  Allen,  108)  451 

V.  Mears  (12  Ind.  515)   722,  725,  1059 
V.  Peake  (8  Johns.  54)  '    923 

V.  School  District  (44  Iowa,  27)   1057 
r.  Searl  (Bridg.  139)  403,411 

V.  Veal  (5  B.  &  A.  454)  631 

V.  Ward  (3  Exch.  (W.  PL  &  G.) 

748)  1065 

I'.  Waterville  (5  Mass.  294)  456 

Woodbridge  v.  Detroit  (8  Mich.  274)  749, 

750,  790 
Woodbury  v.  Hamilton  (6  Pick.  101)  41 
Woodfolk  V.  Railroad  Co.   (2  Swan, 

422)  621 

Woodruff  V.  Neal  (28  Conn.  168)  632,  640, 

652,  6C)2 
V.  Parham  (8  Wall.  1.30)  734 

v:  Trapnall  (10  How.  200)  03 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


CXIX 


Woods  V.  Colfax  Co.  (23  Alb.  L.  J. 

14)  962 

V.  Henry  (55  Mo.  560)  58,  213 

V.  Lawrence    County    (1    Black. 

88U)    lUl,  50'J,  .522,  525,  52(3,  540 
WooJson  V.  Skinner  (22  Mo.  13)  57t5,  (;4!», 


Woodstock  V.  Gallup  (28  Vt.  587) 


592, 
604 


Woodward  i>.  Calhoun  Co.   (2  Cent. 

L.  J.  396)  536,  537,  538 

V.  Sarsons  (L.  R.  10  C.  P.  743)      226 

Woodyer  v.  Hadden  (5  Taunt.  125)     627, 

637 
Woolf  I'.  Beard  (8  C.  &  P.  373)  1023 

Woolrlcli  i>.  Forrest  (1  Pa.  St.  115)       206 
Worcester   r.    Canal   Co.    (16    Pick. 

(Mass.)  541)  1048 

V.  Walker  (9  Gray,  78)  237 

V.  Worcester  (116  Mass.  193)        732, 

771,  776 

Work  V.  State  (2  Ohio  St.  296)  430 

Workingham  v.  Johnson  (Cas.  Temp. 

Hardw.  285)  338 

Worrell  v.  Munn  (5  N.  Y.  229)  448 

Worsley  v.  Municipality  (9  Rob.  (La.) 

324)  133,  945 

Worth  V.  Fayetteville  ( 1  Winst.  Part 

2d,  70)  788,  918 

Worthington  ;;.  Jeffries  (L.  R.  10  C. 

P.  379)  856 

Wortley  v.  Nottingham  (21  L.  T.  N. 

S.  582)  386 

Wragg  V.  Penn  Township  (94  111.  11)  634 

Wray  r.  Ellis  (1  E.  &E.  276)  405 

V.  Pittsburgh  (46  I'a.  St.  365)         744 

i;.  Toke  (12Q.  B.  492)  344 

Wrexford  v.  People  (14  Mich.  41)  372,  375 

Wright  V.  Bishop  (88  111.  302)        192,  911 

I'.  Boston  (9  Cush.  233)  803,  804,  941 

r.  Chicago  (20  111.  252)  764 

V.  Ciiurch  (1  lloff.  Ch.  225)  561 

V.  Defrees  (8  Ind.  298)  326 

V.  Fawcett  (4  Burr.  2044)  867 

V.  Ilolbrook  (13  Am.  Rep.  12)  264,  991, 

1056 
V.  Holbrook  (52  N.  H.  120)    264,  991, 

1056 

V.  Hughes  (13  Md.  113)  443 

V.  Linn  (9  Pa.  St.  433)  559,  567 

V.  Stockman  (59  Ind.  65)  31 

V.  Victoria  (4  Tex.  375)  570,  634 

Wyandotte  v.  Wood  (5  Kan.  603)  65, 66, 67 

V.  Zeitz  (21  Kan.  649)      155,  436,  441 

Wvatt  I.'.  Green  Bay  (1  Biss.  292)         510 

V.  Harrison  (3  B.  &  A.  871)  1003 

V.  Rondout  (44  Barb.  385)  1026 

Wyley  v.  Wilson  (44  Vt.  401)  286 

Wyman  v.  New  York  (11  Wend.  487)  638 

Wyncoop  v.  Society  (10  Iowa,  185)      165 


Wynehamer  v.  People  (13  N.  Y.  429)     70 
Wynne  v.  Wright  (1  Dev.  &  B.  Law 

19)  356,  735 

Xiquer  v.  Bujac  (5  La.  An.  499)  639,  643, 

645, 064 

Yale  V.  Hampden,  etc.  Turnpike  Co. 

(18  Pick.  357)  1052 

Yarmoutli,  Borough  of  v.  North  Yar- 

moutli  (34  Me.  411)  75,  106 

Yarnold  v.  Lawrence  (15  Kan.  126)    464, 

405 

Yates  V.  Judd  (18  Wis.  118)  633,  639 

V.  Milwaukee  (10  Wall.  497)  136, 139, 

378,  633 

V.  Milwaukee  (12  Wis.  752)  385,  392, 

393 
Yeager  in  re  (11  Graft.  (Va.)  665)  819 
Yeakel  v.  Lafayette  (48  Ind.  116)  683 
Yeatman  v.  Crandell  (11  La.  An.  220)  753, 

777 
York  Buildings  Co.  v.  Mackenzie  (8 

B.  P.  C.  42)  437 

York  V.  Forscht  (23  Pa.  St.  391)  165 

Yost's  Report  (17  Pa.  St.  524)  587 

Young  V.  Bank  (4  Cranch,  384)  109 

i;.  Boston  (104  Mass.  95)  915 

V.  Buckingham  (5  Ohio,  485)  282,  297 

V.  Camden  County  (19  Mo.  309)    482 

V.  Commissioners  (2  N.  &  McC. 

537)  263,  958,  960,  963 

V.  Hall  (9  Nev.  212)  85,  94,  729 

V.  Harrison  (17  Ga.  30)  617 

r.  Harvey  (16  Ind.  314)  1062 

V.  Leedom  (67  Pa.  St.  351)  1068 

V.  New  Haven  (39  Conn.  435)       1027 
V.  New    Haven    (12    Am.    Rep. 

400)  1027 

V.  St.  Louis  (47  Mo.  492)  3-30 

V.  Yarmouth  (9  Gray,  386)    694,  927, 

1064 
Youngblood  v.  Sexton  (32  Mich.  400)  357, 
363,  789,  790,  919 
Youngstown  v.   Moore   (30  Ohio  St. 

133)  1002 

Zabriskie  v.  Railroad  Co.  (23  How. 

(U.S.)  381)  62,180 

V.  Railroad  Co.   (2  Beasley   Ch. 

314)  383,  701,  705 

Zanesville  v.  Richards  (5   Ohio  St. 

589)  738,  739,  782 

Zoeller  v.  Kellogg  (4  Mo.  App.  163)      620 
Zottman   v.   San  Francisco   (20  Cal. 

96)  444,  461,  466,  767 

Zylstra  v.  Charleston  (1  Bay,  382)       345, 

346, 348,  308,  372,  422,  430,  431, 

928 


A   TREATISE 


ox   THE 


LAW  OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


CHAPTER  I. 


MUNICIPAL  INSTITUTIONS.  —  INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  VIEW. 
—  MUNICIPAL   ABUSES. —  REMEDIES   SUGGESTED. 

§  1.  It  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  the  present  treatise  to 
give  a  detailed  account  of  the  origin  and  rise  of  cities  and  towns, 
nor  to  trace  minutely  the  history  of  the  rights,  powers,  and  juris- 
diction with  which  they  are  now  generally  invested.  Such  in- 
quiries more  appropriately  belong  to  the  legal  antiquary  or  to  the 
historian  ;  and  yet  a  brief  historical  survey  of  the  rise  and  pro- 
gress of  municipalities  will  conduce  to  an  intelligent  understand- 
ing, even  in  its  practical  bearings,  of  the  subject  of  which  it  is 
proposed  to  treat.  The  origin  of  towns  and  cities,  and  probably 
the  exercise  by  them,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  of  local  jurisdic- 
tion, may  be  ascribed  to  a  very  remote  period. 

Phoenicia  and  Egypt  were  long  noted  for  their  large  and  splen- 
did cities.  In  the  latter  country,  we  find  Memphis,  one  of  the 
old  world's  proudest  capitals,  whose  site  even  was,  until  very 
recently,  a  matter  of  learned  conjecture.  It  was,  centuries  ago, 
buried  beneath  the  sands  of  the  encroaching  desert,  and  in  our 
own  day  it  has  been  exhumed  in  the  presence  of  Bedouins  too 
wild  to  be  interested  in  the  w^ondrous  revelations  of  its  entombed 
mysteries.  Temples  and  buildings,  vast  and  magnificent,  dat- 
ing, probably,  fifteen  centuries  before  the  Christian  era,  and  pre- 
served by  burial  from  decay  and  spoliation,  may  to-day  be  seen 
almost  in  their  original  perfection.  There,  too,  in  "  old,  hushed 
Egypt  and  its  sands,"  on  the  banks  of  the  Nile,  are  the  massive 

VOL.   I.  1 


2  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  I, 

ruins  of  Thebes  (Diospolis),  the  city  of  "the  hundred  gates," 
antedating  secuhvr  history,  and  claimed  by  the  Egyptians  to  have 
been  the  first  capital,  as  it  undoubtedly  was  one  of  the  oldest 
cities,  of  the  historic  world.  As  the  eye  runs  along  the  colonnades 
of  ruined  temples,  the  mind  runs  back  through  the  Egypt  of  the 
Ptolemies  to  the  Egypt  of  the  Pharaohs,  four  thousand  years  ago, 
when  Thebes  was  in  its  glor}?^  and  its  pride.  But  in  the  midst  of 
these  stupendous  remains  of  this  early  civilization,  we  find  but 
little  evidence  of  their  municipal  history  and  organization.  The 
chief  lesson  they  teach  is  that  they  were  the  centres  of  great 
wealth  and  power  in  the  governing  classes,  and  that  the  people^ 
who  constitute  the  true  wealth  of  modern  cities,  were  at  the  ab- 
solute disposal  of  their  masters,  bound  down  and  degraded  by 
servitude  or  oppression. 

§  2.  Notwithstanding  the  people  of  Greece  were  of  a  common 
blood,  language,  and  religion,  Greece  was  never  politically  united. 
Political  power  resided  not  in  a  number  of  independent  states, 
but  in  a  large  number  of  free  and  independent  cities,  with  districts 
of  country  adjoining  or  attached  to  them.  Each  city,  except  ii> 
Attica,  was  sovereign  —  was  the  sole  source  of  supreme  authority 
—  and  possessed  the  exclusive  management  of  its  own  affairs. 
The  citizen  of  one  was  a  foreigner  in  the  others,  and  could  not, 
without  permission  or  grant,  acquire  property,  make  contracts,  or 
marry  out  of  his  own  city.  The  Grecian  heart  always  glowed 
with  patriotic  fervor  for  the  city,  but  rarely,  except  in  times  of 
great  common  danger,  kindled  with  a  love  for  the  whole  country. 
Although,  according  to  Chancellor  Kent,i  the  "  civil  and  political 
institutions  of  some  of  the  states  of  Greece  bear  some  analogy  to 
the  counties,  cities,  and  towns  in  our  American  States,"  the  anal- 
ogy, it  must  be  confessed,  is  remote  and  uncertain,  and  without 
practical  value  in  the  inquiries  we  are  to  prosecute. 

§  3.  Municipal  Corporations,  as  well  as  Private  Corporations, 
were  familiar  to  the  Roman  Law.  "  To  conceive,"  says  a  modern 
writer,  "  of  ancient  Rome  as  the  capital  of  Italy  in  the  same  sense 
that  London  is  the  capital  of  England,  or  Paris  of  France,  would 
be  a  great  mistake.  London  and  Paris  are  the  chief  cities  of 
their  respective  countries,  because  they  are  the  seat  of  govern- 

1  Kent's  Com.  268,  note. 


§  3.]  INTRODUCTORY   HISTORICAL  VIEW,  3 

ment.  The  people  of  these  cities  and  their  surrounding  districts 
liave  no  privileges  superior  to  those  of  other  English  or  French 
citizens.  But  the  city  of  ancient  Rome,  with  her  surrounding 
territory,  was  a  great  corporate  body  or  community,  holding  sov- 
ereignty over  the  whole  of  Italy  and  the  provinces.  None  but 
persons  enrolled  on  the  lists  of  the  tribes  had  a  vote  in  the  popu- 
lar assemblies  or  any  share  in  the  government  or  legislation  of  the 
citj'."  ^  The  common  division  of  civic  communities  established  by 
the  Roman  government  was  three, — prefectures^  municipal  towns ^ 
and  colonies.  The  prefectures  did  not  enjoy  the  right  of  self- 
government,  but  were  under  the  rule  of  prefects,  and  the  in- 
habitants were  subjected  to  the  burdens  without  enjoying  the 
privileges  of  Roman  citizens.  But  with  the  municipal  toivns 
it  was  different.  They  at  length  received  the  full  Roman  fran- 
chise, "  and  hence,"  says  the  intelligent  writer  just  named, 
"  arose  the  common  conception  of  a  municipal  town  ;  that  is,  a 
community  of  which  the  citizens  are  members  of  the  whole  nation, 
all  possessing  the  same  rights,  and  subject  to  the  same  burdens, 
but  retaining  the  administration  of  law  and  government  in  all 
local  matters  which  concern  not  the  nation  at  large,"  —  a  descrip- 
tion which  answers  almost  perfectly  to  municipal  organizations  in 
England  and  America.  The  colonies,  composed  of  Roman  citizens, 
were  established  by  the  parent  city,  sometimes  to  reward  public 
services,  but  generally  as  a  means  of  securing  and  holding  the  coun- 
try which  had  been  subdued  by  Roman  arms.  The  constitution 
of  these  colonies,  and  the  rights  of  the  citizens  and  communities 
composing  them,  varied  ;  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  our  purpose  to 
trace  these  differences.  The  colonies  were  obliged  to  provide  for 
the  erection  of  a  city,  and  cities  thus  erected  were  called  munici- 
pia.  We  thus  perceive  the  justness  of  the  observations  of  a  dis- 
tinguished modern  historian  and  statesman,  who  says  that  "  the 
history  of  the  conquest  of  the  world  by  Rome  is  the  history  of 
the  conquest  and  foundation  of  a  vast  number  of  cities.  In  the 
Roman  world  in  Europe  there  was  an  almost  exclusive  preponder- 
ance of  cities  and  an  absence  of  country  populations  and  dwell- 
ings." 2     The  nation  was  a  vast  congeries  of  municipalities  bound 

1  Dr.  Liddell,  Eome;  ch.  xxvii.  sec.  8.  but  cities — no  country  places,  no  villages. 

2  M.  Guizot's  History  Civilization  in  The  country  veas  cultivated,  but  not  pco- 
Europe,  Lect.  II.  "Rome,  in  its  origin,  pled.  The  proprietors  dwelt  in  cities, 
was  a  mere  municipality,  a  corporation.  If  we  follow  the  history  of  Rome,  we  find 
In  Italy,  around  liome,  we  find  nothing  that  she  founded  or  conquered  a  host  of 


4  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

together  by  the  central  poAA'er  of  Rome.  When  the  Romans  colo- 
nized and  settled  the  countries  they  had  conquered  they  established 
fixed  governments,  and  carried  with  them,  and  to  a  greater  or  less 
extent  necessarily  imparted  to  their  new  subjects  their  arts,  sci- 
ences, language,  and  civilization.  Although  the  political  condi- 
tion of  the  vanquished  people  was  far  from  being  desirable,  still 
the  immediate  residence  among  them  of  the  civilized  Roman  did 
not  fail  to  produce  effects  more  or  less  beneficial ;  and  thus  the 
municipia,  securing  what  the  Roman  arms  had  achieved,  became 
the  efficient  means  of  spreading  civihzation  throughout  the  Roman 
world. 

§  4.  After  the  subversion  of  the  Roman  Empire  the  towns  of 
Europe  from  the  fifth  to  the  tenth  centurj^  were  in  a  state  neither 
of  servitude  nor  liberty,  though  their  condition  differed  greatly 
in  different  countries.  During  this  period  the  power  and  influ- 
ence of  the  towns  were,  in  general,  on  the  decline.  The  power 
of  the  church  was  great,  and  the  inhabitants  found  their  chief 
protection  in  the  clergy. 

The  establishment  of  i\iQ  feudal  system  worked  a  great  change 
in  the  condition  of  the  towns.  Before  that,  towns,  as  we  have 
seen,  were  the  centres  of  wealth  and  population.  The  ruling 
class  lived  within  them.  The  land  was  cultivated  by  persons 
who  were  not  recognized  as  having  political  rights.  After  feu- 
dalism was  established  this  changed.  The  proprietor  then  lived 
upon  his  estates,  instead  of  living  within  a  town ;  the  town  be- 
came part  of  the  lands  of  the  lord,  or  enclosed  within  his  fief. 
It,  with  its  population,  thus  became  subject  to  his  arbitrary  ex- 
actions, oppression,  and  pillage.  Still  the  towns  gradually  pros- 
pered,  and   with   prosperity   came  wealth ;    with  wealth   came 

cities.    It  was  with  cities  that  she  fought,  country  during  the  Middle  Ages.     The 

it  was  with  cities  slie  treated,  into  cities  only  bequests   of  Rome   consist  of  vast 

she   sent   colonies.     In   the    Gauls   and  monuments  impressed   with  a  municipal 

Spain  we  meet  with  nothing  but  cities ;  character,  destined  for  a  numerous  popu- 

the  country  around  is  marsh  and  forest,  lation,  crowded  into  a  single   spot.      A 

In   the   monuments    left   us   of    ancient  municipal  corporation  Uke  Rome  might 

Rome  we  find  great  roads  extending  from  be  able  to  conquer  the  world,  but  it  was 

city  to  city ;  but  the  thousands  of  little  a  much  more  difficult  task  to  mould  it 

by-paths  now  intersecting  every  part  of  into  one  compact  body."    lb.     See  also  2 

the  country  were  unknown.    Neither  do  Kent's  Com.  270,  note;  Dr.  Adam  Smith's 

we  find  traces  of  tlie  immense  number  interesting  chapter,  Wealth  of  Nations, 

of  churches,  castles,  country  seats,   and  Book  III.  ch.  ii. 
villages  which  were  spread  all  over  the 


§  5.]  INTRODUCTORY   HISTORICAL  VIEW.  5 

power.  Such,  in  general,  was  the  condition  of  the  towns  of  con- 
tinental Europe  down  to  the  eleventh  century.  About  this  time, 
without  any  union  or  concert,  many  of  them  in  most  of  the  coun- 
tries of  Europe  rose  against  the  lords,  and  demanded  for  the  bur- 
gesses, commonalty,  or  inhabitants  a  greater  or  less  measure  of 
enfranchisement.  Sometimes  a  town  failed  in  its  struggle,  and 
its  oppression  was  redoubled  by  the  victorious  lord.  Sometimes 
the  towns  were  aided  by  the  king,  who  was  frequently  not  un- 
willing to  humble  the  arrogant  and  haughty  nobility,  and  thereby 
acquire  the  influence  and  affection  of  those  whom  he  assisted. 
Not  unfrequently,  however,  the  struggle  had  to  be  maintained 
by  their  own  unaided  resources,  and  when  successful,  the  result 
was  the  granting  of  Chaetees,  conferring  more  or  less  extensive 
municipal  immunities  and  rights,  by  the  lords  to  the  burghers. 
These  charters,  as  Guizot  justly  observes,  were  in  the  nature  of 
"  treaties  of  peace  between  the  commons  and  their  lords  "  ;  were, 
in  fact,  "  bills  of  rights  "  for  the  people.^  During  the  twelfth 
century  "  all  Europe,  and  especially  France,  which  for  a  century 
had  been  covered  with  insurrections  by  burghers  against  their 
lords,  was  covered  by  charters  more  or  less  favorable  ;  the  cor- 
porators enjoyed  them  with  more  or  less  security,  but  still  they 
enjoyed  them."  ^ 

§  5.  After  the  overthrow  of  the  Roman  Empire  and  the  civiliza- 
tion which  accompanied  the  Roman  power,  Europe  became  largely 
indebted  to  cities  and  to  the  authority  which  they  acquired  and 
the  jurisdiction  which  they  exercised  for  the  creation  of  the  third 
estate — popular  power  —  and  for  the  development  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  constitutional  or  free  government."* 

The  Italian  cities,  especially  Venice,  Genoa,  and  Pisa,  grew 

1  People  V.  Morris,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  cipal  jurisdiction,  contributed  more,  per- 

325,  334,  per  Nelson,  J.  haps,  than  any  other  cause,  to  introduce 

■^  Guizot's  History  Civihzation  in  Eu-  regular  government,  poHce,  and  arts,  and 
rope,  Lect.  VII.  This  philosophic  and  to  diffuse  them  over  Europe."  Robert- 
valuable  work  is  the  source  from  whence  son's  Charles  V. ;  see  Hallam's  Middle 
are  drawn  most  of  the  statements  of  the  Ages,  ch.  ii.  Part  II.  M.  Guizot  considers 
te.xt  as  to  the  condition  of  the  towns  of  the  three  great  elements  of  modern  civili- 
Europe  from  the  fiftii  to  the  tenth  century,  zation  to  be  the  Feudal  System,  the 
See  similar  account,  Wealth  of  Nations,  Cliristian  Church,  the  Commons,  or  free 
Book  III.  ch.  iii.;  Hallam's  Middle  Ages,  corporate  cities;  Civilization  in  Europe, 
ch.  ii.  Part  II.,  and  notes  to  later  editions.  Lect.  VII. ;  see  also  Wealth  of  Nations, 

**  "The  institution  of  cities  into  com-  Book  III.  ch.  iii.,  on  '"The  Rise  and  Pro- 

munities,  corporations,  or  bodies  politic,  gress  of  Cities  and  Towns,  after  the  Fall 

and  granting  them  the  privilege  of  muni-  of  the  Rouuin  Empire." 


6  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

rich  from  the  commerce  resulting  from  the  vast  armies  that  the 
Crusaders  for  two  hundred  years  had  successively  pushed  for- 
ward into  the  Holy  Land.  The  oppressive  feudal  system  was  at 
this  time  in  full  force  throughout  Europe.  These  Italian  cities 
used  their  power  and  wealth  to  secure  their  independence.  Cities 
and  towns,  as  well  as  people  who  dwelt  in  tlie  country,  were 
alike  subject  to  the  arbitrary  and  oppressive  domination  of  their 
feudal  masters.  Some  of  the  cities,  in  the  eleventh  century,  ob- 
tained their  freedom  by  purchase,  some  by  force,  and  some  by 
gift.  They,  in  effect,  constituted  so  many  little  republics,  with 
the  right  to  manage  their  own  concerns.  In  this  way,  before 
the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century,  nearly  every  considerable  city 
of  Italy  was  enfranchised  or  had  received  extensive  corporate 
immunities  from  the  sovereign  or  lord.  The  happy  effects  were 
soon  perceived  in  the  increased  population  and  improved  con- 
dition.    Liberty  and  prosperity  ever  go  hand  in  hand. 

§  6.  Whether  from  example,  as  asserted  by  Dr.  Robertson,  or 
from  other  causes,  the  same  course  was  adopted  by  the  cities  of 
other  states  in  Europe.  The  King  of  France,  Louis  le  Gros,  and 
his  great  barons  granted  many  charters  of  community,  by  which 
the  inhabitants  were  freed  from  feudal  servitude  and  erected  into 
municipal  corporations,  with  the  j^ower  of  local  government. 
These  charters  contained  grants  of  new  privileges,  and  prescribed 
salutary  methods  for  the  enforcement  of  rights  and  the  redress  of 
grievances.  They  are  interesting  and  instructive,  and  a  brief 
view  of  their  character  is  given  in  the  note.^ 

1  Abstract  of  municipal  charter  in  the  Mid-  faction  for  crimes  was  abolished,  and 
die  Ages.  —  In  tliose  turbulent  times  per-  provision  made  for  the  regular  punish- 
sonal  safety  was  an  object  of  the  first  ment  of  offenders.  5.  A  person  reason- 
importance,  and  this  was  usually  afforded  ably  suspected  to  be  about  to  injure 
to  the  vassal  by  the  baron  or  lord.  The  another  might,  as  with  us  at  the  present 
communities  or  free  towns  which  were  day,  be  compelled  to  give  security  to 
instituted  undertook  to  provide  for  the  keep  the  peace.  These  communities  also 
safety  of  their  members,  independent  of  undertook  to  provide  for  the  security  of 
the  nobles.  For,  1.  All  the  members  property  by  the  following:  1.  Abolishing 
were  bound  by  oath  to  assist  and  defend  the  right  of  the  creditor  to  seize  the 
each  other  against  all  aggressors.  2.  All  effects  of  his  debtor  with  his  own  hand 
residents  in  a  town  made  free,  were  and  by  his  private  authority,  and  com- 
obliged  to  take  part  in  the  mutual  de-  peUing  him  to  proceed  before  a  magis- 
fence  of  its  members.  3.  The  communi-  trate,  who  was  authorized  to  issue  the 
ties  could  execute  the  judgments  of  their  necessary  process  for  the  seizure  and  sale 
magistrates  by  coercion,  if  necessary,  of  property,  humane  and  necessary  e.\- 
4.  The  practice  of  making  private  satis-  emptious  being  allowed.    2.  Every  mem- 


§  6.]  INTKODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  VIEW.  7 

We  meet,  iii  France,  with  great  diversity  in  the  origin  and 
government  of  towns  and  cities.  In  some  of  them,  especially  in 
southern  France,  the  Roman  municipal  system,  more  or  less 
modified  from  time  to  time,  was  perpetuated.  The  Roman 
system  was  formed  upon  an  aristocratic  model.  In  each  mutiici- 
pium  there  was  a  senate,  called  an  ordo  or  curia.  This  was, 
politically  considered,  the  city  ;  it  was  the  governing  body.  The 
mass  of  the  population,  except  in  a  few  cases,  had  no  voice  in 
municipal  affairs.  This  senate  was  composed  of  a  comparatively 
small  number  of  families,  and  the  office  was  hereditary.  When 
the  body  became  reduced  in  numbers  by  death  or  otherwise,  it 
was  not  filled  by  the  people,  but  by  the  survivors. 

Other  towns  or  communities  originated,  in  the  most  natural 
manner,  upon  the  fiefs  or  estates  of  the  feudal  proprietors. 
Many  of  these  estates  became  centres  or  agglomerations  of  popu- 
lation, composed  of  the  working  and  industrial  classes.  Trade 
sprang  up,  and  towns  and  cities  originated.  The  lord,  or  pro- 
prietor, was  interested  in  and  derived  profit  from  their  prosperity. 
To  induce  others  to  settle  there,  he  frequently  conceded  certain 
privileges.  He  did  not  emancipate  them  from  all  feudal  restraints 
and  burdens,  but  these  he  mitigated.  Often  he  granted  lands 
and  privileges  to  all  who  settled  in  towns  on  his  domains,  on 
receiving  a  moderate  fixed  rent  and  specified  military  services. 
These  concessions  had  no  higher  origin  than  the  personal  interest 
of  the  proprietor,  and  were  often  violated.  They  did  not  con- 
stitute the  towns  locally  independent,  or  make  them  true  corpora- 
tions. But,  limited  and  uncertain  as  these  concessions  were,  the 
towns  which  received  them  prospered  and  became  more  or  less 
important. 

Other  places  in  France  were  chartered  towns  and  true  corpora- 

ber  was  obliged  to  bring  some  of  his  never  aspired,"  says  this  accurate  and 
property  into  the  town,  or  build  a  house,  elegant  liistorian,  "  to  the  same  independ- 
or  buy  land  ;  and  in  some  places  the  ence  with  those  in  Italy.  They  acquired 
members  were  bound  for  each  other.  3.  in  France  new  privileges  and  immunities, 
Judgments  by  magistrates,  duly  selected,  but  the  right  of  sovereignty  remained 
took  the  place  of  the  arbitrary  and  capri-  entire  to  the  king  or  baron  within  whose 
cious  decisions  of  the  baron  or  feudal  territories  the  respective  cities  were  situ- 
lord.  4.  Arbitrary  taxation  was  prohib-  ated,  and  from  whom  they  received  the 
ited,  and  regulations  for  an  equal  tax  charter  of  their  freedom."  lb.  Charters 
were  sometimes  especially  prescribed,  defined,  post,  §§  32,  82.  Municipal  char- 
Digested  from  Robertson's  Charles  V.,  ters,  treated  of,  post,  ch.  v.  vi.  Outline 
Vol.  I.  note  xvi.  Proofs  and  Illustra-  of  modern  municipal  charter  in  the 
tions.     "  The    communities    of    France  United  States,  post,  §  30. 


8  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

tions.  In  the  twelfth  century  there  was  the  general  movement, 
before  noticed,  on  the  part  of  the  towns  of  France,  for  their 
enfranchisement,  or  delivery  from  feudal  bondage.  The  extent  of 
this  movement  maybe  judged  from  the  fact  that  the  ro7jal  charters 
of  this  period  are  numbered  by  hundreds,  and  those  granted  by 
the  lords,  by  thousands.  These  were,  in  general,  wrested  from 
the  feudal  proprietors  by  force,  or  the  fear  of  it,  and  conferred 
an  almost  independent  political  existence  upon  the  commune,  or 
town.  These  charters  gave  the  community  the  power  of  having 
its  people  judged  for  offences  by  magistrates  of  their  own  choos- 
ing ;  crimes  and  punishments  were  defined  ;  arbitrary  rents  and 
taxes  abolished,  and  fixed  rents  and  regular  taxes  substituted  ; 
main-morte  and  other  restraints  upon  the  alienation  and  enjoy- 
ment of  property  were  removed.  The  government  of  towns 
thus  created,  unlike  those  which  were  mere  perpetuations  of 
the  Roman  system,  was  formed  upon  a  democratic  model.  A 
voice  was  given  to  all  burghers,  or  persons  of  a  certain  fortune, 
or  who  exercised  a  trade  or  calling.  In  a  word,  with  consider- 
able diversit}^  this  class  of  towns  was  independent,  and  possessed, 
in  local  matters,  the  power  of  self-government.  From  and  after 
the  fourteenth  century,  the  political  power  and  influence  of  the 
towns  of  France  decayed.  The  causes  of  this  decline  have  been 
traced,  with  a  masterly  hand,  by  M.  Guizot,  but  they  do  not 
relate  to  our  purpose.^  In  the  course  of  change,  we  may  re- 
mark that  the  royal  power  over  them  became  predominant,  and 
instead  of  being  self-governed,  they  were  administered  by  the 
intendants,  or  officers  of  the  king  or  emperor,  or  central  author- 
ity at  Paris. 

Towns,  or  communes,  in  modern  France  are  governed  by  a 
mayor  and  council.  By  the  law  of  1855,  in  all  communes  of 
3,000  inhabitants  and  upwards,  these  officers  are  appointed  by 
the  emperor ;  while  in  small  communes  the  appointment  is  made 
by  the  prefect  of  the  department,  himself  appointed  by  the 
emperor.  The  prefect  may  suspend  municipal  councillors,  but 
the  emperor  alone  can  dismiss  them.^ 

§  7.  It  seems  to  be  well  established  that  the  toivns  and  cities 
of  Spain  acquired  charters  of  freedom  at  an  earlier  period  than 

^  History  Civilization  in  France,  Lect.        2  American  Encyclopajdia,  Commune. 
XIX. ;    see  also  Hallam's    Middle  Ages, 
ch.  ii.  Part  II.  and  notes. 


§7.] 


INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  VIEW. 


those  in  France,  England,  or  Germany.^  The  cities  of  Italy,  as 
we  have  seen,  owed  their  freedom,  to  a  large  extent,  to  their 
commercial  importance  and  wealth ;  but  those  of  Spain  owed 
their  privileges  and  jurisdiction  to  an  entirely  different  cause. 
For  nearly  eight  hundred  yeavs  the  Gothic  inhabitants  of  Spain 
had  been  engaged  in  an  almost  uninterrupted  struggle  against 
the  Moors  who  occupied  the  southern  part  of  the  peninsula.^  It 
was  obviously  the  dictate  of  policy,  as  the  Spaniards  gradually 
narrowed  the  boundaries  of  their  enemies'  territory,  to  make 
provision  for  securing  and  holding  the  ground  thus  gained. 
With  this  view,  and  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  themselves 
from  the  frequent  raids  of  their  Arab  neighbors,  liberal  charters 
were  granted  to  towns,  with  extensive  districts  of  country  sub- 
ject to  their  municipal  jurisdiction. 

By  these  grants  or  charters  the  citizens  selected  their  own 


1  The  most  ancient  of  these  regular 
charters  of  incorporation  now  extant  was 
granted  by  Alfonso  V.  in  1020,  to  the 
city  of  Leon  and  its  territory.  It  pre- 
ceded by  a  long  interval  those  granted 
to  the  burgesses  in  other  parts  of  Europe, 
witli  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  Italy. 
Acts  of  enfranchisement  became  frequent 
in  Spain  during  the  eleventh  century, 
several  of  wliich  are  preserved,  and  ex- 
hibit with  sufficient  precision  the  nature 
of  the  privileges  accorded  to  the  inhabi- 
tants. Robertson  (in  his  History  of 
Charles  V.,  Introductory  View),  who 
wrote  when  the  constitutional  antiquities 
of  Castile  had  been  but  slightly  investi- 
gated, would  seem  to  have  no  authority, 
tlierefore,  for  deriving  the  establishment 
of  communities  from  Italy,  and  still  less 
for  tracing  their  progress  through  France 
and  Germany  to  Spain.  Prescott's  Fer- 
dinand and  Isabella,  Introduction,  Vol.  I. 
note  24. 

Hallam,  who,  as  well  as  Prescott,  founds 
his  judgment  upon  the  historical  works 
of  Marina  and  Sempere,  expresses  a  simi- 
lar opinion  as  to  the  early  period  at  wliich 
the  towns  of  Spain  were  invested  with 
chartered  rights  and  privileges.  Middle 
Ages,  ch.  iv. ;  lb.  ch.  ii.  Part  II  and  notes. 

^  Mr.  Irving's  fine  reflections,  in  his 
Alhambra,  upon  this  protracted  and  fa- 
mous contest  between  the  Crescent  and 
the  Cross,  are  not  inappropriate :  "  The 
singular    fortunes    of    the    Arabian    or 


Morisco-Spaniards  form  one  of  the  most 
anomalous  yet  splendid  episodes  in  his- 
tory. A  remote  wave  of  the  great  Ara- 
bian inundation,  cast  upon  the  shores  of 
Europe,  they  seem  to  have  all  the  impe- 
tus of  the  first  rush  of  the  torrent.  But 
repelled  (by  unsuccessful  battle)  within 
the  limits  of  the  Pyrenees,  they  gave  up 
the  Moslem  principle  of  conquest,  and 
sought  to  establish  in  Spain  a  peaceful 
and  permanent  dominion.  Generation 
after  generation,  century  after  century 
passed  away,  and  still  they  maintained 
possession  of  the  land.  With  all  this, 
however,  the  Moslem  empire  in  Spain 
was  but  a  brilliant  exotic  that  took  no 
permanent  root  in  the  soil  it  embellished. 
Severed  from  all  their  neighbors  in  the 
west  by  impassable  barriers  of  faith  and 
manners,  and  separated  by  seas  and  des- 
erts from  their  kindred  of  the  east,  the 
Morisco-Spaniards  were  an  isolated  peo- 
ple. Their  whole  existence  was  a  pro- 
longed, though  gallant  and  chivalric, 
struggle  for  a  foothold  in  a  usurped  land. 
They  were  the  outposts  and  frontiers  of 
Islamism.  Tiie  peninsula  was  the  great 
battle-ground  where  the  Gothic  conquer- 
ors of  the  north  and  the  Moslem  con- 
querors of  the  east  met  and  strove  for 
mastery ;  and  the  fiery  courage  of  the 
Arab  was  at  length  (after  eight  hundred 
years)  subdued  by  tlie  obstinate  and  per- 
severing valor  of  the  Goth." 


10  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  I. 

officers,  incliuling  jiulges  and  a  common  council,  and  enjoyed  all 
the  essential  rights  of  freemen.  In  return,  the  community  or 
city  paid  a  certain  (no  longer  an  arbitrary)  tax  or  rent,  and  owed 
military  service-  For  more  effectual  protection,  the  charters  fre- 
quently prohibited  the  nobles  from  acquiring  real  property  or 
erecting  fortresses  or  palaces  within  the  limits  of  the  community, 
and  subjected  them  to  its  jurisdiction  when  .within  its  territory. 
Large  sections  of  the  adjacent  country,  as  we  have  said,  often 
embracing  towns  and  villages,  were  annexed  to  the  city  or  com- 
munity and  placed  under  its  laws  and  jurisdiction.  "  Thus," 
says  J\Ir.  Prescott,^  to  whom  we  are  indebted  for  this  sketch  of 
the  early  municipalities  of  Spain,  "  while  the  inhabitants  of  the 
great  towns  in  other  parts  of  Europe  were  languishing  in  feudal 
servitude,  the  members  of  the  Castilian  corporations,  living 
under  the  protection  of  their  own  laws  and  magistrates  in  time 
of  peace,  and  commanded  by  their  own  officers  in  war,  were  in 
full  enjoyment  of  all  the  essential  rights  and  privileges  of 
freemen." 

§  8.  Britain  was  one  of  the  last  conquests  of  the  Csesars,  and 
was  one  of  the  first  of  the  western  provinces  upon  which  they 
released  their  hold.  The  Latin  language  did  not  become  the 
language  of  the  people  ;  nor  did  the  Romans,  as  in  many  of  the 
continental  provinces,  fill  the  country  with  memorials  of  their 
skill  and  arts.  The  impressions  made  by  the  mastery  of  the  Ro- 
man were  not  destined  to  be  permanent.  According  to  an 
accurate  explorer  and  philosophic  modern  historian,^  Britain, 
when  subject  to  Rome,  was  divided  into  thirty-three  townships, 
with  a  certain  share  of  local  self-government ;  and  quasi  muni- 
cipal institutions,  for  a  long  time  after  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Roman  power,  constituted  whatever  of  government  the  people 
possessed.  At  the  time  of  the  conquest  of  England  by  William 
of  Normandy  (A.D.  1066)  the  towns  and  boroughs  were  depend- 
ent upon  the  uncertain  protection  of  the  king  or  lord  to  whom 
they  owed  rents  or  service,  and  were  liable  to  discretionary,  that 
is,  arbitrary,  rates  or  talliages.  They  were  not  incorporated,  did 
not  constitute  bodies  politic  ;  and  being  composed  mainly  of  trades- 
men and  the  lower  classes,  were  regarded  by  their  feudal  masters 

1  History  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  Vol.  2  sir  James  Mackintosh's  History  of 
I.  Introduction,  sec.  1.  England,  Vol.  I.  p.  30. 


§  8]  INTKODUCTOEY  HISTOEICAL  VIEW.  11 

as  possessed  of  no  political  and  of  but  few  civil  rights.  None  of 
them  enjoyed  the  right  of  representation  in  the  council  of  the 
nation,  and,  with  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  London  and  a  few 
of  the  greater  towns,  did  not  possess  the  right  of  internal  or 
self-government.  Sometime  between  1100  and  1125  Henry  I. 
granted  to  London  the  original  charter,  in  which  Avere  conferred 
many  valuable  municipal  privileges,  with  the  right,  among  others, 
to  choose  certahi  of  their  own  officers,  such  as  sheriff,  justice, 
and  the  like.^  But  the  right  of  local  self-government  was  not,  in 
general,  conferred  upon  towns  and  boroughs  until  the  time  of 
John,  who  reigned  from  1199  to  1216,^  Meantime  the  towns 
and  cities  continued  to  grow  in  population  and  wealth,  and  as 
these  increased,  their  disposition  to  submit  to  arbitrary  exactions 
proportionately  diminished,  and  their  independent  spirit  and 
desire  for  freedom  from  oppressive  restraints  became  more  mani- 
fest ;  but  still  they  did  not  acquire  sufficient  influence  or  import- 
ance to  be  allowed  a  representation  in  the  states  of  the  kingdom 
for  more  than  two  centuries  after  the  conquest.  It  was  not  until 
the  time  of  Edward  I.  that  cities  and  boroughs,  then  mostly  in- 
corporated, obtained  the  right  of  returning  members  to  parliament. 
The  legislative  power  of  the  kingdom  was  at  this  time  vested 
in  the  king  and  the  council,  afterwards  called  the  parliament. 
This  council  was  constituted  of  the  spiritual  and  lay  peerage. 
The  commonalty  of  England  had  no  voice  or  part  in  the  legisla- 
ture. This  wise  and  politic  prince  was  greatly  distressed  for 
money,  and  instead  of  attempting  to  raise  it  by  the  levy  of  arbi- 
trary taxes,  which  were  submitted  to  with  murmurs  and  yielded 
sparingly,  preferred  to  obtain  it  by  the  prior  voluntary  consent 
of  the  cities,  towns,  and  boroughs.  He  hit  upon  this  device. 
He  caused  writs  to  be  issued  to  about  one  hundred  and  twenty 
cities  and  boroughs,  enjoining  them  to  send  to  parliament,  along 
with  the  two  knights  of  the  shire,  two  deputies  from  each  borough 
within  their  county^  with  authority  from  their  respective  commu- 

1  Tliis    famous   charter  lias   no  date,  is  to  be  found  the  germ  of  all  our  foreign 

Its  substance  is  given  in  Norton's  Cora-  attachment  laws.      PuUing's  Laws,  etc., 

mentaries  on  the  History,  Constitution,  of  London,  188;  Hallam's  Middle  Ages, 

and  Chartered  Franchises  of  the  City  of  Vol.  III.  ch.  viii.  Part  III.     Mr.  Norton 

London,  and   its  various   provisions   ex-  gives  the  substance  of  all  the  charters  of 

plained    and    commented    on,   Book    II.  London   from   the   time   of  William  the 

ch.  ii.  p.  337.     In  the  latter  clause  of  this  Conqueror  to  the  present. 
charter  is  an  allusion  to  the  very  ancient        ^  Hallam's  Middle  Ages,  Vol.  III.  clx 

custom  of  foreign  attachment,  in  which  viii. 


12  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  I. 

iiities  to  consent  to  what  the  king  and  his  council  should  require 
of  them.  As  the  experiment  proved  successfal,  and  more  money 
was  obtained,  and  with  less  trouble,  than  in  the  former  way,  the 
practice  was  continued.  And  this  according  to  the  best  opinions 
of  learned  and  careful  inquirers,^  is  the  origin  of  popular  repre- 
sentation, and  of  the  House  of  Commons  itself,  the  latter  consti- 
tuting, as  Macaulay  well  observes,  "  the  archetype  of  all  the 
representative  assemblies  which  now  meet,  either  in  the  old  or 
new  world."  2  For  this  England  and  the  world  are  in  a  great 
measure  indebted,  as  this  cursory  review  shows,  to  the  spirit  of 
independence  which  animated  the  towns  and  cities,  and  to  the 
pecuniary  wants  of  an  enterprising  and  ambitious  monarch. 

The  political  powers  thus  acquired  by  towns  gave  them  politi- 
cal importance.  This  power  was  courted  and  controlled  by  the 
crown.  The  king's  judges  decided  that  no  corporation  was  valid 
without  the  sanction  of  the  king,  and  most  of  the  corporations 
from  time  to  time  applied  to  the  crown  for  a  grant  or  confirma- 
tion of  privileges.  Their  dependence  upon  the  crown  was  thus 
established,  and  the  crown,  as  a  check  upon  the  nobles,  encour-. 
aged  jjopular  elections  by  the  wJiole  corporate  assembly?  In  the 
course  of  time  it  was  found  that  these  representatives  were  more 
formidable  to  the  power  of  the  crown  than  the  nobility  had  been. 
In  Elizabeth's  reign  compliant  judges  decided  that,  although  the 
right  of  election  was,  by  the  original  constitution  or  charter,  in 

1  Hallam's  Middle  Ages,  Vol.  III.  eh.  the  recent  history  of  Great  Britain,  in 
viii. ;  Hume,  England,  Vol.  I.  App.  II.  ;  several  memorable  instances,  shows  that 
Dr.  Adam  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations,  against  tlie  declared  and  positive  determi- 
Book  3,  ch.  iii.,  whose  account  of  the  nation  of  the  commons  neither  the  crown 
condition  of  tlie  towns  and  boroughs  at  nor  the  lords,  in  any  struggle  relating  to 
this  period,  and  the  decay  of  the  power  popular  rights,  can  make  effectual  resis- 
of  tlie  lords  and  the  growth  of  the  power  tance.  So  a  close  observer  of  our  Ameri- 
of  the  inhabitants  of  the  cities  is,  though  can  institutions  will  discover  that  both 
brief,  perspicuous  and  satisfactory.  Nor-  the  senate  and  the  executive,  on  contested 
ton's  Com.  Lond.  109.  A  distinctive-  questions,  ultimately  yield  to  the  con- 
feature  of  boroughs,  in  England,  is  the  trolling  power  and  growing  importance 
right  of  the  borough  to  elect  members  of  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
parliament.  There  tlie  term  "borough  "  ^  An  English  municipal  corporation, 
includes  cities  as  well  as  villages,  but  in  as  will  be  explained  hereafter,  consisted 
the  United  States  the  term  "  borough  "  is  usually  of  one  or  more  select  or  definite 
not  in  very  general  use,  and,  when  used,  bodies,  and  an  indefinite  body,  the  latter 
designates  an  incorporated  village  or  being  generally  composed  of  the  bur- 
town,  but  not  a  city.  American  Cyclo-  gesses  or  citizens;  and  a  Corporate  As- 
pagdia.  Vol.  III.  5.36,  Borour/h.  sembly  was  a  meeting  of  all  the  bodies 

■-  History  England,  Vol.  I.  ch.  i. :  "The  and  not  of  the  select  or  definite  bodies 

Crown  !  it  is  the  House  of  Commons  !  "  alone.     Post,  sec.  35. 
said  an  English  statesman  in  1858 ;  and 


§  8.]  INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  VIEW.  13 

the  whole  assembly,  still  from  tisage,  even  when  within  the  time 
of  memory,  a  by-law  may  be  lyresumecl  giving  the  right  of  elec- 
tion to  a  select  class  (more  readily  controlled  by  the  crown)  in- 
stead of  the  whole  body.^ 

Afterwards,  to  increase  the  power  of  the  crown,  James  incor- 
porated towns  or  boroughs,  endowing  them  with  the  parliament- 
ary franchise,  but  confining  the  exercise  of  the  right  to  vote  to 
select  classes.  The  immense  power  of  popular  representation 
was  a  most  active  agency  in  the  overthrow  of  Charles  I.  This 
power  proving  inimical  to  the  arbitrary  schemes  of  the  Protector, 
he  expelled  the  members  by  violence,  and  subdued  their  author- 
ity iu  parliament  by  force.  He  then  secured  this  power  in  his 
own  favor  by  expelling  all  hostile  magistrates  and  officers  and 
supplanting  them  with  others  of  his  own  creation. 

On  the  restoration,  Charles  II.  commenced  his  reign  by  recon- 
structing the  corporations  and  filling  them  with  his  own  crea- 
tures. Judges,  also  creatures  of  the  king,  holding  commissions 
during  his  pleasure,  aided  him  in  his  scheme  to  acquire  absolute 
control  over  all  of  the  corporations  of  the  realm.  London,  as  the 
largest  and  most  influential,  was  selected  as  an  example,  and  m 
1683  the  famous  quo  toarranto  was  issued  against  the  city  to  de- 
prive it  of  its  charter,  for  two  alleged  violations,  one  of  which 
was  stale  and  both  frivolous.  Judgment  passed,  of  course,  against 
the  city,  and  its  ancient  charter  was  abrogated.^  As  a  condi- 
tion of  its  restoration,  it  was,  among  other  things,  provided  that 
thereafter  the  mayor,  sheriff,  clerk,  etc.,  should  not  exercise  their 
office  without  the  king's  consent ;  and  that  if  the  king  twice  dis- 
approved of  the  officers  elected  by  the  corporation,  he  might  him- 
self appoint  others.  In  short,  the  city  was  deprived  of  the  right 
of  electing  its  own  officers,  and  made  dependent  upon  the  crown. 
Such  also  was  the  fate  of  most  of  the  considerable  corporations 
in  England.     The  whole  power  was  in  the  hands  of  the  king.^ 

Nor  were  these  arbitrary  proceedings  confined  to  England. 
In  1683  writs  of  quo  zvarranto  and  scire  facias  were  issued  for  the 
purpose  of  abrogating  the  charter  of  Massachusetts.     Patriotism 

1  Willcock  on  Municipal  Corp.  8;    3  etc.  of  London,  Book  I.  ch.  xx. ;  see  also 

Hallam's  Const.  History,  52.  T/ie   Case  of  the  City  of  London,  8  How. 

'^  Ilex  V.  City  of  London,  Mich.  3.3  Car.  State  Trials,  1340,  et  seq. 

II. ;  2  Show.  202 ,  PuUing's  Laws,  etc.  of  ^  Tliere  were  eighty-one  quo  warranto 

London,  14.     The  history  of  tlie  seizure  informations   broiiglit  against  municipal 

of  the  city  franchises,  by  virtue  of  the  corporations  by  Charles  II.  and  James  II. 

writ   of   quo   warranto  is  given   at  some  2  Chandl.  Com.  Debs.  316. 
length  by  Norton,  Com.  on  the  History, 


14  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

and  religion  mingled  their  fervors  and  combined  in  its  defence, 
Init  in  vain.  Servile  judges,  in  June,  1684,  one  year  and  six  days 
after  judgment  against  the  city  of  London,  adjudged  the  charter 
to  be  conditionally  forfeited  ;  and  the  charter  government  was 
displaced,  and  popnlar  representation  superseded  by  an  arbitrary 
commission.  In  1687  similar  writs  were  issued  against  the  char- 
ters of  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut ;  when,  as  is  well  known, 
the  people  of  the  latter  colony  unsuccessfully  endeavored  to  pre- 
serve this  cherished  muniment  of  their  liberties  by  concealing  it 
in  the  charter  oak.  The  colonies,  as  a  result  of  the  English  rev- 
olution of  1688,  had  their  charters  restored.  Very  shortly  after 
the  accession  of  William  and  Mary  a  bill  to  restore  the  rights  of 
those  English  corporations  which  had  surrendered  their  charters 
to  the  crown  during  the  reigns  of  James  11.  and  Charles  II.  was 
introduced  into  parliament,  and  became  a  law,  with  the  general 
applause  of  men  of  all  parties.^ 

Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the  fact  that  in  the  time 
of  Elizabeth,  the  controlling  power  of  corporations  was  virtually 
vested  in  "  select  bodies."  To  remedy  these  and  many  other 
abuses,  the  Municipal  Corporations  Reform  Act  (5  and  6  Will. 
IV.  ch.  76)  was  passed.  This  statute  sought  to  restore  corpora- 
tions to  their  original  design,  as  institutions  for  the  local  govern- 
ment of  the  place,  to  be  controlled  by  those  interested  in  it,  and 
not  by  a  favored  few.  It  is  undoubtedly  true,  as  remarked  by 
Mr.  Hallam,  that  "no  political  institution  can  endure  which 
does  not  rivet  itself  to  the  hearts  of  men  by  ancient  prejudice  or 
acknowledged  interest."  That  is,  it  cannot  permanently  endure, 
although  it  may  exist  long  after  it  ought  to  cease.  If  ever  an 
institution  outlived  its  usefulness  —  lived  long  after  it  became  a 
positive  evil — it  was  the  municipal  corporations  of  England, 
prior  to  the  reform  act  just  mentioned,  and  which  became  a  law 
as  late  as  1835.  In  many  important  places  in  England  the  num- 
ber of  corporators  ranged  as  low  as  from  ten  to  thirty.  In  a 
large  majority  of  the  municipalities,  the  corporations  were  close  ; 
that  is,  the  governing  body  had  the  power  to  determine  who 
should  be  admitted  to  freedom  or  membership  ;  and  often  the 
privilege  was  conferred  upon  non-residents  and  the  residents  ex- 
cluded. The  most  important  franchise  they  possessed  was  that 
of  electing  members  of  parliament,  and  this,  in  many  places,  was 

1  Macaulay's  History  of  England,  Vol.  III.  ch.  xv.,  where  a  graphic  account  of 
the  history  of  its  passage  is  given. 


§  8.]  INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  VIEW.  15 

the  principal  function  of  the  corporation.  Not  only  were  the 
councils  self-elective,  but  their  tenure  was  for  life.  They  were 
frequently  controlled  by  a  single  party,  and  all  persons  entertain- 
ing other  opinions  were  excluded.  The  corporations  were  not  in 
sympathy  with,  nor  did  they  reflect  the  wishes  of,  the  people 
over  whom  they  exercised  local  jurisdiction.  There  was  no 
check  upon  mal-administration.  The  property  was  wasted  :  ex- 
travagance characterized  the  expenditures  of  money ;  officers 
were  elected  by  the  irresponsible  councils  from  favoritism  or  de- 
votion to  party. 1  One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Reformed  House 
of  Commons  was  the  overthrow,  in  1835,  of  this  intolerable  sys- 
tem, by  the  passage  of  the  above-mentioned  Municipal  Corpora- 
tion Statute,^  to  which  we  shall  have  frequent  occasion  to  refer 
in  the  subsequent  pages  of  this  work. 

Lord  Brougham  has  many  titles  to  the  affectionate  regard  of 
posterity.  Few  of  his  claims  are  stronger,  however,  than  those 
which  arise  from  his  faithful  and  effective  services  in  promoting 
the  reform  of  the  Municipal  Corporations  of  Great  Britain,  by 
abolishing  these  self-elected  and  perpetual  councils,  by  organiz- 
ing the  corporations  upon  a  uniform  model,  and  by  establishing 
in  the  act  the  principle  that  the  councils  should  be  selected  for 
short  and  fixed  periods  by  the  votes  of  the  burgesses,  thus  recog- 
nizing and  adopting  the  representative  system.  Mr.  Willcock, 
in  concluding  his  treatise,^  had  recommended  a  similar  reform, 
but  disclaimed  being  so  visionary  as  to  suppose  it  would  soon  be 
effected,  since  parliament  would  not  willingly  relinquish  its  influ- 
ence over  venal  boroughs,  and  members  elected  by  corporations 
would  not  be  allowed  by  their  constituents  to  abandon  their 
ancient  though  unjust  privileges  ;  but  within  ten  years  from  the 
time  his  language  was  penned,  the  reform  of  which  he  almost 
despaired  was  accomplished. 

1  Glover  on  Corp.  XXXVIII.  et  seq. ;  and  6  Will.  4,  ch.  76,  but  there  was  sub- 

Keport  of   Commissioners  of  Corporate  sequentiy  passed    an   important    statute 

Inquiry,  32,  et  seq.  known  as  the  London  Corporation  Eeforra 

^  Pos/,  sec.  35,  note,  where  the  leading  Act  of  1849.     See  Supplement  to  Pull- 
provisions  of  this  important  enactment  ing's  Laws,  etc.,  of  London. 
are  given.  On  the  15th  day  of  August,  1867,  after 

^  Willcock's  Municipal  Corp.  518,  514.  a  memorable  struggle  between  the  lords 
London,  with  its  "great  and  notable  fran-  and  the  commons,  what  is  known  as  the 
chises,  liberties,  and  customs,"  to  treat  of  Disraeli  Reform  Bill  became  a  law,  by 
which,  says  Lord  Coke  (4  Inst.  250),  which  the  right  to  vote  for  members  of 
"  would  require  a  whole  volume  of  itself,"  parliament  for  boroughs  was  greatly  ex- 
was  not  embraced  in  the  general  act  of  5  tended. 


16  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

§  9.  In  general,  all  of  our  American  cities,  toivns,  and  counties 
are  public  corporations,  full  or  quasi.  They  are  created  by  the 
legislature,  and  are  usually  endowed  with  power  to  decide  and 
control  local  and  subordinate  matters  pertaining  to  their  respec- 
tive localities.  The  number  and  freedom  of  these  local  organiza- 
tions, whereby  political  power  is  conferred  upon  the  citizens  of 
the  various  local  subdivisions  of  a  State  who  have  a  right  to  vote 
and  to  regulate  their  own  domestic  concerns,  constitute  a  marked 
feature  in  our  free  system  of  government.^  In  general,  each 
road-district,  each  school-district,  each  city  and  each  county  is, 
as  to  its  local  concerns,  self-governed.  These  organizations  are, 
of  course,  subject  to  the  legislature  of  the  State,  and  their  acts, 
so  far  as  they  affect  private  rights,  are  also  subject  to  judicial 
cognizance  and  review.  The  policy  of  creating  local  public  and 
municipal  corporations  for  the  management  of  matters  of  local 
concern,  runs  back  to  an  early  period  in  our  colonial  history,  is 
exhibited  in  all  our  legislation,  and  expressly  or  impliedly  guar- 
anteed in  our  state  constitutions.^ 

The  elective  franchise  in  these  "  local  republics "  is  not,  as 
was  the  case  until  recently  in  England,  a  privilege  dependent 
upon  custom  or  usage,  or  confined  to  certain  classes,  but  is  uni- 
form and  universal,  extending  to  all  of  the  adult  male  citizens. 
Old  sarums  and  rotten  boroughs,  as  well  as  property  qualifica- 
tions, are  unknown.  The  effect  of  this  policy  of  establishing  cities, 
towns,  and  districts  of  country  into  bodies  politic,  and  investing 

1  "In  all  quasi  corporations,  as  cities,  Mich.  44,  1871.     State  v.  Noyes,  10  Fost. 

towns,  parishes,  school-districts,  member-  30  N.  H.  292  ;  Bow  v.  Allenstown,  34  N. 

ship  is  constituted  by  living  within  cer-  H.  351 ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Eep.  103,  and  in  Peo- 

tain  Umits."     Per  Shaw,  C.  J.,  Overseers  pie  v.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228.  s.  c.  15  Am. 

of  Poor,  etc.  v.  Sears,  22  Pick.  122,  130.  Hep.  202.    Post,  sec.  58.    Text  approved. 

Hill  V.  Boston,  122  Mass.  344,  356;  1877.  Luerhman  v.  Taxing  Dist.  2  Lea,(Tenn.) 

s.  c.  23  Am.  Eep.  332.  425.     Caldwell  v.  Justices,  etc.,  4  Jones 

"  When  a  man,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Mor-  (Nor.  Car.)  Eq.  323  ;  Comw.  v.  Roxbury, 

«on,  Oakes  I'.  Hill,  10  Pick.  333,  34G,"  moves  9   Gray,  503,  510,   511,  note  written  by 

into  a  town,  he  becomes  a  citizen  thereof  Mr.  Gray,  now  the  Chief  Justice  of  the 

(if  possessed  of  the  requisite  qualifications  Supreme  Judicial    Court   of    Massachu- 

as  to  age,  etc.,  and  if  he  remains  the  re-  setts  ;  Webster  v.    Harwinton,  32  Conn, 

quisite  length  of  time)  whatever  may  be  131;   People  v.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50, 

the  desire  of  himself  or  the  town."     See  1873.     Post,  sec.  58.      In   Mr.  Quincy's 

Post,  chapters  ii.  and  iii. ;  People  v.  Cana-  Municipal  History  of  Boston,  ch.  i.,  will 

day,  73  Nor.  Car.  189.    s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  be  found  an  interesting  historical  account 

465.     Post,  sec.  195.  of  the  constitution  of  towns  in  Massachu- 

2  Kent  Com.  275;  Cooley  Const.  Limit,  setts,  and  of  their  mode  of  organization 

ch.  viii.     See  also  this  learned  author's  and  operation,  particularly  of  the  town 

recent  opinion  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  of  Boston.    Pos(,  sec.  28. 
Michigan,  in  the  People  v.  Hurlbut,  24 


§10.] 


INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  VIEW. 


17 


the  citizens  thereof  with  the  power  of  self-government,  has,  upon 
the  whole,  been  most  happy. 

It  has  been  noticed  by  Chancellor  Kent  ^  that  one  of  the  most 
philosophical  and  fair  of  foreign  observers  ^  was  much  struck  with 
the  institutions  of  New  England  towns  ;  and  considered  them  as 
small  independent  republics  in  all  matters  of  local  concern,  and 
as  forming  the  principle  of  the  life  of  American  liberty  existing 
at  this  day  .2 


§  10.  The  value  of  our  system  of  municipal  institutions,  to 
which  we  have  thus  alluded,  may  be  seen  on  comparing  the  politi- 
cal condition  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  with  that  of  the 
people  of  modern  France,  —  selected  as  a  fair  example  of  a  govern- 
ment without  municipal  freedom.  France  is  a  highly  centralized 
government.  The  state  there  is  everything ;  the  people,  nothing. 
Municipal  institutions,  with  a  democratic  element,  or  with  the 
power  of  independent  local  self-government,  belong,  there,  to  the 
past.  The  central  power  governs  and  regulates  everything.  It 
provides  amusements,  constructs  roads,  bridges,  internal  improve- 


1  Kent  Com.  275,  note. 

2  M.  De  Tocqueville,  Democracy  in 
America :  "  Local  assemblies  of  citizens 
constitute  the  strength  of  free  nations. 
Municipal  institutions  are  to  liberty  what 
primary  schools  are  to  science ;  they 
bring  it  within  the  people's  reacli ;  they 
teach  men  how  to  use  and  how  to  enjoy 
it.  A  nation  may  establish  a  system  of 
free  government,  but  without  the  spirit 
of  municipal  institutions  it  cannot  have 
the  spirit  of  liberty."  M.  De  Tocque- 
ville's  Democracy  in  America,  ch.  v. 

"From  time  immemorial,"  says  one 
of  the  ablest  of  American  common  law 
judges,  "  the  counties,  parishes,  towns 
and  territorial  subdivisions  of  the  countrj', 
have  been  allowed  in  England,  and,  in- 
deed, required,  to  lay  rates  on  themselves 
for  local  purposes.  It  is  most  convenient 
that  the  local  establishments  and  police 
should  be  sustained  in  that  manner  ;  and, 
indeed,  to  the  interest  taken  in  them  by 
the  inhabitants  of  tiie  particular  districts, 
and  the  information  upon  law  and  pub- 
lic matters  generally  thereby  diffused 
through  the  body  of  the  people,  has  been 
attributed  by  profound  thinkers  much  of 
that  ■  spirit  of  liberty   and  capacity   for 

VOL.  I.  2 


self-government,  through  representatives, 
which  has  been  so  conspicuous  in  the 
mother  country,  and  which  so  eminently 
distinguishes  the  people  of  America. 
From  the  foundation  of  our  government, 
colonial  and  republican,  the  necessary 
sums  for  local  purposes  have  been  raised 
by  the  people  or  authorities  at  home. 
Court-houses,  prisons,  bridges,  poor- 
houses  and  the  like  are  thus  built  and 
kept  up ;  and  the  expenses  of  maintaining 
the  poor,  and  of  prosecutions  and  jurors, 
are  thus  defrayed,  and  of  late  (in  North 
Carolina)  a  portion  of  the  common-school 
fund,  and  a  provision  for  the  indigent 
insane  are  thus  raised,  while  the  high- 
ways are  altogether  constructed  and  re- 
paired by  local  labor,  distributed  under 
the  orders  of  the  county  magistrates. 
When,  therefore,  the  constitution  vests 
the  legislative  power  in  the  General  As- 
sembly, it  must  be  understood  to  mean 
that  power  as  it  had  been  exercised  by 
our  forefathers,  before  and  after  their 
migration  to  this  continent."  Per  Ruffin, 
J.,  in  Caldwell  v.  Justices,  etc.,  4  Jones 
(N.  Car.)  Eq.  323,  1858. 

8  Post,  sees.  28,  29  and  notes. 


18 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  I. 


ments,  controls  trade,  inspects  manufactures.  The  effects  of  this 
system  are  thus  stated :  "  Develop  in  the  slightest  degree  a 
Frenchman's  mental  faculties,  and  he  flies  to  a  town  as  surely  as 
steel  filings  fly  to  a  loadstone.  From  all  parts  of  France  men  of 
great  energy  and  resource  struggle  up,  and  fling  themselves  on 
the  world  of  Paris.  There  they  try  to  become  great  functionaries- 
Through  every  department  of  the  eighty-four,  men  of  less  energy 
and  resource  struggle  up  to  the  provincial  capital.  All  who  have, 
or  think  they  have,  heads  on  their  shoulders,  struggle  into  town 
to  fight  for  office  which  the  government  alone  can  confer.  The 
whole  energy  and  knowledge  and  resource  of  the  land  are  bar- 
relled up  in  the  towns :  all  between  towns  is  utter  intellectual 
barrenness." 

Such  are  the  withering  effects  of  a  centralized  despotism.^ 
How  different  with  the  decentralized  system  of  government  in 
the  United  States,  where  each  local  constituency  chooses  its  own 
officers ;  each  road-district,  school-district,  village,  town,  city, 
and  county  administers  its  own  affairs  by  the  people  and  for  the 
people.^ 


1  The  foregoing  was  written  prior  to 
the  dethronement  of  Napoleon  III.  and 
the  communist  insurrection.  Tlie  com- 
mune  movement  was  the  natural  result 
of  a  popular  uprising  against  centralized 
power.  But  it  went  to  tlie  other  extreme, 
and  contemplated,  without  a  national  com- 
pact, a  league  of  3G,000  independent  cuin- 
munes.  Their  declared  scheme  was  this : 
"  France  shall  no  longer  be  one  and  indi- 
visible, empire  or  republic  ;  she  shall  form 
a  federation,  not  of  small  states  or  prov- 
inces, but  of  free  cities,  linked  together 
only  so  far  as  shall  be  consistent  with  the 
most  absolute  decentralization  and  local 
government."  {Journal  Officiel  de  la  Com- 
mune, April,  1871.)  But  a  scheme  which 
made  cities,  and  not  the  nation,  practicalh"^ 
the  sovereign,  is  radically  defective,  and 
ojien  to  all  the  objections  which  M.  Maz- 
zini  has  so  forcibly  pointed  out  against  it. 
(Contemporary  Review,  1871;  reprinted 
Litlell's  Living  Age,  July,  1871,  p.  112.) 

-  Barrett  v.  Brooks,  21  Iowa,  144,  1-51. 
By  constitutional  provision  in  New  York, 
"  It  belongs  exclusively  to  the  local 
power  to  fill  the  offices,  either  by  election 
or  appointment,  as  the  legislature  may 
direct."    Met.  Bd.  Health  v.  Heister,  37 


N.  Y.  661,  667;  People  v.  McDonald,  69 
N.  Y.  362,  1877;  People  v.  Lynch,  51 
Cal.  15,  1875,  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  677  ; 
Opinion  of  McKinstry,  J.  See  also  con- 
stitution of  Illinois,  art.  ix.  sec.  5:  con- 
strued, People  V.  Chicago,  51  111.  17, 1869; 
s.  c.  2  Am.  Rep.  278.  Constitutional  pro- 
visions as  to  qualitication  of  electors  and 
the  right  of  equal  representation  held  to 
apply  to  municij^al  corporations.  People 
V.  Canaday,  73  N.  C.  198,  1875;  s.  c.  21 
Am.  Rep.  465. 

Speaking  of  the  power  of  creating  debts 
and  expending  money  by  the  city  of  Phil- 
adelphia, under  the  Consolidation  Act  of 
1854,  in  a  case  where  it  was  held  that  this 
power  had  been  invested  in  the  legisla- 
tive department,  and  not  with  subordi- 
nate officers,  Agneiv,  J.,  observed  :  "  It  is 
manifest  that  the  city  government  is 
founded,  in  its  leading  thought,  upon  the 
American  idea  of  a  popular  representa- 
tive government,  its  immediate  prototype 
being  the  form  of  the  state  government. 
The  right  of  supervision  and  control  is 
therefore  vested  in  the  councils  as  the 
immediate  representatives  of  the  popular 
will,  which  exerts  and  enforces  its  deter- 
mining power  by  means   of  constantly 


§11.] 


INTRODUCTORY   HISTORICAL   VIEW. 


19 


§  11.  To  civil  territorial  divisions,  erected  into  corporations 
with  defined  powers  of  local  administration,  and  the  extension  of 
the  right  to  vote  for  officers,  to  all  who  are  to  be  affected  by  their 
action,  are  due  that  familiarity  with  public  aftaii's  and  that  love 
of  liberty  and  regard  for  private  rights  and  property,  which  are 
characteristic  of  the  best  government  in  Europe,  Great  Britain, 
and  the  best  in  America,  the  United  States.^ 

But  the  picture  is  not  without  its  shadows.  The  value  of  our 
municipal  corporations  has  been  impaired  by  evils  that  are  either  in- 
herent in  them  or  that  have  generally  accompanied  administration. 
Some  of  these  may  be  briefly  indicated  :  1.  Men  the  best  fitted,  by 
their  intelligence,  business  experience,  capacity,  and  moral  charac- 
ter, for  local  governors  or  counsellors  are  not  always,  it  is  feared,  — 
it  might  be  added,  are  not  generally,  —  chosen.  2.  Those  chosen 
are  too  apt  to  merge  their  individual  conscience  in  their  corporate 


recurring  elections.  Subject  to  this  pri- 
mary power  the  affairs  of  this  people, 
great  in  numbers,  wealth,  intelligence,  and 
influence,  are  conducted  by  departments 
and  officers."  Philadelphia  v.  Flanigen, 
47  Pa.  St.  21,  186 i. 

"  Wliat,"  inquired  the  Abbe  Sieyes,  in 
a  book  which  gave  a  powerful  impulse  to 
the  public  mind  at  the  beginning  of  the 
French  revolution  of  1789, —  "  What  is  the 
tiers  etat  ?"  And  he  answered,  "  Noth- 
ing." Wliat  ought  it  to  be?  "Every- 
thing." Thiers's  French  Rev.  Vol.  I.  p. 
27  ;  Guizot's  Hist.  Civ.  Lect.  VII.  On  this 
popular  foundation  rests  not  only  our  na- 
tional government,  but  as  well  all  of  our 
state  governments  and  municipal  institu- 
tions. People  V.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228 ; 
s.  c.  1-5  Am.  Rep.  202,  1873. 

'  After  alluding  to  tlie  antiquity  of  this 
system  in  England,  Mr.  Justice  Bronm,  in 
tlie  important  case  of  The  People  v.  Dra- 
per ( 1-5  N.  Y.  532,  5G2),  says  :  "  Wherever 
the  Anglo-Saxon  race  have  gone,  wher- 
ever they  have  carried  their  language  and 
laws,  these  communities,  each  with  a 
local  administration  of  its  own  selection, 
have  gone  with  them.  It  is  here  that 
tliey  have  acquired  the  habits  of  subor- 
dination and  obedience  to  the  laws,  of 
patient  endurance,  resolute  purpose,  and 
knowledge  of  civil  government,  which 
distinguish  them  fron  every  other  people. 
Here  have  been  the  seats  of  modern  civ- 


ilization, the  nurseries  of  public  spirit, 
and  the  centres  of  constitutional  liberty. 
They  are  the  opposites  of  those  systems 
which  collect  all  power  at  a  common  cen- 
tre, to  be  wielded  by  a  common  will  and 
to  effect  a  given  purpose,  which  absorb 
all  political  authority,  exercise  all  its  func- 
tions, distribute  all  its  patronage,  repress 
the  public  activity,  stifle  the  public  voice, 
and  crush  out  the  public  liberty."  "  The 
city  corporations,"  remarks  a  modern 
jurist,  "  which  have  grown  up  in  modern 
times,  are  of  infinite  advantage  to  society  ; 
they  bind  men  more  closely  together  than 
does  any  other  form  of  political  associa- 
tion. But  that  which  most  remarkably 
distinguishes  them  from  the  close  corpo- 
rations which  formerly  existed,  is  the 
general  spirit  of  freedom  which  has  been 
breathed  into  them.  More  especially  is 
this  the  case  with  town  corporations  in 
America,  which  are  as  different  from  those 
of  England  as  the  latter  are  from  similar 
corporations  in  Scotland  and  Holland." 
Per  Grimke,  J.,  Rosebaugh  v.  Saffin,  10 
Ohio,  31,  36 ;  see  also  State  v.  Noyes,  10 
Post.  (N.  H.)  202;  and  the  opinion  of  ^Z- 
len,  J.  in  People  v.  Albertson,  5-5  N.  Y. 
50,  57,  1873,  where  he  says,  "The  right 
of  (local)  self-government  lies  at  the  foun- 
dation of  our  institutions."  Post,  sec.  183. 
People  V.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228,  1873;  s 
c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202. 


20  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  I. 

capacity.  Under  the  shield  of  their  corporate  character,  men 
daily  do  acts  which  they  would  never  do  as  individuals.  The 
public,  as  if  to  retaliate,  acts  towards  corporations  in  the  same 
spirit.  The  notion,  though  not  avowed,  is  quite  too  much  acted 
upon,  that  all  that  can  be  obtained  from  a  public,  or,  indeed,  from 
any  corporation,  is  legitimate  spoil.  Against  these,  men,  usually 
honest  and  fair  in  their  dealings,  do  not  scruple  to  make  demands 
which  they  would  never  make  against  an  individual.^  3.  As  a 
result,  the  administration  of  the  affairs  of  our  municipal  corpora- 
tions is  too  often  unwise  and  extravagant. 

§  12.  Municipal  corporations  are  institutions  designed  for  the 
local  government  of  towns  and  cities ;  or,  more  accurately,  towns 
and  cities.  Math  their  inhabitants,  are,  for  purposes  of  subordinate 
local  administration,  invested  with  a  corporate  character.  To 
clothe  them  with  powers  to  accomplish  purposes  which  can  better 
be  left  to  private  enterprise,  is  unwise.  Their  chief  function 
should  be  to  regulate  and  govern.  To  invest  them  with  the 
powers  of  individuals  or  private  corporations,  for  objects  not  per- 
taining to  municipal  rule,  is  to  pervert  the  institution  from  its 
legitimate  ends,  and  to  require  of  it  duties  it  is  not  adapted  satis- 
factorily to  execute.  Some  of  the  evil  effects  of  municipal  rule 
have  arisen  from  legislation  unwisely  conferring  upon  municipali- 
ties, at  the  suggestion,  often,  of  interested  individuals  or  corpo- 
rations, powers  foreign  to  the  nature  of  these  institutions,  and 
not  necessary  to  enable  them  to  discharge  the  appropriate  func- 
tions and  duties  of  municipal  administration.  Among  the  most 
conspicuous  instances  of  such  legislation  may  be  mentioned  the 
power  to  aid  in  the  building  of  railways,  to  incur  debts,  often 
without  any  limit,  or  any  which  is  effectual,  and  to  issue  negotiable 
securities.^  The  result  has  generally  been  that  debts  are  incurred 
so  large  that  they  press  with  disastrous  weight  on  the  municipality 
and  its  citizens.  Extraordinary  and  extra-municipal  powers  have 
been  too  often  incautiously  or  unwisely  granted,  and  the  charters 

1  These  effects  are  not  confined  to  tliis  shrink  from,  did  he  feel  personally  re- 
side of  the  Atlantic.  "  It  is  a  familiar  sponsible."  Essays,  No.  VII.  p.  261,  Am. 
fact,"  says  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  "  that  Ed.  1865;  and  see  76.  Essays,  No.  5,  for  a 
the  corporate  conscience  is  ever  inferior  description  —  perhaps  too  highly  colored 
to  the  individual  conscience  —  that  a  body  — of  the  unsatisfactory  working  of  the 
of  men  will  commit,  as  a  joint  act,  that  English  reformed  municipal  corporations, 
which  every  individual  of  them  would  ^  See  joost,  sees.  117,  153. 


§  13  ]  INTRODUCTORY  HISTORICAL  VIEW.  21 

or  constituent  acts  carelessly  worded  and  loosely  construed.  The 
remedy  suggested  by  experience  consists,  in  part,  in  constitutional 
provisions  prohibiting  the  granting  of  special  charters,  and  re- 
quiring all  municipal  corporations  to  be  organized  under  general 
laws.  The  legislature  should  also  be  prohibited  from  allowing 
municipal  corporations  to  engage  in  extra-municipal  projects, 
or  to  incur  debts  or  levy  taxes  for  such  purposes.  The  pow- 
ers granted  to  such  corporations,  and  especially  the  power  to 
levy  taxes,  should  be  more  carefully  defined  and  limited,  and 
should  embrace  such  objects  only  as  are  necessary  for  the 
health,  welfare,  safety,  and  convenience  of  the  inhabitants.^ 
The  amount  of  indebtedness  that  may  be  incurred,  even  for 
municipal  purposes,  should  also  be  limited  beyond  the  power  to 
be  evaded. 

§  13.  Experience  has  also  demonstrated  the  necessity  of  more 
power  and  more  responsibility  in  the  executive  head  of  our  muni- 
cipal institutions.  Too  often  the  duties  of  the  mayor  or  executive 
officer  are  only  nominal,  and  to  these  he  gives  but  little  attention 
—  a  natural  result  of  his  want  of  importance,  and  of  his  inability 
to  control  the  administration  of  municipal  affairs.  If  the  ofl&ce 
were  clothed  with  dignity  and  real  authority ;  if  the  mayor  were 
invested  with  the  veto  power ;  if  he  had  the  sole  right  to  appoint 
and  the  unrestricted  power  to  suspend  or  remove  subordinate 
officials  or  heads  of  departments,  then  the  citizens  could  justly 
demand  of  him  that  he  should  be  individually  responsible  for  the 
proper  conduct  of  the  concerns  of  the  municipality,  and  if  griev- 

^  "  Tlie  great  increase  of  corruptions  in  dom  of  strictly  guarding  and  limiting  the 
municipal  bodies,  growing  out  of  the  power  to  create  debts  is  well  enforced  by- 
ability  to  create  by  taxation  a  fund  which  this  learned  judge.  He  truly  says  :  "A 
may  be  squandered  has  made  many  think-  va//rf  contract  is  uncontrollable,  demand- 
ing men  doubt  tiie  wisdom  of  endowing  ing  its  performance  at  the  hands  of  the 
them  with  the  power."  Mr.  Justice  Mil-  judiciary,  and  calling  to  their  aid  the 
/er,  in  Rusch  v.  Des  Moines  County,  1  whole  power  of  the  government.  If  an 
Woolw.  C.  C.  313,  322,  1868.  And  note  appropriation  for  its  payment  is  not  made 
the  striking  observations  of  Mr.  Justice  this  year,  it  must  be  in  tlie  next  or  some 
Aijnew  on  the  abuses  which  attend  tlie  following."  Agneiv,  J.,  47  Pa.  St.  21.  The 
administration  of  finances  by  municipal  gigantic  and  astounding  frauds  and  cor- 
bodies  and  officers,  and  the  too  prevalent  ruption  which  have  been  recently  revealed 
frauds  in  the  procurement  and  execution  (1871)  in  the  local  administration  of  the  af- 
of  public  contracts,  Philadelphia  y.  Flani-  fairs  of  the  great  city  of  New  York  have 
gen,  47  Pa.  St.  21 ;  Hague  v.  Philadel-  awakened  public  attention  to  the  neces- 
pliia,  48  /I).  527.  In  the  case  first  cited,  sity  of  more  efficient  checks  upon  the 
the  suggestion  of  the  text  as  to  the  wis-  misuse  of  municipal  powers. 


22  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

ances  exist,  they  would  know  to  whom  to  apply  for  remedy,  or 
upon  whom  to  fix  the  blame. ^ 

§  14.  Municipal  corporations,  as  they  exist  in  this  country,  it 
may  be  further  suggested,  are  of  exceedingly  complex  character. 
Kot  here  to  allude  to  the  legal  complexity  which  inheres  in  their 
corporate  nature,  we  may  mention  that  which  arises  from  the 
exceedingly  diverse  character  of  the  multiform  duties  which  are 
confided  to  their  agency  and  management,  requiring  the  delega- 
tion of  corresponding  powers  and  provisions  for  their  execution. 
Some  of  these  powers  are  civil  or  political,  and  not  peculiar  to 
the  people  of  the  municipality  ;  others  are  purely  local,  of  which 
some  concern  all  the  inhabitants  and  some  affect  only,  or  mainly, 
the  property  owners,  on  whom  exclusively  the  burden  of  their 
exercise,  or  administration,  falls.  In  the  ordinary  municipal  char- 
acters, the  essential  differences  between  these  powers  have  not 
been  regarded,  and,  in  consequence,  adequate  checks  upon  their 
abuse  have  not  been  provided. 

§  15.  The  general  right  of  suffrage  will  remain,  and  in  the  au- 
thor's judgment,  ought,  as  respects  the  popular  branch  of  the  mu- 
nicipal council,  to  remain  as  extensive  in  the  municipality  as  in 
the  state  ;  and  all  schemes  of  municipal  reform,  whatever  their 
merit,  based  upon  restricting  it  within  narrower  limits  than  those 
here  suggested,  are  simply  impracticable.  But  if  special  or  extra 
municipal  powers  be  granted,  not  affecting  civil,  political,  or  other 

1  Extended   observation   of  the  work-  the  same  effect  is  Mr.  Charles  Nordhoff 's 

ings  of  our  municipal  institutions  has  sat-  interesting  article  in  the  North  American 

isfied  the  author  that  the  views  expressed  Review  for  October,  1871,  entitled  "  The 

in  the  text  are  sound,  and  he  is  glad  to  Misgovernment  of  New  York,  — A  Eem- 

find  them  confirmed  by  the  Hon.  Josiah  edy   Suggested."      This  vigorous  writer 

Quincy  in  his  Municipal  History  of  Bos-  sketches  the  defects  in  the  ordinary  mu- 

ton,  published  in  1852.      Mr.  Quincy  was  nicipal   charters  with  a   masterly  hand, 

mayor  of  the  city  of  Boston  from  1823  to  and  shows  great  familiarity  witli  the  sub- 

1828,  inclusive,  and  his  opinions  are  en-  ject  of  which   he   treats.     Many  of  his 

titled  to  great  respect,  not  only  from  his  suggestions  may  be  profitably  studied  by 

known  ability,  but  large   experience  in  the  legislator. 

municipal  affairs.     It  is  interesting  to  ob-         It  may  be  observed  tliat  in  England, 

serve  the  striking  coincidence  of  his  views  under  tlic  reformed  municipal  system,  the 

with  the  recommendations  of  tlie  "  Com-  right  to  a  voice  in  municipal  management 

mittee   of   Seventy,"  of  New  York,   re-  is  restricted  to  occupiers  of  houses  and 

specting  municipal  administration  and  the  taxpayers,  and  yet  we  have,  as  we  have 

importance  of  efficient  executive  superin-  seen,  complaints   of   municipal  extrava- 

tendence,  control,  and  responsibility.  Mu-  gance,  corruption,  and  abuse, 
nicipal  History  of  Boston,  ch.  v.  And  to 


§  17.]  INTRODUCTORY   HISTORICAL   VIEW.  23 

rights  which  concern  all,  but  which  involve  directly  the  expendi- 
ture and  payment  of  money,  it  is  but  just  that  the  project  should 
be  required  to  have  the  support  of  a  majority  in  value  of  those 
who  must  pay  the  expense. 

No  small  proportion  of  corruption  and  abuse  in  municipalities 
has  had  its  source  in  their  authority  to  make  public  and  local  im- 
provements. The  power  is  usually  conferred  without  sufficient 
care,  and  the  rights  of  the  property  owners  (often  made  liable  for 
the  whole  cost  of  the  improvement  or  amount  of  the  expenditure} 
not  sufficiently  respected  and  guarded. 

§  16.  As  it  is  the  part  of  wisdom  to  organize  municipal  corpo- 
rations under  general  laws,  so  that  defects  and  abuses,  being  gen- 
erally seen  and  felt,  will  be  the  more  speedily  and  better  remedied 
by  the  legislature,  so  municipal  corporations  should  be  shorn 
of  the  power  to  grant  special  privileges,  except  under  ordi- 
nances, general  in  their  character,  and  which,  on  equal  or  fair 
terms,  will  make  them  available  to  all. 

The  courts,  too,  have  duties,  the  most  important  of  which  is  to 
require  these  corporations,  in  all  cases,  to  show  a  plain  and  clear 
grant  for  the  authority  they  assume  to  exercise  ;  to  lean  against 
constructive  powers^  and,  with  firm  hands,  to  hold  them  and  their 
officers  within  chartered  limits. 

§  17.  If  we  analyze  the  complex  powers  usually  conferred  upon 
a  municipality  in  this  country  we  shall  discover  that  these  are  of 
two  general  classes,  viz.,  1.  Those  which  relate  to  health,  good 
government,  efficient  police,  etc.,  in  which  all  the  inhabitants  have 
an  equal  interest  and  should  have  an  equal  voice.  2.  Those 
which  directly  involve  the  expenditure  of  money,  and  especially 
those  relating  to  local  improvements  the  expense  of  which  ulti- 
mately falls  upon  the  property  owners.  As  respects  these  the 
controlling  voice  should  be  with  those  who  have  to  bear  the  bur- 
den. No  municipal  management,  in  the  long  run,  will  be  other 
than  extravagant  and  unwise  where  the  members  of  the  govern- 
ing body  have  no  substantial  interests  in  the  municipality,  and 
where  they  have  more  to  gain  by  plundering  than  by  protecting 
it.  To  insure  good  government  there  must  be  a  real  identity  of 
interest  between  the  members  of  the  governing  body  and  the 
municipality.     The  problem  of  satisfactory  municipal  rule  is  one 


24  MUNICIPAL   CORPOEATIONS.  [CH.  I. 

which  is  urgently  demanding  solution,  but  it  is  also  one  which,  it 
is  feared,  must  be  slowly  wrought  out  by  experience.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  the  indebtedness  of  the  municipalities  in  this  country 
already  exceeds  $1,000,000,000 ;  much  of  it  was  created  without 
the  sanction  of  those  who  will  have  to  pay  it,  and  it  is  pressing 
with  disastrous  force  upon  the  burdened  taxpayer.  A  remedy  is 
imperatively  demanded,  and  suggestions  herein  made  have  been 
offered  in  the  hope  that  some  of  them  may  not  be  wholly  unde- 
serving of  attention. 

But  with  all  the  drawbacks  we  have  mentioned  (many  of  which 
are  remediable)  our  system  of  popular  municipal  organization  and 
administration  is,  beyond  controversy,  the  fairest  to  the  individual 
citizen,  and,  on  the  whole,  the  most  satisfactory  in  its  operations 
and  results  of  any  that  has  yet  been  devised.  Any  other  conclu- 
sion would  be  equivalent  to  admitting  that  the  people  are  incapa- 
ble of  enlightened  self-government ;  that  holders  of  property  ought 
alone  to  be  respected,  and  alone  to  be  endowed  with  political  and 
municipal  rights;  that  the  few  should  govern  the  many,  and  that 
our  representative  system,  the  flower  of  modern  civilization,  based 
upon  the  equal  right  of  every  man  to  a  voice  in  the  local  and  gen- 
eral government,  is  a  failure.  It  is  not  improbable  that  we  some- 
times overestimate  the  shortcomings  in  the  practical  workings  of 
our  municipal  system,  for  the  system  is  an  open  one,  in  which  all 
are  interested  to  bring  its  abuses  into  the  light  of  day.  The  fine 
observation  of  Lord  Bacon  fitly  applies :  "  The  best  governments 
are  always  subject  to  be  like  the  fairest  crystals,  wherein  every  icicle 
or  grain  is  seen,  which  in  a  fouler  stone  is  never  perceived.^^  ^ 

1  Text  in  preceding  sections  cited  and  approved.    People  v.  Harper,  91  111.  357. 


§  18.]  CORPORATIONS   DEFINED   AND   CLASSIFIED.  25 


CHAPTER  II. 

CORPORATIONS  DEFINED  AND  CLASSIFIED.  —  PRIVATE,  PUBLIC, 
AND  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS  DEFINED  —  THE  NEW  ENG- 
LAND  TOWN. 

§  18.  (9a)  A  corporation  is  a  legal  institution,  devised  to  con- 
fer upon  the  individuals  of  which  it  is  composed  powers,  privi- 
leges, and  immunities  which  they  would  not  otherwise  possess, 
the  most  important  of  which  are  continuous  legal  identity  and 
perpetual  or  indefinite  succession,  under  the  corporate  name, 
notwithstanding  successive  changes,  by  death  or  otherwise,  in 
the  corporators  or  members  of  the  corporation.  It  conveys,  per- 
haps, as  intelligible  an  idea  as  can  be  given  by  a  brief  definition 
to  say  that  a  corporation  is  a  legal  person,  with  a  special  name, 
and  composed  of  such  members,  and  endowed  with  such  powers, 
and  such  only,  as  the  law  prescribes.  The  most  accurate  notions 
of  complex  subjects  come  not  from  definition,  but  description  ; 
and  in  the  course  of  the  present  work  we  shall  describe  the  class 
of  corporations  with  which  it  deals,  by  their  creation,  constitu- 
tion, faculties,  powers,  duties,  liabilities,  and  purposes.  Some  of 
the  definitions  and  deductions  in  the  earlier  reports  amuse  by 
their  quaintness,  but  are  without  much  practical  value.  "  As 
touching  corporations,"  says  Lord  Coke,  "  the  opinion  of  Man- 
wood,  chief  baron,  was  this :  that  they  were  invisible,  immortal, 
having  no  conscience  or  soul ;  and  therefore,  no  subpoena  lieth 
against  them ;  they  cannot  speak,  nor  appear  in  person,  but  by 
attorney."  ^ 

Chief  Justice  Marshall's  description  of  a  corporation  is  remark- 
able for  its  general  accuracy  and  felicitous  expression  :  "  A  cor- 
poration is  an  artificial  being,  invisible,  intangible,  and  existing 
only  in  contemplation  of  law.  Being  the  mere  creature  of  the 
law,  it  possesses  only  those  properties  which  the  charter  of  its 
creation  confers  upon  it,  either  expressly  or  as  incidental  to  its 

1  2Bulst.  233;  Willc.  Corp.  15. 


26  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CPI.  II. 

very  existence.  These  are  such  as  are  supposed  to  be  best  cal- 
culated to  effect  the  object  for  which  it  is  created.  Among  the 
most  important  are  immortality  [in  the  legal  sense  that  it  may  be 
made  capable  of  indefinite  duration],  and,  if  the  expression  may 
be  allowed,  individual  if y,  —  properties  by  which  a  perpetual  suc- 
cession of  man}'  persons  are  considered  as  the  same,  and  may  act 
as  a  single  individual.  They  enable  a  corporation  to  manage  its 
own  affairs,  and  to  hold  property  without  the  perplexing  intri- 
cacy, the  hazardous  and  endless  necessity  of  perpetual  convey- 
ances for  the  purpose  of  transmitting  it  from  hand  to  hand.  It 
is  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  clothing  bodies  of  men,  in  succession, 
with  these  qualities  and  capacities  that  corporations  were  in- 
vented and  are  in  use.  By  these  means  a  perpetual  succession 
of  individuals  are  capable  of  acting  for  the  promotion  of  the  par- 
ticular object  like  one  immortal  being."  i  Thus,  though  the 
members  change,  the  corporation  itself  remains,  in  its  legal  per- 
sonality, the  same,  all  of  its  members,  past  and  present,  consti- 
tuting, in  law  but  one  person,  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
Thames,  or  the  Mississippi,  is  still  the  same  river,  though  the 
parts  composing  it  are  constantly  changing.^  The  above  observa- 
tions are,  in  general,  applicable  to  all  corporations,  private  as  well 
as  public  and  municipal. 

§  19.  (9J)  Municipal  corporations  are  bodies  politic  and  cor- 
porate of  the  general  character  above  described,  established  by 
law  to  assist  in  the  civil  government  of  the  country,  but  chiefly 
to  regulate  and  administer  the  local  or  internal  affairs  of  the  city, 
town,  or  district  which  is  incorporated.^ 

1  Dartmouth   College  v.  Woodward,  4  2  Glover,  8;  1  Black.  Com.  468. 

Wheat.  636,  1819.     Other  definitions:  4  ^  "A  body  politic,"  says  Lord  Coke, 

Black.  Com.  37;  1  Kyd  Corp.  13;  Grant  "is  a  body  to  take  in  succession,  framed 

Corp.  3,  4 ;  Angell  &  Ames  Corp.  sec.  1 ;  as  to  its  capacity  by  policy,  and  therefore 

Glover  Corp.  3,  6.     Willcock  declines  to  is  called  by  Littleton   (sec.  413)  a  body 

define,  but  describes  corporations  :  Munic.  politic;  it  is  called  a  corporation,  or  body 

Corp.   15.      The   last-named    author   ob-  corporate,  because  the  persons  are  made 

serves  that  "  a  corporation  continues  the  into  a  body,  and  are  of  capacity  to  take, 

same  body  politic  from  its  creation  to  its  grant,  &c.,  by  a  particularnarae."  Viner's 

dissolution,  unaltered  by  the  revolution  Abr.  Corp.  (a  2).     A  municipal  corporation 

of  ages  or  the  successive  changes  of  its  is  also  defined  to  be  "  An  investing  the 

members,   so   that   it  is  unnecessary  to  people  of  a  place  with  the  local  govern- 

iTiake  grants  to   them  and  their  succes-  ment  thereof."     Salk.  183.     "  This  latter 

sors,  or  to  declare  their  obhgations  bind-  description,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Nelson,  in 

ing  on  their  successors."     lb.  16;  Glover,  the  People  v.  Morris,  13  Wend.  325,  334, 

8  ;  Grant,  5;  7  Vin.  Abr.  358,  363.  1835,  "  is  the  most  appropriate,  and  is  jus- 


§  21.]  CORPORATIONS  DEFINED   AND   CLASSIFIED.  27 

§  20.  We  may,  therefore,  define  a  municipal  corporation  to  be 
the  incorporation,  by  the  authority  of  the  government,  of  the 
inhabitants  of  a  particular  place  or  district,  and  authorizing  them 
in  their  corporate  capacity  to  exercise  subordinate  specified  pow- 
ers of  legislation  and  regulation  with  respect  to  their  local  and 
internal  concerns.  This  power  of  local  government  is  the  distin- 
guishing feature  of  a  municipal  corporation  proper.^ 

"  Tlie  definition  of  a  municipal  corporation,"  says  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri,  "would  only  include  organized  cities  and 
towns  and  other  like  organizations  with  political  and  legislative 
powers  for  the  local  civil  government  and  police  regulation  of 
the  inhabitants  of  particular  districts  included  in  the  boundaries 
of  the  corporation  "  ;  and  it  was  accordingly  held  that  the  incor- 
porated board  of  public  schools  was  not  a  municipal  corporation 
within  the  meaning  of  an  act  declaring  that  no  person  shall  be 
eligible  to  a  certain  office  who  shall  hold  any  office  under  a  muni- 
cipal corporation.^ 

In  AVisconsin  the  term  "municipal  corporation,"  as  used  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  State,  does  not  include  towns,^  and  when 
used  in  Statutes  it  is  presumed  to  be  used  in  the  sense  in  which 
tlie  term  is  used  in  the  Constitution,  unless  a  different  legislative 
intention  appears ;  and  in  that  State  municipal  corporations, 
properly  and  strictly  so  called,  do  not  include  towns  not  chartered, 
school  districts,  or  other  quasi  corporations.^ 

§  21.  Creation  and  powers.  —  Like  other  corporations,  mu- 
nicipal corporations  must  with  us  be  created  by  statute.  They  pos- 
sess no  powers  or  faculties  not  conferred  upon  them,  either  express- 
ly or  by  fair  implication,  by  the  law  which  creates  them  or  other 
statutes  applicable  to  them.  Persons  residing  in  or  inhabiting  a 
place  to  be  incorporated,  as  well  as  the  place  itself,  are  —  both  the 
persons  and  the  place  —  indispensable  to  the  constitution  of  a  muni- 
cipal corporation.^     Artificial  succession,  also,  is  of  the  essence  of 

tified  by  the  history  of  these  institutions,  the   meaning  of   the  terms    "  municipal 

and  the  nature  of  tlie  powers  witii  which  corporations  "  and  "  corporations  for  mu- 

they  were,  and  are,  invested."     It  is  also  nicipal  purposes,"  as  used  in  the  Consti- 

quoted  by  Campbell,  C.  J.,  in  the  People  tution  of  the  State.     Post,  sec.  49, 
V.  Hurlburt,  24  Mich.  44,  1871.  ^  Norton  i^.  Peck,  4  Wis.  714. 

1  2  Bouv.  Law  Diet.  21 ;  2  Kent,  275;  *  Eaton  v.  Manitowoc  Co.  (power  to 
People  V.  Morris,  supra.  purchase   and  hold   tax   certificates),  44 

2  Heller ),'.  Stremmel,  52  Mo.  309,  1873 ;  Wis.  489,  1878. 

State   V.   Leffingwell,    54  Mo.    458,   471,         '^  Galesburg  v.  Hawkinson,  75  111.  166, 
1873.     This  last  case  discusses  at  length     1874.    Post,  sec.  183. 


28  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  II. 

such  a  corporation.  Municipal  corporations  are  created  and  exist 
for  tiie  public  advantage,  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  their  officers  or 
of  particular  individuals  or  classes.  The  corporation  is  the  arti- 
ficial body  created  by  the  law,  and  not  the  officers,  since  these 
are,  from  the  lowest  up  to  the  councilmen  or  mayor,  the  mere 
ministers  of  the  corporation.  Even  the  council,  or  other  legisla- 
tive or  governing  body,  constitutes,  as  it  has  been  well  remarked, 
neither  the  corporation,  nor  in  themselves  a  corporation. ^  It  is 
quite  impossible,  in  any  brief  space,  to  convey  an  adequate  idea 
of  tlie  exact  nature  and  properties  of  a  municipal  corporation. 
There  is  notliing  in  the  law  more  complex  and  abstruse.  Al- 
tliough  the  inhabitants  of  a  place  be  incorporated,  they  do  not 
constitute  the  corporation  ;  neither,  as  we  have  just  observed,  is 
it  constituted  hy  the  governing  body.  Notwithstanding  Mr. 
Kyd's  criticism,  the  corporation  is  invisible^  for,  although  we  may 
see  all  the  inhabitants,  or  all  of  the  officers,  we  do  not  see  the 
legal  body  which  makes  the  corporation,  as  we  see  an  army ;  but 
this  is  a  property  common  to  all  corporations.  An  additional 
complexity  in  municipal  corporations  arises  out  of  the  various 
and  diverse  powers  usually  conferred,  giving  them  an  extremely 
composite  character.  The  primary  and  fundamental  idea  of  a 
municipal  corporation  is  an  agency  to  regulate  and  administer 
the  internal  concerns  of  a  defined  locality  in  matters  peculiar 
to  the  place  incorporated,  or  at  all  events  not  common  to  the 
state  or  people  at  large ;  but  it  is  the  constant  practice  of 
the  states  to  make  use  of  the  incorporated  instrumentality, 
or  of  its  officers,  to  exercise  powers,  perform  duties,  and  exe- 
cute functions  not  strictly  or  properly  local  or  municipal  in 
their  nature,  but  which  are,  in  fact,  state  powers,  exercised 
by  local  officers,  within  defined  territorial  limits ;  and  it  is 
important,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  to  keep  this  distinction  in 
mind.  In  theory,  the  two  classes  of  powers  are  distinct ;  but 
the  line  which  separates  the  one  from  the  other  is  often  very 
difficult  to  trace.  The  point  may  be  illustrated  from  the  English 
law  :  If  the  king  incorporate  a  town,  its  officers  will  have  no 
implied  power  as  conservators  or  justices  of  the  peace  ;  express 
words  are  necessary  to  confer  this  power,  and  when  they  act  in 

'  Reg.  V.  Paramore,  10  Ad.  &  El.  286  ;     &  Cress.  162  ;  Brown  v.  Gates,  15  W.  Va. 
Reg.  V.  York,  2  Q.   B.  8-50  ;  Grant,   357  ;     (approving  text)  131. 
Glover,  4 ;  Harrison  v.  Williams,  3  Barn. 


§  23.]  CORPORATIONS   DEFINED   AND   CLASSIFIED.  29 

the  latter  capacity,  it  is  not  because  they  are  corporate  officers, 
but  because  of  powers  expressly  annexed  to  their  corporate 
offices  ;  and  the  two  capacities  remain  distinct,  although  united 
in  the  same  person. ^  The  subject  itself  will  be  elsewhere 
discussed.  The  name  of  the  municipal  corporation,  its  boun- 
daries^ its  officers,  its  poivers,  its  duties,  and  the  like  are  subjects 
regulated  by  legislative  enactment,  and  will  be  hereafter  noticed. 

§  22.  (10)  Corporations  intended  to  assist  in  the  conduct  of  local 
civil  government  are  sometimes  styled  political,  sometimes  public, 
sometimes  civil,  and  sometimes  municipal,  and  certain  kinds  of 
them  with  very  restricted  powers  —  ^ztasz  corporations  —  all  these 
by  way  of  distinction  from  private  corporations.  All  corporations 
intended  as  agencies  in  the  administration  of  civil  government 
are  public,  as  distinguished  from  private  corporations.  Thus 
an  incorporated  school-district,  or  county,  as  well  as  city,  is  a 
public  corporation ;  but  the  school-district  or  county,  properly 
speaking,  is  not,  while  the  city  is  a  municipal  corporation.  All 
municipal  corporations  are  public  bodies,  created  for  civil  or 
political  purposes ;  but  all  civil,  political,  or  public  corpor- 
ations are  not,  in  the  proper  use  of  language,  municipal  cor- 
porations. The  phrase  "  municipal  corporations,"  in  the 
contemplation  of  this  treatise,  has  reference  to  incorporated 
villages,  towns,  and  cities,  with  power  of  local  administration,  as 
distinguished  from  other  public  corporations,  such  as  counties 
and  q7iasi  corporations.^ 

§  23.  The  distinction,  as  it  is  usually  drawn  between  munici- 
pal corporations  proper,  such  as  chartered  towns  and  cities,  or 
towns  and  cities  voluntarily  organized  under  general  incorporating 
acts,  such  as  exist  in  a  number  of  the  States,  and  involuntary/  quasi 
corporations,  such  as  counties,  is  this  :  Municipal  corporations 
projjer  are  called  into  existence  either  at  the  direct  solicitation 
or  by  the  free  consent  of  the  persons  composing  them,  for  the 

1  1  Kyd,  327 ;  People  v.  Hurlburt,  24  and  tlie  distinction  approved,  and  made 

Mich.  44,  1871,per  Ca?H/)5e//,  C.  J. ;  s.  c.  6  the   basis    of  the   decision    in   Beach   v. 

Am.  Law  Rev.  376  ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103;  Leah}',  11  Kansas,  23,  30,  1873. 

S.  P.  People  V.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228,  2  Hamilton  Co.  v.  Mi-jhels,  7  Ohio  St. 

1878;  8.  0.  15  Am.  Rep.  202,  in  which  the  109,  18.57.     Finch  v.  Board,  etc.,  30  Ohio 

nature  of  municipal  corporations  and  the  St.  37,  Askew  v.  Hale,  64  Ala.,  639;  ap- 

purposes  of  their  creation  are  fully  dis-  proving  text, 
cussed  by    Cooley,  J.     The    text  quoted 


30  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [cil.  II. 

promotion  of  their  own  local  and  private  advantage  and  conven- 
ience. On  tlie  other  hand,  "  Ct)nnties  are  at  most  but  local 
organizations,  which,  for  the  purposes  of  civil  administration,  are 
invested  with  a  few  functions  characteristic  of  a  corporate  exist- 
ence. They  are  local  subdivisions  of  the  state,  created  by 
the  sovereign  power  of  the  state,  of  its  own  sovereign  will, 
without  the  particular  solicitation,  consent,  or  concurrent  action 
of  the  people  who  inhabit  them.  The  former  (municipal) 
organization  is  asked  for,  or  at  least  assented  to,  by  the  people 
it  embraces ;  the  latter  organization  ( counties )  is  superim- 
posed by  a  sovereign  and  paramount  authority.'-  A  county  is 
one  of  the  public  territorial  divisions  of  a  state,  created  and 
organized  for  public  political  purposes  connected  with  the  admin- 
istration of  the  state  government  and  specially  charged  with  the 
superintendence  and  administration  of  the  local  affairs  of  the  com- 
munity ;  and,  being  in  its  nature  and  objects  a  municipal  organiza- 
tion, the  legislature  may,  unless  restrained  by  the  constitution,  or 
some  one  of  those  fundamental  maxims  of  right  and  justice  with 
respect  to  which  all  governments  and  society  are  supposed  to 
be  organized,  exercise  control  over  the  county  agencies,  and 
require  such  public  duties  and  functions  to  be  performed  by 
them  as  fall  within  the  general  scope  and  objects  of  the  municipal 
organization.^ 

"  A  municipal  corporation  proper  is  created  mainly  for  the  inter- 
est, advantage,  and  convenience  of  the  locality  and  its  people  ;  ^ 
a  county  organization  is  created  almost  exclusively  with  a  view  to 
the  policy  of  the  state  at  large,  for  purposes  of  political  organ- 
ization and  civil  administration,  in  matters  of  finance,  of  education, 
of  provision  for  the  poor,  of  military  organization,  of  the  means 
of  travel  and  transport,  and  especially  for  the  general  adminis- 
tration of  justice.  With  scarcely  an  exception,  all  the  powers 
and  functions  of  the  county  organization  have  a  direct  and 
exclusive  reference  to  the  general  policy  of  the  state,  and  are,  in 
fact,  but  a  branch  of  the  general  administration  of  that  policy."  ^ 

1  Hamilton  Co.  v.  Mighels,  supra.  to  make  the  county  liable  in  damages  to 

2  Talbot  V.  Queen  Anne's  Co.,  50  Md.  one  who  suffered  a  personal  injury  from 
245.     Pout,  cli.  iv.  the  neglect  of  the  commissioners  of  the 

3  Po<it,  §  183.  county  in   the  discharge  of  their  official 
*  Hamilton  Co.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio  St.     duties,  says:  "But,  it  is  said,  the  mem- 

109.  In  this  case  from  which  we  have  bers  of  the  board  of  county  commissioners 
quoted,  the  learned  judge,  adverting  to  are  chosen  by  the  electors  of  the  county, 
the  case  in  hand,  in  which  it  was  sought     and  hence  the  board  is  to  be  regarded  as 


§24] 


CORPOEATIONS   DEFINED   AND   CLASSIFIED. 


31 


§  24.  An  incorporated  city  or  town  sometimes  embraces  by 
legislative  provision  two  distinct  corporations,  to  wit,  the  civil  and 
the  school,  existing  within  the  same  territory.  It  is  in  such  cases  a 
distinct  municipal  corporation  for  school  purposes,  and  under  the 
statute  or  charter  may  be  bound  as  such  for  the  contract  price 
of  materials  furnished  and  labor  performed  by  another  in  the 
erection  of  a  school-building  for  such  corporation. ^  More  gener- 
ally, however,  school-districts  are  organized  under  the  general 
laws  of  the  state,  and  fall  within  the  class  of  corporations  known 
as  quasi  corporations.  Speaking  of  the  powers  of  separate 
school-districts  not  included  in  a  municipality  and  of  their 
officers,  Bell,  J.  observes,^  "  These  little  corporations  have 
sprung  into  existence  within  a  few  years,  and  their  corporate 
powers  and  those  of  their  officers  are  to  be  settled  by  the  con- 
structions of  the  courts  upon  a  succession  of  crude,  unconnected, 
and  often  experimental  enactments.  School-districts  are  in 
New  Hampshire  quasi  corporations  of  the  most  limited  powers 


the  agents  of  the  county,  for  whose  torts,  in 
the  performance  of  official  duties,  the 
county  ouglit  to  be  responsible.  True, 
tlie  people  of  the  county  elect  the  board 
of  county  commissioners ;  but  they  also 
elect  the  sheriff  and  treasurer  of  the 
county.  Are  the  people  of  the  county, 
therefore,  responsible  for  the  malfea- 
sances in  office  of  the  sheriff  or  for  the 
official  defalcations  of  the  county  treas- 
urer?   Tins  will  not  be  pretended sees.  14,23,24,25. 

We  cannot  but  think  that  county  com-  chapter  on  Actions, 
missioners  are  not  agents  or  representa- 
tives of  tiie  county  in  any  such  sense  or 
manner  as  to  render  the  people  of  the 
county  justly  answerable  for  their  neg- 
lect; even  if  the  neglect  he  sucli  as  would 
create  a  civil  liability  against  a  natural 
person  or  a  municipal  or  private  corpora- 
tion. It  is,"  he  adds,  "  undoubtedly  com- 
petent for  the  legislature  to  make  the 
people  of  a  county  liable  for  the  official 
delinquencies  of  the  county  commission- 
ers ;  but  this  has  not  yet  been  done,  and 
we  think  such  liability  cannot  be  derived 
from  the  relations  of  the  parties,  either 
on  the  principles  or  the  precedents  of  the 
common  law."  Followed,  Jacobs  v.  Ham- 
ilton Co.,  4  Fisher  Pat.  Cases,  81,  1862. 
Also  cited  and  followed  in  VVehn  v.  Gage 
Co.  5  Neb.  494,  1877,  where  it  was  held 
that,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  creating 


the  liability,  the  county  was  not  liable  to 
an  action  by  reason  of  its  jail  being  so 
erected  and  kept  as  to  become  an  actual 
nuisance  to  persons  residing  near  it.  Sec. 
22,  cited  and  approved.  State  v.  Lefflng- 
well,  54  Mo.  458,  1873 ;  Askew  v.  Hale 
Co.,  54  Ala.  639,  1875,  s.  c.  25  Am.  Rep. 
730.  See  also  Soper  v.  Henry  Co.,  26 
Iowa,  264,  1868 ;  Treadwell  v.  Commis- 
sioners, 11  Ohio  St.  190;  Angell  &  Ames, 
Post,  §§  57,  66;  also 


1  Princeton  v.  Gebhart,  61  Ind.  187; 
Inglis  y.  Hughes,  61  Ind.  212  ;  Wright  v. 
Stockman,  59  Ind.  65;  Sheffield  v.  An- 
dress,  56  Ind.  157. 

-  Harris  v.  School  District,  8  Foster, 
28  (N.  H.)  58,  61,  1853.  See  also  Wilson 
V.  School  Dist.,  32  (N.  H.)  118, 1855  ;  Fos- 
ter V.  Lane,  10  Foster,  30  (N.  H.)  305,  315; 
Giles  V.  School  Dist.,  11  Fost.  31  (N.  H.) 
304;  Scales  v.  Chattahoochee  County,  31 
Geo.  22-5,  1870 ;  Rogers  v.  People,  68  111. 
1-54,  1873,  citing  text.  So  also  Beach  v. 
Leahy,  11  Kansas  23,  30,  1873.  A  school 
district  is  bound  by  the  contract  of  its 
board  for  repairs  of  its  school-house,  not- 
withstanding that  a  given  sum  had  been 
voted  for  such  repairs  and  expended  for 
such  object.  Conklin  v.  School  Dist.  22, 
Kansas,  521.  And  under  a  parol  contract. 
Cases  in  note  1,  supra. 


32  MUNICIPAL  COKPORATIONS.  [CH.  II. 

known  to  the  laws.  They  have  no  powers  derived  from 
usage.  They  have  tlie  powers  expressly  granted  to  them,  and 
such  implied  powers  as  are  necessary  to  enable  them  to  perform 
their  duties,  and  no  more.  Among  them  is  the  power  to  vote 
money  for  specified  purposes,  and  tlie  power  to  appoint  com- 
mittees '  to  carry  tlieir  votes '  relative  to  those  purposes  '  into 
effect.'  The  district  may  clearly,  by  their  votes  for  building  and 
repairing  school-houses,  limit  the  expense  to  a  definite  sum  ; 
and  they  may  limit  the  precise  repairs  or  the  exact  description 
of  tlie  school-house  to  be  built,  and  when  this  is  done  the  com- 
mittee, (appointed  to  '  carry  the  votes  into  effect')  cannot  bind  the 
district  by  exceeding  those  limits.  These  committees  are  special 
agents,  without  any  general  powers  over  the  affairs  of  the  district, 
and  their  powers  are  confined  to  a  special  purpose  ;  and  no  infer- 
ence can  be  drawn  from  the  general  nature  of  their  powers. 
The  liability  of  such  powers  to  abuse  furnishes  the  strongest 
arguments  against  their  existence,"  as  a  committee  might  load 
the  district  with  debts,  though  the  district  had  expressly  limited 
their  authority. 

§  25.  (lOrtf)  Civil  corporations  are  of  different  grades  or  classes^ 
but  in  essence  and  nature  they  must  all  be  regarded  as  public. 
Tlie  school-district  or  the  road-district  is  usually  invested  by  gen- 
eral enactments  operating  throughout  the  state,  with  a  corporate 
character  the  better  to  perform  within  and  for  the  locality  its 
special  function,  which  is  indicated  by  its  name.  It  is  but  an 
instrumentality  of  the  state,  and  the  state  incorporates  it  that  it 
may  the  more  effectually  discharge  its  appointed  duty.  So  with 
counties.  They  are  involuntary  political  or  civil  divisions  of  the 
state,  created  by  general  laws  to  aid  in  the  administration  of  gov- 
ernment. Their  powers  are  not  uniform  in  all  the  States,  but 
these  generally  relate  to  the  administration  of  justice,  the  support  of 
the  poor,  the  establishment  and  repair  of  highways,  —  all  of  which 
are  matters  of  state,  as  distinguished  from  municipal  concern. 
They  are  purely  auxiliaries  of  the  state  ;  and  to  the  general  stat- 
utes of  the  state  they  owe  their  creation,  and  the  statutes  confer 
upon  them  all  the  powers  they  possess,  prescribe  all  the  duties 
they  owe,  and  impose  all  liabilities  to  which  they  are  subject. 
Considered  with  respect  to  the  limited  number  of  their  corporate 
powers,  the  bodies  above  named  rank  low  down  in  the  scale  or 


§  27.]  COKPORATIONS   DEFINED   AND    CLASSIFIED.  33 

grade  of  corporate  existence  ;  and  hence  have  been  frequently 
termed  quasi  corporations.  This  designation  distinguishes  them 
on  the  one  hand  from  private  corporations  aggregate,  and  on  the 
other  from  municipal  corporations  proper,  such  as  cities  or  towns 
acting  under  charters,  or  incorporating  statutes,  and  which  are 
invested  with  more  powers  and  endowed  with  more  functions  and 
a  larger  measure  of  corporate  life. 

§  26.  It  will  appear  hereafter  that  many  of  the  courts  have 
drawn  a  marked  line  of  distinction  between  municipal  corpora- 
tions and  quasi  corporations,  in  respect  to  their  liability  to  persons 
injured  b}^  their  neglect  of  duty  ;  holding  the  former  liable,  with- 
out an  express  statute  giving  the  action,  in  cases  in  which  the 
latter  are  not  considered  liable  unless  made  so  by  express  legisla- 
tive enactment.  One  reason  often  given  for  the  distinction  is, 
that  with  respect  to  local  or  municipal  powers  proper  (as  distin- 
guished from  those  conferred  upon  the  municipality  as  a  mere 
agent  of  the  state)  the  inhabitants  are  to  be  regarded  as  having 
been  clothed  with  them  at  their  request  and  for  their  peculiar  and 
special  advantage,  and  that  as  to  such  powers  and  the  duties 
springing  out  of  them,  the  corporation  has  a  j^rivate  character,  and 
is  liable,  on  the  same  principles  and  to  the  same  extent  as  a  pri- 
vate corporation.  This  subject  will  be  fully  examined  in  its  ap- 
propriate place,  and  is  only  alluded  to  here  for  the  purpose  of 
noting  the  distinction  which  has  been  made  between  municipal 
and  other  public  corporations.^  But  that  a  municipal  corporation 
is  in  any  just  view  a  i^rivate  corporation,  or  possesses  a  double 
character,  the  one  private  and  the  other  public,  although  often 
asserted,  is  only  true  in  a  modified  sense.  In  their  nature  and 
purposes,  municipal  corporations,  however  numerous  and  complex 
their  powers  and  functions,  are  essentially  public.^ 

§  27.  Since  the  fundamental  idea  of  a  municipal  corporation 
proper  is  to  invest  the  people  of  a  thickly  populated  place  or  dis- 
trict with  the  power  of  regulating  their  own  local  affairs,  which 

1  Post,  ch.  xxiii.  Text  approved.  Ilan-  of  municipal  corporations,  as  respects 
non  V.  St.  Louis  County,  62  Mo.  313,  316,  their  property  rights,  is  argued  witli  great 
1876;  Heller  v.  Stremmel,  52  Mo,  309,  force  by  Cooky,  J.,  in  People  v.  Detroit, 
1873;  State  v.  Leffingwell,  5i  Mo.  458,  28  Midi.  228;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.  See 
471,  1873.  post,  ch.  iv. 

2  The  doctrine  of  the  private  character 
VOL.  I.  3 


34  MUNICIPAL   CORPOr^ATIONS.  [CH.  II. 

are  of  a  nature  not  common  to  the  state  at  large,  and  which  it  is 
supposed  they  can  reguhite  for  themselves  better  than  the  legis- 
lature can  regulate  them  by  general  enactments,  and  since  the 
powers  and  duties  of  the  corporation  and  even  its  existence  are  at 
all  times  subject  to  legislative  will  and  pleasure,  the  soundness  of 
the  distinction  so  often  made  between  the  public  and  private 
powers  and  functions  of  the  municipality,  at  least  in  the  breadth 
ascribed  to  it  by  many  of  the  cases,  may  be  doubted.^     On  princi- 
ple, perhaps,  the  following  may  be  regarded  as  the  true  view.     As 
respects   the  usual  and  ordinary   legislative    and   governmental 
powers  conferred  upon  a  municipality  the  better  to  enable  it  to 
aid  the  state  in  properly  governing  that  portion  of  its  people  re- 
siding within  the  municipality,  such  powers  are  in  their  very  na- 
ture public,  although  embodied  in  a  charter  and  not  conferred  by 
laws  general  in  their  nature  and  applicable  to  the  entire  state. 
But  powers  or  franchises  of  an  exceptional   and  extraordinary 
nature  may  be,  and  sometimes  are,  conferred  upon  municipalities, 
such  as  are  frequently  conferred  upon  individuals  or  private  cor- 
porations.    Thus,  for  example,  a  city  may  be  expressly  author- 
ized in  its  discretion  to  erect  a  public  wharf  and  charge  tolls  for 
its  use,2  or  to  supply  its  inhabitants  with  w^ater  or  gas,  charging 
them  therefor  and  making  a  profit  thereby .^     In  one  sense  such 
powers  are  public  in  their  nature  because  conferred  for  the  public 
advantage.     In  another  sense  they  may  be  considered  private  be- 
cause they  are  such  as  may  be,  and  often  are,  conferred  upon  indi- 
viduals and  private  corporations,  and  result  in  a  special  advantage 
or  benefit  to  the  municipality  as  distinct  from  the  public  at  large. 
In  this  limited  sense,  and  as  forming  a  basis  for  the  implied  civil 
liahilitij  for  damages  caused  by  the  negligent  execution  of  such 
powers,  it  may  be  said  that  a  municipality  has  a  private  as  well 
as  a  public  character ;  but  it  is  only  as  thus  qualified  that  this 
famous  distinction,  so  often  asserted  has,  in  the  author's  judgment, 
solid  ground  upon  which  to  rest. 

§  28.  (11)    The  Neio  England  Town.  —  In  the  New  England 
States,  public  corporations  have,  in  many  respects,  a  peculiar  char- 

1  See  cases  cited  y^n&t,  sec.  66,  and  for     540,  1875 ;  and  of  Gray,  C.  J.,  in  Hill  v. 
illustrations  and  application  of  the  doc-     Boston,  122  Mass.  344,  1877. 
trine,  fost,   sec.  58,;   also  chap.   23   Ac-  ^  Pittsburg  u.  Grier,  22  Pa.  St.  54, 1853; 

tions.     See  observations  of  Hunt,  J.,  in     ]mf,t,  sec.  113,  note,  and  the  chapter  on 
Barnes  i;.  District  of  Columbia,  91  U.  S.     Actions. 

3  76.  ])Ost,  chapter  on  Actions. 


§  28.] 


CORPORATIONS   DEFINED   AND    CLASSIFIED. 


acter.  In  some  instances,  there  are  acts  incorporating  cities, 
giving  them  defined  powers  and  providing  a  special  mode  of  gov- 
ernment ;  but  even  then  the  general  laws  in  relation  to  toivns, 
when  not  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  the  local  act,  ordina- 
ril}'  apply  to  the  places  specially  incorporated.  In  the  New  Eng- 
land town  proper,  the  citizens  administer  the  general  affairs  in  per- 
son, at  the  stated  corporate  or  town  meetings,  and  through  ofl&cers 
elected  by  themselves. ^  The  towns  are  charged  with  the  support 
of  schools,  the  relief  of  the  poor,  the  laying  out  and  repair  of  high- 
ways, and  are  empowered  to  preserve  peace  and  good  order,  main- 
tain internal  police,  and  direct  and  manage  generally,  in  a  man- 
ner not  repugnant  to  the  laws  of  the  state,  their  prudential  affairs  ; 
and  for  defraying  these  and  all  necessary  and  lawful  charges,  they 
may  levy  and  collect  taxes.  Speaking  generally,  the  New  England 
towns  are  organized  after  the  same  model ;  and  an  exact  notion 
of  their  character  will  be  best  obtained  by  reference  to  the  leading 
statutory  provisions  in  Massachusetts  respecting  them,  given  in 
the  note.2     The  town  in  New  England,  while  somewhat  anoma- 


1  In  toivns,  according  to  the  use  of  the 
word  in  the  New  England  States  and  some 
of  the  others,  the  citizens  administer  the 
general  affairs  in  person,  in  town  meet- 
ings. In  cities,  tliis  is  done  by  means  of  a 
mayor,  aldermen,  and  council,  to  whom 
the  citizens  entrust  most  of  the  legislative 
and  executive  powers  of  the  place.  State 
V.  Glennon,  3  Rh.  Is.  276,  278,  per  Staples, 
C.  J.  In  New  England,  "  town "  is  a 
generic  term,  and  it  will  embrace  cities, 
unless  the  contrary  appears  in  other  parts 
of  the  statute  to  have  been  the  intent  of 
tiie  legislature.  lb.  The  reader  will  find 
the  opinion  of  Gray,  C.  J.,  in  Hill  v.  Bos- 
ton, 122  Mass.  344;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep. 
332,  1877,  highly  instructive  as  to  the 
ciiaracter  of  New  England  towns  and 
cities.  As  to  general  liabilities,  there  is 
no  substantial  distinction  between  cities 
and  towns  under  the  legislation  of  Massa- 
chusetts,    lb.  p.  354. 

'^  Summary  of  the  leading  statutory 
provisions  in  Massachusetts  respecting 
towns :  — 

1.  As  to  powers  and  duties.  —  They  are 
"  Indies  corporate,  with  all  the  powers  here- 
tofore exercised  by  them,  and  subject  to 
all  the  duties  to  which  tliey  have  hereto- 
fore been  subject."     Genl.  St.   18^*0,  ch. 


xviii.  sec.  1.  "  Towns  may,  in  their  cor- 
porate capacity,  sue  and  be  sued  in  the 
name  of  the  town."  76.  sec.  8.  They 
may  hold  real  estate  and  personal  prop- 
erty "  for  the  public  use  of  the  inhabi- 
tants," and  also  "  in  trust  for  the  support 
of  schools  and  the  promotion  of  education 
within  the  limits  of  the  town."  lb.  sec. 
9.  They  may  make  contracts  necessary 
and  convenient  "  for  the  exercise  of  their 
corporate  powers,"  and  may  dispose  of 
their  corporate  property.  lb.  sees.  8,  9. 
"  They  may,  at  legal  meetings,  grant  and 
vote  such  sums  as  they  judge  necessary, 
for  the  following  purposes :  For  the  sup- 
port of  town  schools ;  for  tlie  relief,  etc., 
and  employment  of  the  poor ;  for  tiie  lay- 
ing out  and  discontinuing  and  repair  of 
highways ;  for  procuring  the  writing  and 
publishing  of  town  histories ;  for  burial 
grounds ;  for  encouraging  the  destruction 
o{  noxious  animals;  for  all  other  necessary 
c/iar7es  arising  therein."  76.  sec.  10.  "May 
make  necessary  by-laws,  not  repugnant  to 
the  laws  of  the  state,  for  directing  and 
managing  the  prudential  affairs,  preserv- 
ing the  peace  and  good  order,  and  main- 
taining the  internal  police  thereof."  lb. 
sec.  11.  But  such  by-laws  must,  before 
taking  effect,  be  approved  by  the   Supe- 


36 


MUNICIPAL  CORPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  II. 


lous,  has  some  of  the  usual  powers  of  a  regular  municipal  corpo- 
ration, and  some  of  the  characteristics  of  the  county  organizations 


rior  Court,  or,  in  vacation,  a  judge  thereof. 
Ih.  sec.  14.  They  are  binding  upon  all 
witiiin  the  limits  of  the  town,  strangers 
as  well  as  inhabitants.     Ih.  sec.  15. 

2.   Corporate  or  Town  Meetings,  — "  Ev- 
ery male  citizen  of  twenty-one  years  of 
ape  and  upwards   (except  paupers,  etc.), 
who  has  resided  within  the  state  one  year, 
and  within  the  town  in  which  he  claims 
the  ri<jld  to  vote,  six  months,  and  who  has 
paid  a  state  or  county  tax,  &c.,  shall  have 
a  riglit  to  vote  upon  all  questions  at  all 
meetings  for  the  transaction  of  town  af- 
fairs, and  no  other  person  shall  be  entitled 
to  vote."    lb.  sec.  19.    "  The  annual  meet- 
ing of  each  town  shall  be  held  in  Febru- 
ary, March,  or  April ;  and  other  meetings 
at  such  time  as  the  selectmen  may  order." 
lb.  sec.  20.     Warrants  issue  for  all  meet- 
ings, under  the  hands  of  tlie  selectmen, 
directed  to  constables  or  others,  who  no- 
tify  such  meeting  in  the  manner  pre- 
scribed by  the  by-laws  or  vote   of  the 
town.    lb.  sec.  21.     "  The  warrant  shall 
express  the  time  and  place  of  the  meeting, 
and  the  subjects  to  be  there  acted  upon ; 
and  nothing  acted  upon  shall 
have  a  legal  operation  unless  the  subject 
matter  thereof  is  contained  in  tlie  war- 
rant."   lb.  sec.  22.    If  selectmen  unrea- 
sonably refuse  to  call  a  meeting,  any  jus- 
tice  of  the  peace  may  do  so  upon  the 
application  of  ten  or  more  legal  voters  of 
the  town.    lb.  sec.  23.     Provision  is  made 
for  moderating  and  conducting  the  meet- 
ing,     lb.  sees.  25-30.     Town  officers  are 
elected  at  the  annual  meeting,  wlio  serve 
for  one  year,  and  until  others  are  cliosen 
and  qualified.      Tliese  consist  of  select- 
men, assessors,  treasurer,  constables,  who 
are  ex-officio  collectors  unless  others  be 
specially    clicsen ;    field    drivers,    fence 
viewers,  surveyors  of  lumber,  measurers 
of  wood,  unless  selectmen  appoint,  "and 
all  other  usual  town  officers."     Jb.  sec. 
31.     Then  follows  a  variety  of  provisions 
respecting  the  duties  of  these  several  offi- 
cers, and  the  manner  of  their  performance. 
In  addition,  there  are  acts  incorporating 
and  establishing   cities.     "  The   laws  in 
relation  to  towns,  where  not  inconsistent 
with  the  general  or  special  provisions  of 
the  acts  establishing  cities,  apply  to  them  ; 


and  cities  are  subject  to  the  liabilities, 
and   city    councils    have   the    powers   of 
towns.     The  mayor  and  aldermen  shall 
have  the  powers  and  be  subject  to  the 
liabilities  of  selectmen,  etc.,  if   no  other 
provisions  are  made  in  relation  thereto." 
General   St.   18G0,  ch.  xix.    166.      "  The 
marked  and  characteristic  distinction  be- 
tween a  town  organization  (in  Massachu- 
setts)   and  that  of  a  citi/  is,  that  in  the 
former  all  of  the  qualified  inhabitants 
meet,  deliberate,  act,  and  vote  in  their 
natural  and  personal  capacities  ;  whereas, 
under  a  city  government,  this  is  all  done 
by  their  representatives."     Per  Shaw,  C. 
J.,  in  Warren  v.  Charlestown,  2  Gray,  84, 
101.     As  to  the  origin  and  power  of  towns 
in  Massachusetts,  consult  Commonwealth 
V.  Roxbury,  9  Gray,  451,  1857;  opinion  of 
Shaiv,  C.  J.,  476,  and  the  valuable  note  of 
Mr.   (since  Chief  Justice)   Gray,  pp.  503, 
528  ;  and  the  opinion  of  the  same  eminent 
judge  in  Hill  v.   Boston,  122  Mass.   344, 
1877;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.    332;  Quincy's 
Municipal  History  of  Boston,  ch.  i. ;  ante, 
ch.  i.     Towns  were  not  expressly  author- 
ized to  sue  and  be  sued  until  1694,  nor  for- 
mally incorporated  until  1785.  lb.  9  Gray, 
511,  note  "  G  "  ;  2  Dane's  Ab.  098  ;  Wil- 
lard  V.  Newburyport,  12  Pick.  227,  231 ; 
Spaulding  v.   Lowell,   23  Pick.   77,   78. 
Post,  sec.  187,  note.     The  necessity  of  the 
representative  system  in  a  populous  place  is 
strikingly  iUustrated  in  The  People  v.  De- 
troit, 28  Midi.  228,  1873 ;  s.  c.  15  Am. 
Rep.  202,  where  the   legislature  had  pro- 
vided that  an  important  question  should 
be  decided  by  a  vote  of  a  citizens'  meet- 
ing.    Two  meetings  were  held,  but  the 
noise,  confusion,  and  violence  prevented 
discussion   and   determination,   and   tliis 
provision    was     subsequently     repealed. 
Speaking  of   the   representative  system    in 
general,  the  late  learned  Dr.  Lieber  calls 
it  "  a  flower  of  civilization,  such  as  neither 
antiquity  or  the  Middle  Ages  either  en- 
joyed or  suspected ;  something  direct  and 
positive  in  itself;    .     .     one  of  the  very 
greatest  political  institutions  which  adorn 
the  pages  of  the  history  of  civilization, 
for  through  it  alone  can  be  obtained  real 
civil  liberty,  broad,  extensive,  and  natural 
freedom."     2  Pol.  Ethics,  489.     The  gen- 


§  28.]  CORPORATIOXS   DEFINED   AXD   CLASSIFIED,  37 

in  many  of  the  States.  The  New  England  town  affords,  perhaps, 
an  example  of  as  pure  a  democracy  as  anywhere  exists.  All  of 
the  qualified  inhabitants  meet  and  directly  act  upon  and  manage, 
or  direct  the  management  of,  their  own  local  concerns.  This 
form  of  government  was  adopted  at  a  very  early  period,  and  is 
firmly  adhered  to  and  deeply  cherished  by  the  people  of  the  New 
England  States.  The  result  has  demonstrated  how  well  adapted 
it  is  to  promote  the  well-being  of  the  communities  that  for  so  long 
a  space  of  time  have  thus  governed  themselves.  The  remarkable 
growth  and  prosperity  of  the  New  England  States,  not  the  most 
favored  by  nature,  and  the  intelligence  and  character  of  the  peo- 
ple, are  facts  known  to  all ;  and  it  is  not  strange  that  these  results 
should  be  attributed,  in  a  large  measure,  to  this  system  of  local 
popular  government.  But,  in  the  course  of  time,  many  of  the 
towns,  or  portions  thereof,  grew  to  be  large  and  populous,  and  the 
system  of  meetings  of  the  electors,  in  their  original  capacity,  be- 
came inconvenient  and  almost  impracticable.  When  the  popula- 
tion of  a  town  or  place  exceeds  10,000  or  12,000  persons,  the  need 
for  the  representative  system  is  urgently  felt.  Accordingly,  in 
the  New  England  States,  there  are  now,  in  addition  to  towns,  a 
large  number  of  incorporated  cities,  with  charters  or  constituent 
statutes,  organized  upon  the  usual  representative  model,  with  a 
legislative  or  governing  body,  and  an  executive  head  and  subor- 
dinate officers.  The  people  of  the  large  city  of  Boston,  in  partic- 
ular, were  wedded  to  the  town  s^'stem,  and  struggled  long  against 
the  change  to  the  representative  plan;  and  five  successive  times 
between  1784  and  1821  rejected  well-considered  schemes  for  a 
city  government.  The  town  continued  to  be  governed  by  meet- 
ings of  the  electors  en  masse,  acting  through  boards  and  offi- 
cers, until  the  place  had  40,000  inhabitants,  of  whom  seven 
thousand  were  qualified  voters.  In  1822,  however,  the  legisla- 
ture, at  the  desire  of  a  majority  of  the  voters,  granted  the  place 
a  city  charter,  by  which  it  was  provided  that  the  control  of  its 
affairs  should  be  in  a  mayor  and  city  council.  After  this,  other 
towns,  from  time  to  time,  made  the  change  from  the  town  to  the 
city  plan ;  so  that,  as  before  observed,  we  have  in  the  New  Eng- 
land States  both  modes  of  local  administration.     The  town  sys- 

eral  justice  of  this  eulogium  cannot  be  elected  by  those  who  do  not  pay  the  taxes, 

denied,  but  this  system  has  worked  every-  the  expenditure  of  which  it  is  his  princi- 

where  better  than   it  has   in  our  birjre  pal  function  to  direct  and  control, 
cities,  where  tlie  representative  is  often 


38 


MUNICIPAL  COKPOEATIONS. 


[CH.  II. 


tern  is  the  general  one  ;  the  city,  or  representative  system,  is  the 
exceptional  one,  and  is  confined  to  places  of  compact  population 
and  considerable  size.^ 

1  No  city  was  incorporated  in  Massa- 
chusetts until  after  the  amendment  of  the 
constitution  of  that  State  in  1820.     Per 
SImu;  C.  J.,  in  Warren  v.  Cliarlestown, 
2  Gray,  84.     The  purpose  and  effect  of 
the  change  in  the  form  of  municipal  gov- 
ernments   in    Massachusetts    under   the 
constitutional  provision   authorizing  the 
establishment  of  cities,  discussed  by  Gray, 
C.  J.,  in  Hill  V.  Boston,  122  Mass.  344, 
1877,  s.  c.  2;3  Am.  Kep.  332.     After  re- 
ferring to  the  previous  attempts  in  1784, 
1785,  1791,  1804,  and  1815,  to  change  the 
town  government  of  Boston,  Mr.  Josiah 
Quincy,  in  his  Municipal  History  of  Bos- 
ton, p.  28,  continues :  "  In    1821  the  im- 
practicability of  conducting  the  munici- 
pal interests  of  the  place,  under  the  form 
of  town  government,  became  apparent  to 
the  inhabitants.     With  a  population  up- 
wards of  forty  thousand,  and  with  seven 
thousand  qualified  voters,  it  was  evidently 
impossible  calmly  to  deliberate  and  act. 
Wlien  a  town-meeting  was  held  on  any 
exciting  subject,  in  Faneuil  Hall,  those 
only  who  obtained  places  near  the  mod- 
erator could   even   hear  the   discussion. 
A  few  busy  or  interested  individuals  easily 
obtained  the   management  of  the  most 
important  affairs,  in  an  assembly  in  which 
the  greater  number  could  have  neither 
voice  nor  hearing.      When   the   subject 
was  not  generally  exciting,  town-meet- 
ings were  usually  composed  of  the  select- 
men, the  town  officers,  and  thirty  or  forty 
inhabitants.    Those  who  thus  came  were, 
for  the  most  part,  drawn  to  it  from  some 
official   duty  or  private   interest,  which, 
■when   performed  or  obtained,  they  gen- 
erally troubled   themselves  but  little,  or 
not  at  all,  about  the  other  business  of  the 
meeting.     In  assemblies  thus  composed, 
by-laws  were  passed,  taxes,  to  the  amount 
of  one  hundred  or  one  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand   dollars,   voted,    on    statements 
often  general  in  their  nature,  and  on  re- 
ports, as  it  respects  the  majority  of  voters 
present,  taken  upon  trust,  and  which  no 
one  had  carefully  considered  except,  per- 
haps, the  chairman.     In  the  constitution 
of  the  town  government  there  had  re- 
sulted, in  the  course  of  time,  from  exi- 


gency or  necessity,   a   complexity  little 
adapted  to  produce  harmony  in  action, 
and  an  irresjjonsibility  irreconcilalUe  with 
a  wise  and  efficient  conduct  of  its  affairs. 
On  the  agents  of  the  town  there  was  no 
direct  check   or   control ;  no   pledge   for 
fidelity  but  their  own  honor  and  sense  of 
character.     The  prosperity  of  the  town 
of  Boston,  under  such  a  form  of  govern- 
ment ;   the   few  defalcations  which   had 
occurred ;   the   frequent,  and    often,   for 
years,   uninterrupted,   re-election   of  tlie 
same  members  to  the  officiating  boards, 
are  conclusive  evidence  of  the  prevailing 
high    state   of   morals    and    intelligence 
among  the  inhabitants."     After  mention- 
ing the  different  boards  among  which  the 
executive  power  was  divided,  and  which 
acted  independently  of  each  other,  and 
which  were  invested  with  the  expending 
power,  and,  in  effect,  with  exercise  of  the 
whole    power   of    taxation,   Mr.    Quincy 
proceeds :  "  A  conviction  of  the  want  of 
safety  and  of  responsibility  in  a  machine 
thus  complicated  and  loosely  combined, 
became   at  length   so   general   that   the 
inherited  and  inveterate  antipathy  to  a 
city   organization  began    perceptibly   to 
diminish.     About  this  time,  also,  one  of 
the  most  common  and  formal  objections 
to  a  city  organization  was  removed.    The 
constitution  of  Massachusetts,  which  was 
passed  in    1780,   contained    no    express 
authority  to  establish  a  city  organization  ; 
and,  in  every  attempt  to  change  that  of 
the  town,  it  never  failed  to  be  zealously 
contended  that  the  legislature  of  the  com- 
monwealth   possessed    no    such    power. 
But  by  the  amendments  to  the  constitu- 
tion, made  by  the   convention  of   1820, 
and  adopted  by  the   people,  this   power 
was  expressly  recognized.    The  question, 
therefore,  now  stood  on  its  own  merits, 
and  independent  of  constitutional  objec- 
tions.    The  debates,  also,  which  occurred 
in   this   convention,  had   a   tendency  to 
open  the  eyes  of  the  inhabitants  to  their 
Dwn  interests,  and  to  allay  some  of  the 
long-cherished  prejudices   against  a  city 
organization."     In  1821  the  people  voted 
to  make  the  change,  and  measures  were 
immediately  taken  to  obtain  the  sanction 


§  29,]  CORPOKATIONS   DEFINED   AXD   CLASSIFIED.  39 

§  29.  (12)  The  character  of  totvns  in  New  England,  and  in 
what  respects  they  differ  from  English  municipal  corporations, 
existing  by  prescription  or  special  charter,  prior  to  the  legislation 
by  parliament  in  1835,  before  mentioned,^  and  the  care  to  be 
observed  in  applying  the  English  cases  relating  to  such  corpora- 
tions to  the  town  and  city  organizations  of  New  England,  are 
well  set  forth  by  the  learned  Chief  Justice  Perley,  in  delivering 
the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Hampshire,  in  an  im- 
portant case  to  which  we  shall  again  have  occasion  to  allude.- 
He  says :  "  It  is  to  be  observed  that  municipal  corporations  in 
England  are  broadly  distinguished  in  many  important  respects 
from  towns  in  this  and  the  other  New  England  States.  There  is 
no  uniformity  in  the  powers  and  duties  of  English  municipal  cor- 
porations. They  were  not  created  and  established  under  any 
general  public  law,  but  the  powers  and  duties  of  each  munici- 
pality depended  upon  its  own  individual  grant  or  prescription. 
Their  corporate  franchises  were  held  of  the  crown  by  the  tenure 
of  performing  the  conditions  upon  which  they  had  been  granted, 
and  were  liable  to  forfeiture  for  breach  of  the  conditions.  They 
indeed  answered  certain  public  purposes,  as  private  corporations 
do  which  have  public  duties  to  perform,  and  some  of  them  exer- 
cised political  rights.  But  they  are  not  like  towns  (with  us) 
general  political  and  territorial  divisions  of  the  country,  with 

of  the  legislature.     The  legislature,  on  executed;  to  inspect  the  conduct  of  all 

the  23d  day  of  February,  1822,  passed  subordinate   officers ;   to   cause   careless- 

"An  Act   establishing  the  City  of  Bos-  ness,  negligence,  and  positive  violation  of 

ton,"  commonly  called  "  the  city  charter."  the  laws  to  be  prosecuted  and  punished  ; 

The  following  is  a  brief  outline  of  the  to  summon  meetings  of  either  or  botli 

principal  features  of  this  charter,  taken  boards ;  to  communicate  and  recommend 

from  Quincy's  Municipal  History  of  Bos-  measures   for  the   improvement   of    the 

ton,  p.  41 :    1.  The  title  of  the  corporation  finances,    the    police,    health,    security, 

to  be,  "Tlie   City  of  Boston."    2.  The  cleanliness,  comfort,  and  ornament  of  the 

control  of  all  its  concerns  is  vested  in  a  city.     6.    The  mayor  and  aldermen  are 

mayor,  a  board  of  aldermen,  consisting  vested   with   the   administration   of    the 

of  eight,  and  common  council,  of  forty-  police  and  executive  power  of  the  corpo- 

eight  inhabitants,  to  be  called,  when  con-  ration   generall\',  and  with  specific  enu- 

joined  "  The  City  Council."     3.  The  city  merated   powers.      7.   All   other  powers 

to  be  divided  into  twelve  wards.      The  belonging  to  the  corporation  are  vested 

mayor  and  aldermen  and  common  council  in   the    mayor,   aldermen,   and   common 

to  be  chosen  annually,  by  ballot,  by  and  council,   to   be  exercised   b}'  concurrent 

from  inhabitants  ;   four  of  the   common  vote.     Post,  sec.  187,  note, 
council  from  and  by  those  of  each  of  the  ^  Ante,  ch.  i. ;  post,  ch.  iii. 

wards.     4.   The  city  clerk  to  be  chosen  -  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284, 

by  the  city  council.     5.   The  mayor  to  290,  1858.    And  see  also  Hill  v.  Boston, 

receive  a  salary.     His  duty,  to  be  vigi-  supra;  post,  sees.  32,  35,  37,  183. 
lant  and  active  in  causing  the  laws  to  be 


40  MUNICIPAL  CORPOKATIONS.  [CH.  II. 

uniform  powers  and  duties,  defined  and  varied,  from  time  to  time, 
by  general  legislation.  Towns  (in  New  England)  do  not  hold 
their  powers  ordinarily  under  any  grant  from  the  government  to 
the  individual  corporation  ;  or  by  virtue  of  any  contract  with  the 
government,  or  upon  any  condition,  express  or  implied.  They 
give  no  assent  in  their  corporate  capacity  to  the  laws  which 
impose  their  public  duties  or  fix  their  territorial  limits."  And 
referring  to  the  case  then  before  the  court,  he  added :  "  In  all 
that  is  material  to  the  present  inquiry,  municipal  corporations  in 
Eno-land  bear  much  less  resemblance  to  towns  in  this  country 
than  to  private  corporations  which  are  charged  with  the  per- 
formance of  public  duties ;  and  for  these  reasons  the  English 
authorities  on  the  subject  are  but  remotely  applicable  to  the 
present  case." 

§  30.  (12a)  The  distinctive  character  of  the  New  England 
towns,  and  particularly  the  limited  nature  of  their  powers,  will 
be  further  seen  by  a  brief  glance  at  the  course  of  judicial  decisions 
with  respect  to  their  authority  to  make  contracts  and  to  obtain 
revenue.  Money  can  only  be  raised  by  them  for  the  purposes 
expressed  in  the  statute,  and  for  expenses  incident  to  such  pur- 
poses. The  power  of  the  majority  is  wisely  limited  by  law  to  the 
object  and  cases  which  are  clearly  provided  for  and  defined  by 
statute.^ 

1  Stetson  V.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272,  towns  to  raise  money  is  discussed  at  large 
1816;  Parsons  v.  Goshen,  11  Pick.  396,  by  £'nr?/co«,  J.,  in  Minotr.  West  Roxbury, 
1831.  "  Tills  limitation,"  says  Mr.  Jus-  112  Mass.  1,  1873 ;  s.  c.  17  Am.  Rep.  62 ; 
tice  Wilde,  with  great  truth,  in  the  case  cited  post,  ch.  xxii.  Anthony  v.  Adams, 
last  cited,  "  upon  the  power  and  authority  1  Met.  (Mass.)  284,  286,  1840,  per  Shaw, 
of  towns  to  enter  into  contracts  and  stip-  C  J. ;  quoted  and  followed  in  Vincent  v. 
ulations,  is  a  wise  and  salutary  provision  Nantucket,  12  Cush.  105,  1853.  See  also 
of  law,  not  only  as  it  protects  the  rights  Norton  v.  Mansfield,  16  Mass.  48;  Dill  v. 
and  interests  of  the  minority  of  the  legal  Wareham,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  438,  1844  (con- 
voters,  but  as  it  may  not  unfrequently  tract  by  the  town,  undertaking  to  transfer 
prove  beneficial  to  the  interests  of  the  the  right  of  taking  oysters  within  its 
majority,  who  may  be  hurried  into  rash  limits). 

and  unprofitable  speculations  by  some  Whether  towns  in  Massachusetts  are 
popular  or  delusive  excitement,  to  the  in-  authorized  by  statute  to  make  any  con- 
fluence of  which  even  wise  and  consider-  tracts  which  involve  the  payment  of 
ate  men  are  sometimes  liable.  A  town  money,  unless  the  contracts  are  such  that 
in  its  corporate  capacity  will  not  be  bound,  a  tax  on  the  inhabitants  maybe  laid  to 
even  by  the  express  vote  of  the  majority,  raise  the  money  does  not  seem  to  be  set- 
to  the  performance  of  contracts  or  otiier  tied  by  express  adjudication.  Bancrofts, 
legal  duties,  not  coming  within  the  scope  Lynnfield,  18  Pick.  566,  1836,  per  Shaw, 
of  the  objects  and  purposes  for  which  C.J. ;  Tash  v.  Adams,  10  Cush.  252,  1852. 
they  are  incorporated."     The  power  of  "  The   inhabitants   of  every  town  in 


30.] 


CORPORATIONS   DEFINED   AND   CLASSIFIED. 


41 


Thus  a  town,  under  a  statute  which  restricts  it  to  raising 
money  to  provide  for  "  the  poor,  for  schools,  for  the  support  of 
public  worship,  and  other  necessary  charges,"  cannot  raise  money, 
even  in  the  time  of  war,  and  when  the  town  is  in  immediate  dan- 
ger from  the  enemy,  for  the  payment  of  additional  wages  to  the 
drafted  and  enlisted  militia,  and  for  other  purposes  of  defence. 
This  is  not  a  corporate  duty,  but  the  duty  of  the  general  govern- 
meut.i  Nor  can  it  appropriate  money,  contract  for,  or  levy  a  tax 
to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  road,  which,  by  law,  is  to  be  made 


this  state  "  —  Maine  —  says  Shepley,  C.  J., 
in  Hooper  v.  Emery,  14  Maine  (2  Shep.), 
375,  1837,  "  are  declared  to  be  a  body  pol- 
itic and  corporate  by  the  statute :  but  these 
corporations  derive  none  of  tlieir  powers 
from,  nor  are  any  duties  imposed  upon 
them  by,  the  common  law.  They  liave  been 
denominated  ^uast  corporations,  and  their 
whole  capacities,  powers,  and  duties  are 
derived  from  legislative  enactments." 
See  also  Pittson  v.  Clark,  15  Maine,  460, 
463 ;  Augusta  v.  Leadbetter,  16  Maine, 
45,  1839 ;  Estes  v.  School  Dist.,  38  Maine, 
170,  1871;  Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  45 
Maine,  496,  504,  1858 ;  Salem  Mill  Dam 
V.  Ropes,  6  Pick.  23,  32;  School  Dist.  etc. 
y.  Wood,  13  Mass.  193,  1816,  per  Parker, 
C.  J. ;  Mower  v.  Leicester,  9  Mass.  247, 
250,  1812.  Non-residents  of  municipal- 
ities.   Post,  sec.  195. 

Where  the  legislature  has  prescribed 
the  purposes  for  which  money  may  be 
raised  by  ta.xation,  it  cannot  be  raised  for 
other  and  distinct  purposes ;  nor  when 
it  is  raised  and  collected  for  authorized 
and  proper  purposes  can  it  be  appropri- 
ated to  or  expended  upon  other  and  dif- 
ferent objects.  This  would  be  to  break 
down  and  defeat  the  limitation.  Hence 
towns  cannot  give  away  or  distribute,  per 
capita  or  otherwise,  money  collected  by 
taxation.  Hooper  v.  Emery,  14  Maine 
(2  Shep.),  375,  explaining  Ford  v.  Clough, 
8  Greenl.  (Me.)  334;  Davis  r.  Bath, 
17  Maine,  141,  1840;  Pease  v.  Cornish, 
19  Maine  (1  Appl.),  191,  1841  ;  Stetson 
r.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272;  DiUingham  v. 
Snow,  5  Mass.  547  ;  Spaulding  v.  Lowell, 
23  Pick.  71,  1830;  Woodbury  r.  Hamil- 
ton, 6  Pick.  101 ;  Cooley  v.  Granville, 
10  Cush.  50. 

The  Ver/nont  statute  respecting  the 
powers  of  towns  is  nearly  a  transcript  of 


that  of  Massachusetts.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Vermont  approves  of  the  expo- 
sition of  tjie  statute  given  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Massachusetts  in  Willard  v.  New- 
buryport,  12  Pick.  230  ;  Allen  v.  Taunton, 
19  Pick.  485 ;  Torry  v.  Milbury,  21  Pick. 
64;  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71; 
Hardy  v.  Walthani,  3  Met.  163,  per  Iskam, 
J.,  in  Van  Sicklen  v.  Burlington,  27  Verm. 
(1  Wms.)  70.  For  discussion  of  powers 
and  duties  of  selectmen,  and  digest  of  pre- 
vious decisions  in  New  Hampshire,  see 
Carleton  v.  Bath;  2  Fost.  (22  N.  H.)  559. 
Have  no  general  authority  to  bind  the 
town  by  contract.  Andover  v.  Grafton, 
7  N.  H.  300.  But  are  confined  to  such 
acts  as  are  necessary  to  the  discharge  of 
their  duties.  Sanborn  v.  Deerfield,  2  N.  H. 
253.  Cannot,  ex-ojficio,  adjust  controver- 
sies of  suits,  or  release  a  cause  of  action. 
Carlton  v.  Bath,  2  Foster  (22  N.  H.),  559. 
May  indemnify  town-officers  in  proper 
cases.  Pike  v.  Middleton,  12  N.  H.  278. 
Post,  sec.  147.  But  there  is  no  promise 
implied  in  law  against  a  town  to  indemnify 
selectmen  in  any  case,  for  damages  which 
they  have  been  compelled  to  pay,  arising 
out  of  the  discharge  of  official  duty. 
Eaves  v.  Shattuck,  35  N.  H.  189.  Are 
supposed  to  be  liable  to  the  corporation 
for  gross  neglect  of  official  duty.  San- 
born V.  Deerfield,  2  N.  H.  253,  by  Wood- 
bury, J. 

1  Stetson  V.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272, 
1816,  where  the  phrase,  necessary  town 
charc/es,  is  construed  by  Parker,  C.  J. ; 
and  see  comment  of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  12  Pick. 
227,  230,  and  23  Pick.  74  ;  and  of  Dewey, 
J.,  in  Allen  v.  Taunton,  19  Pick.  485, 487; 
18  Jb.  566,  10  Cush.  57 ;  of  Clifford,  J.,  in 
Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  Clifford  Cir.  C.  590, 
1867. 


42  MUNICIPAL   CORPOIIATIONS.  [CH.  11. 

at  the  expense  of  the  county,  and  not  the  town.^  A  town  may,  it 
is  said,  raise  money  to  meet  ordinary  expenditures,  such  as  the 
payment  of  officers,  the  support  and  defence  of  actions,  the  ex- 
penses incident  to  discharging  duties  imposed  by  law,  looking  to 
the  safety  and  convenience  of  the  citizens.  Thus  it  can  erect  a 
town  or  city  hall,  or  market  house,  but  not  a  theatre,  a  circus,  or 
any  place  of  mere  amusement,  nor  even  a  statue  or  monument, 
unless  in  populous  and  wealthy  towns,  as  suitable  ornaments  to 
public  buildings  or  squares.^  So  towns  may  provide  for  the  sup- 
port of  a  public  clock,  hay-scales,  burying-ground,  wells,  reservoirs, 
and  many  other  like  objects,  which  relate  to  the  accommoda- 
tion and  convenience  of  the  inhabitants,  and  which  have  been 
placed  under  the  municipal  jurisdiction  of  towns  by  statute  or  by 
usage  .^ 

§  31.  (14)  Although  not  styled  such,  each,  one  of  the  United 
States,  in  its  organized  political  capacity,  is  in  effect  a  public  cor- 
poration. Corporations,  however,  as  the  term  is  commonly  used, 
do  not  include  states,  but  only  derivative  creations,  owing  their 
existence  and  powers  to  the  state  acting  through  its  legislative 
department.  Like  corporations,  however,  a  state,  as  it  can  make 
contracts  and  suffer  wrongs,  so  it  may,  for  this  reason,  and  with- 
out express  provision,  maintain,  in  its  corporate  name,  actions  to 
enforce  its  rights  and  redress  its  injuries.^  But  a  state  is  not 
liable  to  be  sued  without  its  consent ;  ^  although  it  is  not  unusual 
for  states,  by  special  enactment,  to  authorize  suits  to  be  brought 
against  them,  but,  as  the  permission  is  voluntary,  they  may  pre- 
scribe the  terms,  and,  unless  it  impairs  the  obligation  of  contracts, 

1  Parsons  v.  Goshen,  11  Pick.  39G,  West  Roxbury,  112  Mass.  1,  1873;  s.  c. 
1831 :   Anthony  v.  Adams,  1  Met.  (Mass.)     17  Am.  Rep.  52  ;  post,  eh.  xxii. 

284  1840.  *  Delafield  v.  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.), 

2  Stetson  V.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272,  159,  1G2  ;  20  Wend.  192,  1841,  affirming 
181G,  per  Parker,  C.  J. ;  Allen  v.  Taunton,  s.  c,  8  Paige,  531 ;  Indiana  v.  Woram, 
19  Pick.  485,  487,  opinion  by  Dewfi/,  J.,  as  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  33,  1843.  These  cases 
to  power  of  towns  in  Massachusetts;  hold  that  states  may  sue  as  plaintiff  in  the 
Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71,  opinion  state  courts.  State  v.  Delesdenier,  7  Texas, 
o{Shaw,  C.  J.,  on  same  subject.  76  ;  People  v.  Assessors,   1  Hill  (N.  Y.), 

3  Willard  v.  Newburyport,  12  Pick.  620.  The  governor  of  a  state,  as  the  head 
227,230,1831.  General  municipal  powers  of  the  executive  department,  is  a  corpo- 
held  to  include  power  to  erect  a  town-hall,  ration  sole,  and  bonds  made  payable  to 
Greeley  v.  People,  00  111.  19,  1871.  But  him  may  be  enforced  for  the  benefit  of 
does  not  include  power  to  defray  expenses  those  interested.  Governor  v.  Allen, 
of  a  committee  to  petition  the  legislature  8  Hump.  (Tenn.)  176,  1847  ;  Polk,  Gov- 
to  destroy  the  existence  of  the  town  by  ernor,  v.  Plummer,  2  76.  500. 
annexing  it  to  another  town.     Minot  v.  &  Briscoe  v.  Bank,  11  Pet.  257,  821. 


§  31.] 


COEPORATIONS   DEFINED  AND   CLASSIFIED. 


43 


may  withdraw  the  consent  at  pleasure. ^  A  devise  to  a  state  for 
any  object  which  it  may  properly  aid  or  provide  for  is  valid.^ 
Extended  consideration  of  the  powers  of  the  states,  and  of  their 
relation  to  the  United  States  and  to  each  other,  is  not  within  the 
scope  of  the  present  work,  which  is  limited  strictly  to  municipal 
corporations. 


1  Beers  v.  Arkansas,  20  How.  527, 
1857;  Dodd  v.  Miller,  14  Ind.  433;  Audi- 
tor V.  Davies,  2  Pike  (Ark.),  494  ;  Ellis  v. 
State,  4  Ind.  1 ;  State  v.  Trustees,  5  Ind. 
77.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  original  jurisdiction  in  cases 
in  which  a  state  shall  be  a  party,  as  also 


in  suit  between  states.  Kentucky  v.  Den- 
nison,  24  How.  66  ;  Wisconsin  v.  Duluth, 
2  Dillon,  C.  0.400,1872.  The  United  States 
Circuit  Court  has  not.     lb. 

2    McDonough  Will  Case,  15  How.  367, 
382, 1853 ;  post,  sec.  569. 


44  MUNICIP.VL  CORPOKATIONS.  [CH.  lU. 


CHAPTER  HI. 

CREATION,  AND   SEVERAL  KINDS   OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS 
IN  ENGLAND   AND  IN  THE   UNITED   STATES. 

In  England.  —  Difference  between  Begal  and  Parliamentary  Cor- 
porations. —  Municipal  Corporatio7is  Act  of  1835. 

§32.  (15)  Doctrine  in  England. — In  England,  corpora- 
tions can  be  created  only  in  one  of  two  ways :  1.  by  the  king's 
charter  ;  2,  by  act  of  parliament.  They  exist  there,  however  — 
1,  by  the  common  law;  2,  by  prescription;  3,  by  royal  charter; 
4,  by  authority  of  parliament.  Corporations  at  common  laiv  are 
those  which  derive  their  existence  and  powers  from  immemorial 
usage,  although  they  may  have  had  their  origin  in  an  act  of 
parliament  or  royal  grant,  no  longer  discoverable.  Those  by 
2jrescription  presuppose  a  grant  by  charter  or  act  of  parlia- 
ment, which  has  been  lost.  Into  corporations  created  by  regal 
or  legislative  grant  may  be  resolved  what  have  been  styled 
corporations  by  implication,  which  is,  where  a  body,  lawfully 
constituted,  cannot  carry  into  effect  its  purposes  without  at- 
tributing to  it  a  corporate  character.  The  franchise  of  being 
a  corporation,  and  the  right  to  exercise  corporate  powers  and 
to  enjoy  corporate  privileges,  can  be  claimed  in  no  other  way 
than  as  above  stated.  A  legal  sanction  to  the  corporate  char- 
acter is,  therefore,  absolutely  necessary,  and  is  always  im- 
plied.i 

The  distinction  between  corporations  deriving  their  existence 
from  the  king's  charter  and  those  which  derive  their  existence 
from  parliament  is  important.  A  royal  charter  is  a  written  in- 
strument, in  the  form  of  letters  patent,  under  the  great  seal, 
addressed  to  all  the  subjects  of  the  realm,  containing  a  grant  by 

1  Willc.  21 ;  Glover,  23 ;  Grant,  6,  7  ;  284,  290, 1858,  per  Perley,  C.  J. ;  St.  Louis 
1  Kyd,  39;  Angell  &  Am.  sec.  G9;  Bro.  v.  Allen,  13  Mo.  400;  Same  v.  Russell, 
Corp.  65 ;  Eastman  v.  IMeredith,  36  N.  H.     9  Ih.  503.    Post,  sec.  84,  note. 


§  34.]  CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS.  45 

the  crown  to  the  persons  named,  of  the  franchises,  powers,  and 
privileges  therein  mentioned.  A  charter  of  incorporation^  there- 
fore, is  the  written  instrument  by  which  the  king  creates  the 
corporate  body,  names  it,  defines  its  objects,  and  confers  its 
powers.  Unless  restricted  in  the  charter,  all  of  the  common  law 
incidents  of  a  corporation  attach  to  it,  but  no  corporation  can 
pursue  objects  not  warranted  by  its  charter.  The  charter  is  the 
organic  act  which  gives  to  the  corporation  both  its  existence  and 
its  peculiar  character.^ 

§  33.  The  king''s  charter  may  confer  upon  the  corporation  it 
institutes  all  the  usual  and  ordinary  powers  of  a  corporate  body, 
but  it  cannot  invest  such  a  body  with  extraordinary  powers',  such 
as  proceeding  in  a  manner  different  from  the  common  law,  or 
punishing  by  forfeiture  or  imprisonment,  or  conferring  an  exclu- 
sive right  of  trading.  When  the  king  grants  clauses  which  are 
illegal,  they  are  void ;  and  if  illegal  and  not  confirmed  by  parlia- 
ment, no  length  of  time  or  usage  will  make  such  clauses  valid. 
But  'parliament^  in  the  fulness  of  its  power,  may  grant  to  corpo- 
rations which  it  erects,  such  powers,  ordinary  and  extraordinary, 
as  it  deems  proper  ;  and  it  may,  as  it  has  often  done,  confirm 
clauses  in  royal  charters  which  were  void,  because  beyond  the 
king's  power  to  grant, 

§  34.  The  king  cannot  incorporate  a  body  of  men  without  their 
assent.  Until  his  charter  has  been  accepted,  it  is  therefore  inop- 
erative.^ When  once  accepted,  the  acceptance  is  irrevocable. 
The  acceptance  must  be  by  those  to  whom  it  is  addressed  ;  and 
it  is  held  that  a  valid  acceptance  may  be  made  by  a  majority  of 
the  grantees.  The  charter  must  be  accepted  in  toto,  or  not  at 
all,  for  there  can  be  no  partial  acceptance  without  the  assent  of 
the  crown,  which  must  be  shown  by  matter  of  record.  If  the 
corporation  be  a  new  one,  acceptance  of  part  of  the  charter  is 
taken  as  acceptance  of  all.  Acceptance  may  be  shown  by  user, 
—  by  acting  under  it,  as  well  as  by  the  formal  action  of  the  cor- 

1  Outline  of  municipal  charter  of  the  he  gave  were  all  given  to  existing  corn- 
Middle  Ages.  Ante,  sec.  G.  Charters  de-  miinities,  liaving  a  recognized  and  organ- 
fined.    Post,  sec.  82.  ized  existence,  and  in  tlie  liabit  of  acting 

^  Acceptance  of  charter.      Post,  sees,  as  one  body,  through  elections  or  agencies 

44,  64,  Go,  ch.  xxi.     As  acceptance  was  or  offices.     Per  Campbell,  J.,  in  People  v. 

necessary   to    make  the  king's   charter  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451,  1874  ;  s.  c.  18  Am. 

operative,  the  municipal  charters  wliich  Hep.  107.     Post,  sec.  183. 


46  MUNICIPAL  cor.rorvATiONS.  [ch.  hi. 

porate  bod}'.  After  acceptance  the  crown  cannot  resume  the  grants 
nor  dissolve  or  destroy  the  corporation,  without  the  consent  of 
the  orantees  or  their  successors.  The  crown,  at  common  law, 
can  create  a  corporation  for  municipal  government  in  any  place 
where  there  is  not  at  the  time  an  existing  corporation  of  the 
same  kind,  but  there  cannot  be  concurrently  two  corporations, 
for  the  same  place,  having  the  same  or  similar  powers  of  jurisdic- 
tion. But  such  limitations  upon  the  power  of  the  crown  do  not 
apply  with  respect  to  municipal  corporations  created  hy  parlia- 
ment. Its  power  is,  legally  speaking,  illimitable.  It  may  create 
and  abolish  and  change  at  its  pleasure,  with  or  without  the 
assent  of  the  people  or  corporation  to  be  thereby  affected.  It 
may  change  royal  charters,  but  parliamentarj^  corporations  can- 
not be  affected,  without  the  consent  of  parliament,  by  charters 
granted  by  the  crown.  Except  as  to  the  extent  of  powers  which 
may  be  conferred,  a  parliamentary  corporation  is,  at  common  law, 
similar  to  that  which  is  created  by  the  crown.^ 

§  35.  (16)  Same  subject  continued.  —  Prior  to  1835  many 
of  the  towns,  boroughs,  and  cities  of  England  were  incorporated 
in  one  of  the  ways  mentioned  ;  that  is  to  sajs  there  were  in  them 
bodies  corporate,  established  for  the  local  government  thereof. 
There  was  no  uniformity  in  the  constitution  or  powers  of  these 
corporate  bodies.  The  corporation  proper  was  not  the  town  or 
place,  but  a  corjjorate  body  constituted  within  it,  with  powers  or 
jurisdiction,  more  or  less  extensive,  to  govern  the  inhabitants. 
These  bodies  were  established  at  different  times,  and  from  differ- 
ent motives.  The  first  distinct  recognition  of  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration was  in  the  18th  of  Henry  VI.  (A.  D.  1439),  with  reference 
to  Kingston-upon-Hull,  which  had  an  express  charter  of  incorpora- 
tion granted  to  it,  for  the  first  time,  in  that  year.  Charters  had 
previously  been  granted  to  it  by  different  sovereigns,  at  various 
times,  giving  it  various  privileges,  but  they  did  not  incorporate 
the  place,  nor  was  it  incorporated  until  the  charter  of  18th  Henry 
VI.,  which  is  the  first  that  uses  terms  of  incorporation.^  Subse- 
quently such  corporations  were  erected  from  time  to  time,  each 
with  its  peculiar  constitution,  depending  on  the  provisions  of  the 

1  Authorities  last  cited.     Respecting  see  Rutter  v.  Chapmfin,  8  M.  &  W.  1 ; 

the  authority  of  the  crown  to  grant  char-  Reg.  v.  Boucher,  3  Q.  B.  654 ;  s.  c,  2  G. 

ters  to  incorporate  towns,  since  the  Gen-  &  D.  737. 
eral  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835,  2  Glover  on  Munic.  Corp.  16. 


§  36.]  CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS.  47 

charter  or  prescriptive  usage.  The  constitution  of  the  corpora- 
tions was  so  various,  and  is  so  different  from  the  American  model, 
that  it  requires  care  to  acquire  an  accurate  idea  of  it.  For  illus- 
tration, we  will  take  a  simple  form,  viz. :  where  by  charter  or 
prescription  the  corporation  consists  of  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and 
commonalty  of  a  town.  Here  there  are  three  ranks,  classes,  or 
parts :  1,  the  mayor  or  head  officer  ;  2,  the  aldermen,  the  num- 
ber of  whom  is  definite,  being  fixed  by  the  charter,  or  by  pre- 
scriptive usage  ;  3,  the  commonalty,  that  is,  the  common  freemen, 
whose  number  is  indefinite,  and  whose  rights,  in  the  course  of 
time,  were  largely  usurped  or  destroyed.  These  three  classes  were 
denominated  the  ititegral  j^cirts  of  the  corporation,  and  no  corpo- 
ration was  complete  (except  it  be  otherwise  provided  by  the 
charter)  unless  the  mayor,  or  head  officer,  a  majority  of  the  defi- 
nite class  (that  is,  a  majority  of  the  aldermen),  and  some  mem- 
bers of  the  indefinite  class,  or  commonalty,  be  in  existence. 
Hence,  during  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor,  no  valid  corpo- 
rate act  can  be  done  except  to  elect  another,  since  without  a 
mayor  the  corporate  body  is  incomplete.  Hence,  also,  at  every 
corporate  meeting  it  was  essential,  at  common  law,  that  there 
should  be  present  the  mayor,  or  head  officer,  Avhose  duty  it  was 
to  preside,  a  majority  of  each  definite  integral  class,  and  some 
members  of  each  indefinite  class,  if  there  be  more  than  one  such 
class. 

§  36.  In  the  course  of  time,  as  we  have  heretofore  pointed  out, 
great  abuses  had  crept  into  these  bodies,  which  parliament  had 
frequently  been  obliged  to  redress.^  Complaints  of  grievances 
were  universal,  and  misrule,  confusion,  and  internal  disputes  so 
general  that  the  municipal  system  of  government  fell  into  great 
and  deserved  disrepute.  As  a  measure  of  reform,  the  Municipal 
Corporations  Act  of  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.  was  devised 
and   enacted.2     "  I  cordially  concur,"  said   the    king,  "  in  this 

^  Ante.  Introductorj' chapter,  sec.  8  ;  made  a  thorough  examination  of  the  con- 
text approved.  Lueliman  y.  Taxing  Dist.,  dition  of  the  various  borouglis,  and  tlieir 
2  Lea  (Tenn.),  425.  report  disclosed  abuses  and  defects  whicii 

2  The  reformed  House  of  Commons  it  seems  marvellous  tiiat  any  spirited  peo- 

presented  an  address  to  William  IV.  re-  pie   so   long   endured.      See   ch.  i.  ante, 

questing  the  appointment  of  a  commis-  sec.  8. 

sion  to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the  muni-  The  commission  ascertained  the   ex- 

cipal  corporations  in  England  and  Wales,  istence   of    tvv'o   hundred   and    forty-six 

The    commission  which   was   appointed  corporations  in  England  and  Wales,  ex- 


48 


MUNICIPAL   COlirORATIONS. 


[CH.  III. 


important  measure,  which  is  calculated  to  allay  discontent,  to 
promote  peace  and  union,  and  to  procure  for  those  communities 


ercisiiiir  municipal  functions.     The  popu- 
lation of  these  corporate  places  exceeded 
two  millions  of  i)eople.      Some  of  these 
corporations   claimed    to   act  under   pre- 
scriptive custom,  but  most  of  them  under 
several    charters,   forming    a    continued 
series  from  a  very  early  date,  but  gener- 
ally under  charters  fj:ranted  from  the  reign 
of  Edward  I.  down  to  the  reign  of  George 
IV.  inclusive.    The  number  of  corporators 
stated   to  be  definite,  in  fifty  boroughs, 
varied  in  most  cases  from  under  ten  to 
thirty,  and  those  indefinite,  in  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty-two  boroughs,  varied  from 
twelve    to    five    thousand,   but  usually 
averaged    from    fifty    to    two    hundred 
corporators.       The     titles    to    freedom, 
or  citizenship,    generally  comprehended 
those  arising  from  birtli,  servitude,  mar- 
riage, purchase,  gift,   or  election.      The 
governing  bodies    were  formed   by   the 
close  and  corrupt  system  o{  self-election,  in 
a   great  majority  of  the   municipalities. 
The  corporate  officers,  such  as  the  mayor, 
or  other  head  of  the  corporation,  the  re- 
corder—  frequently  unprofessional  —  and 
the   town  clerk,  were  appointed  by  the 
self-elected  governing  body  from  its  own 
immaculate  conclave.     Some  of  the  muni- 
cipalities possessed  exclusive  criminal  ju- 
risdiction, extending  to  the  trial  of  felonies 
and  all  other  offences,  whereas  many  ap- 
pear never  to  have  had  any  criminal  ju- 
risdiction.     Several    boroiu/hs    had    civil 
jurisdiction  extending  to  tlie  decision  of 
all  actions  ;  some  extending  to  the  decis- 
ion of  personal  and  mixed  actions  ;  others 
to  the  decision  of  personal  actions  ;  while 
in  a  considerable  number  no  civil  juris- 
diction appeared  ever  to  have   existed. 
The  propcrii/,  in  some  few  boroughs,  was 
trivial,  but  the  revenue  generally  aver- 
aged from  500/  to  1,000/  in  each,  while  in 
some  the  property  exceeded  50,000/  per 
annum.     In  a  few  towns  corporate,  the 
accounts  were    printed    for   distribution 
and  audited  publicly  ;  but  in  most  cases, 
the  accounts  were  neither  duly  kept,  nor 
audited  nor  published,  besides  being  in- 
accurate and  in  a  generally  unsatisfactory 
state.     The  annual  income  of  these  muni- 
cipal  corporations    amounted   to    about 
360,000/,  and  the  expenditure  to  377,000/, 


while  tlie  debt  in  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
three  exceeded  the  sum  of  two  millions 
sterling.     Throughout  the  course  of  the 
investigation  of  tlie  commissioners  there 
were  perce^)tibk'  the  same  complaints,  — 
of  magistrates  ill-qualified  by  education 
and  habits  for  their  situations,  generally 
partial,  and  sometimes  corrupt ;  of  courts, 
which  might  be  made  the  instruments  of 
much  local  advantage,  falling  into  disuse 
through  defects  of  their  original  constitu- 
tion and  their  recent  maladministration; 
of  juries  improperly  selected  by  reason  of 
notorious  party  bias  ;  of  revenue  misap- 
plied ;  of  debt  contracted  and  of  property 
alienated;  of  the  absence  of  all  accounts 
and  the  denial   of  all  accountability  by 
certain  corporations  ;  of  the  insufficiency 
of  the  police,  the  neglect  of  paving  and 
lighting,  and  the  want  of  those  municipal 
accommodations    for   which    the    public 
property  committed  in  trust  to  the  corpo- 
ration  would,    if   duly  administered,   be 
amply  sufficient  to  provide.  Having  given 
a  general  view  of  the  ordinary  constitu- 
tion  of   the   various   municipalities,   the 
commissioners  next  proceeded  to  specify 
some  of  their  defects.     The  most  common 
and  most  striking  defect  in  the  constitution 
of  the  municipal  corporations  was,  that 
the  corporate  bodies  existed  indepenclentli/  of 
the  communities  among  which  they  were  found. 
The  corporators  looked  upon  themselves, 
and  were  considered  by  the  inliabitants, 
as  separate  and  exclusive  bodies ;   they 
had   powers    and   privileges   within    the 
towns  and  cities  from  which  they  were 
named,  but  in  most  places,  all  identitij  of 
interest  between  the  corporation  and  the 
inhabitants  disappeared.      That  was  the 
case     even    where    the    corporation    in- 
cluded a  large  body  of  inhabitant  free- 
men.    It  appeared  in  a  more  striking  de- 
gree as  the  powers  of  the  corporation  had 
been  restricted  to  smaller  numbers  of  the 
resident  population,  and  still   more  glar- 
ingly when  the  local  privileges  had  been 
conferred  on   non-resident  freemen,  to  the 
exclusion    of  the    inhabitants   to   whom 
they  rightfully   ought   to  belong.      The 
privilege  of  electing  members  of  parliament 
being  that  which,  before  the  passing  of 
the  reform  act,  conferred  upon  the  self- 


§36.] 


CREATION   OF   PUBLIC    CORPORA.TIONS. 


49 


the  advantages  of  responsible  government."     This  act  organizes 
all  of  the  municipal  corporations  of  England  and  Wales  upon  a 


elected  governing  bodies  of  close  corpo- 
rate towns  their  principal  importance,  and 
the  rewards  for  political  services  which 
the  patron  was  accustomed  to  distribute 
among  them,  caused  this  function  to  be 
considered,  in  many  places,  as  the  sole 
object  of  their  institution.  The  power 
so  monopolized  and  employed  in  a  mode 
unsuitable  to  the  altered  circumstances 
of  the  times,  led  to  various  abuses  of  the 
system.  The  custom  of  keeping  tlie 
number  of  corporators  as  low  as  possible 
may  be  referred  to  the  wish  for  preserv- 
ing the  parliamentary  franchise,  rather 
than  to  the  desire  of  monopolizing  the 
municipal  authority,  which  had  been 
coveted  only  as  a  means  of  securing  tlie 
other  and  more  highly  prized  privilege. 
A  great  number  of  corporations  were  pre- 
served solely  as  political  eiujines,  and  the 
towns  to  which  they  belonged  derived  no 
benefit,  but  often  much  injury,  from  their 
existence.  To  maintain  the  political  as- 
cendency of  a  party,  or  the  political  influ- 
ence of  a  family,  was  the  one  end  and 
object  for  which  the  powers  entrusted  to 
a  numerous  class  of  these  bodies  have 
been  exercised.  This  object  was  system- 
atically pursued  in  the  admission  of  free- 
men, resident  or  non-resident ;  in  their 
election  of  municipal  functionaries  for  the 
council  or  the  magistracy ;  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  subordinate  officers  and  the  local 
police ;  in  the  administration  of  charities 
entrusted  to  the  municipal  authorities  ; 
in  the  expenditure  of  the  corporate  reve- 
nue, and  in  the  management  of  the  cor- 
porate property.  The  most  flagrant  abuses 
arose  from  this  perversion  of  municipal 
privileges  to  political  objects.  Thus  the 
inhabitants  had  to  complain,  not  only  that 
the  election  of  their  magistrates  and  other 
municipal  functionaries  was  made  by  an 
inferior  class  of  themselves,  or  by  per- 
sons unconnected  with  the  town,  but  also 
of  the  disgraceful  practices  by  which  the 
magisterial  ofhce  was  frequently  ob- 
tained; while  those  who,  by  character, 
residence,  and  property,  were  best  quali- 
fied to  direct  and  control  its  municipal 
aifairs,  were  excluded  from  any  share  in 
the  elections  or  management.  The  ex- 
clusive and  party  spirit  belonging  to  the 
VOL.   I.  4 


whole  corporate  body  appeared  in  a  still 
more  marked  manner  in  the  councils  by 
whicli,  in  most  cases,  it  was  governed. 
These  councils  were  usually  self-elected, 
and  held  their  offices  for  life.  They 
were  commonly  of  one  political  party, 
and  their  proceedings  were  mainly  di- 
rected to  secure  and  perpetuate  the 
ascendancy  of  the  party  to  wliich  they 
belonged.  Individuals  of  adverse  politi- 
cal opinions  were,  in  most  cases,  system- 
atically excluded  from  the  governing 
body.  These  councils,  which  embodied 
the  opinions  of  a  single  party,  were  en- 
trusted with  the  nomination  of  magis- 
trates, of  the  civil  and  criminal  judges, 
often  of  the  superintendents  of  police,  and 
were,  or  ought  to  have  been,  the  leaders 
in  every  measure  that  concerned  the  in- 
terests and  prosperity  of  the  town.  So 
far  from  being  the  representatives  eitlier  of 
the  population  or  of  the  property  of  the 
town,  they  did  not  represent  even  the 
privileged  class  of  freemen ;  and  being 
elected  for  life,  their  proceedings  were 
unchecked  by  any  feeling  of  responsibil- 
ity. The  commissioners  reported  that 
there  prevailed  amongst  the  inhabitants 
of  a  great  majority  of  the  incorporated 
towns  a  general  and  a  just  dissatisfaction 
witli  their  municipal  councils,  whose 
powers  were  subject  to  no  proper  control, 
whose  acts  and  whose  proceedings,  being 
secret,  were  unchecked  by  tlie  influence 
of  public  opinion  ;  a  distrust  of  tlie  muni- 
cipal magistracy,  tainting  with  suspicion 
the  local  administration  of  justice,  and 
often  accompanied  with  contempt  of  the 
persons  by  whom  the  law  was  adminis- 
tered ;  a  discontent  under  the  burdens  of 
local  taxation,  while  revenues  that  ought 
to  be  applied  for  the  public  advantage 
were  diverted  from  their  legitimate  use, 
and  sometimes  wastefully  bestowed  for 
the  benefit  of  individuals,  sometimes 
squandered  for  purposes  injurious  to  the 
character  and  morals  of  the  people.  The 
commissioners  therefore  felt  it  their  duty 
to  represent  to  his  Majesty  that  the 
municipal  corporations  of  England  and 
Wales  neither  possess  nor  deserve  the  con- 
fidence or  respect  of  his  Majesty's  sub- 
jects, and  that  a  thorough  reform  must 


50  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  III. 

uniform  model.  It  does  not  altogether  destroj^  their  previously 
existing  lawful  corporate  powers,  but  it  does  sweep  away  all 
laws,  statutes,  charters,  and  usages  inconsistent  with  or  contrary 
to  its  provisions.  It  defines  who  shall  be  burgesses  or  citizens, 
making  the  right  essentially  depend  upon  occupancy  of  houses 
or  shops  within  the  borough,  and  the  payment  of  taxes  for  the 
relief  of  the  poor.  These  burgesses  or  citizens  elect,  from  time 
to  time,  a  fixed  number  of  proper  persons  to  be  councillors,  and 
the  council  (composed  of  the  mayor,  aldermen,  and  councillors) 
elect,  from  qualified  persons,  the  aldermen,  and  also  the  mayor 
and  the  ministerial  and  inferior  corporate  officers.  "  Tlie  coun- 
cil "  is  the  governing  body  of  the  corporation,  and  its  most  impor- 
tant powers  are  defined  by  various  acts  of  parliament.  It  will 
thus  be  perceived  that  the  original  power  is  in  the  burgesses  or 
citizens,  that  the  act  adopts  the  representative  system,  and  pro- 
ceeds upon  the  idea  that  a  substantial  interest  in  the  incor- 
porated place,  which  is  made  necessary  in  order  to  be  a  burgess 
or  citizen,  will  induce  care  in  the  selection  of  councillors,  and 
that  frequent  elections  will  prove  the  most  effectual  check  on 
those  entrusted  with  the  administration  of  the  municipal  author- 
ity, which  is  carefully  limited  and  defined. 

The  act  of  1835,  with  some  amendments,  constitutes  the  body 
of  the  existing  English  municipal  corporations  system  ;  its  leading 
provisions  are  so  important  to  be  understood  in  the  study  and 
application  of  the  English  cases  to  questions  arising  in  this  coun- 
try, and  contain  so  much  of  interest  to  the  lawyer,  the  legislator, 
and  the  municipal  inquirer,  that  they  are  given  or  referred  to  in 
the  note.^ 

be  effected  before  they  can  become  what  and  remain  well  and  quietly  governed ; 

they  ought  to  be,— useful  and  efficient  in-  and  it  is  expedient  that  the  charters  by 

struments  of  local  government.    Glover's  which  said  bodies  corporate  were  consti- 

Historical    Summary   of    the   Cornorate  tuted,  should  be  altered  in  the  manner 

System   of    Great   Britian   and   Ireland,  hereinafter  mentioned;   be  it   therefore 

pp.  38  to  45.     The  result  was  the  munici-  enacted,  tliat  so  mucli  of  all  laws,  statutes, 

pal   Corporations  Act  of  5   and   6  Will,  and  usages,  and  so  mucli  of  all  royal  and 

IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.     See  ch.  1,  ante,  sec.  8.  other  charters,  now  in  force,  relating  to 

1  Municipal  Corporations  Act  ofh  and  6  the  several  boroughs  named  in  schedules 

Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi,  enacted  September  9,  (A  and  B)  annexed,  as  are  inconsistent 

1835.  —Name,  etc.     This  act  commences  with,  or  contrary  to,  this  act,  shall  be,  and 

by  reciting,  tliat  "  whereas,  divers  bodies  the   same   are   hereby,   repealed  and  an- 

corporate  at  sundry  times  have  been  con-  nulled"  (sec.  1),  with  the  reservation  of 

stituted   within    the    cities,   towns,    and  certain  rights,  beneficial  exemptions,  and 

borouglis  of  England  and  AYales,  to  the  franchises    to    the   freemen    or   citizens, 

intent  that  the  same  might  forever  be  (Sees.  2-5.)     These  schedules  contain  an 


§37.] 


CREATION   OF  PUBLIC   CORPORATIONS. 


51 


In  the  United  States. 

§  37.(17)    The  proposition  Avhich  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the 
law  of  corporations  of  this  country  is,  tliat  here,  all  corporations. 


alphabetical  list  of  all  the  incorporated 
boroughs,  with  the  number  of  wards, 
number  of  aldermen,  and  number  of  coun- 
cillors, and  style  of  the  corporate  body 
in  each  ;  thus  :  "  Bath,  —  Seven  wards, 
fourteen  aldermen,  forty-two  councillors. 
Corporate  name  —  "Mayor,  Aldermen,  and 
Citizens  of  the  City  of  Bath."  If  it  be  a 
borough  instead  of  a  city,  the  word  "  Bur- 
gesses" is  used  instead  of  "Citizens." 
The  act  provides  that  the  body  corporate 
in  each  of  said  places  "  shall  take  and 
bear  the  name  of  tlie  Mayor,  Aldermen, 
and  Burgesses  [or  Citizens,  in  case  of  a 
city]  of  such  borough,  and  by  that  name 
shall  have  perpetual  succession,  and  shall 
be  capable  in  law,  by  the  council  hereinafter 
mentioned  of  such  borough,  to  do,"  etc. 
(Sec.  6.) 

Membership.  —  Before  the  passage  of 
the  act  under  consideration,  the  qualifica- 
tions for  members  or  ofBcers  of  municipal 
corporations  depended  upon  the  charter, 
usage,  or  by-laws  of  the  particular  cor- 
poration, the  usual  qualifications  being 
tliat  the  person  claiming  to  be  admitted 
to  the  freedom  of  the  corporate  town 
should  be  the  son  of  a  freeman,  or  should 
have  served  an  apprenticeship  to  a  free- 
man, or  (in  some  instances)  married  his 
daughter,  or  acquired  the  privilege  by 
gift  or  purchase ;  but  this  act  provides 
tiiat  hereafter  "  no  person  shall  be  elected, 
made,  or  admitted  a  burgess  or  freeman 
of  any  borough  by  gift  or  purchase." 
(Sec.  3.)  It  fixes  the  qnalijication  of  bur- 
(jesses  or  citizens,  thus  :  "  Every  male  per- 
son, of  full  age,  who  sliall  have  occupied 
any  house,  warehouse,  counting-house, 
or  shop,  within  any  borough"  for  three 
years,  "  and  during  the  time  of  such  occu- 
pation been  an  inhabitant  householder 
within  the  borough,  or  within  seven  miles 
of  the  borough,  shall,  if  duly  enrolled, 
be  a  bun/ess  of  such  borourjh  and  a  member  of 
the  bodji  corporate  of  the  mayor,  aldermen, 
and  burgesses  of  such  borough,  provided  he 
shall  have  been  rated  in  respect  to  the 
premises  so  occupied  by  him  to  all  rates 
made  for  the  relief  of  the  poor  witiiin  the 


parish."  (Sec.  9.)  Such  resident  occupiers 
and  taxpnijers,  only,  are  members  of  the 
corporate  body  of  tlie  place  ;  all  the  other 
inhabitants  are  no  part  of  the  municipal 
corporation,  though  subject  to  its  gov- 
ernment. 

Councillors,  how  chosen,  etc. — 
Ujion  the  first  day  of  November,  in  every 
year,  the  burgesses  so  enrolled  in  every 
borough  shall  openly  assemble,  and  elect 
from  the  persons  qualified  to  be  councillors 
[who  must  have  the  qualifications  of  a 
burgess,  and  also  increased  pecuniary 
and  rating  qualifications]  the  councillors 
of  the  borough"  (sec.  40),  of  whom  one- 
third  part  go  out  of  office  annually.  The 
elections  are  held  before  the  mayor  and 
assessors,  and  the  mode  of  voting  (which 
is  exactl}'  the  opposite  of  the  ballot  in 
America)  is  by  delivering  to  the  officers 
of  election  a  voting-paper  containing  the 
name  and  abode  of  the  person  voted  for, 
and  signed  with  the-  name  and  abode  of 
the  voter.  It  is  thus  seen  that  the  bur- 
gesses elect  the  councillors,  whose  quali- 
fications are  fixed  by  the  statute,  and 
whose  number  in  each  incorporated  place 
is  definite. 

Aldermen,  how  chosen.  —  On  the 
ninth  day  of  November,  in  every  third 
succeeding  year,  the  council  for  the  time 
being  are  directed  to  elect,  "from  the  coun- 
cillors, or  from  persons  qualified  to  be  coun- 
cillors, tiie  aldermen  of  the  borougli,"  who 
are  one  third  in  number  of  the  councillors. 
(Sec.  25.)  The  manner  of  election  is  pre- 
scribed, namel3%  by  everj'  member  of  the 
council  delivering  to  the  mayor  or  chair- 
man a  voting-paper  signed  by  tlie  mem- 
ber voting,  which  the  mayor  or  chairman 
is  directed  openly  to  read.  (Act.  7  Will. 
IV.  and  1  Vict.  ch.  Ixxviii.  sec.  14;  16 
and  17  Vict.  ch.  Ixxix.  sec.  13.) 

Mayor,  how  chosen.  —  At  the  meet- 
ing of  the  council,  to  be  held  on  the  ninth 
day  of  November,  each  year,  the  council 
are  directed  to  elect,  out  of  the  aldermen  or 
councillors,  a  fit  person  to  be  the  mayor, 
who  shall  continue  in  office  for  one  year 
(sec.   49),  and  until  his   successor  shall 


52 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  III. 


public  and  private,  exist  and  can  exist  only  by  virtue  of  express 
h'(/i illative  enactment,  creating,  or  authorizing  the  creation  of  the 
corporate  body.  Legislative  sanction  is  with  us  absolutely  essen- 
tial to  lawful  corporate  existence.  That  a  corporation  may  here 
exist  bv  prescription,  and  its  existence  be  established  by  long  and 
undisputed  user  of  corporate  powers  may  (as  the  cases  hereafter 
referred  to  will  show)  be  true,  but  this  prescription  and  user 
suppose  a  legislative  grant.  Instances  of  prescriptive  corpora- 
tions, with  us,  are  rare  and  exceptional.  But  corporations,  pub- 
lic and  private,  by  virtue  of  direct  legislative  authorization,  are 
bein"-  created  in  such  vast  numbers  as  to  constitute  one  of  the 
most  marked  and  important  features  of  the  present  time.  Speak- 
ing of  "corporations  by  statute,"  in  England,  Mr.  Willcock  says 
that  "  the  legislature  has  not  often  exercised  the  power  of  cre- 
atine- municipal  corporations,  because  it  has  been  esteemed  a 
flower  of  the  prerogative."  ^    This  has  reference  to  a  period  ante- 

(6  and  7 


have  accepted  and  qualified. 
Will.  IV.  ch.  cv.  sec.  4.) 

Who  compose  the  council,  etc. — 
The  mayor,  the  aldermen,  and  the  coun- 
cillors, for  the  time  being,  constitute 
"the  council"  of  the  borough.  (Sec.  25.) 
The  council,  as  we  have  seen,  elect  the 
mayor  and  the  aldermen,  and  it  also 
appoints  the  clerk,  treasurer,  and  other 
corporate  officers.  The  corporate  body 
acts  by  and  through  the  council,  who 
have  the  authority  of  the  old  corporations, 
except  as  modified.  Provision  is  made 
for  the  stated  and  special  meetings  of  the 
council ;  the  notice  prescribed,  tlie  quorum 
fixed,  the  presiding  officer  defined,  etc. 
Power  is  given  to  make  bjj-laics,  and  the 
powers  of  the  council  defined,  and  provision 
is  made  for  powers  vested  in  trustees,  un- 
der sundry  local  acts  of  parliament,  for 
paving,  fighting,  supplying  with  water  or 
gas,  cleansing,  watching,  regulating,  or 
improving,  or  for  providing  or  maintain- 
ing a  cemetery  or  market  in  the  boroughs 
being  transferred  to  the  body  corporate 
of  the  borough.  (Sec.  75,  20  and  21  Vict. 
ch.  1.)  By  other  acts  of  parliament  the 
boundaries  of  boroughs  are  fixed  (6  and 
7  Will.  IV.ch.  ciii.  1836);  the  "adminis- 
tration of  the  borough  fund"  regulated 
(lb.  ch.  civ.);  "the  administration  of 
justice  "  provided  for  (lb.  ch.  cv. ;  13  and 
14  Vict.  ch.  xci.)  ;  borough  rates  regu- 
lated (7  Will.  IV.  and  1  Vict.  ch.  Ixxxi. 


1837;  2  and  3  Vict.  ch.  xxviii. ;  3  and  4 
Vict.  ch.  xxviii. ;  4  and  5  Vict.  ch.  xlviii. ; 
5  and  6  Vict.  ch.  xcviii.)  ;  power  to  sell 
and  mortgage  property  and  to  charge 
rates  given  (5  and  6  Vict.  ch.  xcviii. ;  23 
and  24  Vict.  ch.  xvi.)  ;  provision  made 
as  to  maintaining  bridges  (13  and  14  Vict, 
ch.  Ixiv.  1850)  ;  to  promote  public  libraries 
(18  and  19  Vict.  ch.  Ixx.  1855;  29  and  30 
Vict.  ch.  xciv.)  ;  in  relation  to  the  police 
19  and  20  Vict.  ch.  Ixix.  (27  and  28  Vict, 
ch.  Ixiv;  28  and  29  Vict.  ch.  xxxv.) ;  the 
management  of  highways,  by  enabling 
councils  to  adopt  parish  roads  and  apply 
their  funds  to  their  repair  (25  and  26  Vict, 
ch.  Ixi  ) ;  for  safe  keeping  of  petroleum  (25 
and  26  Vict.  ch.  Ixvi. ) ;  for  tlie  protection  of 
gardens  and  ornamental  grounds  (26  and 
27  Vict.  ch.  xiii.) ;  in  relation  to  prisons 
(28  and  29  Vict.  ch.  cxxvi.  known  as  "  The 
Prisons  Act,  1865  " ;  29  and  30  Vict.  ch.  c). 
A  variety  of  other  statutes,  of  less  import- 
ance, in  relation  to  municipal  corporations, 
have  been  passed  since  tlie  general  act  of 
1835,  some  amendatory  of  it  and  somemak- 
ing  new  and  additional  provisions.  By  the 
famous  Disraeli  reform  bill  of  1867,  the 
right  to  vote  for  a  member,  or  members, 
to  serve  in  parliament  for  boroughs  was 
extended  to  large  numbers  or  classes  of 
persons  who  did  not  before  possess  the 
franchise.  New  American  Cyclopaedia, 
1868,  p.  327.  Ante,  ch.  1.  sec.  8. 
1  Willc.  on  Munic.  Corp.  25. 


§  38.]  CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS.  63 

rior  to  the  famous  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  September  9, 
1835  (5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.),  by  which  parliament  under- 
took the  regulation  of  this  important  subject.^ 

§  37  A.  The  existing  law  of  corporations  is  essentially  of  mod- 
ern growth,  and  has  yet  largely  to  be  developed  and  settled.  Hav- 
ing occasion  to  refer  to  this  subject  in  a  recent  case  in  Illinois,  a 
distinguished  judge  said  :  "  Formerly  but  few  private  corporations 
were  created,  and  these  cut  so  small  a  comparative  figure  in  the 
destinies  of  states,  that  they  attracted  but  little  attention  on  the 
part  of  law-makers,  and  were  but  little  studied  by  the  courts. 
Even  in  England,  until  a  very  recent  period,  both  public  and 
private  corporations  were  created  by  royal  prerogative,  without 
the  intervention  of  parliament,  and  were  invested  with  such 
powers  and  privileges  as  favorites  might  ask,  or  the  public  good 
be  supposed  to  require.  But  even  then  such  corporations  were 
rare.  Now  they  have  become  among  the  greatest  means  of  state 
and  national  prosperity.  It  is  probably  true  that  more  corpora- 
tions were  created  by  the  legislature  of  Illinois,  at  its  last  session, 
than  existed  in  the  whole  civilized  world  at  the  commencement 
of  the  present  century."  This  state  of  things  has  necessarily  led 
to  a  more  careful  study  of  the  whole  subject,  both  by  legislators 
and  the  courts.^  Not  only  are  commercial  or  business  corpora- 
tions being  thus  multiplied,  but  municipal  corporations,  in  all  of 
the  states,  are  constantly  created  and  universally  adopted  as  part 
of  the  ordinary  machinery  of  government,  so  that  it  is  rare  to 
find  a  town  or  city  of  any  considerable  size  not  incorporated  and 
invested  with  the  power  of  local  government.  There  are  in  the 
United  States  many  hundreds  of  incorporated  places  acting  under 
special  charters  granted  by  the  states  or  general  incorporation 
acts  passed  by  them. 

§  38.  (18)  The  poiver  of  Congress  to  create  or  authorize  the 
creation  of  corporations,  public  or  private,  whenever  these  become 
an  appropriate  means  of  exercising  any  of  the  constitutional 
powers  of  the  general  government,  or  of  facilitating  its  lawful 
operations  in  the  States  or  Territories,  must  be  taken  to  be  con- 

1  Ante,  Sees.  8,  35.  servations  of  Rogers,  J.,  in    Bushnell  v. 

2  Per  Caton,  J.,  Railroad  Co.  r.  Dalby,  Insurance  Co.,  15  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.), 
19  111.  353,  1857.     See,  also,  similar  ob-     176,  177. 


54  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  III. 

elusive]}'  settled  by  the  Supreme  Court.^  This  power  has  been 
exercised  on  important  occasions,  such  as  incorporating  the  banks 
of  the  United  States,  the  national  banks,  and  the  Pacific  Railroad 
Company ;  and,  within  the  above  limitations,  it  is  no  longer  dis- 
puted. Congress  habitually  passes  acts  for  the  organization  of 
Territories  and  territorial  governments,  which  are,  in  substance 
and  effect,  municipal  corporations  on  a  large  scale  and  of  a  pe- 
culiar character  ;  but  it  is  not  within  the  power  of  Congress  to 
establish  ordinary  municipal  corporations  within  the  limits  of  the 
States,  and  it  has  never  attempted  to  exercise  it. 

In  a  territorial  organic  act,  a  provision  that  the  power  of  the 
territorial  legislature  "  shall  extend  to  all  rightful  subjects  of  legis- 
lation,''' authorizes  the  legislature  to  create  municipal  corporations, 
and  to  invest  them  with  the  power  to  make  ordinances,  and  to 
provide  corporation  courts  in  which  to  enforce  them.  And  such 
courts  may  be  provided,  although  by  the  organic  act  it  is  declared 
that  the  judicial  power  of  the  Territory  shall  be  vested  in  a 
supreme  court,  district  courts,  probate  courts,  and  justices  of  the 
peace  .2 

§  39.  (19)  In  this  country,  until  comparatively  a  recent  period, 
municipal  corporations  have  been  created  singly,  each  with  its  special 

1  McCullough  V.  Maryland,  4  Wheat,  v.  City  of  Central,  1  Col.  323, 1872.  Under 
316;  Osborn  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  9  lb.  the  same  organic  act  it  was  decided  that 
738 ;  Thompson  i'.  Pacific  Railroad  Co.,  the  legislative  assembly  had  no  power  to 
9  Wall.  579 ;  Pacific  Railroad  v.  Lincoln  confer  upon  a  justice  of  the  peace  a  de- 
Co.,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  314,  1871.  nomination  not  warranted  by  tlie  organic 

-  State  V.  Young,   3    Kan.  445,  1866 ;  act ;  and,  in  so  far  as  a  municipal  char- 

Burnes  v.  Atchison,  2  lb.  454;  S.  P.  Red-  ter   undertook  to   confer   upon  a  justice 

dick  y.  Amelia,  1  Mo.  5,  1821.     In  this  of  the  peace  exercising  jurisdiction  under 

case  the  objection  made  was,  that  such  a  the  ordinances  of  the  city  the  name  of 

legislature  was  not  sovereign,  and   that  "  police  magistrate"  it  is  void.     lb. 

nothing  short  of   sovereign  power  could  It  is  now  provided  by  act  of  Congress, 

create  a  corporation.     The  answer  given  "  That  the  legislative  assemblies  of  the 

was,  that  Congress  could  give,  and  had  several  Territories  of  the  United  States 

given,   the   power  to    legislate   on   such  shall   not,  after  the  passage  of  this  act, 

subjects.     That  a  territorial  legislature,  grant  private  charters   or  especial  privl- 

vested  with  general  legislative   powers,  leges,  but  they  may,  by  general  incorpor- 

niay  create  a  corporation,  which  is  not  ation  acts,   permit   persons   to   associate 

affected  by  tlie  subsequent  adoption  of  a  themselves  together  as  bodies  corporate 

state  constitution,  was  held  in  Vincennes  for  mining,  manufacturing,  and  other  in- 

University  v.  Indiana,  14  How.  268,  1852.  dustrial  pursuits."     Act  of  March  2,  1867, 

See,  also;  Vance  ?;.  Bank,  1  Blackf  (Ind.)  14   Stats,   at  Large,    426,   sec.  1;    Rev. 

80;  Myers  y.  Bank,  20  Ohio,  283.     Under  Stats,    of  U.    S.   sec.    1889;    In    Seattle 

the  territorial  organic  act  of  Colorado,  the  v.    Tyler,    Wash.    Terrritory,    1877,  this 

legislative  assembly  has  power  to  estab-  section   was    held    by    Ch.  J.   Lewis    of 

lish   a    municipal    corporation,   but   the  Washington  Territory  to  extend  to  and 

question  of  such  establishment  by  special  embrace  municipal  corporations  within  its 

or  general  law  is  not  discussed.     Dietz  proliibition. 


§  39.]  CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  CORPOEA.TIONS.  55 

or  separate  charter  passed  by  the  legislature  of  the  State.  These 
charters,  in  all  of  the  States,  were  framed  after  the  same  general 
model ;  but  in  the  extent  of  the  special  powers  conferred,  and  in 
the  peculiar  constitution  of  the  governing  body,  and  the  like, 
there  was  great  variety.  It  will  be  useful  to  iiotice  the  outline 
features  of  one  of  these  charters,  since  it  constitutes  the  organic  act 
of  the  corporation,  and  bestows  upon  it  its  legal  character.  Such 
a  charter  usually  sets  out  with  an  incorporating  clause  declaring 
"  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  of  (naming  it),  or  city  of  (naming 
it),  are  hereby  constituted  a  body  politic  and  corporate  by  the 

name  and  style  of  the  'town  of ,'  or  'city  of ,'  and  by 

that  name  shall  have  perpetual  succession,  may  use  a  common 
seal,  sue  and  be  sued,  purchase,  hold,  and  sell  property,"  etc. 
The  charter  then  defines  the  territorial  boundaries  of  the  town  or 
city  thus  incorporated.  After  that  follow  provisions  relating  to 
the  governing  body  of  the  corporation,  usually  styled  the  town 
or  city  council.  This  is  generallj^  composed  of  one  body,  though 
in  some  instances  of  two;  the  members  being  called  aldermen, 
councilmen,  or  trustees.  The  corporation  is  divided  into  ivards, 
and  each  ward  elects  one  or  more  aldermen,  the  number  being 
specified  and  definite.^  The  qualifications  of  the  voters  are  fixed 
by  the  charter,  which  are  usually  that  the  voter  shall  be  a  male 
citizen  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State,  be  of  age,  and  a 
resident,  for  a  specified  time,  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation. 
The  mode  of  holding  elections  is  specified ;  and  the  power  is  often 
given  to  the  council  to  canvass  returns,  and  to  settle  disputed 
elections  to  corporate  offices.  Provision  is  made  for  the  election 
of  a  mayor,  or  other  chief  executive  officer  of  the  corporation,  and 
his  duties  defined.  The  charter  contains  a  minute  and  detailed 
enumeration  of  the  powers  of  the  city  council,  which  are  usually 
numerous ;  the  most  important  of  which  are,  the  authority 
to  create  debts  (sometimes  restricted) ;  to  levy  and  collect  taxes 
within  the  corporation,  for  corporate  purposes ;  to  make  local  im- 
provements and  assessments  to  pay  therefor ;  to  appoint  corporate 
officers  ;  to  enact  ordinances  to  preserve  the  health  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, to  prevent  and  abate  nuisances,  to  prevent  fires,  to  establish 
and  regulate  markets,  to  regulate  and  license  given  occupations, 

1  Constitutional    provisions  to  secure  in   some   of  whicli  a  voter  should   liave 

£quali1y  of  representation  lield   applicable  several  times  as  much  power  as  a  voter 

to  municipal   corporations  and  to  disable  in   another.     People  i'.  Canaday,  73  Nor. 

the  legislature  to  divide  a  city  into  wards,  Car.  198,  1875,  s.  u.  21  Am.  Rep.  4G5. 


56  MUNICIPAL   CORrORATIONS.  [CH.  III. 

to  establish  a  police  force,  to  punish  offenders  against  ordinances  ; 
to  open  and  grade  and  improve  streets ;  to  hold  corporation 
courts,  etc.,  etc. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  the  charter  of  such  a  corporation  is 
its  constitution,  and  gives  it  all  the  powers  it  possesses  (unless 
other  statutes  are  applicable  to  it),  its  careful  study,  in  any  given 
case,  is  indispensable  to  an  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the 
powers  it  confers,  the  duties  it  enjoins,  and  liabilities  it  creates. 
The  construction  of  its  various  provisions,  and  the  determination 
of  the  relation  which  these  bear  to  the  general  statutes  of  the 
State ;  how  far  the  charter  controls,  or  how  far  it  is  controlled 
by  other  legislation,  are  among  the  most  difficult  problems  which 
perplex  the  lawyer  and  the  judge.  The  study  of  a  question  of 
corporation  law  begins  with  the  charter ;  but  it  must  oftentimes 
be  pursued  into  the  general  statutes  and  legislative  policy  of  the 
State,  and  after  this  into  the  broad  field  of  general  jurisprudence. 

§  40.  In  public  corporations,  as  cities,  towns,  parishes,  school- 
districts,  membership  is  constituted  by  living  within  certain 
limits,  whatever  may  be  the  desire  of  the  individual  thus  residing 
or  that  of  the  municipal  or  public  body.  In  private  corporations, 
on  the  other  hand,  especially  those  organized  for  pecuniary  profit, 
membership  is  constituted  by  subscribing  to  or  receiving,  with 
the  assent  of  the  corporation  when  that  is  necessary,  transfers 
of  its  stock.i  It  is  the  citizens  or  inhabitants  of  a  city,  not  the 
common  council  or  local  legislature,  who  constitute  the  "  corpor- 
ation "  of  the  city.  The  officers  of  the  council  and  other  charter 
officers  are  the  agents  or  officers  of  the  corporation.^ 

§  41.  (20)  Within  a  period  comparatively  recent,  the  legisla- 
tures of  a  number  of  the  States,  following  the  example  of  the 
English  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch. 
Ixxvi.  heretofore  mentioned,  have  passed  general  acts  respect- 
ing municipal  corporations.  These  acts  abolish  all  special 
charters,  or  all  with  enumerated  exceptions,  and  enact  general 
provisions   for   the   incorporation,    regulation,   and   government 

1  Overseers  of  Poor,  etc.  v.  Sears,  22         2  Lowber  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.,  5 

Pick.  122,  130,  per  Shaw,  C  J. ;  Oakes  v.  Abbott's  Pr.  R.  325  ;  Clarke  v.  Rochester, 

Hill,    10  Pick.   333,  346,  per  Morton,  J.;  24 Barb.  446,  1857. 
ante,  sec.  9,  and  notes. 


§41.] 


CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS. 


57 


of  municipal  corporations.  The  usual  scheme  is  to  grade  cor- 
porations into  classes,  according  to  their  size,  as  into  Cities  of  the 
First  Class,  Cities  of  the  Second  Class,  and  Towns,  or  Villages, 
and  to  bestow  upon  each  class  such  powers  as  the  legislature 
deems  expedient;  but  the  powers  and  mode  of  organization  of 
corporations  of  each  class  are  uniform.^     General  incorporation 


1  Ohio.  —  By  the  Towns',  Cities',  and 
Villages'  Act  of  May  3,  1852  (Swan's 
Stat.  954),  all  corporations  existing  for 
the  purposes  of  municipal  government 
are  thereby  organized  into  cities  and  in- 
corporated villaijes.  (Sec.  1.)  In  respect 
to  the  e.xercise  of  certain  corporate  pow- 
ers, municipal  corporations  are  divided 
into  classes,  thus:  1.  Cities  of  the  first  class, 
which  comprise  all  cities  having  a  popu- 
lation exceeding  twenty  thousand  inhabi- 
tants ;  2.  Cities  of  the  second  class,  which 
comprise  all  cities  not  embraced  in  the 
first  class  ;  3.  Incorporated  villages  ;  and 
4.  Incorporated  villages  for  special  pur- 
poses, lb.  sec.  39  et  seq.  These  are  "  de- 
clared to  be  bodies  politic  and  corporate, 
under  the  name  and  style  of  the  city  of 

,  or  the  incorporated  village  of , 

as  the  case  may  be ;  capable  to  sue  and 
be  sued,  to  contract  and  be  contracted 
with,  to  acquire,  hold,  and  possess  prop- 
erty, real  and  personal,  to  have  a  com- 
mon seal,  and  to  exercise  such  other 
powers,  and  to  have  such  other  privileges, 
as  are  incident  to  municipal  corporations 
of  like  character  or  degree,  not  inconsist- 
ent with  this  act  or  the  general  laws  of 
the  state."  lb.  sec.  18.  These  powers 
and  privileges  are  then  specified  with 
great  minuteness,  twenty  sections  of  the 
act  being  devoted  to  this  purpose.  In- 
corporated villages  are  governed  by  one 
mayor,  one  recorder,  and  five  trustees, 
elected  annually  ;  the  mayor,  recorder, 
and  trustees  constituting  the  village  coun- 
cil, any  five  of  whom  make  a  quorum.  lb. 
sec.  43.  The  corporate  authority  of  cities 
is  vested  in  the  mayor,  one  board  of 
trustees  (two  from  each  ward),  who 
compose  the  city  council,  together  with 
such  officers  as  are  mentioned  in  the  act, 
or  as  may  be  created  under  its  authority. 
lb.  sec.  52  et  aeq. 

"The  governing  all  cities  and  villages 
under  one  general  law  was  a  new  experi- 
ment, supposed  to  be   required   by  the 


present  constitution.  It  was  to  be  ex- 
pected that,  in  the  working  of  the  experi- 
ment, omissions,  if  not  mistakes,  would 
be  discovered,  to  be  corrected  by  addi- 
tional legislation.  It  will  be  a  work  of 
care  and  time  to  perfect  an  orderly  and 
harmonious  system."  Per  (Jholson,  J.,  in 
Thomas  v.  Ashland,  12  Ohio  St.  124,  130, 
1801.     Infra,  sec.  46. 

Illinois.  —  The  General  Assembly  has 
the  power  to  delegate  legislative  author- 
ity incident  to  municipal  government  to 
cities,  but  this  can  only  be  done  by  gen- 
eral  /««-,  under  the  constitution  of  1870; 
when,  however,  it  is  done  by  such  law, 
the  constitutional  mandate  is  fully  com- 
plied with,  and  the  ordinances  to  be 
adopted  by  different  municipalities,  under 
the  power  so  conferred,  may  be  as  variant 
in  their  terms  as  the  varying  municipal 
necessities  or  sense  of  public  policy  in 
those  who  exercise  the  legislative  author- 
ity may  require.  Covington  v.  East  St. 
Louis,  78  III.  548,  1875. 

loica.  —  The  Ohio  act  is,  in  substance, 
adopted  in  Iowa.  Revision  1860,  ch.  li. 
But  it  does  not  apply  to  cities  having 
special  charters,  unless  adopted  by  them. 
Burke  v.  Jeffries,  20  Iowa,  145. 

In  Tennessee  (Acts  1849,  ch.  xvii)  pro- 
vision is  made  by  general  act  for  the  in- 
corporation of  towns,  cities,  and  villages. 
The  constitution  of  Tennessee  declares 
that  "  the  legislature  shall  have  power 
to  grant  charters  of  incorporation  as  they 
may  deem  expedient  for  the  public  good." 
Art.  XI.  sec.  7.  In  the  State  v.  Arm- 
strong, 3  Sneed  (Tenn.),  634,  it  was  held 
that  the  act  of  1856,  by  which  full  power 
to  create  corporations,  and  determine  the 
extent  of  their  powers,  was  given  to  the 
Circuit  Courts,  was  unconstitutional,  on 
the  ground  that  the  legislature  could  not 
delegate  its  authority  to  the  courts.  But 
in  the  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Shelton,  1  Head, 
24,  1858,  it  was  held  tliat  the  act  of  1849 
—  which  was  a  general  statute  for  the 


58 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[GH.  III. 


acts,  rather  than  special  charters,  would  seem  clearly  to  be  the 
best  method  of  creating  and  organizing  jnunicipal  corporations. 


incorporation  of  towns  and  cities,  and  by 
whicli  a  petition  was  to  be  presented  by 
tiie  inliabitants  of  a  place  proposing  to 
organize  under  tlie  act  to  tlie  County 
Court,  which  iiad  power  simply  to  record 
the  petition  and  designate  the  boundaries 
of  tlie  corporation  —  was  not  in  conflict 
with  the  constitution,  as  the  statute,  and 
not  the  court,  determined  the  e.xtent  and 
nature  of  the  powers  of  the  corporation. 

MissoHi-i.  —  A  general  act  for  the  in- 
corporation of  towns  was  passed  in  Mis- 
souri in  1845,  and  it  was  held  not  uncon- 
stitutional by  reason  of  certain  duties 
which  it  imposes  on  the  County  Court 
with  reference  to  organization  of  towns 
under  the  act,  as  these  duties  are  not 
legislative  but  judicial,  and  the  law  itself, 
and  not  the  court,  declares  the  powers  of 
which  the  corporation  shall  be  possessed. 
Kayscr  v.  Trustees,  etc.,  16  Mo.  88,  1852. 
Construction  of  statute.  Woods  v.  Henry, 
55  Mo.  560  ;  State  v.  McReynolds,  61  Mo. 
203,  1876.  The  case  of  Kayser  v.  Trus- 
tees, etc.,  supra,  is  thought  by  Campbell, 
J.,  to  conflict  with  the  general  course  of 
decision,  since  such  duties  are  in  their 
nature  administrative  or  political,  rather 
than  judicial.  People  v.  Bennett,  29 
Mich.  451,  s.  c.  18  Am,  Rep.  107.  See 
Damodhar  Gordhani  v.  Deoran  Kanji, 
L.R.I.  App.  Div.  332. 

Indiana.  —  The  general  law  of  1857, 
for  the  incorporation  of  cities,  is  not  un- 
constitutional for  want  of  uniformiti/  in 
the  mode  of  their  organization.  Lafayette 
V.  Jenners,  10  Ind.  70,  80,  1857.  See  also 
Welker  v.  Potter,  18  Ohio  St.  85. 

Pennsylvania.  —  A  general  act  was 
passed  in  1851,  designed  to  form  a  sys- 
tem for  the  regulation  of  boroughs  in- 
corporated therea/ler.  Commonwealth  v. 
Montrose,  52  Pa.  St.  391.  Course  of 
legislation  and  decision  in  Pennsylvania 
as  to  the  incorporation  of  boroughs  dis- 
cussed in  People  v.  Bennett,  sitpra. 

North  Carolina.  —  By  general  act,  every 
incorporated  town  may  elect,  each  year, 
not  less  than  three  nor  more  than  seven 
commissioners,  who  are  a  body  corporate 
and  tiie  governing  body  of  the  town. 
These  commissioners  are  elected  by  the 
vote  of  the  citizens  of  the  place.    At  the 


same  time  they  are  also  to  elect  a  mayor, 
who  presides  at  the  meetings  of  the  com- 
missioners, but  who  has  no  vote  except 
in  case  of  a  tie.  The  mayor  is  both  a 
peace  officer  and  a  judicial  officer,  with 
the  same  jurisdiction  as  a  justice  of  the 
peace,  with  jjowcr  also  to  "  hear  and  de- 
termine all  cases  that  may  arise  upon  the 
ordinances  of  the  commissioners,"  etc. 
The  commissioners  may  levy  certain 
specified  ta.xes,  and  make  ordinances  in 
relation  to  their  officers,  records,  markets, 
nuisances,  the  repair  of  streets  and  bridges 
in  the  town,  etc.,  etc.  These  general  pro- 
visions apply  to  all  incorporated  towns, 
when  not  inconsistent  with  special  char- 
ters or  acts  in  reference  thereto.  Rev. 
Code  1854,  ch.  iii.  p.  586. 

Micltigan.  —  The  general  act  of  1873  for 
the  incorporation  of  villages  within  any 
two  square  miles  of  territory  was  held  un- 
constitutional because  the  rights  of  the 
people  concerned  were  not  respected,  and 
the  legislature  had  attempted  to  delegate 
legislative  powers  to  private  citizens  in- 
stead of  to  corporate  authorities  or  local 
boards  of  officers.  People  v.  Bennett,  29 
Mich.  451,  1874  ;   s.  c.  18,  Am.  Rep.  107. 

New  York.  —  In  this  state  there  are 
cities  with  local  and  special  charters,  and 
also  towns  whose  powers,  duties,  and  privi- 
leges are  particularly  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute. Each  town  is  a  body  corporate  for 
specified  purposes  ;  but  it  is  declared  that 
"  no  town  shall  possess  or  exercise  any 
corporate  powers  except  such  as  are  enu- 
merated in  this  chapter,  or  shall  be  spe- 
cially given  by  law,  or  shall  be  necessary 
to  the  exercise  of  the  powers  so  enumer- 
ated or  given."  Rev.  Sts.  part  I.  ch. 
xi.  p.  337,  sees.  1,  2.  "  The  several 
towns  in  this  state,"  says  Denio,  J.,  in 
Lorillard  v.  The  Town  of  Monroe,  11 
N.  Y.  (1  Kern.)  392,  1854,  "  are  corpora- 
tions for  certain  special  and  very  limited 
purposes,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately, 
they  have  a  certain  limited  corporate  ca- 
pacity. They  may  purchase  and  hold 
lands  within  their  own  limits  for  the  use 
of  their  inhabitants.  They  may,  as  a  cor- 
poration, make  such  contracts  and  hold 
such  personal  property  as  may  be  neces- 
sary to  the  exercise  of  their  corporate  or 


§  42.]  CREATION   OF   PUBLIC   COKPOIIATIONS.  59 

1.  It  tends  to  prevent  favoritism  and  abuse  in  procuring  ex- 
traordinary grants  of  special  powers.  2.  It  secures  uniformity 
of  rule  and  construction.  All  being  created  and  endowed  alike, 
real  wants  are  the  sooner  felt  and  provided  for,  and  real  griev- 
ances the  sooner  redressed. 

Creation  hy  Implication. 

§  42.  (21)  It  is  well  settled  in  England  that,  while  a  corpora^ 
tion  must  commence  or  be  instituted  by  the  proper  authority, 
yet  no  fixed,  prescribed,  or  precise  form  of  words  is  necessary 
in  order  to  create  a  corporation.  While  the  words  "  to  found  " 
"  to  erect  or  establish,"  or  "  to  incorporate,"  are  commonly  used 
to  evince  the  intention  to  erect  or  create  a  body  politic,  they  are 
not  necessary.^  The  king  grants  a  charter  to  the  men  of  Dale, 
that  they  may  annually  elect  a  mayor,  and  plead  and  be  im- 
pleaded by  the  name  of  the  mayor  and  commonalty.  This  is 
considered  to  be  sufficient  to  incorporate  them.^  So  a  grant  by  a 
charter  containing  no  direct  clause  of  incorporation  to  the  inhab- 
itants of  a  town  "  that  their  town  shall  be  2^  free  horough^'  incor- 
porates it.3  So,  also,  a  grant  b}^  the  king  to  the  men  of  Dale  that 
they  be  discharged  of  tolls,  incorporates  them  for  this  particular 
purpose,  but  does  not  enable  them  to  purchase.*  The  settled 
doctrine  is  that  a  corporation  may  be  created  by  implication,  as 
well  as  by  the  use  of  words.     But  this  implication,  to  be  suf- 

administrative  powers,  and,  as  a  neces-  functions   or   duties,"  and   lience,  as  to 

sary  incident,   may    sue   and    te    sued,  such  subjects,  tlie   towns  as   corporations 

wliere   the   assertion   of  their  corporate  are  not  liable  for  any  default  or  malfea- 

rights,  or  the  enforcement  against  them  sance  of  these  officers.    See,  as  to  the  cor- 

of  their  corporate  liabilities,  shall  require  porate  capacity  of  towns  in  New  York, 

such  proceedings.     (1  R.  S.  337,  sec.  1  et  Denton  v.  Jackson,  2  Johns.  Ch.  R.  320; 

seq.)    In  all  other  respects  — for  instance,  North  Hempstead  v.  Hempstead,  2  Wend. 

in  everything  which  concerns  the  admin-  109;  affirming  s.  c.  Hopk.  288;    Cornell 

istration  of  civil  or  criminal  justice,  the  v.  Guilford,  1  Denio,  510. 

preservation  of  the  public  health  and  mor-  Arkansas.  —  State  v.  Jennings,  27  Ark. 

als,  the  conservation  of  highways,  roads,  419,  1872. 

andbridges,  the  relief  of  the  poor,  and  the  i  10  Co.  27a,  28a,  29b,  30;  1  Kyd,  62; 

assessment  and  collection  of  taxes  —  the  2  Kent  Com.  27. 

several  towns  are  political  divisions,  or-  2  21  Edw.  IV.  56.     The  doctrine  of  a 

ganized  for   the   convenient  exercise   of  corporation  by  implication  originated  in 

portions   of    the   political   power   of  the  the  time  of  Edward  IV.     lb.  8  Edw.  IV. 

state,  and  are  no  more  corporations  than  28.     Post,  sec.  5G0. 

the  judicial,  or  the  senate  and  assembly  3  Kyd,   02,  cites   Firm.   Burg.  ch.  ii. ; 

districts,     lb.  sec.  2.     The  functions  and  Madox  Hist.  Exch.  402. 

duties  of  the  several  town  officers  respect-  *  Vin.  Abr.  Corp.  F.  pi.  6;  76.  pi.  4; 

ing  these  subjects  are  judicial  and  admin-  Bagot's  Case,  7  Edw.  IV.  29.  Grant  on 

istrative,  and  not  in  any  sense  corporate  Corp.  43,  note  e,  and  cases  cited. 


CO  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  III. 

ficient,  must  clearly  evince  or  express  the  intention  to  establish 
or  constitute  a  body  politic  or  corporate,  that  is,  to  invest  it 
with  corporate  powers  and  privileges.  But  the  absence  of  ex- 
press provision  respecting  the  incidents  which  the  law  tacitly 
annexes  to  corporations  is  considered  immaterial.  Thus  the 
omission  in  the  charter  or  act  of  the  words  "  to  plead  and  be 
impleaded,"  or  "  to  have  a  seal,"  or  "  to  make  by-laws,"  would 
not  make  it  essentially  defective.^  ^  So  it  would  not  be  essentially 
defective  if  the  name  was  omitted,  if  the  name  could  be  ascer- 
tained from  the  terms  of  the  charter  or  act,  or  from  the  nature 
of  the  thing  or  matters  granted.^  Certain  attributes  or  powers 
are  absolutely  essential  to  constitute  a  body  corporate,  such  as 
perpetual  succession,  the  right  to  contract,  to  sue  and  be  sued 
as  a  corporation,  &c.  Now  if  the  charter  or  act,  which  is  relied 
upon  as  creating  a  body  corporate  by  implication,  instead  of 
simply  omitting  to  express  these  essential  properties,  negatives 
and  excludes  them,  it  is  plain  that  the  body  would  not  be  deemed 
incorporated.^ 

§  43.  (22)  Although  corporations  in  this  country  are  created 
by  statute,  still  the  rule  is  here  also  settled  that  not  only  private 
corporations  aggregate,  but  municipal  or  public  corporations, 
7nay  he  established  ivithout  any  particidar  form  of  words,  or  techni- 
cal mode  of  expression,  though  such  words  are  commonly  em- 
ployed.*    If  powers  and  privileges  are  conferred  upon  a  body  of 

1  Rol.  Abr.  513;  1  Kyd,  63.     The  Con-  1.30,  18.39.     He  says:  "The  mode  of  per- 

sorvators,  etc.  r.  Ash,  lOBai-n.  &  Cres.  349  petuating  the   existence   of  a   corporate 

('21  Eng.  C.  L.  97),  1829.     "  It  is  not  neces-  body  is  not  essential;  all  that  is  essential 

sary,"  says  Mr.  Kyd,  "  that  the  charter  is  that  some  mode  be  provided   by  the 

sliould  expressh/  confer  those  powers  with-  charter  or  act  by  which  it  is  constituted, 

out  which  a  collective  body  of  men  cannot  or  by  the  general  laws  of  the  government, 

be  a  corporation,  such  as  the  power  of  su-  by  means  of  which  it  shall  be  so  perpetu- 

ing  and  being  sued,  and  to  take  and  grant  ated."      22  Pick.  180  ;  The  Conservators 

property,  though  such  powers  are,  in  gen-  v.  Ash.  10  Barn.  &  Cress.  349;  (21  Eng. 

eral,  expressly  given."     1  Kyd  Corp.  63.  C.  L.  97.) 

Thus,  in  the  case  of  the  Borough  of  Yar-  2  Trustees  r.  Parks,  10  Maine  (1  Eairf.), 

mouth,  1609,  2  Brownlow  &  Goldsb.  292,  441 ;  School    Com.   v.  Dean,  2  Stew.  & 

part  II.  it  was  decided  by  the  common  Port.  (Ala.)  190,  1832. 
bench,  per  Lord  Coke,  that  a  grant  of  in-  ^  Grant  on  Corp.  30. 

corporation  to  the  burgesses  or  citizens  of  *  Thomas  v.  Dakin,  22  Wend.  9,  84, 

a  borough   or  city,  which,  being  an  old  per  Coicen,  J.,  and  authorities  cited;  Bow. 

grant,  should  be  favorably  construed,  was  v.  AUentown,   34   N.  H.    351,   372;  Steb- 

good,  without  the  words  "their  succes-  bins  v.  Jennings,  10  Pick.  172;  Benton  v. 

sors."       And   see,   on   this   subject,   the  Jackson,   2  Johns.   Ch.  325,   326,    1817 ; 

learned  opinion  of  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Over-  Mahoney  v.   The   Bank   of  the   State,  4 

seers  of  Poor,  etc.' v.  Sears,  22  Pick.  122,  Ark.  620,  1842;  s.  c.  well  digested  in  An- 


§  43.]  CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  CORPOKATIONS.  61 

men,  or  upon  the  residents  or  inhabitants  of  a  town  or  district, 
and  if  these  cannot  be  exercised  and  enjoyed,  and  if  the  purposes 
intended  cannot  be  carried  into  effect,  without  acting  in  a  cor- 
porate capacity,  a  corporation  is,  to  this  extent,  created  by  impli- 
cation. The  question  turns  upon  the  intent  of  the  legishxture, 
and  this  can  be  shown  constructively  as  well  as  expressly.^  This 
is  well  illustrated  in  a  case  in  Massachusetts,^  where  the  question 
was  whether  the  plaintiffs  were  a  corporate  body,  with  power  to 
sue.  They  were  not  incorporated  expressly.  But,  by  statute, 
the  inhabitants  of  the  several  school-districts  were  empowered,  at 
any  meeting  properly  called,  to  raise  money  to  erect,  repair,  or 
purchase  a  school-house,  to  determine  its  site,  etc.,  etc.,  the  major- 
ity binding  the  minority.  The  cause  was  argued  by  able  counsel, 
and,  after  several  consultations,  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court 
finally  agreed  in  the  opinion  that  the  plaintiffs  possessed  sufficient 
corporate  powers  to  maintain  an  action  on  a  contract  to  build  a 
school-house,  and  to  make  to  them  a  lease  of  land.  But  the 
intentio7i  of  the  legislature,  where  it  is  sought  to  show  tliat  a  cor- 
poration has  been  created  by  implication,  must  satisfactorily 
appear.^ 

It  may  be  remarked  that  where  a  municipal  corporation  ap- 
pears to  be  acting  under  color  of  law,  and  its  existence  is  not 
questioned  by  the  state,  it  cannot  be  collaterally  drawn  in  ques- 
tion by  private  parties ;  and  the  rule  is  not  different  although 
the  constitution  may  prescribe  the  manner  of  incorporation.* 

gell   &  Ames   on   Corp.    sec.  77;    North  legislative  grant  gives  capacity  to  hold 

Hempstead  v.  Hempstead,  2  Wend.  109,  the  thing  granted.      Lord  v.  Bigelovv,  6 

133,  opinion  by  Savage,  C.  J. ;  Conserva-  Verm.  465. 

tors  of  River  Tone  v.  Ash,  10  Barn.  &  ^  Medical    Institute    v.    Patterson,    1 

Cress.  349;    Jeffreys  v.  Garr,  2  B.  and  Denio,  61 ;  s.  c.  affirmed  in  court  of  er- 

Adol.  841;  Newport   Trustees  in  re,  16  rors,  5  ih.  618,  1846;  M^'ers  v.  Irwin,  2 

Sim.  346;  2  Kent  Com.  27.  Serg.   &   Rawle,_    368,    1816;    Angell  & 

1  Same  cases  last  cited.  Ames,  sec.  79,  and  cases  cited ;  Wells  v. 

2  Inhabitants,  etc.  t'.  Wood,  13  Mass.  Burbank,  17  N.  H.  393;  Society,  etc.  i>. 
193,  1810—  Mr.  Fessenden  for  the  plain-  Town  of  Pawlet,  4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  480,  502. 
tiff,  and  Mr.  Greenleaf  for  the  defendant.  To  establisii  a  corporation  by  implication, 
In  Bow  V.  Allentown,34  N.  H.  351,  it  was  says  Shaw,  C.  J.,  in  Stebbins  v.  Jennings, 
held  that  the  annexation,  by  the  legisla-  10  Pick.  172,  it  must  appear  that  the 
ture,  of  other  territory  to  the  town  of  Al-  rights  and  powers  conferred  can  only  be 
lentown  made  that  a  corporate  town  by  enjoyed  by  tJie  exercise  of  corporate 
implication,  if  it  was  not  so  before;  and  powers,  and,  therefore,  if  such  powers  are 
such  also  was  the  effect,  under  the  con-  not  necessary,  they  are  not  impliedly 
stitution  of  New  Hampsliire,  of  a  grant  to  given. 

a  place  having  less  than  one  iiundred  and  ■*  St.  Louis   v.   Shields,  62   Mo.  247, 

fifty  polls  to  send  a  representative.     A     1876 ;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.   180,  254 ;  Ge- 


62  MUNICIPAL   COKrORATIONS.  [ClI.  III. 

Acceptance  of  Charter. 
§  44.  (23)  The  rule  wliich  applies  to  private  corporations,  that 
the  incorporating  act  is  ineffectual  to  constitute  a  corporate  body 
until  it  is  assented  to  or  accepted  by  the  corporators,  has  no  appli- 
cation to  statutes  creating  municipal  corporations.^  These  are 
imperative  and  binding  without  any  consent,  unless  the  act  is 
expressly  made  conditional.  All  who  live  within  the  limits  oP 
the  incorporated  district  are  bound  by  them,  and  can  withdraw 
from  the  corporation  only  by  removal.  Over  such  corporations 
the  legislature,  unless  restrained  by  the  constitution,  has  entire 
control ;  and  unless  otherwise  provided  by  the  act  itself,  or  a 
different  intention  be  manifested,  the  public  corporation  is  legally 
constituted  as  soon  as  the  incorporating  act  declaring  it  to  exist 
goes  into  effect.^  But  while  the  legislature  is  not  bound  to  obtain 
the  acceptance  or  assent  of  the  municipal  corporation,  it  is  well 
established  that  a  provision  in  a  municipal  charter  that  it  shall 
not  take  effect  unless  assented  to  or  accepted  by  a  majority 
of  the  inhabitants  is  not  unconstitutional  it  being  in  no  just 
sense  a  delegation  of  legislative  power,  but  merely  a  question  as 
to  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  a  charter.^     So  a  provision  in 

neva  v.  Cole  (action  to  recover  a  tax),  61  ter,  3  N.  H.  524,  532,  1826 ;  State  v.  Can- 
Ill.  397,  1871.  See  post,  ch.  xxi,  quo  jvar-  terbury,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  218.  Accep- 
ranio.  Entering  into  an  obligation  with  tance,  when  requisite,  may  doubtless  be 
a  corporation  admits  the  corporate  ca-  {mplied  in  proper  cases,  as  where  no  par- 
pacity,  and  precludes  a  plea  of  nul  tiel  ticular  mode  of  expressing  acceptance  is 
corporation.  St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  62  Mo.  prescribed,  from  corporate  acts  and  con- 
247,  251,  and  cases  cited.  See  also  Her-  duct,  as  in  cases  of  private  corporations, 
man,  Estoppel,  chapter  on  Corporations.  Taylor  v.  Newberne,  2  Jones  Eq.  N.  C. 
Post  sec.  449.  141,1855.     See  Zabriskie  w.  Railroad  Co., 

1  'Post,  sees.  54,  84,  note  188.  23  How.  (U.  S.)  381,  397, 1859.    Post,  sec. 

2  Berlin  v.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266, 1856,     270,  note. 

per  Bell,  J.,  where  it  is  accordingly  held,  ^  Tcople  v.  Salomon,  51  111.  5.3,  1869; 

that  to  make  an  incorporation  of  a  town  Alcorn   v.   Horner,  38   Miss.  652,    1860  ; 

effectual,  it  is  not  necessary  that  there  Patterson  v.   Society,  etc.,  4  Zabr.  (24  N. 

should  be  a  legal  town  meeting  holden  in  J.  L. )  385, 1854 ;  Smith  v.  McCarthy,  50  Pa. 

it.     See  also  People  «.  Wren,  4  Scam.  (5  St.  359;    County  v.  Quarter  Sessions,  8 

111.)  269 ;  Warren  v.  Charlestown,  2  Gray,  Barr.  (Pa.)  395;  Commonwealth  v.  Painter, 

104;  Mills  V.  Williams,  11  Ire.  558;  State  10  7/;.  214;  and  see  also  Bull  r.  Read,  13 

r.  Curran,  7Eng.  (12  Ark.)  321;FireDe-  Gratt.    (Va.)   78,   1853;    People   v.   Rey- 

partment  v.  Kip,  10  Wend.  267  ;  Peoples,  nolds,  5  Gilm.   (10  111.)  1 ;  State  v.  Scott, 

Morris,  13  Wend.  325,  337 ;  Brouwer  v.  17  Mo.  521 ;  Hudson  Co.  v.  State,  4  Zabr. 

Appleby,  1  Sandf.  158,  1847;  People  v.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  718;  Bank  ;;.  Brown,  26  N. 

President,  9  Wend.  351 ;  Wood  v.  Bank,  Y.  467, 1863  ;  Call  v.  Chadbourne,  46  Me. 

9  Cow.  194,  205,  1828;  Proprietors,  etc.  206;   State  ?;.  Wilcox,  45  Mo.  458;  Ho- 

V.  Horton,  6  Hill,  .501 ;  Gorham  v.  Spring-  bart  v.  Supervisors,    17  Cal.  23 ;    Lafay- 

field,  21  Maine,  58, 1842 ;  People  v.  Stout,  ette,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Geiger,  34  Ind.  185. 

23  Barb.  319,  1856  ;  Bristol  v.  New  dies-  This  case  asserts  a  distinction  between  a 


§44.] 


CREATION   OF   PUBLIC   CORPORATIONS. 


63 


a  charter,  or  the  constituent  act  of  a  municipal  corporation,  by 
which  the  right  to  make  certain  improvements  or  to  create  cer- 
tain liabilities  is  made  to  depend  upon  a  vote  of  the  people 
interested,  has  frequently  been  upheld  as  valid. i  So  an  act 
directing  an  election  to  be  held  by  the  qualified  electors  inter- 
ested to  determine,  by  ballot,  whether  a  newly-erected  township 
should  be  continued  is  constitutional.^     On  the  same  principle 


bill  submitted  to  the  people  of  the  whole 
state  for  adoption  or  rejection,  and  an  act 
which  leaves  it  to  the  inhabitants  of  a 
particular  locality  whether  they  will 
avail  themselves  of  its  provisions.  It  has 
been  held  in  New  Hampshire  that  it  was 
competent  for  the  legislature,  under  the 
constitution  of  the  state,  to  enact  a  penal 
law  which  shall  have  effect  only  in  those 
towns  which  adopt  it  by  vote.  State  v. 
Noyes,  10  Fost.  (30  N.  H.)  279, 1855.  An 
amendment  to  a  city  charter  was  to  take 
effect  only  when  adopted  "  by  a  majority 
of  the  voters  of  the  city."  This  was  con- 
sidered-to  manifest  the  intention  to  pre- 
sent the  question  of  acceptance  to  the 
voters  at  a  regular  city  election.  The 
council  ordered  the  vote  to  be  taken  at 
the  township  polls ;  the  voters  of  the  two 
organizations  possessing  different  qualifi- 
cations, but  the  township  and  city  occu- 
pied precisely  the  same  territory.  Held, 
that  the  electioTi  was  of  no  vahdity,  and 
that  the  amendment  had  never  been  duly 
accepted.  Foote  v.  Cincinnati,  11  Ohio, 
408,  1842. 

A  useful  article  upon  the  Constitu- 
tionality of  Local.  Option  Laics  will  be 
found  in  12  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.),  March, 
1873,  p.  129.  Affirming  the  principle  that 
municipal  or  public  corporations  or  the 
people  thereof  may  by  the  legislature  be 
invested  with  the  power  to  regulate  or 
prohibit  the  retail  of  intoxicating  drinks, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Jersey  have 
recently  decided  the  Chatham  Local  Op- 
tion Law,  which  declared  the  retail  of 
ardent  spirits  without  license  to  be  un- 
lawful, and  which  provided  that  no  license 
should  be  granted  if  a  majority  of  tlie 
voters  of  a  township  voted  "no  license," 
to  be  constitutional.  State  v.  Morris 
Common  Pleas,  12  Am.  Law  Keg.  (N.  S.) 
32;  8.  c.  36  N.J.  L.  72;  .s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep. 
422.  See  also  Howe  v.  Plainfield  (intoxi- 
cating liquors),   37  N.  J.  L.   I'lO;  Free- 


holders of  Hudson  (power  of  local  body  to 
fix  rates  of  ferriage),  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.) 
718.  Validity  of  Local  Option  Laws  de- 
nied, and  the  subject  fully  examined  in 
AVall  in  re,  48  Cal.  279,  1874;  s.  c.  17 
Am.  Rep.  425 ;  People  v.  Wall,  49  Cal. 
478,  1875 ;  Anderson  v.  Commonwealth, 
14  Bush,  171;  State  v.  Cook,  24  Minn. 
247;  Fell  I'.  State  (Liquor  Law),  42  Md. 
71,  1875;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  83.  See  also 
in  Pennsylvania  the  case  which  involved 
the  question  of  the  validity  of  the  act  of 
May,  1871,  "  to  allow  the  voters  of  the 
22d  Ward  of  Philadelphia  to  vote  on  the 
question  of  granting  licenses  to  sell  in- 
toxicating liquors."  Locke's  Appeal,  72 
Pa.  St.  491;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  716;  Glov- 
ersville  v.  Howard  (intoxicating  liquors), 
70  N.  Y.  287,  1877 ;  State  v.  Wilcox,  42 
Conn.  364,  1875 ;  s.  c.  19  Am.  Rep.  536. 
Post,  sec.  308. 

1  Clarke  v.  Rochester,  28  N.  Y.  605 ; 
Patterson  v.  Society,  etc.  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J. 
L.)  385 ;  Bank  of  Rome  v.  Rome,  18  N.  Y. 
38;  Trustees  i'.  Cherry,  8  Ohio  St.  564; 
Burnes  it.  Atchison,  2  Kansas,  454,  1864  ; 
Bank  v.  Brown,  26  N.  Y.  467  ;  Hammond 
V.  Haines,  25  Md.  541 ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Commissioners,  1  Ohio  St.  77 ;  Foote  v. 
Cincinnati,  11  Ohio,  408,  1842 ;  St.  Louis 
V.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  483;  Blanding  v. 
Burr,  13  Cal.  343.  These  cases  are  dis- 
tinguishable from  Barto  v.  Himrod,  4 
Seld.  (8N.  Y.)  483. 

'•J  Commonwealth  v.  Judges,  etc.,  8  Pa. 
St.  391  ;  distinguished  from  Parker  v. 
Commonwealth,  G  lb.  507  ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Painter,  10  Pa.  St.  214,  1849;  Smith  v. 
McCarthy,  56  Pa.  St.  359.  So  the  ques- 
tion may  be  siibmittcd  whether  a  portion 
of  an  adjoining  county  shall  be  annexed. 
People  V.  IMcNally,  49  Cal.  478,  1875. 
Where  the  authority  to  act  depends  upon 
the  prior  sanction  of  "  a  majority  of  the 
qualijied  voters"  residing  in  the  corpora- 
tion, the  presumption  is  that  all  who  vote 


G4 


MUNICIPAL   COlirORATIONS. 


[CII.  III. 


the  legislature  may  provide  that  a  statute  shall  cease  to  exist* 
unless  the  nuuiicipal  corporation  to  be  affected  by  it  shall,  within 
a  prescribed  period,  assent  to  it.^  Permitting  the  voters  of  a 
municipality  to  decide  upon  questions  of  local  interest  or  expe- 
diency, such  as  those  mentioned  in  this  section  and  in  the  notes, 
seems  to  the  author  to  be  conformable  to  those  ideas  of  self- 
government  and  self-regulation  by  the  people  concerned,  which 
lie  at  the  basis  not  only  of  our  municipalities  but  of  our  institu- 
tions. The  only  limit  is  that  the  legislature  must  not  delegate 
its  function  as  the  law-making  branch  of  the  government. 


Special  Constitutional  Provisions. 
§  45.  (24)  The  constitutions  of  many  of  the  States  contain  pro- 
visions respecting  the  creation  and  powers  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions. In  some  of  the  constitutions  the  legislature  is  in  terms 
allowed  to  create  corporations  for  municipal  purposes  by  special 
act^  and  in  others  it  is  in  terms  forbidden  to  do  this,  and  re- 
quired to  provide  a  general  laiv  for  all  corporations,  public  and 
private.^     So  far  as  municipal  corporations  and  their  rights  are 


are  legal  voters ;  and  the  better  view 
probably  is,  that  those  who  do  not  vote 
acquiesce  in  the  result,  and  that  a  ma- 
jority of  those  actually  voting  is  sufficient, 
though  in  point  of  fact,  it  may  not  be  a 
majoritj-  of  all  who  would  be  entitled  to 
vote.  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo.  450,  18G6 ; 
State  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  37  Mo.  270.  And  of 
tliis  opinion  is  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States,  in  whicli,  in  an  action  on 
municipal  bonds,  the  phrase  "  a  majority 
of  the  legal  voters  of  the  township  "  was 
held  to  mean  a  majority  of  the  legal 
voters  of  the  township  voting  at  the  elec- 
tion. St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers,  16 
Wall.  644,  1872 ;  People  v.  Warfield,  20 
111.  163;  People  v.  Weant,  48  111.  263; 
Railroad  v.  Davidson  County,  1  Sneed 
(Tenn.)  692;  Talbot  y.  Dent,  9  B.  Mon. 
526 ;  Angell  &  Ames  Corp.  9  ed.  sees. 
499,  500.  But  compare  State  v.  Winkel- 
meier,  35  Mo.  103,  which  construes  such 
language  to  require  a  "  majority  of  all  the 
legal  voters  of  the  city,  and  not  merely 
of  all  who  might,  at  a  particular  time, 
choose  to  vote  upon  it."  See  Damon  v. 
Granby,  2  Pick.  345,  355,  1824,  and  chap- 
ter on  Corporate  Meetings,  post.  Infra, 
sec.  47,  note  1. 


1  Corning  v.  Greene,  23  Barb.  33, 1856. 
2  Post,  ch.  iv.  New  York  constitution, 
1846,  art.  viii.  sec.  1 ;  Illinois  constitu- 
tion, 1847,  art.  x.  sec.  1;  see,  also,  new 
constitution,  1870;  Michigan  constitution, 
1850,  art.  xv.  sec.  1  ;  California  constitu- 
tion, 1849,  art.  iv.  sec.  31 ;  construed, 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Plumas  Co.,  37  Cal.  354 ; 
Minnesota  constitution,  1857,  art.  x.  sec. 
2  ;  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn.  171 ;  12  lb. 
41 ;  Oregon  constitution,  1857,  art.  xi.  sec. 
2;  Louisiana  constitution,  1864,  title  vii. 
art.  cxxi. ;  Nevada  constitution,  1864,  art. 
viii.  sec.  1 ;  construed,  Virginia  City  v. 
Mining  Co.,  2  Nev.  86.  In  Missouri  it  is 
provided  that  no  municipal  corporation 
shall.be  created  by  special  act,  except 
cities  of  at  least  5,000  inhabitants,  the 
special  act  to  be  approved  by  a  vote  of 
the  inhabitants.  Constitution  1865,  art. 
viii.  sec.  5. 

3  Iowa  constitution,  1857,  art.  iii.  sec. 
30;  Von  Phul  v.  Hammer,  29  Iowa,  222; 
Florida  constitution,  1865,  art.  iv.  sec.  20; 
Nebraska  constitution,  art.  viii.  sees.  1 
and  2.  By  the  new  constitution  of  Illi- 
nois, special  legislation  is  forbidden  "  in- 
corporating cities,  towns,  or  villages,  or 
changing  or  amending  tlie  charter  of  any 


§45.] 


CREATION   OF   PUBLIC    CORPORATIONS. 


65 


protected  by  constitutional  provisions,  express  or  implied,  they  are 
removed  from  legislative  control,  but  no  further,  as  we  shall  see 
in  a  subsequent  chapter.  Although  the  constitution  of  a  state 
may  recognize  the  municipal  corporation  of  an  important  city  by 
fixing  the  number  of  certain  officers,  and  providing  for  their  elec- 
tion, etc.,  yet  this  does  not  make  the  charter  of  the  city  a  consti- 
tutional charter  conferring  powers  beyond  the  control  of  the 
legislature.^ 


town,  city,  or  village."  Wisconsin  con 
stitutional  amendment  1871.  Atty.  Genl. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  35  Wis.  42-5  ;  Kimball  v. 
Rosendale,  42  Wis.  407  ;  Stevens  Point 
&  Co.  V.  Reilly,  44  Wis.  295 ;  Kansas 
constitution,  art.  xii.  sees.  1  and  5 ;  con- 
strued, Wyandotte  City  v.  Wood,  5  Kan. 
603 ;  Atchison  i'.  Bartholow,  4  lb.  124. 
The  constitution  of  Ohio  is  as  follows : 
"  The  General  Assembly  shall  provide  for 
the  organization  of  cities  and  incorpor- 
ated villages  by  cjeneral  laws,  and  restrict 
their  power  of  taxation,  assessment,  bor- 
rowing money,  contracting  debts,  and 
loaning  their  credit,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
abuse  of  such  power."  Constitution  A, 
D.  1851,  art.  xiii.  sec.  6.  Under  this  sec- 
tion tlie  legislature,  by  the  Towns'  and 
Cities'  Act  of  May  3,  1852  (Swan  & 
Critchf.  Stats.  1497),  undertook  to  pro- 
vide for  the  government  of  all  such 
places  by  a  general  statute.  Thomas 
V.  Ashland,  12  Ohio  St.  124.  An  act 
applying  to  all  cities  of  the  first  class 
containing  less  than  100,000  inhabitants 
is  not  in  conflict  with  the  provision 
of  the  constitution  which  requires  all 
laws  of  a  general  nature  to  have  a  uni- 
form operation  throughout  the  state. 
Welker  v.  Potter,  18  Ohio  St.  85,  1868; 
see  also  Lafayette  v.  Jenners,  10  Ind.  70, 
80,  1857.  Construction  of  constitutional 
provision  that  there  shall  be  "  but  one 
system  of  town  and  county  government," 
which  "  shall  be  as  nearly  uniform  as 
practicable."  State  v.  Dousman,  28  Wis. 
641,  1871 ;  State  v.  Riordan,  24  Wis.  484, 
1869. 

1  Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Police,  15  Md. 
376,  1859 ;  see  also  Patterson  v.  Society, 
etc.  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  385,  18-54.  In 
People  V.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  561,  Brown,  J., 
says:  "When  the  present  constitution 
was  formed,  the  entire  territory  of  the 

VOL.  I.  5 


state  was  separated,  and  appropriated  bj' 
its  civil  divisions,  its  counties,  cities,  and 
towns.  These  civil  divisions  are  coeva! 
with  the  government.  The  state  has 
never  existed  a  moment  without  them. 
All  our  thoughts  and  notions  of  civil 
government  are  inseparably  associated 
with  counties,  cities,  and  towns.  They 
are  permanent  elements  in  the  frame  of 
government;  they  are  institutions  of  the 
state,  durable  and  indestructible  by  any 
power  less  than  that  which  gave  being  to 
the  organic  law.  They  are,  however, 
subject  to  control  and  regulation  \>y  the 
legislature.  It  may  enlarge  or  circum- 
scribe their  territorial  limits,  increase  or 
diminish  their  numbers,  sejiarate  them 
into  parts,  and  annex  some  of  the  parts- 
to  parts  of  others;  but  they  must  still 
assume  the  form  and  be  known  and  gov- 
erned only  as  counties,  cities,  or  towns. 
The  state  at  large  is,  and  ever  has  been, 
an  aggregate  of  these  local  bodies."  To 
same  efTect  in  same  case,  Ih.  541,  per 
Denio,  C.  J.,  and  see  also  opinion  of  Allen, 
J.  in  People  v.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50, 
1873.  See  also  People  v.  Morrell,  21 
Wend.  563  (division  of  counties) ;  ante, 
sec.  9,  et  seq.  In  People  v.  Hurlbut,  de- 
cided by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Michigan, 
in  1871,  24  Mich.  44,  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep. 
103,  this  subject  is  largely  and  learnedly 
examined  by  Mr.  Justice  Coolei/,  who, 
conceding  to  the  state  full  authority  to 
shape  and  control  municipal  organiza- 
tions at  its  will,  nevertheless  maintained 
that  there  were,  in  the  constitution  of  that 
state,  both  express  and  implied  restric- 
tions upon  the  legislative  dominion  over 
municipal  institutions,  and  that  local 
governments  and  the  right  of  the  people 
to  them  were  secured  by  the  constitution, 
and  did  not  exist  by  the  favor  and  at  the 
mere  pleasure  of  the  legislature.     And 


66 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  III. 


§  4G.  (24a)  The  constitution  of  Kansas,  as  well  as  of  Ohio,  in 
the  article  entitled  "  Corporations,"  contains  a  provision  that 
"  the  legislature  shall  pass  no  special  act  conferring  corporate 
powers,"'  1  and  the  Supreme  Courts  of  those  States  have  decided 
that  the  provision  applied  to  municipal  as  well  as  private  corpo- 
rations ;  ^  and  that  the  effect  was  to  compel  the  legislatures  of 
those  states  to  regulate  the  grant  of  powers  to  municipal  corpora- 
lions  by  general  laws.  Hence  an  act  specially  amending  the 
charter  of  a  city  in  respect  to  making  local  improvements  or  as- 
sessments,^ or  specially  extending  the  limits  of  a  particular  city,* 
is  unconstitutional  ;  and  so  it  seems  is  an  act  which  authorizes  a 
city  by  name  to  issue  its  scrip  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  to 
levy  taxes  to  pay  it  in  aid  of  a  single  enterprise,  —  the  court  in- 


in  tlie  same  case  the  court  decided,  under 
a  special  provision  of  the  constitution  of 
tiie  state,  elsewhere  noticed,  that  the 
legislature  could  not  appoint,  for  a  city 
corporation,  officers  whose  duties  were 
purely  local  and  strictly  municipal.  The 
discussions  by  all  of  the  judges  are  un- 
usually interesting.     Ante,  §  11  et  seq. 

1  Constitution  of  Kansas,  art.  xii. 
sees.  1  and  2  of  art.  xiii.  of  the  con- 
stitution of  Ohio  is  the  same  as  sec.  1, 
art.  xii.  of  the  constitution  of  Kansas. 
Sec.  6,  art.  xiii.  of  the  Ohio  constitution 
is  the  same  as  sec.  5,  art.  xii.  of  the 
Kansas  constitution.  There  is  a  similar 
constitutional  provision  in  Nebrasica,  and 
perhaps  in  other  states.  This  provision 
construed  (Clegg  v.  Ricliardson  Co., 
8  Neb.  178;  Dundy  v.  Richardson  Co., 
8  Neb.  508),  and  held  to  invalidate  certain 
bonds  issued  under  a  special  law.  s.  p. 
School  District  v.  Insurance  Co.,  101  U.  S. 
707.    Supra,  sec.  45 ;  post,  sec.  49. 

■^  Atchison  v.  Bartholow,  4  Kan.  124, 
1866  ;  Wyandotte  City  v.  Wood,  5  Kan. 
603,  1870;  The  State  v.  Cincinnati,  20 
Ohio  St.  18,  1870 ;  following  Atkinson  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  15  Ohio  St.  21,  1864.  In 
New  Jersey  such  a  provision  is  held  to 
apply  exclusively  to  private  corporations. 
State  V.  Newark,  40  N.  J.  L.  550,  558, 1878. 
^  Atchison  v.  Bartholow,  siqn-u ;  Gil- 
more  V.  Norton,  10  Kan.  491,  1872. 

*  Wyandotte  v.  Wood,  supra;  State  v. 
Cincinnati,  supra.  In  the  case  last  cited, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio,  under  the 


constitutional  provision  quoted  in  the 
text,  held  that  the  legislature  cannot  by 
special  act  create  a  corporation,  nor  by 
special  act  confer  additional  powers  on  a 
corporation  already  existing;  and  that  in 
these  respects  there  was  no  difference 
between  private  and  municipal  corpora- 
tions, since  the  constitution  equally  em- 
braced and  equally  applies  to  both  classes ; 
and  therefore  the  act  of  April  16,  1870, 
"  to  prescribe  the  corporate  limits  of  Cin- 
cinnati," being  considered  a  special  act, 
was  adjudged  void.  See  also  Atkinson 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  supra.  In  this  case, 
Ranney,  J.,  thus  expounds  the  constitu- 
tion :  "  These  provisions  of  the  constitu- 
tion are  too  explicit  to  admit  of  the  least 
doubt  that  they  were  intended  to  disable 
the  General  Assembly  from  either  creat- 
ing corporations,  or  conferring  upon  them 
corporate  powers  by  special  acts  of  legis- 
lation. It  was  intended  to  correct  an 
existing  evil,  and  to  inaugurate  the  policy 
of  placing  all  corporations  of  the  same 
kind  upon  a  perfect  equality  as  to  all 
future  grants  of  power ;  of  making  such 
law  applicable  to  all  parts  of  the  state, 
and  thereby  securing  the  vigilance  and 
attention  of  its  whole  representation  ;  and 
finally,  of  making  all  judicial  construc- 
tion of  their  powers,  or  the  restrictions 
imposed  upon  them,  equally  applicable  to 
all  corporations  of  the  same  class.  AVe 
must  give  such  a  construction  to  the  con- 
stitution as  will  preserve  its  leading  ob- 
jects intact."    Supra,  sec.  41. 


§46.] 


CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS. 


67 


dining  to  hold  such  an  enactment  to  be  a  special  act,  and  one 
which  undertook  to  confer  corporate  powers.^ 

It  was  subsequently  decided  that  while  the  provision  of  tlie 
constitution  of  Kansas  that  forbids  the  legislature  to  pass  "  any 
special  act  conferring  corporate  powers  "  includes  municipal  cor- 
porations proper,  it  does  not  embrace  quasi  corporations,  such  as 
school-districts,  although  the  latter  are  declared  by  statute  to  be 
bodies  corporate. ^  In  California  an  act  of  the  legislature  which 
grants  to  individuals  and  their  assigns  certain  powers  and  privi- 
leges, and  then  provides  that  the  act  shall  not  take  effect,  unless 
such  persons  within  a  given  time  shall  organize  themselves  under 


1  Commercial  National  Bank  v.  City 
of  lola,  2  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.,  353,  1873.  In 
this  case  the  Circuit  Judge,  delivering 
the  opinion  of  the  court,  and  referring  to 
the  opinion  of  Ranney,  J.,  quoted  in  tlie 
last  note,  observed :  "  One  of  the  objects 
of  the  constitutional  provision  in  Kansas, 
as  well  as  in  Oliio,  was  to  cut  up  by  the 
roots  the  mischief  of  special  legislation, 
particularly  in  respect  to  corporations, 
both  public  and  private.  This  object 
would  be  defeated  if  the  special  act  re- 
lating to  the  city  of  Tola  could  stand.  If 
under  the-doctrine  of  Butz  i'.  Muscatine, 
8  AVall.  575,  this  court  is  not  absolutely 
bound,  in  this  class  of  cases,  to  follow 
the  interpretation  of  the  state  constitu- 
tion given  by  its  highest  court,  yet  it 
seems  that  it  ought  to  follow  it  where  it 
appears  to  rest  upon  solid  grounds,  and 
was  made  in  cases  and  in  respect  to  ques- 
tions where  there  was  nothing  to  warp 
the  judgment  of  its  judges,  and  where 
the  interpretation  was  settled  or  had  been 
declared  at  the  time  the  act  in  controversj' 
was  passed.  In  the  latest  case  on  this 
subject,  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  it  is  not  denied  that 
the  Supreme  Court  of  a  state  is  the  ap- 
pointed expositor  of  its  constitution  and 
laws,  and  that  the  Federal  courts  will 
adopt  as  rules  for  their  own  judgments 
the  decisions  of  the  highest  courts  of  the 
state  'respecting  local  questions  peculiar 
to  itself,  or  respecting  tlie  construction 
of  its  own  constitution  and  laws.'  It  only 
denies  the  binding  force  of  state  adjudi- 
cations which  rest  upon  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  law,  and  not  upon  the  meaning 
of    special    constitutional    or   legislative 


provisions.  Olcott  v.  Supervisors,  16 
Wall.  678,  1872.  I  think  the  present 
case  is  one  in  which  it  is  the  duty  of  this 
court  to  follow  the  decisions  of  the  state 
Supreme  Court ;  and  so  far  as  my  judg- 
ment rests  upon  the  special  provisions  of 
the  constitution  above  referred  to,  I  place 
it  upon  the  state  adjudications  without 
an  inquiry  into  their  soundness."  The 
bonds  in  this  case  were  held  invalid 
mainly  on  the  ground  that  they  were  not 
issued  for  a  public  purpose.  The  judg- 
ment of  the  Circuit  Court  was  affirmed. 
20  Wall.  655,  1874.  See  also  Savings 
Assoc.  V.  Topeka,  3  Dillon,  376,  1874; 
post,  sec.  159 ;  also  ch.  xiv.  on  Contracts. 
-  Beach  v.  Leahy,  11  Kan.  23,  1873. 
Under  the  constitutional  provision  in  ques- 
tion the  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas,  in  the 
State  V.  Maloy,  20  Kan.  619,  1878,  ruled 
the  following  points  as  stated  by  the 
judges:  The  act  of  the  legislature  en- 
titled "  An  act  authorizing  cities  therein 
named  to  become  cities  of  the  second 
class,"  approved  February  29,  1872,  is  a 
special  act,  conferring  corporate  powers 
upon  four  particular  municipal  corpora- 
tions, and  is  therefore  unconstitutional 
and  void,  being  in  contravention  of  sec. 
1  of  art.  xii.  of  the  constitution,  which 
provides  that  "  the  legislature  shall  pass 
no  special  act  conferring  corporate  pow- 
ers." 2.  The  city  of  Council  Grove  was 
organized  as  a  city  of  the  second  class, 
under  said  special  act,  and  was  never 
organized  as  a  city  of  the  second  class 
under  any  other  act,  and  has  never  had 
a  population  of  two  thousand  inhabitants. 
And  it  was  therefore  held  that  said  city 
is  not  legally  a  city  of  the  second  class. 


68 


MUNICIPAL   COKPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  III. 


existing  laws  into  a  corporation,  is  a  grant,  not  to  the  individuals 
as  persons,  but  to  the  corporation  when  formed. ^ 

§  47.  (25)  A  constitutional  provision  that  two  thirds  of  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly  "  shall  be  requisite  to  every  bill  creating,  continuing, 
altering,  or  renewing  any  body  politic  or  corporate^''''  was  held  ))y 
a  majority  of  the  court  of  errors,  reversing  the  majority  view  of 
the  Supreme  Court  in  the  same  case,  to  extend  to  public  and  mu- 
nicipal^ as  well  as  private,  corporations.^  But  the  constitutional 
provision  that  "no  bill  shall  contain  more  than  one  subject,  which 
shall  be  clearly  expressed  in  its  title,"  lias  no  application  to  mu- 
nicipal ordinances.^ 

§  48.  (2G)  Under  a  constitution  which  provides  that  "  in  all 
cases  tvhere  a  general  law  can  be  made  applicable^  no  special  law 
shall  be  enactedy'^  the  better  view,  and  the  one  supported  by  the 
decided  weight  of  authority,  is  that  it  is  for  the  legislature  to  de- 
termine whether  its  purpose  can  or  cannot  be  expediently  effected 
by  a  general  law  ;  and  a  special  act,  as,  for  example,  one  providing 
for  the  location  of  the  county  seat  of  a  specified  county,  will  not 
be  held  invalid  by  the  courts.'* 


1  San  Francisco  v.  S.  V.  W.  W.  48 
Cal.  493,  1874.  Such  an  act  is  an  at- 
tempt by  the  legislature  in  violation  of 
the  constitution  to  confer  powers  and 
privileges  uj?on  a  corporation  by  special 
act.     lb.  post,  sec.  49. 

2  Purely  V.  People,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  384. 
1842;  reversing  2  Hill,  31.  W^hat  is  an 
alteration  within  this  provision.  Corning 
V.  Green,  23  Barb.  33 ;  Smith  v.  Helmer, 
7  Barb.  416  ;  Morris  v.  People,  3  Denio, 
381.  Where  a  constitution  requires  that 
acts  of  incorporation  shall  have  "  the 
assent  of  at  least  two  thirds  of  each 
house,"  the  word  "  house "  means  the 
members  present  doing  business  —  these 
being  a  quorum  —  and  not  a  majority  of 
all  the  members  elected.  Southworth  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  2  Mich.  287. 

8  Humboldt  v.  McCoy,  23  Kan.  249 ; 
Green  v.  Indianapolis,  25  Ind.  490. 

4  State  V.  Johnson.  1  Kan.  178,  1862 ; 
contra,  Pritz  in  re,  9  Iowa,  30,  1859,  where 
a  special  act  amending  the  charter  of  a 
city  was  held  invalid  because  all  such  laws 
were,  by  the  constitution  of  the  state,  re- 


quired to  be,  and  could  be,  made  general. 
Von  Phul  V.  Hammer,  29  Iowa,  222.  It 
is  for  the  legislature,  and  not  the  courts, 
to  determine  when  a  general  law  can  be 
made  applicable.  Gentile  v.  State,  29 
Ind.  409,  overruling  Thomas  v.  Board  of 
Conmiissioners,  5  Ind.  4 ;  Longworth's 
Executors  v.  Evansville,  32  Ind.  322; 
Cooley  Const.  Lim.  129,  note ;  State  v. 
County  Court,  50  Mo.  317,  1872,  s.  c.  11 
Am.  Rep.  415 ;  Murdock  v.  Woodson,  2 
Dillon  C.  C.  188,  1873 ;  Board  of  Commis. 
V.  Siiields,  02  Mo.  247, 1876  ;  Evans  v.  Job, 
8  Nev.  322,  1873,  where  the  decisions  in 
that  state  and  elsewhere  are  reviewed  by 
Hawleij,  J.  The  word  "  town  "  —  as  used 
in  constitutional  inhibition  of  special  laws 
regulating  the  internal  affairs  of  towns 
and  counties  —  is  a  generic  term,  includ- 
ing cities.  State  v.  Parsons,  40  N.  J.  L.  1. 
But  in  the  absence  of  any  clear  expression 
of  a  contrary  intent,  the  term  "  municipal 
corporation,"  in  any  statute  must  be  taken 
in  the  strict  constitutional  sense  as  not  in- 
cluding towns.  Eaton  v.  Manitowoc,  44 
Wis.,  489. 


§  50.]  CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  COKPORATIONS.  69 

§  49,  The  constitutions  of  several  of  the  States  contain  a  pro- 
vision that  corporations  shall  not  he  created  hy  special  acts  except 
for  municipal  purposes.  Wliat  is  a  municipal  jmi'pose  within  this 
provision  has  been  several  times  considered.^  An  act  incorporat- 
ing a  board  of  commissioners  for  filling  up  certain  slough  ponds  in 
the  city  of  St.  Louis  was  lield  to  create  a  corporation  for  municipal 
purposes  within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution.^  An  act  creat- 
ing a  board  of  park  commissioners  was  considered  to  constitute 
them  a  corporate  authority,  the  object  of  their  creation  being 
municipal  in  its  character.-^  So  a  corporation  to  carry  on  a  public 
school  and  raise  funds  for  its  support.^ 

§  50.  (27)  The  constitutions  of  several  of  the  states  contain, 
substantially,  this  provision,  derived  from  the  constitution  of 
New  York:  " /<;  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  legislature  to  provide  for 
the  organization  of  cities  and  incorporated  villages,  and  to  restrict 
their  power  of  taxation,  assessment,  borrowing  money,  contracting 
debts,  and  loaning  their  credit,  so  as  to  prevent  abuses  in  assess- 
ments, and  in  contracting  debts  by  such  municipal  corporations."  *" 
This  obviously  enjoins  upon  the  legislature  the  duty  of  providing 
suitable  and  proper  restrictions  upon  the  enumerated  powers  ;  but 
in  what  these  restrictions  shall  consist  and  how  they  shall  be 
imposed  are  subjects  left  to  the  discretion  or  sense  of  duty  of 
the  legislative  department,  with  the  exercise  of  which  the  courts 

1  State  ex  rel.  Choteau  v.  LefBngwell,  porate   power,  and   therefore  cannot  be 

54    Mo.  458,  1873,  where  the  subject  is  made  to  a  private  corporation  by  special 

elaborately  discussed,  and  the  conclusion  act.     lb.  ante,  sec.  46. 

reached  was  that  corporations  for  "  muni-  -  St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  62  Mo.  247, 1876. 

cipal  purposes  "  under  the  constitution  of  ^  People  v.  Salomon,  51  111.  37. 

Missouri  must  be  connected  with  the  mu-  *  Horton  v.  Mobile  School  Commrs.,  43 

nicipalcorporationitself  and  be  instituted  Ala.  598.      See  comment  of  Wagner,  J., 

for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  some  of  on  this  decision  in  St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  62 

the  objects  of  the  municipality.     Under  Mo.  251.  1876. 

tlie  constitution  of  Ca/{/or/uVj,  which  pro-  ^  New    York    constitution    1846,    art. 

vides  that  "corporations  may  bo  formed  viii.  sec.  9;    Wisconsin  constitution   1848, 

under  general  laws,  but  shall  not  be  ere-  art.    xi.    sec.    3 ;     Michigan    constitution 

ated  by  special  act,  except  for  municipal  1850,    art.  xii.    sec.  13;  Oregon  constitu- 

j)urposes,"   a    corporation    cannot    exer-  tion  1857,  art.  xi.  sec.  5 ;  Kansas  consti- 

cise  any  powers  except  those  conferred  tution  1859,  art.  xii.  sec.  5;  see  Paine  u. 

by  general  laws.      The  legislature   can-  Spratley,    5    Kan.  525;     Nevada  consti- 

not  confer  on  such  corporations  any  pow-  tution    18C4,    art.   viii.  sec.  8 ;    Nebraska 

ers  or  grant  them  any  privileges  by  special  constitution,  art.    viii.  sec.  4;    California 

act.     San  Francisco  v.  S.  V.  W.  W.  48  constitution,  1849,  sec.  37  ;  Ohio  constitu- 

Cal.    403,    1874.      A   grant   of  an  ease-  tion    1851,   art.    xiii.   sec.   6.     Post,   sec. 

ment  in  a  street  made  by  the  legislature  750,  note.     See,  also,  chapters  relating  to 

to  a  corporation,  is  purely  a  grant  of  cor-  Contracts  and  Taxation,  post. 


a") 


MUNICIPAL  CORrOIlATIONS. 


[CH.  III. 


cannot  interfere.^  The  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  in  the 
case  cited  in  tlie  note,  holds  to  some  extent  a  contrary  view, 
but  its  judgment  was  in  effect,  altliough  not  in  terms,  overruled 
bv  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  in  its  full  extent 
is  not  in  harmony  with  the  view  elsewhere  taken  in  the  state 
courts.- 


§  51.  (28)  Many  of  the  state  constitutions  contain  in  sub- 
stance a  provision  that  no  legislative  act  shall  embrace  more  than 
one  object^  to  be  expressed  in  its  title.  This  provision  has  been 
frequently  and  properly  construed  to  require  only  the  general  or 
ultimate  object  to  be  stated  in  the  title,  and  not  the  details  by 
which  the  object  is  to  be  attained.  Any  provision  calculated  to 
carry  the  declared  object  into  effect  is  unobjectionable,  although 
not  specially  indicated  in  the  title.  Thus,  where  a  constitution 
provides  that  no  bill  or  act  shall  pass   containing  any  matter 


1  The  failure  of  the  legislature  to  per- 
form tlie  duty  relative  to  restricting  the 
power  of  taxation,  etc.,  enjoined  by  the 
constitutional  provision  above  cited, 
"  may,"  says  Ranney,  J.,  in  Hill  v.  Higdon, 
5  Ohio  St.  248,  "be  of  very  serious  im- 
port, but  lays  no  foundation  for  judicial 
correction."  See  Maloy  v.  Marietta,  11 
Oiiio  St.  636,  638,  where  this  view  is  left 
open,  but  holding  that  the  legislature 
alone  has  the  power  to  determine  the 
mode  and  measure  of  the  restriction  to  be 
imposed.  It  was  also  left  open  in  the 
People  V.  Mahaney,  13  Mich.  481,  but 
this  case  illustrates  what  is  a  sufficient 
restriction  on  the  power  of  taxation  to 
meet  the  constitutional  requirement.  See 
also  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  518 ;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Connelly,  10  Ohio  St.  165.  To 
the  effect  that  the  constitutional  provi- 
sion quoted  in  the  text  does  not  take 
away,  but  recognizes,  the  discretion  of  the 
legislature  in  conferring  powers  of  the 
enumerated  character  upon  municipal 
corporations,  and  that  such  discretion  is 
not  reviewable  by  the  courts,  see  Bank 
of  Rome  v.  Rome,  18  N.  Y.  38,  1858; 
Benson  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Albany,  24  Barb. 
248,  1857  ;  Clarke  v.  Rochester,  //>.  446 ; 
Grant  v.  Courier,  lb.  232  ;  Wynehamer 
V.  People,  13  N.  Y.  429;  Baltimore  v. 
State,  15  Md.  376.  People  i'.  Draper,  15 
N.Y.  532;  White  v.  Stamford,  37  Conn.587. 


2  Foster  v.  Kenosha,  12  Wis.  616,  1860. 
The  legislature  cannot,  consistently  with 
this  restriction,  confer  upon  a  municipal 
corporation  an  unlimited  power  to  levy 
taxes  and  raise  money  for  extra  munici- 
pal purposes,  such  as  aiding  railroad  com- 
panies ;  and  an  amendment  to  the  charter 
of  a  city,  authorizing  its  council  "  to  levy 
and  collect  special  taxes  for  ani/  purpose 
(aside  from  what  may  be  specially  pro- 
vided for  in  the  city  charter)  which  may 
be  considered  essential  to  promote  or 
secure  the  common  interests  of  the  city, 
or  borrow,  on  the  corporate  credit  of  the 
city,  any  sum  of  money  at  a  rate  of  in- 
terest not  exceeding  ten  per  cent,"  on 
obtaining  tlie  previous  sanction  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  voters  of  the  city,  is  void, 
and  the  requirement  of  the  sanction  of 
the  voters  is  not  a  restriction  on  the  power 
to  levy  taxes  or  contract  debts,  within 
the  meaning  of  the  constitution,  the  court 
being  of  opinion  that  the  duty  of  impos- 
ing the  limitation  rests  on  the  legislature. 
Jb.  But  see  Campbell  v.  Kenosha,  5 
Wall.  194,  1866;  City  v.  Lamson,  9  Wall. 
477,  1869  ;  and  the  authorities  cited  in 
the  last  note.  See  Rogan  v.  Watertown, 
30  Wis.  259,  1872,  as  to  loaning  credit. 

Other  restrictions  upon  the  power  to 
contract  debts :  see  chapters  on  Charters 
and  Contracts,  jMst. 


§51.] 


CREATION  OF  PUBLIC  COKPOEATIONS. 


71 


diffei-ent  from  what  is  expressed  in  the  title  thereof,  an  act,  the 
title  of  which  declares  it  to  he  for  the  better  regulation  of  a  certain 
town  (naming  it),  or  to  amend  or  enlarge  the  powers  of  the  corpora- 
tion thereof^  is  sufficient,  without  enumerating  the  particulars  in 
which  the  powers  are  enlarged  or  extended.^  So  a  provision  in 
an  act  entitled  merely,  "  An  act  to  amend  the  act  incorporating 
the  city  of  M.,"  extending  the  city  limits,  does  not  conflict  with 
the  constitutional  requirement  that  "  every  law  shall  embrace  but 
one  object,  which  shall  be  expressed  in  its  title."  ^ 


1  Green  v.  Mayor,  R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.) 
368,  1832,  per  Law,  J. ;  Mayor  v.  State,  4 
Ga.  26;  Hill  v.  Decatur,  22  Ga.  203. 
Text  affirmed.  Luerhtuan  v.  Taxing  Dist., 
2  Lea  (Tenn.),  42.5. 

2  Morford  v.  linger,  8  Iowa,  82,  1859  ; 
Davis  V.  Woolnough  (act  establishing 
city  court),  9  lb.  104.  S.  P.  St.  Paul  v. 
Coulter,  12  Minn.  41,  50,  1866.  In  de- 
termining whether  a  law  be  in  conflict 
with  the  provision  of  the  constitution,  the 
unity  of  tlie  object  is  to  be  looked  for  in 
the  ultimate  end  to  be  attained,  and  not 
in  the  details  leading  to  that  end.  State, 
etc.  V.  Co.  Judge,  2  Iowa,  280 ;  People  v. 
Mahaney,  13  Mich.  481,  18G5;  approved. 
White  V.  Lincoln,  5  Neb.  505,  1877; 
Atty.  Genl.  v.  Bradley,  36  Mich.  447, 
1877;  People  v.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44, 
1871;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103.  Construc- 
tion of  similar  constitutional  provision. 
Arnoult  v.  New  Orleans,  11  La.  An. 
54  ;  Kathman  v.  New  Orleans,  lb.  145 ; 
People  V.  Mellen,  32  111.  181;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Gregory,  15  111.  21 ;  Davis  v.  State 
(inspection  act  for  Baltimore),  7  Md.  151 ; 
Annapolis  v.  State,  30  Md.  212  ;  Lafon  v. 
Dufrocq,  6  La.  An.  350 ;  Ottawa  v.  Peo- 
ple, 48  111.  233,  1868  ;  Miles  v.  Charleton, 
29  Wis.  400,  1872  ;  Murdock  v.  Woodson, 
2  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  188, 1873  ;  Hubert  v.  Peo- 
ple, 49  N.  Y.  132, 1872 ;  State  v.  Union.  33 
N.  J.  L.  350  (4  Vroom),  where  the  sub- 
ject is  fully  discussed.  State  v.  Elvins,  32 
N.  J.  L.  (3  Vroom)  362  ;  State  v.  New- 
ark, 34  N.J.  L.  (5  Vroom)  236;  Sedg- 
wick Co.  V.  Bailey,  13  Kan.  600,  1874 ; 
Devlin  v.  New  York,  63  N.  Y.  8,  1875; 
People  V.  Willsea,  60  N.  Y.  507,  1875; 
Tecumsoh  v.  Phillips,  5  Neb.  30.5,  1877. 
Wliere  the  act  has  but  one  general  ob- 
ject it  is  sufficient  if  the  object  or  subject 
is  fairly  expressed  in  the  title.    White  v. 


Lincoln,  5  Neb.  505,  1877 ;  Black  v.  Co- 
hen, 52  Ga.  621,  1874;  Lockport  i'.  Gay- 
lord,  61  III.  276,  1871,  where  a  curative 
act  legalizing  warrants  was  held  invalid 
because  it  did  not  set  forth  the  subject- 
matter  in  the  title.  In  Watertown  v. 
Fairbanks,  65  N.  Y.  588,  1875,  a  legis- 
lative act  validating  previous  illegal 
assessments  was  held  to  conflict  with  the 
constitutional  requirement  that  no  bill 
"shall  embrace  more  than  one  subject, 
and  that  shall  be  expressed  in  the  title." 
Under  an  act  to  revise  tlie  charter  "of  a 
specified  city,"  there  may  be  conferred 
upon  the  municipality  the  usual  legisla- 
tive, taxing,  judicial,  and  police  powers, 
including  the  creation  of  a  city  court. 
This  is  but  one  subject,  and  a  charter  with 
such  a  title  does  not  infringe  the  provi- 
sion of  the  constitution  that  no  local 
bill  shall  embrace  more  than  one  subject 
which  shall  be  expressed  in  its  title, 
Harris  v.  People,  59  N.  Y.  599,  1875, 
where  Folger,  J.,  expounds  the  subject 
of  this  constitutional  provision  to  be  "  to 
prevent  the  joining  of  one  local  subject 
to  another  or  others  of  the  same  kind,  or 
to  one  or  more  general  subjects,  so  that 
each  should  gather  votes  for  all ;  and  to 
advise  the  public  and  the  locality,  and 
the  representatives  of  the  locality  and  of 
other  parts,  of  the  general  purpose  of  the 
bill,  so  that  those  interested  might  be  on 
their  guard  as  to  the  whole  or  as  to  the 
details."  People  v.  Supervisors,  43  N.  Y. 
10.  See  also  Sullivan  v.  N.  Y.,  53  N. 
Y.  652,  1873;  Volkening,  in  re,  52  N.  Y. 
650,  1873;  Astor,  in  re,  50  N.  Y.  363, 
1872  ;  Mayer,  in  re,  50  N.  Y.  504,  1872 ; 
and  People  v.  Briggs,  50  N.  Y.  553, 
where  the  purpose  of  the  constitutional 
provision  is  well  expounded  by  Church,  C. 
J.  People  V.  Rochester,  50  N.  Y.  525, 1872. 


72 


MUNICIPAL  COKPORATIONS. 


[CH.  III. 


If  a  Icx'nl  act  contains  a  subject  which  is 
properly  expressed  in  its  title  it  is  valid 
as  to  that  subject  although  it  is  invalid 
as  to  a  subject  not  expressed.  Van  Ant- 
werp, ill  If,  oG  N.  Y.  201,  2(i7,  1874. 

The  subject  of  a  law  to  incorporate  a 
city  or  town  is  the  charter  of  incorpora- 
tion, and  the  title  need  not  enumerate  all 
the  powers  intended  to  be  conferred. 
Lockhart  v.  Troy,  48  Ala.  581,  1872. 
When  the  title  to  an  act  is  "  to  consoli- 
date and  amend  the  several  acts  incor- 
porating the  city  of  Brunswick  and  for 
other  purposes  therein  mentioned,"  and 
contains  a  provision  to  make  valid  and 
confirm  "  all  the  ordinances  of  the  mayor 
and  city  council  of  the  city  of  Bruns- 
wick heretofore  passed,  and  not  in  con- 
flict with  the  constitution  of  the  state  of 
Georgia  or  of  the  United  States,"  it 
was  held  that  it  was  in  violation  of 
the  constitution  of  1808,  wliich  declares^ 


"  Nor  shall  any  law  or  ordinance  pass 
which  refers  to  more  than  one  subject- 
matter,  or  contains  matter  different  from 
what  is  expressed  in  the  title  thereof." 
Brieswick  v.  Brunswick,  51  Ga.  (J3i),  1874. 
And  in  a  later  case  it  was  held  that 
the  act  of  1872,  entitled  "  to  prescribe 
the  manner  of  incorporating  towns  and 
villages,"  not  liaviiig  indicated  by  its 
title  the  provision  making  the  act  an 
amendment  of  existing  municipal  char- 
ters, is  unconstitutional.  Ayeridge  v. 
Commrs.,  00  Ga.  404. 

A  statute  designated  in  its  title  as  an 
amendment  to  a  city  charter,  but  which 
embraces  objects  foreign  to  the  charter,  is 
in  conflict  with  the  constitution  and  void. 
Williamson  v.  Keokuk,  44  Iowa,  88, 
1876.  The  judgments  in  the  case  last 
cited  would  seem  to  be  of  doubtful  cor- 
rectness upon  the  facts. 


§  52.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL.  73 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PUBLIC  AND   PRIVATE    CORPORATIONS  DISTINGUISHED  —  LEGIS- 
LATIVE  AUTHORITY   AND   ITS   LIMITATIONS. 

§  52.  (29)  A  fundame7ital  division  of  corporations,  heretofore 
adverted  to,  is  into  public  and  private}  The  importance  of  this 
distinction  cannot  be  too  much  emphasized,  since  upon  it  are  based 
the  legal  principles  which  so  broadly  distinguish  the  two  classes  of 
corporations.  With  private  corporations  the  present  work  has  no 
other  concern  than  to  point  out  by  way  of  illustration  wherein 
they  differ  from  those  which  are  public.  Both  classes  are  alike 
created  by  the  legislature,  and  in  the  same  way,  —  by  special 
charter  or  under  general  incorporation  acts. 

Private  corporatiotis  are  created  for  private,  as  distinguished 
from  purely  public  purposes,  and  they  are  not,  in  contemplation 
of  law,  public,  because  it  may  have  been  supposed  by  the  legis- 
lature that  their  establishment  would  promote,  either  directly  or 
consequentially,  the  public  interest.     They  cannot  be  compelled 

1  Anle,  ch.  ii.  sec.  18,  et  serf.  a  private  corporation.  Unless  tliere  is 
According  to  tlie  view  of  the  Supreme  some  special  constitutional  restriction  the 
Court  of  California,  corporations  should  legislature  of  a  state  niaj'  regulate  the 
be  divided  into  three  classes,  to  wit:  compensation  of  grain  elevators  and  pub- 
Public  municipal  corporations,  the  object  lie  warehouses  and  fix  a  maximum  rate 
of  which  is  to  promote  the  public  interest ;  of  charges.  Munn  v.  People,  69  111.  80, 
corporations  technically  private,  but  of  a  1873.  Affirmed  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
quasi  public  character,  having  in  view  U.  S.  Munn  v.  People,  9-1  U.  S.  313,  1876. 
some  public  enterprise  in  which  the  public  The  same  principle  was  asserted  and 
interests  are  involved,  such  as  railroad,  applied  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
turnpike,  and  canal  companies  ;  and  cor-  United  States  in  what  is  popularly  known 
porations  strictly  private.  Miner's  Ditch  as  the  "  granger  "  cases.  Chicago,  B.  &Q. 
Co  V.  ZcUerbacii,  37  Cal.  543,  1869.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Iowa,  94  U.  S.  155  ;  Pike  v. 
The  opinion  of  Saici/er,  C.  J.,  in  this  case,  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  94  U.  S. 
is  able  and  instructive.  The  author  pre-  164;  Lawrence  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
fers  the  ordinary  division  of  corporations  Co.,  94  U.  S.  164  ;  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 
into  public  (which  includes  municipal)  Co.  v.  Ackley,  94  U.S.  179;  Winona  v. 
and  private.  See  Foster  v.  Fowler,  60  St.  Peter  R.  R.  Co.,  94  U.  S.,  181 ;  South- 
Pa.  St  27,  1868,  in  which  a  company  ern  Minn.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Coleman,  94  U.  S. 
created  to  supply  a  city  with  water  was  181 ;  Stone  v.  Wisconsin,  94  U.  S.  181. 
held  to  be  a  public,  as  distinguished  from 


74  MUNICIPAL   COKPOKATIONS.  [CII.  IV 

to  accept  a  charter  or  ineori)orating-  act.^  The  assent  of  the 
corporation  is  necessary  to  make  the  incorporating  statute  oper- 
ative ;  but  when  assented  to,  the  Icgiskitive  grant  is  irrevocable, 
and  it  cannot,  without  the  consent  of  the  corporation,  be  impaired 
or  destroyed  by  any  subsequent  act  of  legishition,  unless  the 
rioht  to  do  so  was  reserved  at  the  time.  The  celebrated 
Dartmouth  College  Case^  by  its  construction  of  the  federal  con- 
stitution, incorporated,  wisely  or  otherwise,  into  American  juris- 
prudence the  principle  which  has  been  attended  with  such 
inii)Ovtaiit  practical  consequences,  namely,  that  privileges  and 
franchises  granted  by  legislative  act  to  a  private  corporation, 
when  accepted,  constitute  a  contract  within  the  meaning  of  the 
clause  of  the  constitution  which  secures  inviolability  of  contracts 
by  declaring  that  no  state  shall  pass  any  law  impairing  their 
obligation ;  and  hence  a  law  materially  altering  the  charter  of 
such  a  corporation  is  unconstitutional,  unless  the  power  to  alter 
it  was  reserved  when  the  grant  was  made. 

§  53.  The  purpose  in  making  all  corporations  is  the  accomplish- 
ment of  some  2^ublic  good.  Hence,  the  division  into  public  and 
private  has  a  tendency  to  confuse  and  lead  to  error  in  investiga- 
tion ;  for,  unless  the  public  are  to  be  benefited,  it  is  no  more 
lawful  to  confer  "  exclusive  rights  and  privileges  "  upon  an  arti- 
ficial body  than  upon  a  private  citizen.  The  substantial  distinc- 
tion is  this :  Some  corporations  are  created  by  the  mere  will  of 
the  legislature,  there  being  no  other  jyartg  interested  or  concerned. 
To  this  body  a  portion  of  the  power  of  the  legislature  is  delegated, 
to  be  exercised  for  the  public  good,  and  subject  at  all  times  to  be 
modified,  changed,  or  annulled.  Other  corporations  are  the  result 
of  contract.  The  legislature  is  not  the  only  party  interested; 
for,  although  it  has  a  public  purpose  to  be  accomplished,  it 
chooses  to  do  it  by  the  instrumentality  of  a  second  parti/.  These 
two  make  a  contract.  The  expectation  of  benefit  to  the  public 
is  the  moving  consideration  on  one  side ;  that  of  expected  re- 
muneration for  the  outlay  is  the  consideration  on  the  other.  It 
is  a  contract,  and,  therefore,  cannot  be  modified,  changed,  or 
annulled  without  the  consent  of  both  parties.  Counties  are  an 
instance  of  the  former,  raih-oad  and  turnpike  companies  of  the 

1  Ante,  sec.  44.  4  Wheat.  518.    All  attempts  to  overthrow 

2  Dartmouth  College    v.   Woodward,     this  judgment  have  failed. 


§  54.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTEOL.  75 

latter,  class  of   corporations.^     This  recognizes   the   substantial 

difference  between  tlie  two  classes  of  corporations,  and  is,  in 

effect,  a  criticism   upon   the    names  by  which  they  are  distin- 
guished. 

§  54.  (30)  Public  corporations  are  called  into  being  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  state,  and  while  the  state  may,  it  need  not,  obtain 
the  consent  of  the  people  of  the  locality  to  be  affected.  The  charter 
or  incorporating  act  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  in  no  sense 
a  contract  between  the  state  and  the  corporation,  although,  as  we 
shall  presently  see,  vested  rights  in  favor  of  third  persons,  if  not 
indeed  in  favor  of  the  corporation,  may  arise  under  it.  Public 
corporations  within  the  meaning  of  this  rule  are  such  as  are  estab- 
lished for  public  purposes  exclusively,  —  that  is,  for  purposes 
connected  with  the  administration  of  civil  or  local  government,  — 
and  corporations  are  public  only  when,  in  the  language  of  Chief 
Justice  Marshall,  "  the  whole  interests  and  franchises  are  the  exclu- 
sive property  and  domain  of  the  government  itself,"  such  as  quasi 
corporations  (so  called),  counties  and  towns  or  cities  upon  which 
are  conferred  the  powers  of  local  administration.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  certain  constitutional  limitations  presently  to  be  noticed, 
the  power  of  the  legislature  over  such  corporations  is  supreme 
and  transcendent :  it  may  erect,  change,  divide,  and  even  abolish 
them,  at  pleasure,  as  it  deems  the  public  good  to  require.^ 

1  Milne  y.  Williams,  11  Ire.  (Nor.  Car.)  body  of  men."  S.  P.  Penobscot  Boom 
Law,  558,  1854.  Corporation     v.    Lawson,    16    Me.    224 ; 

2  Dartmouth  College  v.  "Woodward,  Yarmouth  v.  North  Yarmouth,  34  Me. 
4  Wheat.  518,  1819;  Allen  v.  McKean,  411,  1852;  Story  Com.  Const.,  sees.  1385, 
ISumner,  276,  1833  (the  Bowdoin  College  1388;  North  Yarmouth  v.  Skillings,  45 
Case  elaborately  considered  by  (b'toc^,  J);  Me.  133,  1858;  Girard  y.  Philadelphia, 
see  reference  to  this  case,  2  Story's  Life  7  Wall.  1,  1868;  ante,  §  9;  Jersey  City  v. 
and  Letters,  150;  Patterson  v.  Society,  Kailroad  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  300;  Rundle 
etc.,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  385;  Cheany  v.  v.  Del.  etc.  Canal  Co.,  1  Wall.  Jr.,  275, 
Hooser,  9B.  Mon.  330;  Berlin  y.  Gorham,  S.  C.  14  How.  80;  Tinsman  v.  Railroad 
34  N.  H.  266;  People  v.  Morris,  13  Wend.  Co.,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  148  ;  State  v.  Brannin, 
325,  1835.  In  this  case  the  defendant  3  Zabr.  (23  N.  J.  L.)  485;  State  y.  Fuller, 
insisted  that  the  rights  and  privileges  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  227;  Pattersons, 
conferred  upon  the  village  of  Ogdonsburg  Society,  etc.,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.J.  L.)  385;  a>?/e, 
by  the  act  incorporating  it  were  vested  sec.  44 ;  State  v.  Jennings,  27  Ark.  419, 
riyhts,  and  could  not  be  impaired  by  sub-  1872;  Chnton  v.  Railroad  Co.,  24  Iowa, 
sequent  legislation.  But,  said  AWaoh,  J.,  455;  San  Francisco  y.  Canavan,42  Cal. 
with  his  usual  clearness,  "It  is  an  541;  Demarest  v.  New  York,  71  N.  Y. 
unsound  and  even  absurd  proposition  161,  S.  C  below,  11  Ilnn,  19.  "  A  viuni- 
that  political  power  conferred  by  the  c{])al  corporation,  in  which  is  vested  some 
legislature  can  become  a  vested  right  as  portion  of  the  administration  of  the  gov- 
uijalnst  the  (jocernmeid  in  any  individual  or  ernment,  may  be  changed  at  the  will  of 


76 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[cii.  rv. 


§  55.    The  extent  of  the  legislative  control  over  public  or  muni- 
cipal corporations  is  not  impaired  by  the  circumstance  that  the 


tlie  legislature.  Such  is  a  public  corpora- 
tion, used  for  public  purposes."  Per 
McUan,  J.,  in  State  Bank  v.  Knoop, 
10  How.  U.  S.  369,  380,  1853.  "  I'ublic 
or  municipal  corporations  are  established 
for  the  local  government  of  towns  or 
particular  districts.  The  special  powers 
conferred  upon  tliem  are  not  vested  rights 
as  against  the  state,  but,  being  wholly 
political,  e.xist  only  during  the  will  of 
tiie  general  legislature  ;  otherwise,  there 
would  be  numberless  petty  governments 
existing  witliin  the  state  and  forming 
part  of  it,  but  independent  of  the  control 
of  the  sovereign  power.  Such  powers 
may  at  any  time  be  repealed  or  abrogated 
by  the  legislature,  eitlier  by  a  general 
law  operating  upon  the  whole  state,  or 
by  a  special  act  altering  the  powers  of  the 
cor[>oration."  Sloan  v.  State  (implied 
modification  of  charter  as  to  vending 
liquor  by  subsequent  general  law),  8 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  3G1,  1847,  per  Smith,  J. 
Approving  People  v.  Morris,  13  Wend. 
3l!o  ;  Armstrong  v.  Conmi.  (as  to  removal 
of  county  seat),  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  208, 
1836  ;  post,  sees.  62,  183. 

In  the  case  of  the  United  States  v. 
The  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Com- 
pany, decided  by  the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court,  17  Wall.  322,  1872,  in  which 
it  was  held  that  the  general  government 
could  not  tax  the  income  or  property  of 
the  city  of  Baltimore  under  the  Internal 
Revenue  Act  (post,  sec.  775),  the  court 
discusses  and  examines  the  nature  of 
municipal  corporations  and  the  relation 
they  sustain  to  the  state,  of  which  tiiey 
are  treated  as  arms  or  agencies.  The 
court  says,  "  A  municipal  corporation 
like  the  city  of  Baltimore  is  a  representa- 
tive not  only  of  the  state,  but  is  a  portion 
of  its  governmental  power.  It  is  one  of 
its  creatures,  made  for  a  specific  purpose, 
to  exercise  within  a  limited  sphere  the 
powers  of  the  state.  The  state  may 
withdraw  these  local  powers  of  govern- 
ment at  pleasure,  and  may,  tlirougli  its 
legislature  or  other  appointed  channels, 
govern  the  local  territory  as  it  governs 
the  state  at  large.  It  may  enlarge  or 
contract  its  powers  or  destroy  its  exist- 
ence    As  a  portion  of  the  state,  in  the 


exercise  of  a  limited  portion  of  the  pow- 
ers of  the  state,  its  revenues,  like  those 
of  the  state,  are  not  subject  to  taxation." 
Post,  sees.  100,  773. 

As  to  extent  of  legislative  control,  and  the 
distinction  between /«(W/c  and  private  cor- 
porations, see,  also,  People  v.  Wren  (di- 
vision of  a  county),  4  Scam.  (111.)  273; 
Martin  v.  Dix,  52  Miss.  53,  1876;  Peo- 
ple V.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228,  1873;  s.  c.  15 
Am.  Rep.  202  New  Orleans  etc.  Co.  v.  New 
Orleans,  26  La.  An.  512;  Coles  v.  Madi- 
son County,  Breese  (111.),  120;  Laramie 
County  V.  Albany  County,  92  U.  S.  307, 
1875 ;  C.  &  A.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  111. 
344;  State  v.  Brannin,  3  Zabr.  (23  N.J.  L.) 
485;  Rader  y.  Road  Dist.,  7  Vroom  (3(5 
N.  J.  L. )  273;  Bush  v.  Shipman,  4  Scam. 
(5  111.)  190;  Holliday  v.  People,  5  Gilm. 
(10  111.)  21G;  Richland  County  r.  Law- 
rence County,  12  111.  8;  Trustees,  etc.  v. 
Tatman,  13  111.  30 ;  Gutzweller  v.  People, 
14  111.  142;  Sangamon  County  v.  Spring- 
field, 63  111.  66,  1872;  State  v.  Mayor, 
R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.)  250;  State,  etc.  v.  St. 
Louis  County  Court,  34  Mo.  546;  Purdy 
V.  People,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  385;  Morey  v. 
Newfane,  8  Barb.  645;  Lloyd  v.  Mayor, 
etc.  of  New  York,  5  N.  Y.  (1  Seld.)  369; 
Lowber  v.  Same,  7  Abb.  Pr.  R.  248; 
Green  v.  Same,  5  Ih.  503  ;  Aurora  v.  West, 
9  Ind.  74 ;  Plymouth  v.  Jackson,  15  Pa. 
St.  44;  Louisville  v.  Commonwealth,  1 
Duvall  (Ky.),295;  Murphy  v.  Louisville, 

9  Bush  (Ky.),  189, 1872;  O'Hara  v.  Port- 
land, 3  Oregon,  525;  Gray  v.  Brooklyn, 

10  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  Rep.  N.  S.  186 ;  State 
V.  Hundelhausen,  26  Wis.  432,  1870; 
Tinsman  v.  Railroad  Company,  2  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  148;  Marietta  v.  Fearing,  4  Ohio, 
427 ;  Richmond  v.  Richmond,  etc.  Railroad 
Co.,  21  Gratt.  (Va.)  604,  1872;  State  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  24  Ala.  701 ;  Governor  v. 
McEwen,  5  Humph.  (Tenn.)  241 ;  Grogan 
V.  San  Francisco,  18  Cal.  590 ;  Darlington 
t'.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  31  N.  Y.  164  ; 
Savings  Fund  Society  v.  Philadelphia,  31 
Pa.  St.  175,  185  ;   Philadelphia  v.  Field, 

58  Pa.  St.  320;  Erie  v.  Canal  Company, 

59  Pa.  St.  174 ;  Dunsmore's  Appeal,  52 
Pa.  St.  374 ;  Blanding  v.  Burr,  13  Cal. 
343, 1859  ;  People  v.  Hill,  7  Cal.  97,  1857  ; 
Nichol   V.   Mayor,   etc.,  9  Humph.  252; 


§  56.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL.  77 

charter  is  granted  in  the  same  act  that  creates  a  j)rivate  corpo- 
ration, whose  rights  cannot  be  changed  without  their  consent.^ 
Where,  in  incorporating  a  gas  company,  the  legishiture  reserved  tlie 
power  to  alter,  modify,  or  repeal  the  charter,  it  is  competent  for 
it,  by  subsequent  legislation,  to  subject  the  company  to  supervi- 
sion and  control,  and  to  confer  upon  the  municipal  corporation 
in  which  the  works  of  the  company  are  erected  the  power  to 
regulate  the  price  of  gas,  and  ordinances  duly  passed  in  pursu- 
ance of  such  power  are  binding  upon  the  company.^ 

§  56.  (31)  Some  of  the  leading  differences  heretofore  generally 
recognized  between  public  and  private  corporations  are  well  illus- 
trated and  clearly  stated  in  a  case  decided  in  New  Jersey.  In  an 
action  by  a  riparian  proprietor  against  a  canal  company,  for  ob- 
structing a  water-course,  the  company  insisted  that  it  was  not  liable, 
because  the  work  was  authorized  by  its  charter ;  that  the  acts  it 
did  were  legal ;  that  the  injury  complained  of  was  consequential ; 
that  the  enterprise  was  a  pubhc  work,  designed  for  public  pur- 
poses, and  that  the  company,  in  executing  it,  acted  as  the  public 
agents  of  the  state.  But  the  court  held  that  the  company  was 
not  a  public  corporation.  On  this  point  JVevius,  J.,  the  organ  of 
the  court,  observed  :  "•  Public  corporations  are  political  corpora- 
tions, or  such  as  are  founded  wholly  for  public  purposes,  and  the 
whole  interest  in  which  is  in  the  public.  The  fact  of  the  public 
having  an  interest  in  the  works  or  the  property  or  the  object  of  a 
corporation  does  not  make  it  a  f)ublic  corporation.  All  corpo- 
rations, whether  public  or  private,  are,  in  contemplation  of  law, 
founded  upon  the  principle  that  they  will  promote  the  interest  or 
convenience  of  the  public.  A  bank  is  a  private  corporation,  yet 
it  is,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  designed  for  public  benefit.     A  turn- 

Creighton  v.  San  Francisco,  42  Cal.  446,  act  or  contract  invest  any  municipal  cor- 

1871;  Lucas  y.  Tippecanoe  Co.,  44  Ind.  poration  with  an  irrevocable  franchise   of 

524,  1873;  Burns  v.  Clarion   County,  62  government  over  any  part  of  its  territory. 

Pa.  St.  422,  1869 ;  Durach's  Appeal,  76.  lb.  181 ;  post,  sees.  64,  567. 

491 ;  New  Orleans  v.  Hoyle,  23  La.  An.  i  Patterson  v.  Society,  etc.  4  Zabr.  (24 

740 ;  Amite  City  v.  Clements,  24  La  An.  N.  J.  L.)  385, 1854.    See,  also,  Baltimore  v. 

27,  1872.  Board  of  Police,  15  Md.  376, 1859.     Text 

This  subject  is  discussed  in  an  inter-  approved.   Luehrman  v.  Taxing  District, 

esting  manner  by  Sharswood,  J.,  in  his  2  Lea  (Tenn.),  425. 

learned  judgment,  in  Philadelphia  v.  Fox,  2  g^ate  v.  Cincinnati  Gas  Co.,  18  Ohio 
64  Pa.  St.  109,  1870.  The  doctrine  is  here  St.  262,  1868.  See,  also,  Norwich  Gas- 
laid  down  that  since  the  legislature  can-  light  Co.  v.  Norwich  City  Gas  Co.,  25 
not  alienate  any  part  of  its  legislative  Conn.  19,  1856 ;  State  v.  Milwaukee  Gas- 
power,  it  cannot  therefore  by  legislative  light  Co.,  29  Wis.  454,  1872. 


78  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

pike  or  a  canal  company  is  a  private  company,  j^et  the  public  have 
an  interest  in  the  use  of  their  works,  snbject  to  such  tolls  and  re- 
strictions as  the  charter  has  imposed.  The  interest,  therefore, 
which  the  public  may  have  in  the  property  or  in  the  objects  of  a 
corporation,  whether  direct  or  incidental  (unless  it  has  the  whole 
interest),  does  not  determine  its  character  as  a  public  or  private 
corporation.  In  the  present  case,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
objects  of  the  corporation,  whether  to  erect  a  public  navigable 
hiHiway,  or  to  improve  the  navigation  of  the  Raritan  River,  or 
whether  the  public  have  a  right  to  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  these 
improvements,  when  made,  or  not,  the  company  are  essentially  a 
private  company,  and  are  not  [in  the  sense  which  will  confer  the 
state's  exemption  from  liability]  the  agents  of  the  state.  Their 
works  are  not  constructed  by  the  requirement  of  the  state,  nor  at 
the  expense  of  the  state,  nor  does  the  stock  belong  to  the  state, 
nor  is  the  state  answerable  for  the  lands  or  materials  used  in  the 
construction  of  these  works,  or  responsible  for  the  debts  of  the 
company,  or  for  injuries  committed  by  them  in  the  execution 
of  their  work.  The  state  could  not  compel  the  company  to  con- 
struct this  canal  or  improve  the  navigation  of  the  river  ;  it  has 
permitted  them  to  do  so  at  their  own  request.  The  company 
might  have  abandoned  the  work  whenever  they  saw  fit ;  they  may 
now  abandon  it  without  responsibility  to  the  state.  The  corpo- 
ration itself,  the  property  of  the  corporation,  the  object  of  the 
corporation,  are  essentially  private,  subject  only  to  public  use, 
under  their  own  restrictions,  and  from  which  use  the  company 
are  to  derive  the  profits."  ^ 

1  Nfivhis,  J.,  Ten  Eyck  ?;.  Canal  Co.,  of  the  legislature  and  its  members,  offi- 

3   Harrison  (N.  J.),  200,  203,  1841;    ap-  cers  of  the  government,  for  the  adminis- 

proved,  Hanson  v.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28,  tration  or  discharge  of  public  duties,  as 

53,  1869.  in  the  cases  of  cities,  towns,  etc. ;  so  where 

In  an  elaborate  and  well-considered  a  hank  is  created  by  tlie  government  for 
opinion,  in  wliich  the  court  of  appeals  of  its  own  uses,  and  the  stock  belongs  ex- 
Maryland  held  the  regents  of  the  university  clusively  to  the  government,  it  is  a  public 
of  that  state  to  be  a  private  corporation,  corporation  ;  and  so  of  a  hospital  created 
though  its  ends  were  public,  Buchanan,  and  endowed  by  a  government  for  gen- 
C.  J.,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the  eral  purposes  of  charity."  Uegents  of 
court,  thus  defiiHS  a  piihlic  corporation:  University  v.  Williams,  9  Gill  &  Johns. 
"  A  7)»W/c  corporation  is  one  that  is  created  (Md.)  365,  397,  1838.  See,  also^  Norris 
for  political  purposes,  with  political  pow-  v.  Trustees,  7  Gill  &  Johns.  7.  The 
ers,  to  be  exercised  for  purposes  connected  University  of  the  State  of  Nebraska  is  a 
with  the  public  good  in  the  administra-  public  corporation.  Regents  v.  McCon- 
tion  of  civil  government ;  an  instrument  nell,  5  Neb.  423,  1877  ;  poM,  sec.  60,  note, 
of  the  government,  subject  to  the  control  Speaking  of  public  corporations,  and  the 


§  57.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTKOL.  79 

§  57.  (32)  The  adjudged  cases  present  some  contrariety  of  opin- 
ion respecting  the  scope  of  legislative  authority  over  municipal 
corporations,  or,  rather,  respecting  the  question  how  far  such  corpo- 
rations, viewed  as  legal  personalities,  are  within  the  operation  or 
protection  of  the  usual  constitutional  restraints  upon  legislative 
power.  The  present  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  a  consideration 
of  this  subject,  which  can,  perhaps,  be  most  satisfactorily  presented 
by  viewing  it  in  the  light  of  actual  adjudications,  accompanied 
with  such  observations  as  seem  to  be  required.  The  extent  of 
the  authority  of  the  legislature  over  public  corporations  is  strik- 
ingly illustrated  by  an  important  case  decided  by  the  court  of  ap- 
peals in  the  state  of  Maryland.  The  legislature  in  incorporating 
a  railroad  company  made  it  its  duty  to  locate  its  road  through 
three  towns  specially  named,  and  provided  that  if  it  failed  to  do 
so,  "  then  and  in  that  case  said  company  shall  forfeit  rf!l,000,000 
to  the  state  of  Maryland  for  the  use  of  Washington  County."  The 
action  was  instituted  for  the  benefit  of  the  county  to  recover 
the  81,000,000,  it  being  alleged  that  the  defendant  had  not 
constructed  its  road  in  the  manner  required.  The  defendant 
pleaded  that  since  the  last  continuance  the  legislature  had  passed 

relations   they  sustain   to  the  state,  the  in  Amite  City  v.  Clements,  2-4  La.  An.  27, 

Supreme   Court  of   Louisiana  uses   this  1872. 

Language :"  The  government  of  cities  and  In  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court 
towns,  like  that  of  the  police  jury  of  of  tlie  United  States,  holding  that  tiie 
parishes  (counties),  forms  one  of  the  sub-  legislature  of  a  state  miglit  lawfully  re- 
divisions  of  the  internal  administration  peal  or  discontinue  a  ferry  franchise 
of  the  state,  and  is  absolutely  under  the  granted  to  a  municipal  corporation,  it  is 
control  of  the  legislature.  The  laws  remarked  that  towns  and  cities,  '•  wliich 
which  establish  and  regulate  municipal  are  public  municipal  and  political  bodies, 
corporations  are  not  contracts,  but  ordi-  are  incorporated  for  pubUc,  and  not  pri- 
nary  acts  of  legislation,  and  the  powers  vate,  objects.  They  are  allowed  to  hold 
they  confer  are  nothing  more  than  man-  privileges  or  property  only  for  public 
dates  of  the  sovereign  power,  and  those  purposes.  The  members  are  not  share- 
laws  may  be  repealed  or  altered  at  the  holders,  nor  joint  partners  in  any  corpo- 
will  of  the  legislature,  except  so  far  as  rate  estate,  which  they  can  sell  or  devise 
tlie  repeal  or  change  may  affect  the  rights  to  others,  or  which  can  be  attached  or 
of  third  persons  acquired  under  them."  levied  on  for  their  debts.  Hence,  gener- 
Police  Jury  v.  Shreveport  (repeal  of  ally,  the  doings  between  them  and  the 
corporation  ferry  right),  5  La.  An.  G61,  legislature  are  in  the  nature  of  legislation 
1850;  State  Bank  v.  Navigation  Co.  (con-  rather  than  compact,  and  subject  to  all 
struction  of  Charter),  3  Ih.  294,  1848;  the  legislative  conditions  named,  and 
Reynolds  v.  Baldwin,  1  Ih.  162 ;  Haynes  therefore  to  be  considered  as  not  violated 
V.  Municipality,  5  lb.  760 ;  Edgerton  v.  by  subsequent  legislative  changes."  Per 
Municipality,  1  lb.  4.35;  Board  v.  Munici-  Woodburi/,  J.,  in  J^ast  Hartford  v.  Hart- 
pality,  G  lb.  21,  1851.  The  same  doctrine  ford  Company,  10  How.  (U.  S.)  511,  531, 
is  affirmed  and  the  supremacy  of  the  18.50.  See  also  Trustees  r.  Tatman,  13  III. 
legislature  over  municipal  corporations  30;  New  Orleans  y.  Hoyle,  2o  La.  An.  740. 
and  their  funds  and  franchises  asserted 


80  MUNICIPAL   COKPOliATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

an  act  repealing  tlmt  portion  of  the  charter  of  the  company  requir- 
ino-  it  to  bnikl  its  road  through  those  towns,  and  Hpecially  remit- 
ting and  releasing  the  forfeiture  of  $1,000,000.  The  leading 
question,  Avhich  was  argued  on  either  side  by  distinguished  coun- 
sel, was,  whether  the  provision  in  favor  of  the  county  was 
one  of  contract  (the  railroad  company  having  assented  to  the 
act),  and  hence  claimed  to  be  inviolable  by  legislative  inter- 
ference, or  whether  it  was  one  oi  penalty^  and  therefore  subject  to 
unlimited  legislative  control.  The  court  held  the  latter  view  to 
be  the  true  one,  and  that  the  defendant  was  not  liable.  The 
court  also  expressed  the  opinion  that  if  it  should  be  treated  as  a 
contract  made  by  the  state,  yet  it  was  a  contract  for  the  benefit 
of  one  of  its  counties,  to  which  the  money,  if  collected,  would 
belong,  in  its  political  and  public  capacity  as  part  of  the  state,  and 
that  such  a  contract  did  not  come  within  the  meaning  of  that  pro- 
vision of  the  national  constitution  which  prohibits  a  state  from 
impairing  the  obligation  of  a  contract,  so  as  to  prevent  the  legis- 
lature from  releasing  it  at  pleasure,  or  discontinuing  an  action 
brought  for  its  enforcement  in  the  name  of  the  state.^ 

5  58.  (33)  Questions  have  arisen  under  special  constitutional 
provisions  respecting  the  authority  of  the  legislature  over  munici- 
pal offices  and  officers.  And  here  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind 
the  before  mentioned  distinction  between  state  officers  —  that  is, 
officers  whose  duties  concern  the  state  at  large,  or  the  general 
public,  although  exercised  within  defined  territorial  limits  —  and 
municipal  officers,  Avhose  functions  relate  exclusively  to  the  par- 
ticular municipality.  The  administration  of  justice,  the  preserva- 
tion of  the  public  peace,  and  the  like,  although  confided  to  local 
agencies,  are  essentially  matters  of  public  concern;  while  the  en- 
forcement of  municipal  by-laws  proper,  the  establishment  of  gas 
works,  of  water  works,  the  construction  of  sewers,  and  the  like, 
are  matters  which  pertain  to  the  municipality,  as  distinguished 

1  State  t'.Kailroad  Co.,  12  Gill  &  Johns,  for  none  exists.    Coles  v.  Madison  County, 

(Md.)  399, 1842.  Affirmed  on  error,  3  How.  Brecse  (111.),  115  ;  Ilolliday  v.  People,  5 

(U.  S.)  531,  1844  ;  C.  &  A.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Gilni.  (10  111.)  21G  ;  Conner  v.  Bent,  1  Mo. 

Adler,  56  111.  344,  1872.  235;  Rankin  v.  Beaird,  Brcese  (111.),  123, 

A  public  corporation   lias   no  vested  post,  sec.   62.     Effect  of  executive  pardon 

right  io  fines  directed  to  be  paid  to  it,  and  on  fines  going  to  county.  HoUiday  v.  Peo- 

the   legislature  may  release  them.      No  pie,  5  Gilm,  (10  111.)  216. 
contract  in  such  cases  is  thereby  violated. 


§  58.] 


EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATRTl  CONTROL. 


81 


from  the  state  at  large.^  The  constitution  of  Michigan  enjoined 
upon  the  legislature  to  "  provide  for  the  incoiporation  and  organ- 
ization of  cities  and  villages, "  gave  it  authority  to  confer  upon 
them  such  powers  of  a  local  legislative  and  administrative  charac- 
ter as  it  should  deem  proper,  and  contained  the  further  provision 
that  '•'•judicial  officers  of  cities  and  villages  shall  he  elected,  and  all 
other  [municipal]  officers  shall  be  elected,  or  appointed,  at  such 
time  and  in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  may  direct  "  ;  and  it  was 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  in  a  cause  that  under- 
went great  consideration,  and  in  which  the  judges  delivered  sepa- 
rate opinions,  that  while  the  legislature  was  left  free  to  appoint 
officers  not  municipal,  such,  for  example,  as  a  board  of  police  com- 
missioners in  and  for  a  city,  yet  that  it  was  restrained  by  the  above- 
mentioned  provisions,  especially  by  the  one  last  quoted,  from  itself 
directly  appointing  municipal  officers  whose  duties  and  authority 
were  plainly  and  exclusively  local,  such  as  the  board  of  water 
commissioners  and  board  of  sewer  commissioners  for  a  particular 
cit}'.^  The  constitution  of  New  Yorh^  provides  that  municipal 
officers  shall  he  elected  hy  the  electors  of  the  ommicipality,  or  ap- 


1  People  V.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44, 1871  ; 
s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  108.  The  distinction 
mentioned  in  the  text  is  there  accurately 
drawn,  and  clearly  stated  and  illustrated 
in  the  admirable  opinion  of  Camphfll,  C. 
J.  It  is  approved  and  applied  in  Chicago 
V.  Wright,  69  111.  326,  1873 ;  People  y. 
Draper,  1.5  N.  Y.  543,  Denio,  J.  The  text 
is  cited  and  applied  in  Britton  v.  Steber, 
62  Mo.  370,  1876.  See  also  People  v. 
Lynch,  -51  Cal.  15,  1875;  s  c.  15  Am. 
Rep.  677.  Opinion  of  McKinstry,  J.,  and 
of  Coo!ey,J.,  in  People  v.  Detroit,  28  Mich. 
228 ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.  Text  ap- 
proved. Burch  V.  Hardwick,  30  Gratt. 
24;  U.  S.  y.  Memphis,  97  U.  S.  284;  ante, 
sees.  19,  22,  28.  See  chapter  on  Corpo- 
rate Officers,  post. 

2  People  V.  Hnrlbut,  supra,  distin- 
guished from  People  v.  Mahaney,  13 
Mich.  481;  ante,  sec.  9,  and  notes.  In 
People  V.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228,  1873; 
s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  the  People  v.  Hurlbut, 
is  explained,  and  its  doctrine  adhered  to, 
and  it  was  held  that  the  board  of  park 
commissioners  for  Detroit,  selected  by 
the  legislature  without  its  consent,  were 
not  the  officers  or  representatives  of  the 
city.     So,  under  tlie  constitution  of  Ken- 

VOL.  I.  G 


tticky,  which  contains  a  provision  that 
"  officers  of  towns  and  cities  shall  be 
elected  for  such  terms,  and  in  such  manner, 
and  with  such  qualifications,  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  law,"  and  "shall  reside 
within  their  respective  districts,"  it  was 
held  that  the  legislature  could  not  authorize 
the  (jovernor  to  appoint  municipal  officers, 
since  the  constitution  requires  that  they 
shall  be  elected  by  the  voters  of  the  town 
or  city  (Speed  v.  Crawford,  3  Met.  [Ky.] 
207,  1860),  but  it  was  also  likewise  held 
that  it  was  within  the  power  of  the  legis- 
lature to  pass  an  act  depriving  the  mayor 
and  council  of  a  designated  city  of  the 
power  to  elect  the  police  force  thereof, 
and  establishing,  instead,  a  hoard  of  police 
for  the  city  and  the  county  in  which  the 
city  was  situate,  to  be  elected  by  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  city  and  county, 
and  that  this  board,  thus  elected,  should 
select  and  enroll  the  permanent  police 
force  of  the  city,  which,  it  was  provided 
should  be  taxed  to  pay  tliem.  Police 
Commissioners  v.  Louisville,  3  Bush 
(Ky.),  597, 1868.  See  Richmond  Mayor- 
alty Case,  19  Gratt.  (Va.)  673. 
■^  Art.  X.,  sec.  2. 


82  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  IV. 

pointed  hy  the  antliorities  thereof.  The  purpose  of  this  provision 
is  to  secure  to  the  political  and  municipal  divisions  of  the  state 
the  rioht  of  local  self-government,  and  to  prevent  the  legislature 
from  depriving  the  inhabitants  of  the  several  counties,  cities, 
towns,  and  villages,  of  the  right  to  choose  their  officers.^ 

It  has  elsewhere  been  held,  however,  that  administrative  agen- 
cies and  officers,  such  as  police  boards,  and  even  boards  of  water 
commissioners,  park  commissioners,  etc.,  may,  in  the  absence  of 
special  constitutional  limitation,  be  authorized  by  the  legislature 
to  assist  in  local  or  municipal  ad  minis  tration.^ 

§  59.  Recognizing  and  applying  the  distinction  in  the  preced- 
ing section  between  state  oflBcers  and  municipal  officers,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  held  that  the  mayor  of  a  city  was  not 
an  officer  under  the  state,  within  the  meaning  of  a  constitutional 
provision,  giving  the  Supreme  Court  jurisdiction  only  when  title 
to  an  office  under  the  state  is  in  contest.^ 

§  GO.  (34)  And  it  has  been  several  times  determined  that 
the  legislature  may,  unless  si^ecially  restricted  in  the  constitu- 
tion, take  from  a  municipal  corporation  its  charter  powers  respect- 
ing the  police  and  their  appointment,  and  by  statute  itself  directly 
provide  for  a  permanent  police  for  the  corporation,  under  the 
control  of  a  board  of  police,  not  appointed  or  elected  by  the  cor- 
porate authorities,  but  consisting  of  commissioners  named  and 

1  People   V.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.   50,  ^  County   Court  v.  Griswold,  58  Mo. 

1873,  criticising  People  v.  Draper,  15  N.  175,  198,   1874  ;  People  v.  Draper,  15  N. 

Y.  532;  and  People  v.   Sheplierd,  36  N.  Y.  532;  Daily  v.   St.   Paul,  7  Minn.  .390, 

Y.  285 ;  People  v.  Bull,  4G  N.  Y.  57  ;  Peo-  following  People  v.  Draper.     See  People 

pie  V.   McKinney,   52  N.   Y.  374,    1873,  v.  Albertson,  55  N.   Y.  50,  1873,  where 

overruling   People  v.  Batclielor,  22  N.  Y.  People  ;;.  Draper  is  questioned  and  dis- 

128.    And  see  People  v.  Palmer,  52  N.  Y.  tinguished.     State  v.  Valle,  41   Mo.  20  ; 

83,  1873;  People  v.  Clute,  50  N.  Y.  451,  State  v.  St.  Louis  County  Court,  34  Mo. 

1872;  ««<<>,  sec.  9  and  note.     Concerning  540.     Limitations  on  the  right  suggested, 

the  general  inquiry  how  far  right  of  local  People  v.  Detroit,   28   Mich.  228,  1873; 

government  and  municipal  self-regulation,  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202. 

including  the  right  of  the  local  citizens  to  3  Britton  v.  Steber,  62  Mo.  370,  1870. 

select  local  officers,  is  rooted  in  our  Ameri-  A  state  officer  may  be  connected  with 

can  constitutions,  the  reader  will  find  the  some  of  the  municipal  functions,  but  he 

opinion  of  Cooky,  J.,  in  the  People  v.  De-  must  derive  his  powers  from  a  state  stat- 

troit,  28  Mich.  228,  1873 ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  ute,  and  execute  his  powers  in  obedience 

Rep.  202  in  connection  with  the    opin-  to  a  state  law.      State  v.  Valle,  41  Mo. 

ions  in  the  People  v.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  29. 
44,  1871;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103,  highly 
instructive. 


§G1.] 


EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE   CONTROL. 


83 


appointed  by  the  legislature.  And  a  provision  in  such  a  law, 
transferring  to  such  commissioners,  for  the  purposes  of  the  new 
police,  the  use  of  the  police-telegraph,  station-houses,  watch- 
boxes,  etc.,  provided  by  the  corporation,  is  valid,  since  it  only 
takes  cit}'  property  dedicated  to  a  particular  use,  and  applies  it  to 
the  same  purpose,  changing  only  the  agency  by  which  the  use  is 
directed ;  the  property  is  still  the  city's.^ 

§  61.  In  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  restriction  it  is 
competent,  likewise,  to  the  legislature  of  a  state  to  direct  that 
the  county  shall  pay  a  portion  of  the  expenses  of  a  police  force  in 
a  city  situated  wholly  within,  and  forming  part  of,  the  county. 
It  may  even  direct  a  county  to  appropriate  part  of  its  revenue 
already  collected  in  this  way,  since  such  legislation  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional, as  being  retrospective  in  its  operation,  or  as  taking 
away  vested  rights,  or  impairing  the  obligation  of  contracts,  or 
violating  the  principles  of  taxation.  As  moneys  acquired  by 
taxation  are  not  strictly  the  private  property  of  the  county,  such 


1  Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Police  (affirm- 
ing validity  to  the  Baltimore  Police  Bill), 
IsMd.  376,  1859.  Tliere  is  nothing  in 
the  maxim  that  "  Taxation  and  represen- 
tation go  together,"  that  can  preclude 
the  legislature  from  establishing  in  a  city 
a  metropolitan  police  board,  with  power 
to  estimate  the  expenses  of  the  police, 
and  compelling  the  city  authorities  to 
raise,  by  taxation,  the  amount  so  esti- 
mated. Every  city  is  represented  in  the 
state  legislature,  and  it  is  for  that  body 
to  determine  how  much  power  shall  be 
conferred  by  the  municipal  charters  which 
it  grants.  People  v.  Mahaney,  13  Mich. 
481 ;  see  also  same  principle.  People  v. 
Draper,  15  N.  Y.  532,  1857,  where  the  act 
to  establish  the  metropolitan  police  dis- 
trict was  held  constitutional ;  but  see 
People  V.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  50,  1873, 
where  People  v.  Draper  is  questioned  and 
distinguished,  and  People  v.  Shepherd, 
36  N.  Y.  285,  is  doubted  ;  People  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 69  N.  Y.  362,  1877.  Text  ap- 
proved. Burch  V.  Hardwick,  30  Gratt. 
24 ;  Police  Commrs.  v.  Louisville,  3 
Bush,  5".)7  ;  Diamond  v.  Cain,  21  La. 
An.  309,  1869 ;  State  v.  Leovy,  lb.  538. 
The  cases  concur  in  holding  that  police 
officers  are,  in  fact,  state  officers  and  not 
municipal,  although  a  particular  city  or 


town  be  taxed  to  pay  them.  Post,  ch. 
xxiii.  An  act  which  makes  the  mayor 
and  aldermen  of  a  corporation  commis- 
sioners of  the  court-house  and  jail  may 
be  repealed  by  the  legislature,  and  these 
buildings  placed  under  the  control  of 
county  or  other  officers.  State  v.  Mayor, 
K.  m'  Charlt.  (Ga.)  250;  see  also  State 
V.  Dews,  lb.  397.  A  grant  to  a  city 
to  aid  in  building  court-house,  and  for 
educational  purposes,  is  subject,  until 
executed,  to  legislative  resumption  and 
control.  Bass  v.  Fontleroy,  11  Texas, 
698.  In  the  absence  of  constitutional 
restriction  the  legislature  may  directly 
appoint  officers  to  act  within  the  munici- 
pality. Hudson,  etc.  Co.  v.  Seymour 
(higiiway  commissioners),  6  Vroom,  35 
N.  .7.  L.  47. 

The  management  and  mode  of  electing 
trustees  of  an  incorporated  academy,  which 
is  endowed  entirely  hi/  the  state,  may  be 
changed  by  the  legislature  at  its  pleasure. 
Dart  V.  Houston,  22  Ga.  506;  see  also 
University  of  North  Carolina  v.  Maultsby, 
8  Ire.  Eq.  257 ;  University  of  Alabama 
V.  Winston,  5  Stew.  &  Port.  17;  Louis- 
ville V.  University  of  Louisville,  15  B. 
Mon.  645;  Visitors,  etc.  v.  State,  15  Md. 
330  ;  Kegents  v.  McConnell,  6  Neb.  423, 
1877. 


84  MUNICir.VL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

legislation  is  not  the  application  of  private  property  to  public  use 
without  compensation,  since  the  police  board,  by  virtue  of  the 
act  creating  it,  was  an  agency  of  the  state  government  and  per- 
formed public  duties.^  In  Indiana  the  majority  of  the  court  held 
that  such  is  the  legislative  power  over  counties  and  their  prop- 
erty paid  for  by  taxation  that  the  General  Assembly  may  con- 
stitutionally enact  a  law  to  take  railroad  stock  from  the  county 
after  it  has  been  subscribed  and  paid  for  out  of  funds  raised  by 
taxation,  and  transfer  it  to  those  from  whom  the  money  was  col- 
lected, and  in  the  event  they  do  not  apply  for  it,  to  vest  it  in 
townships  for  school  purposes.^ 

§  62.  (35)  The  legitimate  authority  of  the  legislature  over 
municipal  corporations  extends  to  making  provisions  concerning 
theiv  funds  and  revenues,^  and  the  authority  is  not  abridged  be- 
cause the  purpose  to  which  the  revenue  is  to  be  appropriated  is 
specified  in  the  charter ;  and  the  ground  of  the  doctrine  is  that 
such  corporations  have  no  vested  rights  in  powers  conferred  upon 
them  for  civil,  political,  or  administrative  purposes.  Thus,  the 
legislature  may  repeal  the  power  it  had  given  to  cities  to  grant 
licenses  for  the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  although  the  money 
to  be  derived  from  the  sale  of  such  licenses  was  directed  to  be 

1  State  ex  rel.  St.  Louis  Police  Com-  School  districts,   being  public  corpora- 

mrs.  V.  St.  Louis  County  Court    (man-  tions,  under  legislative  control,  a  law  pro- 

damus),     34     Mo.     546,     1864;     contra,  viding  that  school  debts  may  be  paid  in 

Mayor,  etc.  v.  Tows,   5  Sneed  (Tenn.),  bills  of  the  state  bank  of  the  state,  is  valid 

186.     The  view  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  as  against  the  objection  that  the  legisla- 

Missouri  is  undoubtedly  the  correct  one.  ture  had  no  power  to  direct  that  anything 

Approved.     St.  Louis  v.  Shields,  52  Mo.  except  gold  and  silver  should  be  received 

351,  1873;   People  v.  Morris,  13  Wend,  in  payment  of  debts.     Bush  i-.  Shipman, 

325;  Sangamon  Co.  v.  Springfield,  63  111.  4  Scam.  (5  111.)  190. 

66;    Weymouth,  etc.  Fire  Dist.    v.   Co.  A  municipal  corporation  may  constitu- 

Commrs.,  108  Mass.  142;  Stilz  V.Indian-  tionaWyhe  exempted  from  prospecticeliability 

apolis,  55  Ind.  515.  for  nonfeasance  of  its  officers  or  liability 

The  maintenance  of  a  police  force  may  for  torts.  Gray  v.  Brooklyn,  10  Abb.  Pr. 
be  committed  to  the  corporate  authorities  R.  N.  S.  186 ;  post,  ch.  xxiii. 
of  a  municipality,  and  if  there  are  no  ^  Lucas  w.  Tippecanoe  Co.,  44  Ind.  524, 
special  constitutional  restrictions  on  tlie  1873  ;  Downey,  Warden,  and  Oshorn,  JJ., 
power  of  the  legislature,  it  may  authorize  concurring,  Buskirh  and  Petlit,  JJ.,  dis- 
the  assessment  of  a  tax  upon  the  keepers  senting.  The  opinions  are  elaborate,  and 
of  saloons  and  restaurants  in  the  munici-  refer  to  the  leading  authorities  on  the 
pality  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  subject.  The  dissenting  judges  consider 
such  police  force  therein,  to  be  levied  and  Spaulding  v.  Andover,  then  recently  de- 
collected  as  other  taxes.  Durach's  Appeal,  cided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 
62  Pa.  St.  491,  1869 ;  post,  sees.  746,  750,  Hampshire,  as  strongly  sustaining  their 
793 ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  111.  344,  views. 
1870.  3  Ante,  sees.  57,  60,  and  notes. 


63.] 


EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL. 


85 


appropriated  to  the  support  of  paupers  within  the  city.^  Such 
an  authority,  it  was  remarked,  "  gives  the  city  no  more  a  vested 
right  to  issue  licenses,  because  the  legislature  specified  the  ob- 
jects to  which  the  money  should  be  applied,  than  if  it  had  been 
put  into  the  general  fund  of  the  city."  ^ 

§  63.  (36)  Legislative  acts  respecting  municipal  corporations 
not  being  in  the  nature  of  contracts,  the  provisions  thereof  may 
be  changed  at  i^leasure  where  the  constitutional  rights  of  creditors 
and  others  are  not  invaded.  By  act  of  the  legislature  the  sepa- 
rate city  of  Lafayette  was  added  to  and  incorporated  with  the 
city  of  New  Orleans,  with  a  provision  that  the  added  district, 
which  was  less  in  debt  than  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  should  be 
charged  only  witli  its  own  debts;   and  by  a  subsequent  act  oi  the 


1  Gutzweller    v.   People,  14  111.   142, 
1852;  ante,  sec.  54,  note. 

2  Gutzweller  v.  People,  14  111.  142, 
1852,  per  Caton,  J.  See,  also,  Richland 
Co.  V.  Lawrence  Co.,  12  111.  1,  18-50; 
adhered  to,  Sangamon  Co.  v.  Springfield, 
63  111.  71,  1872;  Spaulding  v.  Andover 
(full  discussion  by  Foster,  J.),  54  N.  H. 
38,  1871  ;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  Council, 
93  U.  S  116,  1876;  People  v.  Super- 
visors, 50  Cal.  561  ;  People  v.  Power,  25 
111.  187  ;  Richmond  v.  Richmond,  etc.  Rail- 
road Co.,  21  Gratt.  (Va.)  604,  1872,  hold- 
ing that  the  state  may  exempt  property 
from  municipal  taxatiim.  By  tlie  charter 
of  a  municipal  corporation  there  was 
granted  to  it  sole  power  to  grant  licenses 
to  sell  spirituous  liquors  within  its  limits, 
and  to  appropriate  the  money  arising 
tlierefrom  to  city  purposes.  Subsequently' 
the  legislature  passed  an  act  directing 
the  money  thus  raised  to  be  paid  by  the 
corporation  to  an  academy  located  within 
the  town.  The  municipal  corporation  re- 
fused to  pay  over  to  tlie  academy  an 
amount  received  for  licenses  after  the 
passage  of  the  last-named  act,  and  the 
academy  brought  an  action  to  recover 
it.  The  court  held  tlio  subsequent  act 
to  be  unconstitutional,  and  that  the  town 
was  not  liable.  The  court  were  of  opin- 
ion, that,  by  its  charter,  the  town  had  a 
vested  right  in  the  profits  arising  from 
licenses.  It  admitted  that  the  legislature 
might  altogether  take  away  from  the 
town  the  power  to  grant  licenses;  but  if 


it  allowed  the  power  to  remain,  it  denied 
the  right  of  the  legislature  "  to  make  a 
different  disposition  of  the  funds  arising 
from  such  licenses,  from  that  contained 
in  the  charter,  unless  with  the  consent  of 
the  corporation."  Trustees  of  Aberdeen 
Academy  v.  Aberdeen,  13  Sm.  &  Marsh. 
(21  Miss.)  645,  1850.  See,  also,  Aber- 
deen V.  Saunderson,  8  lb.  663.  The  doc- 
trine that  the  town  corporation  had  a 
vested  right  in  profits  arising  from  li- 
censes, cannot,  we  think,  be  sustained, 
and  is  not  in  harmony  with  the  decisions 
elsewhere.  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis 
Home,  etc.,  50  Ind.  215,  1875. 

Citif,  county,  and  township  funds  are  un- 
der legislative  control.  County  v.  State, 
11  111.  202 ;  County  v.  County,  12  111.  1  ; 
Dennis  v.  Maynard,  15  111.  477  ;  Love  v. 
Schenck,  12  Ire.  Law,  304  ;  Love  i'.  Ram- 
sour,  lb.  .328;  Youngs  v.  Hall,  9  Nev.  212, 
1874 ;  People  v.  Ingersoll,  58  N.  Y.  1 ; 
People  V.  Fields,  58  N.  Y.  491,  1874; 
Home  Ins.  Co.  i-.  City  Council,  93  U.  S. 
116, 187G  ;  ante,  sec.  57,  note;  Indianapo- 
lis V.  Indianapolis  Home,  etc.  50  Ind.  215, 
1875.  The  Indianapolis  Home  for  Friend- 
less Women  is  so  far  a  public  corporation, 
or  institution,  that  an  appropriation  by  the 
legislature  of  fines,  collected  for  the  viola- 
tion of  certain  city  ordinances,  to  its  sup- 
port, is  not  the  appropriation  of  money  to 
a  private  purpose.  ^>ucas  v.  Board,  etc., 
44  Ind.  524)  ;  Indianapolis  r  Indianapolis 
Home,  etc.,  50  Ind.  215,  1875. 


86  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

legislature  it  was  provided  that  taxes  should  be  equal  and  uni- 
form throughout  the  entire  limits  of  the  city ;  the  effect  of  which 
was  to  increase  the  amount  of  taxes  to  be  raised  within  that  por- 
tion of  the  corporation  which  was  formerly  the  city  of  Lafayette. 
A  bill  was  filed  by  residents  and  property  owners  of  the  annexed 
district  to  enjoin  the  collection  of  the  excess  of  taxes  beyond  the 
amount  fixed  by  the  act  incorporating  the  annexed  district  into 
the  "  old  city,"  claiming  that  the  act  was  a  contract,  and  the 
levy  of  taxes  under  the  latter  act,  so  far  as  regards  debts  due 
antecedently  to  the  annexation,  violated  the  vested  rights  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  annexed  district.  The  Supreme  Court,  on  the 
ground  that  public  corporations  are  wholly  under  the  control  of 
the  legislature,  which  has  the  power  to  provide  in  what  manner 
taxes  shall  be  levied  for  their  support,  and  how  their  debts  shall 
be  paid  on  their  dissolution,  held  the  act  authorizing  increased 
taxation  to  be  valid,  and  dismissed  the  bill.-'  So  where,  after  a 
contract  for  paving  streets  had  been  made,  but  before  it  was 
fully  executed,  certain  wards  were  added  to  the  city  (in  which 
wards,  however,  no  part  of  the  paving  was  ever  done),  and  no 
provision  as  to  the  debts  of  the  corporation  was  made  in  the  act 
of  annexation,  it  was  held  that  the  legislature  might  afterwards 
constitutionally  enact,  as  against  the  contractor,  that  the  people 
within  the  wards  thus  added  should  not  be  taxed  to  pay  any 
j)art  of  the  debt  of  the  cit}'-  contracted  prior  to  the  passage  of  the 
act  by  which  they  were  brought  within  the  limits  of  the  corpora- 
tion.2     And   the  same  principle  was  asserted  by  the  Supreme 

1  Layton  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An.  that  it  was  beyond  the  competency  of 
515,  1857.  See,  also,  Girard  v.  Philadel-  the  legislature  to  assess  lands  in  the  town 
phia,  7  Wall.  1,  1868 ;  People  v.  Hill,  7  of  Flatbush  to  pay  debts  previously  in- 
Cal.  97, 1857  ;  post,  ch.  viii. ;  State  y.Flan-  curred  by  the  adjoining  city  of  Brooklyn 
ders,  24  La.  An.  57  ;  U.  S.  ex  rel.  Brown  under  prior  acts  for  a  park,  although  the 
V.  Memphis,  97  U.  S.  300 ;  Vance  i'.  Little  portion  of  the  park  was  carved  out  of 
Rock,  30  Ark.  435,  439, 1875.  Citing  text,  tlie  corporate  limits  of  Flatbush.  Miller, 
Sedgwick  Co.  ?;.  Bailey,  11  Kan.  631, 1873;  J.,  after  stating  that  had  an  original  as- 
San  Francisco  v.  Canavan,  42  Cal.  541,  sessnient  for  benefits  been  made  it  might 
1872.  A  statute  extinguishing  one  cor-  be  said  to  be  an  assessment  for  public  use 
poration  and  throwing  its  obligations  on  and  enforceable  as  such,  says,  "  But 
anotlier  raises  an  implied  promise  on  such  is  not  this  case  .  .  .  There  is  no 
tlie  part  of  the  successor  to  pay  the  same,  principle  that  I  am  aware  of  whicli  sane- 
Little  V.  Union  Township  Committee,  40  tions  the  doctrine  that  it  is  within  the 
N.  J.  L.  397.  taxing  power  of  the  legislature  to  comi)el 

2  United  States  tx  rel.  Brown  v.  Mem-  one  town,  city,  or  locality  to  contribute 
phis,  97  U.  S.  300,  1877 ;  town  of  Flat-  to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  another, 
bush,  in  re,  60  N.  Y.  398,  1875 ;  the  The  government  has  no  such  authority, 
court  of  appeals  expressed  tlie  opinion  and  this  case  is  entirely  without  a  pre- 


§  65.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTKOL.  87 

Court  of  the  United  States,  which  held  to  be  valid  a  legislative 
act  by  ^Yhich  the  city  of  Carrollton  was  annexed  to  New  Orleans, 
with  a  provision  that  the  latter  city  should  succeed  to  all  the 
rights  and  property,  and  assume  and  pay  all  of  the  debts  of  the 
former.^ 

§  64.  (37)  The  power  of  the  legislature  to  alter  and  abolish 
municipal  corporations,  to  erect  new  corporations  in  the  place  of 
the  old,  to  add  to  the  old,  or  to  carve  out  of  the  old  a  new  cor- 
poration, or  the  power  to  divide  and  dispose  of  the  property  held 
by  such  corporations  for  municipal  purposes,  is  not  defeated  or 
affected  by  the  circumstance  that  the  corporation  is,  by  its  char- 
ter, made  the  trustee  of  a  charity,  or  of  other  private  rights  and 
interests.  Where  the  legal  existence  of  the  municipal  trustee  is 
destroyed  by  legislative  act,  the  Court  of  Chancery  will  assume 
the  execution  of  the  trust,  and,  if  necessary,  will  appoint  new 
trustees  to  take  charge  of  the  property  and  carry  into  effect  the 
trust.^ 

§  65.  (38)  The  supremacy  of  the  legislative  authority  over  mio- 
nicipal  corporations  is  tiot,  however,  in  all  respects,  unlimited  ;  but 
the  limitations  must  be  sought  either  in  the  national  or  state 
constitution  ;  and  if  not  there  found,  in  terms  or  by  fair  implica- 
tion, they  do  not  exist.  In  England,  it  is  settled  that  the  crown 
has  no  power,  without  the  consent  of  those  to  be  affected  thereby, 
to  alter  or  abolish  municipal  charters,  or  to  impose  new  ones  on 
the  corporation.  But  Parliament  may  create  new  corporations, 
or  abolish  or  alter  charters,  or  impose  new  ones,  at  its  will,  and 
without  the  consent  of  the  inhabitants.     And  so  may  the  state 

cedent.    If  such  assessments  were  author-  1868;   Phila(k4phia   v.   Fo.x,   G4  Pa.  St. 

ized    they     raiglit     not    be    limited    to  169,  1870 ;  Montpelier  u.  East  Montpelier 

adjoining   towns,   cities   or  villages,  but  (division  of  town  and  contest  as  to  trust 

applied  to  tiiose  located  at  great  distances  property  lield  for  the  benefit  of  the  in- 

frora  each  other.     Such  legislation  would  habitants  of  the   original   township),   29 

be  unjust,   mischievous,  and  oppressive,  Vt.    (3    Wms.)     12,     1856;    same    con- 

and  cannot  be  tolerated."  See  post,  sec.  troversy   at    law,  27  Vt.  704.      See   in- 

43  and  notes.  ./*"«,  sec.  80,  and   chapters  on   Corporate 

1  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  044,  Property  and   Remedies    against  Illegal 

1877.     Such  legislation  is  not  within  the  Corporate   Acts,    post.      Te.xt   approved, 

prohibition     of     the     state     constitution  Luehrman  i'.  Tax.  Dist.,  2  Lea  (Tenn.), 

against  the  passage  of  retroactive  laws.  425 ;     Ellerman  v.  Mc:\Iains,  30  La.  An. 

/b.  190;   Cincimiati  v.  Cameron,  83  Ohio  St. 

■!  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,   7   Wall.   1,  386. 


88  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

leffislatures  in  this  country,  if  there  be  no  special  constitutional 
restriction,  as  generally  there  is  not,  upon  the  povver.i 

§  66.  (39)  It  may  assist  to  an  understanding  of  the  extent  of 
legislative  power  over  uiunicipal  corporations  proper  (incorporated 
towns  and  cities)  to  observe  that  these,  as  ordinarily  constituted, 
possess,  according  to  many  courts,  a  double  character :  the  one 
(/overnmenlal,  legislative,  or  public;  the  other,  in  a  sense,  proprie- 
tor// or  private.  Tlie  distinction  between  these,  though  sometimes 
difficult  to  trace,  is  highly  important,  and  is  frequently  referred 
to,  particularly  in  the  cases  relating  to  the  implied  or  common 
law  liability  of  municipal  corporations  for  the  negligence  of  their 
servants,  agents,  or  officers  in  the  execution  of  corporate  duties 
and  powers.  On  this  distinction,  indeed,  rests  the  doctrine  of 
such  implied  liability .^  In  its  governmental  or  public  character, 
the  corporation  is  made,  by  the  state,  one  of  its  instruments,  or 
the  local  depositary  of  certain  limited  and  prescribed  political 
powers,  to  be  exercised  for  the  public  good  on  behalf  of  the  state, 
and  not  for  itself.  In  this  respect  it  is  assimilated,  in  its  nature 
and  functions,  to  a  county  corporation,  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  purely  part  of  the  governmental  machinery  of  the  sovereignty 
which  creates  it.     Over  all  its  civil,  political,  or  governmental 

1  St.  Louis  V.  Allen  (extension  of  city  tlie  legislature  for  the  public  benefit,  and 

limits),  13  Mo.  400,    1850;   St.  Louis   v.  for  acts  done  in  what  may  be  called  their 

Russell,  9  Mo.  503,  1845.     It  is  justly  ob-  p-ivate   character,  in   the   management  of 

served,  that  "most,  if  not  all, of  the  lead-  property  and  riglits  voluntarily  held  by 

ing  cases    in   the   books,   involving   the  them  for  their  own   immediate   profit  or 

question  of  the  inviolability  of  municipal  advantage,   as   a   corporation,   although 

charters,  in  the  English  courts,  arose  be-  inuring,  of   course,  ultimately  to  the  ben- 

tween  the  prerorjalive  of  the  crown  and  the  efit  of  the  public."     Per   Grajj,  J.,  in  Oli- 

corporation.     The  right  or  power  of  par-  ver  v.    Worcester,  102   Mass.   489,   499, 

liamentm  England,  or  of  the  legislature  18G9;    s.   p.    Detroit   v.   Corey,   9   Mich, 

here,  would  present  (and  was  decided  to  165,  184,  1861  ;  Hill  v.  Boston,  122  Mass. 

present)  quite  a  different  question."     Per  844,  359 ;  s.  c.  2-3  Am.  Rep.  3.32.      In  the 

Xehon,  J.,  in  People  i'.  Morris,  13  Wend,  one  case,  no  private  action  lies  unless  it 

325,  334,  1835 ;  Philadelphia  v.  Field,  68  be  e.xpressly  given  ;  in  the  other,  there 

Pa.  St.  320,  1868  ;  Hudson  County  v.  Sey-  is  an  implied  or  common  law  liability  for 

mour,  6  Vroom  (35  N.  J.  L.),  47  ;  People  v.  the  negligence  of  their  officers  in  the  dis- 

Bennett,2g  Mich.  451,  1874;  s.  c.  18  Am.  charge  of  such  duties.     In  further  illus- 

Rep.  107  ;  Austin  v.  Coggeshall,  12  R.  I.  tration  of  this  alleged  dual  character,  the 

329,  citing  and  approving  text.  reader  is   referred   to  the  cases  cited  in 

2  Ante,  sees.   22,   25,  28.     "  The   dis-  the   next   note.      See   reference    to   this 

tinction  is  well  established  between  the  section  of  the  text  in  Spauiding  v.  An- 

responsibilities   of  towns   and   cities  for  dover,  54  N.  H.  38,  54,  1873 ;    post,  ch. 

acts   done  in  their  public  capacity,  in  the  xxiii. 
discharge  of  duties  imposed  on  them  by 


§  G7.]  EXTENT   OF   LEGISLA.TIVE   CONTROL.  89 

powers,  the  autliority  of  the  legislature  is,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
supreme  and  without  limitation,  unless  the  limitation  is  found  in 
some  peculiar  2:)rovision  of  the  constitution  of  the  particular  state. 
But  in  its  proprietary  or  private  character,  the  theory  is,  that  the 
powers  are  supposed  not  to  be  conferred,  primarily  or  chiefly, 
from  considerations  connected  with  the  government  of  the  state 
at  large,  but  for  the  private  advantage  of  the  particular  corpora- 
tion as  a  distinct  legal  jjersonality  ;  and  as  to  such  powers,  and  to 
property  acquired  thereunder,  and  contracts  made  with  reference 
thereto,  the  corporation  is  to  be  regarded  as  quo  ad  hoc  a  private 
corporation,  or  at  least,  not  public  in  the  sense  that  the  power 
of  the  legislature  over  it  is  omnipotent.^ 

§  67.  This  division  of  the  powers  and  duties  of  a  municipal 
corporation  into  two  classes,  one  public  and  the  other  private, 
has  been  before  alluded  to,  and  is,  to  our  mind,  far  from  satisfac- 
tovy  ;  and  the  private  character  thus  ascribed  to  it,  difficult  exactly 
to  comprehend.  In  what  sense  are  powers  conferred  and  to  be 
exercised  for  the  good  of  all  the  people  of  the  place,  private  ? 
Wherein  do  such  powers,  in  their  origin  or  nature,  differ  from 
those  admitted  to  be  public  ?  Are  not  all  powers  conferred  upon 
municipalities,  whether  many  or  few,  given,  and  given  only,  for 
their  better  regulation  and  government,  and  to  promote  their 
welfare  as  parts  of  the  state  at  large  ?  The  small  municipality, 
with  few  and  simple  powers,  is  no  more  completely  under  the 

^  "West.   Sav.  Fund  Soc.  v.  Philadel-  B.    Mon.    642 ;     Louisville   i".    Common- 

phia,  31   Pa.  St.  17o;  7^.  185;  Bailey  v.  wealth,  1  Duvall  (Ky.),205;  Weightman 

Mayor,   etc.   of  New  York,  3  Hill,  531;  v.  Washington,  1  Black  (U.  S.),  39,  1861; 

People  f.  Fields,  58  N.  Y.  491 ;  Peoples.  Reading   v.    Commonwealth,  11    Pa.   St. 

IngersoU,  58  N.  Y.  1,  1874  ;    Maxmillian  190,   1849  ;    Richmond   v.  Long's  Admr., 

V.  Mayor,   etc.   of  New  York,  62   N.  Y.  17   Gratt.   (Va.)   375;  De  Voss  v.  Rich- 

160,  1875.      People  c  Briggs,    50  N.  Y.  mond,   18  Gratt.   338;  s.  c.  7  Am.   Law 

553,    560,    1872;    Nicliol  v.   Nashville,  9  Reg.   (X.  S.)  589;  New  Orleans,  etc.  R. 

Humph.  252;  Small  v.  Danville,  51  Me.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Orleans,  26  La.  An.  478; 

359  ;  Jones   v.   New  Haven,  34    Conn.  1 ;  s.  c.  lb.  517,  1874  ;  Askew  v.  Hale  Co.,  54 

Western  College  v.   Cleveland,  12   Ohio  Ala.  639;  Detroit  v.  Corey,  9  Mich.  165, 

St.  375,  1861;  Howe  v.  New  Orleans,  12  184,  18G1 ;  People  v.   Hurlbut,  24   Mich. 

I.a.   An.   481;  Martin  v.   Mayor,  etc.,  1  44, 1871,  opinion  of  CWey,  J. ;  s.  c.  9  Am. 

Hill,    545;    Buttrick  ;;.   Lowell,  1  Allen,  Rep.   103;  People   v.    Detroit,   28  xMich. 

172  ;  Oliver  v.  Worcester,  102  Mass.  489,  228,  1873  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.     As  to 

Li69;  Touchard  v.  Touchard,  5  Cal.  306;  what  are  municipal  duties,  and  what  falls 

Gas   Co.  V.   San   Francisco,   9  Cal.  453;  within  the  scope  of  municipal  powers,  see 

Commissioners  r.   Duckett,  20   Md.  408 ;  United  States  v.  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Rail- 

Weet  V.  Brockport,   16  N.  Y.  101,  note;  road  Co.,  17  Wall.   332,  1872;  post,  sec. 

Louisville  v.  University  of  Louisville,  15  775,  ch.  xxiii,  ei  seq. 


90  MUNICir.\JL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

supreme  dominion  of  the  legislature  than  the  more  populous  one, 
reipiiring  for  its  proper  government  organs  and  powers  peculiar 
to  itself.  Arc  the  latter,  thevehvc,  private?  If  so,  it  must  be  in 
a  qualified  and  peeidiar  sense. ^  Contracts  in  favor  of  the  creditor 
are  protected  by  the  national  constitution ;  but  as  against  a  state, 
what  private  powers  and  rights  can  a  municipal  corporation  be 
said  to  have,  when  it  is  within  the  power  Of  the  state,  which 
brea tiled  into  it  the  breath  of  life,  utterly  to  extinguish  its  exist- 
ence at  pleasure  ?  The  distinction  originated  with  the  courts,  to 
promote  justice  and  to  escape  technical  difficulties  in  order  to 
hold  such  corporations  liable  to  private  actions.^ 

§  GS.  (40)  It  is,  perhaps,  at  present,  impossible  to  state,  with 
confidence,  what  limitations  exist  upon  the  power  of  the  legislature 
over  municipal  corporations,  as  ordinarily  constituted.  It  is 
practicable  only  to  refer  to  the  leading  cases  upon  the  subject, 
and  attempt  to  extract  the  principles  upon  which  they  rest. 

It  is  decided  that  a  grant  by  the  legislature  of  the  state  to  a 
town,  of  the  right  to  establish  a  ferry^  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a 
contract,  hence  the  grant  is  repealable,  and  the  corporation  may 
constitutionally  be  deprived  of  the  franchise.'^  So  an  act  confer- 
ring upon  a  municipal  corporation  a  public  trusty  and  the  title  to 

1  Ante,  sees.  25,  26.  ture  may  compel  a  municipal  corporation 
-  On  this  subject,  the  opinion  of  to  submit  to  arbitration  claims  as  to  wliicii 
Chief  Justice  Denio,  in  Darlington  v.  private  corporations  and  natural  persons 
Maj-or,  etc.,  31  N.  Y.  164,  1805,  may  be  would  be  entitled  by  the  constitution  to  a 
read  with  profit.  The  chief  justice  trial  by  jur3'.  The  opposite  view  is  no- 
thcre  asserts  the  unlimited  power  of  the  where  more  ably  presented  than  by  Camp- 
legislature  over  municipal  corporations  bell,  C.  J.,  in  the  People  v.  Hurlbut,  24 
and  their  property.  He  maintains  that  Mich.  44, 1871 ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103,  and 
such  corporations  are  altogether  pub-  by  Cooley,  J.,  in  People  v.  Detroit,  28 
lie,  and  all  their  rights  and  powers  Mich.  228, 1873 ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202 ; 
public  in  their  nature,  and  that  their  Gray  v.  Brooklyn,  10  Abb.  Pr.  Rep.  N. 
property,  tliough  held  for  income  or  sale,  S.  186;  post,  ch.  xxiii.  See  as  to  jury, 
and  unconnected  with  any  use  for  the  Dunsmore's  Appeal,  52  Pa.  St.  374. 
purposes  of  the  municipal  government,  is  Consult  on  this  subject :  Plimpton  v.  Som- 
under  the  control  of  tlie  legislature,  and  erset,  33  Vt.  283,  1860.  See  also  chap- 
not  within  tlie  provisions  of  the  constitu-  ters  on  Municipal  Courts,  Property,  and 
tion  protecting  private  property.  He  denies  Ordinances,  pout. 

the  correctness  of  the  distinction  taken  s  ]5ast    Hartford    v.    Hartford   Bridge 

in  Bailey  y.  the  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  Co.,  10  How.  511,  1850;  s.   c.  IG  Conn. 

3  Hill,  531,  and  other  cases,  between  the  149;  17  lb.   79;  Trustees  v.  Tatman,  13 

public  and  private  functions  of  city  gov-  111.  30 ;  Police  Jury  v.   Shreveport,  5  La. 

ernments,  and  maintains  that,  as  respects  An.  661,  1850;  Darlington  v.  Mayor,  31 

the  slate,  all  their  powers   and  functions  N.  Y.  164,  202,  203,  per  Denio,  C.  J. 
are  pul>lic.     He  affirms  that  the  legisla- 


§  68.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTKOL.  91 

land  as  ancillary  to  its  execution,  is  not  a  contract,  but  may  be 
repealed  at  the  will  of  the  legislature.^  But  suppose  the  legis- 
lature had  granted  in  fee  to  the  corporation  a  tract  of  land  within 
its  limits,  is  such  a  grant,  or  an  ordinary  grant  of  land  to  the 
corporation  from  others,  a  contract  as  respects  the  state,  and  pro- 
tected by  the  constitution  from  legislative  invasion,  the  same  as 
if  the  grant  had  been  made  to,  or  the  property  acquired  by,  an 
individual  or  private  corporation?  The  question  thus  stated  has 
never  arisen  directly  for  adjudication  in  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States;  but,  in  the  celebrated  Dartmouth  College 
Case,  two  of  the  judges  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  legislative 
control  over  public  and  municipal  corporations  was  not  so  tran- 
scendent and  absolute  as  to  extend  to  an  arbitrary  divestiture  of 
its  private  property  and  the  destruction  of  rights  of  a  private  na- 
ture. On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  opinion  of  a  distinguished  and 
able  judge  in  New  York,  in  a  case  already  mentioned,  that  the 
authority  of  the  legislature  over  the  powers,  rights,  and  property 
of  municipal  and  public  corporations,  is,  as  respects  the  corpora- 
tions, quite  without  limit.^  The  weight  of  opinion  seems  to  be 
in  favor  of  the  doctrine  that  there  may  be,  in  such  corporations, 
rights  under  contracts  and  grants  which  are  beyond  destruction 
by  the  legislature,  though  not  beyond  legitimate  legislative  au- 
thority and  control ;  ^  but  in  the  present  state  of  the  decisions  the 
subject  cannot  be  fairly  said  to  be  settled. 

1  People  V.  Vanderbilt,  26  N.  Y.  287,  and  might  resume  or  change  the  purposes 

1863;  pusl,  sec.   114.     Where  an  act  m-  for  wliich  it  was  originally  designed  to 

corporating  a  city  donated  lands  included  be  expended,  or  provide  for  the  payment 

therein,  for  the  erection  of  certain  public  by  an  old  county,  which  had  received, 

buildings,  and  the   residue  to  be  applied  but  not  expended,  its  proportion  of  such 

to  education,  and  the  charter  was  after-  fund,  to  a  new  county  erected  out  of  the 

wards  repealed,  it  was  held  that  until  tiie  old  county  of  an   equitable   share  of  the 

trust  had  been  executed  it  was  competent  fund.       Richland    County    v.   Lawrence 

for  the  legislature  to  change  or  abolish  it,  County,  12  111.  1,  1850,  distinguished  from 

and  that  the  repeal  of  the  charter  extin-  Hampshire  v.  Franklin,  16  Mass.  76.    Post, 

guished  tlie  trusts,  they  being  public,  un-  ch.  viii. 

executed,  and  conditional.     Bass  v.  Font-  2  JJenio,  C.  J.,  in  Darlington  v.  New 

leroy,   11    Tex.  698-708,  1854.      Where  York,  31  N.  Y.  164,  1865. 

an  act  of  tlie  legislature,  instead  of  grant-  ^  \n   Richland    County   v.   Lawrence 

ing  certain  moneys  received  by  the  state  County,  12  111.  1,  1850,  while  the  plenary 

for  the  purposes  of  internal  improvements  power  of  the  legislature  over  tlie  public, 

to  certain  counties  absolutely,  simply  ap-  civil,  or  political  rights  of  public  corpo- 

propriated  it  to  bp  draivn  by  such  counties  rations  was  asserted  and  declared,  still  it 

and  expended   by  them   in  the  improve-  was  admitted  by  tlie  very  able  and  cau- 

ment  of  roads,  etc.,  it  was  held  that  before  tious   judge  who   delivered  the  opinion, 

its  expenditure  by  the  counties  the  legis-  that   "  the   state   may   make   a   contract 

lature  had  entire  control  over  the  fund,  with,  or  a  grant  to,  a  public    municipal 


02 


JIUNICIPAL  COUrORATIONS. 


[CH.  IV. 


§  60.    (41)  It   is   an   interesting  inquiry,  which  has  not  yet 
arisen  for  judgment,  Avhether  the  legislature  of  the  state  has  the 


corporiUion  wliicli  it  could  not  subse- 
qviLMitly  resumo ;  but  in  such  case  tlic 
corporation  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  private 
company."  l\r  Tntiidnill,  J.  Sangamon 
Co.  c.  Springfield,  03  111.  (i6,  1872.  See 
West.  Sav.  Fund  Society  v.  Philadelphia, 
31  I'a.  St.  175;  lb.  185. 

"But  wlule  the  legislative  power  (to 
enlarge,  restraui,  or  even  destroy  munici- 
pal corporations,  as  the  public  interest 
may  re<iuire)  may  be  exercised  over  pub- 
lic anil  numicipal  corporations,  it  has  as 
imiformly  been  held  that  towns,  and  other 
public  corporations,  may  have  private  rights 
and  interests  vested  in  them  under  their  char- 
ter ;  and  as  to  those  rights,  they  are  to  be  re- 
c/arded  and  jirolected  the  same  as  if  they 
were  the  rights  and  interests  of  individuals  or 
of  jtrivale  'corporations,  and  grants  of  prop- 
erty in  trust  for  other  than  corporate  and 
numicipal  use  (that  is,  as  we  understand, 
for  private,  as  distinguished  from  public, 
purposes)  are  no  more  the  subject  of 
legislative  control  than  are  the  private 
and  vested  rights  of  individuals."  Per 
Isham,  J.,  arguendo,  in  Montpelier  v.  East 
Montpelier,  29  Vt.  (3  Wms.)  12,  I'J,  1856; 
8.  c.  27  lb.  704. 

Legislative  grants  of  property  to  private, 
and  it  seems,  also,  to  public  and  municipal 
corporations,  cannot  be  repealed  so  as  to  divest 
the  rights  of  the  grantees.  Town  of  Pawlet 
V.  Clark,  9  Cranch  (U.  S.),  292,  336,  1815, 
per  Story,  J.,  obiter ;  Terret  v.  Taylor,  lb. 
43,  52.  In  this  last  case,  Mr.  Justice 
Story  remarks,  arguendo :  "  In  respect, 
also,  to  public  corporations,  which  exist 
only  for  public  purposes,  such  as  counties, 
towns,  cities,  etc.,  the  legislature  may, 
under  proper  limitations,  have  a  right  to 
change,  modify,  enlarge,  or  restrain  them, 
securing,  however,  the  property,  for  the  uses 
of  those  for  whom  and  at  whose  expense 
it  was  originally  purchased."  Followed 
by  Chancellor  Kent,  2  Com.  305 ;  by  Mr. 
Justice  Washington,  Dartmouth  College 
Case,  4  Wheat.  518,  663.  In  the  last 
case,  Mr.  Justice  Story  said:  "But  it  will 
hardly  be  contended,  that  even  in  respect 
to  such  [public]  corporations,  the  legisla- 
tive power  is  so  transcendent  that  it  may, 
at  its  will,  take  away  the  private  property 
of  the  corporation,  or  change  the  uses  of 


its  private  funds  acquired  under  the  pub- 
lic faith,"  4  Wheat.  518,  004,  obiter. 
And  such  is  Mr.  Justice  Cooley's  view  in 
his  valuable  treatise.  Constitutional  Lim- 
itations, 2.j8.  He  reiterates  it  in  his 
learned  ojjinion  in  People  v.  Ilurlbut,  24 
Mich.  44;  s.  c.  6  Am.  Law  Rev.  376, 
1871 ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  103,  and  also  his 
elaborate  judgment  in  the  important  case 
of  the  People  v.  Detroit,  28  Mich.  228, 
1873  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.  In  Grogan 
V.  San  Francisco,  18  Cal.  590,  Mr.  Chief 
Justice  Field,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  California,  takes  the 
ground  that  the  real  estate  or  private  prop- 
ertj^  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  protected 
by  the  clause  in  the  national  constitution 
securing  tlie  inviolability  of  contracts ; 
that  all  legislative  authority  over  it  must 
be  exercised  in  subordination  to  this 
guaranty,  and  that  it  is  subject  to  legis- 
lative control  to  the  same  extent,  but  no 
greater  extent,  than  all  other  property  in 
the  state.  But  in  Darlington  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  New  York,  31  N.  Y.  164,  193,  205, 
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Denio  observes:  "Let 
us  suppose  the  city  to  be  the  owner  of  a 
parcel  of  land  not  adapted  to  any  muni- 
cipal use,  but  valuable  only  for  sale  to 
private  persons  for  building  purposes,  or 
the  like;  no  one,  I  think,  can  doubt  but 
what  it  would  be  competent  for  the  legis- 
lature to  direct  it  to  be  sold,  and  the  pro- 
ceeds devoted  to  some  municipal  or  other 
public  purpose,  within  the  city,  as  a  court- 
house, a  hospital,  or  the  like It  is 

unnecessary  to  say  whether  the  legisla- 
tive jurisdiction  would  extend  to  divert- 
ing the  city  property  to  other  public  use 
than  such  as  concerns  the  city  and  its 
inhabitants."  And  he  considers  the  ex- 
pression of  Chancellor  Kent  (2  Com.  305) 
and  of  Mr.  Justice  Story,  that  where  a 
municipal  corporation  is  empowered  to 
have  and  to  hold  private  property,  such 
property  is  invested  with  the  security  of 
other  private  rights,  to  mean  only  that 
it  possesses  such  rights  against  wrong- 
doers, and  not  that  it  is  exempt  from 
legislative  control.     31  N.  Y.  164,  196. 

In  two  cases  arising  out  of  the  Tweed 
frauds  in  New  York,  the  conclusion  was 
reached  that,  as  between  the  state  and 


§  69.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL.  93 

right,  in  virtue  of  its  control  over  municipal  corporations,  to  annul 
or  interfere  with  contracts  between  two  municipalities.  If  a 
municipal  corporation,  however,  becomes  indebted,  the  rights  of 
the  creditors  cannot,  it  is  clear,  be  impaired  by  any  subsequent 
legislative  enactment.^  Thus,  where  an  act  of  the  legislature  was 
passed  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  a  municipal 
corporation  and  authorizing  the  creation  of  a  sinking  fund,  to  be 
deposited  and  applied  in  a  particular  manner,  and  where  credi- 
tors acting  thereunder  have  surrendered  the  evidences  of  their 
debts  and  received  new  bonds,  for  the  payment  of  which  the 
fund  stands  pledged  by  the  act,  it  is  not  competent  —  because 
it  impairs  the  obligation  of  contracts  —  for  a  subsequent  legisla- 
ture, in  providing  for  the  liquidation  of  the  corporate  debts,  to 
give  a  different  destination  to  the  sinking  fund  by  changing  the 
depository  of  the  fund.^ 

So  where  the  effect  of  an  act  of  the  legislature  authorizing  a  city 
to  fund  its  floating  debt  was,  in  substance,  a  pledge  to  those 
who  surrendered  their  claims  and  received  new  obligations, 
of  a  portion  of  its  revenues  and  property,  to  be  applied  to 
the  payment  of  its  obligations  in  a  specified  mode,  this,  if 
acted  on,  constitutes  a  contract  which  cannot  be  materially 
altered,  either  by  the  municipality  or  the  legislature,  without 

the  municipal  corporation,  the  fun<ls  of  ^  Van  Hoffman  i'.  Quincy,  4  Wall, 
the  corporation  owned  and  held  for  the  535,  1866 ;  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  lb.  575 ; 
public  uses  of  the  corporation  are  dis-  Lee  County  y.  Kogers,  7 /6.  185;  Furman 
tinctively  and  exclusively  the  property  y.  Nichol,  8 /6.  44;  Woodruff  y.  Trapnall, 
of  the  corporation ;  and  the  opinion  was  10  How.  206 ;  Bronson  v.  Kinsie,  1  lb. 
expressed  arguendo  that  such  funds  were  316  ;  Lansing  v.  County  Treasurer,  1 
invested  with  the  security  of  other  private  Dillon  Cir.  C.  R.  522;  Muscatine  r.  Rail- 
property,  subject  to  the  plenary  power  of  road  Co.,  [b.  536;  State  v.  Milwaukee,  25 
the  legislature,  as  declared  in  Darlington  Wis.  122 ;  Brooklyn  Park  Commrs.  v. 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  supra,  to  direct  their  appro-  Armstrong,  45  N.  Y.  234,  1871 ;  Soutter 
priation  to  any  use  or  purpose  for  the  v.  Madison  (act  forbidding  city  to  levy 
benefit  of  the  municipality  or  its  inliabi-  taxes  to  pay  judgments  held  void),  15 
tants.  People  v.  Ingersoll,  58  N.  Y.  1,  Wis.  30 ;  Western  Savings  Fund  Society 
1874  ;  People  v.  Fields,  58  N.  Y.  491,  v.  Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  175,  185 ;  San 
1874.  The  exact  point,  however,  which  Francisco  v.  Canavan,  42  Cal.  541,  1872; 
was  adjudged  in  these  cases  is  that,  unless  Goodale  i'.  Fennell,  27  Ohio  St.  426, 1875; 
expressly  given  by  statute,  an  action  could  s.  c.  22  Am.  Rep.  321.  Further,  see 
not  be  maintained  in  the  name  of  the  chapter  on  Contracts, /ws^,  sec.  511,  e<  seg'. 
state  by  the  attorney-general,  to  recover  "  Liquidators  v.  Municipality,  6  La. 
a  judgment  for  moneys  of  the  county  and  An.  21,  1851.  As  to  sinking  fimd,  see 
city  of  New  York,  fraudulently  taken  by  Terry  v.  Bank,  18  Wis.  87  ;  post,  chapter 
the  defendants,  as  such  right  of  action  on  Charters.  Fraudulent  transfers  of 
wasexclusively  in  the  municipality  winch  property  by  municipal  corporations, 
was  the  owner  of  moneys  illegally  appro-  Smith  v.  Morse,  2  Cal.  524. 
priated.     Post,  chap.  xxii. 


94  JITJNICIPAL   COEPOEATIONS.  [CII.  IV. 

the  sanction  of  the  creditors  ;  but  it  was  held  that  a  siihscquent 
act,  simply  changing  the  mode  of  levying  taxes,  and  which  did 
not  and  could  not  affect  the  result  or  impair  the  security  of  the 
creditors,  was  not  invalid.^ 

So,  also,  where  the  legislature  authorized  an  indebted  city  to 
issue  bonds  to  a  specified  amount,  in  payment  of  a  like  amount 
of  its  outstanding  bonds,  and  among  other  provisions,  plainly  in- 
tended to  induce  creditors  to  make  the  exchange,  was  one  pro- 
hibiting the  city  from  thereafter  issuing  its  bonds,  "  except  in 
payment  of  its  bonded  debt,"  and  this  authority  having  been 
acted  on,  and  the  arrangement  accepted  by  the  creditors,  and 
new  bonds  issued,  it  was  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wis- 
consin that  the  prohibition  against  the  issue  of  further  bonds 
constituted,  in  favor  of  the  holders  of  the  new  bonds,  a  contract, 
which  the  legislature  could  not  impair  by  a  subsequent  enact- 
ment, authorizing  the  municipality  to  issue  additional  bonds  for 
other  purposes.^ 

§  70.  (42)  But  authority  to  a  city  to  borrow  money,  and  to  tax 
all  the  property  therein  to  pay  the  debt  thus  incurred,  does  not 
necessarily  deprive  the  state  of  the  power  to  modify  taxation  so  as 
to  exempt  portions  of  the  property,  if  the  rights  of  creditors  be  not 
thereby  impaired.^     So  authority  given  in  a  railroad  charter  to  a 

1  People  V.  Bond,  10  Cal.  563,  1858.  Brown  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  London,  9  Com. 
And  see  People  v.  Wood,  7  Cal.  579,  B.  (N.  S.)  726,  1861,  respecting  the  lia- 
1857  ;  Brooklyn  Park  Comrars.  v.  Arm-  bility  of  London  on  bonds  payable  out  of 
strong,  45  N.  Y.  234,  1871.  tolls  and  duties  levied  on  vessels  navigat- 

2  Smith  V.  Appleton,  19  Wis.  468,  ing  the  Thames.  In  this  country,  how- 
1805.  Text  cited  and  approved.  Mount  ever,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  100  U.  S.  514.  legislative  power,  as  respects  creditors. 
Extent  of  legislative  power  over  vmnid-  is  restrained  by  the  provision  of  the  Fed- 
pal  indebtedness  as  against  the  municipal-  eral  Constitution  that  no  state  sliall  pass 
ity,  see  City  v.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  477  ;  and  any  act  impairing  the  obligation  of 
read,  in  connection  therewith,  Campbell  contracts. 

V.  Kenosha,  5  Wall.  194,  in  effect  over-  ^  Oilman  v.  Sheboygan,  2  Black,  510, 

ruling  the  practical  application  of  Foster  1862;  Muscatine  y.  Railroad  Co.,  1  Dil- 

V.    Kenosha,  12    Wis.    616,    1860;    post,  Ion  C.    C.    536;    Goodale  v.   Fennell,  27 

chapters    on    Charters    and     Contracts.  Ohio  St.  420,  1875;    s.  c.  22  Am.  Rep. 

Youngs  V.  Hall,  9  Nev.  212.  321 :  holding  a  subsequent  act  restricting 

W/ien  the  performance  of  the  oblifintion  of  power  of  assessment  inoperative  against 

a  puhlic  or  municipal  corporation   has  been  a  contractor  who  had  agreed  to  take  his 

rendered  impossible  bij  act  of  the  law,  as,  for  payment  in  assessments, 

example,  by  a   subsequent   statute,   the  As  against  a  municipal  corporation,  the 

obligation  is  discharged,  and  no  action  legislature  maji,  it  has   been   recentl}'  de- 

against  the  corporation  will  lie  thereon,  cided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri, 

This  principle    is    well    exemplified    in  repeal  its  powers  to  levy  and  collect  wharfage, 


■1-] 


EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL. 


95 


county  to  take  stock  and  issue  bonds  therefor,  if  a  majority  of  the 
voters  so  determine,  is  not  a  contract,  but  a  mere  authority  con- 
ferred upon  the  county  in  its  public  capacity,  and  may  be  re- 
pealed after  a  vote  at  any  time  before  the  subscription  has  been 
made  ^  or  agreed  to  be  made.^ 

§  71.  (43)  The  legislature,  as  the  trustee  for  the  general  pub- 
lic, has  full  control  over  the  puhlie  property  and  the  subordinate 
rights  of  municipal  corporations.  Accordingly,  it  may  authorize 
a  railroad  company  to  occupy  the  streets  in  a  city  without  its  con- 
sent and  without  payment ;  but  it  could  not,  probably,  authorize 
the  taking  of  the  private  property  of  a  city  by  a  railroad  company, 
except  for  public  purposes,  and  upon  compensation  being  made.^ 


although  the  proceeds  of  the  public 
•wharf  had  been  pledged  by  the  corpora- 
tion, under  legislative  authority,  as  a  fund 
in  connection  with  other  revenues  for  the 
payment  of  bonds  issued  for  money  bor- 
rowed by  the  corporation  to  maintain 
and  improve  the  wharf.  After  the  issue 
of  such  bonds,  which  were  outstanding, 
and  after  the  passage  of  a  subsequent 
act  repealing  all  acts  which  authorized 
the  municipality  to  collect  wharfage,  it 
sued  the  defendant  for  refusing  to  pay 
wharfage,  on  the  ground  that  the  repeal- 
ing act  was  unconstitutional ;  but  the 
Supreme  Court,  assimilating  the  case  to 
tliat  of  Oilman  v.  Sheboygan,  2  Black, 
510,  and  distinguishing  it  from  Van  Hoff- 
man V.  Quincy,  4  Wall.  535,  held  that  the 
city  could  not  recover.  The  language  of 
the  judge  delivering  the  opinion  would 
seem  to  imply  that  the  repealing  act 
would  not  be  invalid  as  to  creditors  un- 
less other  funds  should  prove  insuffi- 
cient; but  it  should  be  observed  that  this 
was  not  a  point  adjudged  in  the  case.  St. 
Louis  V.  Shields,  52  Mo.  351,  1873. 

1  Aspinwall  v.  County  of  Jo  Daviess, 
22  How.  364,  1859.  When  such  repeal 
is  effectual,  see  People  v.  Coon,  25  Cal. 
635 ;  Union  Pacific  Railroad  Co.  v.  Davis 
County,  0  Kan.  256, 1870 ;  compare  Town 
of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Sav.  Bank,  92 
U.  S.  625;  infra,  {ih  on  Contracts.  In  the 
State  V.  Meller,  67  Mo.  G04,  it  was  held 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  state  that 
while  municipal  corporations  cannot  as 
between  the  legislature  and  themselves 
place  their  privileges   on  tlie  ground  of 


contract,  yet  where  the  state  creates  a 
municipal  corporation,  and  through  it  con- 
tracts with  a  third  person,  whereby  rights 
become  vested  in  the  latter,  it  is  beyond 
the  power  of  the  state  to  impair  the  obli- 
gations of  the  contract  when  the  contract 
to  subscribe  for  stock  is  completed.  C.  & 
0.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Barren  Co.,  10  Bush  (Ky.), 
604,  1874  ;  Shelby  Co.  v.  Cumberland  & 
C.  R.  R.  Co.,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  300. 

In  California  it  is  held  that  while  the 
legislature  cannot  require  the  creditors  of  a 
coiwtfj  to  surrender  their  evidences  of  in- 
debtedness, and  accept  new  ones  different 
in  terms  from  the  old,  it  may  refuse  to 
provide  funds  to  pay  any  portion  of  the 
old  indebtedness,  unless  the  creditors 
will  accept  new  evidences  in  place  of  the 
old,  and  for  a  less  sum,  and  that  there  is 
no  constitutional  objection  to  a  law 
which  provides  a  county  fund,  out  of 
which  the  holders  of  county  indebtedness 
can  obtain  fifty  per  cent  of  the  nominal 
value  of  their  demands,  whenever  they 
may  choose  to  accept  the  same.  People 
V.  Morse,  43  Cal.  534, 1872. 

'^  Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth 
Sav.  Bank,  92  U.  S.  625. 

8  Darlington  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  31  N.  Y. 
164,  1865;  Reynolds  v.  Stark  County, 
5  Ohio,  204;  5^  Ohio  St.  113;  Clinton 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  24  Iowa,  455,  1868; 
Louisville  v.  University  of  Louisville,  15 
B.  Mon.  642,  1855.  See  further,  chap- 
ters on  Streets  and  on  Dedication,  post ; 
People  V.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188  ;  Mercer 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  36  Pa.  St.  99  ;  Mayor, 
etc.    V.  Hopkins,  13  La.  An.  326;  New 


96 


MUNICIPAL   COHrOUATIONS. 


[ClI.  IV. 


It  may  authorize  corjiorations  to  make  contracts,  but  it  is,  per- 
haps, more  doubtful  how  far  it  can  compulsorily  make,  in  the 
legal  sense  of  the  word,  contracts  for  them,  smce  the  essence  of 
a  contract  consists  in  the  agreement  of  the  parties.  And  on  this 
view  it  has  been  held,  in  Vermont,  that  the  legislature  cannot 
u'ithout  the  consent  of  a  municipal  corporation,  appoint  an  agent  for 
it,  and  authorize  him,  as  such  agent,  to  purchase  property  and 
bind  the  corporation  to  pay  for  it.^  So  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illi- 
nois has  recently  decided  that  the  legislature,  under  peculiar 
provisions  in  the  constitution  of  that  state,  has  no  power  to  com- 
pel a  city  to  incur  a  debt  against  its  will.^ 


Orleans,  etc.  Kailroad  Co.  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 17  ;  lb.  478,  1874  ;  Reading  r.  Com- 
monwealth, 11  Pa.  St.  196;  jmt,  sec.  701. 
1  Atkins  V.  Kantlolpli,  31  Vt.  226, 
1858.  Tlie  case  was  this:  Plaintiff  sued 
the  town  of  Kandolpli  in  assumpsit  for 
liquor  sold  to  an  "agent"  appointed  by 
tlie  county  commissioners  to  purchase 
liquors  (under  the  act  of  1852,  "  to  pre- 
vent the  traffic  in  intoxicating  liquors"), 
at  the  expense  of  the  town  for  which  he 
was  appointed.  The  town  never  gave 
any  assent,  express  or  implied,  to  this 
appointment;  nor  did  it  receive  any  bene- 
fit from  tlie  sale  of  the  liquors,  or  have 
any  knowledge  tliat  the  agent  was  pur- 
chasing liquors  on  its  credit.  The  court 
held  the  act  of  1852  unconstitutional,  and 
that  the  plaintiffs  could  not  recover. 
Tlie  decision  was  put  mainlj'^  upon  the 
ground  that  tlie  legislature  could  not 
authorize  a  binding  contract  to  be  made 
creating  a  debt  against  a  public  corpora- 
tion without  its  consent.  Bennett,  J.,  dis- 
sented, not  on  tlie  ground  that  the  corpo- 
ration was  bound  by  force  of  any  contract, 
but  because  tlie  act  of  1852  imposed  a 
duty  upon  the  towns,  as  minilcipal  corpora- 
tions, to  pay  for  the  liquors,  and  this  for 
public  purposes,  and  to  carry  out  a  police 
regulation.  Cliief  Justice  Denio  criticises 
this  case,  and  considers  it  as  "  standing 
upon  no  principle."  Darlington  i-.  Mayor, 
etc.  of  New  York,  31  N.  Y.  104,  205, 
1865.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  approved 
by  Lyon,  J.,  in  State  v.  Tappan,  29  Wis. 
664,  1872;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  662,  re- 
ferred to  infra,  sec.  75  and  note.  And  see 
Pliiladelpliia  v.  Field,  58  Pa.  St.  320, 
1808  ;  poit  sec.  831,  note. 


2  Cairo  &  St.  Louis  R.  R.  Co.  v.  City 
of  Sparta,  77  111.  505,  1875 ;  People  /^. 
Chicago  (Lincoln  Park  Case),  51  111.  17, 
1869;  Peojile  v.  Salomon  (South  Park 
Case),  lb.  37;  Howard  v.  Drainage  Com- 
pany, 7i.  130.  Though  the  reasoning  of  the 
court  is  general,  yet  the  point  decided  — 
that  tlie  city  could  not  be  compelled  to 
contract  a  debt  against  its  consent,  was 
influenced  by,  if  it  does  not  rest  upon  —  a 
constitutional  provision  (art.  ix.  sec.  5), 
whicli  was  construed  to  restrict  the  legis- 
lature from  granting  the  riglit  of  loc.'al  or 
corporate  taxation  to  any  other  than  the 
corporate  authorities  of  the  municipality 
or  district  to  be  taxed.  In  Illinois  an  act 
authorizing  police  commissioners  to  issue 
certificates  of  indebtedness  without  its 
consent  is  unconstitutional.  People  v. 
County,  55  III.  33;  ante,  sec.  60.  Com- 
pare Darlington  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  31  N.  Y.  164.  See  Dunnovan 
V.  Green,  57  111.  63;  Linton  v.  Ashbury, 
41  Cal.  625,  1871.  In  California  it  is 
held  that  the  legislature  may  empower 
the  authorities  of  a  city  to  purchase  an 
agricultural  park,  and  to  issue  its  bonds 
in  payment  therefor,  and  to  levy  a  tax 
for  their  payment.  Sonoma  County  Bank 
V.  Fairbanks,  52  Cal.  196.  The  legisla- 
ture, in  providing  for  the  improvement 
of  the  streets  of  a  city,  may  adopt  one 
mode  for  a  part  of  the  streets,  and  a  dif- 
ferent mode  for  the  remainder,  and  may 
authorize  the  l^vy  of  an  assessment  per 
front  foot  to  pay  for  either  mode  of  im- 
provement. Oakland  Paving  Co.  v.  Rier, 
52  Cal.  270. 

The  general  propositions  in  the  text  as 
to  the  restrictions  on  legislative  power 


§  73.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL.  97 

§  72.  And  quite  recently  the  Supreme  Court  of  Michigan, 
in  a  case  arising  under  a  statute  relating  to  a  public  park  for  the 
city  of  Detroit,  which  created  a  Board  of  Park  Commissioners  for 
the  city,  the  act  naming  the  commissioners  and  investing  them 
with  power  to  acquire  by  purchase  the  necessary  lands,  at  a  cost 
not  exceeding  $300,000,  and  imperatively  requiring  the  City 
Council,  without  its  assent  to  the  appointment  of  the  commis- 
sioners or  to  the  purchase  of  the  lands  by  them  selected,  to  pro- 
vide the  money  to  pay  therefor  by  the  issue  and  sale  of  the  bonds 
of  the  city,  held  that  the  city  could  not  be  compelled,  against  the 
will  of  the  council,  to  issue  its  bonds  ;  and  the  decision  was 
placed  on  the  ground  that  a  park  was  purely  a  matter  of  local,  as 
distinguished  from  state,  concern,  and  that  it  was  beyond  legisla- 
tive competency  to  coerce  a  municipal  corporation  to  contract  a 
debt  for  local  purposes  without  its  consent.^ 

§  73.  The  basis  upon  which  the  judgment  in  the  Detroit  Park 
Case  just  mentioned,  rests,  as  appears  by  the  opinion  of  the  court 
delivered  by  Cooley,  J.,  is  that  a  municipal  corporation  like  that 
of  Detroit  will  be  found  to  be  in  part  a  mere  public  agency  of 
the  state  and  in  part  possessed  of  peculiar  and  local  franchises 
and  rights  which  appertain  to  it  as  legal  personality  for  its  private 
(as  distinguished  from  the  public)  advantage.  It  is  admitted 
that  "  in  all  matters  of  general  concern  there  is  no  local  right  to 
act  independently  of  the  state,  ....  and  the  state  may  exercise 
compulsory  authority,  and  enforce  the  performance  of  local  duties, 
either  by  employing  local  officers  for  the  purpose,  or  through 

agents  or  officers  of  its  own  appointment The  proposition 

which  asserts  the  amplitude  of  legislative  control  over  municipal 
corporations,  when  confined,  as  it  should  be,  to  such  corporations 

over  municipal  corporations  will  be  found  v.  Aberdeen,    13  Sm.   &   Mar.  21   Miss. 

to  be  sustained  by  the  following  cases :  64-5 ;    Brunswick    v.    Litchfield,    2    Me. 

Atkins  V.    Randolph,    31   Vt.  226,   18-58;  (2  Greenl.)  28,  32. 

White  V.  Fuller,  39  Vt.  193 ;  Louisville  v.  i  People  ex  rel.  Park  Commrs.  v. 
The  University,  15B.  Mon.  642;  Western  Common  Council  of  Detroit  (mandamus 
Savings  Fund  Society  v.  Philadelphia,  31  to  compel  the  council  to  raise  money  to 
Pa.  St.  17.5,  185;  Montpelier  v.  East  pay  for  lands  for  the  park),  28  Mich. 
Montpelier,  20  Vt.  12  ;  Poultney  y.  Wells,  228,1873;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  202.  The 
1  Aik.  (Vt.)  180;  Trustees  v.  Winston,  5  city's  ownership  of  ^os  ivorls'is  in  its  local 
Stew.  &  Port.  (Ala.)  17  ;  Norris  v.  Trus-  or  private,  as  distinguished  from  its  pub- 
tees  Abingdon  Academy,  7  Gill  &  Johns.  lie  character.  Western  Sav.  Fund  Soc.  v. 
(Md.)  7;  Regents  of  University  v.  Wil-  Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  183. 
liams,  9  Ih.  305 ;  Trustees  of  Academy 
VOL.  I.                         7 


98  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

as  at^encies  of  the  state  in  its  government,  is  entirely  sound. 
They  are  not  created  exclusively  for  that  purpose,  but  have 
other  objects  and  purposes  peculiarly  local  and  in  which  the 
state  at  large,  except  in  conferring  the  power  and  regulating  its 
exorcise,  is  legally  no  more  concerned  than  it  is  in  the  individual 
and  private  concerns  of  its  several  citizens.  Indeed,  it  would 
be  easv  to  show  that  it  is  not  from  the  standpoint  of  state  inter- 
est, but  from  that  of  local  interest,  that  the  necessity  of  incor- 
porating cities  and  villages  most  distinctly  appears.  State  duties 
of  a  local  nature  can  for  the  most  part  be  very  well  performed 
through  the  usual  township  and  county  organizations.  It  is  be- 
cause, where  an  urban  population  is  collected,  many  things  are 
necessary  for  their  comfort  and  protection,  which  are  not  needed 
in  the  country,  that  the  state  is  then  called  upon  to  confer  larger 
powers  and  to  make  the  locality  a  subordinate  commonwealth. 
....  It  is  a  fundamental  principle  in  this  state,  recognized  and 
perpetuated  by  express  provision  of  the  constitution,  that  the 
people  of  every  hamlet,  town,  and  city  of  the  state  are  entitled 
to  the  benefits  of  local  self-government.  But  authority  in  the 
legislature  to  determine  what  shall  be  the  extent  of  the  capacity 
in  a  city  to  acquire  and  hold  property  is  not  equivalent  to  and 
does  not  contain  within  itself  authority  to  deprive  the  city  of 
property  actually  acquired  by  legislative  permission.  As  to 
property  it  thus  holds  for  its  own  private  purposes,  a  city  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  constituent  in  state  government,  and  is  entitled 
to  the  like  protection  in  its  property  rights  as  any  natural  person 
who  is  also  a  constituent.  The  right  of  the  state  is  a  right  of 
regulation,  not  of  appropriation.  It  cannot  be  deprived  of  such 
property  without  due  process  of  law.  And  when  a  local  con- 
venience or  need  is  to  be  supplied  in  which  the  people  of  the 
state  at  large,  or  any  portion  thereof  outside  the  city  limits,  are 
not  concerned,  the  state  can  no  more  by  process  of  taxation  take 
from  the  individual  citizens  the  money  to  purchase  it,  than  they 
could,  if  it  had  been  procured,  appropriate  it  to  the  state  use. 
....  From  the  very  dawn  of  our  liberties  the  principle  most  un- 
questionable of  all  has  been  this  :  that  the  people  shall  vote  the 
taxes  they  are  to  pay,  or  be  permitted  to  choose  representatives 
for  the  purpose." 

The  judgment  of  this  able  court  in  the  Detroit  Park  Case  and 
the  argument  of  the  eminent  judge  in  the  opinion  by  which  it  is 


§  74.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL.  99 

supported  are  in  accordance  with  the  weight  of  judicial  ex- 
pression on  the  subject.  There  are  difficulties  attending  the  as- 
sertion of  unlimited  legislative  power  over  municipalities,  and 
difficulties,  also,  in  assigning  limits  to  that  power.  And  there 
seems  to  us,  in  view  of  the  effect  of  the  Dartmouth  College  Case, 
serious  objections  to  applying  its  principle  in  any  degree  to  munici- 
pal corporations.  The  legislative  power  of  the  state  should  be  at 
all  times  comprehensive  enough  and  penetrating  enough  to  en- 
force all  duties  and  to  redress  all  evils.  If  it  is  not,  abuses  will 
inevitably  arise  which  nothing  but  legislative  surgery  can  remedy. 
It  seems  to  be  right  that  the  citizens  of  Detroit  should  not  be  com- 
pelled to  incur  a  large  debt  for  a  park,  which  after  all  is  a  mat- 
ter of  luxury  and  ornament  rather  than  a  prime  necessity.  But 
change  the  instance.  Suppose  the  city  should  refuse  to  provide 
a  system  of  sewers  or  drainage,  whereby  the  health  of  its  people 
was  injuriously  affected :  may  it  say  that  this  does  not  concern 
the  people  of  the  state  outside  the  city,  that  it  is  peculiarly  a  local 
matter,  and  therefore  is  beyond  the  power  of  the  state  to  compel 
the  city  to  make  such  a  provision  and  to  raise  the  necessary  taxes 
or  make  the  necessary  assessments  to  that  end  ?  In  the  present 
state  of  the  authorities,  the  question  whether  a  city  may  be  com- 
pelled to  create  a  debt  or  liability  against  its  will  must  be  an- 
swered, we  think,  with  reference  not  only  to  the  constitutional 
provisions  of  the  state,  but  to  the  nature  of  the  purposes  for 
which  the  debt  or  liability  is  to  be  incurred. 

§  74.  Questions  of  the  kind  just  discussed  depend,  for  correct 
solution,  not  only  upon  the  constitutional  provisions  in  the  particu- 
lar state,  but  also,  we  think,  upon  the  nature  of  the  liability  which 
the  municipality  is  ordered  to  incur.  If  there  is  no  special  limi- 
tation in  the  constitution,  and  the  debt  is  one  to  be  incurred  in  the 
discharge  of  a  public  duty,  which  it  is  proper  for  the  legislature 
to  impose  upon  the  municipality,  it  can  constitute  no  objection  to 
the  validity  of  the  Act  that  the  debt  or  liability  is  to  be  created 
without  its  consent.  Thus,  in  the  absence  of  constitutional  re- 
striction, it  has  been  decided,  and  the  decision  is  doubtless  correct, 
that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  direct  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  huild  a  bridge  over  a  navigable  watercourse  ivithin  its  limits^ 
or  the  state  may  appoint  agents  of  its  own  to  build  it,  and  em- 
power them  to  create  a  loan  to  pay  for  the  structure,  payable  by 


100 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IV. 


tho  om-poratioii.^  Thus  iilso,  since  municipal  corporations  are  in- 
struments of  government,  created  for  political  purposes,  and  sub- 
ject to  lecfislative  control,  and  since  it  is  one  of  the  ordinary 
duties  of  such  corporations,  under  legislative  authority,  to  make 
and  keep  in  repair  the  streets  and  highways  and  bridges  coiniected 
therewith,  the  court  of  appeals  in  Maryland  sustained  an  act  man- 
datory in  its  terms,  which  not  only  empowered  but  required  the 
city  of  Baltimore  in  its  corporate  capacity  to  take  charge  of  and 
maintain  as  a  public  highway  a  specified  bridge  within  that  city, 
and  enforced  the  duty  created  by  the  act  of  mandamus.^ 


1  Philadelphia  v.  Field,  58  Pa.  St.  320, 
1868,  approving  Thomas  v.  Leland,  24 
Wend.  05;  Guilder  v.  Otsego,  20  Minn. 
74,  1873  ;  supra,  sec.  54,  note,  and  oases 
cited.  United  States  v.  B.  &  0.  R.  R. 
Co.,  17  Wall.  322,  1872;  post,  see.  775; 
Carter  v.  Bridge  Proprietors,  104  Mass. 
236,  1870.  But  tho  legislature  would  not, 
of  course,  possess  such  extensive  powers 
over  a  private  corporation.  Erie  r.  Canal, 
59  Pa.  St.  174. 

-  Pumphrey  v.  Baltimore,  47  Md.  145. 
A  countji  helmj  justly  indebted  under  a 
contract  for  the  erection  of  public  build- 
ings therein,  the  lecjislature  may  require  it 
to  issue  its  bonds  to  pay  such  indebtedness. 
Jefferson  County  v.  People,  5  Neb.  186, 
1876.  The  power  of  the  legislature  over 
municipal  contracts  and  liabilities  was 
very  fully  considered  in  the  People  v. 
Batchellor,  53  N.  Y.  128, 1873  ;  s.  c.  13  Am. 
Rep.  480,  and  the  conclusion  was  reached 
that  while  municipalities  may  be  com- 
pelled by  the  legislature,  without  their 
consent,  to  construct  and  maintain  im- 
provements of  a  public  character,  and 
even  enter  into  contracts  for  this  purpose, 
they  could  not  be  compelled,  without  their 
consent,  or  that  of  their  taxable  inhabi- 
tants, to  become  stockholders  in  a  rail- 
way corporation  ;  and  therefore  a  manda- 
tory statute  rer/uirinrj  a  municipal  or  piddic 
corporation  to  subscribe  for  stock  in  a  railway 
corporation,  and  issue  its  bonds  in  payment 
therefor,  without  such  consent,  was  unconstitu- 
tional. The  opinion  of  Groi-er,  J.,  contains 
a  valuable  review  of  many  of  the  leading 
decisions  upon  the  extent  of  legislative 
control  over  mimicipalities.  And  the 
case  is  distinguished  from  the  People  v. 
Flagg,  46  N.  Y.  401,  where  a  mandatory 
act  of  the  legislature,  requiring  the  town 


of  Yonkers,  without  its  consent,  to  issue 
bonds  to  raise  money  to  be  expended  in 
the  construction  of  highways  in  the  town 
was  held  to  be  constitutional.  The  case 
of  Batchellor  was  also  distinguished,  or 
attempted  to  be,  from  the  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  tiie  United  States  and 
of  the  state  courts,  to  the  effect  that  rail- 
way corporations  are  public,  and  erected 
for  public  puri)oses  in  such  a  sense  as 
that  the  taxing  power  may  be  employed 
to  aid  in  their  construction,  unless  there 
is  some  special  limitation  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  particular  state.  See  Town  of 
Flatbush,  in  re,  cited,  ante,  sec.  63,  note, 
60  N.  Y.  398,  1875  ;  post,  sec.  831,  note. 

In  the  Brooklyn  and  New  York  Bridge 
Case,  the  court  of  appeals  have  declared 
that  the  erection  of  a  bridge  to  connect 
two  cities  may  be  a  "city  purpose,"  for 
which  indebtedness  may  be  incurred  un- 
der the  late  constitutional  amendment 
upon  that  subject.  In  deciding  such  a 
question,  great  weight  should  be  given  to 
the  determination  of  the  legislature.  A 
constitutional  provision  that  no  county, 
city,  or  town  shall  give  money  or  loan  its 
credit  to  any  individual  or  corporation,  or 
become  the  owner  of  corporate  stock  or 
bonds,  is  not  in  conflict  with  a  statute 
authorizing  two  cities  already  owning 
stock  in  a  company  organized  to  build  a 
bridge  between  such  cities,  to  become  the 
owners  of  the  whole  stock,  by  purchasing 
the  stock  of  the  private  stockholders,  or, 
in  case  of  a  failure  to  agree,  by  taking  it 
by  eminent  domain.  A  statute  authoriz- 
ing the  erection  of  a  certain  bridge,  pro- 
vided tliat  the  trustees  should  call  on  the 
cities  who  were  to  pay  for  it  for  the  funds 
necessary,  "provided,  however,  that  the 
whole  amount  to  be  paid  by  both  cities 


§75.] 


EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL. 


101 


§  75.  (44)  The  fact  that  a  claim  against  a  municipal  or  pub- 
lic corporation  is  not  such  an  one  as  the  law  recognizes  as  of  legal 
obligation  has  often  been  decided,  by  courts  of  the  highest  respect- 
ability and  learning,  to  form  no  constitutional  objection  to  the 
validity  of  a  law  imposing  a  tax  and  directing  its  payment  ;^  but 


sliall  not  exceed  eight  million  dollars." 
Held,  that  this  was  not  an  absolute  limit 
against  a  greater  cost,  but  only  a  direc- 
tion that  no  more  should  be  called  for 
without  further  legislative  authority. 
[Church,  C.  J.,  Folger  and  Miller,  JJ.,  dis- 
senting.] People  V.  Kelly,  5  Abb.  N.  Y. 
New  Cas.  383. 

1  Guilford  v.  Supervisors,  etc.,  13  N. 
Y.  (3  Kern.)  143,  1855.  This  case  holds 
the  following  propositions:  1.  That  the 
legislature  has  power  to  levy  a  tax  upon 
the  taxable  property  of  a  town,  and  ap- 
propriate the  same  to  the  payment  of  a 
claim  made  by  an  individual  against  the 
town.  2.  That  it  is  not  a  valid  objection 
to  the  exercise  of  such  power  that  the 
claim,  to  satisfy  which  the  tax  is  levied, 
is  not  recoverable  by  action  against  the 
town.  3.  That  it  does  not  alter  the 
case  that  the  claim  has  been  rejected  by 
the  voters  of  the  town,  when  submitted 
to  them  at  a  town-meeting,  under  an  act 
of  the  legislature  authorizing  such  sub- 
mission, and  declaring  that  their  decision 
should  be  final  and  conclusive. 

This  case  has  recently  been  approved, 
arguendo,  by  the  Supi"eme  Court  of  the 
United  States.  The  United  States  r. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  Co.,  17  Wall. 
322,  1872 ;  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U. 
S.  654,  1877. 

On  the  contrary,  the  same  case  has 
been  disapproved  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Wisconsin,  in  the  State  v.  Tappan, 
29  Wis.  064,  1872;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep. 
622,  and  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  Wis- 
consin, similar  in  its  nature  and  prin- 
ciples to  that  involved  in  Guilford  v. 
Supervisors,  supra,  was  held  unconstitu- 
tional. The  opinion  of  Lyon,  J.,  evinces 
great  care  in  its  preparation ;  but  it  has 
failed  to  satisfy  us,  that,  in  the  absence  of 
special  constitutional  restraints,  the  ex- 
tent of  the  legislative  power  of  taxation 
depends  upon  the  consent  of  the  nuniici- 
pality  or  the  people  therein,  or  that  the 
special  act  before  the  court  exceeded 
the   r'ghtfal    power    of    the    legislature. 


The  principle  has  been  recently  reaf- 
firmed, in  Massachusetts,  that  the  dis- 
cretionary power  of  the  legislature  in 
the  distribution  of  public  burdens  em- 
braces the  power  to  authorize  an  assess- 
ment  on  one  district  for  part  of  the 
expense  of  repairing  a  portion  of  a  bridge 
in  another.  Carter  v.  Bridge  Proprietors, 
104  Mass.  236,  1870 ;  post,  sec.  737.  See 
Mr.  Sedgwick's  opinion  of  this  legislation. 
Const,  and  St.  Law,  313,  314.  The  prin- 
ciple of  Guilford  v.  Supervisors  was  ap- 
plied in  Brewster  v.  Syracuse,  19  N.  Y, 
116,  1859,  where  it  was  decided  by  all  of 
the  judges  of  tiie  court  of  appeals  that 
the  legislature  has  the  power  to  author- 
ize the  levy  of  a  tax  for  the  purpose  of 
paying  to  one  who  has  constructed  a  muni- 
cipal improvement  (a  street  sewer)  an 
addition  to  the  contract  price,^  which  the 
corporation  was  forbidden  to  pay  by  its 
charter.  The  court  did  not  consider  that 
there  was  any  contract  in  the  case,  and 
sustained  the  legislation  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  warranted  by  the  taxing 
power,  which,  in  that  state,  was  not  re- 
strained, thus  leaving  it  in  the  discretion 
of  the  legislature  to  recognize  and  direct 
the  payment  of  claims  founded  in  equity 
and  justice,  or  in  gratitude  or  charity. 
People  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Brooklyn,  4 
Comst.  (N.  Y.)  419.  And  see  Thomas  v. 
Leland,  24  Wend.  65,  1840;  People  v. 
Dayton,  55  N.  Y.  367,  1874  ;  Shelby  Co. 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  5  Bush  (Ky.),  225  ;  Phil- 
adelphia V.  Field,  58  Pa.  St.  320,  1868. 
This  seems  to  be  carrj'ing  the  doctrine 
of  the  control  of  the  legislature  over 
public  corporations  to  its  extreme  limit. 
See  Mr.  Justice  Cooky's  views,  Const. 
Lim.  380,  491,  notes.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  California  has  followed  and 
approved  Guilford  v.  Supervisors.  Bland- 
ing  V.  Burr,  13  Cal.  343,  1859 ;  North 
Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Maguire,  49  Mo.  490, 
500,  1872.  And  recently  in  New  York, 
the  court  of  appeals,  while  not  ques- 
tioning the  judgment  in  Guilford  v. 
Supervisors,   etc.    criticised    and   limited 


102  MUNICIPAL   COIIPOKATIONS.  [CH.  IV. 

the  validity  of  legislation  of  this  character,  if  it  interferes  with 
-what  has  been  called  the  private  contracts  of  such  corporations, 
must  be  sustained  on  the  ground  that  such  contracts,  so  far  as  the 
corporations  are  concerned,  are  under  the  absolute  control  of  the 
lei^islature,  and  not  witiiin  the  protection  of  the  national  constitu- 
tion. The  cases  on  this  subject,  when  carefully  examined,  seem 
to  the  author  to  go  no  further,  probably,  than  to  assert  the  doc- 
trine that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  compel  municipal 
corporations  to  recognize  and  pay  debts  not  binding  in  strict  law, 
and  which,  for  technical  reasons,  could  not  be  enforced  in  equity, 
but  which,  nevertheless,  are  just  and  equitable  in  their  character, 
and  involve  a  moral  obligation.^  To  this  extent  and  with  this 
limitation,  the  doctrine  is  unobjectionable  in  principle,  and  must 
be  regarded  as  settled,  although  it  asserts  a  measure  of  control 
over  municipalities,  in  respect  of  their  duties  and  liabilities,  which 
does  not  exist  as  to  private  corporations  and  individuals. 

§  76.  Accordingly  in  a  case  where  a  municipality,  after  the  pas- 
sage of  an  act  of  the  legislature  which  provided  that  towns  and 
cities  should  not  thereafter  "  have  power  to  contract  any  debt 
without  fully  providing  in  the  ordinance  creating  the  debt  the 
means  of  paying  the  principal  and  interest,"  issued  bonds  without 
such  a  provision  as  the  above  statute  required,  and  used  them  in 

some  of  the  dicta  in  that  case  as  to  the  Wis.  217,  1866 ;  Smith  v.  Morse,  2  Cal. 

extent  of  tlie  legislative  power.    Weismer  524 ;    Grogan  v.  San  Francisco,  18   Cal. 

V.  Village  of  Douglass,  64  N.  Y.  91 ;  8.  c.  590  ;    Linton   v.    Ashbury,   41    Cal.    525, 

21  Am.  Rep.  586.    Under  special  provi-  1871 ;   New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.   S. 

sionsof  Michigan  constitution,  see  People  644,1877;  People   v.  Lynch,  51   Cal.  15, 

r.  Onandaga,  16  Mich.  254.     Where   one  1875;  Creighton  w.  San  Francisco,  42  Cal. 

county  is  under  a  moral  obligation  to  reimburse  446,  1877;    People  v.  Supervisors,  70  N. 

another  county  for  certain  expenses,  the  legis-  Y.  228, 1877.    Text  approved.     Nevada  v. 

lature  may  give  this  a  legal  effect  by  a  subse-  Hampton,  13  Nev.  441  ;  infra,  sec.  77,  note. 

quent  act.     Lycoming  v.  Union,  15  Pa.  St.  The  legislature,  in  favor  of  a  county 

166,  1850.     Rights  of  trial  by  jury  may  be  collecting  officer,  who  has  settled  and  paid 

denied  by  the  legislature  to   municipal  cor-  a  claim  against   him,   may  pass   an  act 

porations,  these   being  mere   creatures  of  its  authorizing  the   settlement  to  be  opened 

policy,  with  such  rights  only  as  it  sees  proper  and  equitably  adjusted,  and  such  an  act  is 

to  confer.    Borough  of  Dunsmore's  Appeal,  an  implied  direction  that  the  rule  of  law, 

52  Pa.   St.  374 ;    but  see  supra,  sec.  66,  as  to  voluntary  payments,  shall  not  apply, 

note;  /n/ra,  sec.  76,  and  note.  Burns   v.    Clarion    Co.,  62   Pa.   St.    422, 

1  Blanding  v.  Burr,  13  Cal.  343,  1853;  1869.     In  California,  the  legislature  can- 

Lycoming    v.   Union,   15    Pa.    St.    166;  not  compel  a  city  to  pay  a  claim  which  it  is 

Guilford   v.  Supervisors,    13  N.    Y.    144,  under  no  obligation  whatever  to  pay  ;  nor 

1855;    Brewster  v.   Syracuse,  19  N.  Y.  require  a  court  to  render  judgment  on  proof 

116,  1859;  Thomas  v.  Leland,  24  Wend,  of  the  amount  thereof .     Hoagland  v.  Sac- 

G5,   1840 ;   Hasbrouck  v.  Milwaukee,  21  ramento,  52  Cal.  142.     See  infra,  sec.  76. 


§  77.]  EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL.  103 

payment  of  an  authorized  indebtedness,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  held  that  inasmuch  as  the  bonds  represented  an 
equitable  claim  against  the  city,  it  was  competent  for  the  legisla- 
ture to  interfere  and  require  the  city  to  pay  them.  "  The  power 
of  the  legislature,"  says  Fields  J.,  delivering  the  judgment  of  the 
court,  "  to  require  the  payment  of  a  claim  for  which  an  equivalent 
has  been  received,  and  from  the  paj^ment  of  which  the  city  can 
only  escape  on  technical  grounds,  would  seem  to  be  clear.  ...  A 
very  different  question,"  the  learned  judge  cautiously  adds,  "would 
be  presented  if  an  attempt  were  made  to  apply  the  means  raised 
[by  taxation]  to  the  payment  of  claims  for  which  no  consideration 
had  been  received  by  the  city."  ^ 

§  77.  (45)  It  has,  however,  been  decided  in  Maryland,  that, 
as  against  the  abutters,  the  legislature  could  not  ratify  an  assess- 
ment for  a  local  improvement  in  front  of  their  property,  and 
which  had  been  adjudged  to  be  void,  and  compel  them  to  pay  for 
the  same.^  In  the  case  just  mentioned,  the  legislature,  in  an  act 
relating  to  the  grading  and  paving  of  an  avenue  in  the  city  of 
Baltimore,  among  other  things,  required,  as  preliminary  to  pro- 
ceedings thereunder,  that  the  mayor  and  council  of  the  city 
should  determine  the  proposed  work  to  be  consistent  with  the 
public  good.  An  application,  by  property  owners,  for  the  improve- 
ment was  made  to  the  city  commissioners  instead  of  the  mayor 
and  council,  and  the  commissioners  determined  to  grade  the 
avenue,  awarded  the  contract,  and  the  contractor  did  the  work  at 
the  cost  of  over  1100,000.  The  abutters  instituted  no  proceed- 
ings to  stop  the  work,  and  after  it  was  completed  the  city  passed 
an  ordinance  ratifying  the  contract  to  grade,  and  all  the  acts  of 
the  officers  of  the  city  in  relation  to  the  grading  of  the  avenue. 
An  assessment  being  made  upon  their  property,  to  pay  the  expense 
of  the  grading,  they  filed  a  bill  for  an  injunction  and  relief,  and  it 
was  judicially  determined  that  the  proceedings  of  the  city  com- 
missioners were  coram  non  judice  and  void,  and  that  they  could 
not  be  ratified  by  ordinance.^    After  this  judicial  determination, 

1  New  Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S.  644,  3  Baltimore  v.  Porter,  18  Md.284, 1861 ; 
652,  1877.  see  infra,  sec.  814.  The  text  (sec.  79)  cited 

2  Baltimore^.  Horn,  26  Md.  194, 1866;  and  approved  and  the  doctrine  applied 
compare  with  cases  cited  in  sees.  75  and  in  Brown  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.  63  N. 
79;  Lennon  v.  New  York,  55  N.  Y.  361,  Y.  239,  1870,  where  a  legislative  ratifi- 
1874.  cation  of  an  ultra  vires  contract  for  street 


104  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IV 

the  lof^islature  passed  an  act  directing  the  city  to  pay  the  con- 
tractors for  the  work  done  by  them  and  accepted  by  the  city,  to 
borrow  the  money  for  the  purpose,  and  levy  a  tax  for  its  payment, 
which  the  city  did.  But  at  the  same  session,  the  legislature,  to 
reimburse  the  city  treasury,  empowered  the  city  to  collect  from 
the  abutters  on  the  avenue  graded  the  amounts  which  had  been 
assessed  and  ascertained  by  the  city  commissioners  ;  and  this  last 
act  was  held  by  the  court  of  appeals  to  be  void,  because  it  was 
an  assumption  of  judicial  power  by  the  legislature,  and,  in  effect, 
a  legislative  reversal  of  the  former  judgment  of  the  court. 

§  78.  In  levying  a  local  assessment  upon  the  abutting  property, 
a  lot  within  the  district  declared  to  be  benefited  was  omitted, 
after  which  the  legislature  validated  the  assessment,  this  omission 
and  exemption  being  retained  and  preserved  ;  and  it  was  held  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  California  that  the  validating  act  was  un- 
constitutional.^ The  ground  for  this  judgment  is  satisfactory : 
since  the  legislature  could  not  prospectively  have  exempted  the 
property  omitted  because  it  would  have  violated  the  constitutional 
requirement  of  uniformity ,2  it  could  not  do  this  retrospectively. 

§  79.  (46)  In  general,  however,  the  legislature  may,  by  suhse' 
quent  act,  validate  and  confirm  previous  acts  of  the  corporation  other- 
wise invalid.^    Merely  because  such  legislation,  in  matters  not 

improvements  was    sustained.     Duanes-  1872;   Linton  v.   Ashbury,  41   Cal.   525, 

burg  V.  Jenkins,  57  N.  Y.  177,  1874.  1871 ;   New   Orleans  v.  Clark,  95  U.  S. 

The  jjower  of  the  legislature  to  appropriate  644,  1877  ;  supra,  sees.  75,  76. 
the  moneys  of  municipal  corporations  in  pay-  In  Iowa  it  appears  to  be  regarded  as 

ment  of  claims  ascertained   by  it  to  be  not  within  the  power  of  the  legislature 

equitably  due  to  individuals,  though  such  to  provide  a  means  for  the  collection  of 

claims  be  not  enforceable  in  the  courts,  an  unconstitutional  obligation  against  a 

depends   largely  in  the  view  of  the  Su-  public  corporation,  as  where  a  debt  had 

preme  Court  of  California  upon  the  lefjisla-  been  incurred  in  excess  of  the  limit  fixed 

live  conscience  and  will  not  be  interfered  by  the   constitution.     Mosher  v.  School 

with  by  the  Judicial  Department  unless  in  District,  44  Iowa,  122,  1876. 
exceptional  cases,  and  the  circumstances  i  People  v.  Lynch,  51   Cal.  15,  1875 ; 

tliat  the  contract,  under  which  the  plain-  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  676. 
tiff  did  certain  work  in   San  Francisco,  ^  Post,  sec.    755,   and   cases   cited   in 

expressly  provided  that  the  city  should  note.     For  construction  of  constitutional 

in  no  event  be  liable  for  any  portion  of  provision   in    California    in    respect    of 

the  expenses   thereof ;   was  held,   not   to  equality  and  uniformity  of  taxation,  the 

affect  or  in  any  manner  invalidate  an  act  opinion  of  McKinstry,  J.,  in  The  People  v. 

subsequently  passed   by  the   legislature.  Lynch,  supra,  will  repay  reading, 
requiring   the   city   to   pay   him   a   debt  ^  Bridgeport  v.  Railroad  Co.,  15  Conn, 

which  in  good  conscience  it  ought  to  pay.  475,  1843,  in  which  it  was  held  that  the 

Creighton  v.  San  Francisco,  42  Cal.  446,  legislature  might  validate  prior  subscrip- 


§80.] 


EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL. 


105 


relating  to  crimes,  is  retrospective,  does  not  make  it  void.  If  in 
addition  to  its  being  retrospective,  it  unjustly  impairs  or  abrogates 
vested  rights,  and,  without  reasonable  cause,  imposes  upon  third 
persons  new  duties  in  respect  to  past  transactions,  it  will  be  void 
because  in  conflict  with  the  constitution.^ 

§  80.  (47)  While  it  is  undeniable  that  the  legislature  has  full 
control  over  public  corporations,  and  over  the  funds  which  belong 
to  them  as  such,  and  held  for  strictly  corporate  purposes ;  yet 
where,  by  authority  of  law,  such  corporations  hold  property  or 
funds  in  trust  for  specific  uses,  it  is  left  in  doubt  by  the  cases  how 
far  the  legislature  can,  unless  the  uses  be  strictly  public  or  chari- 
table, interfere  with  or  control  such  trust  property  or  funds.     In 


tion  of  city  to  stock  of  railroad  company. 
S.  P.  Winn  V.  Macon,  21  Ga.  275,  1857 ; 
Mattingly  v.  District  of  Col.,  97  U.  S. 
687;  McMillen  v.  Boyles,  6  Iowa,  304; 
lb.  391 ;  New  Orleans  v.  Poutz,  H  La. 
An.  853 ;  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24 
How.  287,  295,  1860;  Atcliison  v.  Butch- 
er, 3  Kan.  104,  1805 ;  Frederick  v.  Au- 
gusta, 5  Ga.  561 ;  Allison  v.  R.  W.  Co.,  9 
Bush  (Ky.),  247,  1872;  Triichelut  v.  City 
Council,  1  Nott  &  McCord  (South  Car.), 
227;  Cooley  Const.  Lira.  371,  379;  post, 
sees.  419,  551,  814;  contra  under  constitu- 
tion of  Illinois ;  Marshall  v.  Sullivan,  61 
111.  218.  A  healing  statute  is  not  uncon- 
stitutional by  reason  of  giving  validity 
to  an  act  irregularly  done  which  the  leg- 
islature could  have  authorized  to  be  done 
in  the  irregular  way  in  the  first  instance. 
Lockhart  v.  Troy,  48  Ala.  579,  1872. 

It  is  competent  for  the  legislature,  by 
subsequent  enactment,  to  cure  any  de- 
fects or  omissions  in  the  proceedings  of 
tiie  superintendent  of  streets.  San  Fran- 
cisco V.  Certain  Heal  Estate,  42  Cal.  517, 
1872.  Where  the  original  purpose  for 
which  the  power  of  ta.xation  is  invoked 
is  one  of  the  ordinary  purposes  of  muni- 
cipal government  and  witliin  the  powers 
granted,  and  where  there  is  no  fraud  or 
oppression  in  the  creation  of  the  debt  or 
burden,  and  no  inequality  or  injustice  in 
the  apportionment  of  the  tax,  the  lerjis- 
lature  may  hij  snhser/nent  enactment  cure  any 
d<'fect  in  t/ie  proceedinffs  to  collect  the  tax 
which  it  could  in  the  Jirst  instance,  In/  prior 
enactment  have  wade  immaterial.  p]mporia 
V.  Norton,   13   Kan.  500,  1874.     /Jut  a   re- 


trospective act,  to  make  valid  a  tax  npon 
property  not  within  the  corporation  when 
levied  was  held  void.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Maquillon,  12  Kan.  301,  1873. 

1  Bridgeport  v.  R.  R.  Co.,  15  Conn. 
475,  497,  and  cases  cited  per  Church,  J. 
Laws  passed  to  remedy  defective  execu- 
tion of  powers  of  public  corporations,  or  their 
officers,  are  valid,  though  retrospective  in 
their  operation,  unless  they  contravene 
some  provision  of  the  state  constitution. 
State  V.  Newark,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  187, 
1858;  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How. 
287,  295,  where  such  curative  acts  are 
said  to  be  valid  when  contracts  are  not 
impaired,  or  the  rights  of  third  persons 
injuriously  affected.  New  Orleans  v. 
Clark,  95  U.  S.  044,  1877. 

It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to 
validate  a  citq  ordinance  which  had  become 
null  and  void  for  want  of  l)eing  recorded, 
and  to  provide  that  the  omission  to  record 
shall  not  impair  the  lien  of  the  assess- 
ments against  the  lot  owners.  Schenley 
V.  Commonwealth,  36  Pa.  St.  29,  1859. 
The  legislature  may  ratify,  and  thereby 
make  binding  an  unauthorized  municipal 
subscription  to  the  stock  of  an  incorpor- 
ated theatre  companj'.  Municipality  v. 
Theatre  Company,  2  Rob.  (La.)  209, 
1842 ;  but,  quere,  whether,  if  the  legis- 
lature had  the  power,  the  act  in  this 
case  was  properly  held  to  be  a  ratifica- 
tion. Danielly  v.  Cabaniss,  52  Ga.  211, 
1874.  See,  further,  chapter  on  Contracts, 
post,  sec.  551.  Text  cited  and  approved. 
Pompton  V.  Cooper  Union,  101  U.  S. 
196. 


lOG 


MUNICIPAL   CORrOKATIOXS. 


[CH.  IV. 


a  vorv  loooiit  ease  of  great  interest,  tlic  Supreme  Court  of  Penn- 
sylvania (lociiled  that  it  was  within  tlic  power  of  tlie  legislature 
to  (U'ln-ive  the  cit}'  of  Philadelphia  of  the  right  to  administer  char- 
itable trusts  under  the  will  of  Mr.  Girard  and  others,  which  had 
been  granted  to  and  accepted  by  it,  and  to  confer  the  administra- 
tion of  these  trusts  upon  a  separate  hody,  called  '^  Directors  of 
City  Trusts,"  appointed  by  the  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  and 
other  judges  named  in  the  act.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however, 
that  the  legislature  did  not  attempt  to  change  or  pervert  the  trusts 
themselves.^  Certain  it  is,  that  without  legislative  authority,  a 
municipal  corporation  holding  the  legal  title  to  property  in  trust 
cannot  use  the  funds  derived  from  such  property  for  corporate 
purposes,  or,  indeed,  for  any  except  the  trust  purposes.^ 


1  Philadelphia  v.  Fox,  64  Pa.  St.  169, 
1870;  post,  sec.  507  et  seq. 

•■2  White  V.  Fuller,  39  Vt.  193;  ante, 
sec.  64  ;  Montpelier  v.  East  Montpelier 
(contest  as  to  trust  property  on  division 
of  town),  27  Vt.  (1  Wms.)  704,  1854; 
same  controversy  in  chancery,  29  Vt. 
(3  Wms.)  12.  See,  also,  Trustees,  etc.  v. 
Bradbury,  2  Fairf.  (Me.)  118;  Poultney 
V.  Wells,  1  Aik.  (Vt.)  180;  Plymouth  v. 
Jackson,  15  Pa.  44 ;  Harrison  v.  Bridge- 
ton,  16  Mass.  16 ;  Daniel  v.  Memphis,  11 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  582;  Trustees  of  Acad- 
emy V.  Aberdeen,  13  Sm.  &  Mar.  (21 
Miss.)  645,  as  to  which,  guere.  Aberdeen 
!;.  Sanderson,  8  Ih.  670 ;  Chambers  v.  St. 
Louis,  29  Mo.  543 ;  Holland  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 7  CaL  361 ;  Girard  v.  Philadelphia, 
7  Wall.  1.  See,  post,  chapters  on  Cor- 
porate Property  and  liemedies  against 
Illegal  Corporate  Acts. 

A  conveyance  was  made  in  1873,  by 
the  proprietors  of  the  lands,  to  the  select- 
men of  North  Yarmouth,  of  "  all  the  flats, 
sedge  banks,  and  muscle  beds  in  said 
town,  lying  below  high  water  mark  .  .  .  . 
for  the  sole  use  and  benefit  of  the  pres- 
ent inhabitants,  and  of  all  such  as  may 
or  shall  forever  inhabit  or  dwell  in  said 
town,"  etc.  It  was  decided  that  this 
property  was  held  by  the  town  as  a  pulilic 
corporation,  subject  to  legislative  con- 
trol, m  trust  for  the  use  of  all  of  the  in- 
habitants, and  that  upon  a  division  of 
the  town,  it  was  competent  for  the  legis- 
lature to  provide  that  the  original  town 
should  still  hold  such   property  in  trust 


for  the  inhabitants  of  both  towns.  North 
Yarmouth  v.  Skillings,  45  Me.  133,  1858 ; 
post,  sec.  187. 

To  another  town  in  Maine,  lands  were 
granted  by  Massachusetts  prior  to  the 
separation  of  Maine  therefrom,  for  the 
use  of  its  schools.  The  legislature,  in  1803, 
on  the  application  of  the  town,  authorized 
the  sale  of  the  lands,  and  gave  to  certain 
designated  trustees  the  right  to  control 
the  funds  raised  by  the  sale  of  the  lands. 
This  was  considered  as  constituting  a 
contract,  and  it  was  accordingly  held  that 
a  subsequent  act  of  the  legislature,  au- 
thorizing the  town  to  choose  a  new  set 
of  trustees,  and  directing  the  first  trustees 
to  deliver  over  the  trust  property,  was, 
agreeably  to  the  principles  settled  in  the 
Dartmouth  College  Case,  unconstitu- 
tional and  void.  The  Trustees,  etc.  v. 
Bradbury,  11  Me.  118,  1834;  Yarmouth 
V.  North  Yarmouth,  34  Me.  411,  1852. 
In  this  last  case  the  trustees  of  the  funds 
were  a  pricate  corporation,  and  not  sub- 
ject to  legislative  control.  In  North 
Yarmouth  v.  Skillings,  45  Me.  133,  1858, 
the  trustees  of  the  property  or  fund  in 
question  were  a  public  corporation,  and 
subject  to  such  control.  The  rule  as  to 
private  and  public  corporations  is  well 
exemplified  in  these  two  cases.  See, 
also,  Norris  v.  Abington  Academy,  7  Gill 
&  Johns.  (Md.)  7;  Bass  v.  Fontleroy, 
11  Tex.  698;  Louisville  v.  University 
of  Louisville,  15  B.  Mon.  642. 

In  the  State  v.  Springfield  Township, 
6  Ind.  (Porter)  83,  1854,  it  was  held  that 


§80.] 


EXTENT  OF  LEGISLATIVE  CONTROL. 


107 


a  law  of  the  state  (act  of  1852),  so  far 
as  it  diverted  tlie  proceeds  of  tlie  sale  of 
the  sixteentli  section  (granted  by  act  of 
Congress  of  April  19,  1816)  from  the  use 
of  schools  in  the  congressional  township 
where  the  land  was  situated,  to  the  use 
of  the  school  system  of  the  state  at  large, 
was  in  contravention  of  that  section  of 
the  state  constitution  (sec.  7,  art.  viii.) 
whicii  provides,  that  "all  trust  funds, 
held  by  the  slate,  shall  remain  inviolate, 
and  he  faitlifully  and  exclusively  applied 
to  the  purpose  for  which  the  trust  was 
created." 

Tliat  the  legislature  cannot  in  dividing 
a  town  violate  the  provisions  of  the  donor 
of  a  fund  held  by  a  municipality  in  spe- 
cific trusts  is  affirmed  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  New  Hampshire  in  a  recent 
judgment.  The  case  was  this :  In  1856 
the  town  of  M.  received  from  John  Bojn- 
ton  the  sum  of  $10,000  as  a  fund  for  the 
support  of  its  public  schools,  on  the  ex- 
press condition  that,  unless  the  income 
thereof  should  be   forever  divided   and 


applied,  according  to  the  number  of 
scholars  between  the  ages  of  five  and 
fifteen  in  the  several  schools  or  districts 
of  the  town,  the  fund  should  be  repaid  to 
the  donor,  his  executors,  administrators, 
or  assigns.  In  1872,  the  town  of  G. 
was  created  by  act  of  the  legislature  out 
of  part  of  the  territory  and  inhabitants 
of  M.,  and  it  was  provided  that  all  prop- 
erty, real  and  personal,  and  all  school 
and  other  funds  belonging  to  the  original 
town  of  M.  should  be  divided  in  the  pro- 
portion of  seven  to  M.  and  thirteen  to  G. 
It  was  held  that  the  legislature  had  no 
constitutional  power  to  direct  a  division 
or  distribution  of  the  fund  different  from 
that  prescribed  by  the  donor;  and  that, 
therefore,  no  legal  provision  for  the  divi- 
sion of  the  fund  in  controversy  having 
been  made,  the  rights  of  the  town  of  M. 
therein  were  unaffected  by  the  act,  and 
the  new  town  of  G.  was  not  entitled  to 
any  portion  of  the  fund  or  income. 
Greenville  v.  Mason,  53  N.  H.  515,  1873; 
post,  sec.  187,  note. 


108  MUNICIP.VL   CORPOKATIONS.  [CH.  V. 


CHAPTER  V. 

MUNICIPAL   CHARTEES, 

General  Municipal  Poivers.  —  Their  Nature  and  Construction. 

^  81.  (48)  This  chapter  will  treat  of  Municipal  Charters,  and 
the  principles  upton  which  they  are  construed,  and  of  the  general 
nature  of  the  poivers  which  they  confer  upon  the  corporation  or 
upon  its  legislative  or  governing  body.  The  subject  will  be  con- 
sidered under  the  following  heads :  — 

1.  Charters  defined. 

2.  Judicially  noticed. 

3.  Proof  of  Corporate  Existence. 

4.  Repeal  and  Amendment  of  Charters. 

5.  Conflict  between  General  Laws  and  Special  Charters. 

6.  Extent  of   Corporate    Powers,    Limitations   thereon,   and 
Canons  of  Construction. 

7.  Usage  as  affecting  Powers  and  Their  Interpretation. 

8.  Discretionary  Powers. 

9.  Public  Powers  Incapable  of  Delegation. 

10.  Public  Powers  cannot  be  surrendered. 

11.  Mandatory  and  Discretionary  Powers. 

12.  Exemption  of  Revenues  from  Judicial  Seizure,  and  herein 
of  Garnishment. 

Charters  defined. 
§  82.  (49)  We  have  before  seen  that,  in  this  country,  muni- 
cipal corporations  are  created  by  legislative  act,  either  in  the 
form  of  a  legislative  charter  or  by  general  incorporating  statutes.^ 
A  municipal  charter  granted  hy  the  croivn  in  England  is  a  written 
instrument,  made  in  the  form  of  letters  patent,  with  the  great 
seal  appended  to  it,  addressed  to  all  the  subjects,  and  constitut- 
ing the  persons  therein  named,  and  their  successors,  a  body  cor- 
porate for  or  within  the  place  therein  specified,  and  prescribing 

^  Ante,  sees.  39,  41. 


§  84.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  109 

the  powers  and  duties  of  the  corporation  thereby  created.  But 
such  charters  are  inoperative  until  accepted.^  Here,  as  we  have 
elsewhere  shown,  the  legislature  creates,  alters,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  constitutional  restriction,  can  destroy,  municipal  and 
public  corporations  at  its  will,  and  it  invests  them  with  such  pow- 
ers, and  requires  of  them  such  duties,  as  it  deems  most  expedient 
for  the  general  good,  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  particular  locality .^ 
No  precise  form  of  ivords  is  necessary  to  create  a  corporation,  and 
a  corporation  may  be  created  by  implication.^ 

Charters  judicially  noticed. 

§  83.  (50)  Courts  will  judicially  notice  the  charter  or  incorpo- 
rating act  of  a  municipal  corporation  without  being  specially 
pleaded,  not  only  when  it  is  declared  to  be  a  public  statute.,  but 
when  it  is  public  or  general  in  its  nature  or  purposes,  though  there 
be  no  express  provision  to  that  effect.*  But  the  acts,  votes,  and 
ordinances  of  the  corporation  are  not  public  matters,  and  must 
be  pleaded  and  proved.^ 

Proof  of  Corporate  Existence.  —  User.  —  Legislative  Recognition. 

§  84.  (51)  The  primary  evidence  of  a  special  charter  or  act  of 
incorporation,  in  this  countrj^  is  the  original,  or  an  authenticated 

1  Ante,  sees.  32,  44.     Outline  of  char-  "Watson,  10  Mass.  91 ;  Clapp  v.  Hartford, 

ter  of  the  Middle  Ages,  ante,  sec.  G.  35  Conn.  66 ;  People  v.  Potter,  35  Cal. 

^  Ante,  sees.  8,  9,  22.  110  ;  where  a  city  is  incorporated  under  a 

3  Ante,  sees.  3,  42,  43.  general  act,  the  fact  of  its  corporate  char- 

*  Albrittin     u.  Huntsville,  60  Ala.  486;  acter  must  be  averred  and  proved.     Ingle 

Smoot  V.  Wetumpka,  24  Ala.  121 ;  Case  v.  Jones,  43    Iowa,   286,  1876 ;  post,  sec. 

V.   Mobile,  30   Ala.    538 ;    Perryman    v.  Ill,  note.     A  city  charter  being  declared 

Greenville,  51  Ala.  510.  to  be  a  public  act,  supplements  and  amend- 

5  Beatty  v.   Knowles,  4  Pet.   (U.  S.)  ments  to  it  are  likewise  public.     Newark 

152,  157,  1830;  Stier  v.  Oskaloosa,  citing  Bank  v.  Assessors,  30  N.  J.  L.  22;  State 

and  approving  te.xt,  41  Iowa,  353;  Ingle  v.  Bergen,  .34    N.  J.  L.  4-39  ;  New  Jersey 

V.  Jones,  43  Iowa,  286,   1876  ;  Aldermen  v.  Yard,   95  U.   S.  112,  1877.     See  post, 

V.  Finley,  5  Eng.  10  Ark.  423,  1850 ;  Faunt-  chapter  on  Ordinances,  sec.  422.     Where 

leroy  v.    Hannibal,  1   Dillon   C.  C.    118,  a  public  law  creates  the  mayor  and  alder- 

1871 ;    Prell  v.   McDonald,   7  Kan.    426,  men  an  incorporated  body,  no  averment 

1871;   s.  c.  7   Am.   Kep.   423;    West   v.  or   proof    is    necessary    to   establish  the 

Blake,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  234, 1836;  Briggs  existence  of    the  corporation.     State   v. 

('.Whipple,  7  Vt.   15,   18,  1835;  Case  v.  Mayor,    11    Humph.  (Tenn.)    217,    1850. 

Mobile,  30  Ala.  538, 1857  ;  Clarke  v.  Bank,  State  v.    Helmes    (prescriptive   corpora- 

6  Eng.  10  Ark.   516;  State  v.  Mayor,  11  tions),  Penn.  (N.  J.)  1050.     Hawthorne  v. 

Humph.  (Tenn.)  217,  1850;  see  Vance  v.  Hoboken  (supplemental  act),  3   Vroom, 

Bank,  1   Blackf.  (Ind.)  80,  and  note  (2) ;  32  N.  J.  L.  172;  Stevens  Co.  v.  Railroad 

6  Bac.  Abr.  374,  note  ;  Young  v.  Bank,  Co.  4  Vroom,  33  N.  J.   L.  229 ;  Bowie  v. 

etc.,  4  Cranch,   384  ;  Swails  v.  State,  4  Kansas  City,  51  Mo.  454,  1873. 

Ind.  516,   1853  ;  Portsmoutli,  etc.  Co.  v. 


no 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  V. 


copv,  or  a  pvIntiHl  copy,  published  by  authority.  But  if  primary 
eviiieneo  cannot  be  had,  parol  or  Bccondary  evidence  of  its  exist- 
rnoc  is  admissible.!  Thus,  where  a  public  corporation  had  ex- 
isted for  a  long  space  of  time  (in  the  instance  before  the  court 
for  forty  years),  the  court  admitted  proof  of  its  incorporation  hy 
reputation,  the  original  act  not  being  found,  and  it  being  proba- 
ble that  it  had  been  destroyed  by  fire.^  So  evidence  that  a  town 
has  for  many  years  exercised  corporate  privileges,  no  charter,  after 
search,  being  found,  is  competent  to  go  to  the  jury  to  establish 
that  it  was  duly  incorporated.  And  where  there  is  no  direct  or 
record  evidence  that  a  place  has  been  incorporated,  and  it  is 
sought  to  show  the  fact  of  incorporation  from  circumstantial  evi- 
den'ce,  the  question  is  ordinarily  for  the  jury,  and  not  the  court; 
that  is,  the  jury,  under  the  circumstances,  determine  whether 
there  is  or  is  not  sufficient  ground  to  presume  a  charter  or  act  of 
incorporation,^  or  the  due  establishment  and  existence  of  a  corpo- 
rate district  under  some  general  act.*     So   corporate  existence 


1  Stockbrklge  v.  West  Stockbridge, 
12  Mass.  400,  1815;  Braintree  v.  Battles, 
6  Vt.  395,  18.34 ;  Blackstone  i'.  White, 
41  Pa.  St.  330. 

-'  Dillingham  v.  Snow,  5  Mass.  547, 
1809 ;  s.  p.  Bassett  v.  Porter,  4  Cush. 
487,  1849.  In  view  of  the  defective  man- 
ner in  which  the  records  of  quasi  corpora- 
tions —  such  as  school  and  road  districts, 
and  the  like  —  are  kept,  the  courts,  in 
the  absence  of  any  statute  requiring  re- 
cord evidence,  will  permit  the  existence 
and  organization  of  tlie  corporation  to  be 
proved  by  reputation  and  acts,  where  these 
facts  do  not  appear  of  record.  Barnes  v. 
Barnes,  6  Vt.  388,  1834 ;  Londonderry  v. 
Andovcr,  28  Tb.  416,  1856;  Sherwin  v. 
Bugbee,  16  lb.  4.39;  Ryder  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  13  111.  523;  Highland  Turnpike 
('.  McKean,  10  Johns.  154;  Owings  v. 
Speed,  5  Wheat.  420.  See  cliapter  on 
Corporate  Records  and  Documents,  post. 

Irregularities  in  the  proceedings  to  or- 
ganize a  corporation  are  not  favored  when 
set  up  long  afterwards  to  defeat  tlie  cor- 
porate existence.  Jameson  ;'.  People,  16 
111.  257,  1855;  Dunning  v.  Railroad  Co., 
2  Ind.  4.37,  1850;  Fitch  v.  Pinckard,  4 
Scam.  5111.  76. 

Where  a  corporation  is  created,  and 
declared  to  exist  as  such,  by  the  legisla- 
ture without  condition,  proof  of  onjaniza- 


lion  or  user  is  not  necessary  to  enable  them 
to  maintain  an  action.  Cahill  v.  Insur- 
ance Company,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  124; 
Fire  Department  v.  Kip,  10  Wend.  266, 
1833.  And  see  Proprietors,  etc.  ;;.  Hor- 
ton,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  501 ;  People  v.  Presi- 
dent, 9  Wend.  351;  Wood  v.  Bank,  9 
Cowen,  194,  205.  When  construed  to  be 
immediately  created,  the  omission  to  do 
certain  acts  prescribed  to  organize  the 
institution  was  held  immaterial  as  re- 
spects persons  contracting  with  the  cor- 
poration. Brouwer  v.  Appleby,  1  Sandf. 
153,  1847;  s.  p.  People  v.  President,  9 
Wend.  351.     See  also  ante,  sec.  44. 

3  New  Boston  v.  Dumbarton,  15  N.  H. 
201,  1844;  Mayor  of  Kingston  v.  Horner, 
Cowp.  102,  per  Lord  Mansfield. 

4  Bassett  v.  Porter,  4  Cush.  487,  1849 ; 
New  Boston  v.  Dumbarton,  12  N.  H.  409, 
412,  1841 ;  s.  c.  15  N.  H.  201 ;  Robie  w. 
Sedgwick,  35  Barb.  319,  1861.  The  ex- 
ercise of  corporate  powers  by  a  place  for 
twenty  years,  without  objection,  and  with 
the  knowledge  and  assent  of  the  legisla- 
ture, furnishes  conclusive  evidence  of  a 
charter,  which  has  been  lost ;  or,  in  other 
words,  of  a  corporation  by  i)rescription, 
which  supposes  a  grant.  Bow  r.  Allen- 
town,  34  N.  H.  351,  1857.  In  this  case  it 
was  also  held  that  an  act  of  incorporation 
subsequently  passed   does   not  raise  any 


§85.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


Ill 


may  be  inferred  and  judicially  noticed,  although  the  incorporat- 
ing act  or  charter  cannot  be  found,  if  the  fact  of  incorporation  is 
clearly  recognized  hy  subsequent  legislation,  not  in  contravention 
of  any  constitutional  provision  respecting  the  mode  of  creating 
corpora  tions.i 

Repeals  and  Amendments,  and  their  Effect. 

§  85.  (52)  The  powers  conferred  upon  municipal  corporations 
may  at  any  time  be  altered  or  repealed  by  the  legislature,  either 
by  a  general  law  operating  upon  the  whole  state,  or,  in  absence 
of  constitutional  restriction,  by  a  special  act?  A  charter  may  be 
amended,  and  the  name  of  the  place  and  the  governing  body  may 
be  changed,  and  its  boundaries  altered,  while  in  law  the  corpora- 
tion remains  the  same.  The  insertion  in  an  amended  charter  of 
the  same  provisions  that  were  contained  in  the  old  is  not,  unless, 
such  upon  the  whole  act  appears  to  have  been  the  intention  of 
the  legislature,  a  repeal  of  the  latter.  The  law  on  this  subject  is 
thus  stated  :  "  Where  a  statute  does  not,  in  express  terms,  annul 
a  right  or  power  given  to  a  corporation  by  a  former  act,  but  only 


conclusive  presumption  that  the  town  was 
not  before  incorporated.  Long  use  and  ac- 
quiescence are  evidence  in  support  of  the 
legal  existence  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion. People  V.  Farnliam,  35  111.  562; 
Jameson  v.  People,  16  111.  257,  1855  ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Maynard,  15  Mich.  463,  1867.  Long 
acquiescence  in  the  proceedings  of  a 
school  district  is  presumptive  evidence  of 
the  regular  organization  of  such  district. 
Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16  Vt.  439,  1844; 
Londonderry  i:  Andover,  28  lb.  416.  "  It 
is  now  well  settled  in  this  state,  that  the 
mere  fact  of  a  school  district  maintaining 
its  existence  and  operation  for  a  great 
number  of  years  —  say  fifteen  — is  sufH- 
cient  evidence  of  its  regular  organization. 
The  same  rule  of  presumption  must  be 
applied  to  the  subdivision  of  tlie  town  into 
districts."  Per  Recljield,  J.,  in  Sherwin  u. 
Bugbee,  supra. 

1  Jameson  v.  People,  16  111.  257,  1855 ; 
Swain  r.  Comstock,  18  Wis.  46.3,  1864; 
People  V.  Farnham,  35  111.  562;  Bow  v. 
AUentown,  34  N.  II.  351,  1857 ;  Society, 
etc.  V.  Pawlet,  4  Pet.  480,  1830;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Chenoa ,  43  111.  209 ;  Virginia  City  v. 
Mining  Co.  2  Nev.  86, 1866  ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Plumas  County,  37  Cal.  354 ;  ante,  sec.  42. 


2  Per  Smith,  J.,  Sloan  v.  State,  8 
Blaokf.  (Ind.)  .361,  1847,  approving  People 
V.  Morris,  13  AVend.  325 ;  Daniel  v.  Mayor, 
etc.  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  582;  State  r. 
Mayor,  24  Ala.  701,  1854 ;  Girard  v.  Phil- 
adelphia, 7  Wall.  1,  1868 ;  State  v.  Troth, 
5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  379;  post,  sees. 
171,  172 ;  State  v.  Palmer,  4  N.  W.  Rep. 
966;  Indianapolis  r.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co., 
66  Ind.  396 ;  ante,  sees.  45,  52,  et  seq. 
The  provisions  of  an  amendatory  act,  re- 
ducing the  number  of  councilmen,  though 
the  act  took  effect  at  once,  were  post- 
poned until  the  next  year,  when  they 
could  be  called  into  requisition  at  the 
election  —  no  earlier  election  being  pro- 
vided for  —  and  meanvviiile  the  existing 
council  remained  unaffected  by  the  amend- 
ment. Scovill  V.  Cleveland,  1  Ohio  St. 
126, 1853.  Same  principle  applied.  Read- 
ing V.  Keppleman,  61  Pa.  St.  233,  1869. 

A  legislative  amendment  to  charter 
abolishing  assistant  aldermen,  and  declar- 
ing board  of  aldermen  to  be  common 
council,  is  a  valid  exercise  of  legislative 
authority  ;  a  public  corporation's  charter 
is  always  subject  to  legislative  amend- 
ment or  alteration.  Dcmarest  v.  New 
York,  74  N.  Y.  161. 


112 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  V. 


confers  the  same  rights  and  powers  under  a  new  name,  and  with 
additional  powers,  such  subsequent  act  does  not  annul  the  rights 
and  powers  given  under  the  former  act  and  under  its  former 
name,"  there  being  no  express  repeal.^ 

§  SQ.  (53)  A  repeating  clause  in  a  revised  and  amendatory 
charter,  whereby  a  former  provision  is  included  in  the  revised 
act,  does  not,  as  to  such  provision,  interrupt  the  continuity  of 
the  original  act.^  Where  the  original  charter  of  a  city  prescribed 
the  qualifications  required  to  make  a  person  eligible  to  the  office 
of  mayor,  and  contained  a  j^roviso  that  a  certain  fact  disqualified, 
and  an  amendatov}-  act,  in  dealing  in  the  same  subject,  copied 
all  of  the  original  act  except  the  proviso,  ivhich  ivas  omitted,  the 
court  held  that  the  proviso  in  the  original  act  was  not  repealed, 
placing  stress,  however,  upon  the  express  declaration  that  all 
parts  of  the  new  act  inconsistent  with  or  contrary  to  the  old 
one  were  repealed.  There  is,  however,  much  room  to  contend 
that  the  subject-matter  having  been  revised  in  the  amendatory 
act  in  the  manner  it  was,  the  legislative  intention  was  to  repeal, 
and  not  to  continue  in  force,  the  proviso.^     A  general  law,  for- 


1  State,  etc.  v.  Mobile,  24  Ala.  701, 
1854;  Girard  r.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1, 
1868;  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  03  U.  S. 
2(56,  1870.  Approving  Milner's  admx.  v. 
Pensacola,  2  Woods,  G32 ;  Indianapolis 
V.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396. 
Approving  text.  Commonwealth  v.  Wor- 
cester, 3  Pick.  (Mass.)  474,  1826;  Grant 
on  Corp.  24,  and  cases  cited ;  Ih.  305. 
See  chapter  on  Dissolution,  ;)os<.  "  There 
is  no  doctrine  better  settled,"  says  Mr. 
Justice  Strong,  "  than  that  a  change  in  the 
form  of  government  of  a  community  does  not 
ipso  facto  abrogate  pre-e.xisting  law,  either 
written  or  unwritten.  This  is  true  in 
regard  to  what  is  strictly  municipal  law, 
even  when  the  change  is  hy  conquest. 
Tiie  act  of  assembly  converting  a  borough 
into  a  city  did  not,  therefore,  of  itself, 
and  in  the  absence  of  express  provisions 
to  that  effect,  either  repeal  the  former 
acts  of  assembly  relative  to  the  borough, 
or  annul  existing  ordinances.  It  was 
solely  a  change  in  the  organic  law  for 
the  future,  and  left  unaffected  the  exist- 
ing ordinances,  precisely  as  a  change  of 
a  state  constitution  leaves  undisturbed 


all  prior  acts  of  assembly."  Trustees  of 
Academy  v.  Erie,  31  Pa.  St.  515,  517, 
1858.  As  to  transfer  to  new  or  reorgan- 
ized corporation  of  the  property  and  rights 
of  the  old  or  former  corporation,  see 
Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1,  1868; 
Savannah  v.  Steamboat  Company,  R.  M. 
Charlt.  (Ga.)  342;  Fowle  v.  Alexandria, 
3  Pet.  898,  408;  Municipality  v.  Conmiis- 
sioners,  1  Rob.  (La.)  279.  Transition 
from  town  to  city  organization  does  not 
dissolve  the  corporation  or  extinguish  its 
indebtedness.  Olney  v.  Harvey,  50  111. 
453,  1869;  Maysville  v.  Shultz,  3  Dana, 
10,  1805;  Frank  v.  San  Francisco,  21  Cal. 
668;  post,  ch.  vii.  sees.  171,  172. 

-  St.  Louis  V.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  483, 
1856. 

3  State  V.  Merry,  3  Mo.  278,  1833. 
Consult  Goodenow  v.  Buttrick,  7  Mass. 
140,  143;  King  v.  Grant,  1  Barn.  & 
Adol.  104.  Where  a  later  statute  under- 
takes to  revise  the  entire  subject-matter 
of  a  prior  statute,  it  will  generally  be 
taken  as  intended  to  be  a  substitute  for 
the  former  statute  unless  a  contrary  pur- 
pose appears.     It  is  entirely  a  question 


§  87.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  113 

bidding  the  opening  of  streets  through  cemeteries,  is  not  repealed 
by  a  subsequent  act  extending  the  Hmits  of  a  town,  and  appoint- 
ing commissioners  with  authority  "  to  survey,  lay  out,  etc.,  streets 
and  alleys,  as  they  shall  deem  necessary  within  said  limits,"  since 
both  acts  can  stand,  and  repeals  by  implication  are  not  favored.^ 
So  a  general  statute,  expressly  prohibiting  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion from  debarring  citizens  from  selling  at  wholesale  in  the  city 
market,  is  not  repealed  by  implication  by  a  subsequent  act,  by 
which  the  city  authorities  are  invested  with  power  to  pass  such 
ordinances  as  appear  to  them  necessary  for  the  security,  welfare, 
etc.,  of  the  city .2  So,  also,  where  a  state  law  required  auctioneers 
to  take  out  a  state  license,  and  a  subsequent  charter  to  a  city 
gave  it  power  "  to  provide  for  licensing,  taxing,  and  regulating 
auctions,"  etc.,  it  was  held  that  a  license  granted  by  the  city  cor- 
poration to  an  auctioneer  did  not  relieve  him  of  the  necessity  of 
obtaining,  also,  a  license  from  the  state  authorities,  the  court 
being  of  opinion  that  both  statutes  should  and  ought  to  stand,  as 
they  were  not  inconsistent.^ 

G-eneral  Laws  and  Special  Charters.  —  Conflict.  —  Construction. 

§  87.  (54)  It  is  a  principle  of  very  extensive  operation  that 
statutes  of  a  general  nature  do  not  repeal,  hy  imp)lication,  charters 
and  special  acts  passed  for  the  benefit  of  particular  municipali- 
ties ;  *  but  they  do  so  when  this  appears  to  have  been  the  pur- 

of    legislative    intention.      Murdock    v.  in  re,  50  N.  Y.  403,  1872 ;  Mayor  v.  In- 

Memphis,  20  Wall.  590,  617,  and  cases  man,  57  Ga.  870, 1876;  /wsf,  sees.  1.37, 162. 

cited.     Sedgwick  on  Stats.  126 ;  Bank  v.  Repeals   by  implication   are   not   favored ; 

Bridge,  1  Vroom  (SON.  J.  L.),  112;  Indus-  and    special    laws   conferring   particular 

trial    School   v.    Whitehead,   2   Beasley,  rights  upon  municipal  corporations  were 

N.  J.   290;  State  v.  Kelly,  5  Vroom  (34  held  not  to  be  repealed  by  subsequent 

N.  J.  L.),  75.  statutes  general  in  their  cliaracter.   Ottawa 

1  Egypt  Street,  2  Grant  (Pa.)  Cas.  v.  County,  12  111.  339;  Egypt  Street,  2 
455,  1854.  See,  further,  infra,  sec.  87,  Grant  (Pa.)  Cas.  455,  1854;  supra,  sec. 
as  to  repeals  by  implication.  87.    A  general  statute,  repealing  all  acts 

2  Haywood  v.  Savannah,  12  Ga.  404,  contrar}^  to  its  provisions,  held  not  to 
1853.  repeal  a  clause  in  the  charter  of  a  muni- 

8  Simpson  v.  Savage,  1  Mo.  359,  1823 ;  cipal  corporation  upon  tlie  same  subject. 

infra,  s(.'C.  87.     Text    approved,    Sieben-  State  i^.  Branin  (taxation),  3  Zabr.  (23  N. 

hauer,  in  re,  14  Nev.  365.  J.  L.),  484,  1852.    But  a  general  railroad 

*  Bond  V.  Hiestand,  20  La.  An.  1.39;  tax   law  held   to   repeal   by  implication 

Railroad    Co.   v.   Alexandria,   17    Gratt.  prior  special  charter  powers  of  munici- 

(Vt.)    176,    1867;    Hanmiond  v.    Haines,  palities.      "It  is  really  a  question  of  in- 

25  Md.  541;  Louisville  v.  McKean,  18  B.  tention,"  says  Waipier,  J.,  and  the  inten- 

Mon.   9;    Cumberland   v.   Magruder,    .34  tion  was  regarded  as  manifest  from  the 

Md.   381,  1871 ;   Commrs.  Central  Park,  scope  and  purpose  of  the  whole  act,  al- 

VOL.  1.  8 


114  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  V. 

pose  of  the  legislature.  If  both  the  general  and  the  special  acts 
can  stand,  they  will  be  construed  accordingly.  If  one  7nust  give 
way  it  will  depend  upon  the  supposed  intention  of  the  law-maker, 
to  be  collected  from  the  entire  legislation,  whether  the  charter  is 
superseded  by  the  general  statute,  or  whether  the  special  charter 
provisions  apply  to  the  municipalit}^  in  exclusion  of  the  general 
enactments.  So  particular  provisions  of  charters  should  be  read 
and  construed  in  the  light  of  the  whole  instrument,  of  all  pre- 
ceding charters,  of  the  general  legislation  of  the  state,  and  of  the 
object  of  the  legislature  in  the  erection  of  municipalities,  as  before 
explained.^ 

§  88.  The  presumption  is  not  lightly  to  be  indulged  that  the 
legislature  has  hi/  implication  repealed^  as  respects  a  particular 
municipality  or  as  respects  all  municipalities,  laws  of  a  general 
nature,  elsewhere  in  force  throughout  the  state  ;  yet  a  charter  or 
special  act  passed  subsequent  to  the  general  law,  and  plainly 
irreconcilable  with  it,  will  to  the  extent  of  the  conflict  operate  a 
repeal  of  the  latter  by  implication.  But  by  a  well-known  rule, 
founded  on  solid  reasons,  such  repeals  are  not  favored ;  and  the 
principle  of  implied  repeals  ought  to  be  applied  with  extreme 
caution.2 

thoughnegative  words,  or  words  of  repeal,  33  N.  J.  57,  60.  See  Bank  v.  Davis,  1 
were  used.  State  v.  Sevarance,  55  Mo.  McCarter  Ch.  (N.  J.)  286;  Clintonville  v. 
378,  1874 ;  post,  sec.  770.  Keeting,  4  Denio,  341 ;  Tierney  v.  Dodge, 
The  principle  that  (7e«c?'a/ /e(;/s/a?w»(  on  9  Minn.  166.  Other  illustrations  will  be 
a  particular  subject  must,  in  the  absence  found  in  the  chapters  on  Ordinances  and 
of  anything  showing  a  different  intent  on  Taxation,  post,  sec.  773;  ante,  sec.  80. 
the  part  of  the  legislature,  give  way  to  i  Alexandria  v.  Alexandria  (taxing 
incouxistent  sperial  lecjislation  on  the  same  power),  5  Cranch,  2,  1809;  Grant  on 
subject,  is  recognized  and  applied  in  the  Corp.  27 ;  Canal  Company  v.  Railroad 
following  cases.  State  v.  Morristown,  33  Company,  4  Gill  &  Johns.  1 ;  Smith  c. 
N.  J.  Law,  57, 1808-:  Cross  !\  Morristown,  Kernochen,  7  How.  198;  Janesville  v. 
3  C.  E.  Green  (18  N.  J.  Eq.),  305  ;  State  Markoe,  18  Wis.  350 ;  a7de,  sees.  9,  22,  29. 
V.  Trenton,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.),  198,  Acts  in  pari  materia  should  be  construed 
201 ;  State  v.  Branin,  3  Zabr.  (23  N.  J.  L.)  together  ;  and  on  this  principle,  the  defi- 
484;  State  v.  Clark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  54;  nition  of  the  word  "owner,"  in  a  subse- 
State  V.  Jersey  City,  5  lb.  170;  Jersey  quent  paving  act,  was  considered  as 
City  V.  Railroad  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  360;  proper  to  be  adverted  to,  and  as  appHca- 
Goddard,  in  re,  16  Pick.  504  ;  Railroad  ble  to  the  same  word  in  prior  acts  on  the 
Co.  V.  Alexandria,  supra.  In  Bank  o.  same  subject.  Holland  v.  Baltimore,  11 
Bridges,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  112,  and  Md.  180,  1857.  Provisions  in  a  citij  char- 
State  V.  Miller,  lb.  368,  special  laws  ter,  inconsistent  with  amendments  to  the  con- 
gave  way  to  general  laws,  because  the  stitution  of  the  state  afterwards  adopted 
legislature  had  annexed  to  the  latter  a  are  void.  Public  School  Trustees  i'. 
repealing  clause,  abrogating  all  inconsis-  Taylor,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  618. 
tent  local  or  special  acts.     Per  Depue,  J.,  -  See  cases  cited  to  last  preceding  sec- 


§89.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


115 


Extent  of  Power.  —  Limitation. —  Canons  of  Construction. 
§  89.  (55)  It  is  a  general  and  undisputed  proposition  of  law 
that  a  municipal  corporatio7i  possesses  and  can  exercise  the  folloiv- 
ing powers,  and  no  others:  First,  those  granted  in  express  ivords ; 
second,  those  necessarily  or  fairly  implied  in  or  incident  to  the 
powers  expressly  granted ;  third,  those  essential  to  the  declared 
objects  and  purposes  of  the  corporation,  —  not  simply  convenient, 
but  indispensable.^     Any  fair,  reasonable  doubt  concerning  the 


tion;  also,  St.  Louis  v.  Alexander,  23 
Mo.  483;  Baldwin  v.  Green,  10  Mo.  410; 
State  V.  Binder,  ?.8  Mo.  451;  State  v. 
Young  (intoxicating  liquors),  17  Kan. 
414,  1877  (where  the  Kansas  cases  on  the 
subject  are  discussed  by  Norton,  C.  J.) ; 
State  V.  Clarke,  1  Dutcher  (N.  J.),  54; 
State  V.  Douglass,  4  Vroora  (33  N.  J.  L.), 
363;  State  v.  Mills,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J. 
L.),  177,  180.  The  case  of  the  State  i-. 
Clark,  54  Mo.  17,  1873,  s.  c.  14  Am.  Rep. 
471,  and  of  the  State  v.  De  Bar,  58  Mo. 
305, 1874,  relating  to  the  social  evil  powers 
of  the  city  of  St.  Louis,  are  highly  in- 
structive on  the  question  on  the  effect  of 
a  special  act  upon  the  general  law.  In 
each  case  the  defendant  was  indicted 
under  the  general  criminal  code  of  the 
state  which  prohibited  the  keeping  of 
bawdy  houses.  In  the  first  case  the 
defendant  pleaded  a  license  from  the  city 
to  keep  such  a  house.  In  1870  the 
charter  of  the  city  was  amended,  and 
the  previous  power  to  "suppress"  such 
houses  was  changed  to  the  power  "  to  pass 
ordinances,  not  inconsistent  with  any  law 
of  the  state,  to  regulate  or  suppress  "  such 
houses.  Under  this  power  to  regulate, 
the  city  regulated  such  liouses  bypassing 
an  ordinance  licensing  them  ;  and  such 
an  ordinance  was  held  to  be  valid  not- 
withstanding the  general  law,  and  to 
have  the  effect  to  prevent  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  general  criminal  law  of  the 
state  within  the  city  of  St.  Louis.  The 
question  was  a  close  one,  but  the  majority 
opinion  of  Naplon,  J.,  in  view  of  the 
legislation  recited  in  it,  seems  to  be 
sound.  State  v.  Clark,  54  Mo.  17,  1873. 
The  next  year,  1874,  in  consequence 
of  the  decision,  the  charter  of  tlie  city 
was  amended  in  this  respect,  by  sub- 
tituting  the  words  "  to  suppress,  but  not 
to  license,  bawdy  liouses."  After  this  act 
went  into  efffct  the  State  v.  De  B;ir,  ,s?//;/-«, 
arose.     Tiie  defendant  was  indicted  under 


the  general  law  of  the  state  for  keeping 
such  a  house.  There  was  another  provi- 
sion in  the  general  law  that  the  repeal  of 
a  law  shall  not  by  implication  revive  a 
former  law.  And  it  was  held  by  a  ma- 
jority of  the  court  that  the  amendment  of 
1874,  which  repealed  the  former  amend- 
ment of  1870,  did  not  tliereby  revive 
the  general  criminal  statute  in  the  city 
of  St.  Louis,  and,  as  a  consequence,  that 
the  defendant  could  not  be  convicted. 
This  last  decision  seems  to  the  author  to 
be  erroneous,  on  the  ground  that  the  act 
of  1870  did  not  ipso  facto  repeal  the  gen- 
eral law  in  tlie  city,  but  such  repeal,  or 
suspension  rather,  was  only  effected  when 
the  city  passed  the  ordinance.  If  so,  a 
repeal  of  the  ordinance  by  the  council, 
without  the  act  of  1874,  would  have  left 
the  general  law  of  the  state  in  force 
within  the  city,  and  its  repeal  by  the  act 
of  1874  would  have  precisely  the  same 
effect.  These  cases  may  be  usefully  con- 
sulted on  the  nature  and  scope  of  the 
power  to  "regulate."  General  power  in  a 
municipal  charter  held  not  to  repeal  by 
implication  the  chartered  rights  of  a 
railroad  company.  State  v.  Jersey  City, 
5  Dutcher,  170.  Nor  to  interfere  with 
vested  rights.  State  v.  Jersey  City,  5 
Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  32. 

A  charter  which  coniers  exchisire  juris- 
diction upon  municipal  authorities  oper- 
ates to  repeal  the  general  law  on  tlie  same 
subject  within  the  municipality  ;  not  so 
ordinarily,  wlien  the  charter  confers  con- 
current authority.  Seebold  v.  People,  86 
111.  33.  1878. 

1  Smith  V.  Newbern,  70  No.  Car.  14, 
1874  ;  s.  c.  10  Am.  766.  Referring  to 
the  text,  McAllister,  J.,  in  People  v.  How- 
ard, not  officially  reported,  says,  "  It  is  the 
best  summary  of  all  the  decisions  upon 
that  point  to  lie  found  in  all  tlie  books." 
Cook  Co.  V.  McCrca,  93  111.  2.36,  citi\ig 
and  approving  text. 


IIG  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  V. 

existence  of  power  is  resolved  by  the  courts  against  the  corpora- 
tion, luul  the  power  is  denied.  Of  every  municipal  corporation 
the  charter  or  statute  by  which  it  is  created  is  its  organic  act. 
Noilher  the  corporation  nor  its  officers  can  do  any  act,  or  make 
any  contiact,  or  incur  any  liability,  not  authorized  thereby.  All 
acts  beyond  the  scope  of  the  powers  granted  are  void.^  Much 
less  can  any  power  be  exercised,  or  any  act  done,  which  is  for- 
bidden by  charter  or  statute.  These  principles  are  of  transcend- 
ent importance,  and  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  law  of  municipal 
corporations.  Their  reasonableness,  their  necessity,  and  their 
salutary  character  have  been  often  vindicated,  but  never  more 
forcibly  than  by  the  late  learned  Chief  Justice  Shaiv,  who,  speak- 
ing of  municipal  and  public  corporations,  says  :  "  They  can  exer- 
cise no  powers  but  those  which  are  conferred  upon  them  by  the 
act  by  which  they  are  constituted,  or  such  as  are  necessary  to 
the  exercise  of  their  corporate  powers,  the  performance  of  their 
corporate  duties,  and  the  accomplishment  of  the  purposes  of  their 
association.  This  principle  is  derived  from  the  nature  of  corpo- 
rations, the  mode  in  which  they  are  organized,  and  in  which  their 
affairs  must  be  conducted." 

§  90.  In  aggregate  corporations,  as  a  general  rule,  the  act  and 
will  of  a  majority  is  deemed  in  law  the  act  and  will  of  the  whole, 
—  as  the  act  of  the  corporate  body.  The  consequence  is  that 
a  minority  must  be  bound  not  only  without,  but  against,  their 
consent.  Such  an  obligation  may  extend  to  every  onerous 
duty,  —  to  pay  money  to  an  unlimited  amount,  to  perform  services, 
to  surrender  lands,  and  the  like.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that 
if  this  liability  were  to  extend  to  unlimited  and  indefinite  objects, 
the  citizen,  by  being  a  member  of  a  corporation,  might  be  de- 

1  McCann  v.  Otoe   Co.,   9  Neb.  324  ;  son,  5  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  104  ;  State  «.  Marion 

Stewart  r.  Otoe  Co.,   2  Neb.  177  ;  S.  C.  Co.,  21  Kan.  419 ;  Green  v.  Cape  May, 

and  P.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Washington  Co.,  3  41  N.  J.  L.  45;  Lord  v.  Oconto,  47  Wis. 

Neb.  42  ;    Somerville   v.  Dickerman,  127  386  ;    Garvey,  m  re,  77  N.  Y.  523;  Smith 

Mass.  272;  Boylston  Marltet  v.  Boston,  v.  Newburgli,  77  N.  Y.  130;  Allen  v.  Gal- 

113  Mass.  528 ;  Harvard    College  v.  Bos-  veston,  51  Tex.  302  ;  Dore  i-.  Milwaukee, 

ton,  104  Mass.  470;  Brimmer  v.  Boston,  42  Wis.  18;  Butler  v.  Nevins,  88  111.575 

102  ^L^ss.  19;  People  i-.  Webber,  89  HI.  Kansas    City   v.   Flanagan,   69   Mo.   22 

847;  Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex.  532;  Fran-  Bentleyt;.  County  Commrs.,  25  Minn.  259 

cis  V.  Troy,  74  N.  Y.  .338 ;    State  v.  Pas-  Fulton  v.  Lincoln,  9  Neb.  358 ;  Hurford 

saic,  41  N.  J.  L.  90;    Perrine  v.  Farr,  2  v.  Omaha,  4  Neb.  350;  Reis  v.  Graff,  51 

Zabr.  (22  N.  J.  L).  356  ;  Cannon  v.  Mar-  Cal.  86.     Cook  Co.  v.  McCrea,  93  111.  236, 

tin,  2   Dutch.  (N.  J.)  594  ;    State  v.  Hud-  citing  and  ajjproving  text. 


§  91.]  MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS.  117 

prived  of  his  most  valuable  personal  rights  and  liberties.  The 
security  against  this  danger  is  in  a  steady  adherence  to  the  prin- 
ciple stated,  viz.,  that  corporations  can  only  exercise  their  powers 
over  their  respective  members,  for  the  accomplishment  of  limited 
and  defined  objects.  And  if  this  principle  is  important,  as  a  gen- 
eral rule  of  social  right  and  municipal  law,  it  is  of  the  highest 
importance  in  these  states,  where  corporations  have  been  ex- 
tended and  multiplied  so  as  to  embrace  almost  every  object  of 
human  concern.  ^ 

§  91.  "  In  this  country,  all  corporations,  whether  public  or 
private,  derive  their  powers  from  legislative  grant,  and  can  do 
no  act  for  which  authority  is  not  expressly  given,  or  may  not  be 
reasonably  inferred.  But  if  we  were  to  say  that  they  can  do 
nothing  for  which  a  warrant  could  not  be  found  in  the  language 
of  their  charters,  we  should  deny  them,  in  some  cases,  the  power 
of  self-preservation,  as  well  as  many  of  the  means  necessary  to 
effect  the  essential  objects  of  their  incorporation.  And  therefore 
it  has  long  been  an  established  principle  in  the  law  of  corpora- 
tions, that  they  may  exercise  all  the  powers  within  the  fair  intent 
and  purpose  of  their  creation  which  are  reasonably  proper  to  give 

1  Per  Shaw,   C.  J.,  in   Spaulding  v.  (Mich.  282;  City  Council  i;.  Plank  Road 

Lowell,  23  Pick.  71,  74,  1839 ;  Bangs  v.  Co.,  81  Ala.  76 ;  State  v.  Mayor,  5  Port. 

Snow,  1  Mass.  181;   Stetson  v.  Kempton,  (Ala.)  279;   Burnett,  in  re,  30  Ala.  461, 

13  Mass.  272 ;    Willard   v.  Newburyport,  and  cases  cited ;  Le  Couteulx  v.  Buffalo, 

12   Pick.   227;    Keyes    v.   Westford,    17  33  N.  Y.  3-33 ;  Hayes  y.  Appleton,  24  Wis. 

Pick.  273, 279 ;  Comw.  r.  Turner,  1  Gush.  544;    People   v.   Railroad   Co.,   12    Mich. 

493,  495,   1848 ;    Cooley  v.  Granville,  10  387 ;  Vance  v.  Little   Rock,  30  Ark.  435, 

Cush.  57,   1852;  Merriam  v.  Moody,   25  1876;   Indianapolis    v.    Indianapolis    Gas 

Iowa,   163,    1868;    Minturn  r.  Larue,   23  Co.,  66  Ind.  396.      Text  approved  in  the 

How.   435 ;     Lafayette   v.    Cox,    5    Ind.  •  following   cases :    Noyes  v.  Mason,  5   N. 

(Port.)  38,   1854;    Paine  v.   Spratley,   5  W.  R.  595;   Frank,    in   re,  52   Cal.  606; 

Kan.    525;     Vincent    v.  Nantucket,    12  Green  y.  Cape  May,  41  N.  J.  L.  45. 
Cush.  103,  105  ;  Clark  v.  Davenport,   14  "  The  powers  of  all  corporations  are  lim- 

lowa,  494 ;  Mays   v.  Cincinnati,    1    Ohio  ited  hy  the  grants  in  their  charters,  and  can- 

St.  268 ;  Gallia   Co.  v.  Holcomb,   7   Ohio,  not  extend  beyond  them."     Per   Breese,  J., 

Part  I.  232  ;  Commrs.  v.  Mighels,  7  Ohio  Petersburg  v.  Metzger,  21  III.  205.    "  Cor- 

St.  109;  Fitch  v.  Pinckard  (taxing  pow-  porations    have    only    such    rights    and 

er)  4  Scam.  (5  111.)  78;  Caldwell  v.  Alton  powers  as  are  expressly  granted  to  tiiein, 

(market  ordinance),  33  111.  416;  Trustees,  or  as  are  necessary  to   carry  into  effect 

etc.  y.  McConnel,  12   111.  140;   Louisiana  the  rights  and  powers  so  granted."     Per 

State  Bank  v.  New  Orleans  Nav.  Co.,  3  Storrs,   J.,  in  New   London   v.  Brainard 

La.  An.  294;  State  y.  Mayor,  etc.  (market  (illegal  appropriation  of  money  to  cele- 

house  case),  5  Port.  (Ala.)  279;  Head  v.  brate  4th  of  July),  22  Conn.  552,  1853, 

Ins.  Co.,  2  Cranch,  168;  De  Russoy   v.  approving  Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass. 

Davis  (sale  of  ferry  lease),   13  La.  An.  272;    Hodge   v.  Buffalo,    2  Denio,  110; 

468;     People    v.    Bank,    etc.,    1    Doug,  ante,  sec.  29. 


118 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  V. 


effect  to  powers  expressly  granted.  In  doing  this,  they  must 
[unless  restricted  in  this  respect]  have  a  choice  of  means  adapted 
to  ends,  and  are  not  to  be  confined  to  any  one  mode  of  opera- 
tion." ^  The  Incidental  powers  of  a  municipal  corporation  must 
be  germane  to  the  purposes  for  which  it  is  created.^ 

Courts  adopt  a  strict,  rather  thayi  liberal  construction  of  poivers  : 
"  It  is  a  well  settled  rule  of  construction  of  grants  by  the  legisla- 
ture to  corporations,  whether  public  or  private,  that  only  such 
powers  and  rights  can  be  exercised  under  them  as  are  clearly 
comprehended  within  the  words  of  the  act,  or  derived  therefrom 
by  necessary  implication,  regard  being  had  to  the  objects  of  the 
o-rant.  Any  ambiguity  or  doubt  arising  out  of  the  terms  used  by 
the  legislature  must  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  public.''''^     These 


1  Bridgeport  v.  Railroad  Co.,  15  Conn. 
475,  501,  1843.     Per  Church,  J. 

-  Mayor  v.  Yuille,  3  Ala.  137  (license 
to  bakers)  ;  Harris  v.  lutendant,  28  lb. 
b'll  (retailing  liquors);  Intendant  v.  Chan- 
dler, 6  lb.  899  (retailing  liquors). 

8  Minturn  v.  Larue,  23  How.  435,  436, 
1859.  Per  Nelson,  J.,  construing  muni- 
cipal charter  as  to  ferry  rights  of  corpora- 
tioH  thereunder. 

In  subsequent  cases,  the  Supreme 
Court  has  said  that  a  municipal  cor- 
poration "can  exercise  no  power  wliich 
is  not,  in  express  terms  or  by  fair  im- 
plication, conferred  upon  it."  Thomp- 
son V.  Lee  Co.,  3  Wall.  .320;  Thomas 
V.  Richmond,  United  States  Supreme 
Court,  December  Term,  1871,  12  Wall. 
349;  s.  r.  Clark  v.  Davenport,  14  Iowa, 
495;  Merriam  v.  Moody's  executors,  25 
Iowa,  163 ;  Nichol  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  9 
Humph.  252 ;  Leonard  v.  Canton,  35 
Miss.  189,  where  Fisher,  J.,  gives  a  clear 
exposition  of  the  rationale  of  the  doctrine 
that  corporate  grants  should  be  strictly 
construed.  Douglass  v.  Placerville,  18 
Cal.  643,  647  ;  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco, 
16  Cal.  282 ;  Wallace  v.  San  Jose,  29  Cal. 
180.  With  us,  cities,  towns,  and  munici- 
pal corporations  of  all  kinds  are  created 
and  endowed  with  powers  by  the  legisla- 
ture. These  are  of  a  legislative  and  ad- 
ministrative character,  to  aid  in  the  bet- 
ter government  of  localities  or  portions 
of  the  state.  Tiiis  power  exists  no  fur- 
ther than  it  has  been  delegated.  And 
municipal  corporations,  in  their  action, 
are  confined  "to  a  strict  construction  of 


the  grants  of  powers  contained  in  their 
charters  "  or  acts  of  incorporation.  La- 
fayette V.  Cox,  5  Ind.  (Porter)  38,  1854. 
"  It  is  proper,  too,  that  these  powers 
should  be  strictly  construed,  considering 
with  how  little  care  chartered  privileges 
are  these  days  granted."  Bank  v.  Cliili- 
cothe,  7  Oiiio,  Part  II.  31,  35,  1836,  per 
Hitchcock,  J. ;  Collins  v.  Hatch,  18  Ohio, 
523.  "  Boroughs  and  towns  are,  confess- 
edly, inferior  corporations.  They  act  not 
by  any  inherent  right  of  legislation,  like 
the  legislature  of  the  state,  but  their 
authority  is  delegated,  and  their  powers, 
therefore,  must  be  strictly  pursued. 
Within  the  limits  of  their  charter,  their 
acts  are  valid  ;  without  it,  they  are  void." 
Willard  v.  Killingworth,  8  Conn.  247,  per 
Daggett,  J.,  approved  10  lb.  442.  "  Tiie 
action  of  municipal  corporations  is  to  be 
held  strictly  witliin  the  hmits  prescribed 
by  statute.  Within  these  limits,  they  are 
to  be  favored  by  the  courts.  Powers  ex- 
pressly granted,  or  necessarily  implied, 
are  not  to  be  defeated  or  impaired  by  a 
stringent  construction."  Smith  v.  Madi- 
son, 7  Ind.  86  ;  Kyle  v.  Malin,.  8  lb.  34, 
57,  per  Stuart,  .1.  ;  Memphis  v.  Adams 
(implied  power  to  employ  an  attorney),  9 
Heisk  (Tenn.)  518;  s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep. 
331.  Per  Nicholson,  C.  J.  A  municipal 
corporation  has  no  right  to  appropriate  its 
revenues  to  obtain  an  increase  of  its 
powers,  through  persons  sent  by  the  city 
council  to  appear  before  the  State  Gen- 
eral Assembly  and  Congress.  Henderson 
V.  Covington,  14  Bush  (Ky.),  312. 

In  concluding  this    note,    the   author 


§  93.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  119 

general  principles  of  law  are  indisputably  settled,  but  difficulty 
is  often  experienced  in  their  application,  on  account  of  the  com- 
plex character  of  municipal  duties,  and  the  various,  miscellaneous, 
and  frequentl}'  indefinite  purposes  or  objects  which  municipali- 
ties are  authorized  to  execute  or  carry  into  operation.^ 

Usage  as  affecting  Municipal  Powers. 

§  92.  (56)  In  England  municipal  corporations  claim  and  exer- 
cise many  powers  wholly  in  virtue  of  long-established  usage,  or 
of  prescription,  which  implies  a  lost  charter  conferring  such 
powers.^  Indeed,  from  immemorial  usage,  powers  are  recognized 
as  valid  which  could  not  lawfully  originate  in  a  royal  charter. 
A  usage  to  give  a  right  must,  however,  be  long  established,  and 
forty  years'  duration  was  not  considered,  of  itself,  to  be  suf- 
ficient for  this  purpose.^  But  usage  in  this  country  has  a  much 
more  limited  operation.  It  is  a  necessary  result  of  the  manner 
in  which  our  municipal  corporations  are  created  —  viz.,  by  express 
legislative  act,  wherein  their  powers  and  duties  are  wholly  pre- 
scribed—  that  the  powers  themselves  cannot  be  added  to,  enlarged, 
or  diminished  by  proof  of  usage. 

§  93.  (57)  In  a  case  in  Massachusetts,  the  learned  Chief 
Justice  Bigeloiv,  after  stating  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
that  towns  in  Massachusetts  had  no  authority  to  appropriate 
money  for  the  celebration  of  the  Fourth  of  July,  remarks,  in 
relation  to  the  attempt  to  sustain  the  appropriation  on  the  ground 

thinks  it  pertinent  to  remark  that  the  prin-  or  abridge  natural  or  common  rights,  or 

ciple  of  strict  construction  shouhl  not  be  divest  them  of  their  property',  tlie  doubt 

pressed  in  any  case  to  such  an  unreason-  sliould  be  resolved  in  favor  of  tiie  citizen, 

able  extent  as  to  defeat  tlie  legislative  and  against  the  municipality.     Infra,  sec. 

purpose  fairly  appearing  upon  the  entire  109  ;  Logan  v.  Pyne,  43  Iowa,  524,  1876  ; 

charter  or  enactment.     Perhaps  the  rule  s.  c.  22  Am.  Kep.  261. 

as  it  is  briefly  expressed  in  the  text  best  '  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23   Pick.    71 ; 

embodies  the  result  of  the  adjudications  ante,  sees.  8-28  ;  post,  ch.  vi.  where  some 

upon   this   point,   namely :    If,  upon  the  of  these  miscellaneous  or  special  powers 

whole,  there  be  fair,  reasonable,  and  sub-  are  considered. 

stantial   doubt   whether   tlie    legislature  2  j„^g^  eh.  ii.  sec.  29  ;  ch.  iii.  sec.  82. 

intended  to  confer  the  autliority  in  ques-  ^  Chad  r.  Tilsed,  5  J.  B.  Moore,  185. 

lion,  particularly  if  it  relates  to  a  matter  As  to  the  proper  office  of  usage  in  Eng- 

extra- municipal  or  unusual  in  its  nature,  land,  both  as  a  source  of  power  and  to  aid 

and  the  exercise  of  which  will  be  attended  in    the    interpretation    of   charters,    see 

with  taxes,  tolls,  assessments,  or  burdens  Grant  ou  Corp.  19,  27,  28,  29,  552,  564. 
upon  the  inhabitants,  or  oppress  them, 


120  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  V. 

of  usarje :  "  Usage  cannot  alter  the  case.  An  unlawful  expend- 
iture of  money  by  a  town  cannot  be  rendered  valid  by  usage, 
liowever  long  continued.  Abases  of  power  and  violations  of 
right  derive  no  sanction  from  time  or  custom.  A  casual  or  occa- 
sional exercise  of  a  power  by  one  or  a  few  towns  will  not 
constitute  usage.  It  must  not  only  be  general  and  of  long 
continuance,  but,  what  is  more  important,  it  must  also  be  a 
custom  necessary  to  the  exercise  of  some  corporate  power,  or  the 
enjoyment  of  some  corporate  right,  or  which  contributes  essen- 
tially to  the  necessities  and  convenience  of  the  inhabitants. 
The  usage  relied  on  in  the  present  case  would  not  satisfy  either 
of  these  last-named  requisites,  which  are  necessary  to  give  it 
validity."  ^  But  general  and  long-continued  usage  is  not  without 
its  importance,  and  usage  of  this  character  may  be  resorted  to 
in  aid  of  a  proper  construction  of  the  charter  or  statute,  but  no 
further.  If  the  language  be  uncertain  or  doubtfid,  a  uniform, 
long-established,  and  unquestioned  usage  will  be  regarded  by 
the  courts  in  determining  the  mode  in  which  powers  may  be 
exercised,  and  to  a  reasonable  extent  in  determining  the  scope 
of  the  powers  themselves ;  but  usage  can  have  no  room  for 
operation  where  the  language  of  the  enactment  is  plain  and  the 
legislative  intent  is  clear  upon  the  face  of  it.^ 

1  Hood  V.  Lynn,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  103,  that  place."    Frazier  v.  Warfield  (Inspec- 

1861.     Further  as  to  u*ige  consult  Will-  tion  Act  for  Baltimore),  13  Md.  279,  303 ; 

ard;;.  Newburyport,  12Pick.  227  ;  Spauld-  s.  p.  Love  v.  Hinckley,   Abt.  Adm.  436; 

ing  V.  Lowell,   28   Pick.   71 ;    Smith   v.  see,   also,   Rex   v.   Cliester,   1   Maule   & 

Cheshire,  13   Gray   (Mass.),  308,  1859;  Selw.  101;  Rex  v.    Salway,  9   B.  &  C. 

Butler   V.  Charlestown,  7  Gray,   12,  16,  424. 

185G ;  Benoit  v.  Conway,  10  Allen,  528.  Where  the  true  construction  of  a 
2  Smith  I'.  Cheshire,  13  Gray,  308 ;  charter  admits  of  doubt,  and  tlie  con- 
Butler  V.  Charlestown,  7  Gray,  12,  16;  struction  adopted  by  the  city  autliorities 
Sherwin  t\  Bugbee  (validity  of  school  has  been  acquiesced  in  generally,  and 
meeting),  16  Vt.  439,  444,  where  i?ef//ieW,  acted  upon  by  third  persons  in  good 
J.,  remarks  :  "  In  construing  statutes  ap-  faith,  in  their  transactions  with  the  city, 
plicable  to  public  corporations,  courts  it  will  be  precluded  by  the  courts  in 
will  attach  no  slight  weight  to  the  uniform  actions  by  such  third  parties  from  deny- 
practice  under  tliem,  if  this  practice  has  ing  its  construction  to  be  the  true  one. 
continued  for  a  considerable  period  of  Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison  City  (on  rail- 
time."  It  is  a  rule  "founded  on  reason  road  bonds),  1  Wall.  (U.  S.)  291,  1863; 
and  common  sense,"  says  the  Court  of  Meyer  v.  Muscatine  (on  railroad  bonds), 
Appeals  of  Maryland,  that  "f/o«6(/!i/wor(/s  lb.  384,  391;  pnst,  sec.  420.  Further  as 
in  a  general  statute  may  be  expounded  with  to  eatoppel,  see  chapter  on  Contracts,  post, 
reference  to  a  general  usage;  and  wheti  a  and  Herman  on  Estoppel.  Post,  sees. 
statute  is  applicable  to  a  particular  place  onli/,  457,500  n.,  562  n.,  591  n.,  ch.  xxii.,  ch. 
such  imrds  may  be  construed  by  usage  at  xxiii. 


§94.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS. 


121 


Discretionary  Powers  not  Subject  to  Judicial  Control. 

§  94.  (58)  Power  to  do  an  act  is  often  conferred  upon  muni- 
cipal corporations,  in  general  terms,  without  being  accompanied 
by  any  prescribed  mode  of  exercising  it.  In  such  cases  the  com- 
mon council,  or  governing  bod}',  necessarily  have,  to  a  greater  or 
less  extent,  a  discretion  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  power 
shall  be  used.^  This  discretion  cannot  be  judicially  interfered 
with  or  questioned  except  where  the  power  is  exceeded  or  fraud  is 
imputed  and  shown  or  there  is  a  manifest  invasion  of  private 
rights.  Thus  where  the  law  or  charter  confers  upon  the  city 
council,  or  local  legislature,  power  to  determine  upon  the  expedi- 
ency or  necessity  of  measures  relating  to  the  local  government, 
their  judgment  upon  matters  thus  committed  to  them,  while  act- 
ing within  the  scope  of  their  authority,  cannot  be  controlled  by 
the  courts.  In  such  case  the  decision  of  the  proper  corporate 
officers  is  in  the  absence  of  fraud  final  and  conclusive,  unless 
they  transcend  their  powers.^  Thus,  for  example,  if  a  city  has 
power  to  grade  streets,  the  courts  will  not  inquire  into  the  neces- 


^  Railroad  Co.  v.  Evansville  (power 
to  subscribe  stock  and  to  borrow  money), 
15  Ind.  395,  1860 ;  Kelly  i'.  Milwaukee, 
18  Wis.  83 ;  Slack  v.  Railroad  Co.,  13  B. 
Mon.  1 ;  Bridgeport  v.  Railroad  Co.,  15 
Conn.  475,  501,  1843,  per  Church,  J.; 
Harrison  v.  Baltimore,  1  Gill  (Md.),  264, 
1843 ;  Cincinnati  v.  Gwynne,  10  Oiiio, 
192;  Markle  v.  Akron,  14  Ohio,  586. 
Where  a  municipal  corporation  is  en- 
trusted with  the  execution  of  a  power, 
and  is  not  confined  to  a  particular  mode, 
but  has  a  discretion  in  tlie  choice  of 
means,  a  plain  case  of  abuse  must  be 
shown,  resulting  in  an  injury  to  the  pe- 
titioner, to  warrant  an  injunction  against 
tlie  corporation.  Page  v.  St.  Louis  (special 
assessment),  20  Mo.  136,  1853;  Colton  v. 
Ilancliett,  13  III.  615;  Bush  v.  Carbondale, 
78  111.  74,  1875 ;  Mayor  of  Baltimore  v. 
Gill,  31  Md.  375  ;  Holland  v.  Baltimore, 
11  Md.  186;  post,  sec.  146;  Dodd  v. 
Hartford,  25  Conn.  232;  Sheldon  v. 
School  District,  Ih.  224 ;  Lockwood  v. 
St.  Louis,  24  Mo.  20 ;  Deane  v.  Todd,  22 
Mo.  90;  Mayor,  etc.  i-.  Meserole,  26 
Wend.  132.  See  chapters  on  Contracts 
and  Taxation,  post ;  Wells  v.  Atlanta,  43 
Ga.  67.  1871;  Coulson  i^.  Portland, 
Deady    K.    481,    1808;    post,   sees.    112, 


ch.  xxiii.  In  respect  to  the  legislative 
functions  of  a  municipal  body,  the  courts 
are  bound  to  presume  that  they  will  exer- 
cise any  discretion  with  which  they  are 
clothed  properly,  and  that  they  had  suffi- 
cient reasons  for  doing  an  act,  the  result  of 
such  discretion.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Mayor  of 
New  York,  1  Hilton,  562, 1858;  Des  Moines 
Gas  Co.  V.  Des  Moines,  44  Iowa,  508, 1876 ; 
8.  c.  24  Am.  Rep.  756 ;   post,  sec.  379. 

By  statute  in  Canada,  certain  superior 
courts  have  power  in  their  discretion  to 
set  aside  by-laws  for  illegality  on  the 
application  of  persons  interested,  but 
these  courts  will  not  entertain  an  applica- 
tion to  set  aside  a  by-law  on  a  matter  of 
fact,  which,  according  to  municipal  act,  or 
a  by-law  passed  under  it,  should  be  ascer- 
tained and  finally  determined  by  an 
officer  of  the  corporation,  unless  perhaps 
fraud  or  corrupt  conduct  be  imputed  to 
such  officer.  See  Michie  and  the  Cor- 
poration of  the  City  of  Toronto,  in  re,  11 
Upper  Can.  C.  P.  379. 

2  Baker  y.  Boston,  12  Pick.  184;  Ho- 
vey  V.  Mayo,  43  Maine,  322,  1857  ;  Fay, 
petitioner,  15  Pick.  248,  1834 ;  Parks  v. 
Boston,  8  Pick.  218,  1829;  Danielly  v. 
Cabaniss,  52  Ga.,  211,  1874;  Sheridan 
V.  Colvin,  78  111.  237,  1875. 


122  MUNICIPAL  COKPORATIONS.  [CH.  V. 

sitv  of  llio  exercise  of  it,  or  the  refusal  to  exercise  it,  nor  whether 
a  parlicuhir  grade  adopted,  or  a  particuhir  mode  of  executing  the 
grade,  is  judicious.^  So  if  a  city  has  power  to  build  a  market- 
house,  the  courts  cannot  inquire  into  the  size  and  fitness  of  the 
huilding  for  the  object  intended.^  So  in  the  absence  of  fraud, 
the  court  refused  to  interfere  by  injunction  with  the  action  of  the 
city  council  in  agreeing  to  rent  a  room  for  city  purposes  for 
twenty  years  and  to  pay  for  the  same  in  advance.^ 

§  9*).  (59)  So,  also,  where,  by  its  charter,  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  empowered,  if  it  deems  the  public  welfare  or  convenience 
requires  it,  to  open  streets  or  make  public  improvements  thereon, 
its  determination,  whether  wise  or  unwise,  cannot  be  judicially 
revised  or  corrected.^  On  the  ground  that  it  is  the  province  of 
the  municipal  authorities,  and  not  of  the  judicial  tribunals,  to 
determine  what  improvements  shall  be  made  in  the  streets  and 
highways  of  the  corporation,  the  court,  on  application  of  citizens, 
refused  to  compel  a  city  to  cover  over  an  open  draining  canal  of 
long  standing,  it  "  not  appearing  to  be  a  nuisance  in  the  legal 
sense  of  the  word."^  So  where  it  is  made  the  duty  of  a  city  to 
remove,  as  far  as  they  may  be  able,  every  nuisance  which  may 
endanger  health,  the  courts,  unless  the  power  be  transcended, 
cannot  ordinarily  interfere.^  But  the  power  to  abate  nuisances, 
like  all  other  lyiuriicipal  j^oivers^  must  he  reasonably  exercised;  and 
although  the  power  be  given  to  be  exercised  in  any  manner  the 
corporate  authorities  may  deem  expedient,  it  is  not  an  unlimited 
power,  and  such  means  only  are  intended  as  are  reasonably  neces- 
sary for  the  public  good;  wanton  or  unnecessary  injury  to  private 
property  and  private  rights  are  not  thereby  authorized^     And 

1  Hovey  r.  IMayo,  street  commissioner,  6  Gill  (Md.),  391, 1848.  Passing  ordinan- 
43  Me.  322,  18-57  ;  Benjamin  v.  Wheeler,  ces  in  relation  to  opening,  etc.,  of  streets, 
8  Gray,  409,  413,  1857.  is  the  exercise  of  legislative,  not  judicial 

2  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  71,  80,  power.  Wiggin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  New 
1839.  So  wliere  a  city  has  power  to  lease  York,  9  Paige,  16,  1841.  See  chapter  on 
real  estate  at  a   "  reasonable  rent,"  the  Eminent  Domain,  post. 

council  is  to  determine  what  is  reasona-  ^  Inhabitants  v.  New  Orleans,  14  La. 

ble,  and  their  discretion  in  the  absence  of  An.  4-52,  1859. 

fraud  cannot   be  judicially   overthrown.  6  Baker  n.  Boston,  12  Pick.  184,  1831 ; 

Schanck  v.  Mayor,  69  N.  Y.  440,  1877.  see  also  Kelly  v.   Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  83, 

3  Moses  V.  Risdon,  46  Iowa,  251,  1877  ;  1864 ;  Goodrich  v.  Cliicago,  20  111.  445. 
quaere,  and  compare  Garrison  v.  Chicago,  7  Further  as  to  nuisances,  see  chapter  on 
Bissell,  480,  1877.  Ordinances,  pos<.     Index  —  Nuixances. 

*  Methodist  P.  Church,  v.  Baltimore,  7  Babcock  v.  Buffalo,  66   N.   Y.  268, 


§96.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS. 


123 


generally  the  judicial  tribunals  will  not  interfere  with  municipal 
corporations  in  their  internal  police  and  administrative  gov- 
ernment, unless  some  clear  right  has  been  withheld  or  wrong 
perpetrated.^ 

Public  Powers  and  Trusts  incapable  of  Delegation. 

§  96.  (60)  The  principle  is  a  plain  one,  that  the  public  powers 
or  trusts  devolved  by  law  or  charter  upon  the  council  or  govern- 
ing body,  to  be  exercised  by  it  when  and  in  such  manner  as  it 
shall  judge  best,  cannot  be  delegated  to  others.  Thus,  where  by 
charter  or  statute,  local  imiDroveraents,  to  be  assessed  upon  the 
adjacent  property  owners,  are  to  be  constructed  in  "such  wawwer 
as  the  common  council  shall  prescribe  "  by  ordinance,  it  is  not 
competent  for  the  council  to  pass  an  ordinance  delegating  or 
leaving  to  any  officer  or  committee  of  the  corporation  the  power 
to  determine  the  mode,  manner,  or  plan  of  the  improvement. 
Such  an  ordinance  is  void,  since  powers  of  this  kind  must  be 
exercised  in  strict  conformity  with  the  charter  or  incorporating 
act.2     So,  wliere  a  power,  for  example,  the  power  to  issue  licenses, 


1874,  where  the  city  was  enjoined  from 
filling  up  plaintiff's  slip  in  the  canal,  he- 
cause,  under  the  circumstances,  it  was 
not  a  proper  exercise  of  the  power  to  abate 
nuisances. 

1  State  V.  Swearingen,  12  Ga.  23; 
post,  ch.  xxii. 

2  State  V.  Hauser,  63  Ind.  155 ;  State  v. 
Bell,  34  Ohio  St.  194  ;  Birdsall  v.  Clark,  73 
N.  Y.  73 ;  N. Y.  etc.  Trustees,  in  re,  57  How. 
Pr.  500  ;  Thompson  v.  Scherraerhorn,  6  N. 
Y.  (2  Seld.)  92,  1851,  relating  to  grading 
and  levelling  streets ;  affirming  s.  c.  9 
Barb.  152,  and  approving  in  the  main 
the  views  there  expressed  by  Mr.  Justice 
Cady.  Brooklyn  v.  Breslin,  57  N.  Y. 
591,  1874  ;  distinguishing  Thompson  v. 
Schermerhorn,  supra,  State  v.  Jersey  City, 
1  Dutch.  (N.J.)  309  ;  see  4  lb.  500;  post, 
sees.  357,  716,  780  ;  Indianapolis  v.  Indian- 
apolis Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  citing  this 
section.  Same  i)rinciple  applied  in  simi- 
lar case,  lluggles  v.  Collier,  43  Mo.  359, 
1869,  holding  that  where  tlie  charter  gave 
the  city  power  to  reqiiire  streets  to  he.  paved, 
"  in  all  cases  where  the  citi/  cnnnril  shall 
deem  it  necessary,"  it  could  not  by  ordi- 
nance make  the  mayor  the  judge  of  the 
necessity   for  paving.       Reaffirmed  but 


distinguished,  Shehan  v.  Gleeson,  46  Mo. 
100,  1870;  East  St.  Louis  v.  Wehrung, 
50  111.  28,  1869.  So,  where  the  charter 
gives  the  city  council  power  to  construct 
sewers  of  such  "  dimensions  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  ordinance,"  the  council 
cannot,  by  ordinance,  require  sewers  to 
be  constructed  of  such  dimensions  as  may 
be  deemed  requisite  by  the  city  engineer. 
St.  Louis  V.  Clemens,  43  Mo.  395,  1869, 
overruling  St.  Louis  v.  Eters,  36  Mo.  4-56 ; 
reaffirmed,  St.  Louis  v.  Clemens,  52  Mo. 
133,  1873  ;  Jackson  Co.  ».  Brush,  77  111. 
59,  issuing  bonds.  See  further.  State  v. 
New  Brunswick,  1  Vrooni  (30  N.  J.  L.), 
395,  1863 ;  Meuser  v.  TJisdon,  36  Cal.  239  ; 
Hydes  v.  Joyes,  4  Bush  (Ky.),  464;  Dar- 
ling V.  St.  Paul,  19  Minn.  889, 1872,  citing 
text.  The  doctrine  of  the  text  applied 
where  a  city,  empowered  to  erect  and 
regulate  public  wharves,  and  fix  the  rates 
of  wharfage  thereat,  undertook  to  lease 
the  wharf,  farm  out  its  revenues,  and 
delegate  a  person  to  fix  the  rates.  Mat- 
thews V.  Alexandria,  68  Mo.  115;  post, 
chapter  on  Taxation.  So,  where  a  char- 
ter directed  the  common  council  to  appoint 
a  time  when  persons  interested  in  an  ap- 
plication for  opening  a  street  would  be  heard. 


124 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  V. 


is  granted  by  law,  or  In*  an  ordinance  duly  passed,  to  the  mayor 
o)ui  aldermen,  they  are  constituted  to  act  as  one  deliberative 
body,  to  the  end  that  they  may  assist  each  other  by  their  united 
wisdom  and  experience,  and  the  result  of  their  conference  be  the 
ground  of  their  determination  ;  and  where  this  is  the  case,  the 
board  of  aldermen  cannot,  even  by  a  vote,  delegate  the  power 
to  the  mayor  alone.^  But  the  principle  that  municipal  powers 
or  discretion  cannot  be  delegated  does  not  prevent  a  corpora- 
tion from  appointing  agents  and  empowering  them  to  make 
contracts,  nor  from  appointing  committees  and  investing  them 
with  duties  of  a  ministerial  or  administrative  character.^ 

A  municipal  council  having  authority  to  pave  streets  at  the 


the  council  must  itself  fix  the  time,  and 
cannot  delegate  that  duty  to  the  clerk. 
If  it  does  so,  its  proceedings  will  he  set 
aside  on  certiorari  or  other  direct  proceed- 
hig.  State  V.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N. 
J.)  309,  1855;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  2  lb. 
444,447;  State  v.  Patterson,  34  N.  J.  L. 
Itj3,  1870.  The  text  is  cited  and  ap- 
proved in  the  following  cases  :  Birdsall  v. 
Clark,  73  N.  Y.  73  ;  State  v.  Trenton,  42 
N.  J.  L.  74 ;  Parker  v.  New  Brunswick,  1 
Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  395 ;  State  v.  Patter- 
son, 5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  163.  A  mu- 
nicii)al  corporation  cannot  delegate  powers 
conferred  upon  and  to  be  exercised  by  it 
to  a  street  committee  or  others.  Whyte  v. 
Mayor  (sidewalk  assessment),  2  Swan 
(Tenn.),  364,  1852.  See  Smith  v.  Morse, 
2  Cal.  524;  Oakland  v.  Carpentier,  13 
Cal.  540;  Whyte  v.  Nashville,  2  Swan 
(Tenn.),  364;  compare  State  v.  Atlantic 
City,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  99,  108.  See 
Brooklyn  v.  Breslin,  57  N.  Y.  691,  1874, 
distinguishing  Thompson  v.  Schermer- 
liorn,  supra.  A  delegation  of  power  is  valid 
v?hen  expressly  authorized  by  the  legisla- 
ture. Brooklyn  v.  Breslin,  supra;  State 
V.  Patterson,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  163  ; 
post,  sees.  716,  779. 

1  Day  i;.  Green,  4  Cush.  433, 1849,  and 
cases  tiiere  cited.  Further,  as  to  delega- 
tion of  power,  Coffin  v.  Nantucket,  5  Cush. 
269, 1850 ;  Kuggles  v.  Nantucket,  11  Cush. 
433  ;  Clark  v.  Washington,  12  Wheat.  40, 
64,  1827  ;  Coolcy,  Con.st.  Lim.  204  ;  Kail- 
way  Co.  V.  Baltimore,  21  Md.  93,  1863. 

A  grant  by  the  council  of  a  corpora- 
tion to  build  a  street  railroad  must  be  made 
by  ordinance   directly  to   the  parties   to   he 


therein  named,  and  the  authority  to  make  the 
grant  cannot  be  delegated  by  the  council  to  any 
officer  or  board.  State  v.  Bell,  34  Ohio  St. 
194.  So  where  the  city  built  a  pier  in  re- 
spect of  which  it  was  authorized  to  fix  tolls 
for  its  use  and  collect  the  same.  It  leased 
it  to  a  party  ;  failing  to  keep  the  pier  in  re- 
pair the  lessee  brought  an  action  for  dam- 
ages ;  the  power  of  the  council  not  being 
subject  to  delegation  the  lease  was  de- 
clared void.  Lord  v.  Oconto,  47  Wis.  386; 
8.  p.  Lauenstein  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  28  Wis. 
836 ;  MuUarky  v.  Cedar  Falls,  19  Iowa, 
21 ;  Gale  v.  Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344  ;  Mil- 
hau  V.  Sharp,  19  Barb.  435 ;  Rogers  v.  Col- 
lier, 43  Mo.  359;  East  St.  Louis  v.  Weh- 
rung,  50  111.  28.  "Any  work  not  done 
within  the  time  specified,  required  the 
common  council  to  cause  to  be  done " 
by  contract  or  otherwise.  The  ordinance 
was  that  the  superintendent  of  streets 
should  "cause  the  work  to  be  done," 
thus  delegating  the  precise  authority 
conferred  upon  it.  The  charter  con- 
ferred the  power  to  cause  it  to  be  done 
by  contract  or  otherwise ;  this  requires 
the  exercise  of  discretion  and  judgment 
as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  work  should 
be  done.  The  legislature  says  it  must  be 
the  judgment  of  the  council,  and  they 
attempt  to  invest  the  superintendent  of 
streets  with  its  exercise.  This  they  had 
no  power  to  do,  and  they  could  not  dele- 
gate the  power  thus  conferred.  Birdsall 
V.  Clark,  73  N.  Y.  73. 

2  Railroad  Co.  v.  Marion  Co.,  36  Mo. 
294 ;  Schenley  v.  Commonwealth,  36  Pa. 
St.  62.  See  chapters  on  Contracts  and 
Corporate  Meetings,  post. 


§  97.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  125 

primary  expense  of  the  city,  directed  the  making  of  the  pave- 
ments of  one  or  the  other  of  specified  materials,  but  giving  to 
the  owners  of  abutting  lots,  on  whom  the  expense  would  ulti- 
mately fall,  the  privilege  of  selecting  which,  and  reserving  to  the 
street  committee  the  authority  to  select,  in  case  the  lot  owners 
failed,  and  authorized  the  mayor  to  execute  a  contract  accord- 
ingly, which  was  done.  It  was  objected  by  the  city  that  this 
contract  was  invalid.  1,  because  the  city  could  not  delegate 
the  power  to  the  mayor  to  make  it ;  and  2,  because  the  mayor 
could  not  delegate  to  the  lot  owners  the  power  of  determining 
the  kind  of  materials.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
while  admitting  that  "the  council  could  not  delegate  all  the 
power  conferred  upon  it "  in  this  respect,  yet  held  that  it  could 
do  its  ministerial  work  by  agents,  and  that  there  was  here  no 
unlawful  delegation  of  power. ^ 

Legislative  Powers  incapable  of  Surrender. 

§  97.  (61)  Powers  are  conferred  upon  municipal  corporations 
for  public  purposes  ;  and  as  their  legislative  powers  cannot,  as  we 
have  just  seen,  be  delegated,  so  they  cannot  he  bargaiyied  or  bartered 
away.  Such  corporations  may  make  authorized  contracts,  but 
thej'-  have  no  power,  as  a  party,  to  make  contracts  or  pass  by-laws 
which  shall  cede  away,  control,  or  embarrass  their  legislative  or 
governmental  powers,  or  which  shall  disable  them  from  per- 
forming  their   public   duties.^      The  cases    cited   illustrate    this 

1  Hitchcock   V.    Galveston,   96   U.    S.  Bush   (Ky.),    127;    People's    Railroad  v. 

341, 1877.     If  a  contract  should  be  invalid  Memphis  Eailroad,  10  Wall.  38,  50,  1869  ; 

because  of  the   delegation  of  powers,  it  Presb.  Clnarch  i'.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 

may  be  ratified  by  tlie  council.   lb.  5  Cow.  538,  182G  ;  followed,  Stuyvesant 

'  Richmond  Gasliglit  Co.  v.  Middle-  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.,  7  Cow.  588 ;  Sav. 
town  (gas  contract),  59  N.  Y.  228,1874;  Fund  v.  Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  175; 
Lord  V.  Oconto,  47  Wis.  386,  approving  Mayor,  etc.  of  Albany,  in  re,  23  Wend, 
text;  Matthews  v.  Alexandria,  68  Mo.  277;  Railroad  Co.  y.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Hilt. 
115;  Bodine  i'.  Trenton  (boundaries  of  562,  568;  Martin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Hill 
streets),  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.),  198;  (N.  Y.),  545,  1841 ;  Goszler  ('.Georgetown, 
State  V.  New  Brunswick,  1  Vroom  (31  6  Wheat.  593;  Sedgw.  Const,  and  St. 
N.  J.  L),  395;  Indianapolis  v.  Indian-  Law,  634;  State  v.  Graves,  19  Md.  351, 
apoHs  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  approving  373,1862;  Bryson  r.  Philadelphia,  47  Pa. 
text.  Miliiau  v.  Sharp,  27  N.  Y.  611, 18G3 ;  St.  329  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  206  ;  Albany 
111.  etc.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  2  Dillon  C.  C.  St.,  6  Abb.  Pr.  R.  273 ;  Britton  v.  Mayor, 
Rep.  70;  Gale  v.  Kalamazoo  (market-  etc.  of  N.  Y.,  21  How.  Pr.  R.  251;  New 
house  contract),  23  xMich.  344,1871;  s.  c.  York  v.  Second  Av.,  etc.  Co.,  32  N.  Y. 
9  Am.  Rep.  80  ;  Louisville  City  Railroad  261 ;  Dingman  v.  People,  51  111.  277 ;  Brim- 
Co.  ;;.  Louisville,  8  Busli  (Ky.),  415, 1871 ;  nicr  v.  Boston,  102  Mass.  19,  1809 ;  John- 
Covington,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Covington,  9  son  v.  Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St.  445;  State 


126  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  V. 

salutarv  principle  in  a  great  variety  of  circumstances,  and,  for 
tlu-  protettimi  of  the  citizen,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  that 
it  shall  be  maintained  by  the  courts  in  its  full  scope  and  vigor. 

Mandatory  and  Discretionary  Powers. 

§  08.  (62)  It  often  becomes  a  question  whether  a  duty,  im- 
posed by  law  or  charter  upon  municipal  corporations  or  public 
officers,  is  imperative  or  discretionary.  This  is  always  a  question 
of  legislative  intention.  The  general  tests  to  ascertain  this  in- 
tern ion,  propounded  in  the  cases  cited,  are  of  doubtful  value. 
The  words  that  a  corporation,  or  officer,  "  may  "  act  in  a  certain 
way,  or  that  it  "  shall  be  lawful "  to  act  in  a  certain  way,  may 
be  imperative.  On  this  subject  some  of  the  cases  declare  the 
doctrine  that  what  public  corporations  or  officers  are  empow- 
ered to  do  for  others,  and  that  which  is  beneficial  to  them  or  to 
the  public  to  have  done,  the  law  holds  they  ought  to  do,  espe- 
cially if  the  law  specifically  or  adequately  supplies  them  with  the 
means  of  executing  the  power.  The  power  in  such  cases  is  con- 
ferred for  the  benefit  of  others  or  to  the  public ;  and  the  intent 
of  the  legislature,  wliich  is  the  test  in  such  cases,  ordinarily  seems, 
under  such  circumstances,  to  be  to  impose  a  positive  and  abso- 
lute duty.     But,  under  other  circumstances,  where  the  act  to  be 

V.  Cin.   Gas  Co.,  18  Oliio   St.  262,  295;  any   wliarf,   tlie   mooring  of    vessels   at 

Jackson  ?;.  Bowman,  39  Miss.  671,  1861 ;  such    wharf,"    such    a    by-law     is    not 

Oakland  v.  Carpentier,  13  Cal.  540,  1859,  void  as  delegating  to  the  superintendent 

opinion  of  B/ildwin,  J. ;  Smith  v.  Morse,  of   wharves  the   making   of   regulations 

2   Cal.  524  ;   Louisville  City  Railway  v.  which  the  charter  gave  the  council  alone 

Louisville,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  415;  Karst   v.  the  power  to  make.     Gregorys.  Bridge- 

St.  Baul,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  22  Minn.   118,  port,  41  Conn.  76,  1874. 
1875;  nnte,  sec.  54  and  note;    post,  sees.  One  legislature,  in  the  enactment  of  laws, 

602,  710.     Compare  Attorney  General  ?'.  cannot,  by  contract,  put  it  out  of  t/ie  power  of 

Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.,  3  Duer,   119,  131,  a  subsequent  legislature  to  repeal  or   amend 

147;  Davis  v.  Same,  14  N.  Y.  (4  Kern.)  them;  cannot  thus  surrender  a  portion  of 

506,  532  ;  Costar  v.  Brush,  25  "Wend.  628 ;  its  sovereign  power.     Debolt  v.  Ins.  and 

Brooklyn  v.  City  Railroad  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  Trust  Co.,  1  Ohio  St.  564 ;  Plank  R.  Co. 

475,  1872.  V.   Husted,   3  lb.  578,  per  Bartley,  C.  J., 

"Where  the  charter  gave  the  common  dissenting;    Matheny  v.  Golden,  5  Ohin 

council  power  to  "  ordain  by-laws  relating  St.  375 ;  Mott  v.  Pa.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Pa. 

to  wharves,  and  the   anchoring,  moving,  St.  9,  1858.     But  see,  in  Supreme  Court 

and   mooring   of   vessels "   and    "  to  ap-  of  the  United  States,  Home  v.  Rouse,  8 

point  all  7i(crssarj/  officers  to  carry  the  by-  Wall.  430,  and  prior  cases  cited,  and  tlie 

laws  into  effect"  and  the  council  passed  vigorous   dissent,  lb.  441,  which   seems, 

a  by-law,  creating  the  office  of  superintend-  were  the  question  open,  to  be  the  sound 

ent    of  wharves,    and   giving    him   "full  view.      Cooley,    Const.    Lim.    127,   280; 

power  to  order  and  regulate,  whenever  Sedg.   Const,   and    St.  Law,   616,    633; 

requested    by   the    owner    or   lessee   of  post,  sees.  385,  692,  716. 


§99.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHAETERS. 


done  does  not  affect  third  persons,  and  is  not  clearly  beneficial 
to  them  or  the  public,  and  the  means  for  its  performance  are 
not  thus  supplied,  the  words,  "  may  "  do  an  act,  or  it  is  "  lawful  " 
to  do  it,  do  not  mean  "  must,"  but  rather  indicate  an  intent  in 
the  legislature  to  confer  a  discretionary  power.^  Each  case,  w^e 
repeat,  must  be  largely  decided  on  its  own  circumstances,  and 
the  legislative  intent  gathered  from  the  whole  act.  No  positive 
or  stereotyped  rule  can  be  laid  down. 


§  99.  (63)  It  is  also  sometimes  difficult  to  determine  whether 
specific  duties  prescribed  by  the  charter  or  incorporating  act  rest 
upon  the  corporation,  or  upon  the  aldermen  or  other  officers  named, 
in  their  individual  capacity.  The  question  also  is  one  of  con- 
struction.    The  general  rule  is  this :  that  where  powers  pertaip- 


1  Mason  v.  Fearson  (duty  of  city  un- 
der tax  law),  9  How.  (U.  S.)  248,  259,  per 
Woodburi/,  J.,  and  authorities  there  cited. 
In  Hurford  v.  Omaha,  4  Neb.  336,  350, 
1876,  the  subject  is  fully  examined,  and 
certain  tests  to  ascertain  the  legislative  in- 
tention are  stated.  Veazie  v.  China,  50  Me. 
526.  It  is  the  settled  doctrine  in  New 
York,  that  where  a  public  or  municipal  cor- 
poration or  body  is  invested  with  power 
to  do  an  act  which  the  public  uiterests  re- 
quire to  be  done,  and  the  means  for  its 
complete  performance  are  placed  at  its 
disposal,  not  only  the  execution,  but  the 
proper  execution  of  the  power,  may  be 
insisted  on  as  a  duty,  though  the  statute 
conferring  it  be  only  permissive  in  its 
terms.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  v. 
Furze,  3  Hill,  612,  holding  corporatiort 
liable  for  omitting  its  duty  to  repair  sew- 
ers, although  it  would  not  have  been 
liable  for  omitting  to  have  constructed 
them  originally.  Approved,  16  N.  Y. 
162,  note,  per  Selden,  J.  ;  per  Denio,  J.,  9 
N.  Y.  168,  458 ;  per  Allen,  J.,  lb.  461. 
The  same  doctrine  has  been  declared  in 
New  Jersey,  State  r.  Newark,  4  Dutch. 
491 ;  Seiple  v.  Elizabeth,  3  Dutch.  407 ; 
Reed  i-.  Bainbridge,  1  Southard,  351,  358 ; 
Compare  Reock  v.  Newark,  4  Vroom 
(33  N.  J.  L.),  129.  See,  further,  the 
chapter  on   Actions,  post,  ch.xx'm. 

When  words  are  imperative,  and  when 
director)/,  see  further,  Grant  Corp.  34, 
35;  Rex  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Hastings,  5 
Barn.  &  Aid.  592,  note  ;  Attorney  General 


V.  Lock,  3  Atk.  164 ;  Rex  v.  Mayor,  etc. 
of  Chester,  1  Maule  &  Sel.  101 ;  Rex  v. 
Bailiffs,  etc.,  1  Barn.  &  Cress.  86;  3  lb. 
272 ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Platte  Co.,  42  Mo. 
171;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Buchanan  Co.,  89 
Mo.  485 ;  Grant  i-.  Erie,  69  Pa.  St.  420 ; 
s.  c.  8  Am.  Rep.  272 ;  Goodrich  v.  Chi- 
cago, 20  111.  445,  authority  to  city  "  to 
remove  all  obstructions  in  the  harbor," 
held  not  imperative.  lb.  Ottawa  v.  People, 
48  111.  233 ;  Carr  v.  Nortli  Liberties,  3& 
Pa.  St.  324;  Joliet  v.  Verley,  35  111.  58, 
"Wilson  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Denio,  595. 
An  act  that  "  the  city  council  are  hereby 
authorized  to  elect  a  recorder,  in  whom 
they  may  vest  exclusive  jurisdiction  of 
all  violations  of  their  ordinances,"  im- 
poses the  duty  to  elect  tiiis  officer.  The 
language  is  injunctive,  and  not  discre- 
tionary. Vason  V.  Augusta,  38  Ga.  542, 
18G8.  The  expression,  in  a  supplemental 
charter,  "  it  sliall  be  lawful,"  construed  not 
to  enjoin  an  imperative  duty  on  the  cor- 
poration. Seiple  V.  Elizabeth,  3  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  407;  Steines  v.  Franklin  Co.,  48 
Mo.  167,  1871.  Prirate  Action  for  Breach 
of  statutory  dutt/  when,  Heeny  v.  Sprague, 
11  Rho.  Is.  456;  s.  c.  23  Am.  502.  Such 
is  the  rule  in  the  English  Courts.  Ad- 
dison on  Torts  (4  Eng  Ed.  1054).  When 
the  charter  provision  is  that  the  mai/or 
and  aldermen  should  choose  the  sites  for 
public  markets,  this  duty  cannot  be  dele- 
gated to  commissioners.  State  v.  Patter- 
son, 5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  163.  See  post, 
sees.  832,  836,  848. 


128  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  V, 

injT  to  the  duties  of  a  corporation  are  conferred  upon  those  who 
officially  represent  the  corporation,  these  powers,  unless  the  con- 
trary appear,  are  deemed  to  be  conferred  upon  them  in  their 
corporate,  not  their  individual  character ;  in  other  words,  upon 
the  corporation  itself.^ 

Exemption  of  Revenues  from  Judicial  Seizure  for  Debts. 

§  100.  (64)  Municipal  corporations  are  instituted  by  the 
supreme  authority  of  a  state  for  the  public  good.  They  exercise, 
by  delegation  from  the  legislature,  a  portion  of  the  sovereign 
power.  The  main  object  of  their  creation  is  to  act  as  administra- 
tive agencies  for  the  state,  and  to  provide  for  the  police  and  local 
government  of  certain  designated  civil  divisions  of  its  territory .^ 
To  this  end  they  are  invested  with  governmental  powers  and 
charged  with  civil,  political,  and  municipal  duties.  To  enable 
them  beneficially  to  exercise  these  powers  and  discharge  these 
duties,  they  are  clothed  with  the  authority  to  raise  revenues  by 
taxation  and  other  modes,  as  by  fines  and  penalties.  The  revenue 
of  the  public  corporation  is  the  essential  means  by  which  it  is 
enabled  to  perform  its  appointed  work.  Deprived  of  its  regular 
and  adequate  supply  of  revenue,  such  a  corporation  is  practically 
destroyed,  and  the  very  ends  of  its  erection  thwarted.  Based 
upon  considerations  of  this  character,  it  is  the  settled  doctrine  of 
the  law  that  the  taxes  and  public  revenues  of  such  corporations 
cannot  be  seized  under  execution  against  them,^  either  in  the 
treasury  or  when  in  transit  to  it.  Judgments  rendered  for  taxes, 
and  the  proceeds  of  such  judgments  in  the  hands  of  officers  of 
the  law,  are  not  subject  to  execution  unless  so  declared  by  stat- 
ute. The  doctrine  of  the  inviolability  of  the  public  revenues  by 
the  creditor  is  maintained,  although  the  corporation  is  in  debt, 

1  Conrad  r.  Ithaca,  16  N.  Y.  158,  per  tinguishing  People  ?;.  Nostrand,  where  the 

Sehlen,  J.,  p.  170 ;  Hickok  v.  Plattsburg,  statute  provided  for  filling  the   vacancy 

1-5  Barb.  S.  C.  427  ;   Glidden  v.  Unity,  10  in  the  commission. 

Fost.  (30  N.  H.)  104,  119  ;  post,  ch.  xxiii.  Where  all  are  notified  to  attend,  a  ma- 

A  power  conferred  by  statute  upon  three  jority  may  act.    Post,  sec.  221,  note;  W. 

or  more  persons  as  commissioners  or  other-  B.  Astor  v.  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  567, 1875  ; 

wise,  for  a  public  purpose,  is  not  extin-  John  Jacob  Astor  v.  New  York,  62  N.  Y. 

guished  by  the  death  of  one,  where  no  580.     Presumption  as  to  notice,  lb.  post, 

provision  exists  for  filling  the  vacancy,  but  ch.  xxiii. 

vests  in  the  survivors.     People  v.  Palmer,  2  Ante,  ch.  ii.  sees.  9,  28. 

52  N.  Y.  83,  1873 ;  People  v.  Mavor,  etc.  ^  Brown  v.  Gates,  Treasurer,  etc.,  15 

of  Syracuse,  63  N.  Y.  291,  297,  1875,  dis-  W.  Va.  131. 


§  101.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


129 


and  1ms  no  means  of  payment  but  the  taxes  which  it  is  author- 
ized to  collect.^ 


§  101.  (65)  Upon  similar  considerations  of  public  policy,  muni- 
cipal corporations  and  their  officers  have  usuall}^  though  not 
uniformly,  been  considered  not  to  he  subject  to  garnishment, 
although  private  corporations,  equally  with  natural  persons,  are 
liable  to  this  process.  The  cases  on  the  subject,  as  respects  muni- 
cipal corporations,  are  referred  to  in  the  note,  and  it  will  be  seen, 
on  examination,  that  some  of  them  turn  on  the  construction  of 
particular  statutes,  and  that  the  judges  differ  in  opinion  respect- 
ing the  policy  and  expediency  of  subjecting,  upon  general  princi- 
ples, such  corporations  to  the  process  of  garnishment.  The 
author  suggests,  where  the  question  is  left  entirely  open  by  stat- 


1  Edgerton  v.  Municipality,  1  La.  An. 
435,  1846,  where  the  subject  is  ably  dis- 
cussed in  the  opinion  of  Rost,  J.  He  says  : 
"  On  the  first  view  of  this  question  there 
is  something  very  repugnant  to  the  moral 
sense  in  the  idea  that  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration should  contract  debts,  and  that, 
having  no  resources  but  the  taxes  which 
are  due  to  it,  these  should  not  be  sub- 
jected by  legal  process  to  the  satisfaction 
of  its  creditors.  This  consideration,  de- 
duced from  the  principles  of  moral  duty, 
has  only  given  way  to  the  more  enlarged 
contemplation  of  the  great  and  paramount 
interests  of  public  order  and  the  princi- 
ples of  government."  lb.,  440 ;  s.  p.  Mu- 
nicipality V.  Hart,  6  La.  An.  570,  1851. 
This  case  holds  that  a  judgment  in  favor 
of  tlie  corporation  for  a  fine  incurred  for 
a  violation  of  a  municipal  ordinance  is 
exempt  from  execution  ;  but  that  an  or- 
dinary debt  due  the  corporation  (as  on  a 
bond  taken  for  paving)  is  liable  to  be 
seized.  But  quaere  ?  In  Edgerton  v.  Mu- 
nicipality, supra,  it  was  decided  that  the 
public  taxes  and  revenues  of  the  corpora- 
tion could  not  be  seized  under  execution, 
notwithstanding  the  general  provision  of 
the  Code  of  Practice  of  Louisiana,  autiior- 
izing  the  seizure,  under  execution,  of  "  all 
sums  of  money  which  may  be  due  to  the 
debtor  in  whatsoever  right," — this  gen- 
eral language  being  construed  to  refer 
alone  to  rv/lifs  ofproperti/,  and  not  to  taxes 
imposed  for  the  protection  of  those  rights. 
So  in  tiie  llailroad  Co.  v.  Municipality,  7 

VOL.   I.  9 


La.  An.  148,  1852,  it  was  held  that  per- 
petual ground  rents,  created  and  intended 
by  the  legislature  to  form  part  of  the  per- 
manent revenue  of  the  city  to  enable  it 
to  exercise  its  municipal  powers  of  police 
and  local  government,  cannot  be  sold  on 
execution  against  the  corporation.  In 
Police  Jury  v.  Michael,  4  La.  An.  84,  a 
seizure  by  a  creditor  of  public  buildings, 
etc.,  was  enjoined. 

The  public  nature  of  municipal  corpo- 
rations is  well  illustrated  bj'  the  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  in  the  late  case  of  The  United 
States  V.  The  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad 
Co.,  17  Wall.  322,  1872.  The  case 
involved  the  right  of  Congress  to  levy  a 
tax  upon  the  income  or  property  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  ;  and  viewing  such  a 
corporation  as  an  arm  of  the  state,  and 
partaking  of  the  state's  exemption  from 
liability  to  be  taxed  upon  the  means  and 
instrumentalities  employed  in  conducting 
its  operations,  it  was  held  that  the  tax 
sought  to  be  enforced  under  the  Internal 
Eevenue  Act  could  not  be  collected.  Post, 
sec.  775.  See  chapter  on  Taxation,  post. 
Property  owned  by  a  city  as  an  invest- 
ment of  funds  merelj',  held  liable  to  seiz- 
ure on  execution.  New  Orleans  v.  Insur- 
ance Co.,  23  La.  An.  61,  1871.  In  this 
case  the  court  declare  a  distinction  be- 
tween it  and  Edgerton  i'.  Municipality, 
supra,  and  Police  Jury  v.  Michael,  4  La. 
An.  841,  but  quaere?  Post,  sees.  576,  850, 
801,  884. 


130 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  V. 


lite,  that,  on  principle,  a  municipal  corporation  should  be  exempt 
from  liiibility  of  this  character  with  respect  to  its  revenues  and 
the  salaries  of  its  officers,  but  that  where  it  owes  an  ordinary 
debt  to  a  third  person,  the  mere  inconvenience  of  having  to 
answer  as  n-arnishee  furnishes  no  sufficient  reason  for  withdraw- 
ing- it  from  the  reach  of  the  remedies  which  the  law  gives  to 
creditors  of  natural  persons  and  private  corporations.^ 


1  The  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania 
Is  of  llie  opinion  that,  on  principle,  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  or  its  oflicers  are  not 
subject  to  garnishment  on  attachment  or 
execution,  and  tliat  by  the  statutes  of  that 
state,  they  are  not  made  liable  tiiereto. 
Erie  i-.  Knapp,  29  Pa.  St.  173, 1857  ;  Bulk- 
ley  V.  Eckert,  3  Barr  (Pa.),  368,  per  Sar- 
yeiint,  J. ;  s.  p.  McDougal  v.  Supervisors, 
4  Minn.  184;  Bradley  v  Kichmond,  G  Vt. 
121 ;  Burnliam  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  15  Wis. 
193,  18G2,  where  the  inconvenience  of  the 
opposite  doctrine  is  forcibly  pointed  out 
by  Paine,  J.  ;  Drake  on  Attacli.,  sec.  516, 
10;  Hadlcy  v.  Pcabody,  13  Gray,  200; 
Brown  v.  Gates,  15  W.  Va.  131.  Approv- 
ing text.  That  the  salary  of  an  officer 
of  a  municipal  corporation  cannot  be  gar- 
nished, see  School  District,  etc.  v.  Gage, 
39  :\Iich.  328;  Hebel  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co., 
33  Mich.  407  ;  Wallace  y.  Lawyer,  54  Ind. 
501 ;  Merwin  i-.  Cliicago,  45  111.  133  ;  Chi- 
cago V.  Halsey,  25  111.  595;  Thayer  v. 
Tyler,  5  Allen,  95 ;  Colby  v.  Coates,  6 
Cush.  559  ;  Clark  v.  Mobile,  36  Ala.  621 
(salary  of  school  teacher);  Hightower  v. 
Staton,  54  Ga.  108 ;  McLellan  v.  Young, 
54  Ga.  399  ;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  276 ;  Had- 
ley  V.  Peabody,  13  Gray,  200. 

In  Missouri,  also,  it  is  held  upon  gen- 
eral principles  that  municipal  corpora- 
tions are  not  subject  to  garnishment  on 
account  of  salary  due  to  their  officers. 
Hawthorne  v.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  59,  1847; 
s.  p.  Fortune  v.  St.  Louis,  23  Mo.  239, 
1856,  where  the  decision  is  placed  upon 
the  broad  ground  that  such  corporations 
are  not  liable  to  be  garnished,  and  not  on 
the  ground  that  an  officer's  salary  is  exempt 
from  such  process.  See  also  Neuer  v. 
Fallon,  18  Mo.  277.  Since  the  first  edi- 
tion of  this  work  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Missouri  has  modified  in  an  important 
respect  the  broad  statement  of  the  doc- 
trine held  in  the  former  cases.  See  Pen- 
dleton V.  Perkins  and  the  City  of  St.  Louis, 


49  Mo.  565, 1872.  It  was  there  held,  after 
great  consideration,  that  a  city  corpora- 
tion in  that  state  is  subject  to  garnish- 
ment where  the  main  debtor  has  absconded 
so  that  judgment  cannot  be  obtained 
against  him,  and  he  has  no  property  in 
the  state  subject  to  attachment,  but  has 
money  in  the  city  treasury  belonging  or 
due  to  him,  and  that  it  may  in  such  case 
be  reached  by  bill  in  equity  in  the  first 
instance  without  a  previous  judgment  at 
law,  and  without  showing  fraud  or  other 
ground  of  equitable  jurisdiction.  It  was 
so  decided,  notwithstanding  the  garnish- 
ment act  in  terms  exempts  municipal 
corporations  from  its  operation.  The 
opinion  of  Bliss,  C.  J.,  is  very  full  and 
elaborate. 

In  Tennessee,  a  municipal  corporation 
is  not  subject  to  garnishment  at  the  suit 
of  a  creditor  of  one  of  its  employes  ;  citing 
Bank  v.  Dibrell,  3  Sneed,  379 ;  Burnham 
V.  Fond  du  Lac,  15  Wis.  193;  Chicago  v. 
Hasley,  25  111.  596;  Baltimore  v.  Root, 
8  Md.  102;  Hawthorne  v.  St.  Louis,  11 
Mo.  59  ;  Memphis  v.  Laski,  9  Ileisk.  511, 
1877;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  327.  So  in 
Georgia,  McClellan  v.  Young,  54 ;  Ga. 
399  ;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  276.  So  in  In- 
diana, Wallace  v.  Lawyer,  54  Ind.  501 ; 
s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  661.  In  Kentnch/  a  city 
may  be  garnished  in  respect  of  salary 
due  to  officers.  Rodman  v.  Musselman, 
12  Bush,  354,  1876 ;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep. 
724. 

In  Connecticut,  public  oflBcers  having 
money  in  their  hands,  to  which  an  indi- 
vidual is  entitled,  are  not  subject  to  gar- 
nishment at  the  suit  of  the  creditors  of 
such  individual.  Stillman  v.  Isham,  11 
Conn.  123,  1835,  and  cases  cited;  Ward 
V.  County  of  Hartford,  12  lb.  404,  408. 
And  in  that  state  a  county  not  having 
power  to  contract  a  debt  for  which  an 
action  will  lie  against  it,  is  not  subject  to 
garnishment   in   such  a  case.     Ward  v 


§  101.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHAETERS. 


131 


County  of  Hartford,  12  Conn.  404.  But 
under  a  statute  enabling  towns  and  cities 
to  contract  debts,  and  which  provides 
that  debts  due  from  "any  person"  to  a 
debtor  may  be  attached,  these  corpora- 
tions may  be  factorized  or  garnished. 
Bray  v.  WaUingford,  20  Conn.  416,  1850. 
In  New  Jerspy,  a  municipal  corporation 
may  be  garnished.  Davis  v.  Graves,  9 
Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.),  104;  see  Jersey 
City  V.  Horton,  9  Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.),  88. 

In  Smoot  V.  Hart,  33  Ala.  69,  1858,  it 
is  held  that  the  marshal  of  a  city  may  be 
garnished  for  city  funds  in  his  hands ; 
whether  the  treasurer  could  be  garnished 
not  decided.  Mayor  v.  Rowland,  26  Ala. 
498,  holds  that  a  municipal  corporation 
cannot  be  garnished  as  respects  accruing 
salaries  to  its  officers.  See  also  Clark 
v.  School  Commrs.,  36  Ala.  621.  But  by 
act  of  the  legislature,  1866,  process  of  gar- 
nishment lies  against  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration to  subject  the  wages  or  salary  of  a 
policeman  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  judg- 
ment obtained  against  him.  City  Coun- 
cil (;.  Van  Dorn,  41  Ala.  505,  overruling 
Mobile  V.  Rowland,  and  Clark  v.  School 
Commrs.,  36  Ala.  621.  In  Massachusetts, 
a  county  is  not  chargeable  as  a  garnishee 
for  jurors'  fees.  Williams  v.  Boardman, 
9  Allen,  570.  In  Maryland,  notwithstand- 
ing a  general  statute  of  the  state  author- 
ized the  garnishment  of  any  "  person  or 
persons  whatever,  corporate  or  sole,"  it 
was  held  that  municipalities  were  not  in- 
cluded, and  that  upon  general  grounds  of 
public  policy  and  convenience,  the  city 
could  not  be  garnished  in  respect  of 
money  due  from  the  salaries  of  its  officers, 
although  the  officer  whose  salary  was 
attached  could  have  sued  the  city  there- 
for. Baltimore  v.  Root,  8  Md.  95,  1855. 
The  city,  in  this  case,  was  garnished  in 
respect  of  money  due  from  it  to  a  police 
officer. 

But  in  Neio  Hampshire,  under  a  statute 
making  "  any  corporation  possessed  of  any 
money  "  of  the  debtor  subject  to  garnish- 
ment, a  town  was  held  to  be  included. 
Whidden  v.  Drake,  o  N.  H.  13.  See  Brown 
V.  Heath,  45  N.  H.  168.    In  Iowa,  it  was 


held  that  the  words  "debtor  or  person 
holding  property,"  in  the  attachment  act, 
extended  to  municipal  corporations,  and 
that  they  were  subject  to  garnishment 
with  respect  to  ordinary  debts  which  they 
owed  the  main  debtor.  Wales  v.  ^lusca- 
tine,  4  loAva,  302,  1856.  The  decision  of 
the  court  asserts  the  liability  to  garnish- 
ment on  general  principles ;  but  subse- 
quently the  legislature  enacted  that  "  a 
municipal  or  political  corporation  should 
not  be  garnished."  Rev.  1860,  sec.  3196. 
Under  the  legislation  of  Iowa,  the  exemp- 
tion from  garnishment  is  complete  and 
universal.  Jenks  v.  Township,  45  Iowa, 
554.  Requisites  of  notice  to  corporation, 
Claflin  V.  Iowa  City,  12  Iowa,  284  ;  Wil- 
liams V.  Kenney,  98  Mass.  142.  In  Ohio, 
under  a  statute  which  provides  that  "any 
claims  or  choses  in  action,  due  or  to  be- 
come due"  to  the  judgment  debtor,  or 
"  money  which  lie  may  have  in  the  hands 
of  any  person,  body  politic  or  corporate," 
are  subject  to  execution,  salaries  of  offi- 
cers of  incorporated  cities,  due  and  unpaid, 
may  be  subjected  by  the  judgment  cred- 
itors of  such  officers  to  the  payment  of 
their  judgments,  and  municipal  corpora- 
tions may  be  garnished  with  respect  to 
such  salaries.  The  court  admits  the  con- 
flict in  the  decisions  of  other  states  upon 
similar  statutes,  but  regards  the  construc- 
tion above  given  as  being  in  accordance 
with  public  policy  and  the  meaning  of 
the  statute.  Newark  v.  Funk,  15  Ohio 
St.  462,  1864.  In  Illinois,  municipal  cor- 
porations are  not  subject  to  garnishment 
in  any  case,  no  matter  what  may  be  the 
character  of  the  indebtedness.  This  posi- 
tion is  maintained  by  Laicrence,  J.,  witk 
great  force.  Merwin  v.  Chicago,  45  111. 
133 ;  Burns  v.  Harper  (money  in  hands  of 
school  directors),  59  111.  21,  1871;  Milli- 
son  V.  Fisk,  43  111.  112.  So  in  Iowa.  Jenks 
V.  Township,  supra.  Waiver.  Clapp  v. 
Walker,  25  Iowa,  315.  In  Minnesota,  a 
judgment  debtor  may  be  ordered  to  as- 
sign to  his  creditor  a  debt  due  him  from 
a  municipal  corporation.  Knight  v.  Nash, 
22  Minn.  452,  1876. 


132  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS  —  CONTINUED. 

Special  Powers  and  Special  Limitations. 

§  102.  (66)  While  municipal  corporations  are  instituted  for 
the  same  general  purposes,  heretofore  explained,^  and  while  there 
is  a  striking  resemblance  in  the  authority  with  which  they  are 
clothed,  yet,  except  when  organized  under  general  acts,  the 
powers  given  to  them  are  various,  both  in  character  and  extent.^ 
True  policy,  indeed,  requires,  as  before  suggested,  that  the  pow- 
ers of  these  bodies  should,  in  general,  be  confined  to  subjects 
connected  with  civil  government  and  local  administration ;  but 
legislatures  are  usually  liberal  in  grants  of  this  character,  and  there 
is  no  limit  to  the  faculties  and  capacities  with  which  municipal 
creations  may  be  endowed,  unless  that  limit  is  contained  in  the 
state  constitution.^  The  leading  powers  ordinarily  possessed  by 
municipalities,  such  as  those  relating  to  contracts,  eminent  domain, 
streets,  taxation,  ordinances,  corporate  officers,  actions,  and  the 
like,  will  be  hereafter  separately  treated.  But  it  will  be  conven- 
ient to  notice  in  this  place  some  special  powers  usually  or  often 
conferred  upon  municipalities,  and  some  special  limitations  upon 
ordinary  municipal  powers,  and  the  construction  which  such  pro- 
visions have  judicially  received. 

We  shall  here  consider  the  following  subjects  as  they  relate  to 
municipal  corporations :  — 

1.  Wharves. 

2.  Ferries. 

3.  Borrowing  Money. 

4.  Limitations  on  the  Power  to  create  Debts. 
6.  Rewards  for  Offenders. 

6.  Public  Buildings. 

7.  Police  Powers  and  Regulations. 

1  Ante,  chs.  i.,  ii. ;  supra,  sees.  99, 100.         »  Aurora  v.  West,  9  Ind.  74,   1857; 

2  Ante,  sec.  39.  ante,  ch.  iv. 


§  102.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  13^ 

8.  Prevention  of  Fires. 

9.  Quarantine  and  Health. 

10.  Indemnifying  Officers. 

11.  Furnishing  Entertainments. 

12.  Impounding  Animals. 

13.  Party  Walls. 

14.  Public  Defence. 

15.  Aid  to  Railway  Companies. 

Wharves. 

§  103.  (67)  Among  the  special  powers  conferred  by  the  legis- 
lature upon  municipal  corporations  bordering  upon  the  high  seas 
or  navigable  waters  is  the  authority  to  erect  wharves,  and  charge 
wharfage  as  a  compensation  for  keeeping  the  same  and  their 
approaches  in  a  proper  and  safe  condition  for  the  landing,  load- 
ing, and  unloading  of  vessels.^  The  authority  of  the  state  over 
navigable  waters  and  the  shores  is,  of  course,  subject  to  the 
constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  the  laws  made  in  pursu- 
ance thereof  regulating  commerce,  and  the  admiralty  jurisdiction 
of  the  federal  courts.^     But  although  the  power  to  erect  wharves 

1  Commonwealth  u.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53,  Car.)  Law,  594,  1847;  State  v.  City 
82,  1851;  Pollard's  Lessee  v.  Hagan,  3  Council,  4  Rich.  (South  Car.)  Law,  286; 
How.  (U.  S.)  212;  Municipality  r.  Pease,  Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53,  82, 
2  La.  An.  538,  1847 ;  Worsley  v.  Munici-  1850 ;  Worsley  v.  Municipality,  above 
pality,  9  Rob.  (La.)  324;  New  Orleans  v.  cited;  Jeffersonville  v.  Ferry  Boat,  35 
United  States,  10  Pet.  662,  737  ;  The  Ind.  19,  1870 ;  Harbor-master  v.  Souther- 
Wharf  Case,  3  Bland  Ch.  (Md.)  383;  111.  land,  47  Ala.  511,  1872.  But  state  en- 
etc.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  2  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  actments,  which  amount  to  a  regulation 
70,  1872;  Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk,  05  U.  of  commerce  or  impose  a  duty  on  tonnage 
S.  80,  1877 ;  Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  are,  of  course,  void.  Cannon  v.  New 
324,  1876;  Weber  v.  Harbor  Commrs.,  Orleans,  20  Wail.  577,  1874;  Packet  Co. 
18  Wall.  57,  1873  ;  Packet  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  v.  St.  Paul,  3  Dillon,  454 ;  Peete  v.  Morgan, 
100  U.  S.  423, 1879 ;  Vicksburg  y.  Tobin,  19  Wall.  581,  1873;  Steamship  Co.  v. 
100  U.  S.  430,  1879.  Port  Wardens,  6  Wall.  31,  1867.     Wharf- 

2  State  and  autiiorized  municipal  pilot  age  charges  may  however  be  graduated 
and  harbor  regulatiuiis,  when  not  in  conflict  by  the  size  of  the  vessel  to  be  ascertained 
with  the  federal  constitution  or  federal  by  its  tonnage  ;  this  is  not  a  tax  in  the 
legislation,  are  valid.  Steamsliip  Co.  v.  nature  of  a  tonnage  duty.  N.  W.  Packet 
Joliffe,  2  Wall.  450;  Cooley  u.  Board  of  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  4  Dillon,  10,  1876; 
Wardens,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  296 ;  Pollard's  Keokuk  v.  Packet  Co.,  45  Iowa,  196,  1876 ; 
Lessee  v.  Hagan,  3  lb.  212;  Cisco  v.  8.  c.  affirmed,  95  U.  S.  80,  1877;  Eller- 
Roberts,  36  N.  Y.  292;  Port  Wardens  v.  man  v.  McMains,  30  La.  An.  190.  See, 
Ship,  etc.,  14  La.  An.  289,  1859;  Same  also,  United  States  t-.  Duluth,  1  Dillon 
V.  Pratt,  10  Rob.  (La.)  459  ;  Chapman  v.  C.  C.  469;  Packet  Co.  v.  Atlee,  2  Dillon 
Miller  (pilotage  fee),  2  Speers  (South  479,  1873;  s.  c.  21  Wall.  389.  The 
Car.)  Law,  7(59;  Alexander  v.  Railroad  collection  of  wharfage  dues  does  not 
Co.  (duty  on  tonnage),  3   Strob.    (South  violate  any  provision   of  the    U.  S.  con- 


134 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


and  charge  wharfage  is  not  strictly  one  relating  to  municipalities, 
it  is,  nevertheless,  competent  for  the  legislature  to  make  them, 
in  such  measure  as  it  deems  expedient,  the  repository  of  it.^ 

It  may  authorize  a  municipal  corporation  to  establish  a  public 
wharf  upon  private  property  on  making  compensation  to  the 
owner  of  the  land;  and  the  power,  when  conferred  upon  the 
municipality,  cannot  be  arrested  by  an  offer  on  the  part  of  the 
land-owner  himself  to  erect  a  wharf.'-^ 


§  104.  (68)  Wharves,  piers,  quays,  and  landing  places,  may 
be  either  public  or  private.  They  may  be,  in  their  nature,  public, 
although  the  property  be  owned  by  an  individual.  If  private, 
the  public  have  no  right  to  use  the  erection  without  the  owner's 
consent,  express  or  implied  ;  if  public,  they  may  be  used  by  per- 
sons generally  upon  the  payment  of  a  reasonable  compensation. 
Whether  they  are  public  or  private  depends,  in  case  of  dispute, 
upon  circumstances,  such  as  the  purpose  for  which  they  were 
built,  the  uses  to  which  they  have  been  applied,  the  place  where 
situated,  and  the  character  of  the  structure.^ 


stitution.  Where  a  municipal  corporation 
under  express  legislative  authority  is 
ciotlied  with  the  exclusive  right  to  collect 
wharfage  rates  from  all  vessels  that 
make  use  of  its  wharves  it  is  a  vested 
right  that  cannot  be  impaired  by  the 
legislature.  Ellerman  v.  McMains,  30 
La.  An.  1  P.  190. 

1  Fuller  V.  Edings,  11  Rich.  (South 
Car.)  Law,  239,  1858;  Waddington  v.  St. 
Louis,  14  Mo.  190,  1851 ;  Baltimore  v. 
White,  2  Gill  (Md.),  444,  1845;  Wilson 
V.  Inloes,  11  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  351;  Weber 
V.  Harbor  Commrs.,  18  Wall.  57,  1873. 
The  owner  of  a  private  wharf,  whose 
land  is  compulsorily  taken  for  a  public 
wharf,  is  not  necessarily  entitled  to  be 
compensated  for  loss  of  income  from  his 
private  wharf,  resulting  in  the  establish- 
ment of  the  public  wharf  near  to  the 
private  one.  Fuller  v.  Edings,  supra. 
The  grant  of  an  exclusive  right  to  keep 
a  wharf,  in  order  to  secure  its  erection, 
does  not  violate  the  provision  of  a  state 
constitution,  declaring  "  that  no  man 
or  set  of  men  are  entitled  to  exclusive, 
separate  public  emoluments  or  privileges 
from  the  community,  but  in  considera- 
tion of  public   services."     Such  an  im- 


provement is  beneficial  to  the  public,  and, 
in  order  to  secure  it,  the  exclusive  profits 
for  a  given  period  may  be  granted  to  the 
contractor.  Martin  v.  O'Brien,  34  Miss. 
(5  George)  21,  1857  ;  see,  also,  Geiger  v. 
Filor,  8  Flor.  325,  1859. 

2  Waddington  v.  St.  Louis,  above 
cited  ;  Iron  Railroad  Co.  v.  Ironton,  19 
Oliio  St.  299,  1869;  Page  v.  Baltimore, 
34  Md.  558,  1871 ;  State  v.  Jersey  City, 
34  N.  J.  L.  390.  Municipalities  may  under 
legislative  grant  build  wharves  and 
levees  on  streets  bordering  on  the  Mis- 
sissippi River,  and  make  or  authorize  the 
making  of  other  improvements  thereon  ; 
such  as  a  steamboat  depot  building,  for  the 
storage  of  freight  and  the  convenience  of 
travellers.  Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S. 
.324,  1876;  s.  c.  below,  4  Dillon,  593; 
111.  etc.  Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  2  Dillon,  70. 

3  Dutton  V.  Strong,  1  Black  (U.  S.), 
23,  1861.  The  owner  of  a  private  pier 
may,  it  was  held  in  this  case,  cut  loose  a 
vessel  attached  to  it  without  a  license  if 
the  pier  be  thereby  endangered,  no  matter 
how  great  the  stress  of  the  weather  or 
the  peril  to  which  the  vessel  may  be 
thereby  subjected. 

Whai-f:     What    Constitutes.      Upon   a 


§  106.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTEKS.  135 

§  105.  (69)  The  keeping  of  a  wharf  or  dock,  erected  and 
opened  to  the  public,  like  the  keeping  of  an  inn,  confers  a  general 
license  to  boats  and  vessels  to  occupy  it  for  lawful  purposes,  —  a 
license  which  can  be  terminated  only  by  notice  and  request  to 
remove  the  vessel.^  When  thus  established,  the  owner  at  com- 
mon law  is,  as  respects  the  public,  bound  to  keep  it  in  good  re- 
pair. In  view  of  these  obligations  on  the  part  of  the  owner  of 
the  wharf,  the  common  law  gave  him  the  right  to  distrain  for  his 
wharfage  or  toll.^ 

§  106.  (70)  By  the  common  law,  the  riparian  owner  has  the 
right  to  establish  a  wharf  on  his  own  soil,  this  being  a  lawful 
use  of  the  land.^  The  right  is  judicially  recognized  in  this  country, 
and  riparian  proprietors  on  ocean,  lake,  or  navigable  river  have, 
in  virtue  of  their  proprietorship,  and  without  special  legislative 
authorit}^  the  right  to  erect  wharves,  quays,  piers,  and  landing 
places  on  the  shore,  if  these  conform  to  the  regulations  of  the 
state  for  the  protection  of  the  public,  and  do  not  become  a 
nuisance  by  obstructing  the  paramount  right  of  navigation.  This 
right  has  been  exercised  by  the  owners  of  the  adjacent  land  from 
the  first  settlement  of  the  country.  The  right  terminates  at  the 
point  of  navigability,  unless  special  authority  be  conferred,  be- 

non-tidal  stream,  any  construction  of  tim-  21.     Wharfage  is  not  properly  a  tax,  like 

ber  or  stone   upon   the    bank,   of   such  that  levied   to  support  government,  but 

shape   that  a  vessel  may  lie  alongside  of  rather  compensation  paid  by  owners  of 

it,  with  its  broadside  to  the  shore,  con-  vessels  for  accommodation  for  their  boats 

stitutes  a  wharf ;  and  a  paved  street  ex-  and  merchandise.     Swartz   v.  Flatboats, 

tending  to  the  water's  edge,  and  used  by  14  La.  An.  243,    1859;  s.   p.   Keokuk  v. 

vessels  as  a  place  for  receiving  and  dis-  Keokuk  Packet  Co.,  45  Iowa,  196,  1876. 

charging  freight  and  passengers,  may  be  If  a  city  is  entitled  to  the  wharfage  from 

so  designated.     Keokuk  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  public  wharves,  and  the  owner  of  a  lot 

Packet  Co.,  45  Iowa,  196,  1876.  adjacent  to  such  wharf  receives  wharf- 

1  Heeney  v.  Heeney,  2  Denio,  625 ;  age,  he  is  liable  to  the  city  tlierefor. 
Nicoll  V.  Gardner,  13  Wend.  289,  18.35;  Baltimore  v.  White  (assumpsit),  2  Gill 
Lansing  v.  Smith,  4  Wend.  9;  Button  v.  (Md.),  444.  The  right,  as  between  pri- 
Strong,  1  Black,  2.3,  distinguished  from  vate  persons  and  a  city  corporation,  to 
Heeney  v.  Heeney,  supra.  the   moneys  collected  for  wharfage  may 

2  Hale  de  Port.  Maris,  77 ;  Bradley  on  be  tried  in  an  action  for  money  had  and 
Distress,  133;  Nicoll  v.  Gardner,  13  received.  Murphy  v.  City  Council,  11 
Wend.  289.  The  right  of  distress  is  reg-  Ala.  586,  1847.  See  Grant  v.  Davenport, 
ulated  by    statute   in    the  city   of   New  18  Iowa,  179. 

York,  and  it  was  there  held,  that  where  ^  Nicoll   v.  Gardner,    13    Wend.  289, 

wharfage  accrued   in  the  seventh  ward,  1835,  per  Nelson,  J. ;    Lansing  v.  Smith, 

the   owner  of  the  wharf   might  distrain  4  Wend.  9,  affirming  s.  c.  8  Cow.  146; 

therefor  in  the  eleventh  ward.     13  Wend.  Heeney  v.  Heeney,  2  Denio,  625. 
289.     See  Lansing  v.   .Smith,  4  Wend.  9, 


13G 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  YI. 


cause  at  this  point  the  necessity  for  such  erections  ordinarily 
ceases.  Such  structures  are  presumptively  lawful  where  they 
are  coniiued  to  the  shore,  and  no  positive  law  is  violated  in  their 
erection.^ 


§  107.  (71)  The  rights  of  riparian  proprietors,  in  respect  to  the 
erection  of  wharves,  are  subject  to  such  reasonable  limitations  and 
restraints  as  the  legislature  may  think  it  necessary  and  expedient 
to  impose.  Therefore  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  pass 
acts  establishing  harbor  and  dock  lines,  and  to  take  away  the 
right  of  the  proprietors  to  build  wharves  on  their  own  land  be- 
yond the  lines,  even  when  such  wharves  would  be  no  actual 
injury  to  navigation.''' 


1  Ileeney  v.  Heeney,  2  Denio,  625; 
Thornton  v.  Grant,  10  Kho.  Is.  477,  1873; 
s.  c.  14  Am.  Rep.  701 ;  Sherlock  v.  Bain- 
briilge,  41  Ind.  35,  1872 ;  s.  c.  13  Am. 
Kep.  o02;  Wisconsin,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lyons, 
30  Wis.  61 ;  Dutton  v.  Strong  (action  of 
trespass  by  owner  of  vessel  against  owner 
of  private  pier  for  cutting  the  vessel 
loose),  1  Bhick  (U.  S.),  23,  1861,  distin- 
guished from  Heeney  v.  Heeney,  above 
cited.  Same  principle  reaffirmed.  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Schurmicr,  7  Wall.  272;  Yates 
r.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall.  497;  approved, 
Weber  v.  Harbor  Commrs.,  18  Wall. 
57,  1873;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  525,  530;  Wetmore  v. 
Brooklyn  Gas  Co.,  42  N.  Y.  384  ;  Galves- 
ton V.  Menard,  23  Tex.  349 ;  Grant  v. 
Davenport,  18  Iowa,  179,  per  Wriijht,  J. 
But  in  Ctdifornia,  see  Dana  v.  Jackson, 
etc.  Co.,  31  Cal.  118.  As  to  right  to  erect 
wharf  by  other  than  riparian  owner  on 
a  tidal  river,  below  high-water  mark, 
qucere,  see  Hagan  v.  Campbell,  8  Port. 
(Ala.)  9.  In  this  case  it  is  said  :  "  It  is 
clear  that  no  part  of  such  erections  can 
be  rested  upon  the  lands  of  the  riparian 
proprietor,  nor  can  he  be  excluded  from 
the  use  of  tlie  water,  or  denied  other 
riparian  rights."  See  People  v.  David- 
son, 30  Cal.  379 ;  Walker  v.  State  Harbor 
Commrs.,  17  Wall.  648,  1873;  Packet 
Co.  V.  Atlee,  2  Dillon  479,  1873;  s.  c. 
21  Wall.  389. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Alger,  7  Cush.  53, 
1851.  This  subject  is  here  very  fully 
and  learnedly  discussed  and  examined. 


See  also.  Hart  v.  Mayor,  9  Wend.  571, 
valuable  case,  affirming  3  Paige,  213; 
Wetmore  v.  Brooklyn  Gas  Co.,  42  N.  Y. 
384  ;  People  v.  Vanderbilt,  20  N.  Y.  287  ; 
Same  v.  Same,  28  N.  Y.  396 ;  Pollard's 
Lessee  v.  Hagan,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  212; 
Hagan  v.  Campbell,  8  Port.  (Ala.)  9; 
Mobile  V.  Eslava,  9  Port.  (Ala.)  577, 
1839;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Winthrop,  5  La. 
An.  36.  In  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall. 
497,  Mr.  Justice  Miller,  on  behalf  of  the 
court,  speaking  of  an  existing  wharf, 
denied  that  the  city  of  Milwaukee,  under 
the  power  to  establish  dock  and  wharf 
lines,  could  create  an  artificial  and  imagi- 
nary dock  line,  hundreds  of  feet  away 
from  the  navigable  part  of  tlie  river,  and 
without  making  the  river  navigable  up 
to  that  line,  deprive  the  riparian  owners 
of  the  right  to  avail  tliemselves  of  the 
advantages  of  the  navigable  channel  by 
building  wharves  and  docks  to  it  for  that 
purpose,  and  said  that  if  the  city  deemed 
the  removal  of  the  wliarf  in  question 
necessary  in  the  prosecution  of  any  gen- 
eral scheme  of  widening  the  channel  or 
improving  the  navigation  of  the  river,  it 
must  first  make  the  owner  compensation 
for  his  property  thus  taken  for  the  public 
use.  Nature  and  extent  of  riparian  rights 
fulii/  considered  in  Lyon  v.  Fishmongers' 
Co.',  L.  U.  1  H.  L.  Cas.  662,  1876 ;  Dele- 
plaine  v.  Railway  Co.,  42  Wis.  214,  1877  ; 
Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324,  1876. 

Municipal  control,  under  legislative 
grant,  over  right  of  riparian  owner  to 
wharf  out.    Baltimore   v.  White,   2   Gill 


§  109.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


137 


§  108.  (72)  While  the  riparian  proprietor  has  the  right  to 
erect  wharves,  which  are  private  in  their  nature,  but  which  may 
be  used  by  the  public  b}'  the  consent  of  the  owner,  express  or 
implied,  the  right  to  erect  public  wharves  and  to  demand  tolls  or 
fixed  rates  of  wharfage  is,  according  to  the  better  view,  a  fran- 
chise, which  must  have  its  origin  in  a  legislative  grant.^ 

§  109.  (73)  If  a  municipal  it  1/  is  itself  a  riparian  proprietor^  this 
will  probably  give  to  it,  in  the  absence  of  any  restrictive  pro- 
vision in  its  organic  act,  the  implied  authority  to  erect  a  wharf 
thereon,  and  it  would  have  the  incidental  right,  the  same  as  a 
private  owner,  to  charge  compensation  for  its  use.'^     Its  rights 


(Md.),  444,  1845;  Wilson  v.  Inloes,  11 
Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  351;  Barney  r.  Keokuk, 
94  U.  S.  324,  1876;  s.  c.  4  Dillon,  593; 
Weber  v.  Harbor  Comnirs.,  18  Wall.  57, 
1878.  Where,  under  acts  of  the  legisla- 
ture, a  city  had  the  power  to  refuse 
assent  to  riparian  owners  to  erect 
wliarves,  or  to  allow  it  upon  such  terms 
as  they  deemed  beneficial  to  navigation 
and  the  use  of  the  port  of  that  citj',  it 
was  held  that  the  city  might  make  the 
grant  of  the  right  to  erect  a  wharf  upon 
tiie  condition  that  its  exterior  margin 
should  constitute  a  public  wharf.  Balti- 
more V.  White,  supra. 

1  People  V.  Wharf  Co.,  31  Cal.  34  ; 
The  Wharf  Case,  3  Bland  Ch.  (Md.) 
38:3 ;  Wiswall  v.  Hall,  3  Paige  Ch.  313 ; 
Houck  on  Rivers,  sec.  282 ;  Thompson  v. 
Mayor,  11  N.  Y.  115.  See,  as  to  naviga- 
tor's right  to  moor  and  land,  Bainbridge 
V.  Sherlock,  29  Ind.  361;  modified,  Sher- 
lock V.  Bainbridge,  41  Ind.  35,  1872; 
Talbot  ;;.  Grace,  30  Ind.  889 ;  JeflTerson- 
ville  V.  Ferry  Co.,  27  Ind.  100 ;  s.  c.  35 
Ind.  19,  1870.  State  courts  have  jurisdic- 
tion of  suits  for  wharfage  against  domes- 
tic vessels.  //).  35  Ind.  19,  23;  The 
Phebe,  1  Ware  Rep.  860 ;  Russell  v.  The 
Swift,  Newb.  R.  553;  Lewis,  in  re,  2 
Gallis.  483. 

-  Murphy  v.  City  Council,  11  Ala. 
586,  1847.  The  court  say  :  "  The  title  to 
the  wharf  is  in  the  city,  and,  such  being 
the  fact,  it  had  the  same  right  as  any 
other  proprietor  to  collect  wharfage  from 
those  landing  goods  there.  This  riglit, 
resulting  from  its  proprietary  interest,  is 
not  a  franchise,  but  a  right  of  property." 
//'.  per   Ormond,  J.,  p.  5-08.     The   city  of 


Boston  has,  under  the  laws  of  Massachu- 
setts, the  same  rights  as  other  littoral  pro- 
prietors, and  was  held  not  to  dedicate  a 
dock,  which  it  owned,  to  the  public,  by 
merely  abstaining  from  any  control  over 
it.  The  court  observe:  "The  people  of 
Boston,  who  owned  the  land  as  their  com- 
mon and  private  property,  acted  through 
a  corporation  (the  city),  whose  corporate 
grants  and  licenses  are  matters  of  record. 
Their  own  use  of  their  own  property  for 
their  own  benefit  cannot  be  called  a  dedi- 
cation of  it  to  any  other  public  of  wider  ex- 
tent. Whether  it  was  called  '  town 
dock'  or  'public  dock'  (which  were 
used  as  synonymous  terms),  it  would 
furnish  no  ground  to  presume  that  they 
had  parted  with  their  right  to  govern  and 
use  it  in  the  manner  most  beneficial  to 
the  people  or  public  of  the  town  or  city." 
Boston  V.  Lecraw,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  426, 
1854;  Commonwealth  v.  Roxbury,  9 
Gray,  514,  519,  and  note.  Bonajide  pur- 
chaser of  a  wharf  in  the  city  of  Balti- 
more, erected  under  contract  with  the 
city,  and  in  which  the  city  had  certain 
rights,  held  affected  with  notice  of  those 
rights.  Baltimore  r.  White,  2  Gill  (Md.), 
444.  A  city,  authorized  by  its  charter  to 
build  wharves  on  its  own  property,  and 
to  obtain  by  contract  or  purchase  the 
title  or  the  control  of  other  wharves  in 
the  city,  and  to  raise  a  revenue  there- 
from by  establishing  and  collecting  a 
rate  of  dockage  and  wharfage,  had  no 
power  to  take  a  lease  of  a  wharf  contain- 
ing a  provision  that  it  should  be  kept  as 
a  free  wharf.  Mobile  v.  Mood,  53  Ala. 
561. 


138 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


wouUl  1)0  tlie  same  as  tliose  of  any  similar  proprietor,  and  no 
groater,  unlos.s  enlarged  by  legislative  grant. 

^  110.  (74)  All  the  powers  of  a  munieipality  in  respect  to 
Avharves  and  docks  must,  like  all  its  other  powers,  be  derived 
from  the  legislature. ^  In  regard  to  private  ivharves  lawfully 
erected,  the  municipal  authorities  have  only  such  powers  of  local 
regulation  and  goverinnent  as  their  charters  or  constituent  acts, 
in  o-eneral  or  special  terms,  confer  upon  them.^  Their  own  right 
to  erect  wharves  may  be  express  or  implied.     The  power,  even 


1  Snj'der  v.  Rockport,  6  Ind.  (Porter) 
237.    1855;    Kailroad    Co.   v.    Wintlirop, 
6  La.  An.  36 ;    State  v.  Jersey  City,  34 
N.  J.  L.  31.     Under  the   charter    of    a 
city  providing  that  the    city  "shall  have 
control  of  the  landings    of  the    Mississippi 
River,  and  the  riyht  to  build  wharves  and  reg- 
ulate the  landing,  ivharfage,  and  docking  of 
boats,"   it    may   establisli   and    construct 
wiiarves  and  collect  a  reasonable  compen- 
sation for  their  use.     Muscatine  v.  Keo- 
kuk, etc.  Packet  Co.,  45  Iowa,  185,  1876 ; 
post,  sec.  112.     While  a  city  may  be  en- 
joined, at  the   instance    of   a  tax-payer, 
from  raising  ta.xes  or  appropriating  money 
for   tiie   unauthorized   construction   of  a 
wharf,  it  will  not  be  restrained  from  ex- 
ercising a  clear  power  to  grade  streets, 
merely  because,  by  such  grading,  a  wharf 
at  tlie  river  end  of  tlie  street  will  incident- 
ally result.     Snyder  v.  Rockport,  above 
cited.    As  to  right  of  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  erect,  or  allow  otiiers   to   erect, 
wliarf  at  terminus  of  a  street,  see  Doe  v. 
Jones,  11  Ala.  63.     In  Galveston  v.  Men- 
ard, 23  Tex.  349,  1859,  the  right  of  the 
city,  under  a  grant  from  the  legislature,  to 
build  and  control  wharres  in  front  of  the 
strtfis  is  affirmed.     In  Newport  v.  Taylor, 
16  B.  Mon.  699,  1855,  it  was  decided  that 
the  city  might  build  wharves   on  property 
dedicated  as  a  "common,"  along  a  naviga- 
ble river.     See  also,  Louisville  v.  Bank,  3 
B.  Mon.  144;   Kennedy  v.  Covington,  8 
Dana,  61.     The  city  of  Dubuque,  under 
its  cliarter,  was  held  to  have  power  to 
prohibit   all   persons,    including    riparian 
owners,  from  using  any  place  but  the  pub- 
lic wharf  without  paying  wharfage.     Du- 
buque V.   Stout,   32    Iowa,   80;   s.  c.   7 
Am.  Rep.  171;  post,  sec.  112,  note.     As 
to  the  use,  under  municipal  authority,  of 


streets  bordering  on  a  navigable  river  for 
structures  for  the  acconnnodation  of 
passengers  and  the  storage  of  freights, 
etc.,  Barney  v.  Keokuk,  94  U.  S.  324, 
1876  ;  s.  c.  below,  4  Dillon,  593;  111.,  etc. 
Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  2  Dillon,  70. 

2  Grant  v.  Davenport,  18  Iowa,  179, 
1865.  Where  the  charter  of  a  city  au- 
thorizes it  "  to  regulate  the  erection  and 
repair  of  private  wharves  and  the  rates  of 
wharfiigc  thereat,  the  city,"  says  Wright, 
C.  J.,  "  may  regulate,  but  not  destroy  ;  may 
exercise  control,  as  over  other  private 
property  within  its  limits,  but  not  to  the 
extent  of  appropriating  the  use  and  en- 
joyment thereof  to  the  public  without 
compensation."  lb.  Liability  of  city  corpo- 
ration for  an  injury  to  a  private  wharf, 
caused  by  diverting  streams  of  water  to  a 
point  near  the  wliaif,  thereby  causing  a 
great  deposit  of  sand  and  earth,  which 
lessened  the  depth  of  water  at  the  wh.irf 
and  impaired  its  value.  Barron  v.  Balii- 
more,  2  Am.  Jurist,  203,  cited  and  aj)- 
proved  in  Stetson  v.  Faxon,  19  Pick.  147, 
1858;  and  see,  also,  Thayer  v.  Boston,  19 
Pick.  510.  If  the  deposits  from  sewers  con- 
structed by  the  city  cause  a  peculiar  in- 
jury to  the  wharf  owner,  the  city  is  liable 
to  the  latter  in  damages.  Franklin  Wharf 
Co.  V.  Portland,  67  Me.  46,  1877  ;  s.  c.  24 
Am.  Rep.  1,  and  Mr.  Thompson's  note ; 
Haskell  v.  New  Bedford,  108  Mass.  208; 
Brayton  v.  Fall  River,  113  Mass.  218; 
s.  c.  18  Am.  Rep.  470;  post,  ch.  xxiii. 
Power  to  erect  public  wharves  and  to 
condemn  private  property',  therefore,  in- 
cludes the  power  to  extend  a  wliurf  already 
established,  and  compulsorily  to  appro- 
priate the  necessary  land  for  that  purpose 
on  making  compensation  to  the  owner. 
Hannibal  v.  Wiuchell,  54  Mo.  172,  1873. 


§  111.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  139 

when  conferred  in  terms,  is,  like  other  powers,  to  be  construed 
somewhat  strictly  when  it  affects  private  rights,  but  not  so  strictly 
as  to  defeat  the  purpose  of  the  grant.^  Thus,  although  the  cor- 
porate boundaries  may  by  the  charter  be  extended  to  low-water 
mark,  and  the  corporation  has  express  power  "  to  regulate  the 
erection  and  occupation  of  all  wharves  or  levees  within  the  cor- 
iu)rate  limits,"  this  does  not  give  the  corporation  as  against  the 
riparian  proprietor  (whose  right  was  construed  to  extend  to  low- 
watt  r  mark),  the  power  to  control  the  river  bank  so  as  to  require 
such  proprietor  or  his  lessee  to  take  out  a  license  for  his  wharf- 
boat,  fastened  to  the  shore  of  his  own  land,  and  used  for  business 
purposes.^ 

§  111.  (75)  So  where  a  riparian  proprietor  had  constructed  a 
wharf  which  extended  to,  but  did  not  encroach  upon,  the  naviga- 
ble part  of  the  river,  and  which  was  not  shown  to  be  a  nuisance 
in  fact,  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
that  the  city  within  which  the  wharf  was  situated  could  not, 
under  the  charter  power  to  establish  dock  and  wharf  lines  and 
restrain  and  prevent  encroachments  upon  the  river  and  obstruc- 
tions thereto,  pass  an  ordinance  declaring  the  wharf  to  be  an 
obstruction  to  navigation,  and  a  nuisance,  and  ordering  it  to  be 
summarily  abated.^ 

1  As  to  the  extent    of  municipal  power  519,  and  note  by  Mr.  (now  Chief  Justice) 

over  public  and  private   wharves  and   tlie  Gray;    Trowbridge   v.   Mayor    (right    of 

respective  rights   of   the  riparian   owner  Albany  under   Dongan   charter),  7  Hill 

and    municipal     authorities,    concerning  (N.  Y.),429;  s.  c.5/6. 71;  Hart  ?;.  Mayor, 

wharves  and  wharfage  :  Grant  v.  Daven-  9  Wend.  571 ;  Lansing  v.  Smith,  4  Wend, 

port,  18   Iowa,  179,    1865;  Cincinnati  v.  4;    Thompson  v.  Mayor,  11   N.  Y.  115; 

Walls,  1  Ohio  St.  222 ;  Muscatine  v.  Her-  Marshall  v.  Guion,  lb.  461 ;  Corporation 

shey,  18  Iowa,  39 ;  Galveston  v.  Menard,  v.   Scott,    1   Caines,  543.      Principles    of 

23  Tex.  348;  Baltimore  ?;.  White,  2    Gill  construction,   ante,    sec.    89,   and    notes; 

(Md.),  444,  1845;  Furman  v.  New  York,  5  post,  113,  note. 

Sandf.  S.  C.  16 ;  affirmed,  10  N.  Y.  5G7  ;  The  powers  of  a  municipality  in  re- 

Dugan  y.  Baltimore,  5  Gillfc  Johns.  (Md.)  spect  to  wharfage  are  subject  to  the  un- 

357,  1833  ;  reversing   s.  c.  3  Bland   Ch.  limited  control  of  the  legislature,  except 

361;  Wilson  v.  Inloes,  11  Gill  &  Johns,  so  far  as  the  rights  of  creditors  maybe 

(Md.)  358;  Shepherd  v.  Municipality,  6  impaired.      St.  Louis  ?;.  Shields,  52  Mo. 

Rob.    (La.)    349;    Columbus   v.    Grey,   2  361,1873;  ante,  sec.  69. 
Bush  (Ky.).  476;  Kennedy  v.  Covington,  '-  McLaughlin  v.  Stevens,  18  Ohio,  94, 

17  B.  Mon.  567;  Memphis,    etc.   Packet  1849;  Blanchard  v.  Porter  (extent  of  ri- 

Co.   V.   Grey,  9   Bush   (Ky.),  137,    1872;  parian  right),  11  Ohio,  138,  144;  Musca- 

Commrs.    v.   Neil,   3    Yeates    (Pa.),   54;  tine  i;.  Hershey,  18  Iowa,  39;  Martin  v. 

Richardson  v.   Boston,  24  How.   (U.  S.)  Evansville,  32  Ind.  85, 1869. 
188;  8.  c.  19   lb.  263;  17  76.426;  New-  3  Yates   v.  Milwaukee,  10  Wall.  497, 

port  V.  Taylor,  16  B.  Mon.  699,  1855;  1870. 
Commonwealth  v.  Roxbury,  9  Gray,  514, 


140 


MUNICirAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


§  Hi!.  (Vr)")  If  the  light  to  impose  wharfage  is  given  to  a  muni- 
cipality, but  not  limited,  the  question  of  the  amount  which  the 
municipal  authorities  may  exact  is  confided  to  their  discretion, 
and  is  one  with  which  the  courts  cannot  interfere,^  unless,  per- 
haps, in  a  case  where  the  by-law  imposing  it  is  plainly  unreason- 
able. But  the  amount  of  tolls  or  wharfage  ma}^,  of  course,  be 
regulated  by  the  legislature.^ 

§  113.  (77)  The  interests  of  commerce  imperatively  require 
that  public  wharves  should  be  in  a  safe  condition  ;  and  if  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  is  in  possession  of  such  a  wharf  and  exercises 
control  over  it,  and  receives  tolls  for  its  use,  it  owes  a  duty  to 
the  public  to  keep  it  in  proper  and  secure  condition  for  use,  and 
it  is  liable,  without  statutory  enactment  to  that  effect,  to  an 
action  for  any  special  injuries  to  boats  and  vessels  caused  by  its 


1  Municipality  r.  Pease,  2  La.  An.  538, 
1847  ;  Muscatine  v.  Hersliey,  18  Iowa, 
39,  42,  18G4,  per  Wright,  J.  The  erection 
of  a  wharf  by  a  city  was  presumed  to  be 
for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  and  in  the 
absence  of  an  ordinance  fixing  the  wliarf- 
age  dues  or  providing  for  the  payment 
of  a  compensation  for  tlie  use  of  its 
wiiarves,  it  was  lield  tliat  such  compen- 
sation could  not  be  collected  by  the  city. 
Muscatine  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  Packet  Co.,  45 
Iowa,  185,  1876.  A  city  may  prescribe  by 
ordinance  the  fees  which  shall  be  paid  for 
the  use  of  tiie  wharves  within  its  limits, 
and  this  power  is  impliedly  subject  only 
to  the  limitation  that  such  fees  shall  be 
reasonable.  Keokuk  i'.  Keokuk  Northern 
Line  Packet  Co.,  45  Iowa,  196,  1876.  As 
to  right  of  a  city  to  charge  wharfage  fees 
when  vessels  or  boats  are  moored  at 
places  where  no  wharves  have  been 
founded.  lb ;  Dubuque  v.  Stout,  32 
Iowa,  80. 

Voluntary  Payment.  Where  the  own- 
ers of  boats  have  paid  wharfage  fees 
under  protest,  which  were  demanded  and 
collected  in  the  absence  of  authority  to 
make  the  demand,  they  cannot  recover 
them  back  in  an  action  against  the  city. 
Muscatine  r.  Keokuk,  etc.  Packet  Co., 
45  Iowa,  185,  1876.  The  mere  danger 
that  an  action  at  law  will  be  commenced 
to  enforce  payment  does  not  make  the 
payment  of     a    demand     unjustly   and 


illegally  made  a  compulsory  payment. 
lb.  See  cases  on  the  subject  of  volun- 
tary and  compulsory  payment,  cited  at 
large,  post,  ch.  23.  Packet  Co.  v.  St.  Louis, 
4  Dillon,  10,  1876;  ante,  sees.  94,  95. 

2  Baltimore  v.  White,  2  Gill  (Md.), 
444,  1845;  Murphy  u.  City  Council,  11 
Ala.  586,  1847.  Authority  to  a  city  "  to 
erect,  repair,  and  regulate  wiiarves  and  the 
rates  of  wharfage,"  authorizes  it  to  collect 
wharfage  upon  goods  landed  on  the  bank, 
the  space  in  front  of  the  city  being  dedi- 
cated to  the  public,  although  no  artificial 
wharf  was  erected.  Sacramento  v.  Steam- 
er, 4  Cal.  41.  This  subject  is  discussed 
by  Wright,  J.,  in  Muscatine  v.  Hersliey, 
18  Iowa,  39,  but  the  point  is  not  decided 
by  the  court.  Dubuque  v.  Stout,  32 
Iowa,  47,  80,  1871;  s.  c.  7  Am.  Rep. 
171.  In  Kentucky,  however,  it  is  held 
that  the  owner  of  the  land  must  build 
wharves,  or  improve  the  shore,  or  make 
some  preparation  for  the  reception  or  de- 
livery of  goods,  or  accommodation  of 
vessels,  before  he  is  entitled  to  collect 
tolls  or  wharfage.  Columbus  v.  Grey,  2 
Bush  (Ky.),  476.  If  he  permits  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities  so  to  improve  the 
wharves,  he  will  only  be  entitled  to  rea- 
sonable compensation  for  the  use  of  the 
river  bank.  lb.  The  word  "  quay  "  de- 
fined by  McLean,  J.,  in  New  Orleans  v. 
United  States,  10  Pet.  061,  715. 


§  114.] 


MUNICIPA.L   CHARTERS. 


141 


failure  to  discharge  this  duty.  In  such  a  case  it  is  not  material 
whether  the  city  had  adopted  ordinances  for  the  regulation  of 
the  wharf,  or,  having  such,  neglected  to  enforce  them,  as  in 
either  event  the  responsibility  is  the  same.^ 

Ferries. 

§  114.  (78)  It  is  not  unusual  for  the  legislature  to  make  to  a 
municipal  corporation  a  more  or  less  extensive  grant  respecting 
fet-ries  and  ferry  frarichises.  Such  a  grant  is  not,  unless  other- 
wise expressed,  a  compact  which  cannot  be  impaired,  but  in  the 
nature  of  a  public  law,  subject  to  be  repealed  or  changed,  as  the 
public  interests  may  demand.'-^     If  the  legislature  has  conferred, 


1  Pittsburgh  v.  Grier,  22  Pa.  St.  54, 
1853.  "  This  case,"  says  Perky,  C.  J., 
in  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284, 
295,  "  is  put  distinctly  upon  the  ground 
that  the  public  duty,  which  was  the  foun- 
dation of  the  action,  arose  out  of  the 
control  which  the  city  exercised  over  the 
wharf,  and  the  income  received  for  the 
use  of  it."  That  the  right  to  collect 
wharfage  by  the  city  imposes  the  duty  to 
keep  in  repair,  and  a  correlative  liability, 
has  been  often  determined.  City  not  liable 
for  filling  up  slip  from  a  sewer.  Reed  v. 
Lynn,  126  Mass.  367  ;  Shinkle  v.  Coving- 
ton, 1  Busli  (Ky),  617,  where  there  was  a 
failure  to  provide  proper  fastenings  for 
boats.  People  v.  Albany,  11  Wend.  539, 
54.3 ;  Buckbee  v.  Brown,  21  Wend.  110 ; 
Mersey  Dock  Trustees  v.  Gibbs,  Law  R. 
1  H.  L.  93.  Lessee  of  city  is  under  like 
liability.  Radway  v.  Briggs,  37  N.  Y. 
256,  1867.  In  form,  the  action  in  such  a 
case  against  the  city  may  be  either  case 
or  assumpsit.  Pittsburgh  v.  Grier,  22  Pa. 
St.  54,  1853.  But  it  is  no  defence  to  an 
action  by  a  city  for  wharfage  that  the 
wharf  is  not  well  built  and  needed  further 
improvement  or  repairs.  Prescott  r.  Du- 
quesne,  48  Pa.  St.  118;  Jeffersonville  ?;. 
Ferry  Co.,  27  Ind.  100;  s.  c.  35  Ind.  19, 
1870;  Winpenny  v.  Philadelphia,  65  Pa. 
St.  135,  1870.  Where  it  was  rendered 
unsafe  by  acts  of  others,  notice,  express 
or  implied,  is  an  element  necessary  to  lia- 
bility, the  same  as  in  the  case  of  defective 
highways.  Seaman  v.  New  York,  3  Daly 
(N.  Y.),  147  ;  post,  ch.  xxiii. 

The  duty  of  those  having  control  of  a 


harbor  is,  so  long  as  it  is  open  to  the  public, 
to  have  it  reasonably  safe  for  tlie  public  use, 
and  this  ichether  talis  are  collected  or  not  for 
the  use  of  it.  Parnaby  v.  Lancashire  Ca- 
nal Co.,'ll  A.  &  E.  223 ;  Metcalfe  v.  Heth- 
erington,  11  Ex.  257 ;  s.  c.  5  H.  &  N.  719; 
Gibbs  V.  Liverpool  Docks,  3  H.  &  N.  164 ; 
s.  c.  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  C.  93,  104, 122 ;  Long- 
more  V.  Great  Western  Railway  Co.,  35 
L.  J.  C.  P.  135;  Francis  v.  Cockrell,  L.  R. 
5  Q.  B.  184 ;  Webb  v.  Port  Bruce  Harbor 
Co.,  19  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  626;  Coe  v. 
Wise,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  711;  Winch  v.  Conser- 
vators of  the  Thames,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  471 ; 
see  Sweeney  v.  Port  Burwell  Harbor  Co., 
17  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  574;  reversed,  19 
Upper  Can.  C.  P.  376 ;  Berryraan  v.  Port 
Burwell  Harbor  Co.,  24  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
34 ;  Harrison  v.  Municipality,  Mass.  44. 

2  East  Hartford  i'.  Hartford  Bridge 
Co.,  10  How.  (U.  S.)  511,  18.50;  ante, 
sec.  68.  As  to  extinguishment  of  ferry 
franchise  by  a  subsequent  legislative 
grant  to  build  a  bridge  at  the  site  of  the 
ferry,  and  take  tolls,  see  Charles  River 
Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
420,  18.37.  The  dissenting  opinion  of  Mr. 
Justice  Story,  on  the  important  constitu- 
tional question  involved  in  this  case,  is 
referred  to  by  Mr.  Webster,  in  a  letter  to 
Judge  Story,  as  "  the  ablest  and  best 
written  opinion  I  ever  heard  you  deliver ; 
it  is  close,  searching,  and  scrutinizing; 
the  opposite  opinion  has  not  a  foot  nor 
an  inch  of  grotmd  to  stand  on."  2  Story's 
Life  and  Letters,  268.  Chancellor  Kent 
expressed  the  same  opinion.  lb.  270.  But 
forty  years'  subsequent   experience   has 


142  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

as  in  some  of  the  ancient  charters  in  England  and  in  this  country, 
upon  a  mmiicipal  corporation,  its  ivhole  poiver^  to  establish  and 
regulate  lorries  within  the  corporate  limits,  the  corporation  thus 
representing  the  sovereign  power  may  make  an  exclusive  grant.^ 
But  such  a  corporation  has  not  an  exclusive  power  over  the  sub- 
ject, unless,  b}'  express  words  or  necessary  inference,  it  be  plainly 
given  to  it  by  the  legislature.  Hence,  power  to  a  municipality 
to  establish  and  regulate  ferries  within  its  limits  does  not  give 
it  an  exclusive  power,  and  consequently  does  not  authorize 
it  to  confer  an  exclusive  privilege  upon  others  to  establish  a 
ferry.2 

§  115.  (79)  By  its  charter  a  city  was  empowered  "  to  license, 
continue,  and  regulate  "  as  many  ferries  within  its  limits,  to  the 
opposite  shore  of  a  river  bounding  it,  as  the  public  good  required, 
and  the  common  council  were  further  authorized  "  to  direct  the 
manner  of  issuing  and  registering  the  licenses,  and  to  prescribe 
the  sum  of  money  to  be  paid  therefor  into  the  treasury  of  the 
corporation."  Under  this,  an  ordinance  prohibiting  all  persons 
from  ferrying,  without  a  license  from  the  mayor,  and  authorizing 
this  officer  to  grant  licenses  to  any  person  upon  payment  into  the 
treasury  of  the  city  of  the  sum  of  fifty  dollars,  was  sustained 
against  the  objections  that  there  was  no  power  to  prohibit  ferry- 
ing without  a  license,  and  that  the  license  fee  was  a  tax.  The 
words  of  the  charter  —  "  To  prescribe  the  sum  of  money  to  be 
paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  corporation" — were  regarded  by 
the  court  as  showing  a  clear  intent  to  make  licenses  a  source  of 


vindicated   the  judgment   of   the   court,  gives   the   power  to   limit   the    issue   of 

Construction  of   special  grant.   Hartford  licenses ;   if    it    can    limit,   there    is    no 

Bridge  Co.  v.  Ferry  Co.,  29  Conn.  210.  reason  why  it  cannot  bind  itself  to  issue 

1  Costar  V.  Brusli,  25  Wend.  628,  1841.  no  other;  but  the  power  to  license,  or  to 

"^  Minturn   v.   Larue,  23  How.  (U.S.)  license  and  regulate  certain  occupations, 

435,  1859  ;  Harrison  v.  State,  9  Mo.  526,  does  not,  it  seems,  include  tlie  power  to 

1845;  McEwen  v.   Taylor,   4  G.   Greene  create  a  monopoly.     Chicago  ?;.  Rumph,  45 

(Iowa),  532;  ante,  sec.  80,  note.     While  111.  90;  Logan  v.  Pyne,  43  Iowa,  524;  B. 

the  exclusive  power  conferred  by  the  leg-  &  H.  Ferry  Co.  v.   Davis,  48  Iowa,   133. 

islature    upon   a  city   to   grant  a   ferry  But  "tlie  grant  of  exclusive  ferry  licenses 

license  does  not  authorize  it  to  grant  an  rests  upon  peculiar  grounds.  It  is  in  some 

exclusive  license,  yet  the  power  to  grant  an  sense  an  extension  of  a  public  road.    The 

exclusive  license  is  conferred  when    the  objection  to  the  creation  of  a  monopoly  is 

city  is  authorized  "to  grant  or  refuse  a  overcome  in  the   matter  of  a  few  by  the 

license."     B.  &  H.  Eerry  Co.  v.   Davis,  consideration  of  the   public  necessity  or 

48  Iowa,  133,  1878.     The  power  to  refuse  advantage."     Ih.  per  Adams,  J. 


§  117.]  MUNICIPAL  CHAKTERS.  143 

revenue  to  the  city;  and  the  court  added  that  the  amount  charged 
as  a  license  fee  did  not  appear  to  be  unreasonable.^ 

§  116.  (80)  If  a  municipal  corporation,  seized  of  a  ferry,  lease 
the  same,  through  the  agency  of  the  mayor  and  aldermen,  with  a 
covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment,  this  covenant  will  not  restrain  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  from  exercising  the  powers  vested  in  them 
by  statute,  to  license  another  ferry  over  the  same  waters,  if  in 
their  judgment  (which  cannot  be  reviewed  by  the  courts),  the 
public  necessity  and  convenience  require  it.  On  such  a  cove- 
nant the  city  may  be  liable  to  the  covenantees ;  but  the  powers 
vested  in  the  city  officers,  as  trustees  for  the  public,  cannot  be  thus 
abrogated.  If,  however,  the  city,  in  its  corporate  capacity,  is 
the  legal  owner  of  an  exclusive  franchise,  its  grantees  or  lessees 
would  hold  it,  notwithstanding  any  license  to  others,  whether 
granted  by  the  mayor  and  aldermen  or  any  other  tribunal.^ 

Borrowing  Money. 
§  117.  (81)  We  will  hereafter  treat  of  the  implied  power  of 
municipal  corporations  to  issue  negotiable  securities.  But  this  is 
a  different  question  from  the  power  to  borrow  money.  The  power 
to  borrow  may  be  given  in  express  language,  in  which  case  the 
terms  and  purpose  of  the  grant  will  measure  its  extent.  But 
suppose  the  poAver  is  not  expressly  conferred,   does  it  exist  by 

1  Chilvers  v.  People,  11  Mich.  43,  1862.  son  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  10  Barb. 
As  to  distinction  between  a  license  fee  223 ;  Harris  i\  Nesbit,  24  Ala.  398  ;  United 
and  a  tax,  see  Ash  v.  People,  11  Mich.  States  v.  Fanning,  Morris  (Iowa),  348; 
347,  and  the  chapters  on  Ordinances  and  Conner  v.  New  Albanj-,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
Taxation.  Pos^  sec.  357,  768.  Amount  43;  City  r.  Ferry  Co.,  27  Ind.  100  ;  Shall- 
of  license  city  may  exact,  the  state  law  cross  v.  Jeffersonville,  26  Ind.  193.  The 
on  the  subject  being  held  to  affect  the  right  of  a  city,  given  by  charter,  to  license 
city.   Reddick  v.  Amelia,  1  Mo.  5,  1821.  and  tax  ferries,  is  not,  unless  so  expressed, 

2  Fay,  in  ?v,  15 Pick.  (Mass.)  243,  1834.  exclusive  of  a  like  right  in  the  state  or 
The  court  will  not  try  on  certiorari  the  county.  Harrison  v.  State,  9  Mo.  526, 
conflicting  titles  of  parties  to  a  ferry  fran-  1845.  "Power  to  regulate  ferries,"  given 
chise.     lb.  ante,  cli.  v.  sec.  97.  to  municipal  corporations  in  general  in- 

Rirjhts  of  municipal  corporations  in  connec-  corporation  act,  construed.  Duckwall    v, 

lion  with  ferries  and  extent  of  lerjislative  con-  New  Albany,  25  Ind.  283.     When  equity 

<ro/ ;  see  Fanning  r.  Gregoirec^  a/.,  16  How.  will  annul  lease.  Phillips  y.  Bloomington, 

(U.  S.)  524, 1853;  East  Hartford  r.  Hart-  1  G.   Greene  (Iowa),  498.     Upon  dicision 

ford  Bridge  Co.,  10  lb.  511  :  affirming  s.  c.  of  an  old  town  owning  ferry  franchise,  the 

16  Conn.  149  ;  17  Conn.  80,  96  ;  Chilvers  v.  new  town  owns  no  interest  therein  except 

People,   11   Mich.   43;  O'Neill  v.  Police  so   far  as   conferred   by  the   legislature. 

Jury,  21  La.  An.  586  ;  Aiken  v.  Kailroad  Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  East  Hartford,  16 

Co.,  20  N.  Y.   370,  1859,  relating  to  the  Conn.  149 ;  post,  clu  vii. 
ferry  rights  of  the  city  of  Albany.    Ben- 


144  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

implication  ?  It  is  perhaps  settled  law  in  this  country  that  pri- 
vate corporations,  organized  for  pecuniary  profit,  have,  unless 
specially  restricted,  an  incidental  authority  to  borrow  money  for 
tlRnr  legitimate  purposes,  and  to  give  negotiable  obligations 
for  its  repayment.^  The  question  of  the  incidental  authority 
of  municipal  corporations  to  borrow  money  has  not  been  so 
thoroughly  considered  and  so  often  decided  as  to  be  entirely 
closed  to  controversy.  In  view  of  the  legislative  practice  to 
confer,  in  terras,  all  powers  so  important  as  this,  the  dangerous 
nature  of  this  power,  by  reason  of  the  temptation  it  holds  out  to 
incur  needless  debts  and  to  make  extravagant  expenditures,  and 
the  facilities  it  offers  for  frauds,  and  the  settled  and  salutary 
doctrine  that  such  corporations  have  no  powers  but  such  as  are 
expressly  conferred,  and  those  which  are  necessary  to  effect  the 
objects  of  the  corporation,  and  those  which  are  incidental  to  the 
express  grants,  the  author,  where  the  legislative  will  is  wholly 
silent,  would  be  strongly  inclined  to  deny  the  existence  of  a 
general  implied  or  incidental  poiver  to  borrow  money.  But  it 
must  be  admitted  that  down  to  the  present  time  a  majority 
of  the  express  adjudications  on  the  subject  favor  the  contrary 
opinion. 

§  118.  (82)  The  question  arose  in  Ohio,  in  1836,  and  was  fully 
argued  and  considered.  The  town  of  Chillicothe  possessed 
authority  to  purchase  real  estate,  erect  public  buildings,  repair 
streets,  and  the  usual  municipal  powers.  The  right  to  borrow 
money  was  not  expressly  granted,  and  the  only  question  in  the 
case  (an  action  upon  the  bonds  of  the  town  given  for  borrowed 
money)  was,  whether  it  was  granted  by  implication.  The  case 
was  regarded  as  of  the  first  impression,  no  authorities  in  point 
being  produced.  The  court  distinctly  decided  that  in  carrying 
out  the  express  powers,  or  in  effecting  any  legitimate  municipal 

^  Stratton  v.  Allen,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  229 ;  law  corporations  in  respect  to  drawing, 

see  ante,  sec.  50,  and  chapter  on  Contracts,  accepting,  or  indorsing  negotiable   secu- 

post,  sec.  488.     Lucas  v.  Pitney,  3  Dutch,  rities.     The  court  in  this  case  deny  (in 

(N.J.)  221 ;  ^ackettstown  Ads.  i'.  Swack-  the  absence  of  express  legislative  author- 

hamer,  8  Vrooin,  (.37  N.  J.  L.),  191 ;  con-  ity  conferring  the  powor)  that  it  is  com- 

struction  of  specific  grant,  Mayor,  etc.  v.  petent  to  a  company  incorporated  in  the 

Bailey,  8  Vroom  (.37  N.  J.  L.),  519.     But  usual  way  for  the  formation  and  working 

see  observations  of  Bijles,  J.,  in  Bateman  of  a  railway  to  draw,  accept,  or  endorse 

V.  Mid-Wales  Kaihvay  Co.,  Law  Rep.   1  bills  of  exchange.     Infra,  sec.  126. 
C.  P.  510,  1866,  as  to  powers  of  common- 


§  118.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


145 


object,  the  corporation  possessed  the  incidental  or  implied  right 
to  borrow  money.i  And  subsequently  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Wisconsin  affirmed  the  implied  authority  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, as  incidental  to  the  execution  of  the  general  powers  granted 
by  its  charter,  and  in  the  absence  of  a  special  restriction,  to 
borroAV  money  and  issue  its  bonds  therefor,  it  appearing  that  the 
proceeds  thereof  went  into  the  treasury  of  the  city  and  were 
expended  by  it.2  "The  charter,"  says  the  court,  stating  its 
reasons,  "does  confer  the  power  to  purchase  fire  apparatus, 
cemetery  grounds,  etc.,  to  establish  markets,  and  to  do  many 
other  things,  for  the  execution  of  which  money  would  be  neces- 
sary as  a  means.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  in  the  absence 
of  any  restriction,  the  power  to  borrow  money  would  pass  as  an 
incident  to  these  general  powers,  according  to  the  well-settled 
rule  that  corporations  may  resort  to  the  usual  and  convenient 
means  of  executing  the  powers  granted ;  for  certainly  no  means 
is  more  usual  for  the  execution  of  such  objects  than  that  of 
borrowing  money."  In  this  case,  as  in  the  other,  the  question 
was  not  raised  until  the  money  had  been  borrowed  and  the  right 
of  third  persons  had  attached.^ 


1  Bank  v.  Chillicothe,  7  Ohio,  Part  II. 
p.  31,  1836. 

2  Mills  V.  Gleason,  11  Wis.  470,  18G0 ; 
8.  c.  8  Am.  Law  Reg.  692 ;  State  v.  Mad- 
ison, 7  Wis.  688;  Clark  v.  Janesville,  10 
Wis.  136;  Clarke  v.  School  District,  3 
Rho.  Is.  199,  1855,  in  which  it  is  lield  that 
when  money  is  borrowed  to  pay  a  lawful 
debt  of  a  corporation,  and  it  is  so  applied, 
the  corporation  is  liable  on  the  notes 
given  for  the  money  borrowed ;  it  is  not 
lield  that  notes  so  given  under  the  inci- 
dental power  to  provide  for  the  payment 
of  debts  have  all  the  qualities  of  com- 
mercial paper.     Infra,  sec.  126. 

8  City  V.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  477,  486, 
1869,  where  the  Wisconsin  cases  are  re- 
ferred to  by  Nelson,  J. ;  ante,  sec.  50,  and 
notes.  The  riglit  of  private  corporations 
generally  to  hormw  moneif,  as  incidental  to 
the  express  powers  granted,  is  extensively 
considered  upon  principle  and  authority 
in  the  important  case  of  Curtis  v.  Leavitt, 
16  N.  Y.  9,  1857.  See,  also,  Barry  v. 
Merch.  Ex.  Co.,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  280;  Beers 
V.  Phcenix  Glass  Co.,  14  Barb.  358  ;  Strat- 
ton  V.  Allen,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  229 ;  Lucas  v. 
VOL.  I.  10 


Pitney  (power  of  railroad  company),  3 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  221 ;  Fay  v.  Noble  (manu- 
facturing corporation),  12  Cush.  1;  Davis 
V.  Prop,  etc.,  of  Meeting  House  (religious 
corporation),  8  Met.  821.  Perhaps  it  is 
difficult  to  draw  a  distinction  between 
private  and  municipal  corporations  in 
respect  to  the  incidental  right  to  borrow 
money.  But  we  see  much  more  reason 
for  atfirming  the  existence  of  an  inciden- 
tal power  of  this  kind  with  respect  to 
trading,  banking,  manufacturing,  •  and 
railroad  corporations  than  in  relation  to 
municipal  corporations.  There  is  a  differ- 
ence between  contracting  a  debt  in  tiie 
prosecution  of  an  ordinary  legitimate  cor- 
porate purpose  and  borrowing  money  for 
tliat  purpose.  In  the  one  case,  the  appli- 
cation of  the  credit  is  secured  to  tlie  ad- 
vancement of  the  authorized  object,  while 
money  borrowed  is  liable  to  be  lost,  or  to 
be  diverted  to  illegitimate  purposes.  This 
difference  is  insisted  on  with  great  force 
by  Arfnew,  J.  C.  J.,  in  the  dissenting  opin- 
ion in  Williamsport  v.  Commonwealth, 
84  Pa.  St.,  487,  607,  1877.  It  should  be 
remembered,  also,  that  the  express  powers 


146 


MUinCIPAL   COEPORATIONS. 


[CII.  VI. 


§  119.  In  Indiana,  the  doctrine  is  that  corporations,  along  with 
the  express  and  substantive  powers  conferred  by  their  charters 
take  by  implication  all  the  reasonable  modes  of  executing  such 
powei's  which  a  natural  person  may  adopt.^  It  is  a  power  inci- 
dent to  corporations  in  the  absence  of  positive  restriction  to  borrow 
money  as  means  of  executing  the  power .^   In  Iowa,  school  districts 


can  be  executed  without  holding  that 
there  is  an  implied  power  to  borrow 
money.  The  revenue  provisions  of  charters 
supply  it  with  the  means  designed  to  fur- 
nish it  witii  money.  And  powers  are  not 
lield  to  exist  merely  because  they  are 
convenient.  As  applicable  to  municipal 
corporations,  there  is  great  and  almost 
convincing  force  in  the  argument  of  »SW- 
den,  J.,  in  Curtis  v.  Leavitt,  supra,  pp. 
2G7,  268.  And  see  Ketchum  v.  City  of 
Buffalo,  1,4  N.  Y.  356,  365,  185G,  where 
the  subject  is  considered  by  the  same 
judge,  and  the  power  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration to  contract  debts  on  credit,  for 
legitimate  purposes,  is  admitted  to  be  a 
question  which  has  "yet  to  be  judicially 
settled."  Infra,  sec.  126.  See,  on  the 
general  subject,  Canal  Bank  v.  Super- 
visors, 5  Denio,  517,  1848;  Barker  v. 
Loomis,  6  Hill,  463, 1844;  People  ;;.  Bren- 
nan,  39  Barb.  522,  1863.  In  Common- 
wealth V.  Pittsburgh,  41  Pa.  St.  278,  Strotiff, 
J.,  says  that  the  power  to  execute  and 
issue  bonds  is  inseparable  from  the  exis- 
tence of  all  corporations,  public  and 
private.  Douglass  v.  Virginia  City,  5 
Nevada,  147,  1869.  In  New  York,  see 
Stat.  1853,  1135,  ch.  603.  In  Mississippi, 
Boards  of  Police  of  counties  have  no  im- 
plied power  to  borrow  money  ;  and  when 
special  power  to  borrow  money  is  con- 
ferred, it  must  be  fairly  pursued  ;  and  it 
was  held  that  where  a  warrant  properly 
signed  did  not  (as  required  by  the  stat- 
ute) state  on  its  face  the  object  for  which 
it  was  issued,  nor  upon  what  fund  drawn, 
it  could  not  be  enforced.  Beamair  v. 
Board  of  Police,  42  Miss.  2.']8;  s.  c.  15 
Wall.  560.  There  may  be  ground  for  a 
distinction,  as  to  the  implied  power  to 
borrow  money,  between  counties  and  or- 
dinary city  corporations. 

Recent  English  Decisions. — Bond  for 
borrowed  money,  given  after  the  Munici- 
pal Corporations  Act,  held  valid.  Pallis- 
ter  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  67  Eng.  C.  L.  (9  C.  B.) 
744 ;  Payne  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  3  Hurl.  &,  Nor. 


572.  See  Nowell  i'.  Mayor,  etc.,  9  Exch. 
457  ;  Kendall  v.  King,  84  Eng.  C.  L.  (17  C. 
B.)  483.  Note  for  borrowed  money  held 
invalid  under  the  act.  Attorney  General 
V.  Lichfield,  13  Sim.  547 ;  Reg.  v.  Lich- 
field, 4  Q.  B.  893.  See  Bateman  v.  Mid- 
Wales  Railway  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  510. 
1866;  ante,  sec.  117,  note;  sees.  125,  126. 

1  New  England,  etc.  Co.  v.  Robinson, 
25  Ind.  536;  Lafayette  v.  Cox,  5  Ind.  38; 
Board,  etc.  v.  Day,  19  Ind.  450 ;  Kyle  v. 
Martin,  8  Ind.  84;  Haag  v.  Board,  etc.,  00 
Ind.  511 ;  Second,  etc.  Bank  v.  Danville,  00 
Ind.  504 ;  Board  v.  Saunders,  17  Ind.  437. 

2  Board  v.  Day,  19  Ind.  450 ;  Miller  v. 
Board,  66  Ind.  162,  citing  Ketchum  v. 
Bufialo,  14  N.  Y.  856  ;  Mills  v.  Gleason, 
11  Wis.  470;  State  v.  Madison,  7  Wis. 
688;  Bank  v.  Chillicothe,  7  Ohio,  354; 
Moss  V.  Harpeth  Academy,  7  Heisk.  283 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  34  Pa.  St. 
496 ;  Clark  v.  School  Dist.,  3  Rho.  Is.  199 ; 
Hardy  v.  Merriwether,  14  Ind.  203 ;  Shef- 
field V.  Andress,  50  Ind.  157 ;  Second  Bank 
V.  Danville,  60  Ind.  504.  Where  a  city 
negotiated  her  bonds  to  raise  means  to 
construct  water  works,  and  the  city  treas- 
urer misapplied  a  part  of  the  funds  so  real- 
ized, leaving  debts  unpaid  on  account  of 
such  works,  it  was  competent  for  the  city 
council  to  issue  and  sell  other  bonds  to 
make  up  such  deficiency.  Daily  v.  Co- 
lumbus, 49  Ind.  169,  1874.  Under  Ind. 
Rev.  Stat.  1876,  authorizing  towns  to  pro- 
vide apparatus  for  extinguishing  fires, 
and  to  incur  a  debt  on  petition  of  tax- 
payers, levy  a  tax,  etc.,  the  board  of  town 
trustees  has  power  to  purchase  such  ap- 
paratus on  credit,  and  direct  a  note  there- 
for to  be  issued  in  the  name  of  the  town. 
And  this  power  is  not  exhausted  by  the 
passage,  pending  the  negotiation  there- 
for, of  an  ordinance  for  issuance  of  bonds 
to  realize  means  to  purchase  the  appara- 
tus, if  no  bonds  are  in  fact  issued  there- 
under. New  Albany  Bank  v.  Danville, 
60  Ind.  504. 


§  120.] 


MTTNICIPAL  CHAKTERS. 


147 


have  the  power  to  borrow  money  to  discharge  debts  legitimately 
created  and  to  pledge  the  credit  of  the  district  for  that  purpose.^ 
In  Illinois,  the  same  power  is  accorded  after  being  authorized 
hy  a  vote  of  the  people  of  the  district?  But  where  a  law  author- 
izes the  donation  of  money  by  a  municipal  corporation  to  aid 
in  the  construction  of  a  railroad  and  provides  for  levying  a  tax 
to  raise  the  amounts  donated  as  they  become  due,  neither  the 
corporation  nor  its  officers  have  the  power  to  borrow  money  or 
to  issue  bonds  in  payment  of  such  donation,  and  bonds  issued  in 
payment  thereof  are  void.^ 

§  120.  The  subject  of  the  incidental  or  implied  poiver  of  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  to  horroiv  money  to  pay  pre-existing  indebted- 
ness, and  also  to  enable  it  to  grade  and  pave  its  streets,  and  to 
issue  negotiable  bonds  for  this  purpose  is  elaborately  discussed  in 
a  case  recently  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania.^ 
It  was  admitted  that  "taken  in  its  broad  sense,  the  power  to 
borrow  money  and  issue  bonds  therefor  cannot  be  said  to  be 
among  the  implied  powers  of  a  municipal  corporation."     But, 


1  Austin  V.  Colony,  51  Iowa,  102. 

2  Folsom  V.  School  Directors,  91  III. 
404,  where  it  is  held  that  the  power  to 
borrow  money  carries  with  it  at  common 
law,  independent  of  the  statute,  the  power 
to  give  evidence  of  the  loan.  The  power 
to  give  bonds  for  money  borrowed  is  not 
a  limitation  but  an  enlargement  of  their 
powers,  and  an  order  given  by  them  on 
their  treasurer  is  valid  and  maj'  be  en- 
forced against  the  district.  lb.  The  court 
limits  and  distinguishes  the  case  of  Clark 
V.  School  Directors,  78  111.  474. 

3  Lippincott  v.  Pana,  92  111.  24 ;  Mid- 
dleport  v.  iEtna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  82  111.  562. 
In  Nebraska  county  bonds  may  be  issued 
to  raise  money  to  meet  current  expenses 
in  case  of  a  deficit  in  the  county  revenue, 
but  to  do  this  it  must  first  be  authorized  by 
a  vote  of  the  electors  of  the  county.  Daw- 
son Co.  V.  McNamar,  4  N.  W.  Rep.  991.  In 
Georr/iait  is  held  to  be  within  the  purpose 
and  scope  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  ap- 
ply the  corporate  funds  or  to  create  a  corpo- 
rate debt  for  the  purchase  of  an  interest  in 
a  building  to  be  used  as  a  public  school  or 
college  for  the  accommodation  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  town  ;  and  the  fact  that  super- 
intendence of   the   school  is  left  in   the 


hands  of  trustees  not  elected  by  the  cor- 
poration does  not  render  the  appropria- 
tion of  the  corporate  funds  illegal,  it  ap- 
pearing that  the  enterprise  is  not  for  any 
private  gain,  and  that  the  trustees  con- 
tract to  keep  up,  in  tlie  building,  a  public 
school.  Qiuere?  Danielly  et  al.  v.  Ca- 
baniss,  52  Ga.  211,  1874.  In  Wyoming 
the  law  prohibiting  the  trustees  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  from  incurring  any 
debt  or  borrowing  money  for  the  use  of  the 
city,  without  having  the  concurrence  of 
five  eighths  of  the  taxable  property'  own- 
ers, —  to  be  ascertained  by  a  petition  for 
that  purpose, —  does  not  preclude  the  trus- 
tees from  issuing  warrants  on  the  treasury  to 
be  used  as  evidences  of  indebtedness,  al- 
though there  is  no  money  in  the  munici- 
pal treasury  at  the  time,  nor  any  special 
authority  therefor  in  the  city  charter. 
Ivinson  v.  Hance,  1  Wy.  Ter.  270. 

*  Williamsport  v.  Commonwealth,  84 
Pa.  St.  487, 1877,  Paxon,  J.,  delivered  the 
opinion  of  the  court  in  which  Sharswood, 
Mercur,  and  6Vf?o«,  JJ.,  concurred;  Ag- 
neio,  C.  J.,  delivered  the  dissenting  opin- 
ion, in  which  Woodward  and  Sterrett,  JJ., 
concurred. 


148  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  VI. 

nevertheless,  the  majority  of  the  court  after  examining  the  sub- 
ject and  reviewing"  the  authorities,  sums  up  the  result  in  guarded 
language  as  follows :  — "  The  foregoing  cases  rest  upon  the 
principle,  which  we  think  a  sound  one,  that  where  a  municipal  cor- 
poration has  lawfully  contracted  a  debt,  it  has  the  implied  power, 
unless  restricted  by  its  charter  or  prohibited  by  statute,  to  evi- 
dence the  same  by  a  bill,  bond,  note,  or  other  instrument ;  that 
the  power  to  contract  a  debt  carries  with  it  by  necessary  implica- 
tion the  right  to  give  an  appropriate  acknowledgment  of  such 
debt  and  to  agree  with  the  creditor  as  to  the  time  and  mode  of 
payment;  that  in  the  absence  of  statutory  provision  there  is  no 
rule  of  law  limiting  the  extent  of  the  credit."  There  was  a 
dissent  by  three  judges  on  the  ground  that  part  of  the  bonds  in 
question  were  issued  in  advance  of  an}'-  debt  incurred  for  grading 
and  paving,  and  as  a  means  of  raising  money  to  pay  for  future 
improvements ;  that  they  were  sold  at  a  heavy  discount,  and  the 
proceeds  only  thus  applied  ;  and  while  admitting  that  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  may  have  the  implied  power  to  give* suitable 
evidences  of  an  authorized  debt  actually  incurred,  they  denied 
any  incidental  power  in  such  corporations,  as  a  means  of  raising 
money  to  execute  its  ordinary  charter  powers  or  duties  "  to  issue 
commercial  paper,  be  it  bonds  or  notes,  payable  to  bearer,  and 
negotiable  according  to  the  law  merchant  or  general  usage,  and 
either  to  sell  them  in  the  market,  or  pass  them  off  to  individuals 
by  way  of  a  general  loan."  The  dissenting  judges  admitted  that 
where  express  power  to  borrow  is  given,  the  municipality  has  the 
implied  right  to  issue  negotiable  evidences  of  the  debt,  and  they 
also  seemed  to  concede  that  if  an  authorized  debt  is  actually 
incurred  for  paving  or  other  proper  purposes,  the  municipality 
has  the  right  to  issue  a  bond  or  note  or  warrant  as  evidence  of 
it ;  but  it  was  not  said  that,  even  when  thus  issued,  that  is,  issued 
by  virtue  of  a  merely  incidental  power,  the  instrument  partook 
of  all  the  attributes  of  commercial  paper,  especially  the  one 
which  protects  such  paper  in  the  hands  of  a  holder  for  value 
before  maturity,  from  defences  of  which  he  has  no  notice. 

§  121.  If  the  judgment  of  the  court  in  this  case  is  to  be  taken 
as  holding  that  a  municipal  corporation,  merely  by  virtue  of  its 
authority  to  pave  streets,  may,  without  any  express  power  to 
borrow  money,  issue  its  negotiable  bonds  in   advance  and  sell 


§  122.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHAKTEES. 


149 


them  as  a  means  of  raising  money  to  be  applied  to  this  purpose  ; 
may  issue  them  in  any  sum  it  pleases  and  sell  them  for  any  price 
it  can  obtain,  and  that  bonds  so  issued  are  commercial  paper 
with  all  the  qualities  and  incidents  of  such  paper,  — if  such  is  the 
doctrine  of  the  court,  we  are  unable,  notwithstanding  the  ability 
with  which  it  is  supported,  to  regard  it  as  otherwise  than  unsound 
and  dangerous. 

§  122.  The  question  under  consideration  was  somewhat  re- 
cently considered  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States} 
Four  of  the  justices  assented  to  the  proposition  that  a  municipal 
corporation  possessed  no  inherent  or  incidental  power  to  raise  loans 
or  to  horroiv  money  for  that  purpose :  such  a  power  must  in  their 
judgment  be  conferred  by  legislation,  expressly  or  by  plain  im- 


1  Mayor  of  Nashville  v.  Ray,  19  "Wall. 
468,  1873. 

This  subject  being  under  consideration 
in  Haclcettstown  Ads.  v.  Swackhamer,  37 
N.  J.  L.  191,  the  able  and  learned  judge 
who  delivered  tlie  opinion  of  tlie  court 
said  :  "  Municipal  corporations,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  specific  grant  of  power,  do  not 
in  general  possess  the  capacity  to  borrow 
money.  A  note  given  by  such  corpora- 
tion, for  an  unauthorized  loan,  cannot  be 
enforced,  even  though  the  money  bor- 
rowed has  been  expended  for  municipal 
purposes.  Seemingly,  a  promissory  note 
given  for  legitimate  purposes  by  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  will  not  have  tlie 
effect,  when  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide 
holder,  of  cutting  off  the  equities  existing 
between  such  corporation  and  the  payee. 
An  examination  of  the  books  will  show 
that  this  question  lias  not  as  yet  received 
much  judicial  consideration.  The  courts 
of  Wisconsin  and  Ohio  have  had  this  mat- 
ter before  them,  and  have  arrived  at  a  re- 
sult the  opposite  of  tliat  which  has  just 
been  stated.  I  have  carefully  weighed  the 
arguments  of  these  learned  tribunals, 
but  tliey  have  failed  to  convince  my  un- 
derstanding. The  cases  referred  to  are 
those  of  Mills  v.  Gleason,  and  Bank  v. 
Chillicothe.  As  a  counterpoise  to  these 
views  stands  the  weighty  opinion  of 
Judge  Dillon  in  his  treatise  on  Municipal 
Corporations,  Vol.  I,  §  117.  Much  empha- 
sis is  added  to  this  expression  of  opinion 
from  the  fact  that  this  author  had  before 


him,  at  the  time  he  wrote,  the  opposing 
cases  just  cited.  In  this  state  of  the 
authority,  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  the 
principle  is  so  settled  that  the  judgment 
of  this  court  cannot  be  freely  exercised 
with  respect  to  this  important  subject. 
My  conclusion  is  that  already  expressed, 
that  a  right  to  borrow  money  is  not  to  be 
inferred  from  any  of  the  ordinary  powers 
conferred  in  the  charters  of  municipal 
corporations,  and  that,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  such  a  power  can  proceed 
only  from  an  express  grant  to  that  effect. 
....  The  further  question  was  dis- 
cussed at  the  bar,  whether  a  municipal 
corporation,  lacking  a  special  authority 
to  that  end,  can  execute  a  promissory 
note. 

"  I  have  examined  the  subject,  but  the 
views  already  expressed  render  it  unne- 
cessary to  pronounce  any  final  conclusion 
with  respect  to  it ;  for  the  purposes  of 
the  present  case,  I  may  say,  however,  that 
my  present  view  is,  that  a  corporate  body 
of  this  character  has  the  general  and  inherent 
right  to  a  note  as  a  voucher  of  indebtedness, 
but  that  such  note  will  not  have  the 
effect,  when  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide 
holder  before  maturity,  of  cutting  off  the 
equities  existing  between  tlie  maker  and 
payee.  In  this  respect  I  fully  concur  in 
tlie  learned  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Brad- 
ley, recently  read  in  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  in  the  case  of  the 
Mayor  v.  Kay,  19  Wall.  468,"  per  Beasley, 
C.J. 


150  MUNICIPAL  COKPOKATIONS.  [CH.  VL 

plication.  Indebtedness  may  be  created,  it  was  conceded,  for 
authorized  purposes,  to  the  extent  permitted,  but  the  legitimate 
means  of  paving  such  indebtedness  was  by  taxation  in  the  usual 
mode  and  not  by  the  issue  of  commercial  paper  for  sale  in  the 
market ;  and  such  paper,  if  issued  without  the  sanction  of  the 
legislature,  although  it  may  be  valid  as  a  voucher,  is  open,  into 
wliosesoever  hands  it  may  come,  to  all  defences. 

§  123.  It  was  not  denied  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  in  the  case  referred  to  in  the  preceding  section,  that  the 
power  to  borrow  might  he  implied  from  the  existence  of  express 
powers  ^  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  beyond  the  ordinary  range  of 
munieipal  expenditure,  and  which  are  usually  executed  by  means 
of  borrowing  ;  but  it  was  denied  by  four  of  the  judges  that  such 
a  power  Avas  incidental  to  the  ordinary  grants  of  municipal 
authority.  To  the  author,  the  brief  and  compact  opinion  of  Mr. 
Justice  Bradley  seems  to  be  a  careful  and  accurate  exposition  of 
the  law  on  the  subject;  but  the  remaining  four  justices  appear  to 
have  considered  that  it  unduly  restricted  the  powers  of  muni- 
cipal corporations.  In  that  court  the  question  still  remains 
open.2 

1  Infra,  sec.  127 ;  ante,  sec.  118,  note.  of  the  broad  proposition  that  the  pow- 

2  The  prior  case  of  Lynde  v.  The  er  to  make  contracts,  for  example. 
County  of  Winnebago,  decided  by  the  as  in  that  case,  tlie  building  of  a  court- 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  house,  carries  with  it  the  power  to 
16  Wall.  6,  1872,  when  carefully  viewed  borrow  money,  and,  as  incidental  to 
with  reference  to  the  legislation  of  that,  the  power  to  issue  negotiable  bonds 
Iowa  as  to  the  powers  of  the  county  for  the  money  borrowed,  will  clearly 
judge  in  the  erection  of  court-houses  appear  M-hen  the  statutory  provisions  and 
and  the  express  power  to  borrow  money  the  facts  in  that  case  are  considered, 
for  this  purpose  when  the  proposi-  Power  to  build  court-houses  when  pay- 
tion  to  borrow  is  sanctioned  by  a  pop-  ment  therefor  is  to  be  made  out  of  the 
ular  vote,  will  be  found  to  assert  or  ordinary  revenue  is  conferred  by  statute 
involve  no  general  principle,  but  to  turn  upon  the  county  judge  without  the  sanc- 
upon  the  special  statutory  provisions  tion  of  a  popular  vote.  When,  however, 
and  on  the  construction  and  effect  to  be  money  is  to  be  borrowed  for  this  purpose 
given  to  the  particular  proposition  that  the  statute  requires  the  proposition  to 
was  submitted  to  the  people.  That  prop-  borrow  to  be  submitted  to  the  vote  of 
osition  having  been  adopted  by  the  vot-  the  people  of  the  county.  No  proposi- 
ers  was  held  by  the  majority  of  the  tion  to  borrow  money  and  to  issue  bonds 
court  to  imply  the  power  to  borrow  was  in  terms  submitted  to  the  people,  but 
money  to  accomplish  the  object  in  view  there  was  submitted  this  question,  viz., 
and  assuming  the  construction  adopted  "  Shall  the  county  judge,  in  1860,  levy  a 
to  be  the  true  one,  the  result  reached  log-  tax  of  seven  mills  for  constructing  a 
ically  followed.  That  this  judgment  of  court-house  in  the  county,  said  tax  to  be 
the  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  just  levied  from  year  to  year  until  a  sufficient 
referred   to    is    not    authority    in   favor  amount  is  raised  fur  that  purpose,  not. 


§  125.]  MUNICIPAL  CHAETERS.  151 

§  124.  The  nature  and  extent  of  the  power  to  borrow  money  and 
issue  negotiable  paper  therefor  was  considered  at  length  by  the 
United  States  Circuit  Court  for  Missouri,^  in  which  after  a  re- 
view of  the  decisions  —  English  and  American  —  the  following 
conclusions  were  reached:  Whether  a  municipal  corporation 
possesses  the  power  to  borrow  money,  and  to  issue  negotiable 
securities  therefor,  depends  upon  a  true  construction  of  its  char- 
ter and  the  legislation  of  the  state  apx)licable  to  it.  It  has  no 
incidental  or  inherent  authority  under  the  usual  grants  of  muni- 
cipal powers  as  a  means  of  discharging  its  ordinary  municipal 
functions.  Such  authority  may  be  inferred  from  special  and  ex- 
traordinary jJoivers,  which  require  the  expenditure  of  unusual  sums 
of  money,  when  it  is  usual  to  execute  such  powers  by  means  of 
borrowing,  and  when,  upon  the  whole  legislation  applicable  to 
the  municipality,  such  appears  to  have  been  the  legislative  intent. 
These  principles  were  applied,  and  coupon  bonds  to  borrow 
money  to  erect  and  repair  wharves  and  to  open  streets,  issued 
under  the  general  grants  of  municipal  power  in  the  charter,  were 
held  not  to  be  binding  upon  the  city,  while  other  bonds,  issued 
under  a  special  act  of  the  legislature,  in  payment  of  stock  in  com- 
panies organized  to  construct  macadamized  roads  from  the  city, 
were  held  to  be  valid. 

§  125.    Whether  there  is  power  in  a  municipal  corporation  to 
borrow  money  and  to  issue  negotiable  paper,  depends,  we  think, 

howerer,  to  exceed  ten  years."  The  prop-  be  imposed,  or  that  the  work  sliould  pro- 

osition  having  been  carried,  a  majority  of  ceed  only  pari  passu  with  the  progress  of 

the  court  (three  judges  dissenting)  held  its  collection  from  year  to  year.     What 

that  under  the  Iowa  statute  the  vote  gave  is    implied    is    as   effectual  as    what  is 

the  authority  to  borrow  money  and  issue  expressed." 

the  bonds.  Mr.  Justice  Swayne  said,  "  It  Tlie  dissenting  judges  said,  "  "We  can- 
was  expressed  in  this  formula  (of  the  not  find  in  this  vote  any  authority  in  the 
vote  taken)  that  a  court-house  was  to  be  county  judge  to  issue  the  bonds  of  the 
built,  and  we  think  that  it  was  implied  county." 

that  money  was  to  be  borrowed  to  accom-  ^  Cause  r.  Clarksville,  5  Dillon,  165, 

plish   that  object.     Otherwise   the   vote  183,  1879.    Thomas  v.  Fort   Hudson,  27 

gave  no  autiiority  which  did  not  already  Mich.  320,  1873,  declares  the  remedy  for 

exist,  and  was  an   idle   ceremony.     The  the  money  or  property  received.  Pos^,  sec. 

statute  authorized  an  appeal  to  the  voters  126,  note.     The  remedy  where  bonds  of 

only   tiiat   they    might    give    or  refuse  a  city  are  issued  without  authority  and 

authority  to  incur  a  debt.  the  money  thereon   is   actually  received 

"  It  could  not  have  been  intended  that  by  the  city,  is  not  an  action  ou  the  bonds, 

the  erection  should  be  delayed  till  a  sum  but   to  recover   the    money.      Cause  u. 

sufficient    to  pay  for  the  structure  had  Clarksville,  supra. 
been  realized  from  the  tax  authorized  to 


152 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  VI. 


upon  the  legislative  intent  to  be  collected  from  statutes,  general 
and  special,  applicable  to  the  municipality.  The  American  cases 
are  contlieting  and  cannot  be  harmonized. 

The  following  summarizes  our  view  of  the  sound  and  true 
doctrines  on  this  subject :  — 

1.  The  power  to  borrow  money  as  a  means  of  raising  a  fund  to 
make  future  local  improvements,  or  to  carry  on  the  ordinary 
ojierations  of  the  municipality,  cannot  be  implied  from  the  mere 
authority  to  make  such  improvements  or  from  the  usual  grants 
of  municipal  power.  These  contemplate  that  the  expense  of  the 
execution  of  the  ordinary  municipal  powers  shall  be  met  by  the 
revenues  derived  year  by  year  from  taxation. 

2.  It  does  not  follow  that  because  banking  and  trading  corpora- 
tions and  other  private  corporations  organized  for  pecuniary  profit 
are  held  in  this  country  to  possess  the  incidental  power  to  borrow 
money,  and  to  issue  commercial  paper  having  all  the  qualities 
attributed  to  such  paper  by  the  law  merchant,  that  a  like  power 
is  inherently  possessed  by  public   and   municipal  corporations.^ 


^  As  to  the  power  of  corporations  to 
issue  commercial  paper,  the  law  of  Eng- 
land is  settled.  In  England  no  corpora- 
tion, whether  municipal  (Reg.  v.  Lich- 
field, 4  Ad.  &  EI.  [N.  S.]  891,  906)  or  pri- 
vate (Bateman  v.  Mid-Wales  Railway 
Co.,  Law  Rep.  1  C.  P.  499,  1866),  has  the 
incidental  right  to  make  commercial 
paper,  except  the  Bank  of  England, 
wliich  was  incorporated  for  the  very 
purpose,  and  trading  corporations  strict- 
ly, such  as  the  East  India  Company. 
Accordingly  it  is  laid  down  by  Mr.  Justice 
Byles,  in  his  work  on  bills,  that,  "  without 
special  authority,  expressed  or  implied, 
a  corporation  has  no  power  to  make,  in- 
dorse, or  accept  bills  or  notes.  (Byles  on 
Bills  [8th  Eng.  ed.],  62) ;  Grant  on  Corp. 
276.  Thus,  a  water-works  company 
( Broughton  v.  Manchester  Water- Works, 
8  Barn.  &  Aid.  1),  a  gas  joint-stock  com- 
j)any  (Bramah  v.  Roberts,  3  Bing.  N.  C. 
'M-j),  or  even  trading  companies,  unless 
such  a  power  is  essential  to  the  purposes 
for  which  they  are  formed  (Bateman  v. 
Railway  Co.,  supra),  have  no  general  or 
implied  authority  to  make  commercial 
paper.  In  Bateman's  case,  last  cited,  tlie 
question  for  the  first  time  arose  in  Eng- 
land, as  late  as  1866,  as  to  the  right  of  a 


railway  company,  with  an  authorized 
capital  of  .£170,000,  to  make  or  accept 
bills  of  exchange,  and  it  was  unanimous- 
ly decided,  by  judges  of  great  eminence 
[Erie,  C.  J.,  Byles,  Keatiiu],  and  Montague 
Smith,  JJ.),  that  the  company  had  no  such 
power.  The  acceptance  was  under  seal, 
and  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the 
decision  rested  on  the  technical  ground 
that  a  corporation  can  only  contract 
under  seal.  It  was  placed  upon  the  broad 
ground  that  there  was  no  act  of  parlia- 
ment, general  or  special,  which  conferred 
the  power.  It  was  admitted  by  all  the 
judges  that  the  railway  company  might 
incur  debts  in  the  construction  or  opera- 
tion of  the  road ;  "  but  it  is  one  thing," 
says  Keating,  J.,  "  to  say  that  they  shall  be 
liable  to  be  sued  for  goods  sold  and  de- 
livered or  for  work  done,  and  an  entirely 
different  thing  to  say  that  they  may 
accept  bills  in  payment."  And  to  the 
same  effect  was  the  opinion  of  the  other 
judges.  The  principle  of  this  case  (vas 
approved  in  the  Peruvian,  etc.  Railway 
Co.  V.  Thames,  etc.  Insurance  Co.,  Law 
Rep.  2  Ch.  617,  when  a  general  inciden- 
tal power  to  issue  bills  of  exchange  and 
negotiable  instruments  under  the  com- 
panies' act  of  1862  was  denied,  and  the 


§  125.]  MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS.  153 

The  analogy  is  false  and  delusive.  The  purposes  of  the  two 
classes  of  corporations,  the  powers  of  their  officers,  and  the  means 
of  making  provision  for  meeting  their  liabilities,  are  all  essentially- 
different.  The  nature  of  the  usual  duties  devolved  by  law  upon 
municipalities  does  not  make  it  necessary  to  imply  the  existence 
of  a  general  power  to  borrow  money  and  to  issue  commercial  paper. 
The  consequences  of  recognizing  such  a  power,  in  the  extrava- 
gance it  will  stimulate,  in  the  frauds  it  will  engender,  and  in  the 
ruinous  indebtedness  it  will  inevitably  produce,  are  alarming  to 
contemplate.  The  history  of  the  express  power  given  to  muni- 
cipalities to  aid  railways  by  borrowing  money  and  issuing  com- 
mercial obligations  is  full  of  warning  and  instruction. 

3.  The  power  to  issue  commercial  paper  which  is  unimpeach- 
able in  the  hands  of  the  holder  is  not  among  the  ordinary  inci- 
dental powers  of  a  public  or  municipal  corporation.  It  must  be 
conferred  expressly,  or  by  fair  implication,  as  a  necessary,  or  at 
least  a  reasonable  and  usual  means  of  executing  the  particular 
power  to  which  it  is  claimed  to  be  incidental. 

4.  Express  poiver  to  horrotv  money,  perhaps  in  all  cases,  but 
especially  if  conferred  to  effect  objects  for  which  large  or  unusual 
sums  are  required,  as  for  example  subscriptions  to  aid  railways 
and  other  public  improvements,  will  ordinarily  be  taken  to  include 

power  held  to  depend  upon  the  proper  whicli  the  acceptance  is  given  is  suffi- 
construction  of  the  memorandum  and  ciently  connected  witli  tlie  purpose  for 
articles  of  association.  The  companies  which  the  acceptors  are  incorporated.  It 
organized  under  that  act  may  communi-  would  be  inconvenient  to  the  last  degree 
cate  this  power  to  their  directors,  but  it  if  such  an  inquiry  could  be  gone  into, 
must  be  given  expressly  or  by  fair  intend-  Some  bills  might  be  given  for  a  consid- 
ment  in  the  memorandum  and  articles  of  eration  which  was  valid,  as  for  work 
association  of  the  company,  or  it  will  not  done  for  the  company,  and  others  as  a 
exist.  In  England,  as  shown  by  Bate-  security  for  money  obtained  on  loans  be- 
man's  case,  s((y<ra,  it  is  held  that,  inasmuch  yond  their  borrowing  powers.  It  would 
as  the  corporation  has  no  power  to  accept  be  a  pernicious  thing  to  hold  that,  in  re- 
bills,  it  cannot  be  made  liable  on  its  ac-  spect  of  the  former  the  corporation  might 
ceptance,  thougli  the  bill  was  drawn  for  be  sued  by  an  indorsee,  but  in  respect 
a  valid  and  binding  debt.  On  this  point,  of  the  latter,  not"  Cause  v.  Clarksville, 
Erie,  C.  J.,  says  :  "  The  bill  of  exchange  5  Dillon,  165, 1879. 

is  a  cause  of  action  —  a  contract  by  itself  The  American  courts,  however,  have 

—  which  binds  the  acceptor  in  the  liands  generally    held     that    banking,    trading, 

of  an  indorsee  for  value ;  and  I  conceive  commercial,    railway,  and   other  private 

it   would   be  altogether   contrary   to  the  corporations,    organized     for    pecuniary 

principlesof  the  In  w  which  regulates  such  profit,  have  an  incidental  power  to  issue 

instruments  that  tliey  should  be  valid  or  commercial   paper  when   such  power  is 

not   according  as  the   consideration  be-  not  negatived  by  a  true  construction  of 

tween  the  original   parties  was  good  or  their  charters   or  constituent  acts      See 

bad,  or  whether,  in  the  case  of  a  corpor-  chapter  on  Contracts,  post. 
ation,    the   consideration    in    respect  of 


154  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VL 

the  powov  (tlie  same  as  if  conferred  upon  a  corporation  organized 
for  pecuniar}-  profit)  to  issue  negotiable  paper  with  all  the  inci- 
dents of  negotiabihty.^ 

5.  "When  it  is  expressly  provided  by  statute,  that  public  and 
municipal  corporations  shall  audit  all  claims  presented,  and  shall 
issue  to  the  creditor  ivarrants  or  orders,  and  no  other  provision 
is  made,  this  will  not  authorize  as  a  means  of  payment  the  issue 
of  negotiable  or  commercial  paper  which  shall  possess  all  the 
incidents  of  negotiability  ;  and  if  issued,  it  is  subject  to  all  defences 
in  the  hands  of  a  transferree  to  which  it  would  be  subject  in  the 
hands  of  the  original  holder. 

6.  A  municipal  corporation  proper,  although  in  the  execution 
of  its  ordinary  corporate  powers  and  the  discharge  of  its  corporate 
duties,  it  may  make  contracts  and  create  debts,  and  may,  when 
not  restrained  by  statute,  evidence  the  liabilities  thus  incurred,  yet 
if  the  instrument  is  made  to  assume  the  form  of  negotiable  paper, 
such  paper  is  always  open  to  defences  in  the  hands  of  transferees 
when  it  is  issued  without  express  authority  from  the  legislature, 
or  authority  fairly  to  be  implied  from  the  charter  or  legislature 
applicable  to  the  municipality.^ 

§  126.  In  other  words,  the  author  regards  it  as  the  true  doctrine 
that,  as  incidental  to  the  discharge  of  its  ordinary  corporate  func- 
tions, no  municipal  or  public  corporation  has  the  right  to  invest 
any  instrument  it  may  issue,  whatever  its  form,  with  that  suprenje 
and  dangerous  attribute  of  commercial  paper  which  insulates 
the  holder  for  value  from  equities  which  attach  to  its  inception. 

1  Ante,  sec.  117,  note ;  post,  sec.  127 ;  ^  -phe  arguments  in  support  of  the 
Williarasport  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Pa.  propositions  of  the  text  embodied  in  this 
St.  487  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburg,  34  section  will  be  found  to  be  ably  presented 
Pa.  St.  496 ;  Reinboth  r.  Pittsburg,  41  Pa.  by  Bradki/,  J.,  in  the  Mayor  of  Nashville 
St.  278  ;Middletonr.  Alleghany  Co.,  37 /c/.  j;.  Ray,  19  Wall.  468,  1873;  by  Beasley, 
241;  Seybert  r.  Pittsburg,  1  Wall.  272;  C.  J.,in  Hackettstown  ac?s.  Swackhamer, 
Galena  v.  Corwith,  48  111.  423;  Kelly  v.  37  N.  J.  L.  (8  Vroom)  191,  1874;  and 
Mayor,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  265 ;  DeVoss  v.  City  by  Agnew,  C.  J.,  dissenting  in  Williams- 
Richmond,  18Gratt.  338;  R.  R.  r.  Evans-  port  v.  Commonwealth,  84  Pa.  St.  487, 
ville,  15  Ind.  305;  Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  605,  1877.  See  also  Cause  v.  Clarksville, 
15  Wall.  572  ;  Daniel  on  Nego.  Inst.  sees.  5  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  165,  1879 ;  Knapp  v.  Ho- 
1.527  and  1531;  Rogers  v.  Burlington,  3  boken,  39  N.  J.  L.  (10  Vroom)  394, 
Wall.  654,  666 ;  Milner's  Admr.  v.  Pensa-  1877. 

cola,  2  Woods,  637 ;  Mayor  v.  Inman,  57  The  authorities  in  favor  of  the  other 

Ga.  370 ;  Tucker  v.  City  of  Randolph,  75  view  are  collected,  and  the  argument  in 

N.  C.  267  ;   City  of  Vicksburg  v.  Lorn-  support  of  that  view  is  presented  with 

bard,  51  Miss.  125;  Mercer  Co.  v.  Hacket,  fulness,  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of 

1  Wall.  95.    See  cases  cited  in  notes  to  the  court,  delivered  by  Paxson,  J.,  in  Wil- 

sec.  488,  post.  liamsport  i'.  Commonwealth,  supra. 


§  127.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHAETEKS. 


155 


This  point  should  be  guarded  by  the  courts  with  the  utmost 


vigilance  and  resolution.^ 


§  127.  (83)  While  express  power  to  a  municipal  corporation 
"  to  borrow  money  "  is  usually  held  to  include  the  power  to  issue 
its    negotiable   bonds,  or   other  securities,  to  the  lender.^     But 


^  If  money  is  improperly  borrowed  in 
advance  of  liabilities  actually  created, 
and  reaches  the  municipal  treasury,  and 
is  expended  by  direction  of  the  governing 
body  for  authorized  municipal  objects, 
the  municipality  may  then  be  liable  in  the 
proper  action  or  suit;  but  the  action 
should  be,  we  think,  for  money  had  and 
received  or  by  suit  in  equity  and  not  upon 
the  invalid  bonds.  Bateman  v.  Mid- Wales 
Eailway  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  499,  1866 ; 
Thomas  i'.  Port  Hudson,  27  Mich.  320; 
Hackettstown  ads.  Swackhamer,  37  N.  J. 
L.  191;  Reg.  v.  Litchfield,  4  Ad.  & 
El.  N.  S.  891,  906;  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Ray, 
19  Wall.  468,  480,  per  Bradley,  J. ;  ante, 
sec.  124,  note.  The  holder  of  such  bonds, 
will,  it  seems,  be  considered  as  the  assignee 
and  owner  of  the  original  claim  of  the  payee. 
Oneida  Bank  v.  Ontario  Bank,  21  N.  Y. 
490 ;  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Ray,  19  Wall.  468, 
484,  per  Hunt,  J. ;  Shirk  v.  Pulaski  County, 
4  Dillon,  208,  1877  ;  Paul  v.  Kenosha,  22 
Wis.  206 ;  Cause  v.  Clarksville,  5  Dillon, 
C.  0.  16-5,  1877 ;  post,  sees.  910,  133,  135, 
note  ;  chapter  on  Contracts.  In  Hacketts- 
town ads.  Swackhamer,  supra,  any  remedy 
upon  the  unauthorized  note  was  denied, 
and  Beasley,  C.  J.,  seemed  to  think  the  only 
remedy  was  in  equity  to  be  subrogated  to 
the  rights  of  the  creditors  of  the  corpora- 
tion who  had  been  paid  by  the  proceeds  of 
the  money  improperly  borrowed ;  but  no 
necessity  is  perceived  for  so  strict  a  doc- 
trine. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburg,  34  Pa. 
St.  496,  511,  1859;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Evans- 
ville,  15  Ind.  395,  412,  1800 ;  Middlcton  v. 
Allegheny  Co.,  37  Pa.  St.  241 ;  Reinboth 
V.  Pittsburg,  41  Pa.  St.  278;  Seybert  v. 
Pittsburg,  1  Wall.  272;  Rogers  v.  Bur- 
lington, 3  Wall.  654,  606,  per  Clifford,  J. ; 
De  Voss  I'.  Richmond,  18  Gratt.  (Va.) 
338;  s.  c.  7  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  589; 
Galena  v.  Corwith,  48  111.  423,  18G8  ;  post, 
sec.  488.  Money  borrowed,  and  note 
given  by  officers  of  a  town,  without  au- 


thority, does  not  bind  the  town  in  case  it 
never  receives  the  benefit  of  it.  Benoit 
V.  Conway,  10  Allen,  528;  People  v.  Su- 
pervisors, 34  N.  Y.  516;  Pohce  Jury  v. 
Britton,  15  W^all.  566. 

The  ground  has  been  broadly  taken, 
that  for  debts  and  obligations  lawfully 
created,  any  corporation,  public  as  well  as 
private,  has  the  implied  authority,  unless 
prohibited  by  statute,  charter,  or  by-law, 
to  evidence  the  same  by  the  execution  of 
a  bill,  note,  bond,  or  other  contract,  and 
to  secure  the  same  by  a  mortgage,  pledge, 
or  other  proper  disposition  of  its  property ; 
that  power  to  contract  a  debt  carries  with 
it  the  power  to  give  a  suitable  acknowl- 
edgment of  it ;  and  there  is  no  rule  of 
law  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  limiting 
the  length  of  the  credit.  Municipality  v. 
McDonough,  2  Rob.  (La.)  242,  2-50,  1842  ; 
Barry  v.  Merchants'  Express  Company,  1 
Sandf.  Ch.  280 ;  cited  with  approval  in 
Curtis  V.  Leavitt,  15  N.  Y.  9,  62,  and  in 
Smith  V.  Law,  21  N.  Y.  296,  299,  1860 ; 
Bank,  etc.  v.  Chillicothe,  7  Ohio,  Part  11. 
31,  1836;  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  K  Y. 
356,  1856,  market-house  bonds  given  on 
twenty-five  j'ears'  time  held  valid ;  and 
see  cases  cited  on  page  37-5,  by  Wright, 
J. ;  Douglass  v.  Virginia  City,  5  Nev. 
147.  See  also  and  compare,  Bateman 
V.  Mid-Wales  Railway  Co.,  L.  R.  1  C. 
P.  510  ;  Hackettstown  ads.  Swackhamer, 
37  N.  J.  L.  191 ;  Wyandotte  r.  Zeitz,  21 
Kan.  649;  Lawrence  v.  Kellam,  11  Kan. 
512. 

As  to  express  power  to  issue  bonds,  etc., 
see  also  Bank  of  Rome  v.  Village  of 
Rome,  18  N.  Y.  38,  44,  and  cases  cited ; 
Mills  V.  Gleason,  8  Am.  Law  Reg.  683; 
Louisiana  Stale  Bank  v.  Orleans  Naviga- 
tion Co.,  3  La.  An.  294.  State  bonds 
negotiable.  Delafield  v.  Illinois,  2  Hill, 
159. 

Power  "to  borrow  money"  \\q\A  to  in- 
clude power  to  issue  negotiable  bonds  or  other 
usual  securities   to   the   lender.     Common- 


156 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


it  does  not  include   the  power   to  issue   notes   to   circulate   as 
money,  in  violation  of  the  statute  law  and  public  policy  of  the 

i>tate.» 

§  128.  Express  charter  power  to  borrow  money  for  general 
purposes,  not  exceeding  a  specified  sum,  was  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  upon  an  examination  of  the  nature 
of  other  powers  contained  in  the  charter,  not  to  prohibit  or  limit 
the  city  in  incurring  an  indebtedness  for  authorized  purposes 
greater  than  the  sum  it  was  empowered  to  borrow.^ 

§  129.  (84)  A  contract  whereby  a  city  agrees  with  an  indi- 
vidual that  if  the  latter  will  pay  or  advance  the  amount  of  interest 
due  and  to  become  due  on  certain  bonds  of  the  city  already 
issued,  the  city  will  pay  or  refund  the  amount,  is  "  not  a  harrow- 
ing of  money  "  within  the  terms  or  spirit  of  the  charter  prohibit- 
ing the  municipal  authorities  from  borrowing  money  unless 
authorized  by  a  prior  vote  of  the  citizens  ;  such  a  contract  being 
one  simply  for  the  payment  of  a  debt.^  Under  authority  to  a 
city  to  borrow  money,  it  may,  if  there  be  no  statutory  restriction, 


wealth  v.  Pittsburg,  34  Pa.  St.  496,  511; 
Rogers  v.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654,  1865; 
ante,  sec.  117.  Board  of  supervisors  of  a 
county  have  not  power  to  issue  bill  of  ex- 
chaiu/e.  Canal  Bank  v.  Supervisors,  etc., 
5  lienio,  517,  1848.  Nor  have  village 
trustees.  ■,.  Lake  v.  Trustees,  4  Denio,  520. 
Corporate  city  has  the  power.  Kelly  v. 
flavor,  4  Hill,  263 ;  compare  Clark  v.  Des 
Moines,  19  Iowa,  199,  213.  In  Inhabit- 
ants, etc.  V.  Weir,  9  Ind.  224,  1857,  an 
action  against  a  congressional  township 
upon  a  promissory  note  made  by  the  trus- 
tees, the  court,  per  Stuart,  J.,  says : 
"  There  is  no  power  to  make  notes  con- 
ferred by  the  act  of  1841.  That  act  was 
the  charter  under  which  they  acted. 
Tlie  trustees,  as  a  corporation,  had  no 
power  but  such  as  that  act  expressly  con- 
ferred, and  such  as  might  arise  by  impli- 
cation, or  be  essential  to  the  exercise  of 
those  granted.  Such  a  power  is  always 
expressed,  even  in  bank  charters.  In  so 
limited  a  corporation  as  a  congressional 
township,  the  power  to  make  promissory 
notes  could  hardly  be  implied.  The  case 
at  bar  cannot  easily  be  distinguished  in 


principle  from  McClure  v.  Bennett,  I 
Blackf.  189,  and  Mears  v.  Graham,  8  lb. 
144."  Power  to  borrow  money,  if  granted 
on  condition  of  a  previous  popular  vote, 
must  be  exercised  in  conformity  with  the 
condition  or  the  orders  issued  therefor 
will  be  void.  Lockport  v.  Gaylord,  61 
111.  276, 1871.  What  amounts  to  a  borrow- 
ing,   lb. 

1  Thomas  v.  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349, 
1871. 

Construction  of  the  constitutional 
power  of  the  general  government  to  "  bor- 
row money."  See  Hepburn  v.  Griswold,  8 
Wall.  603,  and  Knox  i-.  Lee,  12  Wall.  457, 
1871,  known  as  the  "  legal-tender  cases." 

-  Hitchcock  V.  Galveston,  96  U.  S. 
341, 1877  ;  approved,  United  States  v.  Fort 
Scott,  99  U.  S.  152. 

»  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
221,  1863,  Miller,  J.,  dissenting.  Where 
a  city  can  make  such  a  contract,  with  the 
sanction  of  a  prior  vote,  the  sanction  will, 
in  an  action  on  such  a  contract,  be  pre- 
sumed until  the  contrary  is  shown  by  the 
city.     lb.  per  Swayne,  J. 


§  130.]  MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS.  157 

make  the  principal  and  interest  payable  at  the  place  ivhere  the 
nioney  is  borrotved,  or  where  it  pleases,  though  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  state}  Among  the  powers  of  a  strictly  municipal  nature 
conferred  upon  a  city  was  the  power  "  to  borrow  money  for  any 
object,  in  its  discretion,"  or  "  for  any  public  purpose,"  on  a  two- 
thirds  vote  of  the  citizens ;  and  this  was  held,  in  connection 
with  a  general  statute  of  the  state,  recognizing  by  implication 
(as  construed)  the  validity  of  city  and  county  bonds  gener- 
ally, to  authorize  such  city  to  issue  bonds  to  aid  in  the  con- 
struction of  a  railway  or  plank  road  leading  to,  through,  or  from 
the  city .2 

Limitation  on  Power  to  become  indebted. 

§  130.  (85)  Provisions  are  frequently  made  in  constitutions, 
or  in  charters  or  incorporating  acts,  to  preve7it  the  creation  or 
increase  of  municipal  indebtedness  beyond  certain  limits,  or  except 
upon  certain  conditions.  The  judicial  construction  of  some  of 
these  provisions  will  be  noticed  in  this  place.  The  constitution 
of  Maryland  contains  a  provision  that  "  no  debt  shall  be  created 
by  the  mayor  and  city  council  of  Baltimore  "  (except  for  speci- 
fied temporary  purposes),  unless  it  shall  be  first  sanctioned  by 
the  legislature  and  approved  by  the  voters  of  the  city.  The  city 
being  the  owner  of  a  large  amount  of  stock  in  the  Baltimore  and 

1  Meyers.  Muscatine,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.)  Evansville,  15  Ind.   395,  412,   1860,  dis- 

384,  1863.     In  this  case,   the    court,  pei-  tinguished  as  to  place  of  payment  from 

Swmjne,  J.,   say   (1   Wall.  391) :     "  The  Prettyman  v.  Tazwell  Co.,  19111.  406;  '12 

power  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  make  76.  147,  which  were  regarded  as  turning 

any  contract  does  not  depend  upon  the  upon  peculiar  statutory  provisions.      See 

place  of  performance,  but  upon  its  scope  further,  chapter  on  Contracts,  post. 

and  object.    A  city  authorized  to  estab-  '^  Meyer  v.  Muscatine,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

lish  gas-works  and  water-works,  and  to  384,    1863,   Miller,   J.,    dissenting,  in    an 

gravel  its  streets,  may  buy  water,  coal,  opinion  of    marked   ability  ;    Mitchell  v. 

and  gravel  beyond  its  limits,  and  agree  to  Burlington,  4  Wall.  270,  1866  ;  Rogers  v. 

pay  where  they  are  found,  or  elsewhere.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654,  1865.     General 

The  principal  power,    when    expressed,  power  granted  to  a  city  to  create  a  debt 

draws  to  it,  by  necessary  implication,  the  will  be  construed  to  mean  debts  for  speci- 

ineans    of    its   execution.      This    is    the  Jied,  legitimate,  and  proper  municipal  pur- 

settled  rule   in   the   construction    of   all  poses,  and  not  for  any  or  all  purposes,  at 

grants  of  authority,  whether   to   govern-  the  discretion  of  the  city  council  or  in- 

ments  or  individuals."     Express  autlioriti/  liabitants.      Lafayette    v.    Cox,     5  Ind. 

<o  a  ciVi/ "  <o  borrow  mone^,"  necessarily  im-  (Porter)    38,   1854.      Limitation  on  taxing 

plies  the  power  to  determine  the  time  of  power  does  not  limit  power  to  contract  debts. 

payment  and  to  issue  bonds,  or  other  evi-  Emerson   v.   Blairsville,    2  Pittsb.   (Pa.) 

dence  of   indebtedness,  to  borrow  within  Rep.   39 ;   post,  sec.   162.     See,  further, 

or  without   the  state,  and  to  agree  to  ch.  xiv.  on  Contracts,  post. 
pay    where  borrowed.      Railroad  Co.  v. 


158  MUNICIPAL  COErORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

Ohio  Railroad  Company,  without  previous  legislative  authority 
or  the  approval  of  the  voters,  passed  an  ordinance  to  provide  for 
tlie  raif<i>i(/  of  one  million  of  dollars,  by  hypothecating  its  railroad 
stock,  and  for  the  investment  of  the  same  in  the  bonds  of  another 
railroatl  company  in  process  of  construction.  The  validity  of 
this  ordinance  being  drawn  in  question,  the  court  considered  it 
to  be  plain  that  the  constitutional  provision  quoted  was  intended 
to  prohibit  the  city  from  aiding  in  the  construction  of  works  of 
internal  improvement  without  the  previous  assent  of  the  legisla- 
ture and  of  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  city ;  and  that  the 
ordinance  (notwithstanding  the  ingenious  use  of  the  phrase 
raislnr/  instead  of  horroiving  money,  and  the  further  provision 
that  the  parties  furnishing  the  money  should  look  for  its  repay- 
ment exclusively  to  the  stock  pledged,  and  that  the  city  should 
not  be  responsible  for  any  deficit)  did  create  a  debt  within  the 
meaning  of  the  constitution,  and  was  therefore  void.^ 

§  131.  (80)  Under  a  charter  prohibiting  the  common  council 
of  a  city  from  '■'■authorizing  any  expenditure,  for  any  purpose,''  in 
the  current  political  year,  exceeding  the  amount  of  the  annual  tax 
levy,  the  council  cannot  authorize  any  expenditure  to  be  made 
within  the  year  exceeding  the  limit ;  but  they  are  not  forbidden 
to  authorize,  in  that  year,  an  expenditure  to  be  made  in  a  subse- 
quent year,  for  services  to  be  performed  in  such  subsequent  year.^ 
The  charter  of  Chicago  contains  the  provision  that  "  no  contract 
shall  he  made  hy  the  common  council,  and  no  expense  incurred, 
unless  an  appropriation  shall  have  been  previously  made  concerning 

'  B.altimore  v.  Gill,  31  Md.  375, 1869.  2.  Limitation  on  rate  of  tax  to  be  an- 
That  a  debt  may  be  created  by  borrowing  nually  levied  construed.  State  v.  Mayor, 
money,  although  there  be  a  provision  ex-  23  La.  An.  .358.  Tiie  charter  of  a  city 
empting  the  borrower  from  liability  be-  provided  that  "  no  funded  debt  shall  be 
j-ond  the  property  pledged,  see  Newell  contracted."  It  was  decided,  that  a  city 
V.  People,  3  Seld.  (7  N.  Y.)  9,  87.  Where  bond,  issued  on  time,  for  the  purchase  of 
a  municipal  corporation  is  forbidden  by  market  grounds,  was  not  a  funded  debt. 
the  constitution  to  become  indebted  in  any  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  356.  Mean- 
amount  exceeding  a  given  indebtedness,  ing  of  "  funded  debt"  and  "funding" 
held,  1,  that  if  it  exceed  the  limited  considered  by  Selden,  J.,  lb.  p.  367,  and 
amount  it  may  be  enjoined ;  2,  that  the  by  \Vri(jht,  J.,  p.  378.  City  may  fund 
bill  is  maintainable  by  a  citizen  and  tax-  valid  bonds  and  issue  new  bonds  therefor, 
payer  of  the  place.  Springfield  r.  Ed-  without  express  authority.  Galena  v. 
wards,  84  111.  77,  1877.  Remedy  of  Tax-  Corwith,  48  111.  423,  1868  ;  Burr  v.  Car- 
payer,  see  post,  sec.  914.  bondale,    76    111.   455,   474,   1875.    How 

'  Weston  I'.    Syracuse,  17  N.  Y.  110,  fund.    Smith  v.  Morse,  2  Cal.  524 ;  ante, 

18.58.     See,  also.  Cook  v.  City  of  Buffalo,  sees.  69,  63;  15  Wall.  566. 
1  Clinton's  N.  Y.  Digest,  "  Buffalo,"  sec. 


§  132.]  MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS.  159 

such  expense"  and  the  comptroller  is  required  to  submit  each 
year  an  estimate  of  the  amount  necessar}'-  to  defray  the  expenses 
of  the  city  for  the  current  year.  With  this  provision  in  force, 
the  city  made  a  contract  with  a  gas  company  whose  works  were 
already  complete  to  take  gas  for  its  streets  and  public  buildings 
at  a  specified  price  for  the  period  of  ten  years.  This  contract 
•was  held  invalid  on  the  ground  that  under  the  above  charter 
provision  there  was  no  actual  or  reasonable  necessity  to  make  a 
contract  extending  over  ten  years,  no  appropriation  having  been 
made  commensurate  with  the  obligations  of  the  contract ;  and 
the  court,  aside  from  the  special  provision  of  the  charter,  inclined 
to  the  same  result  on  the  ground  that  the  power  was  legislative 
and  that  the  council  could  not,  without  any  reasonable  necessity 
appearing,  bind  their  successors  for  ten  years  or  indefinitely. 
Brummond^  J.,  added  :  "  In  all  cases  of  contracts  to  run  for  years, 
the  authority  to  make  them  should  be  clear.  It  is  better  that  all 
parties  should  understand  there  is  a  limit  to  the  power  of  muni- 
cipal bodies  in  such  cases."  ^ 

§  132.  The  city  of  G-alveston,  under  a  provision  of  its  charter 
authorizing  it  to  construct  sidewalks  and  make  street  improve- 
ments, and  to  reimburse  itself  for  the  expense  from  abutting 
lot  owners,  made  a  contract  for  local  improvements  of  this  char- 
acter which  created  a  liability  exceeding  $50,000.  This  contract 
was  claimed  by  the  city  to  be  invalid  by  reason  of  another  pro- 
vision of  the  charter  that  the  council  shall  not  borrow  money  for 
general  purposes,  to  an  amount  greater  than  $50,000.  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  held  the  objection  to  the 
validity  of  the  contract  not  to  be  well  taken ;  and  the  reasons 
for  its  judgment  are  thus  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Strong  :2  — 

"  The  limitation  is  upon  the  power  to  borrow  money,  and  to 
borrow  it  for  general  purposes.  It  implies  that  there  may  be 
lawful  purposes  which  are  not  general  in  the  sense  in  which 
that  word  is  used  in  the  charter.     An  examination  of  the  whole 

1  Garrison  v.   Chicago,    7   Biss.   480,  received  into  the  County  Treasurj',  but 

1877,     Drumrnond,    J.      Tiie    statute    of  the  estimate  of  the  board  of  supervisors 

California,  which  declares  tliat  the  board  of  wliat  the  revenue  will  be.    Babcock  v. 

of  supervisors   must  not  contract  debts  Goodrich,  47  Cal.  488,  1874. 
and  liabilities  which,  added  to  the  salaries  2  jjitchcock    v.    Galveston,   96   U.    S. 

of  officials,   will  e.xceed  the   revenue  of  341,   1877.      Approved,     U.    S.  v.   Fort 

the  county  for  the  year,  does  not  mean  Scott,  99  U.  S.  152,  1878. 
by  "revenue"  the  actual  amount  of  money 


IGO  MUNICir.VL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  VI. 

instrument,  and  of  the  numerous  and  large  powers  conferred 
upon  the  council,  as  well  as  duties  imposed,  makes  it  evident 
that  the  provision  could  not  have  been  intended  to  prohibit  in- 
curring an  indebtedness  exceeding  the  sum  named.  It  is  in  no 
sense  a  Hniitation  of  the  debt  of  the  city.  If  it  is,  the  grant  of 
power  the  charter  contains  was  an  idle  thing,  and  the  duties 
imposed  could  not  be  performed.  The  council,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  empowered  to  grade  and  pave  the  streets  and  to  construct 
sidewalks.  There  is  no  express  limitation  of  these  powers. 
Their  exercise  necessarily  involves  large  expenditure.  Such  ex- 
penditure is,  therefore,  authorized.  It  is  a  plain  incident  of  the 
power,  and  it  is  a  special  expenditure.  It  is  for  a  new  work, 
unlike  the  work  of  keeping  in  repair.  Conceding  that  it  is  a 
purpose  of  the  act  incorporating  the  city,  it  cannot  be  regarded 
as  a  general  purpose,  for  if  it  is,  all  purposes  of  the  charter  are 
general.  Grading  a  street  or  making  a  sidewalk,  where  none 
had  existed  before,  is  a  special  improvement,  not  like  repairs  of 
constant  recurrence.  By  another  article  of  defendant's  charter 
the  city  council  was  authorized  to  provide  by  ordinance  special 
funds  for  special  purposes,  and  to  make  the  same  disbursable 
only  for  the  purpose  for  which  the  fund  was  created.  For  these 
reasons  we  are  of  opinion  that  the  limitation  upon  the  power  of 
the  council  to  borrow  for  general  purposes  did  not  make  the 
agreement  with  the  plaintiffs  invalid." 

§  133.  Under  a  statute  which  was  passed  to  prohibit  the  mak- 
ing of  contracts  by  unauthorized  official  agents  for  supplies  for  the 
use  of  the  city  of  New  York,  if  a  contractor  makes  a  contract 
without  observing  the  requirements  of  the  statute  and  furnishes 
supplies  thereunder,  the  city  is  not  bound,  although  the  materials 
supplied  were  used  by  it,  and  an  implied  liability  cannot  be  raised 
in  the  face  of  the  statute.^ 

§  134.  (87)  A  municipal  charter  provided  that  it  should  not 
be  lawful  fur  the  city  council  to  make,  or  authorize  to  be  made, 
"  any  contract  for  the  payment  of  money  beyond  the  current  fiscal 
year^''  declaring  every  such  prohibited  contract  "  illegal  and  void." 
In  construing  this  language  the  court  says:  "  By  this  section  of 
the  charter,  the  legislature  have,  in  the  most  explicit  manner,  pro- 

1  McDonald  v.  New  York,  68  N.  Y.  23,  1876;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  144;  jiosl, 
eecs.  135,  note,  460;  ante,  sec.  126,  note. 


§  135.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  16X 

hibited  the  city  council  from  contracting  any  debt  beyond  the 
fiscal  year.  If  the  city  council  had,  at  the  time  the  contract  was 
made,  in  1845,  passed  an  ordinance  that  the  expense  of  lighting 
the  streets  of  the  city  for  that  year  should  be  paid  in  1848,  by  a 
tax  then  assessed  for  that  purpose,  it  would  have  come  within 
the  letter  of  the  prohibition.  It  is  none  the  less  a  violation  of 
its  spirit  that  the  council  did  not  pass  the  ordinance  providing 
for  its  payment  until  1848."  ^ 

§  135.  (88)  The  constitution  of  Iowa  contains  the  provision 
that  "  no  county,  or  other  political  or  municipal  corporation, 
shall  he  allowed  to  become  indebted  in  any  manner^  or  for  any  pur- 
pose to  an  amount  exceeding  five  per  cent  on  the  value  of  the 
taxable  property  within  such  county  or  corporation,  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  the  last  state  and  count}^  list,  previous  to  the  incurring 
of  such  indebtedness."  Under  this  constitutional  provision,  as 
construed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  no  indebtedness, 
for  whatcA^er  purpose  created,  is  exemj^ted  from  the  operation  of 
the  prohibition,  and  applies  to  negotiable  bonds  issued  under  legis- 
lative authority  as  well  as  to  other  debts,  and  the  creditor  or 
bondholder  must  at  his  peril  take  notice  that  the  constitutional 
limit  is  not  exceeded.^  If  a  municipal  corporation  has  the  means 
in  its  treasury  to  meet  its  indebtedness,  the  issue  of  warrants  to 
an  amount  larger  than  five  per  cent  of  its  taxable  property  is  not 
a  violation  of  the  section  of  the  state  constitution  which  provides 
that  "  no  municipal  corporation  shall  be  allowed  to  become  in- 
debted, in  any  manner  or  for  any  purpose,  to  an  amount  exceed- 

1  Per  Caldwell,  J.,  Jonas  v.  Cincinnati,  385.  The  fact  that  the  corporation  re- 
18  Oliio,  ol8,  322,  1849.  Construction  of  ceived  the  value  of  its  bonds,  and  that 
similar  provision  in  other  cliarters.  Good-  tlie  purchaser  acted  in  good  faith,  and 
rich  V.  Detroit,  12  Mich.  279  ;  Philadel-  without  notice,  does  not  entitle  him  to  re- 
phia  )•.  Flanigen,  47  Pa.  St.  21 ;  Johnson  cover  the  amount  paid  therefor.  Since, 
V.  Philadelphia,  76.  382;  Wallaces.  San  in  the  view  of  the  court,  the  receipt  of 
Jose,  29  Cal.  180  ;  Bladen  i\  Philadelphia,  value  for  the  bonds  does  not  create  a  debt, 
60  Pa.  St.  404,  construing  an  act  apply-  whether  the  identical  money  received  for 
ing  to  the  city  to  the  effect  that  no  debt  the  bonds  could  be  recovered  of  the  mu- 
shall  be  binding  unless  authorized  by  law  nicipality,  the  court  left  undecided.  lb. 
or  ordinance,  and  a  sufficient  appropria-  But  see  ante,  sec.  125,  note.  In  Mosher 
tion  therefor  be  made.  i'.  School  District,  44  Iowa,  122,  1876,  the 

2  Bank  v.  School  District,  39  Iowa,  doctrine  of  the  preceding  cases  was  ad- 
490 ;  French  v.  Burlington,  42  Iowa,  614,  hered  to,  and  the  attempt  of  the  legisla- 
1870 ;  Grant  v.  Davenport,  3G  Iowa,  396,  ture  to  give  a  remedy  was  held  to  be  in- 
1873 ;  McPherson  v.  Foster,  43  Iowa,  48,  effectual. 

1876 ;  Council  Bluffs  v.  Stewart,  51  Iowa, 
VOL.  1.  11 


162 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  71. 


incr  five  per  cent  of  the  taxable  property  within  the  corporation." 
In  suc'li  case  it  would  not  become  indebted  within  the  meaning 
of  the  constitutional  clause.^     An  act  of  the  legislature  prohibit- 


1  Divcly  !•.  Cedar  Falls,  27  Iowa,  227, 
1809.  A  contract  by  the  corporation  to 
pay  for  work  when  it  shall  be  perfornied 
in  the  future,  docs  not  constitute  an  in- 
debtedness, within  the  meaning  of  this 
provision  of  the  constitution,  until  the 
performance  of  the  work.  Jb.  \\\it  qiuvre? 
See  Davenport,  etc.  Gas  Co.  v.  Daven- 
port, lo  Iowa,  22'J.  A  similar  provision 
exists  in  tiie  constitution  of  Illinois  and 
of  some  other  states.  The  meaning  and 
effect  of  the  Iowa  constitution  quoted 
above,  were  much  discussed  before  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Iowa  in  a  very  recent 
case,  in  which  the  question  was,  "  Is  a 
city  corporation  liable  to  a  bona  fide  holder, 
upon  its  negotiable  bonds  issued  for  value, 
when  at  the  time  of  such  issue  the  city 
was  indebted  to  the  full  extent  of  the 
constitutional  limit  ?  "  The  cause  was 
settled  before  being  decided,  and  no 
opinions  were  filed  ;  but  the  judges  dif- 
fered in  their  judgment.  In  the  Western 
Jurist  (Vol.  VI.  p.  1,  January,  1872)  will 
be  found  two  able  and  interesting  arti- 
cles upon  the  question  above  stated,  con- 
taining the  arguments  upon  both  sides  of 
it,  —  the  one  being  prepared,  as  it  is  un- 
derstood, by  Mr.  Justice  Beck,  and  the 
other  by  Mr.  Justice  Cole,  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  loiva.  The  proposition  upon 
wiiich  they  differ  is  whether  the  power 
given  to  a  city  to  issue  its  bonds  abso- 
lutely ceases,  as  to  innocent  holders,  the 
moment  the  constitutional  limit  is  reached, 
the  same  as  if  it  liad  never  been  (conferred. 
In  view  of  the  language  "  shall  not  be  al- 
lowed," the  course  of  decision  in  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court,  elsewhere 
noticed,  protecting  the  holders  of  this 
class  of  securities,  and  the  impractica- 
bility, and  even  impossibility,  of  pur- 
chasers ever  to  ascertain,  at  a  given 
moment,  the  amount  of  indebtedness  of  a 
corporation,  the  author,  while  appreciat- 
ing the  difficulties  of  the  question,  is  in- 
clined to  think  that  if  the  power  to  issue 
negotiable  securities  be  given,  and  the 
inhabitants  stand  by  and  allow  such 
bonds  to  be  issued,  for  value  received,  by 
Mie  corporation,  and  sold,  that  it  should 


be  held  liable  thereon.  If  the  bonds  are 
void,  and  the  city  has  received  value,  it 
would  be  liable  to  pay  back  what  it  had 
received  from  innocent  persons,  or  else 
the  provision  of  the  constitution  would 
operate  to  ensnare  and  defraud  those  who 
deal  with  it ;  and  if  thus  liable,  the  con- 
stitutional limit  may  be  exceeded  in  this 
way,  as  well  as  by  sustaining  the  right  to 
recover  on  the  bonds. 

The  foregoing  observations  in  this 
note,  in  respect  of  tlie  rights  of  bona  fide 
holders  of  municipal  bonds,  appeared  as 
they  now  stand  in  the  second  edition  of  this 
work.  Subsequently  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  state  decided  that  bonds  issued  in 
excess  of  the  constitutional  limit  were 
void  in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders  for 
value  ;  and  Mr.  Justice  Beck,  delivering 
the  opinion  of  the  court,  criticises  and 
dissents  from  the  author's  views,  and 
denies  any  liability  on  the  part  of  the  mu- 
nicipality, eitlier  on  the  bonds  or  in  re- 
spect of  the  value  it  received  for  them. 
McPherson  v.  Foster,  43  Iowa,  48,  1876 
It  is  not  our  purpose  to  enter  upon  tlie 
discussion.  In  respect  of  the  effect  of 
the  over-issue,  the  soundness  of  the 
author's  view  has  since  been  sanctioned 
in  principle  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  tlie 
United  States  in  the  Kansas  over-issue 
bond  cases.  See  posl,  chapter  on  Con- 
tracts. But  if  the  bonds  are  void  in  the 
hands  of  an  innocent  holder,  can  it  be  the 
law  that  the  city  is  not  liable  to  repay  to 
the  innocent  purcliaser  of  its  void  bonds 
the  amount  of  money  it  actually  received 
from  him  ?  Does  its  liability  depend 
upon  whether  the  identical  money  received 
still  remains  on  hand "?  It  seems  to  us 
not.     Ante,  sec.  125,  note. 

The  provision  of  the  7o««  constitution, 
above  quoted,  was  expounded  in  the  case 
of  Grant  v.  Davenport,  36  Iowa,  396, 
1873,  which  involved  the  validity  of  a 
contract  by  the  city  to  supply  itself  with 
water ;  and  it  was  held  that  where  a  con- 
tract made  by  a  municipal  corporation 
pertains  to  its  ordinary  expenses,  and  is, 
together  with  other  like  expenses,  within 
the  limit  of  its  current  revenues  and  such 


§  136.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  163 

ing  counties  and  cities  from  thereafter  "  contracting  any  debt  or 
pecuniary  liability,  without  fully  providing,  in  the  ordinance 
creating  the  debt,  the  means  of  paying  the  principal  and  interest 
of  the  debt  so  contracted,"  does  not  extend  to  ordinary  street 
work,  which  forms  part  of  the  current  expenses  of  the  corpora- 
tion, and  which  may  be  paid  out  of  its  current  revenues.^ 

§  136.  Under  a  constitutional  provision  in  Ulinois  the  Supreme 
Court  have  established  the  doctrine  that  where  the  indebtedness 
of  a  corporation  has  a  limit  (as  five  per  cent  of  the  assessed  value 
of  the  property  within  its  limits  for  taxation),  it  is  prohibited 
from  borrowing  monet/  and  giving  evidences  of  indebtedness  therefor, 
although  taxes  have  been  levied  to  meet  their  payment.  Such 
evidences  are  void.  It  cannot  incur  corporate  indebtedness  in 
anticipation  of  the  collection  of  taxes  levied,^  and  a  warrant 
drawn,  payable  only  out  of  such  taxes  when  levied  imposes  no 
liability  upon  the  city  in  whose  behalf  it  is  issued.^  Even  for 
meeting  current  expenses  no  city  can  anticipate  the  collection  of 
taxes  for  such  puipose,  unless  the  tax  is  actually  levied.  Such 
warrants  are   mere  assignments  without  recourse  on  the  city. 

special  taxes  as  it  may  legally  levy,  and  stitutional  means  are  employed.  Bur- 
in good  faith  intends  to  levy  therefor,  lington  Water  Co.  v.  Woodward,  49  Iowa, 
such  contract   does  not  constitute   "  the  58. 

incurring  of  indebtedness "  within  the  The  charter  of  the  City  of  PoHland, 
meaning  of  the  constitutional  provision  Oregon,  prohibited  the  city  from  con- 
limiting  the  power  of  municipal  corpora-  tracting  an  indebtedness  exceeding  %bO,- 
tions  to  contract  debts.  000 ;  and  it  was  held  by  Judge  Deadtj 
An  ordinance  authorizing  a  corpora-  that  an  ordinance  assuming  a  liability  of 
tion  to  construct  wdhr-ivorks  within  a  city  .§350,000,  to  be  paid  in  semiannual  in- 
upon  certain  conditions  prescribed,  and  stalments  extending  through  twenty 
providing  that  the  city  may,  whenever  its  years,  was  in  violation  of  the  charter,  and 
financial  condition  will  permit,  purchase  this,  although  the  ordinance  made  pro- 
and  control  them,  is  7iot  an  "  incurring  of  visions  for  the  payment  of  such  instal- 
u/(/e/-W«c.ss"  within  tlie  constitutional  pro-  ments  as  they  fell  due,  by  the  levy  of 
vision  ;  it  is  only  assuming  an  obligation,  taxes  for  that  purpose.  Coulson  v.  Port- 
which,  without  further  action  on  the  part  land,  Deady,  481,  1868. 
of  the  city,  will  ripen  into  a  debt  that  is  As  io  constitutional  provision  requiring 
thus  forbidden.  The  city  may  provide  a  the  legislature  to  restrict  the  power  of  mit- 
tax  not  exceeding  five  nulls  for  the  main-  nicipalilies  to  levj/  taxes,  borrow  money,  etc. 
tenance  of  water-works,  and  a  sinking  see,  ante,  ch.  iii.  sec.  50. 
fund  to  reduce  the  debt  thereon.  The  ^  Reynolds  v.  Siireveport,  13  La.  An. 
fact  that,  by  the  levy  of  the  tax,  the  city  326,  1858. 

may  in   time  become  the  owner  of  the  "  Fuller  r.  Chicago,  89111. 282;  Spring- 
works   does    not    render  the    ordinance  field  v.  Edwards,  84  111.  626 ;  Law  u.  Peo- 
liable  to  the  objection  that  it  permits  the  pie,  87  111.  385. 
city  to  do  indirectly  what  it  cannot  do  ^  Fuller  v.  Heath,  89  111.  296. 
directly,  because  none  but  legal  and  con- 


164  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  VI. 

Thev  lire  muniments  of  title  without  covenants  on  the  part  of 
the  city.i 

§  137.  (80)  A  restrictive  provision  in  a  city  charter,  that  the 
"  council  shall  not  create,  or  permit  to  accrue,  any  debts  or  liabili- 
ties which  shall  exceed  "  a  specified  sum,  unless  a  certain  course 
be  pursued  by  the  council  and  approved  by  a  vote  of  the  people, 
has  been  considered  to  have  no  relation  to  liabilities  arisiyig  ex 
delicto,  or  to  those  which  the  law  may  cast  upon  the  corporation, 
and  to  apply,  at  most,  only  to  contracts  or  liabilities  voluntarily 
created.  The  court,  indeed,  seems  to  consider  the  provision  as 
directory  simpl}^  and  not  as  a  limitation  on  the  power  of  the  coun- 
cil to  create  debts.^  The  provision  in  the  constitution  of  Iowa 
referred  to  in  a  preceding  section,  although  it  is  construed  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  state  to  fix  an  absolute  limit  to  the  amount 
of  indebtedness  which  a  municipality  has  the  power  to  incur,^  is 
by  the  same  court  held  to  have  no  application  to  liabilities  aris- 
ing in  tort ;  and  it  is,  therefore,  no  defence  in  an  action  against 
the  municipality  for  damages  caused  by  a  defective  street  or  side- 
walk that  it  was  indebted  at  the  time  of  the  accident  up  to  or 
be^-ond  the  constitutional  limit.*  A  provision  in  a  city  charter 
that  the  council  shall  not  have  power  to  pledge  the  credit  of  the 
city  for  more  than  a  specified  sum  without  submitting  the  question 
to  the  voters  of  the  city  was  regarded  as  a  definite  restriction  on 
the  power ;  and  hence  a  statute  authorizing  the  city  to  issue 
bonds  to  defray  the  expenses  of  building  a  bridge  is  subordinate 
to,  and  does  not  override,  the  restriction  in  the  charter.^ 

§  138.  (90)  Constitutional  limitations  on  state  indebtedness 
apply  to  the  state  alone,  and  not  to  her  political  and  muni- 
cipal subdivisions.^     A  legislative  provision  prohibiting  the  city 

1  Fuller  V.  Heath,  89  III.  296;  Law  v.  6  Pattison  v.  Supervisors,  13  Cal.  175, 
People,  87  III.  .385.  1869;    Cass    v.   Dillon,  2  Ohio    St.  607, 

2  McCracken?;.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  1853;  Slack  v.  Railroad  Co., 13,  B.  Mon. 
591,1860.  16;    Clark    v.   Janesville,    10   Wis.    136; 

3  French  v.  Burlington,  42  Iowa,  614,  Prettyman  v.  Supervisors,  19  III.  406.  A 
1876 ;  ante,  sec.  135.  constitutional  provision  that  "  the  state 

*  Bartle  v.  Des  Moines,  38  Iowa,  414,  shall  never  he  a  party  to  carrying  on  any 

1874 ;  Rice  v.  Des  Moines,  40  Iowa,  638,  works    of    internal    improvement "  does 

1875.  not  disahlc  the  legislature  from  authoriz- 

5  Cumherland   v.    Magruder,    34    Md.  ing  mimicipalities  and   counties  to   sub- 

381,  1871.    But  see  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  scribe  for  the  stock  of  railway  companies 

Wall  575,  1869 ;  post,  sec.  162.  and   issue   their   bonds   to  pay  therefor. 


§  139.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHAETEES. 


165 


autJiorities  from  incurring  an  indebtedness  beyond  a  designated 
amount  does  not  appl}'  to  the  legislature  of  the  state ;  and  the 
latter  may,  of  course,  by  a  subsequent  act,  authorize  an  increase 
of  the  amount.^ 

Rewards  for  Offenders. 
§  139.  (91)  The  governing  body  of  a  municipal  corporation 
(which  has  express  power  to  protect  the  property  and  promote 
the  welfare  of  its  inhabitants)  may,  it  has  been  held,  offer  a 
reward  for  the  detection  of  offenders  against  the  general  safety 
of  its  people,  as,  for  example,  those  guilty  of  the  crime  of  arson 
within  the  corporate  limits.^  The  contrary  doctrine  has  also 
been  held.^  If  made  by  the  mayor,  it  may  be  ratified  by  the 
city  council  subsequently,  and  is  binding  upon  the  city,  though 
not  so  ratified  until  after  the  performance  of  the  service  for 
which  the  reward  is  claimed.'*     A  promise  to  reward  an  officer 


Commrs.  v.  Miller,  7  Kan.  479, 1871 ;  s.  c. 

12  Am.  Rep.  425.  See  People  v.  Su- 
pervisors, 16  Micii.  254,  and  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Lowe's  individual  opinion  —  not  the 
court's  —  in   State  y.  County  of  Wapello, 

13  Iowa,  388,  418-422 ;  Dubuque  County 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  4  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  1; 
Dean  v.  Madison,  7  Wis.  688. 

1  Aniey  v.  Allegheny  City,  24  How. 
(U.  S)  304,  1860.  Construction  of  par- 
ticular limitation.  Ih.  See,  on  the  gen- 
eral subject,  Wallace  v.  Mayor,  29  Cal. 
180;  Wyncoop  v.  Society,  10  Iowa,  185; 
Rice  V.  Keokuk,  15  Iowa,  579;  Gibbon 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  36  Ala.  410;  Foote  v.  Sa- 
lem, 14  Allen,  487;  Dunnovan».  Green,  57 
111.  63. 

2  York  V.  Forscht,  23  Pa.  St.  391, 1854 ; 
Crawshaw  v.  Roxbury,  7  Gray,  374,  1856. 
An  offer  for  a  reward  is  revocable  at  any 
time  before  its  terras  have  been  complied 
with,  and  may  be  revoked  in  the  same 
manner  in  which  it  was  made,  yet  it  is  im- 
material tiiat  the  claimant  of  the  reward 
was  ignorant  of  its  withdrawal.  Shuey  v. 
United  States,  92  U.  S.  73,  1875.  Such  an 
offer  is  not  void  for  ambiguity,  and  entitles 
a  person  to  the  reward  wlio  gives  informa- 
tion to  the  police  officers  of  the  city  upon 
wliich  the  incendiary  is  arrested,  he  being 
afterwards    convicted. 

^  The  power  of  towns  in  Maine  to  offer 
rewards  denied.  Gale  v.  South  Berwick, 
51  Me  174.  See  Lee  v.  Fleminsburg,  7 
D.ma,  5'>,  and    Loveland  v.  Detroit,   41 


Mich.  367.  In  a  late  case  in  Iowa  it  is 
held  that  "  in  the  absence  of  express  statutory 
authoritji  a  city  has  no  power  to  offer  a  reward 
for  the  apprehension  of  criminals,  such 
power  not  being  included  in  the  general 
authority  given  to  the  city  council  to  pass 
ordinances  for  the  preservation  of  peace 
and  good  order  in  the  city."  Hawk  v. 
Marion  Co.,  48  Iowa,  472 ;  Hanger  v.  Des 
Moines,  Iowa,  1879  ;  s.  c.  9  C.  L.  J.  478  S. 
P. ;  Patton  v.  Stephens,  14  Bush  (Ky.),  324, 
where  the  court  say,  "  The  power  to  pass 
all  needful  by-laws  and  ordinances  for  the 
due  and  effectual  administration  of  jus- 
tice in  said  city,"  and  to  "  legislate  upon 
all  subjects  which  the  good  government 
of  said  city  shall  require,"  does  not  au- 
thorize an  appropriation  of  money  to  en- 
force laws  of  the  Commonwealth,  wherein 
every  other  community  thereof  has  the 
same  interest. 

^  Crawshaw  f.  Roxbury, S!;/jra.  Under 
a  statute  authorizing  the  mayor  and  city 
council  of  any  city,  or  the  selectmen  of 
any  town,  to  offer  and  pay  from  the 
treasury  of  such  city  or  town  a  suitable 
reward,  not  exceeding  $300,  for  appre- 
hending and  securing  a  person  cliarged 
with  a  capital  or  other  high  crime,  any 
city  or  town  niaj'  be  bound  by  an  offer 
of  a  reward  in  sucli  cases  ;  and  any  per- 
son who  performs  the  service,  relying 
upon  such  offer,  may,  in  action  of  assump' 
sit,  recover  the  amount  offered  of  such 
city  or  town.     Janvrin  (;.  Exeter,  48  N.  H. 


166 


MUNICIPAL  COIIPORATIONS. 


[ciI.  VI. 


for  doing  that  which,  without  such  reward,  it  was  his  duty  to 
do,  is  void.  Such  a  promise  is,  on  general  principles,  without 
consideration,  if,  indeed,  it  be  not  illegal. ^  Therefore,  a  watch- 
man of  a  city,  who,  Avhile  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty  as  such, 
discovers  a  person  in  the  act  of  committing  a  crime,  cannot  re- 
cover from  tlie  city  a  reward  offered  by  it.^ 

Public  Buildings. 
§  140.  (92)  Power  to  the  officers,  or  to  one  of  the  departments 
of  a  municipal  corporation,  to  provide  for  repairs  to  public  build- 
ings, does  not  give  authority  to  erect  a  new  building,  and  certainly 
not  a  large  and  expensive  edifice.^  But  power  to  a  municipal 
corporation  to  build  or  repair  carries  with  it  the  right  to  deter- 
mine plan  and  mode.^ 

Police   Powers   and   Regulations. 
§  141.    (93)  Many  of  the  powers  most  generally  exercised  by 
municipalities  are  derived  from  what  is  known  as  the  police  power 

83.  If  two  persons  jointly  perform  the 
service  they  must  be  joined  as  phiintiffs. 
lb.  Requisites  of  decLaration  wliere  re- 
ward is  offered  hy  a  town,  see  Codding  v. 
Mansfield,  7  Gray,  272.  In  order  to  re- 
cover the  reward  the  plaintiff  must  in  gen- 
eral  prove  performance  according  to  the  terms 
of  the  advert isemettt.  See  Neville  v.  Kelly, 
12  C.  B.  N.  S.  740 ;  Smith  v.  Moore,  1  C. 
B.  4.38  ;  Thatchers.  England,  3  C.  B.  254  ; 
England  v.  Davidson,  11  A.  &  E.  85G  ; 
Lancaster  v.  Walsh,  4  M.  &  W.  16  ;  Eal- 
lick  V.  Barber,  1  M.  &  S.  108 ;  Williams  v. 
Carwardine.  4  B.  &  Ad.  621 ;  Tarner  v. 
Walker,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  641;  S.  C.  L.  R.  2 
Q.  B.  301. 

1  Stotesbury  v.  Smith,  2  Burr.  924; 
Harris  v.  Watson,  Peake,  72;  3  Kent 
Com.  185;  Harris  v.  Watson,  Peake,  72; 
Stilk  V.  Myrick,  2  Campb.  317  ;  Bridge  v. 
Cage,  Cro.  Jac.  103.  See  chapter  on 
Corporate  Officers,  post,  sees.  233,  234. 

2  Pool  V.  Boston,  5  Cush.  219,  1849; 
Gilmore  v.  Lewis,  12  Ohio,  281 ;  Means  v. 
Hendershott,  24  Iowa,  78  ;  ch.  ix.  post. 

3  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  17  N.  Y. 
449,  4o-5,  per  Denio,  J.  Contract  between 
city  and  county  in  respect  to  public  build- 
ings. Bergen  v.  Clarkson,  1  Ilalst.  (N.  J.) 
3-52,  1796;  De  Witt  v.  San  Francisco,  2 
Cal.  289,  18.52. 

*  Ely  V.  Rochester,  26  Barb.  133, 1837. 


As  to  power  to  build  town-house.  French 
V.  Quincy,  3  Allen,  9.  Incidental  power 
to  provide  suitable  accommodations  for 
the  transaction  of  the  business  of  the  cor- 
poration. People  V.  Harris,  4  Cal.  9;  see 
Vanover  v.  Davis,  27  Ga.  354 ;  chapter 
on  Corporate  Property,  post.  Council 
have  power  to  fit  up  and  furnish  the  room 
in  which  they  meet,  and  the  court  refused 
to  enjoin  them  from  furnishing  the  council 
chamber  with  portraits  of  the  governors 
of  the  state.  Reynolds  v.  Mayor  of  Al- 
bany, 8  Barb.  597 ;  People  v.  Harris,  4 
Cal.  9 ;  but  see  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2 
Denio,  110  ;  Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass. 
272,  1816,  per  Parker,  C.  J.  Proper  uses 
of  public  buildings.  Scofield  v.  School 
District,  27  Conn.  499 ;  French  v.  Quincy, 
3  Allen,  9.  Market  Houses,  post,  sees. 
380-385,  562,  648. 

In  organizing  a  county  the  legislature 
may  delegate  the  authority  to  locate  the 
county  seat  to  the  county  commissioners. 
Rice  V.  Shuey,  5  N.  W.R.  435.  But  the 
county  seat  cannot  be  changed  at  the 
will  of  the  county  board  after  they  have 
canvassed  the  vote  and  located  it  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  result.  People  v.  Ben- 
zie Co.,  41  Mich.  6  ;  Attorney  General  v. 
Lake  Co.,  33  Mich.  289  ;  Attorney  General 
V.  Benzie,  34  Mich.  211. 


§  141.]  MUNICIPAL   CHAKTERS.  167 

of  the  state/  and  are  delegated  to  them  to  be  exercised  for  the 
public  good.  Of  this  nature  is  the  authority  to  suppress  nuisances, 
preserve  health,  prevent  fires,  to  regulate  the  use  and  storing  of 
dano-erous  articles,  to  establish  and  control  markets,  and  the  like. 
These  and  other  similar  topics  will  be  considered  in  appropriate 
places.  But  it  may  here  be  observed  that  every  citizen  holds  his 
property  subject  to  the  proper  exercise  of  this  power,  either  by 
the  state  legislature  directly,  or  by  public  corporations  to  which 
the  legislature  may  delegate  it.  Laws  and  ordinances  relating  to 
the  comfort,  health,  convenience,  good  order,  and  general  welfare 
of  the  inhabitants  are  comprehensively  styled,  "  Police  Laws  or 
Regulations."  And  it  is  well  settled  that  laws  and  regulations 
of  this  character,  though  they  may  disturb  the  enjoyment  of  in- 
dividual rights,  are  not  unconstitutional,  though  no  provision  is 
made  for  compensation  for  such  disturbances.  They  do  not  ap- 
propriate private  property  for  public  use,  but  simply  regulate  its 
use  and  enjoyment  by  the  owner.  If  he  suffers  injury,  it  is  either 
damnum  absque  injuria,  or,  in  the  theory  of  the  law,  lie  is  com- 
pensated for  it  by  sharing  in  the  general  benefits  which  the  regu- 
lations are  intended  and  calculated  to  secure.  The  citizen  owns 
his  property  absolutely,  it  is  true  ;  it  cannot  be  taken  from  him 
for  any  private  use  whatever,  without  his  consent,  nor  for  any 
public  use  without  compensation  ,  still  he  owns  it  subject  to  this 
restriction,  namely:  that  it  must  be  so  used  as  not  to  injure 
others,  and  that  the  sovereign  authority  may,  by  police  regula- 
tions, so  direct  the  use  of  it  that  it  shall  not  prove  pernicious  to 
his  neighbors,  or  the  citizens  generally.  These  regulations  rest 
upon  the  maxim,  Salus  populi  suprema  est  lex.  This  power,  to 
restrain  a  private,  injurious  use  of  property,  is  very  different  from 
the  right  of  eminent  domain.  It  is  not  a  taking  of  private  prop- 
erty for  public  use,  but  a  salutary  restraint  on  a  noxious  use  by 
the  owner,  contrary  to  the  maxim,  Sic  utere  tuo  ut  alienum  non 
loidas? 

1  The  power  of  a  corporation  to  exer-  principle  upon  which  police  laws  rest  is 
cise  po/jcey«mcZic<iOTi  is  a  power  delegated  very  satisfactorily  discussed  by  Wood- 
by  the  State.  Cranston  v.  Augusta,  61  worth,  J.) ;  Con)monwoaith  v.  Alger,  7 
Ga.  572.  Cush.  53,  84  (valuable  opinion  by  Shaw, 

2  Baker  v.  Boston,  12  Pick.  184,  1831  C.  J.) ;  Fisher  v.  McGirr,  1  Gray,  1 ;  Com 
(as  to  nuisances) ;  Wadleigh  v.  Gillman,  monwealth  v.  Tewksbury,  11  Met.  55 
12  Me.  403  (as  to  wooden  buildings);  Salem  y.  Eastern  llailroad,  98  Mass.  431 
Vanderbilt  v.  Adams,  7  Cow.  139  (as  to  Watertown  v.  Mayo,  109  Mass.  315 
harbor   regulations,  where    the    general  Dingley  v.  Boston,  100  Mass.  544 ;  Cobb 


168 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VL 


§  142.  All-embracing  and  penetrating  as  the  police  power  of 
the  state  is,  and  of  necessity  must  be,  it  is  nevertheless  subject, 
like  all  other  lc(jtslativc  potvers,  to  the  paramount  authority  of 
the  state  and  the  Federal  Constitution.  A  right  conferred  or  pro- 
tected by  the  Constitution  cannot  be  overthrown  or  impaired  by 
any  authority  derived  from  the  police  power.  Thus  the  police 
power  of  the  state  must  be  exercised  in  subordination  to  the 
Federal  Constitution,  and  cannot  extend,  as  was  held  by  the 


c.  Boston,  112  Mass.  181 ;  Bancroft  v. 
Cambridge,  120  Mass.  438  ;  Welch  i'.  Bos- 
ton, 120  Mass.  442  ;  Little  Kock  v.  Barton, 
33  Ark.  43b,  citing  and  approving  text. 
Coates  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  7 
Cow.  685,  1826  (as  to  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting the  interment  of  the  dead  within 
the  city);  Goszler  v.  Georgetown,  0 
Wheat.  503  (as  to  power  to  grade). 

In  the  case  of  the  Boston  Beer  Co.  v. 
Massachusetts,  97  U.  S.  25,  1877,  Mr. 
Justice  Bradley,  speaking  for  the  court, 
said :  "  Whatever  differences  of  opinion 
may  exist  as  to  the  extent  and  boundaries 
oithe  police  power,  and  however  difficult  it 
may  be  to  render  a  satisfactory  definition 
of  it,  there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  it 
does  extend  to  the  protection  of  the 
lives,  health,  and  property  of  the  citi- 
zens and  to  the  preservation  of  good 
order  and  the  public  morals."  See  also 
Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park  (village 
of),  98  U.  S.  -659,  1878.  In  the  last  case 
Mr.  .Justice  Swayne  says  :  "  Perhaps  the 
most  striking  application  of  the  police 
power  is  in  the  destruction  of  buildings  to 
prevent  the  spread  of  a  conflagration. 
This  right  existed  by  the  common  law, 
and  the  owner  was  entitled  to  no  com- 
pensation. 2  Kent's  Com.  339  (marg. 
paging),  and  notes  1  and  a  and  b."  Post, 
ch.  x.xiii. 

It  is  held  that  under  tlie  police  power 
of  the  state  the  duty  of  pavinr;  and  repair- 
ing a  sidewalk  in  front  of  a  house  may  be 
imposed  on  the  owner.  Macon  v.  Patty, 
9  Reporter,  G13. 

It  is  within  the  police  power  of  the 
state  to  authorize  the  channel  of  a  ricer  to 
be  turned  or  straightened,  in  order  to  pro- 
tect from  threatened  inundation  a  popu- 
lous jiortion  of  the  state,  and  such  work 
is  of  a  public  character.  Green  v.  Swift, 
47  Cal.  5.36,  1874.  In  such  case,  the  au- 
thority of  the  state  is  none  the  less  in 


degree,  even  if  the  inhabitants  of  the  dis- 
trict to  be  protected  did  not  constitute  a 
body  politic.   lb. 

Speaking  of  turnpike  acts,  paving 
acts,  etc..  Lord  Kenyan,  in  the  case  of 
the  Governor,  etc.  v.  Meredith,  4  Term 
Hep.  790,  796,  says :  "  Some  individuals 
suffer  an  inconvenience  under  all  these 
acts  of  parliament ;  but  the  interests  of 
individuals  nmst  give  way  to  the  accom- 
modation of  the  public."  And  per  Buller, 
J.,  in  same  case  :  "  There  are  many  cases 
in  which  individuals  sustain  an  injury, 
for  which  the  law  gives  no  action ;  for 
instance,  pulling  down  houses,  or  raising 
bulwarks,  for  the  preservation  and  de- 
fence of  the  kingdom  against  the  king's 
enemies."  But  "  the  law  will  not  allow 
the  right  of  property  to  be  invaded,  under 
the  guise  of  a  police  regulation  for  the 
preservation  of  health,  when  it  is  manifest 
that  such  is  not  the  object  and  purpose  of 
the  regulation."  Per  Wilde,  J.,  in  Austin 
V.  Murray,  16  Pick.  126  ;  Green  v.  Savan- 
nah, 6  Ga.  1,  1849;  People  v.  Hawley,  3 
Mich.  330;  Ames  v.  County,  11  Mich. 
139.  The  extent  of  the  police  power  will 
be  further  discussed  in  the  chapter  on 
Ordinances,  post.  See,  also,  Cooley  Const. 
Lim.  572-594.  How  far  and  when  cities, 
in  executing  police  duties,  are  agents  of 
the  state,  and  not  of  the  municipality.  See 
Buttrick  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  172; 
Mitchell  V.  Rockland,  51  Mc.  118,  122; 
52  Me.  118;  Brown  f.Vinalhaven,  65  Me. 
402,  1876  ;  Keller  v.  Corpus  Christi,  50 
Tex.  014,  approving  text ;  State  v.  St. 
Louis  Court,  34  Mo.  546 ;  White  v.  Kent, 

11  Ohio   St.  650;    Thomas   v.  Ashland, 

12  lb.  127;  City  Council  v.  Payne,  2 
Nott  &  McCord  (South  Car.),  475;  Peo- 
ple V.  Hurlbut,  24  Mich.  44,  1871;  s.  c. 
9  Am.  Rep.  103;  ante,  sec.  60;  post, 
sees.  253,  393,  396,  768. 


§  142.]  MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS.  169 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  in  respect  of  state  laws  for- 
bidding the  transportation  of  Texas  cattle^  to  inter-state  transpor- 
tation of  the  subjects  of  commerce.^  In  a  subsequent  case^  the 
rights  chiimed  by  a  private  corporation,  chartered  by  an  act  of  the 
legishiture,  and  authorized  by  its  charter  to  establish  and  carry  on 
a  business  which  was  intrinsically  and  unavoidably  a  nuisance  to 
the  inhabitants  in  the  neighborhood,^  came  in  conflict  with  the 
police  power  of  the  state,  subsequently  delegated  to  a  munici- 
pality within  whose  limits  the  offensive  and  unhealthy  business 
of  the  private  corporation  was  conducted.  The  subject  was 
thoroughly  considered.  The  court  did  not  deny  that  by  a  spe- 
cific contract  the  legislature  might  surrender  for  a  limited  period 
the  right  to  interfere  with  a  business  which  was  a  positive  nui- 
sance. On  the  ground,  however,  that  the  private  corporation, 
when  its  charter  was  tested  by  the  principles  of  strict  construc- 
tion applicable  to  such  grants,  had  no  specific  legislative  authority 
to  maintain  its  works  ow  the  site  where  they  were  established,  if 
not,  indeed,  on  the  broader  ground  that  all  legislative  charters  to 
private  corporations  are  subordinate  to  the  police  power  in  all 
cases  whatsoever,  or,  at  all  events,  in  all  cases  except  where  it  is 
otherwise  provided  by  the  express  terms  of  the  contract,  or  by 
what  is  necessarily  implied,  the  municipal  ordinances  to  abate  the 
nuisance  were  sustained,  although  the  corporation  had  erected 

1  Railroad  Co.  v.  Husen,  95  U.  S.  465,  lutely  prohibiting  the  transportation  of 

1877.  offal  through  the  village.     The  majority 

^  Fertilizing  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park   (vil-  opinion  sustaining  the  ordinance  is  based 

lage  of),  98  U.  S.  659,  1878.  upon    two    propositions  :      1.    That    the 

3  Tlie   Fertilizing  Company  obtained  chartered  rights  of  the  Fertilizing  Com- 

by  its  charter  from  the  state  (which  was  pany  were  subject  to  tiie  police  power  of 

a  legislative  contract),  for  the  period  of  the  state,  which  was  delegated  to  the  mu- 

fifty  years,  three  rights,  among  others  :  nicipal  authorities.     2.  The  charter  of  the 

one  a  right  to  establish  and  maintain  at  a  company  is  not  a  contract  guaranteeing 

jilace  in  Cook  County,  south  of  tlie  divid-  in  the.  lociUti/  originally  selected,  exemption 

ing-line  between   townships  thirty-seven  for  fifty  years   from  the  exercise  of  the 

and    tidrty-eight,    works   for   converting  police  power  of  the  state,  however  serious 

ofEal  and  animal    matter;  and  the  works  the  nuisance  might  become  in  the  future, 

have   been  established  there  at  a  cost  of  by  reason    of  the  growth  of  population 

more  than  two  iiundred  thousand  dollars  ;  around  it.     Mr.  Justice  Miller  limited  his 

second,  they  obtained  the  right  to  estab-  judgment  to  a  concurrence  on  the  second 

lisii   receiving   depots    for  receiving  and  point  and  denied  the  first.      Strong,  J., 

carrying  such  matter  from  Chicago  ;  and  dissented.  Fi'eW,  J.,  did  not  sit.    Critically 

third,  they  obtained    the  riglit  to  carry  viewed,  the  case  is  perhajjs  only  an  au- 

such  matter  from  tlieir  receiving  depots  thoritative  decision  on  the  second  ground, 

to  their  converting  works  in   Hyde  Park,  since  it  is  relied  on  in  botii  concurring 

Under  legislative  authority  subsequently  opinions,  and  is  amply  sufficient  to  sus- 

conferred   upon   it,   the   municipality  of  tain  the  judgment  which  nffirmed  that  of 

Hyde   Park   passed  an   ordinance  abso-  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois. 


170 


MUNICIPAL   COKPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


expLMisivo  works  and  iil though  the  effect  of  enforcing  the  or- 
dinance woulil  lie  to  prevent  the  further  carrying  on  of  the 
business  in  that  locality.  Similar  results  in  favor  of  the  police 
power  as  against  alleged  vested  rights  under  charters  have  been 
reached  in  other  eases. ^ 

1  Coatcs  V.  Miiyor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
7  Cow.  685,  18*20,  rel'erreil  to  in  the  cjise 
of  tlio  rortilizinsi  Co.  v.  Hyde  Park,  supra, 
ami  tliiis  sitatod  hy  Sinn/nc,  J. :  In  Coates 
V.  Tlie  Mayor,  etc.  of  is^ew  York,  7  Cow. 
685,  a  law  was  enacted  by  tlie  legislature 
of  the  state,  on  the  9th  of  March,  ISlo, 
which  gave  to  the  city  government  power 
to  pass  ordinances  regulating,  and  if  nec- 
essary j)revcnting,  the  interment  of  dead 
bodies  within  the  city  ;  and  a  penalty  of 
S250  was  authorized  to  be  imposed  for 
the  violation  of  the  prohibition.  On  tlie 
7th  of  October,  1823,  an  ordinance  was 
adopted  forbidding  interments  or  the  de- 
positing of  dead  bodies  in  vaults  in  the 
city  south  of  a  designated  line.  A  penalty 
was  prescribed  for  its  violation.  The 
action  was  brought  to  recover  the  penalty 
for  depositing  a  dead  body  in  a  vault  in 
Trinity  church-yard.  A  plea  was  inter- 
posed setting  forth  that  the  locus  in  (jno 
was  granted  by  the  King  of  Great  Britain 
on  tiie  6th  of  May,  1G97,  to  a  corporation 
by  the  name  of  the  "  Kector  and  Inhabi- 
tants of  the  City  of  New  York  in  Com- 
munion with  the  Protestant  Episcopal 
Church  of  England,"  and  their  successors 
forever,  as  and  for  a  church-yard  and  bury- 
ing jilace,  with  the  rights,  fees,  etc.  ;  that 
immediately  after  the  grant  the  land  was 
appropriated  and  thenceforward  was  used 
as  and  for  a  cemetery  for  the  interment 
of  dead  bodies  ;  that  the  rector  and  war- 
dens of  Trinity  Church  were  the  same 
corporation,  and  that  the  body  in  question 
was  deposited  in  the  vault  in  the  church- 
yard by  the  license  of  that  corporation. 
A  general  demurrer  was  filed,  and  the 
case  was  elaborately  argued.  The  validity 
of  the  ordinance  was  sustained.  The 
court  held  that  "  the  act  under  which  it 
was  passed  was  not  unconstitutional, 
either  as  impairing  the  obligation  of  con- 
tracts, or  taking  property  for  public  use 
without  compensation,  but  stands  on  the 
police  power  to  make  regulations  in  re- 
spect to  nuisances."  It  was  said  :  "  Every 
right,  from  absolute  ownership  in  prop- 
erty down  to  a  mere  easement,  is  pur- 


chased and  holden  subject  to  the  restric- 
tion that  it  shall  be  so  exercised  as  not  to 
injure  others.  Though  at  the  time  it  be 
remote  and  inolTensive,  the  purchaser  is 
bound  to  know  at  his  peril  that  it  may 
become  otherwise  by  the  residence  of 
many  people  in  its  vicinity,  and  that  it 
must  yield  to  by-laws  and  other  regular 
remedies  for  the  suppression  of  nui- 
sances." In  such  cases  prescription,  what- 
ever the  length  of  time,  has  no  applica- 
tion. Every  day's  continuance  is  a  new 
offence,  and  it  is  no  justification  that  the 
party  ccjmplaining  came  voluntarily  with- 
in its  reach.  Pure  air  and  the  comforta- 
ble enjoyment  of  property  are  as  much 
rights  belonging  to  it  as  the  right  of  pos- 
session and  occupancy.  If  population, 
where  there  was  none  before,  approaches 
a  nuisance,  it  is  the  duty  of  those  liable 
at  once  to  put  an  end  to  it.  Brady  v. 
Weeks,  3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  157.  Post,  sec.  372. 
So  in  the  case  of  the  Boston  Beer  Com- 
pany, where  the  legislature  of  Massachu- 
setts on  the  1st  of  February,  1827,  incor- 
porated the  "  Boston  Beer  Company," 
"  for  the  purpose  of  manufacturing  malt 
liquors  in  all  their  varieties  in  the  city  of 
Boston,"  etc.  By  an  act  of  June,  1869, 
the  manufacture  of  malt  liquors  to  be 
sold  in  Massachusetts,  and  brewing  and 
keeping  them  for  sale,  were  prohibited 
under  penalties  of  fine  and  imprisonment 
and  the  forfeiture  of  the  liquors  to  the 
commonwealth.  In  the  Boston  Beer  Co. 
V.  The  Commonwealth,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Massachusetts  held  that  "the 
act  of  1869  did  not  impair  the  obligations 
of  the  contract  contained  in  the  charter 
of  the  claimant,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the 
sale  of  malt  liquors,  but  is  binding  on 
the  claimant  to  the  same  extent  as  on 
individuals.  The  act  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  police  regulation  in  regard  to  the 
sale  of  a  certain  article  of  property,  and 
is  applicable  to  the  sale  of  such  property 
by  individuals  and  corporations,  even 
where  the  charter  of  the  corporation  can- 
not be  altered  or  repealed  by  the  legis- 
lature."    This  judgment  was  affirmed  by 


§  144.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHAKTEKS. 


171 


Prevention  of  Fires. 

§  143.  (94)  The  prevention  of  damage  by  fire  is  usually  an 
object  within  the  scope  of  municipal  authority,  either  by  express 
grant  or  by  the  power,  in  a  chartered  town  or  city,  to  make  po- 
lice regulations  or  needful  by-laws,  and  for  this  purpose  it  may 
reo-ulate  the  mode  and  removal  of  ashes. ^  And  where  the  town 
or  municipal  body  has  such  power,  it  is  authorized  to  appropriate 
money  for  the  purchase  of  engines,  or  for  the  repair  thereof,  if  to 
be  used  for  the  purpose  of  extinguishing  fires  therein  ;  and  this, 
whether  they  belong  to  the  corporation  or  were  purchased  by 
private  subscription.^  And  money  may  also  be  appropriated  for 
the  benefit  of  engine  and  hook  and  ladder  companies  therein.^ 

Quarantine  and  Health. 
§  144.  (95)     The  preservation  of  the  public  health  and  safety 
is  often  made  a  matter  of  municipal  duty,  and  it  is  competent 

the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 
97  U.  S.  2.5. 

The  question  whether  certain  require- 
ments are  a  p.<irt  of  a  system  of  police 
regulation  adapted  to  aid  in  the  protec- 
tion of  life  and  health,  is  properly  one  of 
legislative  determination,  and  a  court 
should  not  lightly  interfere  with  such  de- 
termination, unless  the  legislature  has 
manifestly  transcended  its  province.  Dan- 
iels u.  Hilgard,  77  111.  640,  1875. 

1  Many  fires  are  said  to  he  "  acciden- 
tal "  which  are  the  result  of  neglect  to 
keep  ashes  in  fire-proof  utensils;  and  yet 
regulations  for  the  safe  keeping  of  ashes 
are  seldom  made,  and  when  made,  rarely 
enforced.  Filhey  v.  Comhe,  2  M.  &  W. 
677 ;  Low  v.  Dodd,  1  Ex.  845  ;  Lynden  v. 
Stanhridge,  2  H.  &  N.  45.  See  further. 
The  Queen  i;.  Wood,  5  E.  &  B.  49  ;  Guar- 
dians of  Holborn  Union  v.  Vestry  of  St. 
Leonard,  Shoreditch,  L.  R.,  2  Q.  B.  Div. 
145 ;  Gay  v.  Cadby,  L.  K.  2  C.  P.  Div. 
3'Jl  ;  Harrison's  Munic.  Manual,  4th  ed. 

2  Allen  V.  Taunton,  19  Pick.  485,  18-37  ; 
Huneman  v.  Fire  District,  37  Vt.  40; 
Kobinson  v.  St.  Louis,  28  Mo.  488  (repair 
of  engine-house) ;  Wadleigh  v.  Gillnian, 
12  Me.  403;  Vanderhilt  v.  Adams,  7 
Cow.  349,  352 ;  post,  sees.  405,  572  n., 
690,  ch.  xxiii.  Text  approved.  Green  v. 
Cape  May,  41  N.  J.  L.  45. 

3  Van    Sicklen  v.  Burlington,  27  Vt. 


(1  Wms.)  70,  1854.  Approving,  Allen 
V.  Taunton,  supra.  See  ]>ost,  chapter  on 
Ordinances.  Power  of  council  over  fire 
companies,  and  to  appoint  officers  there- 
for. See  Miller  v.  Savannah  Fire  Co.,  26 
Ga.  078. 

The  protection  of  all  the  buildings  in 
a  city  or  town  from  destruction  or  injury 
by  fire  is  for  the  benefit  of  all  the  inhab- 
itants, and  for  their  relief  from  a  common 
danger ;  and  cities  and  towns  are  there- 
fore authorized  bj'  general  law  in  Massa- 
chusetts to  provide  and  maintain  fire 
engines,  reservoirs,  and  hydrants  to  sup- 
ply water  for  the  extinguishment  of  fires. 
Allen  V.  Taunton,  19  Pick.  485;  Hardy  i-. 
Waltham,  3  Met.  163 ;  Fisher  v.  Boston, 
104  Mass.  87  ;  Tainter  v.  Worcester,  123 
Mass.  311.  The  question  whether  and 
where  piihlic  hydrants  should  be  erected 
is  within  the  exclusive  control  of  the 
municipal  authorities,  as  the  public  in- 
terests may  seem  from  time  to  time  to 
require ;  and  such  municipality  does  not 
assume  any  liability  to  the  owners  of 
property  to  furnish  means  of  extinguish- 
ment of  fires  upon  which  an  action  can 
be  maintained.  Grant  v.  Erie,  69  Pa. 
420;  Wheeler  v.  Cincinnati,  19  Ohio  St. 
19 ;  Brinkmeyer  v.  Evansville,  29  Ind. 
187  ;  Fisher  v.  Boston,  104  Mass.  87  ;  Hill 
V.  Boston,  122  Mass.  344 ;  post,  ch.  xxiii. 


172  MUNICIPAL  CORrORATIONS.  [CII.  VI. 

for  the  legislature  to  delegate  to  municipalities  the  power  to 
roL^uhito,  ivstiain,  and  even  suppress,  particular  branches  of 
husini'ss,  if  deemed  necessary  for  the  public  good.^  The  sub- 
ieet  will  be  considered  more  in  detail  in  the  chapter  on  Ordi- 
nances. The  general  nature  and  scope  of  the  authority,  as  it  is 
not  unfrequently  bestowed,  are  well  illustrated  by  a  case  in 
Maryland.  By  its  charter  the  city  of  Baltimore  was  vested  with 
'■'■  full  power  and  authority  to  enact  all  ordinances  necessary  to 
preserve  the  health  of  the  city,  prevent  and  remove  nuisances, 
and  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  contagious  diseases  within  the 
city  and  within  three  miles  of  the  same."  Commenting  on  this 
provision  of  the  charter,  the  Court  of  Appeals  say :  "  The 
transfer  of  this  salutary  and  essential  power  is  given  in  terms  as 
explict  and  comprehensive  as  could  have  been  used  for  such  a 
purpose.  To  accomplish,  within  the  specified  territorial  limits, 
the  objects  enumerated,  the  corporate  authorities  were  clothed 
with  all  the  legislative  powers  which  the  general  assembly  could 
have  exercised.  Of  the  degree  of  necessity  for  such  municipal 
legislation,  the  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Baltimore  were  the 
exclusive  judges.  To  their  sound  discretion  is  committed  the 
selection  of  the  means  and  manner  (contributor)'  to  the  end)  of 
exercising  the  powers  which  they  might  deem  requisite  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  objects  of  which  they  were  made  the 
guardians.  '  To  prevent  the  introduction  of  contagious  diseases 
within  the  city,  and  within  three  miles  of  the  same,'  they  might 
impose  heavy  penalties  on  the  captain,  owner,  or  consignee  of 
any  ship  or  other  vessel  entering  the  port  of  Baltimore,  on 
board  of  which  small-pox  or  other  contagious  diseases  might  pre- 
vail, or  they  might  seek  the  accomplishment  of  their  object  by 
causing  the  vessel  and  all  persons  to  be  taken  possession  of  and 
controlled  until  their  purification  and  disinfection  were  effected, 
and  impose  on  the  captain,  owner,  or  consignee,  the  payment  or 
reimbursement  of  all  the  expenses  incurred  by  such  proceedings  ; 
or  they  might  adopt,  at  the  same  time,  both  suggested  remedies, 
if  for  the  successful  and  faithful  execution  of  their  powers  they 
deemed  it  necessary  to  do  so."  ^ 

§  145.  (96)    And  it  was  held  that,  under  this  authority,  it  was 

1  Slirader,  in   re,  33  Cal.   279,  1867;  Cal.  242,  1872;  post,  sees.  369,  371,  372, 

Ashbrook    v.    Common  wealth,    1     Bush  ch.  xxiii. 

(Ky.),  139, 1866  ;  Tucker?;.  Virginia  City,  ^  Harrison  v.  Baltimore,  1  Gill  (Md.), 

4  Nev.   20  ;    Johnson   v.   Simonton,   43  264,  1843 ;  ante,  sec.  94. 


§  146.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS.  173 

competent  for  the  city  to  pass  an  ordinance  providing  for  the 
appointment  of  a  "  health  officer,"  prescribing  iiis  duties  and 
powers ;  and  that  the  city  might  recover  from  the  consignee  of 
a  vessel,  and  was  not  confined  to  the  charterer,  the  expenses 
incurred  by  it  in  disinfecting  and  purifying  the  vessel,  persons, 
and  baggage  on  board  of  her  at  the  time  of  her  arrival  from  the 
infection  of  the  small-pox.  Respecting  the  extent  of  liability, 
the  court  decided  that  the  defendant  was  not  entitled  to  an 
instruction  that  the  recovery  must  be  limited  to  the  amount  of 
expenses  absolutely  necessary  to  preserve  the  health  of  the  city, 
or  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  the  small-pox.  On  this  point 
the  court  expressed  its  judgment  to  be  that,  "  if  the  health  offi- 
cer "  (on  whom  the  duty  of  disinfecting  the  vessel  was  imposed 
by  ordinance),  in  causing  expenses,  "acted  hona  fide,  within  the 
limits  of  a  sound  discretion,  and  with  reasonable  skill  and  judg- 
ment, in  the  discharge  of  his  official  duties,  the  reasonable  ex- 
penses thus  incurred  must  be  j)aid."  Concerning  the  power  of 
the  corporation  over  the  persons  on  board  of  an  infected  vessel, 
the  court  was  of  opinion  that  it  was  competent  for  the  health 
officer  to  be  authorized  by  ordinance  to  send  persons  laboring 
under  infectious  disease  to  the  hospital,  and  also  those  on  board 
of  the  vessel  liable  to  be  affected  by  the  disease,  if,  in  his  opinion, 
such  a  course  be  necessary  to  prevent  the  spread  of  disease ;  and 
the  owner,  master,  or  consignee  may  be  liable  for  expenses  thus 
incurred,  if  the  health  officer  acts  with  reasonable  skill  and  judg- 
ment, and  exercises  a  sound  and  honest  discretion.^ 

§  146.  (97)  A  city  having  power  to  pass  ordinances  respecting 
the  i:)olice  of  the  place,  and  to  preserve  health,  is  authorized,  as  a 
sanitary  and  police  regulation,  to  contract  to  procure  a  supply  of 
water,  by  boring  an  artesian  well,  or  otherwise,  on  the  public 
square,  and  is  the  judge  of  the  mode  best  adapted  to  accomplish 
the  object.^ 

1  Harrison  v.  Baltimore,  1  Gill  (Md.),  course,  distant  from  the  city,  to  supply 
204,  1843.  its  inhabitants   with   water,  has  no  riglit 

2  Livingston  v.  Pippin,  31  Ala.  542,  (unless  acquired  by  purchase  or  by  the 
1858;  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  domain) 
Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  approving  text ;  ante,  to  divert  water  to  the  injury  of  other 
sec.  94.  As  to  water-works,  Eome  v.  riparian  proprietors.  Stein  v.  Burden,  24 
Cabot,  28  Ga.  50 ;  Hale  v.  Hougiiton,  8  Ala.  130,  1854  ;  Fleming's  Appeal,  65  Pa. 
Mich.  458  ;  post,  sec.  443.  A  municipal  St.  444.  As  against  the  owner  of  ihefee 
corporation   owning  lands    on  a   water-  abutting  on  a  higliway  the  selectmen  of 


174 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


Indemnifying  Officers. 

^  147.  (08)  Where  a  municipal  corporation  lias  no  interest  in 
the  event  of  a  suit,  or  in  the  question  involved  in  the  case,  and 
tlio  judgment  therein  can  in  no  way  affect  the  corporate  rights  or 
corporate  property,  it  cannot  assume  the  defence  of  the  suit,  or 
appropriate  its  money  to  pay  the  judgment^iherein  ;  and  warrants 
or  orders  based  upon  such  a  consideration  are  void.^  But  a 
municipal  corporation  has  power  to  indemnify  its  officers  against 
liability  which  they  may  incur  hi  the  ho7ia  fide  discharge  of  their 
duties,  although  the  result  may  show  that  the  officers  have  ex-, 
ceeded  their  legal  authority.^     Thus,  it  may  vote  to  defend  suits 


a  town  have  a  right  to  drain  a  spring  on 
tlie  owner's  side  of  such  road  and  dispose 
of  the  water  in  siicii  mode  as  to  pro- 
tect tiie  highway  from  overflow  ;  but  if 
tliey  divert  tlie  water  for  any  other  pur- 
pot^c,  tliey  act  individually,  and  not  for  the 
pultlic  good,  and  as  against  the  owner 
liave  no  capacity  to  act  at  all.  Saffield 
V.  Hathaway,  44  Conn.  521 ;  ante,  sec.  30; 
l)ost,  ch.  xxiii.  Power  to  purchase  site 
for  water-works.  People  v.  McClintock, 
45  Cal.  11, 1872 ;  post,  sees.  501,  5G2.  Reg- 
ulations of  water  supply,    Post,  sec.  320. 

1  Halstead  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  N.  Y.,  3 
Comst.  (-3  N.  Y.)  430,  1850,  affirming  s.  c. 
5  Barb.  218,  and  deciding  that  corporate 
funds  cannot  be  appropriated  to  pay  pen- 
alties personally  incurred  by  officers  for 
refusing  to  discharge  their  official  duties  ; 
refer  to,  in  explanntion,  Morris  i'.  Tlie 
People,  3  Denio,  381.  And  see,  also, 
People  V.  Lawrence,  6  Hill,  244,  holding 
that  the  supervisors  of  a  county  had  no 
right  to  appropriate  money  to  defray  the 
costs  of  a  justice  of  the  peace  vvlio  had 
been  prosecuted  for  official  misconduct 
and  acquitted  ;  recognized  in  Bank  v.  Su- 
pervisors, 5  Denio,  517,  521.  Same  prin- 
ciple, Merrill  v.  Plainfield,  45  N.  H.  126. 

The  common  council  of  a  city  in  Con- 
necticut, under  authority  of  the  cit}'  char- 
ter, enacted  a  by-law  with  respect  to 
wharves,  and  the  anchoring,  moving,  and 
mooring  of  vessels  in  the  harbor,  and 
appointed  a  superintendent  of  wharves, 
to  discharge  the  duties  provided  for  in  the 
by-law ;  the  performance  of  his  duties 
was  not  enforced  by  a  penalty,  and  he 
acted  only  upon  application  of  parties  in- 


terested, and  at  their  expense.  In  the 
discharge  of  his  duties,  and  while  acting 
in  good  faith,  he  ordered  a  vessel  lying 
at  a  wharf  to  be  hauled  astern  to  make 
more  room  for  another  at  an  adjoining 
wharf,  and  was  sued  by  the  owner  of  the 
wharf  for  damages.  It  was  held  that 
the  city  could  not  legally  indemnify  him 
for  the  expenses  incurred  by  him  in  de- 
fending against  the  suit.  Gregory  v. 
Bridgeport,  41  Conn.  76,  87,  1874;  s.  c. 
19  Am.  Rep.  485,  where  Phelps,  J.,  cites 
and  follows  the  text,  and  refers  to  other 
cases  to  the  same  point.  In  Canada  it  is 
held  that  a  municipal  corporation  cannot 
pass  a  by-law  to  pay  the  costs  of  a  contested 
election  to  a  municipal  office,  nor  indemnifi/ 
one  of  the  parties  to  such  a  contest.  Bell, 
in  re,  2  Upper  Can.  Com.  Pleas  Rep.  507  ; 
s.  c.  3  lb.  400. 

-  Pike  V.  Middleton  (indemnifying  tax 
collector),  12  N.  H.  278,  1841  ;  Fuller  v. 
Groton,  14  Gray,  340 ;  Sherman  v.  Carr 
(indemnifying  executive  officer),  8  R.  I. 
431,  1867;  Briggs  v.  Whipple,  6  Vt.  95, 
1834;  Bancroft  v.  Lynnfield,  18  Pick. 
566,  1836;  Nelson  v.  Milford,  7  Pick.  18, 
26,  1828;  Babbitt  v.  Savoy,  3  Cush.  530, 
1849  ;  Hasdell  v.  Hancock,  3  Gray,  526, 
1853  ;  State  ii.  Hammonton,  9  Vroom 
(38  N.  J.  L.),  430,  1876  ;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep. 
404,  where  many  of  the  cases  are  referred 
to  by  Di.ron,  J.  Lewis  v.  Rochester,  9 
C.  B.  (N.  S.)  401;  Queen  v.  Litchfield,  4 
Ad.  &*E.  (N.  S  )  897  ;  Attorney  General 
V.  Norwich,  2  Mylne  &  Cr.  406.  In  Page  v. 
Frankford,  9  Greenl.  (Me.)  155,  this  was 
left  an  open  question. 


148.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


175 


brought  against  its  officers  for  acts  done  in  good  faith  in  the 
exercise  of  their  office.^  So,  if  a  public  corporation  is  charged 
with  the  duty  of  repairing  highways,  and  is  made  liable  for  de- 
fects therein,  it  has  the  incidental  power  to  indemnify  an  officer 
who  digs  a  ditch  for  the  purpose  of  raising  a  legal  question  as  to 
the  bounds  of  the  highway .^ 

§  148.  (99)  So,  a  vote  by  a  town  to  refund  money  paid  by 
assessors  on  an  illegal  assessment  of  a  toivn  tax  made  by  them 
is  an  express  promise,  founded  upon  a  meritorious  and  legal  con- 
sideration, and  is  irrevocably  binding  upon  the  town.  And  this, 
"although,  without  such  vote,  the  town  could  not  have  been  com- 
pelled to  refund  or  indemnify  the  assessors.  But  such  a  vote,  by 
a  town,  would  be  without  consideration  in  respect  to  state  and 
county  taxes.3  So,  if  the  town  is  not  concerned,  having  nothing 
to  lose  or  gain  in  the  result  of  the  litigation,  a  vote  to  indemnify 
an  officer  would  be  in  excess  of  its  power,  and  void;^  but  it 
would  be  otherwise  if  the  suit  against  the  officer  was  in  respect 
to  matters  in  which  the  corporation  was  interested.^ 


1  lb.  Baker  v.  Windham,  13  Me. 
(1  Shep.)  74,  183G. 

-  Bancroft  v.  Lynnfielcl,  supra. 

3  Nelson  v.  Milford,  7  Pick.  18,  1828. 
A  separate  action,  on  such  a  vote,  lies 
against  tlie  town  in  favor  of  each  assessor 
for  his  share,  wiiich  does  not  include, 
however,  his  own  tax,  paid  by  him  vol- 
untarily,    lb. 

4  Vincent  v.  Nantucket,  12  Cush.  105, 
1853 ;  Gregory  v.  Bridgeport,  41  Conn. 
76,  1874.  "  A  promise  to  indemnify  a 
tax  collector  if  he  would  collect,  by  pre- 
tence of  his  official  authority,  a  tax  which 
he  knew  was  illegal,  would  be  an  agree- 
ment to  violate  the  law,  and  could  not  be 
enforced."  Pike  v.  Middleton,  12  N.  H. 
281,  per  Gilchrist,  J.  Selectmen,  under 
their  authority  "  to  order  and  manage  all 
of  the  prudential  affairs  of  the  town," 
may  bind  the  town  thus  to  indemnify  its 
officers.  12  N.  H.  281,  supra;  ante,  sec. 
30,  and  notes. 

5  Briggs  V.  Whipple,  6  Vt.  95,  1834. 
A  by-law  declaring  that  the  officers  of 
the  corporation  shall  be  indemnified  for 
all  lawful  acts  done  in  an  official  capacity 
is  not  illegal.  Irwin  v.  Mariposa,  22  Up- 
per Can.  C.  P.  367. 

An  indemnity  to  an  officer  for  lawful 


acts  gives  him  no  claim  for  compensation 
against  the  consequences  of  unlawful  acts. 
Irwin  V.  Mariposa,  22  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  3G7. 
By-law  to  indemnify  a  councillor  for  the 
costs  of  a  contested  election  would  be  ille- 
gal. Bell  and  Manvers,  in  re.  2  Upper  Can. 
C.  P.  507,  3  lb.  400.  In  England  an  agree- 
ment by  a  corporation  with  one  of  its  offi- 
cers foran  increase  of  the  salary  of  an  office 
retained  by  him  as  compensation  for  the 
loss  of  an  office  of  whicli  he  was  deprived, 
is  not  binding  unless  under  the  seal  of  the 
corporation.  The  Queen  v.  Stamford,  6  Q. 
B.  403 ;  see  also  Cope  v.  Thames,  etc., 
Dock  and  Railroad  Co.,  3  Ex.  841.  So 
the  appointment  of  a  corporation  solicitor 
should  be  regularly  imder  the  corporation 
seal.  Arnold  v.  Poole,  4  M.  &  G.  860.  A 
town  clerk,  if  a  solicitor,  may  have  a  lien 
on  papers  of  the  corporation,  with  respect 
to  wliich  he  has  done  work  as  an  attorney 
or  solicitor.  The  King  v.  Sankey,  5  A. 
&  E.  423.     But  qimre  in  this  country. 

Where  persons  entrusted  with  the 
administration  of  a  fund  have  incurred 
legitimate  and  proper  expenses  thrown 
upon  them  by  their  fiduciary  situation 
they  have  a  right  to  reimburse  them- 
selves out  of  the  funds.  See  The  King  v. 
The  Inhabitants  of  Essex,  4  T.  R.  591 ; 


176  Municipal  coRroiiATiONS.  [cu.  vi. 

Furnishing  Entertainments. 

§  149.  (100)  Without  express  power,  a  public  corporation 
cannot  make  a  contract  to  provide  for  celebrating  the  Fourth  of 
July.,  or  to  provide  an  entertainment  for  its  citizens  or  guests. 
Such  contracts  are  void,  and,  although  the  plaintiff  complies  there- 
with on  his  part,  he  cannot  recover  of  the  corporation.^ 

Impounding  Animals. 

§  150.  (101)  Power  to  impound  and  forfeit  domestic  animals 
must  be  expressly  granted  to  the  corporation,  and  laws  or  ordi- 
nances authorizing  the  officers  of  the  corporation  to  impound, 
and  upon  taking  specified  proceedings,  to  sell  the  property,  are 
penal  in  their  nature,  and  where  doubtful  in  their  meaning  will 
not  be  construed  to  produce  a  forfeiture  of  the  property,  but 
rather  the  reverse.  The  pound-keeper  cannot  justify  in  an  action 
brought  against  him  by  the  property  owner  unless  he  has  strictly 
complied  with  all  the  requirements  of  the  law  under  which  he 
acts.  Thus,  if  he  sells  without  giving  the  requisite  notice,  or  for 
the  full  length  of  time  required,  he  is  liable,  although  the  owner 
sustains  no  actual  injury  from  the  omission,  or  the  owner  may 

The  King  v.  Tlie  Commissioners  of  Sew-  a  statutory  declaration  of  this  common 
ers  for  the  Tower  Hamlets,  1  B.  &  Ad.  law  principle.  1  Rev.  Sts.  599,  sees.  1-3. 
232 ;  Attorney-General  v.  Mayor  of  Nor-  "  Until  the  case  of  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2 
wich,  2  M.  &  C.  406;  Regina  v.  The  Denio,  110,  nothing,"  says  Pratt,  J.,  3 
Mayor  and  Town  Council  of  Sheffield,  L.  Comst.  433,  "  was  more  frequent  than  for 
R.  G  Q.  B.  652.  An  attempted  appropri-  city  authorities  to  vote  largesses  and  give 
ation  contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  trust  splendid  banquets  for  objects  and  pur- 
may  be  restrained.  Attorney-General  v.  poses  having  no  possible  connection  with 
Aspinali,  2  ]M.  &  C.  613;  Harrison's  Mu-  the  growth  or  weal  of  the  body  politic, 
nicipal  ^lanual,  4th  ed  ;  /w.s/,  ch.  xxii.  thus  subjecting  their  constituents  to  un- 
1  Hodges  V.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.),  necessary  and  oppressive  taxation."  Un- 
110,  1846.  Same  principle.  Cornell  v.  der  a  clause  in  a  charter  providing  that 
Guilford,  1  Denio,  510;  Hood  i'.  Lynn,  1  "nothing  in  this  charter  shall  be  con- 
Allen  (Mass.),  103,  1861 ;  Gerry  v.  Stone-  strued  ....  as  giving  the  power  to 
man,  lb.  319 ;  Hale  i\  People,  87  111.  72.  vote  money  for  any  ordinary  object  ex- 
Nor  to  celebrate  surrender  of  Cornwallis.  cept  for  the  regular,  ordinary,  and  usual 
Tash  r.  Adams,  10  Cush.  252, 1852.  Nor  expenses  of  the  city,"  the  city  council 
can  towns  in  Massachusetts  vote  money  of  Newport  gave  a  ball  and  banquet ;  ccr- 
ioT  ihe  purchase  of  uniforms  for  an  artillery  tain  taxpayers  obtained  a  temporary  iii- 
company.  Claflin  v.  Hopkinton,  4  Gray,  jimction  restraining  the  treasurer  from 
502,  1855.  "Corporations,"  says  Jewett,  paying  the  bills,  which,  upon  final  hear- 
J.,  in  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio,  110,  ing,  was  sustained  and  made  perpetual. 
"  have  no  other  powers  than  sucli  as  are  Austin  v.  Coggeshall,  12  Rho.  Is.  329;  s. 
expressly  granted,  or  such  as  are  neces-  p.  Greenough  v.  Wakefield,  127  Mass. 
sary  to  carry  into  effect  the  powers  ex-  275 ;  ante,  sec.  89 ;  j)ost,  ch.  xxii.  sec.  916. 
pressly  granted."    In  New  York  there  is 


§  151.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


177 


treat  the  sale  as  void  and  recover  his  property.^  A  statute  direct- 
ing the  mayor  to  issue  a  warrant  annually,  within  ten  days  from 
July  1,  commanding  police  officers  to  '•  kill  all  dogs  not  licensed 
according  to  law,  whenever  and  wherever  found,"  is  not  in  con- 
flict with  the  constitution  of  Massachusetts.^ 

Party  WalU. 
§  151.    (102)    Power   in   a   charter   to    pass   ordinances   "  to 
authorize  the  erection  of  party  walls  and  fences,  and  to  regulate 

1  White  V.  Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
67,  1856  ;  Willis  v.  Legris,  45  111.  289;  Ih. 
218;  Rounds  v.  Stetson,  45  Me.  596, 
1858 ;  Gilmore  v.  Holt,  4  Pick.  258,  1826  ; 
Rounds  V.  Mansfield,  38  Me.  586,  1854; 
Smith  V.  Gates,  21  Pick.  55,  where  the 
rule  in  the  text  was  applied,  although  the 
sale  was  made  only  twenty  minutes  be- 
fore the  expiration  of  the  time  required 
\>y  law.  So  actual  knowledge,  by  the 
owner  of  the  beasts,  of  the  impounding 
thereof,  is  not  equivalent  to  the  loritten 
notice  required  by  the  statute.  Coffin  v. 
Field,  7  Gush.  355.  Abridgment  of  the 
required  notice  for  the  shortest  period 
avoids  the  sale ;  and  so  does  a  sale,  at  one 
bidding,  of  two  animals  having  different 
owners.  Clark  v.  Lewis,  35  111.  417, 1864. 
Purchaser  must  sliow  a  regular  and  au- 
thorized sale  when  his  title  is  questioned 
by  the  former  owner,  lb.  Breach  of  a 
pound,  and  liberating  an  animal  therein 
confined,  is  no  violation  of  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  "  any  person  from  opposing 
or  interrupting  any  city  officer  in  the  ex- 
ecution of  tlie  ordinances  of  the  city." 
Mayor,  etc.  r.  Omburg,  22  Ga.  67,  1857. 
Marshal  must  strictly  comply  with  the 
ordinance,  or  he  becomes  a  trespasser 
from  the  beginning.  13  Pick.  384 ;  4  lb. 
258;  21  Ih.bf,;  13  Met.  407;  7Cush.  355; 
9  Pick.  14;  12  Met.  118;  23  Pick.  255; 
12  Met.  198.  Owner  cannot  legally  break 
pound  and  rescue  animals.  5  Pick.  514; 
6  Cush.  207.  I'ound  defined.  2  Gush. 
305.  Marshal  cannot  delegate  his  au- 
thority to  others  to  impound  for  him  gen- 
erally, and  in  his  absence,  but  may  have 
assistants  to  act  in  concert  with  him. 
Jackson  v.  Morris,  1  Denio,  199.  See 
Friday  t;.  Floyd,  03  111.  50,  1872.  Offi- 
cers must  use  the  public  pound.  1  Rho. 
Is.  219.  Replevin  does  not  lie  against 
a  pound-keeper,  at  common  law,  while 
the  creatures  are  in  his  legal  custody. 

VOL.  I.  12 


Co.  Litt.  47  B. ;  lb.  145  B. ;  1  Chit.  PI. 
159 ;  Pritchard  v.  Stevens,  6  Durn.  &  E. 
522;  Isley  v.  Stubbs,  5  Mass.  283  ;  Smith 
V.  Huntington,  3  N.  H.  70  ;  but  it  does  lie 
if  he  voluntarily  parts  with  his  legal  con- 
trol over  them,  or  if  he  impounds  them 
in  any  other  places  than  those  prescribed 
by  the  law,  as,  for  example,  in  his  pasture 
or  barn,  although  this  be  done  the  more 
conveniently  to  furnish  them  with  food 
and  drink.  Bills  v.  Kinson,  1  Foster  (N. 
H.),  448,  1850.  In  Netv  Hampshire  if 
creatures  are  found  "  doing  damage," 
they  may  be  impounded,  and  appraisers 
are  to  ascertain  "  whether  any  damage 
was  done."  Held  that  the  statute  contem- 
plated actual,  and  not  merely  nominal 
damages,  to  justify  impounding.  Osgood 
V.  Green,  33  N.  H.  318,  and  cases  cited. 
As  to  power  to  take  up  and  forfeit  ani- 
mals at  large,  see  also  chapter  on  Ordi- 
nances, ])ost ;  infra,  sec.  348. 

2  Blair  r.  Forehand,  100  Mass.  136. 
The  act  of  July  3,  1863,  entitled  "  An  Act 
in  Relation  to  Damages  occasioned  by 
Dogs,"  so  far  as  it  undertakes  to  charge  the 
owner  with  the  amount  of  damage  done 
by  his  dog,  as  fixed  by  the  selectmen  of 
the  town,  without  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard,  is  unconstitutional ;  because  it  is 
contrarj'  to  natural  justice  and  not  within 
the  scope  of  legislative  authority  con- 
ferred by  the  constitution  on  the  general 
court,  and  also  because  it  is  in  violation 
of  the  provision  of  the  bill  of  rights  which 
secures  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  in  all 
controversies  concerning  property,  ex- 
cept in  cases  where  it  had  not  theretofore 
been  used  and  practised.  East  Kingston 
V.  Towle,  48  N.  H.  57.  The  legislature 
have  power  to  make  towns  liable  for 
damage  done  within  their  limits  by  dogs, 
and  to  give  towns  a  right  of  action  to  re- 
cover the  actual  damage  from  the  owners 
of  the  dogs.    lb. 


178 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VL 


them,"  includes  the  power  to  authorize  their  erection  upon  the 
application  of  either  owner,  and  without  the  consent  of  the  other  ; 
and  such  an  ordinance  is  not  unconstitutional  because  compen- 
sation is  not  provided  for  the  land  occupied  by  the  wall.^ 

Public  Defence. 
§  152.  (103)  During  the  late  Rebellion,  acts  were  passed  by 
many  of  the  legislatures  of  the  adhering  states  in  effect  authoriz- 
ing municipalities  to  raise  money,  by  loans  and  taxation,  to  pay 
bounties  to  volunteers,  to  enable  the  municipality  to  fill  its  quota 
under  tlie  calls  of  the  President  for  troops,  and  thereby  avoid  an 
anticipated  draft.  The  constitutional  principles  involved  in  legis- 
lation of  this  character  will  be  found  learnedly  discussed  in  the 
cases  below  cited,  which  fully  establish  the  validity  of  such  legis- 
lation.2  But,  witliout  express  authority,  a  municipality  possesses 
no  such  power  ;  ^  yet,  if  exercised,  it  may  be  validated  by  subse- 
quent legislative  action.* 


1  Hunt  V.  Ambru8ter,  17  N.  J.  Eq. 
(2  C.E.Green),  208, 1865. 

Regulations  as  to  party-walls  must  be 
strictly  followed.  If  a  person,  under  color 
of  such  regulations,  does  injury  to  his 
neighbor,  he  is  liable  to  be  sued.  Pratt 
V.  Hillman,  4  B.  &  C.  269  ;  see  also  The 
Queen  v.  Ponsford,  1  D.  &  L.  116.  No 
man  has  a  right  to  presume  that  his 
neiglibor  will  hereafter  build  a  house  ad- 
joining to  his,  and  erect  half  of  his  out- 
side wall  on  his  neighbor's  ground  in 
consequence  of  such  presumption.  Bar- 
low I'.  Norman,  2  W.  Bl.  959.  An  exter- 
nal wall  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  party- 
wall.  Sims  V.  Estate  Company,  14  L.  T. 
N.  S.  55.  A  party-wall  is  a  wall  which 
belongs  to  two  persons  as  part  owners,  or 
divides  two  buildings  one  from  another. 
Weston  V.  Arnold,  L.  R.  8.  Ch.  Ap.  1084. 
The  English  Stat.,  14  Geo.  Ill.ch.  Ixxviii, 
was  held  not  to  make  party-walls  common 
property.  Matts  v.  Hawkins,  5  Taunt.  20. 
If  one  proprietor  added  to  the  height  of 
such  a  party-wall,  and  the  other  pulled 
down  the  addition,  the  first  might  main- 
tain trespass  for  pulling  down  so  nmch  of 
it  as  stood  on  the  half  of  the  wall  which 
was  erected  on  his  own  soil.  lb.  The 
property  in  a  wall,  though  erected  at  joint 
expense,  follows  the  property  of  the  land 
whereon  it  stands.    lb.     Power  to  pass 


ordinances  "  to  authorize  the  erection  of 
party-walls,  etc.,  and  to  regulate  them," 
has  been  held  to  include  the  power  to 
authorize  their  erection  \ipon  the  appli- 
cation of  either  owner,  and  without  the 
consent  of  the  other.  Hunt  v.  Ambrus- 
ter,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  208;  Harrison's  Muni- 
cipal Manual,  4th  ed.  Further  as  to 
party-walls :  McAdam  on  Landlord  & 
Ten.  145-160. 

-  Speer  v.  School  Directors,  50  Pa.  St. 
150,  two  judges  dissenting.  See  Hilbish 
I'.  Catherman,  64  Pa.  St.  154,  1870,  where 
the  prior  cases  in  that  state  are  commented 
on  by  Agnew,  J.  State  v.  Richland  Town- 
ship, 20"Ohio  St.  362;  Thompsons.  Pitt- 
son,  59  Me.  545 ;  Broadhead  v.  Milwaukee, 
19  Wis.  652 ;  State  v.  Tappan,  29  Wis. 
664;  8.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  622;  Sperry  v. 
Horr,  32  Iowa,  184 ;  Booth  ?;. Woodbury,  32 
Conn.  118;  Sliackford  v.  Newington,  46  N. 
H.415;  Lowcllv.  0Hver,8  Allen  (Mass.), 
247 ;  Freeland  v.  Hastings,  10  Allen, 
570;  Comer  v.  Folsom,  13  Minn.  219; 
Cooley  Const.  Lim.  219-229  ;  Veazie  v. 
Ciiina,  50  Me.  518 ;  Clark  Co.  v.  Law- 
rence, 63   111.  82  ;  lb.  40. 

3  Stetson  V.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272; 
Fiske  V.  Hazzard,  7  Rho.  Is.  438  ;  Shack- 
ford  V.  Newington,  aupra  ;  ante,  sec.  30. 

«  Booth  V.  Woodbury,  32  Conn.  118 ; 
Kunkle  v.  Franklin,  13  Minn.  127  ;  Comer 


§  153.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS. 


179 


Aid  to  Railroad  Companies. 

§  153.  (104)  The  most  noted  of  extraordinary  powers  con- 
ferred upon  municipal  and  public  corporations  is  the  authority  to 
aid  in  the  construction  of  railways  by  subscribing  to  their  stock, 
issuing  negotiable  bonds  as  a  means  of  paying  their  subscription, 
and  taxing  the  inhabitants  or  the  property  within  their  limits  to 
pay  the  indebtedness  thereby  incurred.  Legislation  of  this  kind 
had  its  origin  within  a  period  comparatively  recent,  and  has  been 
more  or  less  resorted  to,  at  times,  by  almost  every  state  in  the 
Union.  As  it  is  an  author's  duty,  in  a  work  of  this  character,  to 
state  what  the  law  is,  rather  than  what,  in  his  judgment,  it 
ought  to  be,  he  feels  constrained  to  admit  that  a  long  and  almost 
unbroken  line  of  judicial  decisions  in  the  courts  of  most  of  the 
states  has  established  the  principle  that,  in  the  absence  of  special 
restrictive  constitutional  provisions,  it  is  competent  for  the 
legislature  to  authorize  a  municipal  or  public  corporation  to  aid, 
in  the  manner  above  indicated,  the  construction  of  railways  run- 
ning near,  or  to,  or  through  them.  The  cases  on  this  subject  are 
referred  to  in  the  note  ;  ^  but,  notwithstanding  the  opinion  of  so 


r.  Folsom,  13  Minn.  219  ;  Hilbish  v.  Cath- 
erman,  64  Pa.  St.  154,  1870;  State  v. 
Kichland  Township,  20  Ohio  St.  362, 
1870  ;  ante,  sec.  79. 

1  Goddin  v.  Crump  (act  authorizing 
tlie  city  of  Richmond  to  subscribe  stock 
in  a  company  incorporated  to  improve 
tiie  navigation  of  the  James  River,  and  to 
buiUl  a  road  to  the  falls  of  the  Kanawha 
River).  8  Leigh  (Ya  ),  120,  1837.  This 
is  the  earliest  case  of  the  class.  Bridge- 
port V.  Railroad  Co.,  15  Conn.  475,  184.3; 
Society,  etc.  i'.  New  London,  29  Conn. 
174  ;  Douglass  v.  Chatham,  41  Conn.  211, 
1874;  Nichol  v.  Nashville,  9  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  252,  1848;  Powers  v.  Superior 
Court,  23  Ga.  65,  1857 ;  Talbot  v.  Dent, 
9  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  526,  1849  ;  Slack  i'.  Rail- 
road Co.,  13  lb.  1,  18.52;  Maddox  v.  Gra- 
ham, 2  Met.  (Ky.)  56;  Commonwealth 
f.Mc Williams,  11  Pa.  St.  61,1849;  Sharp- 
less  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  21  Ih.  147;  lb.  188; 
Commonwealth  v.  Perkins,  43  Pa.  St. 
410;  47  Ih.  189;  Cotton  v.  County 
Commrs.,  6  Flor.  010,  1856  ;  Railroad  Co. 
V.  Commrs.,  1  Ohio  St.  77,  1852;  Cass  v. 
Dillon,  2  lb.  607,  1853 ;  Ohio  v.  Commrs., 
etc.,  6  /*  280 ;  7  lb.  327  ;  8  lb.  394  ;  12  lb. 


596,  624  ;  14  Ih.  569 ;  Strickland  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  27  Miss.  209  ;  City  v.  Alexander, 
23  Mo.  483,  1856  ;  .39  lb.  485;  Leaven- 
worth County  V.  Jliller,  Supreme  Court 
of  Kansas,  1871,7  Kan.  479;  s.  c.  12 
Am.  Rep.  425.  The  opinion  of  Valentine,, 
J.,  covers  the  whole  groimd  of  contro- 
versy. Kingman,  C.  J.,  concurred,  and 
Brewer,  J.,  dissented.  Clarke  r.  Roches- 
ter, 24  Barb.  446, 1857  ;  Bank  of  Rome  v. 
Rome,  18  N.  Y.  38,  1858  ;  Starin  v.  Genoa, 
23  N.  Y.  439, 1861 ;  People  r.  Mitchell, 
35  N.  Y.  551,  1866  ;  Police  Jury  v.  Suc- 
cession of  McDonough,  8  La.  An.  341 ; 
Aurora  v.  West,  9  Ind.  74,  1857 ;  22  Ih. 
88 ;  Mt.  Vernon  v.  Hovey,  52  Ind.  568, 
1876;  Kobinson  t-.  Bidwell,  22  Cal.  379; 
Stein  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  24  Ala.  591,  1854; 
Gibbons  v.  Railroad  Co.,  36  Ala.  410; 
Prettyman  r.  Supervisors,  19  111.  406, 
1858;  s.  p.  24  lb.  75,  208  ;  Butler  v.  Dun- 
ham, 27  111.  474,  1861  ;  Robertson  v.  Rock- 
ford,  21  111.  451 ;  Chicago,  etc.  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Smith  (donation  to  Railroad  Co.), 
62  111.  268, 1871  ;  s.  c.  14  Am.  Rep.  99  ;  Sib- 
ley V.  Mobile,  3  Woods  C.  C.  535 ;  and 
see  also  as  to  authority  to  precinct  to  levy 
tax  to  maintain  a  bridge,  Shaw  v.  Dennis, 


180 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


many  learned  and  eminent  judges,  there  remain  serious  doubts 
as  to  the  soundness  of  the  princii^le,  viewed  simply  as  one  of 


5  Gilm.  (111.)  405;  San  Antonio  v.  Jones, 
28    Tex.    19;    Copes  i'.    Charleston,    10 
Rich   (S.   C.)  491,   1857;  Augusta  Bank 
r.   Augusta,  49  Me.    507 ;  Clark  v.  City, 
etc.,  10  Wis.  136 ;  lb.  195,  1859  (compare 
Whiting  r.   Sheboygan   Railroad  Co.,  in- 
fra).    The  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin, 
in  an  opinion  delivered  in  Phillips  v.  Al- 
bany, 28  Wis.  340,   1871,  say  the  power 
of  tlie  legislature  to  authorize  municipal 
subscriptions  to  the  stock  of  railroads  is 
settled  by  former  decisions  in  this  state, 
as  well  as  in  other  states,  though  the  ma- 
jority of  this  court  would  be  disposed  to 
deny  the  power,  if  it  were  a  new  ques- 
tion,    s.  p.  Rogan  v.  Watertown,  80  Wis. 
259,   1872;  Lawson   v.   Railway  Co.,  30 
Wis.  597  ;  U.  S.  v.  New  Orleans,  2  Wood, 
C.  C.  230.     The    Supremo    Court  of  the 
United  States  have  decided  that  the  power 
may   be    conferred    by    the    legislature. 
i?)/ra,  sec.  158;  Thompson  i;.  Lee  County, 
3  W^all.  327  ;  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 
21  How.   (U.  S.)  539,  547,  1858;  Zabris- 
kie  V.  Railroad  Co.,  23  lb.  381 ;  Amey  v. 
Mayor,  24  lb.  365,  376;  Gelpecke  v.  Du- 
buque, 1  Wall.  175, 1863  ;  Mercer  County 
r.   Hacket,   lb.  81  ;  Meyer  v.  Muscatine, 
lb.  384  ;  Caldwell  v.  Justices,  4  Jones  (N. 
C.)  Eq.  323;  Taylor  v.  Newberne,  2  lb. 
141,  1854;  s.  p.  Hill  u.  Forsythe  Co.,  67 
N.  C.  367,  1870.     In  lou-a  the  constitu- 
tionality of  railroad  subscriptions  by  mu- 
nicipalities was  first  (18.53)  affirmed  in  Du- 
buque County  r.  Railroad  Co.,  4  G.  Greene 
(Iowa),    1;     afterwards    (1862)    denied, 
State  V.  Wapello  County,  13  Iowa,  888 ; 
denial  adhered  to  down  to  1869,  Hanson 
V.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28  ;  but  note  the  vir- 
tual, yet  not  acknowledged   overthrow  of 
the  line  of  decisions  denying  the  power, 
in  Stewart   v.  Polk  County,  30  Iowa,  1, 
1870;  Renwick  v.  Davenport,  etc.  Rail- 
way Co.,  47  Iowa,  511.     The  legislative 
and  judicial  liistory  of  the  subject  is  fully 
stated  in  King  v.  Wilson,  1  Dillon's  C.  C. 
E.  5.5-5,  1871.    By  the  constitution  of  Ten- 
nessee, the  legislature  has  power  to  au- 
tliorize  counties  and  incorporated  towns 
to  impose  taxes  for  "  county  and  corpo- 
ration purposes."     In  Nichol  v.  Mayor, 
etc.  of  Nashville,  9  Humph.  252,  1848,  it 
was  held,  notwithstanding  this  provision, 


that  the  legislature  possessed  the  power 
to  authorize  municij)al  corporations  to 
subscribe  for  the  stock  of  railway  com- 
panies whose  roads  run  to  or  near  sucli 
corporations,  and  that  this  u-as  a  layitiwate 
corporate  purpose.  So  in  Florida,  held  to 
be  a  "  county  purpose,"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  constitution  ;  but  gwn-e  ?  There 
is  nothing  in  the  constitution  of  Alahuma 
prohibiting  the  legislature  from  authoriz- 
ing a  municipal  corporation  to  levy  a  tax 
on  the  real  estate  within  the  corporation 
to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad, 
even  though  the  road  extends  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  corporation,  or  even  of 
the  state.  So  held  in  Stein  v.  Mobile,  24 
Ala.  591,  1854.  An  act  authorizing  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  to  borrow  money  to 
aid  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad,  upon 
the  written  assent  of  two  thirds  of  the 
resident  tax-payers,  or  iipon  the  approval 
of  two  thirds  of  the  tax-paying  electors, 
is  constitutional  and  valid  ;  and  it  is  not 
open  to  the  objection  that  it  submits  a 
legislative  question  to  the  town.  Starin 
V.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  439,  1861 ;  Gould  v. 
Sterling,  lb.  439,  456 ;  Bank  of  Rome  v. 
Rome,  18  N.  Y.  38 ;  People  v.  Mead,  24 
N.  Y.  124  ;  Horton  v.  Thompson,  71  N. 
Y.  513 ;  affirmed  in  Town  of  Scipio  v. 
Wright,  101  U.  S.  665 ;  s.  c.  21  Alb.  L. 
Jour.  476.  These  cases  distinguished  on 
this  point  from  Barto  v.  Himrod,  4  Seld. 
(8  N.  Y.)  48.3.     Ante,  sec.  44. 

Since  the  first  edition  of  this  work  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota  has  affirmed 
the  validity  of  compulsorj'  aid  to  railways, 
and  that  it  is  wholly  for  the  legislature  to 
determine  whether  the  aid  shall  be  by 
subscribing  to  the  stock  and  issuing  bonds 
in  payment,  or  by  a  donation  of  money  or 
bonds  to  secure  their  construction,  the 
court  in  either  case  regarding  the  vse  to 
be  a  public  use  for  which  taxation  may  be 
authorized.  Davidson  v.  Ramsey  County, 
18  Minn.  482,  1872.  And  the  validity  of 
such  legislation  has  also  been  affirmed  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska.  Crounse 
and  Lake,  JJ.,  concurring,  and  Mason,  C. 
J.,  dissenting.  The  opinion  of  Crounse, 
J.,  reviews  the  principal  cases.  Hallen- 
beck  V.  Hahn,  2  Neb.  377 ;  and  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  California,  Stockton, 


§  156.]  MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS.  181 

constitutional  law.  Regarded  in  the  light  of  its  effects,  how- 
ever, there  is  little  hesitation  in  affirming  that  this  invention  to 
aid  the  enterprises  of  private  corporations  has  proved  itself  bane- 
ful in  the  last  degrq^e. 

§  154.  It  is  estimated  that  the  municipal  indebtedness  in  this 
country  has  already  reached  the  enormous  sum  of  $1,000,000,000, 
and  it  is  constantly  increasing.  A  large  portion  of  this  indebt- 
edness is  evidenced  by  negotiable  bonds,  which  are  held  by  thou- 
sands of  persons,  at  home  and  abroad,  as  an  investment.  These 
bonds  have  been  issued  for  a  great  variety  of  purposes,  such  as 
the  erecting  of  public  buildings,  the  making  of  municipal  im- 
provements, and  in  payment  of  subscriptions  for  the  stock  of 
railway  corporations,  or  as  donations  to  aid  them  in  the  construc- 
tion of  their  roads  located  in  or  near  the  municipality  or  public 
corporation  thus  extending  its  assistance.^ 

§  155.  The  power  conferred  upon  municipal  and  public  cor- 
porations to  issue  commercial  securities  for  such  purposes  is  of 
comparatively  recent  origin,  and  it  has  undeniably  been  at- 
tended with  very  serious,  and  it  is  perhaps  not  too  strong  a 
statement  to  add,  disastrous,  consequences.  One  of  these  is  the 
stimulus  which  the  long  credit  commonly  provided  for  effectually 
supplies  to  over-indebtedness.  The  bonds  usually  fix  a  time, 
twenty  or  thirty  years  distant,  for  payment  of  the  principal. 
Those  who  vote  the  debt,  and  the  councils  or  bodies  which 
create  it  and  issue  the  bonds,  do  so  without  much  hesitation,  as 
the  burden  is  expected  to  fall  principally  on  posterity.  A  learned 
justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  very  fitly 
described  the  effect  witnessed  as  a  mania  for  running  in  debt  for 
public  improvements.^  It  has  elsewhere  been  characterized  as 
an  "  epidemic  insanity  "  inducing  extravagant  corporate  subscrip- 
tions to  public  works. 

§  156.  In  many  parts  of  the  country,  and  particularly  in  the 
West,  this  mania  has  become  general  in  cities,  counties,  townships, 

etc.    Railroad   Co.  v.   City  of  Stockton,  Text  approved.    Jacksonport  v.  Watson, 

41  Cal.  147,  1871 ;  and  in  Alabama,  Opel-  33  Ark.  704. 

ika  V.  Daniel,  50  Ala.  211  ;  Selma  &  Gulf  ^  As  to  coupon   bonds,  see  Daniel  on 

Railroad  in  re,  45  Ala.  596,  1871 ;    and  in  Neg.  Instr.  sec.  1480,  e<  seg^.    Pos<,  chapter 

Kentucky,  Allison  v.  V.  L.  H.  C.  &  W.  on  Contracts. 

Railway   Co.,   10  Bush   (Ky.),   1,   1873.  2  Mr.  Justice  Davis. 


182  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

and  school-districts,  and  large  and  burdensome  debts  have  been 
thoughtlessly  created.  The  author  has  known  new  counties,  in 
a  western  state,  not  containing  over  10,000  inhabitants,  vote,  for 
a  single  railway,  bonds  to  the  amount  of  $300,000,  drawing  ten 
per  cent  interest,  payable  annually  ;  and  instances  are  not  infre- 
quent where  bonds  have  been  issued  greater  than  the  assessed 
value  of  all  the  taxable  property  at  the  time  within  the  municipal 
or  territorial  subdivision.  No  check  against  the  incuniiig  of  over- 
indebtedness  is  so  effectual  as  the  one  that  you  must  pay  as  you 
go  ;  but  this  is  wholly  disregarded  in  the  legislation  which  author- 
izes bonds  payable  at  a  remote  period.  Another  serious  conse- 
quence of  this  policy  is  that  even  the  interest  on  these  bonds  often 
proves  to  be  a  heavy  burden  upon  the  community,  and  in  many 
instances  the  bonds  have  been  issued  fraudulently  by  the  public 
or  municipal  officers,  and  no  consideration,  or  none  of  value,  has 
been  in  fact  received  therefor.  They  may,  indeed,  have  the 
stock  of  the  railway  company  ;  but  in  most  cases,  under  the  pre- 
vailing mode  of  constructing  railwaj's,  the  stock  is  utterly  value- 
less. When  the  sting  of  taxation  is  felt,  and  when  the  tax-paj^er 
knows  that  the  bonds  were  fraudulently  issued,  and  even  when 
he  feels  that  they  were  improvidently  given,  experience  shows 
that  repudiation,  or  attempted  repudiation,  is  the  next  stage, 
involving  a  forfeiture  of  the  public  faith  pledged  for  their  pay- 
ment. Occasionally  it  has  been  witnessed  that  the  state^  in  all  its 
departments,  has  actively  sympathized  with  the  repudiating 
municipality,  and  the  public  faith  has  been  redeemed  only 
through  the  coercion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 
In  a  few  instances,  indeed,  the  states  have  set  the  example  of 
repudiating  their  own  obligations  issued  in  aid  of  railways ;  and 
it  was  only  last  winter,  in  a  case  of  this  kind,  that  the  Su- 
preme Court  at  Washington  felt  itself  bound  to  declare  "that 
the  faith  of  the  state,  [of  Minnesota]  solemnly  pledged,  has  not 
been  kept ;  and  were  she  amenable  to  the  tribunals  of  the  country, 
as  private  individuals  are,  no  court  of  justice  would  withhold  its 
judgment  against  her."  Examples  of  this  kind  are  demoralizing, 
and  cannot  safely  become  general  or  frequent. 

§  157.  (105)  It  is  not  proposed  here  to  enter  into  a  discussion 
of  the  constitutional  principles  involved  in  such  legislation.  The 
arguments  in  favor  of  the   power  are  fully  presented  in  the 


§  157.] 


MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS. 


183 


leading  case  of  Sharpless  v.  The  Maj^or,'  and  against  it  in  Han- 
son V.  Vernon,2  f^  Whiting  v.  Sheboygan  Railway  Company  ,3  and 
in  the  People  v.  Township  Board  of  Salem,^  to  which,  and  to 


i  Sharpless  v.  Mayor,  21  Pa.  St.  147. 
See,  also,  Am.  Law  Rev.  Oct.  1870 ;  infra, 
sec.  158. 

2  Hanson  v.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28, 1869. 

3  Whiting  V.  Sheboygan  Railway  Co., 
25  Wis.  167,  1870.  9  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N. 
S.)  156  ;  s.  c.  25  Wis.,  opinion  hy  Dixon, 
C.  J. ;  Rogan  v.  Watertown,  30  Wis.  259, 
1872. 

*  People  V.  Township  Board  of  Salem, 
9  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  487,  and  notes, 
1870 ;  8.  c.  20  Mich.  452.  "  Bonds  like 
these  are  of  modern  invention,  and  when 
counties  and  towns  were  decoyed  into 
the  use  of  them  for  the  purpose  of  rail- 
road corporations,  they  had  to  obtain  en- 
abling statutes  before  they  could  prosti- 
tute municipal  seals  to  any  such  purpose. 
And  as  soon  as  the  people  [of  Pennsylva- 
nia] began  to  feel  the  consequences  of  ap- 
plying the  fundamental  principle  of  com- 
mercial paper  to  their  bonds,  they  altered 
their  organic  law  so  as  to  render  such 
bonds  and  enabling  statutes  impossibili- 
ties in  the  future."  Per  Woodward,  C.  J. 
County  V.  Brinton,  47  Pa.  St.  367,  1864. 
The  evil  of  these  subscriptions  was  the 
cause  of  the  amendment  to  the  constitu- 
tion. Per  Bead,  J.,  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road Co.  V.  Philadelphia,  lb.  193.  The 
amended  constitutional  provision  in  Penn- 
sylvania is  as  follows  :  "  The  legislature 
shall  not  authorize  any  county,  city,  bor- 
ough, township,  or  incorporated  district, 
by  virtue  of  a  vote  of  its  citizens,  or  other- 
wise, to  become  a  stockholder  in  any  com- 
pany, association,  or  corporation,  or  obtain 
money  for,  or  loan  its  credit  to,  any  corpo- 
ration, association,  institution,  or  party." 
Sec.  7,  art.  xi..  Amendment  to  Constitu- 
tion, 1857.  See  Pennsylvania  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Philadelphia,  47  Pa.  St.  189,  for 
construction  of  this  amendment. 

The  Ohio  constitution  (art.  viii.  sec.  6) 
provides  that  "  the  General  Assembly 
shall  never  authorize  any  county,  city, 
town,  or  township,  by  vote  of  its  citizens 
or  otherwise,  to  become  a  stockholder  in 
any  joint  stock  company,  corporation,  or 
association  whatever;  or  to  raise  money 
or  loan  its  credit  to,  or  in  aid  of,  any  such 


company,  corporation,  or  association ;  and 
this  was  held  not  to  prohibit  the  legisla- 
ture from  authorizing  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration to  engage  in  building  a  railroad 
mainly  outside  of  the  state  on  its  own 
account.  Walker  v.  Cincinnati,  21  Ohio 
St.  14,  1871  ;  s.  c.  11  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N. 
S.)  346,  and  note  of  Judge  Redjield ;  s.  c. 
8  Am.  Rep.  24.  Considering  the  evil 
which  this  provision  of  the  constitution 
was  aimed  at,  it  seems  difficult  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  this  construction  thwarts 
the  intention  and  purpose  for  which  the 
provision  was  designed  and  adopted. 

This  case  illustrates  the  dangerous  na- 
ture of  the  invention  of  bringing  the  taxing 
power  to  aid  in  the  building  of  railway 
lines,  and  particularly  does  it  subvert  all 
previous  notions  of  the  appropriate  powers, 
functions,  and  duties  of  municipalities. 
Here  a  single  city,  in  the  face  of  the  con- 
stitution, was  authorized  to  borrow  §10,- 
000,000,  and  issue  its  bonds  in  payment, 
to  be  appropriated  to  the  construction  of 
a  long  railroad  line  by  itself  and  for  itself, 
lying  chiefly  in  other  states ;  and  yet  the 
validity  of  the  act  giving  the  authority 
was  sustained.  In  May,  1873,  the  same 
constitutional  provision  was  before  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  and  the  act 
of  1872,  mentioned  below,  was  held  to  be 
in  conflict  with  it,  since  the  legislature 
could  not  do  indirectly  what  it  was  pro- 
hibited from  doing  directly.  The  court 
held:  1.  Taxation  can  only  be  .authorized 
for  public  purposes.  Wlien,  therefore,  a 
statute  authorizes  a  county,  township,  or 
municipality  to  levy  taxes  not  above  a 
given  per  cent  on  the  taxable  property  of 
the  locality  for  the  purpose  of  building 
so  much  of  a  railroad  as  can  be  built  for 
that  amount,  and  the  part  of  a  railroad 
so  to  be  built  can  be  of  no  public  utility 
unless  used  to  accompli.sh  an  unconstitu- 
tional purpose,  such  tax  is  illegal  and  can- 
not be  enforced.  2.  Where  public  credit 
or  money  is  furnished  by  any  of  the  sub- 
divisions of  the  state  named  in  tlie  con- 
stitution, to  be  used  in  part  in  the  con- 
struction of  a  work  which,  under  the 
statute  authorizing  its  construction,  must 


184  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

the  other  cases  before  cited,  the  reader  is  referred.  The  judg- 
ments affirming  the  existence  of  the  power  have  generally  met 
with  strong  judicial  dissent  and  with  much  professional  dis- 
approval, and  experience  has  demonstrated  that  the  exercise  of 
it  has  been  productive  of  bad  results.  Taxes,  it  is  everywhere 
agreed,  can  only  be  imposed  for  public  objects,  and  taxation  to 
aid  in  building  the  roads  of  private  railway  companies^  even  if 
the  use  is  a  public  use,  is  hardly  consistent  with  a  proper  respect 
for  the  inviolability  of  private  property  and  individual  rights. 
Fraud  usually  accompanies  the  exercise  of  the  power,  and  ex- 
travagant indebtedness  is  the  result ;  and,  sooner  or  later,  the 
power  will  be  denied  by  constitutional  provision,  as  it  already  is 
in  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Illinois,  New  York,  Missouri,  and  possibly 
some  of  the  other  states,  or  by  legislative  enactment.  It  is  too 
late  to  expect,  in  view  of  the  line  of  decisions  referred  to,  that 
the  courts  in  the  states  which  have  already  passed  upon  the  ques- 
tion will  retrace  their  steps,  and  too  much  to  hope  that  the  courts 
in  other  states  will  have  the  boldness  successfully  to  stem  the 
strong  tide  of  authority,  strengthened,  as  it  will  be,  by  temporary 
popular  feeling  and  insidious  corporate  influence. 

§  158.  (105a)  Since  the  first  edition  of  this  work,  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  following  repeated  intima- 
tions of  its  judges  in  previous  cases,  have  directly  sustained  the 

be  completed,  if  completed  at  all,  by  other  By  amendment  of  tlie  constitution  of 

parties  out  of  their  own  means,  who  are  New  York,  which  took  effect  January  1, 

to  own,  or  have  the  beneficial  control  and  1875,  "  No  county,  town,  or  village  shall 

management  of  the  work  when  completed,  hereafter  give  any  money  or  property,  or 

public  money  or  credit  thus  used  can  only  loan  its  money  or  credit  to  or  in  aid  of  any 

be  regarded  as  furnished  for  or  in  aid  of  individual,  association,   or   corporation," 

such  parties.     The  act  of  April  23,  1872,  People  v.  Ft.  Edward,  70  N.  Y.  28,  1879. 

to  authorize  counties,  townships,  and  other  The    constitution  of /»c//a»a  provides 

municipalities  therein  named  to  build  rail-  that "  no  county  shall  subscribe  for  stock 

roads,  etc.    [59  O.  L.  84],  authorizes  the  in  any  incorporated  company,  unless  the 

raising  of  money  by  ta.xation,  which  is  same    be    paid  for  at  the  time  of  such 

equally  applicable  to  the  unlawful   pur-  subscription."     Art.  x.  sec.  10.     W^hat  is 

pose   of  aiding  railroad   companies,  and  an    "  incorporated    company,"  and   how 

others  engaged  in  building  and  operating  and  when  stock    may  be   paid   for,   see 

railroads,  as  it  is  any  lawful  purpose,  and  Lafayette,  etc.  Railroad    Co.  v.  Geiger, 

gives   to  the  officers  entrusted  with   the  34  Ind.  185,   1870,  where  the  subject  is 

control  and  operation  of  the  money  thus  very  elaborately  considered  by  Buskirk, 

raised  no  means  or  power  of  discrimina-  .J.      John  v.  Cm.,  etc.   Railroad  Co.,  35 

tion  as  to  the  lawfulness  of  the  work  or  Ind.    539 ;  Aspinwall  v.  Jo  Daviess  Co., 

purpose  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied,  and  22   How.  364.     Tlie  new   constitution  of 

this  is  in  contravention  of  sec.  6.  art.  viii.  3Iissouri   cuts   up    the  business    by  the 

of  the  constitution,  and  therefore  void.  roots.    Art.  iv.  sec.  47. 


§  159.]  MUNICIPAL   CHARTERS,  185 

validity  of  legislative  acts  authorizing  municipal  aid  to  railways.^ 
In  view  of  the  prior  adjudications  of  that  tribunal  in  the  munici- 
pal bond  cases,  referred  to  in  the  chapter  on  Contracts,  and  of 
the  almost  uniform  holding  of  the  state  courts,  no  other  result 
could  have  been  anticipated.  This  ends  judicial  discussion  if  it 
does  not  terminate  doubts.  The  Supreme  Court,  in  reaching 
this  result,  places  its  judgment  upon  the  ground  that  highways, 
turnpikes,  canals,  and  railways,  although  owned  by  individuals 
under  public  grants  or  by  private  corporations,  hxq  puhlici  juris  ; 
that  they  have  always  been  regarded  as  governmental  affairs, 
and  their  establishment  and  maintenance  recognized  as  among 
the  most  important  duties  of  the  state,  in  order  to  facilitate 
transportation  and  easy  communication  among  its  different  parts ; 
and  hence  the  state  may  put  forth,  in  favor  of  such  improve- 
ments, both  its  power  of  eminent  domain  (as  it  constantly  does) 
and  its  power  to  tax,  unless  there  be  some  special  restriction  in 
the  constitution  of  the  particular  state.  These  powers  may,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  court,  be  lawfully  exerted,  because  the  use 
is  in  its  nature  a  public  use,  and  these  works  are  subject  to  public 
control  and  regulation  (except  so  far  as  this  right  has  been  law- 
fully parted  with  by  valid  legislative  contract),  notwithstanding 
they  maybe  exclusively  owned  by  private  persons  or  corporations. 
It  must  be  admitted  that  compulsory  taxation  in  favor  of  railways 
and  like  public  improvements  owned  by  individuals  or  companies 
is  an  exercise  of  power  going  quite  to  the  verge  of  legislative 
authority.  Although  it  is  a  doctrine  that  must  now  be  con- 
sidered as  judicially  settled,  still  it  is  one  which  has,  as  we  think 
justly,  encountered  a  vigorous  opposition,  both  on  the  ground  of 
expediency  and  of  power  ;  and  the  exercise  of  authority  has,  as 
before  noticed,  been  so  disastrous  as  already,  in  some  of  the 
states,  to  have  led  to  constitutional  provisions  for  the  protection 
of  the  citizen. 

§  159.  (105A)  It  is  obvious,  from  the  foregoing  statement  of 
the  grounds  upon  which  the  validity  of  such  legislation  rests,^ 
that  it  furnishes  no  support  for  the  validity  of  taxation  in  favor  of 

1  Olcott  V.  Supervisors,  IG  Wall.  678,  Journal,  362;    Rogers   v.   Burlington,   3 

1872;  Railroad   Co.  v.  Otoe  County.  16  Wall.    654;    Mitchell    v.  Burlington,    4 

Wall.   687,   1872;  s.  c.  reprinter],  2  Neb.  Wall.  270. 
406  ;  St.  Josepli  Township  v  Rogers,  16  ^  Ante,  supra,  sec.  157. 

Wall.    664,   1872;    s.   c.  7  Albany   Law 


186 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  VI. 


enterprises  and  objects  which  are  essentially  private.  We  consider 
the  principle  eiiually  sound  and  sahitary,  that  the  mere  incidental 
benefits  to  the  public  or  the  state,  or  any  of  its  municipalities  or 
divisions,  which  result  from  the  pursuit  by  individuals  of  ordinary 
branches  of  business  or  industry,  do  not  constitute  a  public  use  in 
tiie  legal  sense,  which  justifies  the  exercise  cither  of  the  power  of 
eminent  domain  or  of  taxation.  It  would  have  been  well,  in  our 
judgment,  if  this  doctrine  had  been  extended  in  its  application  to 
railwa}"  companies;  but  it  cannot  be  abandoned  without  unsettling 
the  foundations  of  individual  rights,  without  recognizing  legishitive 
omnipotence  over  private  property,  or  the  irresponsible  despotism 
of  a  local  majority,  and  unwisel}^  opening  the  way  for  frauds  and 
abuses  which,  in  view  of  the  past,  cannot  be  contemplated  without 
deep  anxiety .1 


1  The  doctrine  of  tlie  text  finds  inter- 
esting illustrations  and  authoritative  sup- 
port in  several  cases  recently  determined. 
One  is  Lowell  v.  Boston,  decided  by  tlie 
Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts 
in  1873.  Ill  Mass  463,  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep. 
39.  After  the  great  fire  in  Boston,  in 
1872,  the  legislature  enacted  that  the  city 
might  issue  its  bonds  to  the  amount  of  $20,- 
000,000,  the  proceeds  of  which  three  com- 
missioners appointed  by  the  mayor  were 
authorized  to  loan  in  a  safe  and  judicious 
manner  "  in  such  sums  as  they  shall  de- 
termine to  the  owners  of  land,  tlie  build- 
ings upon  which  were  burned  by  the  fire 
in  said  Boston  on  the  ninth  and  tenth  days 
of  November,  1872,  upon  the  notes  or 
bonds  of  said  owners  secured  by  first 
mortgages  of  said  land  ;  said  mortgages 
to  be  conditioned  that  the  rebuilding  shall 
be  commenced  within  one  year  from  the 
first  day  of  January,  1873,  and  said  com- 
missioners to  have  full  power  to  apply  the 
proceeds  of  said  bonds  in  making  said 
loans  in  sucli  manner,  and  to  make  such 
further  provisions,  conditions,  and  limita- 
tions in  reference  to  said  loans,  and  secur- 
ing the  same,  as  shall  be  best  calculated, 
in  their  judgment,  to  ensure  the  employ- 
ment of  the  same  in  rebuilding  upon  said 
land  burned  over,  and  the  payment  there- 
of to  the  said  city." 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  object  of  this 
act,  as  sliown  by  its  provisions,  was  "  to 
ensure  the  speedy  rebuilding  on  land  the 
buildings  upon  which  were  burned  "  by 


the  great  fire ;  and  the  question  was  as 
to  the  right  of  the  state  to  impose  any 
taxes  for  this  object,  and  this  depended 
upon  the  further  question  whether  this 
object  was,  in  a  legal  sense,  a  public  ob- 
ject. 

The  court  distinctly  held,  to  use  the 
language  of  the  rescript  sent  down  in  the 
case,  tliat  taxes  can  only  be  laid  "  for 
some  public  service  or  some  object  whicii 
concerns  the  public  welfare  "  ;  that  "  the 
preservation  of  the  interests  of  individuals, 
either  in  respect  of  property  or  business, 
although  it  may  result  incidentally  in  the 
advancement  of  the  public  welfare,  is,  in 
its  essential  character,  a  private  and  not 
a  public  object.  .  .  .  That  the  incidental 
advantages  to  the  public  or  to  the  state 
which  result  from  the  promotion  of  pri- 
vate interests,  or  the  prosperity  of  private 
enterprises  or  business  does  not  justify 
tlieir  aid  by  taxation.  .  .  .  That  as  a  judi- 
cial question  the  case  is  not  changed  by  the 
magnitude  of  the  calamity  which  has 
created  the  emergency."  And  finally  the 
court  say,  "  The  expenditure  authorized 
by  this  statute  being  for  private  and  not 
for  public  objects,  in  a  legal  sense,  it  ex- 
ceeds the  constitutional  power  of  the  legis- 
lature, and  the  city  cannot  legally  issue 
the  bonds  for  the  purposes  named  in  the 
act."  Ill  Mass.  463.  This  case  is  followed 
and  approved  in  State  v.  Osawkee  Town- 
ship, 14  Kan.  418,  1875,  and  the  "  relief 
bonds  "  which  the  township  was  authorized 
to  issue  were  held  not  to  be  for  a  public  ^ 


§  160.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS. 


187 


§  160.  Hundreds  of  municipalities  in  the  country  have  ren- 
dered themselves  Bankrupt  by  the  mania  to  aid  railways,  and 
hundreds  of  others  are  groaning  under  oppressive  burdens  occa- 
sioned thereby.  In  looking  over  the  field,  it  is  now  plain  that 
most  of  the  evils  originating  from  this  source,  and  from  which 
the  municipalities  are  suffering,  have  sprung  not  so  much  from 
the  bare  power  to  aid  railways,  as  from  the  manner  in  which  the 
power  has  usually  been  conferred.  If  municipalities  had  been 
forbidden  to  issue  their  bonds,  and  permitted  to  give  such  aid 
only  to  the  extent  of  taxes,  to  be  levied  within  a  short  limited 
period  of  time,  this  pay-as-you-go  policy  would  have  been  an 
effectual  restraint  upon  extravagance  in  this  direction.  But  the 
power  to  give  the  aid  was  usually  accompanied  with  express 
authority  to  issue  bonds,  payable  twenty  or  thirty  years  distant, 
in  general  without  limit  as  to  amount ;  and  thus  those  who  cre- 
ated the  debt  were  almost  indifferent  as  to  the  amount  of  it, 
since  the  main  burden  was  expected  to  fall  on  posterity.     This 


purpose,  and  therefore  void.  s.  c.  19  Am. 
Rep.  99;  McConnell  v.  Hamm,  16  Kan. 
228;  C.  B.  U.  P.  Railway  Co.  v.  Smith, 
23  Kan.  745. 

Another  case  is  Allen  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Jay,  60  Me.  124,  1871;  12  Am.  Law 
Reg.  (N.  S.)  481.  The  legislature  author- 
ized the  town  of  Jay  to  lend  §10,000 
to  enable  the  borrowers  to  build  a  saw- 
mill and  grist-mill,  and  to  exempt  the 
mills  from  taxation  for  ten  years.  On 
the  ground  that  the  purpose  was  not  a 
public  one,  the  act  was  adjudged  uncon- 
stitutional. See  opinions  of  the  judges, 
58  Me.  Appendix,  590,  et  seq.,  given  to 
the  House  of  Representatives.  The  doc- 
trine was  adliered  to  in  Brewer  Brick  Co. 
V.  Brewer,  62  Me.  G2,  1873  ;  s.  c.  16  Am. 
Rep.  395,  and  ably  vindicated  by  Appleton, 
C.  J  ;  Bissell  v.  Kankakee,  01  111.  249, 1872. 

Another  case  is  the  Commercial  Na- 
tional Bank  v.  City  of  lola,  decided  by 
tlie  U.  S.  Circuit  Court  for  the  District 
of  Kan.sas,  June,  1873,  reported  in  2 
Dillon  C.  C.  353,  affirmed  20  Wall.  655, 
1874.  For  the  same  reasons  the  act  of  the 
legislature  which  authorized  the  city  of 
lola  to  appropriate  850,000  to  aid  private 
persons  in  tiie  erection  and  equipment  of 
buildings,  at  or  near  the  city,  to  be  used 
for  manufacturing  purposes,  was  held  un- 


constitutional, and  the  bonds  void  which 
had  been  issued  to  raise  the  money  thus 
appropriated.  The  case  was  distinguished 
from  those  relating  to  railway  aid  bonds, 
and  also  construes  the  provision  of  tlie 
constitution  of  the  state  that  "the  leg- 
islature shall  pass  no  special  act  conferring 
corporate  powers."  Ante,  sec.  46.  And 
moi-e  recently  the  Court  of  Appeals  of 
New  York  have  decided  in  the  same  way, 
holding  an  act  to  authorize  municipal 
bonds  to  pai/  for  stock  in  a  private  corpora- 
tion to  construct  a  water  privilege  and  to 
manufacture  lumber,  to  be  void.  Weis- 
mer  v.  Village  of  Douglass,  64  N.  Y.  91, 
1876. 

Further,  as  to  extent  and  nature  of  the 
taxing  power,  and  distinction  between 
public  and  private  use,  see  post,  sees.  735, 
736;  Bloodgood  v.  Railroad  Co.,  18  Wend. 
G5 ;  Jenkins  v.  Andover,  103  Mass.  94, 
holding  invalid  a  statute  authorizing  tax- 
ation in  favor  of  a  private  incorporated 
academy.  Same  principle,  Curtis  v. 
"WHiipple,  24  Wis.  350  ;  People  v.  Salem, 
20  Mich.  452 ;  Freeland  v.  Hastings,  10 
Allen,  570;  Tyson  v.  School  Directors, 
51  Pa.  St.  9  ;  Thompson  v.  Pittson,  69 
Me.  545,  1871  ;  Savings  Assoc,  v.  To- 
peka,  3  DiUon,  376. 


18S  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

led  to  the  wildest  extravagance.  Bonds  thus  issued  have  been 
treated  b}^  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  possessing 
all  the  attributes  of  commercial  paper,  and  to  be  unimpeachable 
in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders  for  value,  notwithstanding  the 
frauds  of  the  municipal  officers,  or  non-compliance  with  the  con- 
ditions upon  which  the  bonds  were  authorized  to  be  issued. 
Under  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  all  restraints  and 
checks  upon  the  power  proved  practically  valueless,  since  if  they 
were  disregarded  or  evaded  and  the  bonds  issued  and  negotiated, 
they  became  valid  and  enforceable  obligations.  The  result  of  leg- 
islative authority  thus  conferred  and  thus  construed  is  seen  in  the 
vast  municipal  debt  of  the  country,  largely  created  in  aid  of 
railways,  and  in  our  municipalities,  blighted  and  burdened  with 
debt.  This  retrospect  after  the  battle  has  been  lost  will  tend  to 
confirm  the  dissenting  judges  in  their  opinions,  although  they  are 
compelled  to  acknowledge  the  law  to  be  otherwise  settled.^ 

§  161.  (106)  The  courts  concur,  with  great  unanimity,  in 
holding  that  there  is  no  implied  mdliority  in  municipal  corpo- 
rations to  incur  debts  or  borrow  money  in  order  to  become 
subscribers  to  the  stock  of  railway  companies,  and  that  such 
power  must  be  conferred  by  express^  grant.  To  become  stock- 
holders in  private  corporations  is  manifestly  foreign  to  the  usual 
purposes  intended  to  be  subserved  by  the  creation  of  corporate 
municipalities  ;  the  practice  of  bestowing  such  powers  is  of  recent 
origin,  and  hence  the  rule  that  the  authority  must  be  specially 
conferred,  and  cannot  be  deduced  from  the  ordinary  municipal 
grants.^ 

1  See  further,  chapter  on  Contracts,  St.  Louis  v.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  483, 1856 ; 
post.  Jones   v.  Mayor,  etc.,  25  Ga.  610,  1858; 

2  Aurora  v.  West,  22  Ind.  88,  508,  Oebricke  v.  Pittsburg,  U.  S.  C.  C.  1859  ;  7 
1864  ;  Starin  v.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  439,  1869 ;  Am.  Law  Reg.  725  ;  Duanesburg  v.  Jen- 
Gould  r.  Sterling,  76.  439,  456;  Atchison  kins.  40  Barb.  574;  French  v.  Tesche- 
V.  Butcher,  3  Kan.  104,  1865;  Burnes  maker,  24  Cal.  518,  1864;  People  v. 
V.  Atchison,  2  lb.  454;  Bank  r.  Rome.  18  Mitchell,  35  N.  Y.  551,  1866;  St.  Joseph 
N.  Y.  38;  Bridgeport  v.  Housatonic  Rail-  Township  v.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  044,  1872; 
way  Co.,  15  Conn.  475;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  English  v.  Chicot  County,  26  Ark.  454, 
Co..  10  Wall.  676,  1870;  Cook  v.  Manu-  1871;  Thompson  v.  Lee  County,  3  Wall, 
facturing  Co.,  1  Snced  (Tenn.),  698, 18.54;  327;  Commercial  Bank  v.  lola,  2  Dillon 
Gaddis  v.  Richland  Co.,  92  111.  119;  Pitz-  C.  C.  R.  353,  1873;  s.  c.  20  Wall.  655. 
man  v.  Freeburg,  92  111.  Ill;  McCoy  v.  "No  lawyer  doubts  that  a  borough  can 
Brant,  53  Cal.  247  ;  Lewis  v.  Shreveport,  only  subscribe  to  a  railroad  when  ex- 
3  Wood  C.  C.  205;  Nichol  v.  Nashville,  9  pressly  authorized  by  law."  Black,  C.  J., 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  252;  City  and  County  of  in  Sharpless's  Case,  cited  Pennsylvania 


§  161.] 


MUNICIPAL  CHARTERS. 


189 


Accordingly,  where  a  city  was,  by  charter,  specifically  author- 
ized to  construct  wharves,  docks,  i)iers,  water-works,  works  for 
lighting  the  city,  etc.,  and  was  also  authorized,  upon  certain  for- 
malities, to  create  a  debt,  this  was  considered  to  mean  a  debt  for 
some  of  these  specified  purposes,  and  not  to  empower  the  corpo- 
rate authorities  to  issue  bonds  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a 
railroad.^  So  there  is  no  power  in  a  municipal  corporation  as 
incidental  to  the  usual  grants  of  municipal  authority  to  take 
stock  in  a  manufacturing  company  located  in  or  near  the  corpora- 
tion,2  or  to  aid  or  engage  in  other  enterprises,  essentially  private.^ 


Railway  Co.  v.  Philadelphia,  47  Pa.  St. 
189.  A  railroad  is  such  a  "  road  "  as  is 
embraced  in  the  terms  of  a  charter  by 
which  the  common  council  of  a  city  were 
authorized  "to  take  stock  in  any  char- 
tered company  for  making  roads  to  said 
city."  Railroad  Co.  v.  Evansville,  15  Ind. 
395,  1860;  Aurora  v.  West,  9  lb.  74; 
post,  ch.  xiv.  Contracts.  The  legislature 
may,  before  (Aspinwall  v.  Daviess  Coun- 
ty, 22  How.  364),  if  not,  indeed,  after, 
the  subscription  is  made,  but  before  it  is 
paid  for,  annul  the  proceeding  and  au- 
thorize the  municipal  corporation  to  with- 
draw the  subscription  and  release  its 
right  to  the  stock.  People  v.  Coon,  25 
Cal.  635.  Extent  of  legislative  power. 
Ante,  ch.  iv.  Text  approved.  Jackson- 
port  V.  Watson,  33  Ark.  704. 

1  Lafayette  v.  Cox,  5  Ind.  (Port.)  38, 
1854.  As  to  rights  of  bondholders,  how- 
ever, see  })ost,  Contracts,  and  decisions  in 
the  national  and  state  courts,  there  cited. 
Power  in  general  to  the  city  council  of 
Charleston,  by  the  charter  of  1783,  to 
pass,  inter  alia,  "  every  other  by-law  as 
shall  appear  to  the  city  council  requisite 
and  necessary  for  the  security,  welfare,  and 
convenience  of  said  city,"  was  held  by  the 
Court  of  Errors  to  authorize  the  city  to 
subscribe  to  the  stock  of  railroad  compa- 
nies within  or  without  the  state.  Copes 
1-.  Charleston,  10  Rich.  (South  Car.)  Law, 
491,  1857;  see  City  Council  v.  Baptist 
Cliurch,  4  Strob.  Law,  306,  308,  for  pre- 
amble to  the  charter  of  Charleston.  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  this  is  pressing 
the  constructive  powers  of  the  corjjora- 
tion  to  an  unwarrantable  extent. 

Construction  of  special  acts  or  charters 
held  to  (jive  power  to  take  stock  and  issue 


bonds,  Meyer  ?;.  Muscatine,  1  Wall.  384, 
1863 ;  Curtis  v.  Butler  County,  24  How. 
435 ;  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  220 ; 
City  and  County  of  St.  Louis  v.  Alex- 
ander, 23  Mo.  483 ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Otoe 
County,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  338,  1871 ;  Rogers 
V.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654  (compare 
Chamberlain  v.  Burlington,  19  Iowa, 
395) ;  Fosdick  v.  Perrysburg,  14  Ohio  St. 
472;  Goshorn  v.  County,  1  West  Va. 
308  ;  Taylor  v.  Newberne,  2  Jones  (North 
Car.)  Eq.  141;  Caldwell  v.  Justices,  4 
lb.  323;  People  v.  Spencer,  55  N.  Y.  1, 
1873 ;  Decker  i-.  Hughes,  68  111.  33,  1873 ; 
People  V.  Pueblo  Co.,  2  Col.  .360,  1875; 
English  V.  Chicot  Co.,  26  Ark.  454,  1871 ; 
distinguishing  Seybert  v.  Pittsburgh,  1 
Wall.  272 ;  Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280, 
1865.  The  opinion  of  Dixon,  C.  J.,  con- 
tains an  interesting  discussion  of  the 
questions  presented  by  that  case. 

^  Cook  V.  ^Manufacturing  Co.,  1  Sneed 
(Tenn.),  698,  1854;  Com.  Nat.  Bank  v. 
lola,  2  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  353,  1870. 

3  Clark  V.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199, 
1865 ;  Hanson  v.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28 ; 
Cooley  Const.  Lim.  212.  A  city  corpora- 
tion cannot  subscribe  for  stock  in  a  .'iteam- 
ship  line  without  express  legislative  au- 
thority. Pennsjlvania  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Philadelphia,  47  Pa.  St.  189;  and  since 
the  new  constitution  of  Pennsylvania 
(art.  xi.  sec.  7,  Amendment  to  Constitu- 
tion, 1857),  the  legislature  cannot  give 
that  power.  Where  a  charter  recited  its 
purpose  to  delegate  to  tlie  city  authorities 
power  to  make  such  ordinances  as  the 
"  contingencies,  or  tlio  local  circumstan- 
ces," of  the  corporation  might  require, 
and  gave  "full  power  and  authority  to 
make  such  assessments  on  the  inhabitants 


10  0  MUNICIPAL  COEPORATIONS.  [CH.  VI. 

§  102.  (107)  Whether  special  authority  to  a  municipality  to 
borrow  money  to  pay  for  stock  subscribed  to  a  railway  company 
will  impliedly  repeal,  pro  tanto,  existing  charter  limitations  upon 
the  rate  of  taxation,  is  a  question  depending  upon  construction, 
and  in  relation  to  which  the  courts  have  differed.  But  the  strong 
inclination  of  the  National  Supreme  Court  seems  to  be  in  favor 
of  that  construction  which  restricts  such  limitations  to  the  exer- 
cise of  the  power  of  taxation  in  the  ordinary  course  of  municipal 
action.^ 

§  163.  (108)  If  the  power  to  issue  bonds  in  aid  of  railway  and 
other  like  enterprises  does  not  exist,  they  are  void  into  whosesoever 
hands  they  may  come.^  The  power,  when  it  has  been  conferred,  to 
aid  or  engage  in  extra-municipal  enterprises,  being  extraordinary 
in  its  nature  and  burdensome  to  the  citizen,  must  (at  least  be- 
t\Yeen  all  persons  except  bona  fide  holders  of  the  securities) 
1)6  strictly  pursued  according  to  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the 
grant  conferring  it.^  Thus,  under  an  act  authorizing  town 
officers  to  borrow  money  upon  the  credit  of  the  town,  and  to  pay 
it  over  to  a  railroad  corporation,  to  be  expended  by  it  "  in 
grading   and   constructing   a   railroad,"  taking  in  exchange  its 

of  tlie  city,  or  those  who  hold  taxable  ant'',  sed.  137 ;  Fosdick  v.  Perrysburg,  14 

property  therein,  for  the  safety,  benefit,  Ohio  St.  472;    Cumberland  w.  Magruder, 

and  advantage  of  the  city,  as  shall  appear  34  Md.  381,  1871 ;  see  Assessors  v.  Cora- 

to  tliem  expedient,"  tlie  court   were  of  missioners,  3  Brews.  (Pa. J  333.    State  v. 

opinion  that  the  city  might  assess  a  tax  Guttenburg,  39  N.  J.  L.  660. 

upon  the  real  estate  within  the  corpora-  ^  Marsh    v.    Fulton    County,    supra; 

tion   for   tlie   purpose   of  constructing  a  Com.  Bank  v.  Tola,  2  Dillon,  353,   1873, 

can.al  "for  mannfacturinri  purposes,  and  for  affirmed  in  Supreme  Court,  20  Wall.  655; 

the  better  securing  an  abundant  supply  Sav.  Assoc,  w.  Topeka,  3  Dillon,  37G,  1874  ; 

of  water  for  the  city,"  and  if  it  could  not,  Weimer  v.  Village  of  Douglass,  61  N.  Y. 

yet  that  it  was  competent  for  the  legisla-  01,  1876  ;  Clay  v.  County,  4  Bush  (Ky.), 

ture,  as   it  did  by  a  subsequent  act,  to  154.     See  further,  chapter  on  Contracts, 

adopt  and  confirm  the  action  of  the  city  /ws/,  where  the  rights  of  ?wna7?f/e  holders  of 

in  passing  such  an  ordinance.     Frederick  such  instruments  are  considered  at  length. 

V.  Augusta,  5  Ga.  561,  1848.     Aside  from  Dunovan  v.  Green,  57  111.  63;    Lynde  v. 

the  curative  act,  the  correctness  of   the  Winnebago   County,    16    Wall.   6,    1873; 

view  taken  by  the  court  is  by  no  means  James  v.  Milwaukee,  16  Wall.  159,  1872  ; 

clear.     Ante,  sec.  79,  sees.  158,  159.  post,  sec.  553 ;  Police  Jury  v.  Britton,  15 

1  Butz  V.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575, 1869.  Wall.  566. 

Co«?)a,  Clark  y.  Davenport,  14  Iowa,  494;  ^  i^   Pennsylvania    the    doctrine     has 

Learned   r.  Burlington,  2  Am.  Law  Ileg.  been  adopted  that  equity  will  compel  the 

(N.  S.)   394,  and  note;  Leavenworth  v.  holder  to  take  what  he  gave  and  interest 

Korton,  1  Kan.  432 ;  Burncs  v.  Atchison,  2  where  the  bonds  were  issued  in  violation 

Kan.  454.     And    see    Commonwealth   v.  of  statute ;  but  qncere  ?     See    County   v. 

Pittsburgh,    34  Pa.    St.    496 ;    Amey   v.  Brinton,   47   Pa.  St.    367 ;    Pennsylvania 

Allegheny   City,  24  How.   (U.  S.)   364;  Railroad  Co.  i;.  Philadelphia,  76. 193. 


§  164.] 


MTJNICIPAL  CHARTERS. 


191 


stock  at  par,  it  is  not  within  the  power  of  municipal  officers  to 
make  a  direct  exchange  of  the  bonds  of  the  town,  even  for  an 
equal  nominal  amount  of  stock,  as  this  leaves  it  in  the  power  of 
the  railroad  corporation  to  sell  such  bonds  at  a  discount.^  So  in  a 
case  where  a  county  had  by  the  legislative  act  no  authority  to 
issue  its  bonds  to  the  railroad  company  unless  upon  the  sanction 
of  a  previous  vote  after  thirty  days'  notice  of  the  election  to  be 
held  for  that  purpose,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  held  in  a 
direct  proceeding  against  the  county  to  enjoin  it  from  issuing  its 
bonds,  that  although  there  was  an  election  at  which  a  majority 
voted  in  favor  of  the  subscription,  yet  the  failure  to  give  the 
thirty  days'  notice  was  a  fatal  defect,  and  the  issue  of  the  bonds 
was  restrained. 2 

§  164.  It  may  be  observed  in  conclusion  that  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  in  the  municipal  railway  aid  bond 
cases  referred  to  in  a  subsequent  chapter,^  have  held  the  doc- 


1  Starin  v.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  439 ;  Gould 
V.  Sterling,  Ih.  439.  In  the  case  last 
cited,  Selden,  J.,  p.  460,  remarks  :  "  In  the 
present  case  the  only  authority  given  (to 
tlie  town)  by  the  act  is  to  borrow  upon 
the  bonds  of  the  town.  No  express 
power  to  sell  the  bonds  is  given,  and  no 
such  power,  can,  I  think,  be  implied. 
To  borrow  money,  and  give  a  bond  or 
obligation  for  it,  and  to  sell  a  bond  or  ob- 
ligation for  money,  are  by  no  means  iden- 
tical transactions.  In  the  one  case  the 
money  and  the  bond  would,  of  course,  be 
equal  in  amount ;  in  the  other  they  might 
or  might  not  be  equal."  Whetlier  such 
a  defence  would  be  available  against  a 
bonajide  holder  of  the  bonds  was  not  deter- 
mined. As  to  these  cases  see  chapter  on 
Contracts  post.  See  Woods  v.  Lawrence 
Count}',  1  Black,  o86 ;  Moran  v.  Miami 
County,  2  Black,  722.  That  such  a  de- 
fence is  not  available  against  a  holder  for 
value,  see  post,  sec.  583. 

2  Harding  v.  Kockford,  etc.  Railroad 
Co.,  Go  111.  90,  1873. 

In  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
T/io?-«/o«,  J.,  remarks  :  "Such  municipal- 
ities were  not  created  with  the  view  to  en- 
gage in  commerce,  or  to  aid  in  the  con- 
struction of  railways,  but  for  govern- 
mental purposes  only.  When  they  exer- 
cise the  functions  given  by  the  statutes 
under  consideration,  the  powers  granted 


must  not  only  be  clearly  conferred,  but 
strictly  pursued.  If  the  mode  prescribed 
for  carrying  into  effect  the  right  to  issue 
bonds  is  not  complied  with  in  all  material 
matters,  then  the  bonds  siiould  not  be 
issued,  and  thus  the  tax-payer  will  be  ex- 
empt from  the  imposition  of  illegal  taxes, 
and  a  grievous  burden  upon  his  property. 
These  principles  have  been  so  elaborately 
discussed  and  fully  settled  by  this  court, 
that  we  need  only  refer  to  some  of  the 
cases.  The  People  v.  Tazwell  Count}',  22 
III.  147;  Fulton  Coimty  i'.  The  Missis- 
sippi &  ^Yabash  Railroad  Co.,  21  111.  278; 
Middleport  v.  /Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  82  111. 
562;  People  v.  Logan  Co.,  63  111.384; 
Williams  v.  Roberts,  88  111.  11 ;  People  v. 
Oldtown,  88  111.  202;  Clark  v.  Board, 
etc.,  27  111.  307  ;  Force  v.  Batavia,  61  111. 
99;  Harding  v.  R.  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  R., 
65  111.  90  ;  Lippincott  v.  Pana,  92  111.  24; 
Gaddis  v.  Richland  Co.,  92  111.  119 ;  Su- 
pervisors of  Schuyler  Co.  v.  The  People, 
15  111.  181;  Supervisors  of  Hancock 
County  V.  Clark,  27  IK  305  ;  Marshall 
County  V.  Cook,  38  lb.  44 ;  Wiley  v.  The 
Town  of  Brimfield,  59  111.  306;  People?;. 
Cass  Co.,  77  III.  438, 1875. 

If  aid  has  been  conditionally  voted, 
the  condition  must  be  complied  with  be- 
fore the  company  can  demand  the  aid. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hartford,  58  Me.  23. 

'^  Post,  eh.  xiv. 


192 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS, 


[CH.  VI. 


trine  ia  favor  of  the  innocent  holders  for  value  of  such  securities, 
that  the  mnniripality  ma}^  be  estopped,  by  recitals  in  the  bonds, 
by  tlie  subscMiuent  levy  of  taxes  to  pay  interest  thereon,  and  by 
retaining  the  stock  which  Avas  received  in  exchange  for  the  bonds 
or  purchased  with  their  proceeds,  to  set  up  in  defence  a  nt)n- 
compliance  with  preliminary  conditions.^  This  is  a  doctrine, 
however,  which  is  asserted  for  the  protection  of  such  holders, 
and  has  ordinarily  no  place  in  controversies  which  arise  before 
the  issue  of  the  bonds,  between  the  tax-payers  or  municipality 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  company  on  the  other.  In  such 
cases  estoppel  has  no  place,  and  the  sound  doctrine  is  that 
compliance  with  all  substantial  or  material  conditions  is  essential.^ 


1  Post,  sec.  521,  etseq. 

2  Jackson  Co.  v.  Brush,  77  111.  59, 1875. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Connecticut, 

under  peculiar  circumstances,  held  the 
town  voting  aid  to  a  railroad  company 
estopped  to  show,  as  against  the  railroad 
company  (equitable  rights  of  material  men 
and  contractors  having  intervened),  that 
the  vote  at  the  town  meeting  had  not 
been  taken  by  ballot  as  required  by  the 
act  of  the  legislature,  but  by  a  division  of 
the  house,  without  ballot.  New  Haven, 
etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Chatham,  42  Conn. 
465,  1875.  See  also  Douglas  v.  Chatham, 
41  Conn.  211.  In  submitting  the  question 
to  vote  whether  a  township  will  take  stock 
in  a  railroad  company,  the  township  has 
the  right  to  impose  such  conditions  in  re- 
gard thereto  as  it  deems  proper  ;  and  such 
conditions  when  imposed  are  binding,  and 
the  company  will  have  no  right  to  the 
subscription,  or  to  compel  the  issue  of  the 
bonds,  until  the  conditions  are  fully  per- 
formed on  its  part,  if  the  authorities  have 
a  discretion.  People  v.  Holden,  91  111. 
446.  A  vote  without  conditions,  the  an- 
nexing of  conditions  will  not  deprive  them 
of  its  exercise.  People  ex  rel.,  etc.  v. 
County  Board  of  Cass  County,  77  111. 
438,  1875. 

Except  in  controversies  with  bona  fide 
bondholders  for  value,  the  state  courts 
have  generally  held  that  the  power  of  a 
municipality  to  issue  railroad  aid  bonds 
is  dependent  upon  a  strict  compliance 
with  the  statute  authorizing  the  issue  of 
such  bonds  ;  and  that  when  the  power  is 
conditional  on  a  prior  vote  of  the  electors 
the  statutory  notice  must  be  given.  Peo- 


ple V.  Jackson  County,  02  111.  444  ;  Hard- 
ing V.  R.  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.,  05  111.  90, 
1872  ;  People  v.  Wayncsville,  88  111.  460, 
in  which  it  is  held  that  one  submission 
exhausts  the  power,  and  a  subsequent 
one  is  idtra  vires:  quaere?  A  subscription 
cannot  be  made  to  a  division  of  a  road. 
McWhorter  v.  People,  65  111.  290,  1872. 
Power  to  issue  upon  compliance  with 
conditions  cannot  be  delegated.  Jackson 
County  V.  Brush,  77  111.  59,  1875 ;  People 
I'.  Waynesville,  supra ;  People  v.  Harper 
(vote  need  not  fix  time  for  bonds  to  run), 
67  111.  62,  1873.  Cannot  make  a  contract 
with  railroad  company  for  subscription 
before  election.  People  v.  Cass  County, 
77  111.  438,  1875.  Submitting  two  proposi- 
tions, Marshall  v.  Silliman,  61  111.  218, 
1871 ;  see  also  Garrigus  v.  Park  County, 
89  Ind.  66,  1872.  Conditions,  effect  of 
non-observance,  Alley  v.  Adams  County, 
76  111.  101,  1875.  Voting  on  unauthorized 
proposition,  Cairo,  etc.  Co.  v.  Sparta,  77 
111.  505,  1875.  Election  must  he  held  accord- 
ing to  the  law  governing  it.  The  People,  etc. 
V.  Supervisor,  etc.,  67  111.  57,  1873.  See 
also  the  following  cases :  Wright  v. 
Bishop,  88  111.  302;  Edwards  v.  People, 
88  111.  340  ;  Williams  v.  Roberts,  88  111. 
11 ;  People  v.  Clayton,  88  111.  45;  People 
V.  OWtown,  88  111.  202. 

The  reader  is  referred  to  chapter  on 
Contracts,  7)os<,  where  the  subject  oi  Mu- 
nicipal Bonds  is  considered  at  large,  with 
special  reference  to  the  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
which,  generally  speaking,  are  more  favor- 
able to  the  holders  of  such  bonds  than 
those  of  the  state  courts. 


§  165.] 


DISSOLUTION. 


193 


CHAPTER  VII. 


DISSOLUTION  OF  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


In  England. 
§  165.  (109)    In  England,  a  municipal  corporation  may  be  dis- 
solved. 

1.  By  an  act  of  parliament,  this  power  being  a  necessary  con- 
sequence of  the  omnipotence  of  that  body  in  all  matters  of 
political  institution.^  The  king  may,  by  his  prerogative,  create^ 
but  cannot  dissolve  or  destroy  a  corporation ;  may  grant  privi- 
leges, but  when  vested,  cannot  take  them  away.^ 

It  has  there  often  been  declared  that  a  municipal  corporation 
may  also  be  dissolved. 

2.  By  the  loss  of  an  integral  part,  or  the  loss  of  all  or  of  the 
majority  of  the  members  of  any  integral  part,  without  which  it 
cannot  transact  its  business,  unless  the  parts  that  remain  have 
the  right  to  act  or  to  restore  the  corporate  succession .^ 

8  Willc.  on  Corp.  325,  ch.  vii.  This 
chapter  contains  an  interesting  discussion 
of  the  question  of  dissolution,  and  it 
would  seem  that  the  author,  notwith- 
standing the  occasional  judgments  and 
the  many  and  broad  dicta  in  the  books, 
doubts  whether  there  can  be  an  actual  and 
total  dissolution  of  a  municipal  corporation, 
either  by  the  loss  of  an  integral  part,  or 
by  surrender,  or  by  forfeiture.  But  see 
2  Kyd,  ch.  V. ;  Glover,  ch.  xx. ;  Angell  & 
Ames,  sec.  769 ;  and  particularly  Rex  v. 
Morris  and  Rex  v.  Stewart,  3  East,  213  ; 
4  East,  17.  In  Rex  v.  Passmore,  3  Term 
R.  241,  where  the  subject  was  much  con- 
sidered, Lord  Kenyan  observed,  "  When 
an  integral  part  of  a  corporation  is  gone, , 
without  whose  existence  the  functions  of 
the  corporation  cannot  be  exercised,  and 
the  corporation  has  no  manner  of  supply- 
ing the  integral  part,  the  corporation  is 
dissolved  as  to  certain  purposes.  But  the 
king  may  renovate  either  with  the  old  or 
new  corporators." 

The  leading  authorities  respecting  the 


1  Co.Litt.  176,note;  2  Kyd,  447;  Rex 
V.  Amery,  2  Term  R.  515 ;  Glover,  408 ; 
Angell  &  Ames,  ch.  xxii.  sec.  767 ;  2 
Kent's  Com.  305;  County  Commrs.  v.  Cox, 
6  Ind.  403;  State  v.  Trustees,  etc.,  5  Ind. 
77 ;  ante,  sec.  32. 

2  Ante,  sec.  32 ;  sec.  35  ;  Rex  v.  Amery, 
supra;  Regents  of  University  v.  Williams, 
9  Gill  &  Johns.  365,  409,  1838.  In  this 
case,  Buchanan,  J.,  in  substance,  observes  : 
The  crown  may  create,  but  cannot,  at 
pleasure,  dissolve  a  corporation,  or,  with- 
out its  consent,  alter  or  amend  its  charter. 
Parliament  may  do  this ;  but,  restrained 
by  public  opinion,  it  has  not  undertaken 
to  dissolve  any  private  corporation  since 
the  time  of  Henry  VIII.,  so  tliat  the  power 
to  do  60  rests  wholly  in  theory.  In  1783 
a  bill  was  proposed  to  remodel  the  East 
India  Company.  Lord  Thurlow  opposed 
it  as  subversive  of  the  law  and  constitu- 
tion, and,  in  strong,  nervous  language, 
declared  it  to  be  "an  atrocious  violation 
of  private  property,  which  cut  every  Eng- 
lishman to  the  bone." 

VOL.  I.  13 


194  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VII. 

3.  By  a  surrender  of  the  franchise  of  being  a  corporation  to  the 
crown,  whose  acceptance  is  necessary ;  and  to  be  effectual  the 
surrender  must  be  enrolled  in  chancer3^  The  power  to  surrender 
has  been  much  questioned ;  the  argument  in  favor  of  it  being, 
that  since  by  royal  grant  and  acceptance  a  corporation  may  be 
created,  so  by  surrender  and  acceptance  it  may  be  annulled.  It 
is  admitted,  however,  that  a  corporation  created  or  confirmed  by 
parliament  or  statute  cannot  dissolve  itself  by  a  surrender  of  its 
charter  or  franchise.^ 

4.  By  forfeiture  of  its  charter,  through  negligence  or  abuse  of 
its  franchise,  judicially  ascertained  by  proceedings  in  quo  warranto 
or  scire  facias.  This  mode  of  dissolution  proceeds  upon  the  doc- 
trine, well  settled  as  to  private  corporations,  both  in  England  and 
in  this  country,  and  perhaps  settled  in  that  country,  also,  as  re- 
spects the  old  municipal  corporations  when  created  by  royal 
charter,  that  there  is  a  tacit  or  implied  condition  annexed  to  the 
grant  of  every  act  or  charter  of  incorporation  that  the  grantees 
shall  not  neglect  to  use  or  misapply  the  powers  granted,  and 
that  if  they  do,  the  condition  is  broken  upon  which  the  corpora- 
tion was  created,  and  the  corporation  thereupon  ceases  to  exist. 
And  in  the  cases  in  the  time  of  Charles  II.  it  was  held  that  the 
corporation  might  forfeit  its  franchise  by  reason  of  the  neglect  or 
misconduct  of  its  officers.^ 

effect  of  the  loss  of  an  integral  part  are,  1  v.  Miller,  6  T.  R.  277  ;  Willc.  332,  pi.  861 ; 

Rol.  Abr.  514  ;  Regina  v.  Bewdley,  1  P.  Howard's  Case,  Hutt.  87  ;  Grant  on  Corp. 

Wms.    207;    Banbury's    Case,    10    Mod.  306,  308;  Thicknesse  r.  Canal  Co.,  4  M. 

346 ;  Rex  v.  Tregony,  8  Mod.  129  ;  Col-  &  W.  472. 

Chester  v.  Seaber,  3  Burr.  1870;  s.  c.  1  2  Black's  Com.  485;  2Kyd,447;  Willc. 

Wm.  Bl.  591,  which,  however,  is  said  not  ch.  vii.  325,  et  seq.;  Taylors  of  Ipswich,  1 

to  be  a  case  of  the  loss  of  an  integral  Rol.  5  ;  Rex  v.  Grosvenor,  7  Mod.  199 ; 

part,  but  of   magistrates.     Grant   Corp.  Smith's    Case,  4   Mod.  55,  58 ;   s.  c.   12 

305,  note;  Rex  v.  Passmore,  3  Term  R.  Mod.  17;  Skin.  311;  1  Show.  278;  Rex 

241.     The  foregoing  cases  are  succinctly  v.  Saunders,  3  East,  119 ;  Mayor,  etc.  of 

stated  by  Mr.  Kyd,  2  Corp.  ch.  v.     See,  Lyme  v.  Henley,  2  CI.  &  F.  .331 ;  Rex  v. 

also,  Mayor,  etc.  of  Colchester  v.  Brooke,  Kent,  13  East,  220  ;  Priestly  v.  Foulds,  2 

7  Queen's  B.  383,  and  Mr.  Justice  Camp-  Scott,  N.  R.  205,  225 ;  Attorney  General 

btll's  learned  opinion  in  Bacon  v.  Robert-  v.  Shrewsbury,  6  Beav.  220.     See  refer- 

son,  18  How.  (U.  S.)  480, 1855;  infra,  sec.  ence  argmndo  to  subject  of  forfeiture  of 

169,  note ;  People  v.  Wren,  4  Scam.  (5  111.)  municipal  charter  in  Whalen  v.  Macomb, 

275,  citing  and  relying  on  Colchester  v.  76  111.     49,  1876.     Tlie   American   cases 

Seaber,  supra ;  Smith's  Case,  4  Mod.  53  ;  relating  to  the  dissolution  of  private  cor- 

Smith  V.  Smith,  3  Desaus.  (S.  C.)  557;  porations  by  forfeiture  of  their  charters ; 

Welch  V.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  what  will  constitute  sufficient  ground  of 

130 ;  chapters  on  Corporate  Officers  and  forfeiture ;    and  the  mode  of  proceeding 

Corporate  Meetings,  post.  to  ascertain  and  enforce  the  forfeiture, 

'  Rex  V.  Osbourne,  4  East,  326 ;  Rex  are  collected,  and  the  result  very  clearly 


§  166.]  DISSOLUTION.  195 

In  the  United  States. 

§  166.  (110)  These  various  modes  of  dissolution,  except  the 
first,  are  believed  by  the  author  to  be  inapplicable  to  municipal 
corporations  in  this  country  as  they  are  generally  created  and 
constituted.  Here  it  is  the  people  of  the  locality  who  are  erected 
into  a  corporation,  not  for  private,  but  for  public  purposes.  The 
corporation  is  mainly  and  primarily  an  instrument  of  government. 
The  officers  do  not  constitute  the  corporation,  or  an  integral  part 
of  it.  The  existence  of  the  corporation  does  not  depend  upon 
the  existence  of  officers.  The  qualified  voters  or  electors  have, 
indeed,  the  right  to  select  officers,  but  they  are  the  mere  agents 
or  servants  of  the  corporation,  and  hence  the  doctrine  of  a  disso- 
lution by  the  loss  of  an  integral  part  has,  in  such  cases,  no  place. 
If  all  the  people  of  the  defined  locality  should  wholly  remove 
from  or  desert  it,  the  corporation  would,  from  necessity,  be  sus- 
pended or  dormant,  or  perhaps  entirely  cease  ;  but  the  mere 
neglect  or  mere  failure  to  elect  officers  will  not  dissolve  the  cor- 
poration, certainly  not  while  the  right  or  capacity  to  elect  re- 
mains.^    In  this  respect  municipal  corporations  resemble  ordinary 

and  satisfactorily  stated,  in  Angell  &  ^  Willc.  ch.  vii.  and  observations  at  pp. 
Ames  on  Corporations,  ch.  xxii.  See,  325,  326,  327,  pi.  852;  Colchester  v.  Sea- 
also,  2  Kent  Com.  305.  Private  corpora-  ber,  3  Burr.  1866 ;  Colchester  v.  Brooke, 
tions  may  lose  their  legal  existence,  1.  7  Queen's  B.  383;  Rex  v.  Passinore,  3 
By  the  act  of  the  legislature  ;  2.  By  the  Term  R.  2il  ;  Grant  on  Corp.  308 ;  Ba- 
death  of  all  their  members;  3.  By  a  for-  con  v.  Robertson,  18  How.  480;  Lowber 
feiture  of  their  franchises,  and  4.  By  a  y.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  5  Abb.  Pr.  325; 
surrender  of  their  charter.  No  other  Clarke  v.  Rochester,  lb.  107 ;  Welch  v. 
mode  of  dissolution  is  anywhere  alluded  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Uillon  C.  C.  130,  1871. 
to.  Boston  Glass  Manuf.  v.  Langdon,  24  That  the  failure  to  elect  officers  does  not  dis- 
Pick.  49,  52,  per  Morton,  J. ;  Common-  solve,  while  the  capacity  to  elect  remains, 
wealth  V.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  5  Mass.  230,  see,  also,  Philips  ?-.  Wickam,  1  Paige  Cli. 
232;  Riddle  r.  Locks  and  Canals,  7  Mass.  590;  Commonwealth  v.  Cullen,  1  Harris 
169;  School  v.  Canal,  etc.  Co.,  9  Ohio,  (Pa.).  133;  President  r.  Thompson,  20 
203;  Canal  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  Gill  &  111.  197;  Rose  v.  Turnpike  Co.,  3  Watts 
Johns.  1;  Vincennes  University  v.  Indi-  (Pa.),  46;  People  v.  Wren,  4  Scam.  (5 
ana,  14  How.  268.  111.)  275;  Brown  v.  Insurance  Co.,  3  La. 
Mr.  Grant,  in  his  work  on  Corpora-  An.  177  ;  Welch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  supra  ; 
tions,  considers  it  doubtful  whether  an  Green  Township,  9  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  28; 
information  in  the  nature  of  quo  tvarranto  Vincennes  University  i'.  Indiana,  14  How. 
will  lie,  in  England,  against  parliamen-  268;  Muscatine  Turnverein  w.  Funck,  18 
tary  or  statute  corporations,  for  usurping  Iowa,  469.  In  Lea  v.  Hernandez,  10  Tex. 
powers  not  given,  or  misusing  those  con-  137, 1853,  it  appeared  that  a  place  was  in- 
ferred (Corp.  307,  308  ;  Rex  v.  Nicholson,  corporated  as  a  town  prior  to  1848,  that 
1  Str.  290);  but  in  this  country,  the  law  as  in  the  year  just  named  the  legislature 
to  private  corporations  is  indisputably  passed  an  act  to  incorporate  the  town,  and 
settled,  that  in  such  cases  an  information  that  no  election  for  officers  nor  any  or- 
may  be  brought.  ganization  was  had  thereunder  for  three 


19G  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  Vn. 

private  corporations,  which  exist  per  se,  and  consists  of  the  stock- 
holders who  compose  the  company.  The  officers  are  their  agents 
or  servants,  but  do  not  constitute  an  integral  part  of  their  corpo- 
ration, the  failure  to  elect  whom  may  suspend  the  functions,  but 
will  not  dissolve  the  corporation.^ 

§  167.  (Ill)  Since  all  of  our  charters  of  incorporation  come 
from  the  legislature,^  there  can  be  no  dissolution  of  a  municipal 
corporation  by  a  surrender  of  its  franchise.  The  state  creates 
such  corporations  for  public  ends,  and  they  will  and  must  continue 
until  the  legislature  annuls  or  destroys  them,  or  authorizes  it  to 
be  done.  If  there  could  be  such  a  thing  as  a  surrender,  it  would, 
from  necessity,  have  to  be  made  to  the  legislature,  and  its  accep- 
tance would  have  to  be  manifested  by  appropriate  legislative 
action. 

§  168.  (112)  The  doctrine  of  a  forfeiture  of  the  right  to  be  a 
corporation  has  also,  it  is  believed  by  the  author,  no  just  or  proper 
application  to  our  muriicipal  corporations.^  If  they  neglect  to 
use  powers  in  which  the  public  or  individuals  have  an  interest, 
and  the  exercise  of  such  powers  be  not  discretionary,  the  courts 
will  interfere  and  compel  them  to  do  their  duty.*  On  the  other 
hand,  acts  done  beyond  the  powers  granted  are  void.^  If  private 
rights  are  threatened  or  invaded,  the  courts  will,  as  hereafter 
shown,  restrain  or  redress  the  injury.^  With  what  surprise  would 
we  hear  of  a  proceeding  to  forfeit  the  charter  of  the  city  of  New 
York  or  Chicago  because  of  the  misconduct  of  its  officers,  or 
because  the  common  council,  as  in  the  famous  case  against  the 

years  and  down  to  the  commencement  of  Wend.  693.    Further,  see  chapters  relat- 

the  action,  nor  were  there  any  officers  de  ing  to  Corporate  Officers  and  Corporate 

facto  acting.     The  court  held  that  the  fail-  Meetings,  post. 

ure  to  elect  officers  operated  to  dissolve  ^  Angell  &  Ames  on  Corp.  sec.  771, 

the  corporation,  there  being  no  express  and  cases  there  cited  ;  People  y.  Fairbury, 

provision  of  the  charter  to  the  contrary.  51  111.  149,  1869. 

But  no  authorities  are  cited  and  no  rea-  ^  ^nte,  sees.  37,  43,  54. 

sons  given,  and  the  conclusion  that  an  3  gee  W^elch  v.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dil- 

actual  dissolution  of  the  corporation  re-  Ion  C.  C.  130,  1871,  arguendo. 

suited  from  a  failure  to  elect,  is  believed  *  Ante,  ch.  v.  sec.  98  ;  post,  chapter  on 

to  be  unsound.  Mandamus. 

The  existence  of  a  municipjil  corpora-  ^  Ante,  sec.  89,  and  notes, 

tion  is  not  considered  to  be  interrupted  in  ®  See  chapter  on  Remedies  to  prevent, 

consequence  of  a  change  in  the  council,  correct,  and  redress    Illegal    Corporate 

Elmendorf  v.  Ewen,  2N.Y.  Leg.  Obs.  85;  Acts,  post,  sees.  906-934. 
Elmendorf  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  25 


§  169.]  DISSOLUTION.  197 

city  of  London,  were  assuming  to  exercise  unauthorized  powers 
by  ordaining  an  oppressive  by-law.  In  short,  unless  otherwise 
specially  provided  by  the  legislature,  the  nature  and  constitution 
of  our  municipal  corporations,  as  well  as  the  purposes  they  are 
designed  to  subserve,  are  such  that  they  can,  in  the  author's  judg- 
ment, only  be  dissolved  by  the  legislature.^  They  may  become 
inert  or  dormant,  or  their  functions  may  be  suspended,  for  want 
of  officers  or  of  inhabitants ;  but  dissolved,  when  created  by  an 
act  of  the  legislature,  and  once  in  existence,  they  cannot  be,  by 
reason  of  any  default  or  abuse  of  the  powers  conferred,  either 
on  the  part  of  the  officers  or  inhabitants  of  the  incorporated  place. 
As  they  can  exist  only  by  legislative  sanction,  so  they  cannot  be 
dissolved  or  cease  to  exist  except  by  legislative  consent  or  pur- 
suant to  legislative  provision. 

Effect  of  Dissolution. 
§  169.  (113)  At  common  law,  a  corporation,  of  whatever  kind, 
which  was  wholly  dissolved,  was  considered  to  be  civilly  dead ; 
and  the  effect  was  that  their  lands  reverted  to  the  grantor  or  his 
heirs,  and  the  debts  of  the  corporation,  whether  owing  to  or  by  it, 
were  extinguished.  Leases  made  by  the  corporation  would  cease 
because  of  the  reversion  of  the  lands  to  the  original  owners  ;  and, 
for  the  same  reason,  lands  given  to  or  held  by  the  corporation 
for  charitable  purposes  would  be  lost.^  These  inconveniences 
and  results  are  so  disastrous  that  the  English  courts,  as  the  more 
recent  cases  before  cited  will  show,  have  doubted  and  limited, 
although  they  may  not  have  overthrown  the  doctrine  that  muni- 

1  Municipal  corporations  are  within  to  municipal  corporations,  lb.  In  Ten- 
the  absolute  control  of  the  legislature,  nessee  the  legislature  may  reserve  to 
and  may  be  abolished  at  any  time  in  its  itself  the  right  to  directly  impose  the  ne- 
discretion,  and  an  act  which  repeals  the  cessary  taxes  for  thesupport  of  municipal 
charter  of  a  single  municipal  corporation  corporations.  76.  Further  on  the  sub- 
is  constitutional.  Luehrman  v.  Taxing  ject  of  legislative  extinction  of  corporations 
District  of  Shelby  Co.,  2  Lea  (Tenn  ),  and  its  effect  on  creditors,  post,  sees.  173, 
425.  An  act  which  grants  municipal  186,  et  se^.,  and  the  chapter  on  Contracts, 
franchises  to  the  communities  within  the  ^  Co.  Litt.  13  ;  1  Lev.  237;  Knight  v. 
territorial  limits  of  certain  districts  in  Wells,  1  Lut.  519  ;  Rex  v.  Sanders,  3  East, 
order  to  provide  the  means  of  local  gov-  119;  Attorney  General  v.  Gower,  9  Mod. 
ernment,  and  creates  the  "agencies  and  226;  1  Rol.  Abr.  816;  Colchester  v.  Sea- 
governing  instrumentalities  "  of  a  muni-  ber,  3  Burr.  1866  ;  Willc.  330,  pi.  858  ;  2 
cipal  corporation,  with  the  usual  legisla-  Kyd,  516 ;  Rex  v.  Passmore,  3  Term  R. 
tive,  executive,  and  judicial  powers,  247;  Grant  Corp.  305:  Colchester  j;. 
although  it  may  style  the  creations  Brooke,  7  Queen's  B.  383;  Common- 
"  Taxing  Districts  "  in  reality  organizes  wealth  v.  Roxbury  9  Gray,  510,  note, 
the  people  and  territory  of  the  district  in- 


198 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VIL 


cipal  corporations  may  be  totally  dissolved.  These  consequences 
of  a  dissolution  of  a  corporation  attached  to  all  corporations, 
eleemosynary,  municipal,  and  private;  and  since  this  doctrine 
has,  in  this  country,  been  generally  rejected  as  to  private  corpo- 
rations organized  for  pecuniary  profit,  and  rests  upon  no  founda- 
tion in  reason  or  justice,  it  may,  perhaps,  be  safely  affirmed  that 
it  would  not,  on  full  consideration,  be  applied  to  the  dissolution 
of  a  municipal  corporation  by  an  absolute  and  unconditional 
repeal  of  its  charter,  or  to  the  case  where  the  charter  of  such  a 
corporation  is  forfeited,  if  that  may  be  done,  by  judicial  sentence. 
Therefore,  the  leases  of  a  corporation  would  not  be  disturbed 
by  its  dissolution,  nor  would  their  lands  held  in  fee  revert,  nor 
would  those  held  in  trust  for  charitable  purposes  be  lost,  since 
equity  would  supply  trustees.^ 


1  Ante,  sees.  64,  80  ;  chapters  on  Corpor- 
ate Boundaries  and  Property,  post.  Bacon 
V.  Robertson,  18  How.  (U.  S.)  480, 
1855  ;  Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1, 
1868  ;  Mumma  v.  Potomac  Co.,  8  Pet. 
281,  1834  ;  Curran  v.  Arkansas,  15  How. 
(U.  S.)  312;  2  Kent,  307,  note;  Angell 
&  Ames  Corp.  779a  ,■  Coulter  v.  Robert- 
son, 24  Miss.  278 ;  County  Commrs.  v. 
Cox,  6  Ind.  403;  State  v.  Trustees,  etc., 
5  Ind.  77  ;  Vincennes  University  v.  Indi- 
ana, 14  How.  268 ;  Owen  v.  Smith,  31 
Barb.  641 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Roxbury, 
9  Gray,  510,  note. 

The  general  subject  of  the  effect  of  a 
dissolution  of  a  corporation  is  extensively 
discussed  by  Mr.  Justice  Campbell,  in 
Bacon  v.  Robertson,  supra.  The  case 
was  a  bill  in  chancery  by  the  stockhold- 
ers of  a  bank,  whose  charter  had  been 
judicially  forfeited,  for  a  distribution  of 
the  surplus  after  the  payment  of  the 
debts,  and  the  relief  was  granted.*  The 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
seemed  to  be  of  opinion  that,  upon  the 
general  principles  of  equity  jurisprudence,  and 
without  statutory  aid,  the  surplus  of  the 
assets  of  a  corporation  for  pecuniary 
profit,  after  the  payment  of  debts  and  ex- 
penses, belonged  to  the  shareholders ; 
that  the  creditor  of  such  a  corporation, 
dissolved  or  declared  forfeited  by  judg- 
ment upon  quo  warranto  or  judicial  sen- 
tence, has,  without  a  statute  to  that 
effect,  a  claim  in  equity  upon  the  corpor- 
ate property  for  the  satisfaction  of  his 


debt ;  that  lands  conveyed  to  the  corpor- 
ation in  fee  and  for  a  full  price  do  not  re- 
vert, and  that  the  stockholder,  as  to  the 
surplus  after  paying  the  debts,  stands 
upon  grounds  as  high  and  has  claims  as 
irresistible  as  the  creditor  before  had. 
The  usual  consequences  of  a  dissolution, 
as  stated  by  the  text-writers,  if  correct, 
which  was  doubted,  were  deemed  inap- 
plicable to  moneyed  or  trading  corpora- 
tions. 

In  the  course  of  his  admirable  opinion, 
the  learned  justice  observed :  "  The 
common  law  of  Great  Britain  was  defi- 
cient in  supplying  the  instrumentalities 
for  a  speedy  and  just  settlement  of  the 
affairs  of  an  insolvent  corporation  whose 
charter  had  been  forfeited  by  judicial 
sentence.  The  opinion  usually  expressed 
as  to  the  effect  of  such  a  sentence  was 
unsatisfactory  and  questioned.  There 
had  been  instances  in  Great  Britain  of 
the  dissolution  of  public  or  ecclesiastical 
corporations  by  the  exertion  of  public 
authority,  or  as  a  consequence  of  the 
death  of  their  members  ;  and  parliament 
and  the  courts  had  affirmed,  in  these  in- 
stances, that  the  endowments  they  had 
received  from  the  prince  or  pious  found- 
ers would  revert  in  such  a  case."  Stat,  de 
Terns  Templariorum,  17  Edw.  II. ;  Dean 
and  Canons  of  Windsor,  Godb.  211 ; 
Johnson  v.  Norway,  Winch.  37 ;  Owen, 
73 ;  6  Vin.  Abr.  280.  What  was  to  be- 
come of  their  personal  estate,  and  of 
their  debts  and  credits,  had  not  been  set- 


§  170.] 


DISSOLUTION. 


199 


§  170.  (114)  As  respects  the  creditors  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, their  rights  are  protected  from  the  legislative  invasion  by 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  no  repeal  of  a  charier 
of  a  municipal  corporation  can  so  dissolve  it  as  to  impair  the 
obligation  of  the  contract,  or,  it  ma}^  probably  be  safely  added, 
preclude  the  creditor  from  recovering  his  debt.^ 


tied  in  any  adjudicated  ease,  and,  as  was 
said  by  PoUexfm  in  the  argument  of  the 
quo  warranto  against  the  city  of  London, 
was,  perhaps,  "non  definitur  injure."  (See 
ante,  Introductory  Chapter,  sec.  8.)  Solic- 
itor Finch,  who  argued  for  the  crown  in 
that  cause,  admitted  :  "  I  do  not  find  any 
judgment  in  a  quo  warranto  of  a  corpora- 
tion being  forfeited."  Treby,  on  behalf 
of  the  city,  said :  "  The  dissolving  a  cor- 
poration by  a  judgment  in  law,  as  is  here 
sought,  I  believe  is  a  thing  that  never 
came  within  the  compass  of  any  man's 
imagination  till  now ;  no,  not  so  much  as 
the  putting  of  a  case.  For  in  all  my 
search  (and  upon  this  occasion  I  have  be- 
stowed a  great  deal  of  time  in  searching) 
I  cannot  find  that  it  even  so  much  as  en- 
tered into  the  conception  of  any  man  be- 
fore ;  and  I  am  the  more  confirmed  in  it 
because  so  learned  a  gentleman  as  Mr. 
Solicitor  has  not  cited  any  one  such  case 
wherein  it  has  been  (I  do  not  say  ad- 
judged, but)  even  so  much  as  questioned 
or  attempted ;  and,  therefore,  I  may 
very  boldly  call  this  a  case  primce  impres- 
sionis."  The  argument  of  Pollexfen  was 
equally  positive. 

The  power  of  courts  to  adjudge  a  for- 
feiture so  as  to  dissolve  a  corporation 
was  affirmed  in  that  case,  but  the  effect 
of  that  judgment  was  not  illustrated  by 
any  execution,  and  the  courts  were  re- 
lieved from  their  embarrassment  by  an 
act  of  parliament  annulling  it.  Smith's 
Case,  4  Mod.  53 ;  Skin.  310  ;  8  St.  Trials, 
1042,  1052,  1283.  Nor  have  the  discus- 
sions since  the  revolution  extended  our 
knowledge  upon  this  intricate  subject. 
The  case  of  Rex  v.  Amery,  2  Term  R. 
515,  has  exerted  much  influence  upon 
text-writers.  The  questions  were,  wheth- 
er a  judgment  of  seizure  qnosque  upon  a 
default  was  final,  and,  if  so,  whether  the 
king's  grant  of  pardon  and  restitution 
would  overreach  and  defeat  a  charter 
granting  to  a  new  body  of  men  the  same 


liberties,  intermediate  the  seizure  and 
the  pardon.  The  king's  bench,  relying 
upon  the  Year-Book,  discovered  that  it 
did  not  support  the  conclusion  drawn 
from  it,  and  Chief  Baron  Eyre  says  that 
"  Lord  Coke  had  adopted  the  doctrine  too 
hastily."  The  discussions  upon  this 
case  show  how  much  the  knowledge  of 
the  writ  of  quo  ivarratito,  as  it  had  been 
used  and  applied  under  the  Plantagenets 
and  Tudors,  had  gone  from  the  memories 
of  courts  and  lawyers.  4  Term  R.  122; 
Tan.  on  Quo.  War.  24.  In  Colchester  v. 
Seaber,  3  Burr.  1866,  where  the  suit  was 
upon  a  bond,  and  the  defence  was  that 
certain  facts  had  occurred  to  dissolve  the 
corporation,  and  that  the  creditor's  claim 
was  extinguished  on  the  bond,  Lord 
Mansfield  said,  "  Without  an  express 
authority,  so  strong  as  not  to  be  gotten 
over,  we  ought  not  to  determine  so  much 
against  reason  as  that  parliament  should 
be  obliged  to  interfere.  The  question 
occurs  here.  Could  parliament  interfere  ? 
And  the  answer  would  be  by  their 
authorizing  a  suit  to  be  brought,  not- 
withstanding the  dissolution.  These  are 
all  cases  of  municipal  corporations  where 
the  corporators  had  no  rights  in  the  prop- 
erty of  the  corporation  in  severalty." 

1  Ante,  ch.  iv.  passim  ;  particularly,  sec. 
69;  post,  sees.  171,  186-189;  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.  290,292  ;  Curran  v.  Arkansas, 
15  How.  (U.  S.)312;  Bacon  v.  Robert- 
son, supra ;  2  Kent,  307,  note ;  Brough- 
ton  V.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266,  1876 ;  ob- 
servations of  Field,  J.,  p.  269 ;  Milner's 
Admx.  V.  Pensacola,  2  Woods,  32,  642, 
1875,  quoting  text;  Indianapolis  v.  India- 
napolis Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  approving 
text;  County  Commrs.  i'.  Cox,  6  Ind.  403 ; 
State  V.  Trustees,  5  Ind.  77 ;  Coulter  v. 
Roberson,  24  Miss.  278;  Gelj)ecke  v.  Du- 
buque, 1  Wall.  175,  1865;  Von  Hoffman 
r.  Quincy,  4  Wall.  -535  ;  Welch  v.  Ste.  Gen- 
evieve, i  Dillon  C.  C.  130;  Thompson  v. 
Lee  County,  3  Wall.  327 ;  Havemeyer  v. 


200 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VII. 


§  171.  (115)  The  name  of  an  incorporated  place  may  be 
changed,  its  boundaries  enlarged  or  diminished,  and  its  mode  of 
government  altered,  and  yet  the  corporation  not  he  dissolved^  hut 
in  law  remain  the  same} 

§  172.  Accordingly,  the  substitution  of  a  new  municipal  charter 
in  the  place  of  a  previous  charter,  or  a  change  in  such  a  charter 
in  whole  or  in  part,  where  substantially  the  same  territory  and 
the  same  inhabitants  are  concerned,  will  not  be  presumed  to  be 
the  creation  of  a  new  corporation,  but  the  assumption  by  the  old 
one  of  new  powers  and  privileges.  And  where  the  rights  of 
creditors  are  involved,  the  presumption  is  extremely  strong  that 
the  identity  of  the  corporation  continues,  notwithstanding  differ- 
ent powers  are  possessed  by  the  new  organization  and  different 
officers  administer  its  affairs.^ 


Iowa  County,  3  Wall.  294  ;  Butz  v.  Mus- 
catine, 8  Wall.  575  ;  Lansing  v.  Treasurer, 
etc.,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  5'J2  ;  Soutter  v.  Madi- 
son, 15  Wis.  30 ;  Smith  v.  Appleton.  19 
Wis.  468 ;  Blake  i'.  Railroad  Co.,  39  N. 
H.  435  ;  compare  Richmond  Gaslight  Co. 
V.  Middletown,  59  N.  Y.  228,  1874  ;  post, 
692.  The  dissolution  of  a  private  corpor- 
ation by  authorized  legislative  act  or 
judicial  sentence,  does  not  impair  the 
obligation  of  a  contract  any  more  than 
the  death  of  a  private  person  impairs  the 
obligation  of  his  contract.  This  doctrine 
was  based  upon  two  grounds :  First,  the 
obligation  survives,  and  the  creditors  may 
enforce  their  claims  against  any  property 
belonging  to  the  corporation  which  has 
not  passed  into  the  hand  of  honajide  pur- 
chasers ;  second,  every  creditor  is  pre- 
sumed to  contract  with  reference  to  a 
possibility  of  the  dissolution  of  a  corpor- 
ate body.  Mumma  v.  Potomac  Co.  (hold- 
ing that  on  sci.  fa.  a  judgment  could  not 
be  revived,  or  costs  adjudged,  against  a 
corporation  legislatively  annulled),  8  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  281,  1834.  In  the  case  of  the 
town  of  Port  Gibson  v.  Moore,  13  Sm.  & 
Marsh.  (21  Miss.)  157,  1849,  it  was  held, 
indeed,  that  the  repeal  of  the  charter  of 
an  indebted  municipal  corporation  dis- 
solved it ;  that  such  dissolution  extinguished 
debts  to  and  from  the  corporation,  and 
that  a  subsequent  act  re-incorporating  the 
place  did  not  make  it  liable  for  a  debt  ex- 


isting anterior  to  the  act  repealing  its 
charter.  The  court  overlooked  the  con- 
stitutional provision  protecting  contracts, 
and  the  case  as  to  the  effect  of  a  dissolu- 
tion upon  the  rights  of  creditors  seems  to 
conflict  with  those  above  cited.  See  fur- 
ther, as  to  extinguishment  of  debts  by 
dissolution  of  corporation,  Mallory  v. 
Mallett,  6  Jones  Eq.  345 ;  Hopkins  v. 
Whitesides,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  31 ;  Bank  v. 
Lockwood,  2  Harring.  (Del.)  8;  Robinson 
V.  Lane,  19  Ga.  337 ;  Muscatine  Turn- 
verein  v.  Funck,  18  Iowa,  469 ;  Owen  v. 
Smith,  31  Barb.  641  ;  Welch  v.  Ste.  Gene- 
vieve, 1  Dillon  C.  C.  180 ;  Thompson  v. 
Abbott,  61  Mo.  176,  1875;  Barclay  v. 
Levee  Coramrs.,  93  U.  S.  258,  1876; 
Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  266, 
1876 ;  post,  ch.  xiv. 

1  Ante,  sec.  85,  and  cases  cited ;  post, 
ch.  viii.  sees.  176,  177 ;  and  see  ante,  ch. 
iv.,  where  the  extent  of  the  legislative 
authority  over  municipal  corporations  is 
considered.  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93 
U.  S.  266,  1876. 

2  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S. 
266,  1876;  approving  Milner's  Admx.  v. 
Pensacola,  2  Woods,  632  ;  ante,  sec.  85, 
and  cases  cited;  infra,  sec.  173;  post, 
sees.  176,  177. 

In  delivering  the  judgment  of  the 
court  in  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Field  observes  :  — 

"Although  a  municipal  corporation,  so 


§  173.]  DISSOLUTION.  201 

§  173.  The  case  contemplated  in  the  preceding  section,  in 
which,  in  the  absence  of  a  plain  statute  provision  to  the  contrary, 
the  continuous  legal  existence  and  identity  of  a  municipality  will  he 
presumed,  where  substantially  the  same  inhabitants  and  the  same 
territory  are  concerned,  notwithstanding  a  change  in  boundaries 
and  form  of  organization  has  taken  place,  is  one  of  quite  common 
occurrence  and  easy  solution.  But  suppose  the  legislature  abso- 
lutely repeals  the  charter  or  constituent  act  of  an  indebted  muni- 
cipality, and  makes  no  provision  for  the  payment  of  its  debts, 
or,  instead  of  an  absolute  repeal,  it  makes  such  changes  as  do  not 
relate  substantially  to  the  same  inhabitants  and  the  same  terri- 
tory, as  for  example  supersedes  or  dissolves  the  indebted  munici- 
pality, and  annexes  what  constituted  its  territory  and  people  to 
other  municipalities,  and  makes  no  provision  for  its  debts  or  their 
mode  of  payment.  Is  the  creditor  remediless  except  by  an  ap- 
peal to  the  legislature  ?  Or,  in  such  a  case,  may  a  court  of  equity 
in  analogy  to  its  jurisdiction  over  insolvent  or  dissolved  private 
corporations,  assume  jurisdiction  and  grant  relief  to  the  creditor 
to  the  extent  of  its  power  and  of  his  legal  rights?  These  are 
difficult  questions.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  where  a  munici- 
pality under  legislative   authority  has  created  a  valid  debt,  no 

far  as  it  is  invested  with  subordinate  organized  under  a  new  cliarter,  taking  in 
legislative  powers  for  local  purposes,  is  a  its  new  organization  tiie  place  of  the  old 
mere  instrumentality  of  the  state  for  the  one,  embracing  substantially  the  same 
convenient  administration  of  government ;  corporators  and  the  same  territory,  it 
yet,  when  authorized  to  take  stock  in  a  will  be  presumed  that  the  legislature  in- 
railroad  company,  and  issue  its  obliga-  tended  a  continued  existence  of  the  same 
lions  in  payment  of  the  stock,  it  is  to  that  corporation,  although  different  powers 
extent  to  be  deemed  a  private  corpora-  are  possessed  under  the  new  charter,  and 
tion,  and  its  obligations  are  secured  by  all  different  officers  administer  its  affairs; 
the  guaranties  which  protect  the  engage-  and  in  the  absence  of  express  provision 
ments  of  private  individuals.  The  inhi-  for  their  payment  otherwise,  it  will  also 
bition  of  the  constitution,  which  pre-  be  presumed  in  such  case  that  the  Icgis- 
serves  against  the  interference  of  a  state  lature  intended  that  tiie  liabilities  as  well 
the  sacredness  of  contracts,  applies  to  the  as  the  rights  of  property'  of  the  corpora- 
liabilities  of  municipal  corporations  ere-  tion  in  its  old  form  sliould  accompany  the 
ated  by  its  permission  ;  and  althougli  the  corporation  in  its  reorganization."  See 
repeal  or  modification  of  the  charter  of  a  and  compare  Barclay  v.  Levee  Commrs., 
corporation  of  that  kind  is  not  witliin  the  93  U.  S.  258,  where  a  levee  district  —  a 
inhibition,  yet  it  will  not  be  admitted,  ^(^as/ public  corporation  —  was  superseded 
where  its  legislation  is  susceptible  of  in  its  functions  by  a  law  dividing  the 
another  construction,  that  the  state  has  district  and  creating  a  new  corporation 
in  this  way  sanctioned  an  evasion  of  or  for  one  portion  and  placing  the  other 
escape  from  liabilities,  the  creation  of  under  the  cliarge  of  the  local  authorities 
which  it  authorized.  When,  therefore,  a  and  where  under  the  circumstances  a 
new  form  is  given  to  an  old  municipal  judgment  creditor  was  held  to  be  without 
corporation,  or  such  a  corporation  is  re-  legal  remedy. 


202  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  VII, 

repeal  ov  change  in  its  charter  can,  in  consequence  of  the  contract 
clause  of  the  constitution,  have  the  effect  to  extinguish  the  debt 
or  even  to  impair  its  obligation. ^  Such  repeal  or  change,  so  far 
as  the  political  rights  and  condition  of  the  municipality  are  con- 
cerned, is  valid  and  effectual.  This  may  destroy  the  power  of 
the  creditor  to  enforce  his  rights  at  law,  since  no  officers  may 
remain  on  whom  process  can  be  served.  Such  appears  to  be  the 
logical  consequence  of  the  acknowledged  supremacy  of  the  legis- 
lature over  public  and  municipal  corporations.^  But  it  is  clear 
that  the  obligation  of  the  contract  remains.  It  is  clear,  also,  that 
the  great  and  almost  only  resource  of  a  municipality  to  pay  its 
debts  is  the  power  of  taxation.  In  cases  of  municipal  bonds  it  is 
ordinarily  provided  that  a  special  tax  shall  be  levied  on  the  prop- 
erty within  the  municipality,  subject  to  taxation  sufficient  to  pay 
the  interest  and  principal.  It  seems  clear  that  this  power  cannot 
be  taken  away  or  substantially  impaired.  It  has  been  so  decided.^ 
Where  the  legislature  has  repealed  a  municipal  charter,  or  super- 
seded a  municipality  by  dissolving  it  or  destroying  its  identity, 
without  making  provision  for  its  debts,  one  of  three  results  must 
follow:  1.  Either  the  act  which  does  this  is  wholly  void  and 
inoperative,  from  which  it  would  result  that  the  legal  existence 
and  identity  of  the  indebted  municipality  will  remain  ;  or,  2.  The 
creditor  is  without  remedy  except  by  an  appeal  to  the  legislature  ; 
or,  3.  Equity  will  assume  jurisdiction,  treating  the  property  sub- 
ject to  taxation  as  a  fund  out  of  which  the  creditor  is  entitled  to 
payment,  and  will  order  the  officers  of  the  new  organizations, 
within  which  such  property  is  situate,  to  levy  thereon  the  neces- 
sary taxes  to  pay  the  creditor.  This  last  result,  although  supposed 
by  some  to  be  inconsistent  with  views  expressed  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  in  cases  where  the  precise  question  now  under  considera- 
tion was  not  in  judgment^  has  been  judicially  sanctioned  by  the 
United  States  Circuit  Court  for  Wisconsin  ;  ^  and  where  the  cir- 

1  Ajite,  sees.  69,  70,  170,  and  cases  *  Rees  v.  Watertown,  19  "Wall.  107, 
cited ;  Broughton  v.  Pensacola,  93  U.  S.  1873  ;  Heine  v.  Levee  Commrs.,  19  Wall. 
266,  1876,  and  language  of  Field,  J.,  655,  1873 ;  Walkley  v.  Muscatine,  6  Wall, 
quoted,  ante,  sec.  172,  note;  Mumma  v.  481,  1867;  Barclay  v.  Levee  Commrs., 
Potomac  Co.,  8  Pet.  281,  1834.  93  U.  S.  258,  1876. 

2  Ante,  ch.  iv.  and  cases  there  cited.  ^  Beckwith  v.  Racine,  7  Bissell,  142, 
Pos^,  ch.  viii.  sec.  185,  e«  se^.,  as  to  legis-  1876,  Drummond  and  Dyer,  J  J.  The 
lative  power  on  division  and  re-organiza-  point  decided  may  be  briefly  stated  thus  : 
tion  of  public  and  municipal  corporations.  Where   a    municipality    owing    railroad 

*  Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy,  4  Wall.  535,  aid  bonds,  which  it  was  provided  by 
1866;  ante,  sees.  69,  70.  statute  should  be  paid  by  an  annual  tax 


§  174.] 


DISSOLUTION. 


203 


cumstances  are  such  as  that  equity  can  clearly  afford  a  practicable 
remedy  without  doing  injustice  to  others,  it  is  based  upon  con- 
siderations which  commend  themselves  to  the  sense  of  universal 
justice.  This  view,  since  the  foregoing  was  written,  has  received 
the  sanction  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.^ 

It  is  usual,  however,  for  the  legislature,  on  the  change  or  division 
of  municipal  and  public  corporations,  to  make  provision  concern- 
ing existing  indebtedness;  and  its  power  to  do  so,  unless  restrained 
by  special  constitutional  provision,  is  clear  and  ample.^ 

§  174.  (116)  It  is  the  doctrine  of  the  English  courts  that  where 
the  functions  of  an  old  corporation  are  suspended,  or  where  the 
corporation,  by  loss  of  all  its  members,  or  of  an  integral  part,  is 
dissolved  as  to  certain  purposes,  it  may  be  revived  by  a  new  char- 
ter, and  the  rights  of  the  old  corporation  be  granted  over  to  the 
same,  or  a  new  set  of  corporators,  who  in  such  case  take  all  the 
rights  and  are  subject  to  all  the  liabilities  of  the  old  corporation, 
of  which  it  is  but  a  continuation.^ 


upon  the  property  within  it,  was  legis- 
lated out  of  existence  and  the  territory 
was  included  in  three  other  municipalities 
without  any  provision  being  made  in 
respect  to  the  payment  of  tlie  bonds,  it 
was  held  that  the  legislature  had  the 
power  to  make  these  changes,  but  that 
the  obligations  of  the  contract  and  the 
power  of  taxation  still  remained.  It  was 
further  held  that  in  consequence  of  these 
changes  the  creditor  could  not  sue  at  law, 
as  service  of  process  on  the  old  corpora- 
tion could  not  be  made,  but  that  equity 
would  give  the  creditor  a  remedy'  by  re- 
quiring the  existing  corporations,  within 
whose  boundaries  tlie  property  included 
in  the  old  is  situate,  to  levy  the  necessary 
taxes  to  pay  the  debt  in  proi)ortion  to 
the  amount  of  territory  each  obtained. 
See  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwitii,  100  U.  S. 
514,  1879;  pout,  sec.  186. 

1  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beck. with,  100  U. 
S.  514,  1879;  po.s/.  sec.  186. 

2  Post,  sees.  185,  187, 188.  Wlien  two 
municipal  corporations  (St.  Anthony  and 
Old  Minneapolis)  were  merged,  by  legisla- 
tive act,  into  a  new  corporation,  it  was 
held  that  the  new  corporation,  hy  force  of 
provisions  in  the  act,  was  liable  for  a  tort, 
for  which  one  of  the  constituent  corpora- 


tions would  have  been  responsible  if  the 
merger  had  not  taken  place.  Adams  i: 
Minneapolis,  20  Minn.  484,  1874. 

2  Kex  V.  Passmore,  3  Term  R.  119, 
247 ;  Regina  v.  Bewdley,  1  P.  Wms.  207  ; 
Colchester  v.  Brooke,  7  Queen's  Bench, 
383;  Colchester  v.  Seaber,  3  Burr.  1866; 
Grant  on  Corporations,  304  and  note;  2 
Kyd,  516.  Whether  a  statute,  or  legisla- 
tive charter  will  operate  to  revive  or 
continue  an  old,  or  to  create  a  new  and 
distinct  corporation,  depends  upon  the  in- 
tention of  the  legislature.  Ante,  eh.  v.; 
Bellows  V.  Bank,  etc.,  2  Mason  C.  C. 
43,  per  Story,  J. ;  Angell  &  Ames,  sec. 
780;  Grant  on  Corporations,  304,  305; 
Hoffman  ;•.  Van  Nostrand,  42  Barb.  174  ; 
Girard  i».  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  1  ;  Olney 
V.  Harvey,  50  111.  453,  1869;  supra,  sees. 
171,  172,  173 ;  pnst,  sees.  170, 177  ;  Neely  v. 
Yorkville,  10  So.  Car.  141.  Approving 
text,  as  to  whom  the  revenue  is  to  be 
paid  on  the  dissolution  of  a  corporation  in 
New  Jersey.  See  Heckel  v.  Sandford,  40 
N.  J.  L.  180. 

The  late  civil  war  did  not  suspend  the 
right  to  the  exercise  of  the  franchises  ot 
an  incorporated  town  within  the  lines 
of  the  insurrectionary  forces,  and  it 
might  still  make  valid  contracts,  notwith- 


204  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VUI. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

CORPORATE  NAME,  BOUNDARIES,  AND  SEAL. 

Corporate  Name. 

§  175.  (117)  Every  corporation  must  have  a  name.  This  is 
essential  to  distinguish  it  from  other  corporations.  In  England, 
before  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch. 
Ixxvi.  1835,1  such  corporations  obtained  their  name  by  having  it 
expressed  in  their  charter  (whether  royal  or  parliamentary),  or 
bv  usage  or  by  implication.^  If  a  particular  name  be  given  to  a 
corporation  in  its  charter,  the  corporation  can  no  more  change 
it  at  its  pleasure  than  a  man  can  at  pleasure  change  his  baptismal 
name.  If  no  name  be  given  to  a  corporation  by  its  charter  or 
by  statute,  it  may  obtain  one  by  implication.  Where  a  corpora- 
tion exists  by  prescription,  it  may  have  more  than  one  name,  but 
the  names,  to  be  recognized  as  valid,  must  be  prescriptive,  and 
cannot  be  acquired  by  usage  within  the  time  of  memory.  It  has 
been  decided,  in  England,  that  a  corporation  may  have  one  name 
by  prescription  and  another  by  grant ;  but  it  is  said  that  the 
same  corporation  cannot,  at  the  same  time,  have  two  different 
names  by  different  grants,  for  the  name  in  the  last  grant  will 
take  the  place  of  the  other.^ 

§  176.  (118)  But  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  just  men- 
tioned, which  changed  the  corporate  constitution  of  the  cities, 
towns,  and  boroughs  of  England  and  Wales,  and  reduced  them 
to  an  uniform  model,  made  this  provision  as  to  the  name  of  the 

atanding  it  was  under  the  control  of  the  Dig.  Franch.  F.  9  ;  per  Holt,  1  Salli.  191 ; 

insurgent  power.      Sehna  v.  Mullen,  46  1    Str.    614  ;    Smith    v.    Railroad     Co., 

Ala.  411,1871.  30  Ala.  650,  1857.     See  also,  All  Saints 

1  Ante,  sec.  36,  and  note.  Church   v.  Lovett,  1    Hall   (N.  Y.),  191 ; 

2  Glover,  52,53;  Willc.  35;  Grant,  50;  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Davis,  14  Johns. 
ante,  sec.  42.  As  to  usage,  see  ante,  ch.  238  ;  Middlesex,  etc.  v.  Davis,  3  Md. 
V.  sec.  92  133  ;    Trustees  v.  Peaslee,  15  N.  H.  317  ; 

3  Knight  V.  Wells,  1  Ld.  Raym.  80;  Society,  etc.  v.  Young,  2  N.  H.  310. 
Physicians  v.  Salmon,  3  Salk.  102 ;  Com. 


§  177.]  CORPORATE    NAME.  205 

corporation,  under  the  new  act :  "  Said  body,  or  reputed  body, 
corporate  shall  take  and  bear  the  name  of  the  mayor,  aldermen, 
and  burgesses  of  such  borough,  and  by  that  name  shall  have 
perpetual  succession,  and  shall  be  capable,  in  law,  by  the  council 
hereinafter  mentioned  of  such  borough,  to  do  and  suffer  all  acts 
which  now  lawfully  they  and  their  successors  may  do  and  suifer, 
by  any  name  or  title  of  incorporation,  so  far  as  not  altered  or 
annulled  by  the  provisions  of  this  act."  i  It  is  settled  by  the 
decisions  under  this  act  that  the  true  or  proper  corporate  name 
for  boroughs  mentioned  in  it  is  "  mayor,  aldermen,  and  burgesses 

of  the  borough  of  ,"  and  (under  the  interpretation  clause, 

sec.  142  of  the  act)  for  cities,  "  mayor,  aldermen,  and  citizens  of 

the  city  of ."  ^     It  may  also  be  here  observed  that  the  courts 

have  determined  that,  though  this  act  changed  the  name  and 
made  new  and  important  alterations  in  the  constitution  of  the 
corporations,  yet  that  its  effect  was  not  in  any  case  to  create  a  new 
corporation,  but  to  continue  the  old,  with  all  their  rights,  privileges, 
and  franchises,  except  so  far  as  inconsistent  with  the  provisions 
of  the  act.3  But  the  name  mentioned  in  the  act  would  doubtless 
govern,  and  by  that  they  would  have  to  sue  and  be  sued. 

§  177.  (119)  Municipal  Charters  granted  by  legislative  enact- 
ment, in  this  country,  almost  'm\2ivmh\y  prescribe  the  name  of  the 
corporate  body  thus:  "The  inhabitants  of  the  city  or  town  of 

are  hereby  constituted  a  body  politic  and  corporate,  by  the 

name  and  style  of  'city  of  '  or  'town  of  .'"*     So  the 

general  municipal  incorporation  acts  usually  contain  a  provision 

1  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi,  sec.  6  ;  ^  Ante,  sec.  39.  Harrison  Munic. 
ante,  sec  35,  and  note.  Manual,  4th  ed.  11. 

2  Attorney  General  v.  Corporation  of  The  proper  corporate  name  of  a  mu- 
Worcester,  2  Phillips,  3 ;  Corporation  of  nicipal  corporation  ought  always  to  be 
Rochester  v.  Lee,  15  Sim.  376  ;  Grant,  used.  But  it  has  been  decided  in  Canada 
3i2  ;  Rawlinson,  13.  that  a   by-law  of  a  municipal   council  is 

3  Corporation  of  Ludlow  v.  Tyler,  7  valid  if  it  appear  on  the  face  of  it  to  have 
Car.  &  P.  537  ;  Attorney  General  v.  Wil-  been  enacted  l)y  a  municipal  body  having 
son,  9  Sim.  30,  48 ;  Attorney  General  v.  authority  to  make  the  by-law  under  the 
Kerr,  2  Beav.  420,  429  ;  Attorney  General  municipal  laws.  Flewcllyn  v.  Webster, 
i\  Corporation  of  Leicester,  9  Beav.  546  6  Oliio' St.  586;  Hawkins  i'.  Huron,  Perth 
Doe,  etc.  v.  Norton,  11  M.  &  W.  913,  928.  and  Bruce,  in  re,  2  Upper  Can,  C.  P.  72 ; 
Parke,  B.,  there  said,  "  Thougli  the  name  Fisher  v.  Vaughan,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
and  style  of  the  corporation,  and  the  mode  492;  Barclay  and  Darlington,  in  re,  11 
of  electing  members  were  changed,  the  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  470  ;  Brophy  and  Gan- 
identity  of  the  body  itself  was  not  af-  anoquo,  26  U.  C.  C.  P.  290;  see  also 
fected."     Ante,  ch.  vii.  sees.  115, 116.  Gwynne  i'.  Rccs,  2  Upper  Can.  P.  R.  282. 


206  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  VIII. 

to  the  effect  that  "  cities  and  towns  organized  or  to  be  organized 
thereunder,  are  dechired  to  be  bodies  politic  and  corporate,  under 

the  name  and  style  of  the  city  of  ,  or  town  of  ,  as  the 

case  may  be,"  etc.  Where  such  an  act  authorized  any  existing 
town  or  city  to  adopt  its  provisions  in  place  of  its  special  charter, 
and  was  silent  as  to  the  corporate  name  after  the  change  was 
made,  it  was  held  that  the  former  name  was  retained.^ 

§  178.  (1-0)  Where  a  name  is  given  to  a  municipal  corporation 
by  cliarter  or  statute^  this  cannot  be  changed  by  the  act  of  the 
corporation.^  But,  in  this  country,  general  statutes  are  not  un- 
frequent,  authorizing  the  creation  of  quasi  corporations,  without 
making  it  necessary  to  designate  the  name  by  which  a  particular 
district  shall  be  called  ;  in  such  case  it  may  acquire  a  name  hy 
reputation,  and  sue  and  be  sued  by  such  name.^ 

§  179.  (121)  A  misnomer,  or  variation  from  the  precise  name  of 
the  corporation,  in  a  grant  or  obligation  by  or  to  it,  is  not  mate- 
rial, if  the  identity  of  the  corporation  is  unmistakable,  either  from 
the  face  of  the  instrument  or  from  the  averments  and  proof.* 

1  Jolinson  V.  Indianapolis,  16  Ind.  227,  York    Conference   v.  Clarkson,   4   Halst. 

1861.      Corporate  name  of  the  city  not  Ch.  (N.  J.)  541,  1851;  Angell  &  Ames, 

judicially  noticed.    lb.    Limits  of  Indian-  sec.  185  ;  Pendleton  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky, 

apolis  are  fixed  by  public  law,  and  public  1   Mon.   177;  Medway  Cotton  Manufac- 

records  open  to  all.     Newman  v.  Sylves-  turing  Co.  v.  Adams,  10  Mass.  360  ;  People 

ter,  42  Ind.  106,  1873;  ante,  sees.  41,  83.  v.  Love,  19  Cal.  676;  African  Society  v. 

'•2  Willcock,  34,  37,  38  ;  Regina  v.  Reg-  Varick,  13  Johns.  38  ;  Woolrich  v.  For- 

istrar  Joint  Stock  Cos.,  10  Q.  B.  839.    See  rest,  1  Pa.   115  ;  Bower  ;;.  State  Bank,  5 

Episcopal,    etc.     Society     v.    Episcopal  Ark.  234 ;  Pierce  !?.  Somerworth,  10  N.  H. 

Cliurch,  1  Pick.   372.     Change    of  name  369;  Pittsburgh  v.   Craft,!  Pitts.    (Pa.) 

does  not  necessarily  involve  a  change  of  158,  1871 ;  Douglas  v.  Branch  Bank,  etc., 

identity.     Girard  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Wall.  19  Ala.    659.     Slir/ht  variances  in  tiie  use 

1 ;  ante,  ch.  vii.  sec.  174.  of  corporate  names,  where  substantially 

3  SclioolDistrict  y.  Blakeslee,  13Conn.  correct,  have  been  held  immaterial  even 

227,18.39;  The  Queen  r.  The  Registrar  in  matters  of  contract.     Brock  District  i'. 

of  Joint  Stock  Cos.,  10  Q.  B.  839  ;  Epis-  Bowen,  7  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  471 ;  The  Trent 

copal    Charitable    Society   v.    Episcopal  and  Frankford  Road  Co.  ".  Marshall,  10 

Church,   1    Pick.  372;  see   further.  The  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  336  ;  Whitby  r.  Harrison, 

King  V.  Norris,  1   Ld.  Raym.  337  ;    The  IS  Upper  Can.   Q.  B.  603 ;  Bruce  v.  Cro- 

Queen  i-.  Bailiffs  of  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  mar,  22  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  321.     See  also 

1232,  1238,  1239.     As   to   quasi  corpora-  Mayor  and  Burgesses  of  Lynne  Regis,  10 

tions,  ante,  sec.  22,  and  note;  post,  chapter  Coke  Rep.  120,  122  ;  Mayor  of  Carlisle  v. 

on  Actions.  Blamire  et  al.,  8  East,  487  ;    The  King  v. 

*  Inliabitants  r.  String,  5  Halst.  (N.  J.)  Croke,  Cowp.  29  ;  Beverley  v.  Barlow,  10 

323,  1829  ;  Neely  v.  Yorkville,  10  So.  Car.  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  178  ;  Goodwin  and  The 

141,  approving  text;  Kentucky  Seminary  Ottawa  and  Prescott  Railway  Co.,  in  re, 

V.  Wallace,  15  B.  Mon.  35,  1854 ;  New  1.3  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  254.    It  was,  how- 


180.]  CORPORATE  NAME.  207 

§  180.  (122)  Where  the  intention  of  the  testator  is  clear,  a 
mistake  in  the  name  or  description  of  the  object  of  his  bounty  will 
not  make  the  devise  void.  This  general  principle  is  applicable 
to  all  corporations,  private  and  public.  But  the  intention  must 
be  so  clear  as  to  remove  all  reasonable  doubt  as  to  the  corporation 
meant.  This  rule  may  be  illustrated  by  a  few  examples.  Thus, 
a  devise  to  a  college  by  its  common  name,  though  not  the  true 
corporate  name,  is  good.i  So,  where  the  devisees  were  called  by 
their  popular  name,  "  The  South  Parish  in  Sutton,''  their  legal 
name  being,  "  The  First  Parish  in  Sutton,"  the  devise  was  sus- 
tained.2  So,  also,  the  "  Mayor,  Jurats,  and  Commonalty  of  the 
Town  of  Rye,"  that  being  the  corporate  name,  were  held  entitled 
to  lands  by  a  devise  to  "  The  Right  Worshipful  the  Mayor,  Jurats, 
and  Town  Council  of  the  Town  of  Rye,"  although  there  was  no 
town  council  in  the  town,  and  although  the  court  admitted  the 
proposition  of  counsel  against  the  will,  that  if  the  "  intent  ap- 
pears to  give  to  a  part  of  the  corporation,  although  that  intent  fails 
of  effect,  the  whole  corporation  cannot  take."  ^  So,  also,  a  devise 
to  the  Mayor,  Chamberlain,  and  Crouernors,  is  valid  to  a  corpora- 
tion whose  true  name  is  Mayor,  Citizens,  and  Commonalty^     So,  a 

ever,  held  differently  as  to  the  entitling  particular  corporation  was  intended,  and 

of  a  rule  in  a  proceeding  against  a  munic-  that  a  latent  ambiguity  may,  under  proper 

ipal  corporation.      Sams   v.    Toronto,   9  averments,    be    explained   by  parol   evi- 

Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  181 ;  Harrison  Munic.  dence  in  this  as  in  other  cases,  to  show 

Manual,  4th  ed.  11.  tlie  mtention."     Per  Gibson,  J.,  in  Presi- 

"  The  general  rule  to  be  collected  from  dent,  etc.  v.  Myers,  6  Serg.  &  Rawle,  12 ; 

the  cases  is,"  says  Chancellor  Kent,  "  that  s.  p.  Milford,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brush,  10  Ohio, 

a  variation  from  the  precise  name  of  the  111. 

corporation,  when  tlie  true  name  is  ne-  When  an  act  of  parliament  makes  a 

cessarily  to  be  collected  from  the  instru-  grant   to   a    corporation,   it  takes   effect 

ment,  or  is  shown  by  pr(jper  averments,  tliough  the  true  corporate  name  be  not 

will  not  invalidate  a  grant  by  or  to  a  cor-  used,  provided  the  corporation  intended 

poration,  or  a  contract  with  it,  and  the  be  sufficiently  identified  or  described.     1 

modern  cases  sliow  an  increased  liberality  Kyd,  256  ;  Chancellor  of  Oxford's  Case, 

on  this  subject."     2  Kent  Com.  292  ;  ap-  iQ  Co.  44,  576. 

proved,  St.  Louis  Hospital  v.  Williams,  i  Chancellor  of  Oxford's  Case,  10  Co. 

Administrator,  19  Mo.  609,  1854.     "  We  S7h. 

adopt  the  more  reasonable  rule  laid  down  2  pirst  Parish  in    Sutton   v.    Cole,  3 

by  Mr.  Kyd  (Corp.  Vol.  I.  pp.  286,  288),  piek.  282,  1825,  and  cases  there  cited, 
that  the  variance  must  be  materially  dif-  3  Attorney  General  v.  Mayor  of  Rye, 

ferent  in  substance,  to.  injure."     Per  Cn-  7  Taunton,  546 ;  2  Eng.  Com.  Law,  213, 

riam,   People   v.   Runkle,  9  Johns.    147,  1817. 
1^7.  4  Owen,  35  (UYAh.).     "The  devise 

"I  take  the  law  of  the  present  day  to  held  good  by  Dijer,  nVs/o»,and  ifnnwoorl, 

be,  that  a  departure  from  the  strict  style  of  for  it  shall  be  taken  according  to  tlie  in- 

the   corporation   will   not  avoid  its  con-  tent  of  the  devisor."     See  also  Connden 

tracts,  if  it  substantially  appear  that  the  r.  Gierke,  Hobart,  32 ;  Croydon  Hospital 


208 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  VIII, 


legacy  may  be  given  or  a,  devise  made  to  a  corporation  either  by 
its  corporate  name  or  by  a  description  wliicli  clearly  distinguishes 
and  identities  the  legatee.^ 

§  181.  (123)  Where  the  name  of  the  corporation  is  expressly 
defined  by  charter  or  statute,  it  is  usually  provided  in  terms  that 
by  such  name  it  may  sue  and  he  sued.  In  such  case  the  true  cor- 
porate name  should  be  used  both  in  suits  by  and  against  the 
corporation.  A  name  in  a  grant  or  obligation  to  or  b}'  a  corpoi-a- 
tion  may  be  sufficient  to  enable  the  corporation  to  enjoy  or  to 
make  it  liable,  which  would  not  be  sufficient  in  an  action  by  or 
against  it.^  If  the  name  of  a  corporation  is  lawfully  changed, 
not  the  identity  of  the  corporation  itself,  suit  should,  in  general, 
unless  provision  be  otherwise  made,  be  in  the  new  name.^  If  a 
note,  bond,  or  other  promise  be  made  to  a  corporation  by  a  name 
differing  from  the  corporate  name,  the  corporation  may  sue  in  its 
true  name,  and  allege  that  it  is  the  party  to  whom  the  promise  or 
obligation  was  made.* 


V.  Farley,  G  Taunton,  467;  1  Eng. 
Com.  Law,  457,  1816,  where  Gihhs,  C. 
J.,  justly  condemns  the  absurd  nicety  of 
many  of  the  decisions  from  the  reign  of 
Edward  VI.  to  the  end  of  James  I.  on 
the  subject  of  the  names  and  description 
of  corporate  bodies. 

1  New  York  Institute  v.  How,  10  N.  Y. 
(6  Seld.)  84, 1854.  In  this  case  the  plain- 
tiff, whose  corporate  name  was,  "  The 
New  York  Institution  for  the  Blind,"  was 
decided  to  be  entitled  to  a  legacy  given 
to  the  "  Trustees  of  the  Institution  for 
the  Maintenance  and  Instruction  of  the 
Indigent  Blind,"  there  being  no  other  in- 
stitution in  the  city  of  New  York  for  the 
blind.  See  also  Vansnnt  v.  Boberts,  3 
Md.  119;  Preachers'  Aid  Societj%  45  Me. 
552:  Chapin  v.  School  District,  etc.,  35 
N.  H.  445;  Minot  i\  Boston  Asylum,  7 
Met.  416.  Parol  evidence  may,  in  proper 
cases,  be  received  to  identify  the  corpo- 
ration intended.  Trustees  v.  Peaslee,  15 
N.  H.  317  ;  Bodman  v.  American  Tract 
Society,  9  Allen,  447. 

2  Cambridge  University  v.  Crofts,  10 
Mod.  208;  1  Kyd,  253;  Willc.  37;  Brit- 
tan  V.  Newland,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  (North 
Car.)  363;  Insane  Asylum  v.  Higgins, 
15  111.  185;  Berks  Co.,  etc  v.  Myers,  0 


Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  12;  Clark  v.  Potter 
Co.,  1  Barr  (Pa.),  163;  Porter  r.  Blakely, 
1  Root  (Conn.), 440;  Kentucky  Seminary 
V.  Wallace,  15  B.  Mon.  35;  Romeo  v. 
Chapman,  2  Mich.  179 ;  County  Court 
V.  Griswold,  58  Mo.  175,  1874;  Corder 
V.  Commrs.,  16  Ohio  St.  .353  ;  Trustees  v. 
Campbell,  16  Ohio  St.  11. 

3  Mayor,  etc.  of  Colchester,  3  Burr. 
1866  ;  Regina  v.  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym. 
1232,  1238;  Angell  &  Ames,  sec.  644; 
Glover,  63.  Mr.  Kyd  says  :  "  Where  a 
corporation  becomes  liable  to  any  duty, 
and  then  its  name  is  changed,  the  writ 
brought  against  it  should  be  in  the  new 
name.'  1  Corp.  288.  On  a  merger,  by 
statute,  of  a  toini  into  a  city  corporation,  it 
was  provided  that  all  of  the  books,  papers, 
moneys,' and  effects  of  the  former  should 
vest  in  the  latter.  Held,  that  a  suit  on  a 
bond  made  to  a  town  before  the  transfer 
could  not  afterwards  be  instituted  in  the 
name  of  the  town,  but  should  be  brought 
in  the  corporate  name  of  the  city.  Port 
Wayne  v.  Jackson,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  36, 
1843. 

<  10  Co.  125&;  1  Kyd,  287;  African 
Society  r.  Yarick,  13  Johns.  38,  1816; 
Trustees  r.  Reneau,  2  Swan  (Tenn.),  94, 
1852 ;  Fort  Wayne  v.  Jackson,  7  Blackf 


§  182.] 


CORPORATE   BOUNDARIES. 


209 


Corporate  Boundaries. 

§  182.  (124)  Since  the  leading  object  of  an  American  muni- 
cipal corporation  is  to  invest  the  inhabitants  of  a  defined  locality 
or  place  with  a  corporate  existence,  chiefly  for  the  purposes  of  local 
government,  it  is  obvious  that  the  geographical  limits  or  boun- 
daries of  the  corporation  ought  to  be  defined  and  certain.  These 
boundaries  are  usually  described  in  the  charter  or  constituent  act, 
or  a  method  is  prescribed  therein,  by  which  they  may  be  ascer- 
tained and  settled.  Because  residence  within  the  corporation 
confers  rights  and  imposes  duties  upon  the  residents,  and  the 
local  jurisdiction  of  the  incorporated  place  is,  in  most  cases,  con- 
fined to  the  limits  of  the  corporation,. it  is  necessary  that  these 
limits  be  definitely  fixed.^     They  are   established  by  legislative 

the  purpose  of  civil  and  criminal  juris- 
diction. Palmer  v.  Hicks,  6  Johns.  13.3, 
1810. 

In  New  Hampshire,  towns  bounded  by 
or  on  rivers  not  navigable,  or  by  lines  up 
and  down  the  river,  extend  to  the  centre 
of  the  river,  and  this  principle  is  held  to 
apply  to  the  great  streams,  the  Connec- 
ticut and  the  Merrimack.   State  v.  Canter- 


(Ind.)  36,1843.  An  allegation  that  the 
defendants  acknowedged  themselves  to  be 
bound  unto  the  plaintiff's,  hi/  the  descrip- 
tion, etc.,  is  equivalent  to  such  an  aver- 
ment.    13  Johns.  38,  supra. 

1  Cutting  f.*  Stone,  7  Vt.  471 ;  Gray  v. 
Sheldon,  8  lb.  402.  Pierce  v.  Carpenter, 
10  lb.  480.      The  general  rule  is  that  muni- 


cipal corporations  cannot  exercise    their 

powers  beyond  their  own  limits,  but  there     bury,  8  Post.  (28  N.  H.)  19-5, 1854  ;  State  v. 

are  some  exceptions,  as  for  example  to  pro-     Gilmanton,  14  N.  H.  467.     See,  also,  Cold 


vide  for  the  discharge  of  sewage.  Coldwater 
r.  Tucker,  36  Mich.  474,  1877;  s.  c.  24 
Am.  Rep.  601.  As  to  boundaries  generally, 
and  construction  of  acts  relating  thereto, 
see  Hamilton  v.  McNeil,  13  Gratt.  (Va.) 
389 ;  Raab  v.  Maryland,  7  Md.  483 ;  Green 
V.  Cheek,  5  Ind.  10.5  ;  People  v.  Carpenter, 
24  N.  Y.  86 ;  Elraendorf  y.  Mayor,  etc.,  25 
Wend.  693  ;  post,  sees.  562, 6.34.  A  munici- 
pal corporation  cannot  usually  exercise  its 
powers  beyond  its  own  limits.  Consider- 
ations of  public  policy  sometimes  induce 
the  legislature  to  grant  authority  to  do  so, 
as  where  a  water  supply  must  be  obtained 
from  a  distance.  Coldwater  v.  Tucker, 
36  Mich.  474,  1877. 

The  following  cases  relate  to  questions 
which  have  arisen  with  respect  to  places 
bounded  on  rivers.  An  act  extending  the 
bounds  of  a  town  over  the  adjacent  navi- 
gable waters  does  not  thereby  grant  to  the 
town  the  land  covered  by  the  water,  and 
consequently  confers  no  right  to  make 
rules  to  regulate  the  use  of  such  land, 
although  such  an  act  will  bring  the  ter- 
ritory within  the  limits  of  the  town  for 

VOL.  I.  14 


Springs,  etc.   v.  Tolland,  9  Cush.  492. 

In  Connecticut,  towns  bounded  on  rivers, 
in  some  instances  take  the  land  on  each 
side  of  the  river,  in  which  case  the  whole 
river  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
town.  In  other  instances,  where  towns 
are  bounded  on  rivers  the  jurisdiction 
thereof  is  construed,  without  any  express 
provision  to  that  effect,  and  in  virtue  of 
ancient  usage  to  that  effect,  to  extend  to 
the  centre  of  the  stream.  Opposite  towns 
have  each  political  and  civil  jurisdiction 
to  the  centre,  though  the  charter  limits 
extend  only  to  the  stream  or  margin  or 
channel  thereof.  Pratt  v.  State  (assault 
on  officer  on  the  river  Connecticut),  5 
Conn.  388,  1824  ;  Ilayden  v.  Noyes  (oyster 
fishery  on  the  Connecticut  River),  lb.  391, 
395.  Hosmer,  C.  J.  (lb.  395),  remarks : 
"  Every  part  of  the  Connecticut  River,  so 
far  as  it  relates  to  jurisdiction,  is  within 
some  town  in  the  state  ;  or  these  waters 
would  be  a  sanctuary  for  debtors  or  crimi- 
nals. Such  has  been  the  invariable  usage." 

The  jurisdiction  of  Brooklyn,  for  police 
purposes,  extends  to  low-water  line  whether 


210  MUNICIPAL   COIirOllATIONS.  [CII.  Till. 

aiithority.     The  power  to  incorporate  a  place  necessarily  includes 
the  power  to  lix  and  change  its  boundaries.^ 

§  183.  Tlie  fundamental  idea  of  a  municipal  corporation  proper^ 
both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  is  to  invest  compact  or  dense 
populations  with  the  poiver  of  local  self-government.  Indeed,  the 
necessity  for  such  corporations  springs  from  the  existence  of 
centres  or  agglomerations  of  population,  having,  by  reason  of 
density  and  numbers,  local  or  peculiar  interests  and  wants,  not 
common  to  adjoining  sparsely  settled  or  agricultural  region.  It  is 
necessary  to  draw  the  line  which  separates  the  limits  of  the  place 
and  people  to  be  incorporated.  This  is  with  us  a  legislative  func- 
tion.'^ And,  therefore,  in  a  special  charter  incorporating  a  place, 
the  boundaries  are  expressly  defined  in  the  charter  itself,  and  the 
poiver  of  the  legislation  hy  its  direct  action  thus  to  determine  the 
extent  of  the  geographical  limits  of  the  corporation  is  very  broad, 
and  in  fact  unlimited,  except  where  the  provisions  of  the  charter 
are  such  as  would  contravene  constitutional  limitations,  express 
or  implied. 

But  where  municipalities  are  organized  under  general  statutes 
no  expression  of  the  legislative  will  as  to  the  exact  boundaries  of 
any  particular  place  proposing  to  become  incorporated  can  be 
made.  The  vital  question  of  boundaries  must  then  be  determined 
in  some  other  mode.  The  legislation  of  the  different  states  in 
which  this  system  of  organizing  municipal  corporations  has  been 
adopted,  is  not  uniform  in  its  details  ;  but  the  authority  to  incor- 

formed  naturally  or  artificiiiUy.     Furinan  towns  bounding  on  a  river  running  be- 

Street,  17  Wend.  649,  661.     See  Udall  v.  tween  them.     Brookline  v.  Westminster, 

Trustees,  19  Jolms.  175,  lb.  179,  as  to  boun-  4  Vt.  224 ;  Granby  v.  Thurston,  23  Conn, 

dary  of  Neiv  York  City.     By  statute,  the  416. 

bounds  of  Albany  extend  to  the  middle  of  The  same  construction  that  is  given  to 

the  Hudson  River.     9  Wend.  602.     East-  grants  is  given  to  statutes  which  prescribe 

em  boundary  line  of  St.  Louis  was  de-  the  boundary  of  incorporated  territories, 

fined  by  the  charter  to  be  the  Mississippi  Thus,  where  a  stream   not  navigable   is 

River,  and  it  was  held  to  extend  to  the  made   the  boundary,  the  centre  of  the 

middle  of  the  stream,  and  not  simply  to  stream  is  the  true  line.     Cold  Springs, 

the  bank.     Jones  v.  Soulard,  24  How.  41,  etc.  v.  Tolland,  9  Cush.  492,  1852  (action 

I860.  for  defective  bridge) ;  Inhabitants  of  Ips- 

Where  the   riparian   proprietor  only  wich,  13  Pick.  431 ;  Granger  y.  Avery,  64 

owns  to  high-water  mark,  and  all  below  Me.  292,  1874. 

belongs   to  the  state,  a  city  cannot  tax  i  Galesburg  u.  Hawkinson,  75  111.156, 

lots  covered  by  water  beyond  high-water  1874. 

mark.     State  v.  Jersey  City,  I  Dutch.  (N.  «  Ante,  sees.  9, 19,  22,  28,  29,  32,  37,  41, 

J.)  525;  76.  530.  44,54,58. 

Statute  duty  as  to  bridges  of  adjacent 


184.] 


CORPOKATE   BOUNDARIES. 


211 


porate  has  usually  been  restricted  as  in  England  to  cases  in  which 
communities  more  or  less  dense  and  populous  already  exist,  and 
who  desire  to  take  on  a  corporate  character  in  order  to  exercise 
the  powers  of  local  government.^  When  duly  organized  their 
powers  are  prescribed  and  defined  by  the  general  incorporating 
statutes.  But  how  and  by  whom  is  the  extent  of  territory  to  be 
included  within  the  corporate  limits  (which  necessarily  settles 
what  propert}-  and  what  persons  will  become  subject  to  municipal 
rule)  to  be  determined?  Unless  specially  restrained,  the  legisla- 
ture may  delegate  this  power  to  appropriate  local  bodies  or  boards 
or  officers  ;  ^  but  it  has  in  several  cases  been  made  a  question  how 
far  this  power,  which  is  essentially  political  or  administrative,  may 
be  conferred  upon  the  judicial  courts. 

This  depends  somewhat  upon  local  constitutions,  laws,  and 
usages ;  and  the  principal  cases  on  the  subject  are  referred  to  in 
the  note.^ 

§  184.  (125)  There  cannot  he,  at  the  same  time,  ivithin  the 
same  territory,  two  distinct  municipal  corporations,  exercising  the 
same  powers,  jurisdictions,  and  privileges.* 


1  Peoplev.  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451, 1874  ; 
s.  c.  18,  Am.  Kep.  107,  where  this  subject 
is  learnedly  examined  by  Campbell,  J., 
from  whose  opinion  the  doctrines  of  the 
text  have  mainly  been  deduced. 

-  People  V.  Bennett,  supra ;  Blanchard 
t'.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96,  1860  ;  People  c. 
Carpenter,  24  N.  Y.  86,  1861 ;  Devore's 
Appeal,  56  Pa.  St.  163 ;  Borough  of 
Blooming  Valley,  lb.  66.  Osgood  v. 
Clark,  (J  Post.  (26   N.  H.)  307. 

In  the  People  v.  Bennett,  supra,  arising 
under  the  Michigan  Statute  of  187.3,  for  tlie 
general  incorporation  of  villages  within 
any  two  square  miles  of  territory',  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  incorporate  as  one 
two  village  settlements  separated  by  in- 
tervening farms ;  it  was  held  that  the 
statute  was  unconstitutional  because  it 
allowed  the  petitioners  for  incorporation 
to  decide  upon  extent  of  tcrritor}'  to  be 
incorporated  and  because  the  legislature 
had  attempted  to  delegate  legislative 
powers  in  this  respect  to  private  citizens, 
instead  of  legal  bodies,  boards,  or  officers, 
no  notice,  no  hearing,  and  no  right  to  a* 
hearing  being  provided. 


^  People  V.  Bennett,  supra,  and  cases 
cited  in  last  note.  But  compare  with 
People  V.  Nevada,  6  Cal.  143,  in  which  it 
was  held  that  the  judicial  courts  could 
not  be  empowered  to  act  in  the  incorpo- 
ration of  towns,  because  it  was  not  a  judi- 
cial act.  Co}itra,Kayserv.  Trustees,  etc., 
10  Mo.  88;  an/e,  sec.  41,  note.  In  Illinois 
it  has  been  decided  that  the  legislature 
cannot  constitutionally  confer  upon  the 
judicial  courts  the  power  to  change  the 
boundaries  of  municipalities  by  annexing 
or  disannexing  territory,  as  such  acts  are 
legislative  and  not  judicial.  Galesburg  v. 
Hawkinson,  75  III.  152.  See,  however, 
Blanchard  t-.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96, 1860 ; 
post,  sec. 185,  note. 

*  Willc.  on  Corp.  27  ;  Patterson  v.  So- 
ciety, etc.,  4  Zabr.  24  N.  J.  L.  385,  399, 
prr  Green,  C.  J.,  1854;  Rex  v.  Passniore, 
3  Term  R.  243 ;  Rex  v.  Amery,  2  Bro.  P. 
C.  33(i ;  Grant  on  Corp.  18.  "  This,"  says 
Oshorn,  J.,  "  is  a  self-evident  proposition." 
Taylor  v.  Fort  Wayne,  47  Ind.  281,  1874. 

The  city  of  Chicago  adopted  an  ordi- 
nance prohibiting  any  person,  company, 
or  corporation  within  the  city,  or  tcit/iin 


212 


MUNICirAL   CORrOllATIONS. 


[cn.  VIII. 


§  185.  (1'26)  Not  only  may  the  legislature  originally  fix  the 
limits  of  the  eoi'i")oration,  but  it  may,  ii)dei<s  speclallij  restrained  in 
the  constitution^  subsequently  annex,  or  authorize  the  annexation 
of,  contiguous  or  other  territory,  and  this  without  the  consent, 
and  even  against  the  remonstrance,  of  the  majority  of  the  persons 
residing  in  the  corporation  or  on  the  annexed  territory.  And  it 
is  no  constitutional  objection  to  the  exercise  of  this  power  of 
compulsory  annexation  that  the  property  thus  brought  Avithin 
the  corporate  limits  will  be  subject  to  taxation  to  discharge  a 
pre-existing  municipal  indebtedness,  since  this  is  a  matter  which, 
in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  restriction,  belongs  wholly 
to  the  legislature  to  determine.^ 


a  mile  of  the  city  limits,  from  en(]agin<j  in  the 
businesf.  of  slawjhtering  animals  for  food,  or 
packing  them  for  market,  or  retulering 
the  offal,  bones,  etc.,  of  any  dead  animal 
matter,  etc.,  .  .  .  until  they  shall  have 
obtained  a  license  therefor.  The  defen- 
dant was  a  corporation,  organized  under 
the  laws  of  the  state,  and  when  the  suit 
was  instituted  against  tlie  company  it  was 
carrying  on  the  kind  of  business  men- 
tioned in  the  ordinance.  Its  factory  was 
in  Cook  County,  outside  of  the  city  limits, 
and  within  the  town  of  Lake,  in  that  county, 
and  it  had  then  a  license  from  the  town 
of  Lake  to  carry  on  the  kind  of  business 
it  was  engaged  in,  but  had  no  license 
from  the  city  of  Chicago.  It  was  urged 
that  the  city  of  Chicago  had  no  power  to 
pass  or  enforce  the  ordinance.  Wallcer, 
J.,  who  delivered  the  opinion,  after  a 
careful  discussion  of  the  questions,  viz. : 

1.  Whether  the  General  Assembly  had 
granted  the  power  to  the  city  of  Chicago 
to  pass  an  ordinance  of  such  a  character ; 

2.  Whether  the  power  was  also  granted 
to  exercise  police  restraint  outside  of  the 
city  limits,  and  within  another  munici- 
pality, saj^s :  "We  must  conclude  that 
the  General  Assembly,  rather  than  subject 
one  large  city  to  such  hazards  from 
smaller  municipalities  in  their  immediate 
vicinity,  would  have  repealed  the  charter 
of  the  latter,  or  at  least  curtailed  their 
power.  What  in  the  open  and  thinly 
settled  country  would  not  be  obnoxious 
as  a  nuisance,  would  in  the  heart  of  a 
city  be  a  terrible  nuisance.  Persons  then 
desiring  to  engage   in  or  near  to  cities 


must  submit  to  have  their  pursuits  lim- 
ited and  contracted.  Whilst  trade,  manu- 
factures, and  commerce  have  large  claims 
on  the  laws  for  protection,  theirs  is  not 
theonly,  nor  have  they  the  liighest  claims. 
.  .  .  To  accomplish  this  purpose  (pro- 
tect healtli  and  lives),  the  power  was 
conferred  by  the  legislature  upon  cities 
and  villages  to  regulate  these  establish- 
ments for  the  distance  of  one  mile  beyond 
their  corporate  limits,  even  if  that  should 
lap  over  and  embrace  a  portion  of  terri- 
tory embraced  in  the  boundaries  of 
another  municipality."  Chicago  Pack- 
ing Co.  V.  Chicago,  88  111.  221,  1879. 
Where  the  boundary  line  of  a  corporation 
was  vague  and  indefinite,  the  practical 
interpretation  which  had  been  given  to 
the  statute  by  the  citizens  of  the  disputed 
district  in  exercising  municipal  privileges, 
such  as  voting,  etc.,  was  adopted  by  the 
court.  Milne  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  13  La.  69, 
1838.  See  also  Hamilton  v.  McNeil,  13 
Graft.  (Va.),  389,  185G;  post,  sec.  420,  n. 
Boundaries  may  be  defined  by  long  use, 
confirmed  by  a  legislative  recognition. 
People  V.  Farnham,  35  111.  562.  If  a  dwell- 
ing-house is  divided  by  the  boundary  line 
between  two  towns,  that  portion  of  the 
house  which  the  occupant  mainly  and 
substantially  makes  his  home  (as  by 
sleeping,  eating,  etc.)  fixes  his  residence, 
and  he  cannot  elect  to  reside  and  be  taxed 
in  the  other  town.  Chenery  v.  Waltham, 
8  Cush.  .327. 

1  Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96, 
1860,  defining  rontigui/i/  and  construing 
statute  authorizing  county  commissioners 


§  186.] 


COKPORATE   BOUNDARIES. 


213 


§  186.  Where  no  constitutional  restriction  exists,  the  corporate 
existence  and  powers  of  counties,  cities,  and  towns  are  subject  to 


to  annex  ;  following  and  approving  Pow- 
ers V.  Wood  County,  8  Oliio  St.  285, 1858. 
See  also  Laramie  County  i:  Albany 
County,  92  U.  S.  307.  1875 ;  Queen  i-.  Lo- 
cal Governing  Board,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  227; 
Woods  V.  Henry,  55  Mo.  560 ;  Giboney  v. 
Girardeau,  58  :Mo.  141 ;  State  v.  McRey- 
nolds,  61  Mo.  203,  1875;  Layton  v.  New 
Orleans,  12  La.  An.  515,  18-57  ;  Arnoult 
I'.  New  Orleans,  11  lb.  54;  Cheany  v. 
Hooser,  9  B.  Mon.  330;  Gorham  v. 
Springfield,  21  Me.  59  ;  Morford  v.  Unger, 

8  Iowa,  82,  18.59 ;  St.  Louis  i'.  Russell, 

9  Mo.  503,  1845 ;  St.  Louis  v.  Allen,  13 
Mo.  400,  1850;  Smith  v.  McCarthy,  56 
Pa.  St  359;  Chandler  v.  Boston,  112 
Mass.  200,  1873 ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Spear- 
man, 12  Iowa,  112;  Wade  v.  Richmond, 
18  Gratt.  (Va.)  583,  1868;  Norris  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  1  Swan  (Tenn.),  164  ;  Elston 
V.  Crawfordsville,  20  Ind.  272 ;  Edmunds 
r.  Gookins,  lb.  ill ;  Girard  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 7  Wall.  1,  1868;  Opinion  of  Jus- 
tices, 6  Cush.  580;  Warren  v.  Charles- 
town,  2  Gray,  104  ;  Covington  v.  East  St. 
Louis,  78  111.  548.  "  It  would  require," 
says  Swan,  J.,  in  Powers  v.  Wood  County, 
8  Ohio  St.  28-5,  290,  "  a  very  artificial  and 
unsound  mode  of  reasoning  to  hold  that 
territory  could  not  be  annexed  to  a  town 
which  owed  debts,  until  the  owners  of 
such  territory  were  paid  a  compensation 
in  money  for  a  proportional  part  of  such 
debts,  on  the  ground  that  the  property 
annexed  was  condemned  for  public  use. 
It  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  a  municipal 
corporation  has  contracted  a  debt  without 
being  correspondingly  benefited."  The 
doctrine  of  the  text  approved.  United 
States  V.  Mempiiis,  97  U.  S.  284,  1877  ; 
ante,  ch.  iv.  In  Michujan  there  are  rnnsti- 
tuiional  limitations  on  the  riglit  of  the  leg- 
islature to  change,  except  as  provided  in 
the  constitution,  municipal  boundaries  so 
far  as  to  interfere  witli  repr^.i^ntative  dis- 
tricts. Attorney  General  v.  Bradley,  36 
Mich.  447,  1877 ;  Attorney  General  v. 
Holiiian,  29  Mich.  116. 

It  is  held  in  Pennsi/lrania  that  under 
the  terms  of  the  act  of  the  legislature  au- 
thorizing the  incorporation  of  villages, 
the  boundaries  cannot  be  extended  so  as 


to  include  a  large  body  of  farm  lands ; 
but  the  district  to  be  incorporated  should 
be  restricted  by  the  courts  in  which  the 
proceeding  is  had,  so  as  to  include  no 
more  than  the  village  itself  and  its  proper 
territory.  Borough  of  Little  Meadows, 
35  Pa.  St.  335,  1860;  Devore's  Appeal, 
56  Pa.  St.  163 ;  Blooming  Valley,  lb.  66. 
These  cases  commented  on  bj'  Campbell, 
J.  People  V.  Bennett,  29  Mich.  451, 1874 ; 
s.  c.  18  Am.  Rep.  107.  See  chapter  on 
Taxation,  post,  sees.  794,  795. 

In  Indiana,  under  act  of  June  18,  1852, 
lots  adjoining  a  city,  which  are  laid  off, 
platted,  and  recorded,  may  be  included 
within  the  city  limits  by  resolution  of  the 
common  council.  Contiguous  territory 
not  thus  laid  off,  etc.,  can  only  be  an- 
nexed by  petition  to  the  board  of  county 
commissioners.  Jeffersonville  v.  Weeras, 
5  Ind.  (Porter)  547, 1854.  Construction  of 
existing  laws  on  subject  of  annexation  of 
Platte  Territory,  Taylor  v.  Fort  Wayne, 
49  Ind.  274,  1874. 

Effect  of  extension  of  corporate  limits 
on  homestead  rit/ht,  where  different  pro- 
visions are  made  for  country  and  town 
homesteads.  Taylor  v.  Boulware,  17 
Tex  74 ;  Pinley  v.  Dietrick,  12  Iowa, 
516 ;  Truax  v.  Pool,  40  Iowa,  2-56. 

Ordinances  or  contracts  designed  to 
operate  throughout  the  city  at  large,  ex- 
tend to  and  operate  witliin  subsequent 
enlarged  municipal  limits.  St.  Louis  Gas 
Co.  V.  St.  Louis,  46  Mo.  121,  1870. 

Recordi\ig  town  plats.  Bemis  v.  Becker, 
1  Kan.  226 ;  Mason  v.  Pitt,  21  Mo.  391 ; 
Strong  V.  Darling,  9  Ohio,  201  ;  post,  sec. 
628. 

As  to  taxation,  for  general  municipal 
purposes,  of  rural  property  within  corpo- 
rate limits,  and  the  restrictions  on  the 
right,  see  chapter  on  Taxation,  post,  sees. 
794,  795. 

Locality,  under  the  Canadian  system 
of  municipal  government,  is  subject  to 
taxation.  Each  portion  of  a  county  there- 
fore should  bear  its  proper  proportion  of 
the  taxation  of  the  whole  county.  Where 
a  portion  is  detaclied  from  one  and  added 
to  another  county,  some  mode  of  adjust- 
ment of  existing  liabilities  becomes  indis- 


214  MUNICIPAL   COKrORATIONS.  [CH.  VIII. 

legislative  control.  Where  a  municipal  corporation  is  legislated 
out  of  existence  and  its  territory  antiexed  to  other  corporations,  the 
latter,  unless  the  legislature  otherwise  provides,  become  entitled 
to  its  property  and  severally  liable  for  a  proportionate  share  of 
its  then  subsisting  legal  debts  and  vested  with  the  power  to  raise 
revenue  wherewith  to  pay  them  by  levying  taxes  upon  the  prop- 
erty transferred  and  the  persons  residing  therein.  The  remedy 
of  the  creditors  of  the  extinguislied  corporation  is  in  equity  against 
the  corporations  succeeding  to  its  property  and  powers.^ 

§  187.  (127)  In  connection  with  the  power  of  the  legislature 
to  create  corporations  and  determine  their  territorial  extent, 
reference  may  be  made  to  the  division  of  towns  or  public  corpora- 
tions by  legislative  act  or  authority.  Tliere  is  no  restriction  on 
the  general  power,  unless  it  be  found  in  the  constitution  of  the 
state.^  In  case  of  division,  the  legislature  may,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  apportion  the  burden  between  the  two,  and  determine  the 
proportion  to  be  borne  by  each.^  In  Connecticut,  "  the  legisla- 
ture," says  the  Supreme  Court,  "  have  immemorially  exercised 
the  power  of  dividing  towns  at  its  pleasure,  and  upon  such  divi- 
sion, apportioning  the  common  property  and  common  burdens 
in  such  manner  as  to  it  shall  seem  reasonable  and  equitable."  ■* 

pensable.     See  MeKee  v.  Huron  District  ^  Ante,  sec.  63,  et  seq. ;  Londonderry  v. 

Court,  1   Upper   Can.  Q.  B.  368  ;  North  Derry,  8  N.  H.  320,  1836 ;  Bristol  v.  New 

Dumfries  v.  The  County  of  Waterioo,  12  Chester,  3  N.  H.  532 ;  Sill  v.  Corning,  15 

Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  507 ;  County  of  Wei-  N.  Y.   297  ;    People   v.  Draper,  lb.  532 ; 

lington  V.  Township  of  Waterloo,  8  Up-  Smith  v.  Adrian,  1  Mich.  495 ;  Waring  v. 

per  Can.  C.  P.  358 ;  County  of  Welling-  Mobile,  24  Ala.  701 ;   Mayor  v.  State,  15 

ton   V.  Township  of   Wilmot,   17    Upper  Md.  376;   Love  ??.  Schenck,  12  Ire.  Law, 

Can.  Q.  B.  82;  Windham  v.  Poriland,  4  304,    1851;    Love   v.    Ramsour,   lb.   328, 

Mass.    384  ;    Hampshire   v.  Franklin,    16  1855  ;  Olney  v.  Harvey,  50  111.  453 ;  Sedg- 

Mass.  75 ;  Plunkett's  Creek  v.  Crawford,  wick  Co.  v.  Bailey,  11  Kan.  631,  1873; 

27  Penn.  St.  107;  New  London  w.  Mont-  Sangamon  County  y.  Springfield,  63111.  66, 

ville,  1   Root  (Conn.),  184;  North   Yar-  1873;  Dunsmore's  Appeal,52Pa.  St.  374 ; 

mouth  V.  Skillings,  45  Me.  133 ;  Lakin  v.  Barclay  v.  Levee  Commrs.,  93  U.  S.  258, 

Ames,  10  Cush.  198;  Brewster  t'.  Harwich,  1876;    Broughton  i;.  Pensacola,  93  U.S. 

4  Mass.  278 ;  Randolph  v.  Braintree,  Jb.  266,  1876  ;  County  Court  v.  County  Court, 

315;    Blackstone   v.  Taft,   4   Gray,  250;  3  Bush  (Ky.),  93.     And  see  an^e,  ch.  iv. 

Hartford  Bridge  Co.  v.  East  Hartford,  16  for  a  general  view  of  the  extent  of  the 

Conn.    149  ;    East   Hartford   v.   Hartford  legislative  authority  over  public  and  mu- 

Bridge  Co.,  17  Conn.  80;  Crawford  County  nicipal  corporations  and  their  rights,  lia- 

V.  Iowa  County,  2  Chand.  (Wis.)  14.  bilities,  property,  and  contracts  ;   and  ch. 

1  Mount  Pleasant  v.  Beckwith,  100  vii.  as  to  the  dissolution  of  municipal  cor- 
U.  S.  514,  1879;  mite,  sees.  168,  173;  in-  porations  and  its  effect  upon  their  credi- 
fra,  sees.  187,  188,  189.  tors  and  property. 

2  Ante,  ch.  iv.  sees.  54,  63 ;  supra,  sec  *  Granby  v.  Thurston,  23  Conn.  416, 
186.  419,  per  Wake,  C.  J. ;  Willimantic  Society 


§  188.] 


CORPORATE   BOUNDARIES. 


215 


Accordingly,  it  may  impose  on  one  town,  upon  such  division,  the 
entire  expense  of  erecting  and  maintaining  a  bridge  across  a  river 
which  is  the  dividing  line  between  the  two  towns.^ 

§  188.  (128)  On  the  division  of  a  town  or  public  corporation 
possessi7ig  corporate  property^  into  two  separate  towns  or  commu- 
nities, eacli^  in  the  absence  of  a  different  provision  by  the  legisla- 
ture, was  considered  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Neio  York  to  be 
entitled  to  hold  in  severalty  the  public  p>roperty  which  fell  within 
its  limits.2     In  Connecticut^  it  is  declared  to  be  "  well  settled  that 


V.  School  Society  (division  of  scliool  so- 
cieties and  funds),  14  Conn.  457  ;  Hart- 
ford Bridge  Co.  v.  East  Hartford  (ferry 
franchise),  16  Conn.  149;  affirmed,  10 
How.  (U.  S.)  511,  541 ;  Laramie  County  v. 
Albany  County,  92  U.  S.  307,  1875.  Leg- 
islature cannot  control  an  educational 
fund  raised  by  individual  bounty  and  not 
by  taxation  (Plymouth  v.  Jackson,  15 
Pa.  St.  44),  or  direct  a  division  of  the 
funds  between  two  towns  different  from 
that  which  is  prescribed  in  the  will  of  the 
donor.  Greenville  i-.  Mason,  53  N.  H.  515, 
1873.  See,  also,  Montpelier  i-.  East  Mont- 
pelier,  27  Vt.  704 ;  29  lb.  12 ;  ante,  sees. 
64,  80,  85,  171. 

1  Granby  v.  Thurston,  supra ;  ante,  sec. 
7L 

The  tenacity  with  which  the  people  of 
New  England  cling  to  the  popular  or  town 
form  of  government  has  been  before  no- 
ticed (arile,  sees.  28,  29)  ;  and  the  Consti- 
tution of  Massachusetts  in  the  second 
amendment,  accepted  in  1821,  contains  the 
provision  tiiat  the  legislature  "  shall  have 
full  power  and  authority  to  erect  and  con- 
stitute municipal  or  city  governments,  in 
any  corporate  town  or  towns  in  this  com- 
monwealth, ....  provided,  that  no  such 
government  shall  be  erected  or  consti- 
tuted in  any  town  not  containing  12,000 
inhabitants,  nor  unless  it  be  with  tlie  con- 
sent and  on  the  application  of  a  majority 
of  the  inhabitants  of  such  town  present 
and  voting  thereon  at  a  meeting  duly 
warned  and  holden  for  that  purpose." 
On  May  16,  1873,  the  legislature,  without 
any  application  by  a  majority  of  tlie  in- 
habitants of  the  tou-n  of  Brookline,  wliich 
contained  a  population  of  about  (J, .300,  an- 
nexed it  to  the  city  of  Boston,  the  act  to 


take  effect  if  accepted  by  a  majority  of 
voters  voting  at  meetings  to  be  held  in  Oc- 
tober, 1873.  In  the  case  of  Chandler  v.  Bos- 
ton, 112  Mass.  200,  1873,  the  question  was 
presented  whether  an  entire  town  with 
less  than  12,000  inhabitants  can  be  an- 
nexed to  a  city,  and  also  whether  a  pre- 
vious application  of  a  majority  of  the  in- 
habitants of  the  town  is  not  essential  to 
the  erection  or  constitution  of  a  city  govern- 
ment therein  or  over  the  inhabitants 
thereof.  The  validity  of  the  act  provid- 
ing for  such  annexation  was  sustained. 
See  opinion  of  Justices,  6  Cush.  580; 
AVarren  v.  Charlestown,  2  Gray,  104,  as 
to  general  power  of  the  legislature  to 
change  the  boundaries  of  towns  and  cities. 
-  North  Hempstead  v.  Hempstead,  2 
Wend.  109,  1828.  "  Suppose,"  says  Sav- 
age, C.  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court  in  this  case,  "  the  state  to  be  divided 
into  two  states  :  without  some  special 
agreement,  each  would  own  the  public 
property  within  its  limits.  So  of  coun- 
ties :  the  public  buildings  remain  the 
property  of  the  old  county;  yet  public 
buildings  are  as  much  public  property  as 
public  lands.  So  as  to  the  plains,  mea- 
dows, and  marshes  which  are  the  subject 
of  this  suit.  A  bill  filed  by  a  new  county 
for  the  partition  of  the  gaol  and  court- 
house, which  had  been  common  property, 
would  be  the  same  in  principle  as  the  bill 
in  this  suit.  Would  not  such  a  suit  be 
considered  preposterous  ?  Suppose  a  re- 
ligious corporation  possessed  of  a  church 
and  parsonage;  it  becomes  expedient  to 
erect  part  into  a  new  corporation  :  would 
not  the  old  corporation  retain  the  prop- 
erty, unless  an  agreement  was  made  as 
to  the  partition  of   it  ?  "    2  Wend.  109, 


216  MUNICIPAL  COKPORATIONS.  [CII.  VIII. 

when  part  of  the  iiiliabitaiits  and  territory  of  an  older  town  are 
erected  into  a  new  corporation,  the  old  town  retains  all  of  the 
property,  rights,  and  i)rivileges  formerly  belonging  to  it,  and  is 
subject  to  all  its  former  duties  and  liabilities,  at  least  as  it  regards 
property  which  has  no  lixed  location  in  the  new  town,  as  lands, 
buildings,  etc."  Accordingly,  "  upon  the  division  of  Hartford,  no 
part  of  the  ferry  franchise  would  pass  to  the  new  town  of  East 
Hartford,  except  by  virtue  of  a  legal  provision  to  that  effect."  ^ 
So,  it  has  been  frequently  held  that  if  a  new  corporation  is  created 
out  of  the  territory  of  an  old  corporation  or  if  part  of  its  territory 
or  inhabitants  is  annexed  to  another  corporation,^  unless  some  pro- 
vision is  made  in  the  act  respecting  the  property  and  existing 
liabilities  of  the  old  corporation,  the  latter  will  be  entitled  to  all 
the  property,  and  be  solely  answerable  for  all  the  liabilities.^ 

§  189.  (129)  But  upon  the  division  of  the  old  corpo7-ation,  and 
the  creation  of  a  new  corporation  out  of  part  of  its  inhabitants 
and  territory,  or  upon  the  annexation  of  part  to  another  corpora- 
tion, the  legislature  may  protiide  for  an  equitable  appropriation  or 
division  of  the  property,  and  impose  upon  the  new  corporation, 
or  upon  the  people  and  territory  thus  disannexed,  the  obligation 
to  pay  an  equitable  proportion  of  the  corporate   debts.*     The 

135 ;  Laramie  County  v.  Albany,  92  U.  S.  Albany  County,  92  U.  S.  307, 1875,  where 

307,  1875.     Incorporation  of  a  part  of  a  the  cases  are  cited,  and  the  subject  learn- 

toicn  into  a  city,  held  not  to  divest  the  title  edly  discussed  by  Clifford,  J.     Greenville 

of  the  town  to  a  tract  of  land  owned  by  v.  Mason,  53  N.  H.   515,  1873;  Depere  v. 

it  in  fee  simple,  "  in  trust,  for  the  use  of  Bellevue,  31  Wis.  120, 1872  ;  s.  c.  11  Am. 

the  town,  forever."    Milwaukee  v.  Mil-  Hep.  602. 

waukee,  12  Wis.  93.  •*  Text  cited  and   approved.      Mount 

1  Per  Church,  J.,  in  Hartford  Bridge  v.  Pleasant  i'.  Beckwith,  100  U.  S.  514. 
East  Hartford,  16  Conn.  149,  171,  1844;  *  Gorham  v.  Springfield,  21  Me.  61; 
affirmed  by  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  North  Yarmouth  v.  Skillings,  45  Me.  133, 
States,  10  How.  (U.  S.)  511,  541.  Ap-  1858;  Brewster  y.  Harwich,  4  Mass.  278; 
proving  Windiiam  i'.  Portland,  8  Mass.  lb.  315 ;  lb.  384 ;  Harrison  v.  Bridgton, 
384 ;  Hampshire  v.  Franklin,  16  Mass.  76  ;  16  Mass.  16  ;  lb.  76, 1819  ;  Lakin  v.  Ames, 
North  Plempstead  v.  Hempstead,  2  Wend.  10  Cush.  198,  1852.  See  School  District 
109;  wi^e,  sec.  9.  v.  Ricliard.son,  23  Pick.   62,1839,  as  to 

2  Windiiam  t;.  Portland,  4  Mass.  384,  tiie  effect  in  Massachusetts  upon  the  title 
1808 ;  Richards  i\  Daggett,  4  Ih.  539  ;  to  property  of  tlie  abolition  of  old  school 
Hampshire  v.  Franklin,  16  Mass.  76,  1819;  districts  and  the  formation  of  new  ones  ; 
Richland  County  v.  Lawrence,  12  111.  1,  followed  by  School  District  v.  Tapley,  1 
1850;  Biackstone  v.  Taft,  4  Gray,  250,  Allen,  49;  but  a  c//r^<);i  therein  questioned 
1855;  North  Yarmouth  v.  Skillings,  45  hy  Hoar,J.  Simmons  i?.  Nahant,  3  Allen, 
Me.  133,  142,  1858  ;  Cobb  v.  Kingman,  316,  as  to  necessity  of  a  deed  of  convey- 
15  Mass.  197  ;  Minot  i\  Curtis,  7  Mass.  ance  for  real  estate.  Sanbornton  v.  Til- 
441,445;  Opinion  of  Supreme  Judges,  6  ton,  55  N.  H.  60.3,  1875;  s.  c.  53  N.  H. 
Cush.  575;  lb.  578;  Laramie    County  v.  438;  Tilton  v.  Sanbornton,  55  N.  H.  610. 


§  189.] 


CORPORATE   BOUNDARIES. 


217 


charters  and  constituent  acts  of  public  and  municipal  corpora- 
tions are  not,  as  we  have  before  seen,  contracts,  and  they  may  be 
changed  at  the  pleasure  of  the  legislature,  subject  only  to  the  re- 
straints of  special  constitutional  provisions,  if  any  there  be.  And 
it  is  an  ordinary  exercise  of  the  legislative  dominion  over  such 
corporations  to  provide  for  their  enlargement  or  division  ;  and, 
incidental  to  this,  to  apportion  their  pro2:)erty  and  to  direct  the 
manner  in  whicli  their  debts  or  liabilities  shall  be  met,  and  by 
whom.  The  opinion  has  been  expressed  that  the  partition  of  the 
property  must  be  made  at  the  time  of  the  division  of,  or  change 
in,  the  corporation,  since  otherwise  the  old  corporation  becomes, 
under  the  rule  just  before  stated,  the  sole  owner  of  the  property, 
and  hence  cannot  be  deprived  of  it  by  a  subsequent  act  of  the 
legislature. 1     But,  in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  limita- 


Note  relating  to  division  of  property  un- 
der legislative  act.  Southampton  v.  Fow- 
ler (Little  Islands  on  division  of  town), 
52  N.  H.  225,  1872 ;  Tileson  v.  Newman, 
23  Vt.  421 ;  Richards  v.  Daggett,  4  Mass. 
534;  Waldron  v.  Lee,  5  Pick.  323.  In 
Pennsylvania  it  was  held  that  on  a  division 
of  a  township,  each  fraction  remains  lia- 
ble for  the  whole  debt  due  by  the  old 
township  ;  if  one  pays  the  whole  amount, 
it  lays  the  foundation  for  contribution. 
Plunkett  Township  v.  Crawford,  27  Pa. 
St.  107,  1856.  See  New  London  v.  Mont- 
ville,  1  Root  (Conn.),  184.  On  annexa- 
tion of  a  portion  of  a  township  to  a  city, 
the  residue  retains  all  its  property,  real 
and  personal,  unless  a  different  disposi- 
tion has  been  made  by  the  terms  of  the 
division.  People  v.  School  Trustees,  86 
111.  613.  As  to  right  to  collect  taxes  on 
such  division,  see  Barnett  Township  v. 
Jefferson  County,  9  Watts,  166 ;  Devor  v. 
McClintock,  9  Watts  &  S.  80. 

As  to  support  of  jioor  in  case  of  divis- 
ion. North  Whiteliall  v.  South  White- 
hall, 3  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  117;  Over- 
seers, etc.  V  Overseers,  etc.,  2  76.422; 
Stillwater  v.  Green,  4  Ilalst.  (N.  J.)  59. 

Where  there  has  l)een  an  visnfficifnt 
If-rjal  division  and  organization  of  a  new 
district,  this  may  be  afterwards  ratijiid 
and  made  binding.  Sawyer  v.  Williams, 
25  Vt.  311  ;  Pierce  v.  Carpenter,  10  Vt. 
480;  Alden  v.  Rounsville,  7  Met.  219. 

The  mode  of  proceed  I  mj,  under  the  stat- 
ute of  New   York,  in  the  division  of  old 


and  the  erection  of  new  towns,  the  di- 
rectorij  nature  of  the  statute  as  to  mode  of 
l^roceeding,  and  the  presumption  in  favor 
of  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings,  are 
clearly  set  forth  in  the  case  of  the  Peo- 
ple V.  Carpenter,  24  N.  Y.  86. 

As  illustrating  tlie  directory  nature  of 
such  statutes,  see  Elmendorf  v.  Mayor, 
25  Wend.  693  ;  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  HiU 
(N.  Y.),  9.  But  an  agreement  in  such 
division,  transcending  the  powers  of  the 
officers  who  make  it,  is  not  binding  on 
the  town.  Overseers  v.  Same,  18  Johns. 
382.  Effect  of  erection  of  a  new  out  of  a 
portion  of  an  old  county  on  the  term-^  of 
officers  who  respectively  7-es/c/e  in  the  new 
and  old  portions,  see  People  v.  Morrell, 
21  Wend.  563,  1839,  and  authorities  cited 
by  Cowen,  J.,  p.  580.  County  commis- 
sioners must,  by  law,  reside  in  the  county, 
and  on  tlie  erection  of  a  new  county  in 
which  their  residence  is  included  they 
become  residents  of  the  new  county  and 
non-residents  of  the  old  county,  and  can- 
not legally  act  for  it,  imless  they  remove 
within  it ;  though  if  they  continue  to  act 
without  such  removal  their  acts  are  valid, 
being  officers  de  facto.  State  v.  Harts- 
horn, 17  Ohio,  135;  State  v.  Jacobs,  76. 
143. 

'  Hampshire  v.  Franklin,  16  Mass.  76 ; 
WindJiam  v.  Portland,  4  76.  390;  Bow- 
doinham  r.  Richmond,  6  Greenl.  6  Me. 
112,  lioiding  that  subsequent  legislation 
could  not  cliange  the  apjiortionmcnt  of 
the  debts  between   an  old  town  and  one 


218 


JIUNICirAL   CORrORATIONS. 


[CH.  VIII. 


tions  upon  the  legislature,  this  view  cannot,  perhaps,  bo  main- 
tainetl,  as  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  necessary  supremacy  of  the 
legislature  over  all  its  corporate  and  unincorporate  bodies,  divi- 
sions and  parts,  and  with  several  well-considered  adjudications.^ 


Corporate  Seal. 

§  100.  (130)  The  charters  of  municipal  corporations  usually 
contain  a  clause  authorizing  them  to  have  and  use  a  common  seal, 
and  to  alter  the  same  at  pleasure.  Without  an  express  grant  it 
is,  however,  incident  to  every  corporation  to  adopt  and  use  a 
corporate  seal.  The  essential  importance  which  the  common  law 
anciently  attached  to  seals,  and  the  modern  relaxation  of  the 
rule,  are  well  known.  Respecting  seals,  the  same  general  prin- 
ciples apply  to  private  and  to  municipal  corporations.  Thus,  a 
corporation  of  the  latter  class  would  doubtless  be  bound  equally 
"with  a  private  corporation  by  an}^  seal  which  has  been  author- 
itatively affixed  to  an  instrument  requiring  it,  though  it  be  not 
the  seal  regularly  adopted.^  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  not  be 
bound  by  the  affixing  of  either  the  regular  or  temporary  seal  by 
a  person  not  legally  and  duly  authorized.^     So,  under  the  modern 


created  from  it,  since  such  an  apportion- 
ment was  in  the  nature  of  a  contract. 
But  see,  ante,  ch.  iv.  sees.  64,  75. 

1  Layton  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An. 
515,  18-57,  cited,  ante,  sec.  6-3;  Laramie 
County  V.  Albany  County,  92  U.  S.  307, 
1875 ;  Dunsmore's  Appeal,  52  Pa.  St.  374. 
In  this  last  case  one  borough  was  divided 
into  four,  and  tlie  legislature  was  held  to 
liave  the  power  afterwards  to  provide  for 
an  equitable  adjustment  of  the  indebted- 
ness among  them  all,  by  commissioners 
to  be  appointed  by  a  designated  court, 
and  from  whose  determination  no  appeal 
was  allowed.  As  to  extent  of  legislative 
control  over  public  and  municipal  corpo- 
rations and  their  rights,  liabilities,  prop- 
erty, and  contracts  see  ante,  ch.  iv.  and 
cases  there  cited;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim. 
19.3,  231,  232;  ante,  sees.  112,  \1Z;  post, 
chapter  on  Taxation. 

-  Bank,  etc.  v.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Vt. 
159,  18.58,  per  liedjukl,  C.  J. ;  Tenney  v. 
Lumber  Co.,  43  N.  H.  343;  Mill  Dam 
Foundry  i-.  Hovey,  21  Pick.  417  ;  Porter 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  il  Me.  349 ;  Angell  & 
Ames  Corp.  sec.  217;  Phillips  v.  Coffee, 


17  111.  154;  Stebbins  v.  Merritt,  10  Cush. 
27 ;  City  Council  v.  Moorehead,  2  Rich. 
Law,  430 ;  Grant  on  Corp.  59,  and  cases  ; 
and  note  author's  opinion  and  his  doubt 
as  to  the  existence  of  any  common  law 
right  to  change  the  common  seal.  An  im- 
pression of  a  corporate  seal  stamped  upon 
and  into  the  substance  of  the  paper  containing 
the  instrument  is  sufficient,  ivithout  wafer  or 
war.  Hendee  v.  Pinkerton,  14  Allen,  381. 
3  Koehler  v.  Iron  Co.,  2  Black,  715, 
1862 ;  Bank  of  Ireland  v.  Evans,  33  Eng. 
Law  &  Eq.  23.  "  But  where  a  corpora- 
tion is  created  by  an  act  for  particidar 
pwposes  with  special  powers,  then  another 
question  arises :  their  deed,  though  un- 
der their  corporate  seal,  and  that  regu- 
larly affixed,  does  not  bind  them  if  it 
appear  by  the  express  provisions  of  the 
statute  creating  the  corporation,  or  by 
necessary  or  reasonable  inference  from 
its  enactments,  that  the  deed  was  ultra 
vires;  that  is,  that  the  legislature  meant 
that  such  a  deed  should  not  be  made." 
Per  Parke,  B.,  in  Soutli  Yarmouth  Rail- 
way Co.  r.  Great  Northern  Railway  Co., 
9  Ex.  55,  84 ;  adopted  by  Martin,  B.,  in 


§  192.]  CORPORATE   SEAL.  219- 

doctrine,  a  corporation  can  do  an  act  in  pais  by  an  attorney  in 
fact,  and  such  attorney  need  not  necessarily  be  appointed  under 
seal.i 

§  191.  (131)  The  seal  of  a  private  corporation  attached  to  an 
instrument  does  not  prove  its  own  authenticity  ;  but  it  should  be 
shown  by  evidence  aliunde  to  be  really  the  seal  of  the  cor^Dora- 
tion.2  The  same  doctrine  is,  probably,  applicable  to  the  seal  of  a 
municipal  corporation,  except  where  changed  by  charter  or  stat- 
ute, although  it  seems  that  it  is  usual  in  England  to  allow  deeds 
and  other  instruments  relating  to  real  estate  to  go  to  the  jury 
when  authenticated  by  the  corporate  seals  of  London,  Edinburgh, 
or  Dublin  — these  being  corporations  of  great  antiquity,  or  recog- 
nized by  the  legislature.^  The  corporate  seal  attached  to  an 
instrument,  attested  by  the  signatures  of  the  proper  officers,  is 
prima  facie  but  not  conclusive  evidence  that  it  was  lawfully 
placed  there,  and  that  the  instrument  is  the  act  of  the  corpora- 
tion.'' 

§  192.  (132)  The  modern  rule  is  that  corporations  niay  be 
bound  by  contracts  not  under  seal,  and  the  circumstances  under 
which  they  will  be  bound  have  been  stated  by  Story,  J.,  in  terms 
which  have  been  a]3proved  by  the  courts  of  nearly  every  state  in 
the  Union.  "  Wherever  a  corporation  is  acting  within  the  scope 
of  the  legitimate  purposes  of  its  institution,  all  prtro?  contracts 
made  by  its  authorized  agents  are  express  promises  of  the  cor- 
poration ;  and  all  duties  imposed  on  them  by  law,  and  all  benefits 

Payne   v.   Brecon,  3  H.  &  N.  579.     See  ^  Per  Kinspy,  C.  J.,  Den  v.  Vreelandt, 

also   Holdsworth  v.  Dartmouth,  11  A.  &  2  Halst.  (N.  J.)  352. 

E.  490 ;  Regina  v.  Lichfield,  4  Q.  B.  893  ;  *  Levering    v.     Mayor,     7     Humph. 

Pallister  y.  Gravesend,  y  C.  B.  774 ;  Now-  (Tenn.)    553,  1847;  Mempliis  y.  Adams, 

ell  et  al.  v.  Worcester,  9  Ex.  457  ;  Kendall  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  518, 1872  ;  Abbott  Corp. 

V.  King,  17  C.  B.  48.3.  Digest,  tit.  Seal,  p.  725,  sec.  56,  and  the 

1  Curry  v.  Bank,  8  Porter  (Ala.),  361,  many  cases  there  cited  ;  Benedict  v.  Den- 
1839;  Lathrop  v.  Bank,  8  Dana,  114;  ton,  Walk.  Ch.  .336 ;  Railway  Co.  r.  Rail- 
Abby  r.  Billups,  35  Miss.  018.  way   Co.,   9  Exchq.    55,   84;    Musser  y. 

2  Den  V.  Vreelandt,  2  Ilalst.  (N.  J.)  Johnson.  42  Mo.  74.  In  Jowa  the  county 
352,  1800 ;  Gilbert  Ev.  19 ;  Jackson  v.  seal  held  to  be  essential  to  the  v.alidity 
Pratt,  10  Johns.  381 ;  Moises  v.  Thomp-  of  a  county  warrant.  Prescott  v.  Gouser, 
son,  9  Term  R.  303 ;  City  Council  i'.  34  Iowa,  178  ;  Springer  v.  Clay  Co.,  35 
Moorehead,  2  Rich.  (South  Car.)  Law,  Iowa,  243;  Smeltzer  v.  White,  92  U.  S. 
430 ;    Foster  v.   Shaw,  7  Scrg.  &  Rawle  890, 1875. 

(Pa.),  163;    //).  318;   Mann  v.  Pentz,  2 
Sandf.  Ch.  257. 


220 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  VUI, 


conferred  at  their  request,  raise  imjAied  promises,  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  which  an  action  lies.^ 


1  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Patterson,  7 
Cranch  (U.  S.),  200,  306,  181o;  Bank  ;•. 
"Wistcr,  2  Pet.  318;  Davenport  i'.  Insur- 
ance Co.,  17  Iowa,  270;  ]\ing  c  Johnson 
County,  6  Iowa,  '2G5.  See  further,  (hs. 
on  Contracts  and  Projicrt}',  post,  sees. 
4o9,  936.  Cori)orate  seal  affi.xcd  to  the 
note  of  the  corporation  makes  it  a  spe- 
cialty, having  in  this  respect  the  same 
effect  as  the  seal  of  a  natural  person. 
Clarke  v.  Farmers',  etc. Co.,  15  Wend.  256  ; 
lb.  265 ;  Benoist  v.  Carondolet,  8  ]\Io. 
240  ;  Sturtevant  v.  Alton,  3  McLean,  393. 
Lease  held  void  for  want  of  the  corporate 
seal.  Kinzie  v.  Chicago,  2  Scam.  (III.) 
188.    But  otherwise  of    an    authorized 


agreement  by  an  agent  of  a  corporation 
to  sell  lands  (Legrand  v.  The  College,  5 
Munf.  (Va.)  324),  or  authorized  assign- 
ment of  a  lease.  Sanford  v.  Tremlett,  42 
Mo.  384.  Corporate  seal  to  conveyance 
by  county  commissioners.  Bestor  v.  Pow- 
ers, 2  Gilm.  (7  III.)  126. 

Further,  see  Inde.K  —  Sral. 

Mr.  Broom  gives  an  excellent  view  of 
the  exceptions  to  the  rule  that  corpora- 
tions must  contract  by  deed,  as  recog- 
nized and  established  by  the  modern 
English  decisions.  Broom  Com.  on 
Com.  Law,  562-569.  Seals  in  connec- 
tion with  municipal  bonds.  See  chapter 
on  Contracts,  post. 


§  194]  MUNICIPAL  POPULAR  ELECTIONS.  221 


CHAPTER  IX. 

MUNICIPAL   ELECTIONS   AND   OFFICEES. 

§  193.  (133)  In  considering  the  Creation  and  Constitution  of 
Municipal  Corporations,  we  have  now  reached,  in  its  order,  the 

subject    of  MUNICIPAL    ELECTIONS   AND    OFFICERS.       It    will   be 

treated  under  the  following  heads :  — 

1.  Municipal  Popular  Elections  —  sees.  195-199. 

2.  Special  Tribunal  to  determine  Election  Contests  for  Muni- 
cipal Offices— sees.  200-205. 

3.  Power  to  create    and    appoint  Municipal  Officers  —  sees. 
206-213. 

4.  Oath  and  Official  Bond  — sees.  214-216. 

6.  Duration  of  Official  Term —  sees.  217-221. 

6.  Vacancies  in  Municipal  Offices  —  sec.  222. 

7.  Refusal  to  serve  in  Office  —  sec.  223. 

8.  Resignation  of  Municipal  Officers  —  sees.  224-228. 

9.  Compensation  of  Municipal  Officers — sees.  229-234. 

10.  Liability  of  the  Corporation  to  the  Officer  —  sec.  235. 

11.  Liability  of  the  Officer  to  the  Corporation  and  to  Others 
—  sec.  236. 

12.  Amotion  and  Disfranchisement  —  sees.  238-256. 

Municipal  Popular  Elections. 

§  194.  Elections  must  he  held  at  the  time  and  place  provided  hy 
law.  Where  the  law  fixes  no  time,  but  leaves  the  time  to  be  fixed 
by  some  authority  named  in  it,  after  the  happening  of  some  condi- 
tion precedent,  it  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  election  that 
it  be  called  and  the  time  and  place  thereof  fixed  by  the  very 
agency  designated  by  law,  and  none  other  ;  as  where  the  mayor 
and  city  council  is  the  designated  authority,  neither  the  mayor 
alone  nor  the  council  alone  has  power  to  call  such  an  election; 
if  either  neglect  its  duty,  mandamus  is  the  remedy.^ 

1  Stephens  v.  People,  89  III.  337  ;  Hurlbut,  5  Cal.  343 ;  People  v.  Murray, 
Glencoe  v.  People,  78  111.  382;  Ducker  v.     15  Cal.  321 ;  Juker  v.  Commonwealth,  20 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


§  llV).  (134)  Elections  by  the  people,  with  exceptions  in  a  few- 
states,  arc  by  folded  or  secret  ballot,  and  not  open  or  vira  voce} 
Tiie  qualifications  of  electors  or  voters  are  fixed  by  the  constitu- 
tion and  laws,  and  cannot  be  changed  by  any  ordinance  or  act  of 
the  corporation.^  Residence  for  a  certain  period  within  the  muni- 
cipality is  almost  invariably  required  in  express  terms,  as  one  of 
the  qualifications  of  the  right  to  vote  at  elections  therein  and  as 
one  of  the  conditions  of  eligibility  to  hold  a  municipal  office. 
Non-residents  of  the  corporation  have,  however,  been  held  com- 
petent to  be  elected  to  office  when  residence  was  not  expressly 
required,  but  the  decisions  cannot,  perhaps,  be  said  to  conclude 
the  point,^  and,  if  extended  to  the  higher  offices,  are  hardly 
consistent  with  the  fundamental  idea  of  municipal  government. 


Pa.  St.  484 ;  Chadwick  v.  Melvin,  68  Pa. 
St.  333 ;  Knowles  v.  Yates,  ?A  Cal.  82  ; 
Clark  V.  Board,  etc.,  27  III.  310 ;  Miller  v. 
English,  1  Zabr.  (21  N.  J.  L.)  317;  Mar- 
shall V.  Cook,  38  111.  44;  Marshall  v. 
Kerns,  2  Swan  (Tenn.),  68;  Force  v.  Ba- 
tavia,  61  111.  99;  Foster  v.  Scarf,  15 
Ohio  St.  535  ;  as  to  mandamus  to  compel 
the  holding  of  an  election.  See  post,  sees. 
8-38,  8.39.  If  such  an  election  is  held 
it  is  void  and  cannot  be  ratified.  Steph- 
ens V.  People,  supra. 

1  Cooley  Const.  Lira.  ch.  xvii.  598, 
where  the  subject  of  Popular  Elections, 
the  Right  to  participate  tlierein,  the  Con- 
ditions Necessary  to  the  Exercise  of  the 
Right,  the  Manner  of  Voting,  the  Con- 
duct and  Sufficiency  of  Elections  iire  sat- 
isfactorily presented ;  and  the  rules  and 
doctrines  deduced  from  the  cases  are,  in 
general,  applicable  to  popular  munici- 
pal elections.  Ante,  sec.  39.  A  ballot 
implies  absolute  secrecy,  and  where  the 
constitution  of  a  state  declares  that  "all 
elections  by  the  people  shall  be  by  ballot " 
the  legislature  cannot  by  law  require  the 
outside  of  tlie  ballot  to  be  numbered  so 
as  to  correspond  with  the  number  placed 
opposite  the  name  of  the  voter  on  the 
poll  list.  Williams  v.  Stein,  38  Ind.  89, 
1871;  s.  c.  10  Am.  Rep.  97. 

2  Petty  V.  Tooker,  21  N.  Y.  267 ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Woelper,  3  Serg.  &  Rawle 
(Pa.),  29;  People  v.  Phillips,  1  Denio  (N. 
Y.),  388;  Rex  i'.  Spencer,  3  Burr.  1827; 
Rex  r.  Mayor  of  Weymouth,  7  Mod.  371 ; 
Newling  v.  Francis,  3  Term  R.  189;  Rex 


V.  Chitty,  5  Ad.  &  E.  609 ;  Rex  v.  Bum- 
stead,  2  B.  &  Ad.  699.  The  provision  of 
the  constitution  that  "every  male  person 
twent^'-one  years  old,  resident  in  the 
state  twelve  months  and  in  the  county 
thirty  days  shall  be  an  elector,"  applies 
in  corporated  cities  and  disables  the 
legislature  from  requiring  ninety  days' 
residence  in  a  city  as  a  qualification  for 
voting  for  city  officers.  I'eople  v.  Cana- 
day  (charter  of  Wilmington),  73  Nor. 
Car.  198,  1875;  s.  c.21  Am.  Rep.  465. 

^  Municipal  officers  may  be  elected 
from  non-residents  of  the  corporation 
when  there  is  no  statute  or  constitution 
prohibiting  it,  particularly  when  the  office 
to  be  filled  is  one  requiring  professional 
skill,  and  not  representative  or  legislative 
in  its  character.  State  i'.  Blanchard  (city 
surveyor),  6  La.  An.  515, 1851.  The  con- 
clusion was  reached  with  hesitation,  but 
the  whole  court  concurred.  //;.  So  in 
The  State  v.  Swearingen,  12  Ga.  23, 
1852,  it  was  decided  where  the  charter  of 
the  town  provided  "for  the  election  of 
city  officers  by  the  people  of  the  city 
qualified  to  vote,"  and  was  silent  as  to  re- 
quiring the  officers  to  be  residents,  that  a 
person  might  legally  be  elected  and  quali- 
fied who  was  not  a  resident  of  the  place. 
Residence  as  a  qualification  for  municipal 
office.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Jones,  12 
Pa.  St.  365.  liesidents,  who  are.  Cohen 
V.  Wigfall,  8  Rich.  Law,  237  ;  2  lb.  489; 
Goldersleeve  v.  Alexander,  2  Speer  (So. 
Car.),  298.  In  England,  by  the  Municipal 
Corporations    Act    (sec.   9),    inhabitant 


§  196.] 


MUNICIPAL   POPULAR   ELECTIONS. 


223 


§  196.  (135)   The  choice  of  a  disqualified  person  is  ineffectual. 
Thus,  if  the  law  requires  freeholders  to  be  chosen  for  certain 


householders  resident  witliin  the  borougli, 
or  within   seven   miles  o(   tiie   borougli, 
and  rated  to  the   relief  of  the   poor,  are 
made  burgesses  or  citizens.     Before  that 
act  was  passed,  residence  in  the  freeman 
or  citizen  was  sometimes  required  to  ren- 
der him  eligible  to  office,  although  non- 
residents, wherever  residing,  might,  by  a 
similar  perversion  of  the  purposes   of  a 
municipal   corporation,   be    admitted   to 
freedom  or  membership,  unless  expressly 
restrained  by  the  charter ;  and  if  resi- 
dence was  expressly  required  as  a  condi- 
tion of  eligibility,  it   was  not  necessary 
that  the  officer  should  continue  to  reside 
in   the  place    while   holding    the   office. 
Not  only  so,  but  it  was  held  that  where 
residence  was  necessary  as  a  qualification 
during  office,  it  was  not,  by  implication, 
necessary  that  the  person  elected  should 
have  been  a  resident  at  the  time  of  the 
election.     And    when    inhabitancy   was 
requisite,  it  meant  not  merely  residence, 
but  keeping  a  house  within  the  place,  and 
paying  scot  and  lot.    Willcock  on  Munic. 
Corp.  188,  pi.  472;    lb.   191,  pi.   481 ;  lb. 
193,   488 ;  Rex   v.   Monday,  Cowp.    539 ; 
Kex  V.  Mallet,  2  Barnard.  408 ;  Rex  v. 
Cambridge,  4  Burr.  2008 ;  Rex  v.  Heath, 
1  Barnard.  417.     These  rules  are  of  very 
doubtful  application  in  this  country,  since 
liere  all  of  the  inhabitants  are  members  of 
the  corporation,  and  non-residents  cannot 
become  such.     See  on  this  point  opinion 
of  Read,  J.,  in  People  v.  Canaday,  supra. 
And,  in   general,  it  may  be   said  that  a 
person  is  an   inhabitant  or  resident  who 
has   his  domicile  or  home  in  the  place; 
but  it  is  foreign   to  the   purpose  of  this 
work  to  enter  into  the  difficult  questions 
which  have  arisen  with  respect  to  resi- 
dency  and  domicile.     Hinds  v.  Hinds,  1 
Iowa,   3G;   Story    Confl.    Laws,    sec.  43; 
Putnam  y.  Johnson,  10  Mass.  488;  Thorn- 
dike  I'.  Boston,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  245.     Pub- 
lic officers  vacate  their  office  by  perma- 
nent removal   from   territorial  limits  of 
the  corporation.     Barre  v.   Greenwich,  1 
Pick.  (Mass.)  120;  Rumscy  r.  Campton, 
16  N.  H.  5G7  ;  Giles  i-.  School  District,  11 
Fost.   (31   N.  11.)  304.     But  a  tfmpnrcin/ 
removal,  with  an  intention  to  return,  will 
not,  of  itself,  have  this  effect.     Van  Ors- 


dall  V.  Hazard,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  243,  1842; 
People  V.  Metropolitan  Police  Board,  19 
N.  Y.  201 ;  Lyon  v.  Commonwealth,  3 
Bibb  (Ky.),  430;  Rex  v.  E.veter,  Comb. 
197. 

"  Nice  questions,"  says  Mr.  Harrison 
(Munic.  Manual  for  Upper  Canada,  2d 
ed.  60,  note),  "  arise  as  to  when  a  party 
can  or  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  resident  of 
a  municipality."  Attorney  General  i".  Par- 
ker, 3  Atk.  576  ;  Ettherington  v.  Wilson 
L.  R.  1  Ch.  Div.  160;  King  v.  Foxwell, 
L.  R.  3  Ch.  Div.  518.  A,  man  cannot, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  municipal 
laws  of  Canada,  be  said  to  be  resident  in 
two  municipalities  at  the  same  time. 
Marr  v.  Vienna,  10  Upper  Can.  L.  J.  275. 
A  man's  residence  is  where  his  home  is  sit- 
uate —  where  his  family  live.  The  King 
V.  Inhabitants  of  North  Curry,  4  B.  &  C. 
959.  An  occasional  absence  from  his 
home  to  attend  to  business  in  another 
municipality  does  not  make  his  home  less 
his  residence.  Withorn  v.  Thomas,  7  M. 
&  G.  1.  Where  A.  had  a  dwelUng-house 
at  Bowmanville,  where  his  wife  and  fam- 
ily lived,  but  had  a  saw-mill  and  store  and 
was  postmaster  in  the  township  of  Cart- 
wright,  which  occasioned  him  frequently 
to  visit  that  place,  and  who,  while  there, 
used  to  board  with  one  of  his  men  in  a 
house  owned  by  himself,  —  Held,  that  af- 
ter voting  in  Bowmanville,  he  had  no  right 
to  vote  in  Cartwright.  The  Queen  ex  re/. 
Taylor  v.  Caesar,  11  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.461. 
IMere  colorable  residence  is  in  no  case 
sufficient.     The  King  v.  Duke  of  Bedford, 

6  T.  R.  560.  Each  case  must,  to  a  great 
extent,  depend  on  its  own  circumstances, 
As  to  what  is  sufficient,  see  The  King  v. 
Sergeant,  5  T.  R.  406 ;  Bruce  v.  Bruce,  2 
B.  &  P.  229 ;  The  King  v.  Mitchell,  10 
East,  511 ;  Withorn  v.  Thomas,  7  M.  &  G. 
1 ;  The  Queen  ex  rel.  Forward  v.  Bartels, 

7  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  533;  Queen  v.  Boy- 
cott, 14  L.  T.  N.  S.  599 ;  Queen  v.  Exeter, 
L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  110  ;  Manning  y.  Manning,  L. 
R.  2  P.  &  D.  223  ;  Taylor  v.  Parish,  etc., 
L.  R.  6  C.  P.  309 ;  Bond  v.  St.  George,  L. 
R.  6  C.  P.  312  ;  Queen  !•.  St.  Ives,  L.  R. 
7  Q  B.  467  ;  Durant  v.  Carter,  L.  R.  9  C. 
P.  261 ;  Ford  v.  Pye,L.  R.  9  C.  P.  269; 
Ford  V.  Hart,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  273 ;  Wilton 


224 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[cn.  rx. 


ofiioors,  the  elect  ion  of  a  person  not  a  froeliolder  is  void.^  But 
unless  the  votes  for  an  ineligible  person  are  expressly  declared  to 
be  void  the  effect  of  such  a  person  receiving  a  majority  of  the 
votes  cast  is,  according  to  the  weight  of  American  authority,  and 
the  reason  of  the  matter  (in  view  of  our  mode  of  election,  with- 
out previous  binding  nominations,  by  secret  ballot,  leaving  each 
elector  to  vote  for  whomsoever  he  pleases),  that  a  new  election 
must  be  held,  and  not  to  give  the  office  to  the  qualified  person 
having  the  next  highest  number  of  votes.^ 


V.  Fnlniont)i,  3  Sbep.  479  ;  State  v.  Decasi- 
nova,  1  Tex.  401 ;  State  i'.  Frost,  4  Ilar- 
ring.  558;  Fry's  election,  71  Pa.  St.  302; 
s.  c.  10  Am.  Kep.  (598. 

1  Spear  v.  Robinson,  29  Me.  531,  1840  ; 
State  V.  Swcaringen,  12  Ga.  23,  1852; 
State  V.  Gastinel,  20  La.  An.  114,  18G8. 

-  State  V.  Swcaringen,  12  Ga.  23;  Sub- 
lett  V.  Bedwell,  47  Miss.  2GB  ;  s.  c.  12  Am. 
Rep.  338;  State  r.  Giles,  1  Chand.  (Wis.) 
112;  State  v.  Smith,  14  Wis.  497;  Sami- 
ders  V.  Ilaynes,  13  Cal.  145;  State  v.  Gas- 
tinel (mider  charter),  20  La.  An.  114; 
Cooley  Const.  Lim.  620  ;  Commonwealth 
ex  rel.  McLaughlin  v.  Cluley  (Sheriff),  56 
Pa.  St.  270,  18G8;  People  v.  Clute,  50  N. 
Y.  4.51,  1872;  s.  c.  10  Am.  Rep.  508; 
Wood  r.  Bartling,  16  Kan.  100,  114,  1876. 
The  following  points  are  ruled  in  People 
V.  Clute,  supra.  Where  a  majority  of  the 
electors,  through  ignorance  of  the  law  or 
the  fact,  vote  for  one  ineligible  to  the 
office,  the  votes  are  not  nullities ;  but 
while  they  fail  to  elect,  the  office  cannot 
be  given  to  the  qualified  person  having 
the  next  highest  number  of  votes.  The 
election  is  a  failure,  and  a  new  election 
must  be  had.  A  minority  of  the  whole 
body  of  qualified  electors  may  elect  to  an 
office  where  the  majority  decline  to  vote, 
or  where  they  vote  for  one  who  is  ineligi- 
ble to  the  office,  knowing  of  the  disquali- 
fication. Notice  of  the  disqualifying  fact, 
and  of  its  legal  effect,  may  be  given  so 
directly  to  the  voter  as  to  charge  him 
with  actual  knowledge  of  the  disqualifica- 
tion ;  or  the  disqualifying  fact  may  be  so 
patent  or  notorious  as  that  his  knowledge 
of  the  ineligibility  may  be  presumed  as 
matter  of  law.  But  not  only  the  fact 
which  disqualifies,  but  also  the  rule  or 
enactment  of  law  which  makes  it  thus  ef- 
fectual, must  be  brought  home  so  clearly 


to  the  knowledge  or  notice  of  the  elector 
as  that  to  give  his  vote  therewith  indi- 
cates an  intent  to  waste  it  in  order  to 
render  his  vote  a  nidlity. 

But  in  Indiana  the  view  is  taken  that, 
whether  an  election,  because  of  the  ineli- 
gibility of  the  candidate  receiving  the 
highest  number  of  ballots,  is  a  failure,  and 
must  be  held  over,  or  whether  the  highest 
eligible  candidate  is  elected,  depends  upon 
circumstances:  1.  If  the  candidate  re- 
ceiving the  highest  number  of  votes  is 
ineligible,  but  from  a  cause  unknoicn  to 
the  voters,  and  which  they  were  not  hound 
to  know  —  as,  for  example,  infancy,  want 
of  naturalization,  and  the  like  —  the  re- 
sult is  a  failure,  and  there  must  be  another 
election.  2.  If  the  voters  know,  or  are 
bound  to  know,  the  ineligibility  of  a  can- 
didate, the  election  is  not  a  failure,  as  the 
eligible  candidate  receiving  the  highest 
number  of  votes  is  legally  elected.  3. 
Where  the  ineligibility  of  a  candidate 
arises  from  his  holding,  or  having  held,  a 
public  office,  the  people  within  the  juris- 
diction of  such  office  are  held  in  law  to 
know  —  are  chargeable  with  notice  of  — 
such  ineligibility,  and  votes  given  for  such 
a  candidate  are  of  no  etfect,  and  his  high- 
est eligible  competitor  is  elected.  Gulick 
V.  New,  14  Ind.  93,  102,  1860,  per  Perkins, 
J. ;  commenting  on  State  v.  Swearingen 
(case  of  non-residencj'),  12  Ga.  23;  Price 
V.  Baker,  44  Ind.  572,  1873;  s.  c.  13  Am. 
Rep.  346,  where  the  extent  of  this  rule  is 
stated  by  Downey,  J.  Opinion  of  judges, 
38  Me.,  appendix,  where  a  portion  of  the 
people  voted  for  a  person  not  in  being. 
State  V.  Giles,  1  Chand.  (Wis.)  112. 

In  England,  candidates  are  previously 
nominated  and  known,  and  the  votes  are, 
or  at  least  until  very  recently  have  been, 
ojien,  and  there  are  cases  there  which  de. 


§  197.] 


MUNICIPAL   POPULAK   ELECTIONS. 


225 


§  197.  (136)  Where  it  is  discretionary  with  the  municipal  au- 
thorities whether  the}''  will  hold  an  election  or  not,  votes  at  an 
unauthorized  election  are  simply  nullities.^  Elections  fixed  by 
law  at  a  certain  time  and  place  may  be  legally  holden,  although 
notice  has  not  been  published  or  given ;  but  if  the  time  be  not 
defined  by  statute,  and  is  to  be  fixed  by  notice,  the  notice  required 
is  imperative.^  Time  and  place  are  generally  essential,  but  many 
of  the  details  as  to  the  conduct  of  elections  are  usually  regarded 
as  directory .3 


cide  or  favor  the  proposition  that  votes 
for  a  disqualified  person,  given  after  notice 
of  disqualification,  are  thrown  away,  and 
the  otl)er  candidate  is  elected.  Grant  on 
Corporations,  203-208,  and  cases  cited. 
But  see,  as  to  disqualification  and  notice, 
Eegina  v.  Hiorns,  7  Ad.  &  E.  9(J0 ;  Regina 
r.  Councillors  of  Derby,  7  Ad.  &  E.  419; 
and  particularly  Regina  v.  Mayor  of 
Tewkesbury,  Law  Rep.  3  Q.  B.  629, 
1868  ;  Regina  v.  Ledyard,  8  Ad.  &  E.  535; 
Rawlinson  on  Corporations  (5thcd.)64, 
note,  and  authorities.  "The  principle  of 
these  decisions,"  says  the  London  Law 
Times,  January  25,  1873,  "must  be  mate- 
rially aS"ected  by  secret  voting."  This 
subject  was  much  discussed  in  the  de- 
bates before  the  Electoral  Commission 
created  by  Congress  to  decide  the  presi- 
dential contest  of  1876. 

1  Opinions  of  Judges,  7  Mass.  525; 
Same,  15  lb.  537 ;  Cooley  Const.  Lim. 
603;  People  v.  Mathewson,  47  Cal.  442, 
1874  ;  George  v.  Oxford  Township,  16 
Kan.  72,  80,  1876;  Force  v.  Batavia,  CI 
III.  99;  Marshall  v.  Silliman,  61  111.  218; 
Wiley  V.  Silliman,  62  111.  170;  Harding  v. 
E.  I.  &  St.  L.  R.  R.  Co.,  65  111.  90;  People 
V.  Santa  Anna,  67  111.  57. 

2  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  303,  and  cases 
cited ;  People  v.  Brenham,  3  Cal.  477, 
1851;   People   v.  Fairbury,   51   111.   149, 

1869.  Computation  of  time  of  notice.  Queen 
V.  Justices,  8  Ad.  &  E.  173 ;  Mitchell  v. 
Foster,  9  Dowl,  P.  C.  527;  Warsop  v. 
Hastings,  22  Minn.  437. 

8  Dickey  v.  Hurlbut,  5  Cal.  343;  Peo- 
ple V.  Knight  (essentialness  of  place),  13 
Mich.  424;    Gass  v.  State,  34  Ind.  425, 

1870.  Where  the  legislature  provided 
that  the  polls  of  the  different  wards  should 
be  kept  open  until  10  o'clock  p.  m.  and 
they  were  closed  at  8  o'clock,  the  election 

VOL.  I.  15 


was  set  aside.  Pennsylvania  District 
Election,  2  Par.  (Pa.)  526  ;  Clark's  Case, 
lb.  521.  Illegal  adjournment  of  election  to 
a  different  place  from  the  one  designated 
in  the  notice.  Commonwealth  v.  Com- 
missioners, etc.,  5  Rawle  (Pa.),  75. 
Where  an  election  is  held  on  a  day  subse- 
quent to  that  named  in  the  charter,  the 
acts  of  officers  thus  elected  are  valid,  as 
respects  the  public  and  third  persons,  and 
cannot  be  collaterally  inquired  into. 
Coles  County  v.  Allison,  23  III.  383,  dis- 
tinguished from  Hayes  v.  Washington 
County,  19  111.  QQ,  and  approved  in  Peo- 
ple V.  Fairbury,  51  111.  149,  1869.  As  to 
election  held  on  a  day  prior  to  the  date 
provided  by  law,  see  People  v.  Keeling, 
4  Col.  127.  Title  of  officers  elected  before 
the  legal  incorporation  of  a  place  may  be 
validated  by  tlie  legislature.  State  v. 
Kline,  23  Ark.  587 ;  post,  sees.  256,  276, 
892  n. 

It  is  now  a  canon  of  election  law  that  an 
election  is  not  to  be  set  aside  for  a  mere 
informality  or  irregularity  which  cannot 
be  said  in  any  manner  to  have  affected 
the  result  of  the  election.  The  Queen 
V.  The  Rectorof  St.  Mary,  Lambeth,  8  Ad. 
&  E.  356 ;  Regina  ex  reJ.  Walker  v.  Mitch- 
ell et  al.,  4  Upper  Can.  P.  R.  218;  Monk 
Election,  in  re,  .32  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  147 ; 
The  Queen  v.  Plenty,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  346 ; 
The  Queen  i'.  Ward,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  210; 
Regina  v.  Cousins,  28  L.  T.  N.  S.  116;  Re- 
gina e.T  rel.  Harris  v.  Bradburn,  6  Upper 
Can.  P.  R.  .308,  Regina  er  rel.  Preston  v. 
Touchburn,  lb.  .344  ;  Shaw  v.  Thompson, 
L.  R.  3  Chy.  Div.  233 ;  People  v.  Cook, 
14  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  259;  Clifton  v.  Cook,  7 
Ala.  114;  Truehart  v.  Addicks,  2  Tex. 
217  ;  Dishon  v.  Smith,  10  Iowa,  212 ;  Atty. 
Genl.  V.  Ely,  4  Wis.  420;  State  v.  Jones, 
19  Ind.  356;   People  v.  Higgins,  3  Mich. 


226 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


Courts  are  anxious  ratlier  to  sustain  than  to  defeat  the  popular 
^ill.i 


§  198.  (137)  Thus,  an  inaccurate  designation  of  the  name 
of  the  oftice  voted  for  —  as,  for  example,  "  Police  Justice," 
instead  of  "  Police  Magistrate  "  (the  term  used  in  the  statute) 
—  will  not  render  the  votes  invalid,  where  the  legislative 
provisions  make  clear  the  intention  of  the  voters  in  thus  casting 
their  ballots  —  to  which  intention  effect  should  be  given.^  But 
if  a  specific  number  of  officers  only  can  be  chosen  —  for  example, 
four  —  ballots  containing  the  names  of  more  than  four  persons  for 
the  office  in  question  must  be  rejected.  Any  other  doctrine 
might  result  in  giving  the  elector  two  votes.  There  are  usual- 
ly two  competing  tickets,  and  if  an  elector  can,  in  the  case  sup- 
posed, cast  a  ballot  containing  jive  names,  he  may  one  of  eiglit^ 


233;  Gorham  v.  Campbell,  2  Cal.  135; 
Taylor  v.  Taylor,  10  IMinn.  112  ;  Bowland 
V.  Ilildreth,  2G  Cal.  IGl ;  Day  v.  Kent,  1 
Oregon,  123 ;  Piatt  v.  People,  29  111.  54 ; 
Ewing  V.  Filley,  43  Pa.  St.  384 ;  Howard 
».  Shields,  16  Ohio  St.  184 ;  McKinney  v. 
O'Connor,  26  Tex.  5 ;  Sprague  v.  Norway, 
31  Cal.  173  ;  Fry  v.  Booth,  19  Ohio  St.  25. 
But  where  it  appears  that  the  irregu- 
larity is  of  such  character  and  of  such 
magnitude  that  it  may  have  affected  the 
result,  the  election  ought  to  be  set  aside. 
Hackney  Election,  31  L.  T.  N.  S.  69; 
Woodward  v.  Sarsons,  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  74:]; 
Mather  v.  Brown,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  Div.  596  ; 
Johnson  v.  Lambton,  40  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
297;  Harrison's  Municipal  Manual,  4tli  ed. 
"  If  rioting  takes  place  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  ordinary  men,  having  the  ordi- 
nary nerve  and  courage  of  men,  are  there- 
by prevented  from  recording  their  votes, 
the  election  is  void  by  the  common  law, 
for  the  common  law  provides  that  an 
election  should  be  free  in  the  sense  that 
all  persons  shall  have  an  opportunity  of 
coming  to  the  poll  and  voting  without 
fear  or  molestation."  Nottingham  m  re, 
1  O'M.  &  H.  245  ;  Stafford,  in  re.,  Ih.  234 ; 
Drogheda,  in  re,  lb.  252.  The  freedom  of 
elections  is  of  the  utmost  importance. 
All  attempts  to  interfere  with  the  electors 
in  the  peaceable  and  quiet  exercise  of 
their  rights,  or  to  improperly  influence 
them  against  their  judgment  or  desire,  is 
a  crime ;  and  in  addition  to  the  ordinary 


punishment  of  the  crime  of  bribery  of  an 
elector  it  is  a  constitutional  provision  in 
many  states  that  whoever  shall  be  con- 
victed of  the  crime  shall  forfeit  the  right 
to  any  office  of  profit  or  trust  under  the 
state.     McCrary,  Elections,  sec.  432. 

1  Skerritt's  Case,  2  Par.  (Pa.)  516; 
Boileau's  Case,  2  Par.  (Pa.)  505;  Carpen- 
ter's Case,  2  Par.  (Pa.)  537  ;  New  Orleans 
V.  Graihle,  9  La.  An.  673;  Chfton  v. 
Cook,  7  Ala.  114;  People  v.  Cook,  14 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  259;  8  N.  Y.  67  ;  Regina  ;■. 
Touchburn,  6  Upper  Can.  P.  R.  344 ; 
United  States  v.  Memphis,  97  U.  S.  284,  ap- 
proving text.  The  rule  as  therein  stated  is 
regarded  by  Mr.  Justice  Cooley  as  "  an 
eminently  proper  one,  and  to  furnish  a 
very  satisfactory  test  of  what  is  essential, 
and  what  not,  in  election  laws."  Const. 
Lim.  618.  See,  also,  as  to  charter  elec- 
tions and  returns,  Heath,  in  re,  3  Hill  (N. 
Y.),  42,  53;  People  i-.  Stevens,  5  Hill,  616 ; 
Morgan  v.  Quackenbush,  22  Barb  (N. 
Y.)  72.  Courts  will  not  enjoin  municipal 
clertions  unless  the  power  and  right  to  do 
so  plainly  exist.  Smith  v.  McCarthy,  56 
Pa.  St.  359;  post,  sec.  308,  note.  The 
legislature  may  ratify  the  title  to  an  office 
in  which  case  it  cannot  be  questioned  on 
quo  warranto.  People  i'.  Flanagan,  66  N. 
Y.  237,  1876.  Acts  of  officers  de  facto, 
post,  sec.  221,  note;  compensation  or  sal- 
ary of  officers  de  facto,  Samis  v.  King, 
40  Conn.  298,  1873. 

2  People  V.  Matteson,  17  111.  167,  1855. 


§  200.] 


MUNICIPAL   POPULAR   ELECTIONS. 


227 


and  thus  vote  (if  lie  chooses  to  insert  the  names)  for  both  tick- 
ets.i 

§  199.  (138)  Receiving  illegal  or  improper  votes  will  not  alone 
vitiate  an  election.  It  must  be  shown  affirmatively,  in  order  to 
overturn  the  declared  result,  that  the  wrongful  action  changed 
it.     This  rule  applies  to  corporation  elections  as  well  as  others.^ 

Special  Tribunal  to  decide  Election  Contests  for  Municipal  Offices. 

§  200.  (139)  A  constitutional  provision  that  the  judicial  power 
of  the  state  shall  be  vested  in  a  supreme  and  inferior  courts,  does 


1  People  V.  Loomis,  8  Wend.{N.  Y.)  396, 
1832 ;  People  v.  Seaman,  5  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
409;  State  v.  Griffey,  5  Neb.  161,  1876. 
Where  only  one  vacancy  exists,  votes  given 
for  two  persons  jointly  are  thrown  away. 
Rex  V.  Mayor  of  Leeds,  7  Ad.  &  E.  963 ; 
and  in  this  case  it  was  held  that  a  third 
candidate  chosen  by  a  single  regular  vote 
was  elected,  but  as  to  votes  being  thrown 
away,  see  supra.  Where,  by  an  erroneous 
construction,  of  the  act,  an  election  has 
been  held  for  but  one  councillor,  instead 
of  two,  the  candidate  second  on  the  poll 
cannot  have  a  mandamus  to  admit  him  to 
the  office.  Regina  v.  Hoyle,  H.  L.  1855, 
cited  in  Rawl.  on  Corp.  65,  note.  His 
remedy  is,  by  mandamus,  to  have  a  new 
election  held  for  councillor,  or  (if  the 
office  be  filled)  by  a  quo  ivarranto.  lb.  The 
voting  papers  (corresponding  in  function 
to  the  American  ballot,  except  that  it  is 
to  be  signed  by  the  voter  and  openly 
voted)  must  distinguish  between  different 
classes  of  candidates  ;  and  hence  where 
an  election  of  four  councillors  had  taken 
place  on  the  1st  of  November,  three  of 
whom  were  to  supply  ordinary  vacancies, 
and  one  an  extraordinary  vacancy,  but 
no  distinction  had  been  made  between 
them  in  the  notice  of  election,  in  the 
voting  papers,  or  in  publishing  the  names 
of  the  persons  elected,  the  election  was 
irregular  and  void.  Regina  v.  Rowley,  3 
Q.  B.  143 ;  8.  c.  in  Exchequer  Chamber, 
6  Q.  B.  6(58.  See  sec.  47,  Municipal  Cor- 
porations Act,  and  also  7  Will.  IV.  and  1 
Vict.  ch.  Ixxviii.  sec.  11.  rulterson,  .!., 
says  :  "  There  is  no  objection  to  the  votes 
all  being  given  on  the  same  paper,  if  a 
proper  distinction  were  made."     Regina 


I'.  Rowley,  supra ;  and  see  Rex  v.  Win- 
chester, 2  Ad.  &  E.  215.  By  the  Muni- 
cipal Corporations  Act,  sec.  32,  the  voting 
paper  is  required  to  contain  "  the  Christian 
and  surnames  of  the  persons  for  whom 
the  burgess  votes,  with  their  respective 
places  of  abode,  such  voting  paper  being 
previously  signed  with  the  name  of  the 
burgess  voting  and  the  name  of  the  street 
in  which  the  property  for  which  he  ap- 
pears to  be  rated  is  situate."  In  con- 
struction of  this  section,  it  is  held  that 
the  Christian  name  of  the  person  voted 
for  need  not  be  written  out  in  full ;  the 
contraction  ordinarily  used  is  sufficient. 
Regina  v.  Bradley,  3  E.  &  E.  634.  But  it 
seems  that  an  initial  letter  only  would 
not  be  sufficient,  lb.  Though  it  would 
be  in  the  signature  of  the  voter.  Regina 
V.  Avery,  18  Q.  B.  57G  ;  Regina  v.  Tart,  1 
E.  &  E.  618.  "  Places  of  abode  "  held  to 
mean  places  of  residence,  not  of  business. 
Regina  v.  Hammond,  17  Q.  B.  772 ;  Re- 
gina V.  Deighton,  5  Q.  B.  896  ;  Dav.  &  M. 
682. 

2  Murphy,  in  re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  153, 
1827;  People  v.  Cicotte,  16  Mich.  283, 
1868;  First  Parish  v.  Stearnes,  21  Pick. 
(Mass.)  148;  Judkins  v.  Hill,  50  N.  H. 
140,  1870 ;  Johnston  v.  Charleston,  1  Bay 
(S.  C),  441,  1795.  In  this  last  case  the 
city  council  was  specially  autliorized  to 
judge  of  elections  of  corporation  officers, 
and  the  court,  respecting  a  contest  before 
the  council,  said  :  "  If  the  bad  votes  be  de- 
ducted from  the  highest  candidate,  and  he 
still  has  a  majority,  his  election  is  good  ; 
but  if,  after  such  deduction,  the  next  candi- 
date has  an  equal  or  greater  number  of 
votes   than  the   other,  and  il   is   doubtful 


228  MUNICIPAL   CORrORATIONS.  [CH.  IX. 

not  disable  the  legislature,  in  creating  nnmicipal  corporations, 
from  providing  that  the  city  council  shall  he  the  judge  of  the  elec- 
tion of  its  mayor,  members,  and  other  officers,  and  from  prohibiting 
the  ordinary  courts  of  justice  from  inquiring  into  the  validity 
of  the  determination  of  the  city  council.^ 

§  201.  (140)  Where,  by  the  charter,  the  council  are  author- 
ized to  provide,  by  ordinance,  a  special  tribunal  before  which  con- 
tested municipal  elections  shall  be  tried,  and  to  provide  the  mode 
of  procedure,  it  may  pass  such  ordinance  after  an  election  has 
been  held,  and  authorize  it  to  determine  contests  arising  out  of 
a  previous  election.  After  such  determination,  quo  warranto 
will  lie  against  the  party  who  Avas  unsuccessful  before  the  local 
tribunal,  if  he  continue  to  claim  and  exercise  the  office.^ 

§  202.  (141)  Common  laiv  courts  of  general  and  original 
jurisdiction  have  the  admitted  power  to  inquire  into  the  regu- 
larity of  elections,  corporate  and  others,  by  quo  warranto,  or  an 
information  in  that  nature,  and,  in  certain  cases,  by  mandamus. 
It  is  not  unusual  for  charters  to  contain  provisions  to  the  effect 
that  the  common  council  or  governing  body  of  the  municipality 
"shall  be  the  judge  of  the  qualifications,"  or  "of  the  qualifi- 
cations and  election  of  its  own  members,"  and  of  those  of  the 
other  officers  of  the  corporation.  What  effect  do  provisions  of  this 
kind  have  upon  the  jurisdiction  of  the  superior  courts?  The 
answer  must  depend    upon  the    language  in  which    these  pro- 

which  candidate  had  the  greatest  number  its  power  to  provide,  prospectively,  by  a 
of  vaHd  votes,  the  council  should  send  general  act,  the  mode  in  which  contests 
the  matter  back  to  the  people."  shall  be  determined.  See  Govan  v.  Jack- 
1  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Morgan,  7  Martin,  La.  son,  32  Ark.  553,  1877;  State  v.  Fitzger- 
(0.  S.)  1;  9  Ih.  (N.  S.)  381,  1828;  {71/m,  aid,  44  Mo.  425,  1869;  Ewing  i>.  Filley,  43 
sec.  244.  In  Wammacks  v.  Holloway,  2  Pa.  St.  384  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Leech,  44 
Ala.  31,  1841,  a  shrievalty  contest,  it  was  Pa.  St.  332;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  276;  Jb. 
denied  that  it  was  within  the  constitu-  623,  624,  note ;  Smith  v.  New  York,  37  N. 
tional  power  of  the  legislature  to  deprive  Y.  518;  People  v.  Mahaney,  13  Mich.  481 ; 
a  party  claiming  a  public  office  of  the  Steele  v.  Martin,  6  Kan.  430,  1870. 
right  to  a  jury  trial  by  making  the  sum-  Wlien  a  city  charter  makes  the  cojnmon 
mary  or  extra-judicial  method  conclusive,  council  tJieJhial  judges  of  the  election  of  al- 
And  to  this  effect  was  the  opinion  of  two  dermen,  mandamus  will  not  lie  to  compel 
of  the  judges  in  The  People  v.  Cicotte,  16  them  to  reinstate  one  whom  they  had  ex- 
Mich.  283.  Since  elections  to  offices  are  eluded  without  a  proper  hearing  on  the 
not  in  the  nature  of  contracts,  there  does  merits.  People  v.  Fitzgerald,  41  Mich.  2. 
not  seem  to  be  anj'  substantial  reason,  in  ^  State  v.  Johnson,  17  Ark.  407,  1856 
view  of  the  plenary  authority  of  the  leg-  (mayoralty  contest), 
islature  over  offices  and  officers,  to  doubt 


§  202.] 


MUNICIPAL   POPULAR  ELECTIONS. 


229 


visions  are  couched,  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  general  laws  of 
the  state  on  the  subjects  of  contested  elections  and  quo  warranto. 
The  principle  is,  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  remains  unless 
it  appears  with  unequivocal  certainty  that  the  legislature  in- 
tended to  take  it  away.  Language  like  that  quoted  above  will 
not  ordinarily  have  this  effect,  but  will  be  construed  to  afford 
a  cumulative  or  primary  tribunal  only,  not  an  exclusive  one. 
A  provision  that  no  court  should  take  cognizance  of  election 
cases  by  quo  warranto.,  etc.,  would  doubtless  be  sufficient  to  divest 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  judicial  tribunals.  And  so,  in  general,  of  a 
provision  that  the  council  should  have  the  sole  or  the  final 
power. of  deciding  elections.^ 


1  Heath,  in  re,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  42,  52, 
and  cases  cited  by  Cowen,  J.,  who  is  of 
opinion  that  no  mere  negative  words,  and 
that  nothing  less  than  express  words,  will 
oust  the  supervisory  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts.  The  amended  charter  of  a  city 
provided  "  that  the  board  of  councilmen 
shall  be  the  Jinal  judges  of  the  election 
returns  and  of  the  validity  of  elections 
and  qualifications  of  its  own  members." 
Park,  J.,  says  :  "  The  statute  in  question 
was  clearly  intended  to  apply  to  cases  of 
this  kind.  It  makes  the  common  council 
of  the  city  final  judges  of  the  election  re- 
turns and  qualifications  of  its  members. 
By  the  use  of  the  word  '  final '  the  legis- 
lature intended  to  divest  the  superior 
court  of  jurisdiction  in  such  cases,  and 
make  the  common  council  tlie  sole  tribu- 
nal to  determine  the  legality  of  the  elec- 
tion of  its  members,"  citing,  inter  alia, 
Commonwealth  v.  Baxter,  35  Pa.  St.  263 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Leech,  44  Pa.  St.  332; 
Lamb  v.  Lynd,  44  Pa.  St.  3-30 ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Meeser,  44  Pa.  St.  341 ;  People  v. 
Wetiierell,  14  Mich.  48;  O'Docherty  v. 
Archer,  0  Tex.  2'J5 ;  Sellick  v.  Common 
Council  of  South  Norwalk,  40  Conn.  359, 
1873.  In  Linegar  v.  Ilitteniiouse,  94  111. 
208,  and  Oregon  v.  McKennon,  8  Oregon, 
485,  the  text  is  cited  and  applied.  In  Cali- 
fornia, when  the  charter  of  a  city  provides 
that  the  common  council  "shall  judge  of 
the  qualifications,  elections,  atid  returns  of 
their  own  members,"  tiie  council  possesses 
the  exclusive  authority  to  pass  on  the 
subject,  and  the  courts  have  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  inquire  into  the  qualifications, 
elections,  or  returns  of  members  of  the 


council.  People  v.  Metzker,  47  Cal.  524, 
1874.  See  in  support  of  the  text,  Grier 
V.  Shackelford,  Const.  Rep.  642  ;  State  v. 
Fitzgerald,  44  Mo.  425,  1869  ;  Common- 
wealth V.  McCloskey,  2  Rawle  (Pa.),  369 
(two  judges  dissenting) ;  Strahl,  in  re,  16 
Iowa,  309,  1864 ;  State  v.  Funck,  17  Iowa, 
365,  1864;  Kane  v.  People,  4  Neb.  509, 
1876  ;  Bateman  v.  Megowan,  1  Met.  (Ky.) 
533;  Wammacks  v.  Holloway,  2  Ala.  31, 
1841  (sheriffalty  contest)  ;  Hummer  v. 
Hummer,  3  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  42;  Mack- 
lot  V.  Davenport,  17  Iowa,  379;  Gass  v. 
State,  34  Ind.  424,  1870.  State  v.  Mar- 
low,  15  Ohio  St.  114;  distinguished,  Kane 
V.  People,  4  Neb.  509,  1876  ;  post,  chapters 
on  Quo  Warranto,  Mandamus,  and  Rem- 
edies against  Illegal  Corporate  Acts. 
Action  of  board  of  canvassers  not  conclu- 
sive of  the  right  of  the  party  to  an  oflSce, 
though  it  may  deprive  him,  in  the  first 
instance,  of  a  commission  or  certificate. 
Quo  warranto  lies  notwithstanding  the  de- 
termination of  tiie  board  of  canvassers, 
on  which  full  investigation  may  be  had. 
State  V.  Governor,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  331, 
1856 ;  State  v.  Tlie  Clerk,  lb.  354 ;  Peo- 
ple V.  Kilduff,  15  111.  492;  Cooley  Const. 
Lim.  623,  and  cases  cited;  Hadley  v. 
Mayor,  33  N.  Y.  603,  1865 ;  Anthony  v. 
Halderman,  7  Kan.  50,  1871. 

Conformably  to  the  views  expressed 
in  the  text  it  has  been  recently  decided 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania, 
tiiat  tlie  right  given  to  city  councils  to  be 
the  judges  of  the  qualification  of  their 
own  members  "in  like  manner  as  each 
branch  of  the  legislature,"  does  not  pre- 
clude the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts  to  try 


230 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


§  203.  (142)  Agreeably  to  the  rule  just  stated,  a  clause  in 
the  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation,  that  the  city  council  "  shall 
be  the  judges  of  the  election,  returns,  and  qualifications  of  their 
own  members,  and  of  all  other  officers  of  the  corporation,"  was 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Delaware  not  to  oust  the  Superior 
Court  of  the  state  (invested  with  the  usual  powers  of  the  King's 
Bench)  of  its  superintending  jurisdiction  over  corporations,  and 
it  was  declared,  if  the  council  should  erroneously  decide  that 
a  person  duly  elected  by  the  people  to  an  office  was  not  qualified 


the  question  of  qualification  by  quo  war- 
ranto, though  the  opinion  of  the  profes- 
sion seems  to  be  otherwise,  and  it  was 
otherwise  held  in  the  court  below.     Com- 
monwealth V.  Huhn,  70  Pa.  St.  465,  1872. 
A  special   remedy  given   by  statute   is 
cumulative  and  not  exclusive  of  the  ordi- 
nary jurisdiction   of  the   courts,   unless 
sucli  be  the   manifest   intention  of   the 
statute.    Attorney  General  v.  Corporation 
of  Poole,  4  Mylne  &  Cr.  17,  overruhng  '2 
Keen,  190;  see,  also,  Attorney  General  v. 
Aspinwall,   2    Mylne    &   Cr.   613.     And 
hence  a  breach  of  a  public   trust  by  a 
municipal  corporation  is  held,  in  England, 
to  be   cognizable    in   chancery,  notwith- 
standing a  special  appeal  be  given  in  the 
particular    matter  to    the  lords   of   the 
treasury.     lb.     Parr  ik  Attorney  General, 
8  CI.  &  F.  409 ;  Attorney  General  v.  Cor- 
poration of  Litchfield,  11  Beav.  120;  see 
chapter    on     Remedies    against    Illegal 
Corporate  Acts,  post,  sec.  910.     A  court 
of  chancery  has  no  jurisdiction  to  enjoin 
the  holding  of  an  election   by  the   people, 
and   a  writ   issued   for   that   purpose   is 
void,  and  disobedience  thereof  will   not 
subject  a  party  to  punishment  as  for  a 
contempt  of  court.    Darst  v.  People,  62  111. 
306, 1872  ;  Walton  v.  Beveling,  61  111.  201, 
1871 ;  post,  sees.  205,  255,  275,  890,  900.  n. 
Courts  of  Equitfi  have  no  inherent  power 
to  try  contested  elections,  and  have  never  ex- 
ercised it  except  in  cases  where  it  has 
been  conferred  by  express  enactment  or 
necessary  implication  therefrom.    Dickey 
V.  Reed,  78  111.  261, 1875.    Where  an  elec- 
tion was  held  in  a  city  on  the  question  of 
whether  the  municipality  should  become 
incorporated  under  the  general  incorpo- 
ration act  for  cities   and  villages,  and  a 
writ  of  injunction  was  issued  out  of  the 


Circuit  Court  enjoining  the  board  of  can- 
vassers from  canvassing  the  returns  and 
declaring  the  result,  it  was  held  that  the 
Circuit  Court  had  no  power  to  issue  the 
writ;  that  it  was  utterly  void;  that  the 
canvassers  were  not  bound  to  obey  it,  and 
could  not  be  punished  for  contempt  for 
refusing  to  do  so.  lb.  An  injunction,  re- 
straining a  board  of  canvassers  from 
proceeding  to  canvass  and  certify  the 
result  of  an  election  until  the  further 
order  of  tlie  judge  granting  the  same, 
where  the  statute  requires  the  board  to 
proceed  by  a  certain  day,  is  unauthorized. 
State,  ex  rel.  Bloxham  ?;.  State  Board  of 
Canvassers,  13  Fla.  55,  1869.  Equity 
will  not  interfere,  by  injunction,  to  re- 
strain persons  from  exercising  the  functions 
of  public  offices  on  the  ground  of  the  want 
of  binding  force  in  the  law  under  which 
their  appointments  were  made,  but  will 
leave  that  question  to  be  determined  at 
law.  Slieridan  v.  Colvin,  78  III.  237, 1875. 
In  this  case  it  was  sought  to  enjoin  the 
city  council  from  enforcing  an  ordinance 
on  the  sole  ground  that,  if  the  ordinance 
was  enforced,  it  would  deprive  the  com- 
plainants of  the  functions  of  offices  which 
they  held  in  the  city  ;  and  it  was  held  that 
a  Court  of  Chancery  had  no  jurisdiction. 
76.  Jurisdiction  in  equity  over  contested 
county  seat  elections  in  Illinois.  Dickey  v. 
Reed,  78  111.  261,  1875;  Shaw  v.  Hill,  67 
III.  455,  1873.  The  expenses  of  a  municipal 
election  must  be  borne  by  the  municipality 
and  not  in  whole,  or  in  part,  by  the 
county  ;  but  to  a  bill  by  resident  tax- 
payers to  restrain  the  city  from  paying 
the  election  officers  for  their  services 
such  officers  are  necessary  parties.  Bing- 
ham V.  Camden,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  (2  Stew.) 
464,  1878 ;  Butcher  v.  Camden,  76.  478. 


§  205.] 


MUNICIPAL   POPULAR   ELECTIONS. 


231 


to  hold  it,  a  mandamus  might  issue  commanding  them  to  admit 
him  to  the  office.^ 

§  204.  (143)  Where  the  legislative  intent  is  clear,  that  the 
action  of  the  council  in  contested  election  cases  shall  be  final,  the 
court  will  not  inquire  into  election  frauds,  since  the  council  is 
the  judge  of  this  matter  as  of  others  pertaining  to  the  election  ; 
but  the  courts  will  inquire  whether,  in  point  of  law,  there  was  an 
office  or  vacancy  to  be  filled.^ 

§  205.  (144)  Where,  by  statute,  the  returns  of  all  municipal 
elections  were  declared  to  be  "subject  to  the  inquiry  and  de- 
termination of  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  upon  the  complaint 
of  fifteen  or  more  voters  filed  in  said  court  within  twenty  days, 
and  the  court,  in  judging  of  such  elections,  was  directed  to  pro- 
ceed upon  the  7nerits  thereof,  and  determine  finally  concerning 
the  same  according  to  the  laws  of  the  commonwealth,"  this  was 


1  State  V.  Wilmington,  3  Harring. 
(Del.)  294,  1840;  s.  p.  State  v.  Fitzger- 
ald, 44  Mo.  426, 1869.  So  in  Iowa,  where 
the  city  charter  provided  that  the  council 
should  be  "  the  judge  of  the  election  and 
qualifications  of  its  own  members,"  but 
no  ordinance  had  been  passed  prescribing 
any  method  of  trial,  it  was  held  that  the 
mere  provision  in  the  charter  did  not  pre- 
clude a  contestant  from  a  resort  to  an  in- 
formation in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto. 
State  I'.  Funck  (mayoralty  contest),  17 
Iowa,  365,  1864.  In  a  previous  case  the 
same  court  decided  that  under  a  charter 
making  the  council  "judges  of  the  elec- 
tion, returns,  and  qualifications  of  their 
own  members,"  it  was  competent  for  the 
council  to  pass  a  general  ordinance  pro- 
viding for  the  trial  of  contested  elections 
of  city  officers,  and  making  the  council 
the  tribunal  for  the  trial  of  the  same, 
such  an  ordinance  being  consistent  with 
the  general  laws  of  the  state,  which,  in 
providing  special  tribunals  for  contesting 
state,  county,  and  township  officers, 
omitted  to  make  any  special  provision  for 
contested  elections  to  municipal  offices. 
Strahl,  in  re,  16  Iowa,  369,  1864  (mayor- 
alty contest).    See  sec.  202,  note. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Leech,  44  Pa.  St. 
332,  1863 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Meeser,  lb. 


341.  Construction  of  words  making  the 
number  of  members  of  the  council  from 
a  ward  depend  upon  "  the  list  of  the  taxa- 
ble inhabitants."  lb. ;  People  v.  "Weth- 
erell,  14  Mich.  48  ;  Tompert  v.  Lithgow, 
1  Bush  (Ky.),  176,  1866. 

Pending  legal  proceedings,  the  court, 
in  favor  of  the  officer  apparently  entitled, 
enjouted  the  adverse  claimant  from  attempt- 
ing to  take  possession  of  the  office.  Ew- 
ing  V.  Thompson,  43  Pa.  St.  384,  1862  ; 
Kerr  v.  Trego,  47  Pa.  St.  16,  292,  1864. 
Certificate  of  election  is  the  prima  facie 
written  title  to  office,  and  remains  so 
until  regularly  set  aside  or  annulled.  lb  ; 
post,  sec.  275 ;  People  v.  Thatcher,  55  N. 
Y.  525,  1874. 

The  council,  as  board  of  canvassers,  can- 
not investigate  the  legality  of  an  election, 
but  are  concluded  by  the  returns  of  the 
judges  ;  but  the  council,  when  sitting  as 
a  tribunal  to  judge  of  the  election  of 
members  of  their  body,  may  go  behind 
the  returns  and  inquire  into  the  fact  as 
to  who  is  elected.  State  v.  Rahway, 
33  N.  J.  L.  Ill,  1868.  Under  special 
charter  the  declaration  and  decision  of 
the  council  as  to  who  are  elected,  held 
essential  to  a  complete  election.  People 
V.  North,  72  N.  Y.  124,  1878. 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


held  to  exclude  the  remedy  by  quo  tvarranto  and  all  common 
law  remedies  as  to  matters  which  might  have  been  investigated 
in  the  special  mode  prescribed  by  the  statute.  The  opinion  was 
expressed  that  the  judgment  of  the  Common  Pleas  was  final ; 
that  it  could  not  be  reversed  by  quo  tvarranto  or  in  any  other 
collateral  manner ;  and  that  even  a  certiorari  would  enable  the 
appellate  court  to  examine  only  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings 
of  the  Common  Pleas,  but  not  to  examine  the  case  on  its  merits 
as  disclosed  in  the  evidence.^ 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Garrigues,  28  Pa. 
St.  9,  1857 ;  Commonwealtli  v.  Baxter, 
35  Pa.  St.  203;  Commonwealtli  v.  Leech, 
44  Pa.  St.  332;  followed  and  ai^proved. 
State  V.  Mario w,  15  Ohio  St.  114 ;  see 
Ewing  V.  Filley,  43  Pa.  St.  386 ;  Lamb 
V.  Lynd,  44  Pa.  St.  336.  Ellison,  in  re, 
20Gratt.  (Va.)  10,  29,  1870,  commenting 
on  Commonwealtli  v.  Garrigues,  supra. 
Function  and  {lowers  of  common  council 
as  election  canvassers.  Morgan  v.  Quack- 
enbush,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  72.  A  city 
council,  under  authority,  "  to  canvass  re- 
turns and  determine  and  declare  the 
result"  of  elections  to  municipal  offices, 
exhausts  its  power  when  it  has  once  le- 
gally canvassed  the  returns  and  declared 
the  result,  and  it  cannot  at  a  subsequent 
meeting,  make  a  re-canvass  and  reverse 
its  prior  determination.  Hadley  v.  Mayor, 
33  N.  Y.  603,  18G5.  The  rule  stated  in 
the  text,  that  the  original  or  superintend- 
ing jurisdiction  of  the  superior  courts 
should  not  be  held  to  be  taken  away  by 
any  language  which  does  not  expressly, 
or  by  unequivocal  implication,  show  this 
to  have  been  the  legislative  intention,  is 
a  salutary  one,  but  seems  in  some  cases 
not  to  have  been  very  strictly  observed. 
In  Texas,  where  the  statute  conferred 
upon  the  county  court  the  power  to  de- 
termine contested  elections  of  county  offi- 
cers, and  gave  no  right  to  appeal,  it  was 
considered  to  be  the  policy  of  the  statute 
to  secure  an  early  determination  of  such 
disputes,  and  it  was  held  that  the  judg- 
ment of  the  county  court  could  not  be 
revised  either  upon  appeal  or  certiorari, 
and  was  final.  O'Docherty  r.  Archer,  9 
Tex.  295,  18-52.  The  special  mode  pro- 
vided by  law  for  contesting  elections  must 
be  followed.  Dickey  v.  Reed,  78  111.  261, 
1875;  post,  ch.  xxii. 


The  constitution  of  Ohio  requires  the 
General  Assembly  "to  determine  by  law 
before  what  authority,  and  in  what  man- 
ner, the  trial  of  contested  elections  shall 
be  conducted,"  and  accordingly  a  specific 
mode  of  contesting  elections  in  tliat  state 
was  provided  by  statute  ;  and  this  mode 
was  lield  to  exclude  the  common  law 
niode  by  proceedings  in  quo  warranto,  and 
the  result  to  bind  the  state  as  well  as  in- 
dividuals. State  V.  Marlow,  15  Ohio  St. 
114,  18G4. 

In  South  Carolina  it  was  held,  where 
the  legislature  had  authorized  managers 
of  elections  "to  hear  and  determine" 
cases  of  contested  elections,  without  mak- 
ing any  provision  for  an  appeal,  or  any 
reference  in  the  act  to  proceedings  by  ^mo 
warranto  that  their  decision  was  without 
any  express  statutory  declaration  to  that 
effect,  final  and  conclusive,  and  that 
courts  had  no  control  over  it.  Grier  v. 
Shackelford,  3  Brev.  (South  Car.)  491, 
1814  (Nott,  J.,  dissenting)  ;  followed  in 
the  State  v.  Deliesseline,  1  McCord 
(South  Car.),  52,  1821  (two  judges  dis- 
senting). See  State  v.  Huggins,  Harper 
Law,  94,  1824.  But  note  remarks  of 
Evans,  J.,  in  State  v.  Cockrell,  2  Rich. 
(South  Car.)  Law,  6,  who,  speaking  of 
the  subsequent  act  of  1839  (requiring  the 
managers  to  hear  and  determine  the  va- 
lidity of  the  election,  and  providing  that 
their  "decisions  shall  be  final"),  says: 
"  I  take  it  to  be  clear  that  the  validity  of 
an  election,  in  all  cases,  must  (under  the 
act),  in  the  first  instance,  be  decided  by 
the  court  of  managers  duly  authorized 
according  to  law.  All  questions,  wliether 
of  law  or  fact,  must  be  submitted  to  this 
tribunal.  Their  decisions,  on  questions 
of  fact,  must  necessarily  be  final,  as  no 
appeal  is  given;  but  I  do  not  mean  to  say 


§  207.] 


MUNICIPAL  POPULAK   ELECTIONS. 


233 


Power  to  create  and  appoint  3funicipal   Officers. 

§  206.  (145)  At  co7)inion  law,  municipal  corporations  ma^/ 
appoint  officers,  but  only  such  as  the  nature  of  their  constitution 
requires.  The  right  of  electing  such  officers  as  they  are  autho- 
rized to  have  is  incidental  to  every  corporation,  and  need  not  be 
conferred  by  charter.  The  power  of  appointing  officers  is,  at 
common  law,  to  be  exercised  by  the  corporation  at  large,  and  not 
by  any  select  body,  unless  it  is  so  provided  in  the  charter.  The 
powers  of  corporate  officers  proper  at  common  law  are  very 
limited,  extending  only  to  the  administration  of  the  by-laws  and 
charter  regulations  of  the  corporation.^ 


§  207.  (146)  In  this  country  the  charter  or  constitution  of 
the  corporation  usually  provides  with  care  as  to  all  the  principal 
officers,  such  as  mayor,  aldermen,  marshal,  clerk,  treasurer,  and 
the  like,  and  prescribes  their  various  duties.  This  leaves  but 
little  necessity  or  room  for  the  exercise  of  any  implied  power  to 
create  other  offices  and  appoint  other  officers.  ^     It  is  supposed, 


that  their  errors  of  law  may  not  be  cor- 
rected by  certiorari,  or  sucli  of  the  pre- 
rogative writs  as  may  be  best  suited  to 
tlie  case."  Accordingly,  where  an  elec- 
tion within  the  act  had  not  been  con- 
tested before  the  managers,  the  court 
refused  leave  to  file  an  information  in  the 
nature  of  a  quo  warranto.  It  was  after- 
wards stated,  by  a  distinguished  judge  in 
that  state,  that  tlie  scrutiny  of  municipal 
elections,  as  an  incidental  power,  belongs 
in  the  first  place  to  tlie  city  council ;  and 
if  they  abuse  that  power,  the  correction 
of  that  abuse  devolves  upon  tlie  courts  by 
information  in  tlie  nature  of  a  quo  icar- 
ranto.  Per  O'yeall,  J.,  in  State  v.  Sclini- 
erle,  5  Rich.  Law  (South  Car.),  299,  301, 
1852  {Quo.  War.  to  test  validity  of  de- 
fendant's election  as  mayor  of  Charles- 
ton). 8.  p.  Johnson  v.  Charleston,  1  Bay 
(South  Car.),  441,  1795.  But  the  city 
council,  in  order  to  determine  a  contest 
for  a  municipal  office,  cannot  swear  the 
individual  voters  to  compel  them  to  de- 
clare for  whom  they  voted.  Tills  is  an 
inquisitorial  power  unknown  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  our  government,  and  of  danger- 
ous tendency.  lb.  See  also  People  v. 
Pease,  27  N.  Y.  81  ;  People  v.  Thacher, 
55  N.  Y.  525,  1874;  People  v.  Cicotte,  16 


Mich.  283  ;  Cooley,  Const.  Lim.  604-606. 
Election  contests  for  office  will  not  be 
determined  on  habeas  corpus  (Stralil,  in  re, 
16  Iowa,  369),  nor  in  general  on  bill  in 
equity.  Hagner  v.  Heyberger,  7  Watts  & 
S.  (Pa.)  104;  but  see  Kerr  v.  Trego,  47 
Pa.  St.  292 ;  supra,  sec.  202,  note ;  post, 
sec.  275 ;  Hughes  v.  Parker,  20  N.  H.  58  ; 
Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75,  1867, 
and  chapter  on  Corporate  Meetings,  post. 
But  as  to  county  seat  contest,  where  fraud 
is  alleged,  see  Brown  v.  Smith,  46  111. 
See  also  ch.  xxii.  post. 

1  WiUc.  2.34,  pi.  598  ;  lb.  297,  pi.  767 ; 
lb.  298,  pi.  769;  Glover,  220;  Vintners 
V.  Passey,  1  Burr.  237 ;  Easting's  Case,  1 
Mod.  24 ;  Rex  v.  Barnard,  Comb.  416. 

2  Where  it  was  manifest,  from  the 
whole  tenor  of  a  city  charter,  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  legislature  itself  to 
specify  therein  all  the  offices,  and  desig- 
nate all  the  officers  to  be  elected  or 
chosen,  and  to  regulate  the  mode  of  ap- 
pointment, it  was  held  that  the  city  coun- 
cil could  not,  by  virtue  of  an  inherent  or 
implied  power,  create  another  officer,  fix 
his  term,  provide  for  his  appointment, 
and  clotlie  him  with  tlie  powers  of  a 
municipal  officer.  Iloboken  v.  Harrison, 
1  Vrooin  (30  N.J.  L.),  73, 1862.    Itissaid, 


234 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


however,  when  not  in  contravention  of  the  charter,  that  muni- 
cipal corporations  may,  to  a  limited  extent,  have  an  incidental 
right  to  create  certain  minor  offices  of  a  ministerial  or  executive 
nature.  Thus,  if  power  be  conferred  to  provide  for  the  health  of 
the  inhabitants,  this  would  give  the  corporation  the  right  to  pass 
ordinances  to  secure  this  end,  and  the  execution  of  such  ordi- 
nances might  be  committed  to  a  health  officer,  although  no  such 
officer  be  specifically  named  in  the  organic  act,  if  this  course 
would  not  conflict  with  any  of  its  provisions.  But  the  power  to 
create  offices  even  of  this  character  would  be  limited  to  such  as 
the  nature  of  the  duties  devolved  on  the  cor2:)oration  naturally 
and  reasonably  required. 

The  provisions  of  the  charter  as  to  time  and  mode  of  election, 
the  appointment,  qualifications,  and  duration  of  the  terms  of  offi- 
cers must  be  strictly  observed.  Therefore,  an  ordinance  which 
makes  eligible  those  who,  by  the  charter,  are  not  so,  ^  or  which 


in  tlie  opinion,  that  the  power  to  create 
municipal  officers  siiould  be  expressly  con- 
ferred. In  New  Jcrseif,  pound-keepers, 
from  a  very  early  period,  had  been  pub- 
lic township  officers,  elected  in  the  same 
way  as  other  officers  of  the  township. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  was  held 
that  a  municipal  corporation  could  not, 
without  express  autliority  therefor,  estab- 
lish another  public  pound  within  the 
limits  of  the  township,  and  prescribe  reg- 
ulations and  fees  variant  from  those  pre- 
scribed by  the  general  law;  and  it  was 
further  held,  that  the  office  of  pound- 
keeper  could  not  be  considered  as  one 
essential  to  the  business  of  the  corpora- 
tion ;  nor  is  a  pound-keeper  one  of  those 
subordinate  officers  whicli  all  municipal 
corporations  may,  as  of  course,  appoint. 
It  was,  however,  admitted  by  the  court 
that  where  such  a  corporation  has  power 
to  do  an  act,  it  has  the  incidental  power 
to  appoint  persons  to  carry  it  into  effect. 
White  V.  Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  67, 
1856.  Construction  of  power  to  appoint 
weigh  master.  Hoffman  v.  Jersey  City,  5 
Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  172.  Power  to  ap- 
point when  office  is  vacated  "  by  death  or 
disability,"  held  to  authorize  appoint- 
ment where  a  vacancy  is  caused  by  resig- 
nation. State  V.  Newark,  3  Dutch.  (N. 
J.)  185.  Authority  to  a  municipal  cor- 
poration to  appoint  an  officer  was  inferred 
from  the  frequent  mention  of  the  office 


and  its  duties  in  the  charter.  People  v. 
Bedell,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  196;  see,  also, 
Field  V.  Girard  College,  54  Pa.  St.  233. 
Legislative  prohibition  to  common  coun- 
cil against  creating  new  offices  extends  to 
clerks,  but  not  to  janitors  and  ordinary 
servants.  Costello  v.  Ma3'or,  etc.  of  N. 
Y.,  63  N.  Y.  48,  1875;  Sullivan  v.  Mayor, 
etc.  of  N.  Y.,  53  N.  Y.  652.  Power  to 
appoint  marshal  under  charter  of  East 
St.  Louis.  See  People  v.  Canty,  55  111. 
33. 

1  Rex  V.  Mayor  of  Weymouth,  7  Mod. 
373;  Rex  v.  Bumstead,2  B.  &  Ad.  699; 
Rex  V.  Spencer,  3  Burr.  1827  ;  Rex  v. 
Chitty,  5  Ad.  &  E.  609.  A  city  council 
cannot  elect  its  own  members  when  the 
law  provides  that  they  shall  be  elected 
by  ballot,  by  the  electors  of  the  city. 
Kearney  v.  Andrews,  2  Stockt.  (N.  J.)  70. 
Majority  of  council  essential  to  valid  ap- 
pointment of  city  treasurer.  State  v. 
Patterson,  6  Vroom  (35  N.  J.  L.),  190; 
See  Douglass  v.  Essex,  9  Vroom  (38  N. 
J.  L.),  214;  State  r.  Jersey  City,  2  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  444,  447.  Officer  (/e/ac<o.  Power  of 
mayor.  The  appointment  of  a  person  to 
a  city  office  by  a  mayor  under  a  law 
which  requires  confirmation  bj'  the  coun- 
cil gives  the  appointee  no  right  to  the 
office  without  such  confirmation  by  the 
proper  and  legal  city  council.  People  v. 
Weber,  89  III  347. 


§  208.]  MUNICIPAL  POPULAR  ELECTIONS.  235 

abridges  the  term  of  officers,  as  fixed  by  the  charter,  is  unautho- 
rized and  void.^ 

§  208.  (147)  Every  municipal  corporation  is  provided  with 
an  executive  head,  usually  styled  the  mayor.  In  the  chapter  on 
Corporate  Meetings  we  have  pointed  out  the  difference,  in  some 
respects,  between  the  mayor  of  an  old  corporation  in  England  and 
the  officer  known  by  that  name  in  this  country.  In  both  coun- 
tries the  mayor  is  the  head  officer  or  executive  magistrate  of  the 
corporation  ;  but  with  us  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  all 
his  powers  and  duties  depend  entirely  upon  the  provisions  of  the 
charter  or  constituent  act  of  the  corporation,  and  valid  by-laws 
passed  in  pursuance  thereof,  and  these  vary,  of  course,  in  dif- 
ferent municipalities.  It  is  usually  made  his  duty,  however,  to 
see  that  municipal  ordinances  are  executed,  and  to  preside  at 
corporate  meetings ;  and  he  is  frequently  expressly  declared  to  be 
a  member  of  the  council  or  local  legislative  body.  Properly  and 
primarily  his  duties  are  executive  and  administrative,  and  not 
judicial  or  legislative.  But  judicial  duties  are  often  superadded 
to  those  which  properly  appertain  to  the  office  of  mayor,  and  he 
is  invested  with  the  authority  to  administer  not  only  the  ordi- 
nances of  the  corporation,  but  also  judicially  to  administer  the 
laws  of  the  state. ^ 

1  Stadler  v.   Detroit,    13    Mich.  346,  office  of  city  clerk,  Mohan  v.  Jackson,  52 

1865 ;  Vason  v.  Augusta,  38  Ga.  542,  1868.  Ind.  599,  1876. 

Chapter  on  Ordinances,  post.  The  office  '^  Waldo  v.  Wallace,  12  Ind.  569,  1859, 
of  treasurer  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  and  growing  out  of  it,  see,  also,  Gulick  v. 
not  a  "civil  office  "  within  the  meaning  of  New,  14  lb.  93,  1860;  Howard  y.  Shoe- 
the  provision  of  the  constitution  exclud-  maker,  35  Ind.  Ill,  1871  ;  Reynolds  v. 
ing  the  clergy  from  "holding  any  civil  Baldwin,  1  La.  An.  162, 1846;  Muscatine  i*. 
office  in  this  state,  or  from  being  a  mem-  Steck,  7  Iowa,  505;  2  lb.  220;  Strahl,  in 
ber  of  the  legislature."  State  v.  Wil-  re,  16  Iowa,  369  ;  Shafer  v.  Munima,  17 
mington,  3  Harring.  (Del.)  294,  1840;  Md.  331  ;  Luehrman  v.  Taxing  District, 
see  Commonwealth  i'.  Dallas,  3  Yeates  2  Lea,  425.  Approving  text.  Slater  v. 
(Pa.),  300.  "Lucrative  offices,"  in  the  Wood,  9  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  15;  ante,  ch.  iii. 
constitutional  sense,  defined  to  embrace  Morrisons.  McDonald,  21  Me.  550,  1842; 
county  recorder,  commissioner,  township  State  v.  Maynard,  14  111.  419  ;  Common- 
trustee,  and  supervisor.  Daily  v.  State,  wealth  v.  Dallas,  3  Yeates  (Pa.),  300, 
8  Blackf  329  ;  Creighton  v.  Piper,  14  Ind.  1801 ;  Starr  i-.  Wilmington,  3  Harring. 
182;  Howard  y.  Shoemaker,  35  Ind.  111.  (Del.)  294,  1839;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7 
The  office  of  city  councilman  is  not  "lu-  Kan.  426,  1871.  This  section  of  the  text 
crative"  within  the  prohibition  of  the  cited  and  followed.  Martindale  y.  Palmer, 
state   constitution  against  the  same  per-  52  Ind.  411,  1876. 

son  holding  more  ttian  one  lucrative  office  Power  of  mayor,  in  his  official  name, 

at  the  same  time.     State  v.  Kirk,  44  Ind.  to  bring  suit  to  prevent  or  restrain   viola- 

401, 1873 ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  239.     As  to  tions  of  law  by  other  municipal  officers, 


236 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[oil.  IX. 


^  209.  (148)    The  office  of  mayor  has  long  existed  in  England,^ 
and  many  of  its  general  features  have  been  adopted  in  this  country. 

Spolm.  Gloss.  "  Mayor";  Ela  v.  Smith,  5 
Gray  (Mass.),  121,  1855;  Adiley's  Case, 
4  Abb.  Tr.  Rep.  85,  1856  ;  Cochran  v.  Mc- 


dofhirotl.  Geiiois,  Mayor,  etc.  i'.  Lock- 
ett,  13  La.  545,  1838.  But  qiuvre  f  The 
mayor  of  a  city  has  no  incidental  j)Ower 
to  execute  an  appeal  bond  for  tiie  corpora- 
tion ;  and  such  a  bond  was  regarded  as 
not  even  incidental  to  tlie  power  of  tak- 
in<'  an  appeal,  but  must  be  autiiorizod  by 
the  council.  Baltimore  v.  Kailroad  Co., 
21  Md.  50,  18G3.  A  precept  to  collect  a 
street  assessment,  signed  by  a  member  of 
tlie  council  acting  temporarily  as  presi- 
dent thereof,  is  void,  when  the  statute 
requires  the  sirjnnture  of  the  mayor. 
Jeffersonville  i-.  Patterson,  32  Ind.  140, 
1869.  Injunction  will  lie  to  restrain  a 
sale  on  such  a  precept.  lb.  See  chapter 
on  Remedies  against  Illegal  Corporate 
Acts,  post. 

As  to  nature  and  e.xtent  of  authority 
of  mayors  and  other  civil  officers  to  em 
ploy  force  for  the  prevention  or  suppres- 
sion of  mobs,  riots,  etc.,  see  Kla  v.  Smith, 
5  Gray  (Mass.),  121,  1855,  arising  out  of 
the  arrest  of  Anthony  Burns  as  a  fugitive 
slave.  Power  of  mayor  to  order  demoli- 
tion of  works  and  buildings  in  public 
places.  Henderson  v.  Mayor,  3  La.  563. 
Mayor  may  sanction  an  ordinance  passed 
by  a  common  council,  whose  term  has 
expired.  Elmendorf  v.  Ewen,  2  N.  Y. 
Leg.  Obs.  85.  Notice  to  mai/or.  Nicliols 
r.  Boston,  98  Mass.  39.  Police  and  execu- 
tive poiver  of  maijor.  Sliafer  v.  Mumma, 
17  Md.  33i ;  Slater  v.  Wood,  9  Bosw.  (N. 
Y.)  15;  Pedrick  v.  Bailey,  12  Gray 
(Mass.),  161 ;  Nichols  v.  Boston,  98  Mass. 
39.  Alderman  acting  as  mayor.  State 
V.  Buffalo,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  434.  Judicial 
power  of  mayor.  See  Municipal  Courts, 
post ;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  426 ; 
Howard  r.  Shoemaker,  35  Ind.  Ill,  1871. 
Presence  and  functions  of  mayor  at 
meetings  of  the  council.  See  chapter  on 
Corporate  Meetings,  post. 

Liabilit)/  of  mayor  in  Upper  Canada  to 
private  actions  in  respect  to  his  official 
acts.  Fair  v.  Moore,  3  Up.  Can.  C.  P. 
484 ;  Moran  v.  Palmer,  13  lb.  450,  528. 
Fraud  of  mayor  restrained  and  relieved 
against.  Patterson  v.  Bowes,  4  Grant, 
170  ;  lb.  489  ;  post,  sec.  910,  note. 

1  History  and  nature  of  office  nf  mayor, 
consult:  4  Jacob's  Law  Diet.  264,265; 
2  Toml.  Law  Diet.  540;    2   Bouv.    150; 


Cleary,  22  Iowa,  75,  82,  1867  ;  Nichols  v. 
Boston,  98  Mass.  39;  Fletcher  i'.  Lowell, 
15  Gray  (Mass.),  103;  ante,  sees.  9,  174; 
post,  sees.  253,  200,  271,  331,  428.  The 
office  in  England  is  quite  ancient.  In 
1204  King  Joiui  made  the  bailiff  of  King's 
Lynn  a  mayor,  with  administrative  pow- 
ers. The  title  was  a  common  one  as 
early  as  the  time  of  Bracton. 

Mr.  Norton,  in  his  valuable  "  Commen- 
taries on  the  History,  Constitution,  and 
Chartered  Franchises  of  the  City  of 
London,"  says  that  the  first  special  grant 
of  the  mayoralty  to  the  city  of  London 
was  made  by  King  John  in  a  charter 
dated  on  the  ninth  day  of  May,  in  the  six- 
teenth year  of  his  reign,  a.  d.  1207.  This 
charter  declares  that  the  king  has  granted 
and  confirmed  to  the  barons  of  London 
the  right  of  choosing  a  mayor  every 
year,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year  of  re- 
moving him  and  substituting  another,  if 
they  will,  or  electing  the  same  again.  He 
is  to  be  presented  to  the  king,  and  swear 
to  be  faithful  to  him.  The  use  of  the 
word  confirmed,  in  this  cliarter,  shows 
that  the  name  and  officer  existed  before. 
The  first  civic  magistrate  had  begun  to  be 
called  by  the  name  of  mayor  toward 
the  end  of  the  reign  of  King  Rich- 
ard. The  denomination  of  mayor,  it  is 
said  on  the  authority  of  legal  antiquaries, 
can  be  traced  to  a  very  far  date  among 
the  German  and  French  nations  of  Eu- 
rope. The  chief  governor  of  the  town 
communities  which  arose  in  France  in  the 
eleventh  century  was  often  styled  the 
mayor.  It  is  a  matter  of  history  that  in 
France,  the  mayor  of  the  palace  was  the 
governor  of  Paris,  often  holding  sove- 
reign power,  and,  indeed,  in  time,  usurp- 
ing it,  since  it  was  from  one  of  the  mayors 
of  the  palace  that  the  family  of  Charle- 
magne descended.  And  it  is  suggested 
by  Mr.  Norton  that  the  term  "  mayor," 
familiar  to  the  Normans,  may  have  been 
originally,  though  remotely,  derived  from 
the  same  source.  Norton's  Com.,  pp.  90, 
402,  403 ;  see,  also,  PuUing's  Laws,  Cus- 
toms, etc.,  of  London,  ch.  ii,  16  m. 


210.] 


CREATION   AND   APPOINTMENT   OF   OFFICERS. 


237 


In  a  former  page,  suggestions  have  been  made  in  favor  of  increas- 
ing its  dignity  and  responsibility,  as  a  means  of  ensuring  more 
satisfactory  municipal  rule  ;  but  the  subject  is  not  sufficiently 
connected  with  practical  law  to  warrant  more  than  an  allusion  to 
it  in  a  work  of  this  character.^ 

§  210.  (149)  The  office  of  a  police  officer  is  not  known  to  the 
common  law ;  it  is  created  by  statute,  and  such  an  officer  has, 
and  can  exercise,  only  such  powers  as  he  is  authorized  to  do  by 
the  legislature,  expressly  or  derivatively .^  He  is  an  officer  of  the 
state  and  not  of  the  municipality  in  which  he  exercises  his  office.^ 
Where  police  officers  are,  by  statute,  invested  with  all  the  powers 
of  constables,  as  conservators  of  the  peace,  this  gives  them  au- 
thority to  arrest,  upon  view,  intoxicated  persons  while  guilty  of 
disorderly  conduct,  or  other  persons  violating  the  laws,  and  to 


1  Ante,  ch.  i.  sec.  9,  and  notes. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Dugan,  12  Met. 
(Mass.)  233,  1847 ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Hastings,  9  Met.  (Mass.)  259;  ante,  sees. 
58,  60.  Where  a  policeman  is  duly  ap- 
pointed under  charter  authority  to  organ- 
ize and  regulate  a  city  watch  and  the 
general  police  of  the  city,  the  presumption 
is  that  he  possesses  the  powers  of  ordi- 
nary peace  officers  at  common  law.  Doe- 
ring  V.  State,  49  Ind.  56,  1874.  In  Massa- 
chusetts they  are  peace  officers,  and  a 
person  who  assaults  or  obstructs  them  in 
the  discharge  of  their  duties  is  indictable, 
thougli  they  have  not  been  sworn,  the 
statute  not  requiring  this.  Buttrick  v. 
Lowell,  1  Allen  (Mass.).  172;  Mitchell  v. 
Kockland,  52  Me.  118,  122.  In  The  Peo- 
ple V.  Metropolitan  Police  Board,  19  N. 
y.  188,  1859,  growing  out  of  tlie  act  to 
establish  a  Metropolitan  Police  District, 
it  was  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  Court 
of  Appeals  that,  though  the  office  was  a 
new  one,  yet  the  mode  of  filling  it  not 
being  provided  by  the  constitution,  it  was 
in  tlie  power  of  the  legislature  to  confer 
it  upon  persons  discharging  substantially 
the  same  duties  within  a  more  limited 
territorial  jurisdiction,  and  to  dispense 
with  an  oath  of  office.  See,  also,  People 
r.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  -532,  1857,  where  the 
Court  of  Appeals  held  the  "  Act  to  estab- 
lish   a    Metropolitan    Police    District" 


valid  ;  approved.  Metropolitan  Board  of 
Health  v.  Heister,  37  N.  Y.  661,  18G8 ; 
McDermott  v.  Metropolitan  Police  Board, 
5  Abb.  Pr.  422  ;  Police  Commissioners  v. 
Louisville,  3  Busli  (Ky.),597,  1868;  ante, 
sec.  58,  and  notes.  See  People  v.  Albert- 
son,  55  N.  Y.  50,  1873,  where  People  v. 
Draper,  supra,  is  limited,  questioned,  and 
distinguished.  Extent  of  legislative  pow- 
er and  control  over  appointment,  powers, 
etc.  of  police,  health,  and  otiier  local  offi- 
cers. Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Police  (Balti- 
more Police  Act),  15  Md.  376,  1859;  Met- 
ropolitan Board  of  Health  v.  Heister,  37 
N.  Y.  661,  ]8(i8;  People  v.  Hurlbut,  24 
Mich.  44,  1871 ;  Police  Commrs.  v.  Louis- 
ville, above  cited,  ante,  sec.  58,  n.  Mode 
of  com[)ensation.  Worcester  v.  Walker, 
9  Gray  (Mass.),  78. 

3  Burch  V.  Hardwicke,  30  Gratt.  24. 
Wiiile  a  mayor  under  tiie  constitution  may 
remove  officers  of  a  municipality,  he  can- 
not remove  a  state  officer  though  elected 
or  appointed  by  the  people  of  the  munici- 
pality and  paid  by  them  ;  if  the  mayor 
removes  him  from  office  he  exceeds  his 
authority  and  is  responsible  to  the  officer 
in  a  civil  action  for  damages.    lb. 

A  poUreman  of  a  riti/  is  a  public  officer 
holding  his  office  as  a  trust  from  the  state, 
and  not  as  a  matter  of  contract  between 
himself  and  the  city.  Farrell  v.  Bridge- 
port, 45  Conn.  191. 


238 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[.■II.  IX. 


detain  them  until  they  can  be  brought  before  a  magistrate.^     If 
such  an   officer  releases  an  intoxicated  person,  whom   he   had 

1  Taylor  v.  Strong,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
384,  lyuy ;  Bacon  Ab.  Constable,  C. ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Hastings,  9  Met. 
(Mass.)  25!),  1843;  Prell  v.  McDonald,  7 
Kan.  420,  1871.  As  to  power  of  consta- 
bles in  such  cases,  see  1  Hale  P.  C.  587  ; 
Hawkins  P.  C.  Book  II.  cli.  xiii.  sec.  8. 
Where  sucli  a  course  is  not  repugnant  to 
the  general  law  of  the  state,  tlie  proper 
officers  of  a  municipal  corporation  may 
be  authorized  to  arrest  without  warrant,  or 
upon  view,  offenders  who  violate  ordi- 
nances in  the  presence  of  such  officers. 
Bryan  v.  Bates,  15  111.  87,  1853  ;  Main  v. 
McCarty,  15  111.  442 ;  State  v.  Lafferty, 
6  Harring.  (Del.)  491 ;  post,  sec.  414,  n. 
If  an  offence  is  committed  in  view  of  the 
officer,  he  may  arrest  immediately,  or  as 
soon  thereafter  as  he  can.  Boaz  v.  Tate, 
43  Ind.  60,  187.3.  See  chapter  on  Muni- 
cipal Courts,  post. 

Power  to  a  city  corporation  to  make 
ordinances  for  the  security,  or  good  order, 
or  government  of  the  place,  and  to  ap- 
point or  elect  officers  to  carry  out  ordi- 
nances, authorizes  the  appointment  of 
city  guards,  or  police  officers,  or  peace 
officers ;  and  such  officers  may  arrest, 
■without  a  warrant,  persons  engaged  in 
breaches  of  the  peace.  City  Council  v. 
Payne,  2  Nott  &  McCord  (South  Car.), 
475,  1820.  A  city  council  may  authorize 
arrests  upon  view,  without  warrant,  for 
violation  of  its  by-laws,  when  not  incon- 
sistent with  the  general  statutes  or  policy 
of  the  state  (White  v.  Kent,  11  Ohio  St. 
5.50,  1860;  Thomas  v.  Ashland,  12  lb. 
127),  but  not  otherwise.  Thus,  wliere 
the  city  charter  declared  all  by-laws  in- 
consistent with  the  general  law  to  be  void, 
and  where  the  general  law  did  not  allow 
an  officer  to  arrest  for  a  misdemeanor  not 
committed  in  liis  presence,  without  a 
warrant,  it  was  held  that  an  ordinance 
authorizing  police  officers  to  make  arrests, 
without  a  warrant,  for  violation  of  ordi- 
nances not  committed  in  their  presence, 
was  void,  and  would  not  protect  the  offi- 
cer against  a  suit  for  trespass.  Pester- 
field  V.  Vickers,  3  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  205, 
1866.  Further  as  to  arrests,  on  view, 
without  information,  and  the  duty  of  the 
officer,  see  Doering  v.  State,  49  Ind.  56, 


1874;  Johnson  v.  Americus,  46  Ga.  80, 
1872  ;  Nealesy.  Hay  ward,  48  Ind.  19, 1874; 
Boaz  V.  Tate,  43  Ind.  GO,  1873 ;  Smith  v. 
Donnelly,  GO  111.404, 1873  ;  Scircley.  Nevis, 
47  Ind.  289,  1874;  Galliard  v.  Laxton,  2 
B.  &  S.  36.3;  Codd  v.  Cabe,  L.  R. 
1  Ex.  Div.  352 ;  s.  c.  13  Cox,  202 ;  Ke- 
gina  V.  Ciiapman,  12  Cox,  4.  If  a  private 
individual  state  facts  to  an  officer,  wlio 
thereupon,  on  his  o\yn  responsibility,  ar- 
rests a  person,  or  if  he  procure  a  magis- 
trate to  issue  a  warrant  for  taking  a  per- 
son, the  imprisonment  is  not  his  act,  and 
be  may  sliow  this  under  the  plea  of  not 
guilty.  Barber  v.  Eollinson,  1  C.  &  M. 
330;  Stonehouse  v.  Elliott,  6  T.  R.  315; 
Brandt  v.  Craddock,  27  L.  J.  Ex.  314  ; 
Grinham  v.  WiUey,  4  H.  &  N.  496.  An 
officer  is  justified  in  arresting  without  a 
warrant  upon  a  reasonable  suspicion  of  a 
felony  having  been  committed,  and  of  the 
person  being  guilty  of  it,  althougli  no 
felony  has  in  fact  been  committed,  and 
whether  tlie  reasonable  grounds  for  sus- 
picion are  matters  within  his  own  knowl- 
edge or  facts  stated  to  him  by  another. 
Lawrence  v.  Iledger,  3  Taunt.  14 ;  Davis 
17.  Russell,  5  Bing.  355 ;  Beckwith  v. 
Philby,  6  B.  &  C.  635 ;  Hogg  v.  Ward,  3 
H.  &  N.  417.  But  an  officer  is  not  in  gen- 
eral justified  in  arresting  a  person  who 
frequents  a  highway  with  intent  to  com- 
mit a  felony  (Timson,  in  re,  L.  R.  5  Ex. 
257  ;  see  also  Jones,  inre,  7  Ex.  580),  or  in 
arresting  a  person  for  a  misdemeanor  with- 
out a  warrant  (Matthews  v.  Biddulph,  3 
M.  &  G.  390 ;  Griffin  v.  Coleman,  (4  H. 
&  N.  265) ;  unless  there  be  a  breach 
of  the  peace  in  his  presence  (Timothy 
V.  Simpson,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  757  ;  Dere- 
court  V.  Corbishley,  5  El.  &  B.  188),  or 
danger  of  a  renewal  of  it.  The  Queen 
r.  Light,  27  L.  J.  Mag.  Cas.  1 ;  The  Queen 
V.  Walker,  23  L.  J.  Mag.  Cas.  123 ;  Pester- 
field  V.  Vickers,  3  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  205. 
It  would  seem  that  a  constable  having  a 
warrant  to  arrest  is  not  bound  to  accept 
a  tender  of  the  fine  and  costs.  See  Ar- 
nott  I'.  Bradley,  23  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  1. 
Although  police  officers  may  arrest  with- 
out warrant  for  crimes,  it  does  not  follow 
that  they  have  the  power  to  do  so  in  the 
case  of  lesser  offences.     Galliard  v.  Lax- 


§  212.]  CREATION   AND   APPOINTMENT   OF   OFFICEKS.  239 

arrested  while  conducting  himself  in  a  disorderly  manner,  upon 
his  promise  to  go  directly  home,  he  may  lawfully  retake  him,  on 
his  going  into  a  bar-room  before  he  is  out  of  the  officer's  sight ; 
and  such  arrest  is  justified,  whether  it  be  regarded  as  a  recaption 
for  the  original  purpose,  or  as  a  new  arrest  for  disorderly  conduct 
still  continuing.^ 

§  211.  (150)  Charters  authorizing  municipal  officers  to  make 
arrests  upon  vieiv,  and  uithout  process,  are  to  be  viewed  in  con- 
nection with  the  general  statutes  of  the  state,  and  being  in  dero- 
gation of  liberty,  are  strictly  construed ;  hence  an  officer  making 
such  an  arrest,  though  on  the  Sabbath  day,  should  instead  of  im- 
prisoning, take,  without  unreasonable  delay,  the  person  arrested 
before  the  proper  tribunal  and  prefer  a  complaint  against  him,  as 
provided  by  the  statutes  of  the  state.^ 

§  212.  (151)  A  city  council  authorized  to  elect  certain  officers, 
may,  where  no  mode  of  election  is  prescribed,  appoint  them  by 
resolution  and  is  not  bound  to  elect  them  by  ballot;^  and  the 
corporation  has  full  control,  unless  specially  restricted,  over  all 
offices  and  officers  existing  only  under  by-laws.*     A  vote  of  an 

ton,  2  B.  &  S.  361 ;  Regina  v.  Chapman,  person,  arrested  late  at  night,  may  be  de- 

12  Cox,  4;  Codd  r.  Cabe,  13  Cox,  202;  tained  until  the  next  day  before  being 

s.  c.  L.  R.  1  Ex.  Div.  352.  taken  to  the  court.     Scircle  v.  Nevis,  47 

1  Commonwealth   v.  Hastings,  supra.  Ind.  289,  1874. 

It  follows  that  an  obstruction  offered  by  »  Low  v.  Commrs.  of  Pilotage,  R.  M. 

a  third  person  to  the  officer  in  making  Charlt.  (Ga.)  302, 1830,  per  Zaw,  J. ;  ante, 

such    an    arrest  would  be  unjustifiable,  sec.   94.      Power  of  council   to  appoint, 

II,  and  when  it  may  delegate  this  power  to 

2  Low  V.  Evans,  16  Ind.  486,  1868  a  committee.  People  v.  Bedell,  2  Hill 
(action  for  false  imprisonment);  Pow  r.  (N.Y.),  196  ;  Commonwealth  r.  Pittsburgh 
Becker,  3  Ind.  475,  1852;  Vandever  (police  force),  14  Pa.  St.  177,  1850; 
V.  Mattock,  3  Ind.  479.  The  delay  in  Wilder  v.  Chicago,  26  III.  182  ;  Russell  v. 
taking  the  person  arrested  before  a  mag-  Chicago  (collectors),  22  111.  285;  ante, 
istrate  must  not  be  unreasonable.     John-  sec.  96. 

son  i;.  Americus,  46  Ga.  80,  1872.  In  Low  <  As  to  plenary  power  and  control, 
V.  Evans,  it  was  held  that  there  was  no  when  not  restricted,  of  a  municipal  cor- 
authority  in  tlie  officer  making  the  arrest  poration  over  offices  and  officers  existing 
for  imprisoning  tlie  party  arrested  for  an  only  under  ordinances,  see  People  v.  Con- 
indefinite  time  (c.  fj.,  from  Sunday  until  over,  17  N.  Y.  64,  1858 ;  Waldraven  v. 
the  next  day),  because  he  may  be  subject  Memphis  (right  to  abolish  office),  4 
to  a  penalty,  to  be  recovered  in  a  suit  in  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  431, 1867  ;  infrn,  sec.  231 ; 
the  nature  of  an  action  of  debt.  If  the  Madison  v.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74,  70,  1869; 
Courtis  not  in  session  the  officer  may  con-  Samis  v.  King,  40  Conn.  298, 1873.  The 
fine  the  person  arrested  until  he  can  be  power  to  appoint  implies,  in  general,  the 
brought  before  the  court,  which  should  power  to  remove  the  appointees.  People 
be  done  at  the  earliest  period.  Boaz  v.  v.  Hill,  7  Cal.  07.  Thus  a  municipal  cor- 
Tate,  43  Ind.  60,  1873.     An  intoxicated  poration    appointing    commissioners    in 


240 


MUNICIPAL  CORPOEATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


authorized  connnittee  of  a  city,  electing  their  clerk  city  engineer 
for  a  year  iVoni  a  subsequent  day,  duly  recorded,  and  signed  by 
him  as  tlicir  clerk,  is  sufficient  to  take  his  appointment  out  of  the 
statute  oi"  frauds.^ 


§  213.  (152)  The  same  presumptions  which  are  applicable  to 
individuals  are,  in  general,  applicable  to  acts  of  corporations. 
Thus,  if  a  person  acts  notoriously  as  the  officer  of  a  corporation, 
and  is  recognized  by  it  as  such  officer,  a  regular  appointment  tvill 
be  presumed,  and  his  acts  will  bind  the  corporation,  although  no 
written  proof  is  or  can  be  adduced  of  his  appointment.^ 

Oath  and  Official  Bond. 
§  214.  (153)  All  public  officers  are  usually  required  to  take 
an  oath  of  office,  and  those  entrusted  with  money  or  property  are 
also  generally  required  to  give  bond  and  sureties  for  the  faithful 
performance  of  their  duties.  In  England  it  is  said  that  an  oath 
of  office  cannot  be  required  to  be  taken  by  a  by-law  when  none 
is  required  by  the  charter.^     But  in  this  country  the  oath  of  office 


cases  of  local  improvements,  may  remove 
them.  People  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)'  43,  1848.  But  in 
South  Carolina,  see  Caulfield  v.  State,  1  S. 
C.  461,  1860,  tlie  exercise  of  the  power 
to  appoint  to  office  is  an  executive,  not  a 
legislative  act.  Achley's  Case,  4  Abb. 
Pr.  35,  1856.  Power  to  suspend  officer. 
Post,  sec.  247,  note.  A  provision  that 
the  city  council  "  may "  by  ordinance, 
provide  for  the  election,  by  the  qualified 
voters,  of  any  of  the  officers  named  in 
the  act,  held  to  leave  it  to  the  discretion 
of  the  city  council  whether  the  office  of 
city  attorney  should  be  elective  or  not. 
Ball  V.  Fagg,  67  Mo.  481. 

1  Ciiase  V.  Lowell,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  33, 
1856, 

'^  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Dandridge, 
12  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  64,  70,  where  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Storij  cites  many  cases,  establishing 
the  principle  "  that  the  acts  of  artificial 
persons  afford  the  same  presumptions  as 
the  acts  of  natural  persons."  The  doc- 
trine that  not  only  the  appointment,  but 
the  authority  of  an  agent  of  a  corpora- 
tion may  be  implied  from  the  adoption  or 
recognition  of  his  acts  (Angell  &  Ames 
Corp.  sec.  284)   was  applied  in  Killey  v. 


Porsee,  57  Mo.  300,  1874,  to  municipal 
corporations,  and  it  was  held  that  the 
failure  of  a  deputy  city  engineer  to  file  a 
certificate  of  his  appointment,  as  provided 
by  the  charter,  did  not  vitiate  his  acts. 

3  Eex  V.  Dean,  etc.,  1  Str.  539 ;  Glover, 
305;  Willc.  133;  Grant,  76.  It  is  the 
settled  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court 
that  the  United  States,  being  a  body  pol- 
itic, with  a  capacity  to  enter  into  con- 
tracts, may,  within  the  sphere  and  in  the 
execution  of  its  appropriate  powers,  take 
bonds  and  securities,  which  are  not  pro- 
hibited by  law,  though  such  bonds  and 
securities  may  not  have  been  prescribed 
by  any  pre-existing  legislative  act.  These, 
though  voluntary,  — that  is,  not  e.xtorted 
or  coerced,  —  if  taken  for  a  lawful  pur- 
pose and  upon  a  good  consideration,  are 
valid.  United  States  v.  Tingey,  5  Pet. 
(U.  S  )  114,  128,  1831,  approved;  Same 
V.  Linn,  15  lb.  290,  1841 ;  and  see  Dugan 
f.  United  States,  3  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  172; 
United  States  v.  Bradley,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
343.  Pight  of  city  to  require  bond  of 
indemnity  from  the  owner,  who  proposes 
to  excavate  sidewalk  to  make  cellars, 
vaults,  or  improvements.  McCarthy  v. 
Chicago,  53  111.  38,  1870.     A  prospective 


§  215.] 


OATH   AND   OFFICIAL   BOND. 


241 


is,  in  substance,  only  that  the  officer  will  support  the  constitution 
and  faithfully  perform  his  official  duties.  And  such  an  oath  may, 
doubtless,  be  required  by  ordinance,  to  be  taken  by  every  muni- 
cipal officer  before  entering  upon  his  office.  Statutes  requiring  W 
an  oath  of  office  and  bond  are  usually  directory  in  their  nature  ;  A 
and  unless  the  failure  to  take  the  oath  or  give  the  bond  by  the 
time  prescribed  is  expressly  declared,  ipso  facto,  to  vacate  the 
office,  the  oath  may  be  taken  or  the  bond  given  afterwards,  if  no 
vacancy  has  been  declared.^ 

§  215.  (154)    When  the  statute  requires  a  prescribed  oath  of 
office  before  any  person  elected  "  shall  act  therein^''''  a  person  can- 


appointment  to  public  oflBce,  made  by  a 
body  which,  as  then  constituted,  is  empow- 
ered to  fill  the  vacancy  when  it  arises,  is  le- 
gal in  the  absence  of  any  express  statutory 
provision  to  the  contrary,  and  vests  title 
to  the  office  in  the  appointee.  State  v. 
Van  Buskirk,  40  N.  J.  L.  463.  The  power 
of  appointment  to  office,  when  executed 
by  the  performance  of  the  last  act  made 
necessary  in  its  execution,  is  not  revoca- 
ble without  the  consent  of  the  appointee. 
lb. 

1  Smith  V.  Cronkliite,  8  Ind.  134 ;  State 
V.  Findley,  10  Ohio,  51,  59,  and  cases 
cited;  State  v.  Porter  (failure  to  give 
bond  by  city  marshal  in  time),  7  Ind.  204  ; 
Sprawl  V.  Laurence,  33  Ala.  674 ;  Bank 
V.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  64;  United 
States  V.  Le  Baron,  19  How.  73 ;  8.  c.  4 
Wall.  642 ;  JNIarbury  v.  Madison,  1  Cranch, 
137.  Charter  provisions  that  oaths  of 
office  be  taken  and  subscribed  within  ten 
days  is  directory,  and  may  be  complied 
with  after  that  time.  Kearney  v.  An- 
drews, 2  Stockt.  (N.  J.)  70.  In  New  York 
it  is  held  that  a  town  collector  elect,  in 
order  to  qualify  for  the  office,  is  re- 
quired by  the  constitution  to  take  and 
subscribe  an  oath  of  office,  and  until  he 
has  thus  qualified,  the  incumbent  may 
hold  over.  People  v.  McKinney,  52  N.  Y. 
374,  1873.  But  as  no  time  is  limited  for 
taking  such  oath  it  may  be  taken  before 
the  office  is  forfeited  by  the  neglect  to 
execute  the  required  bond.  lb.  A  town 
may  lawfully  rerpiire  a  collector  of  taxes  or 
other  officer  to  furnish  sureties  for  the 
faithful  discharge  of  the  duties  of  his 
office.  This  power  is  incidental,  and 
need  not  be  express.  If  the  person 
VOL.  I.  16 


chosen  neglects,  or  is  unable,  to  furnish 
sureties,  this  amounts  to  a  non-acceptance 
of  the  trust,  although  he  has  taken  the 
oath  of  office.  Morrell  v.  Sylvester,  1 
Greenl.  (Me.)  248.  While  it  is  the  duty\- 
of  an  officer  to  perfect  his  title  to  his  \ 
office  by  complying  with  the  directions  of 
tlie  law  as  to  taking  oath,  depositing 
bonds,  etc.,  yet  his  failure  to  do  so  is  his 
own  wrongful  neglect,  and  is  no  defence 
to  his  sureties  in  an  action  on  his  official 
bond.  State  v.  Toomer,  7  Rich.  (South 
Car.)  Law,  216,  18-54;  State  v.  Findley,  10 
Ohio,  51,  1840. 

A  city  council,  whose  duty  it  is  to  de- 
cide upon  the  sufficiency  of  the  sureties 
of  a  city  officer,  cannot  refuse  to  do  so  or 
postpone  its  decision  because  the  title  to 
the  office  is  elsewhere  disputed ;  and  a 
mandamus  will  lie  to  compel  it  to  act  upon 
the  sufficiency  of  the  securities  offered. 
Commonwealth  v.  City  Council  of  Phiia- 
delpliia,  7  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  362. 
Certain  persons  signed  a  printed  form 
of  a  city  treasurer's  bond,  with  blanks  for 
inserting  in  the  body  the  names  of  the 
sureties,  amount  of  the  penalty,  etc., 
which  blanks  were  afterwards  filled  up 
by  the  city  officials  without  the  knowledge 
or  consent  of  the  signers.  Held,  that  as 
to  tliem  the  bond  was  void,  and  that  the 
knowledge  of  the  city  clerk,  the  legal 
custodian  thereof,  of  such  signing  in 
blank  was  notice  to  the  city.  Gage  v. 
Chicago,  2  111.  App.  332.  The  stat- 
utory requirement  that  the  treasurer 
file  his  bond  within  fifteen  days  after 
his  election  is  mandatory,  and  his  fail- 
ure to  do  so  is  a  vacation  of  the  office. 
Gage  V.  Chicago,  2  III.  App.  332. 


242 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


not  justify  as  such  officer  unless  he  has  taken  an  oath  in  substan- 
tial, not  necessarily  literal,  compliance  with  the  law.  Third 
parties,  however,  acting  in  good  faith  with  him  as  such  officer, 
ai-e  protected,  notwithstanding  his  failure  to  take  the  requisite 
oath.^ 


§  216.  (155)  The  principle  is  well  settled,  that  official  bonds  are 
valid  if  the  conditio7i  complies  substantially  with  the  requirements 
of  the  statute.  The  exact  form  prescribed  is  not  essential  unless 
made  so  by  the  charter  or  act.^  As  such  bonds  are  intended  to 
secure  the  public  the  courts  do  not  favor  technical  defences.  Ac- 
cordingly, actions  have  been  sustained  on  bonds,  not  required 
by  la^y,  when  executed  voluntarily,  and  with  proper  conditions, 
to  secure  the  performance  of  official  duty.^  And  when  required 
by  law,  bonds  are  good,  as  common  law  obligations,  though  they 
do  not  conform  to  the  statute,  if  they  contain  no  condition  con- 
trary to  law.     In  such  case  the  obligor  voluntarily  agrees  to 


1  Olney  v.  Pearce,  1  Rli.  Is.  292,  1850, 
and  authorities  cited  by  Mr.  Angell  in 
note;  Riddle  v.  Bedford  County,  7  Serg. 
&  R.awle  (Pa.),  392  ;  Neale  v.  Overseers,  5 
Whart.  (Pa.)  538.  Wliere  an  officer,  be- 
fore acting,  is  required  to  qualify  by 
taking  an  oath  of  office,  he  has  no  legal 
right,  until  he  qualifies,  to  recover  fees  of 
an  incumbent  received  after  the  plain- 
tifTs  appointment  or  election,  and  before 
he  qualifies.  Thompson  v.  Nicholson,  12 
Rob.  (La )  326,  1845.  See  City  v.  Given, 
60  Pa.  St.  130 ;  post,  sec.  235. 

If  members  of  a  common  council,  who 
are  required  by  the  charter  to  be  sworn 
before  they  enter  on  the  duties  of  their 
office,  are  sworn  before  an  officer  not 
authorized  to  administer  the  oath,  they 
are  still  officers  de  facto,  and  a  tax  levied 
by  them  is  not  invalid,  and  will  not  be 
set  aside  even  in  a  direct  proceeding. 
State  V.  Perkins,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L  ) 
409,  1854. 

An  act  of  Congress  provided  that  pay- 
masters should,  "previous  to  entering  upon 
the  duties  of  their  office,  give  good  and  suffi- 
cient bonds,"  etc.  It  was  held  that  an  ap- 
pointment as  paymaster  was  complete 
when  made  by  the  president  and  con- 
firmed by  the  senate  ;  that  the  giving  of 
the  bond  was  a  mere  ministerial  act  for 
the  security  of  the  government,  and  not 


a  condition  precedent  to  his  authority  to 
act  as  paymaster ;  and  tliat  a  recital  in 
the  bond  of  the  appointment  estops  the 
principal  and  sureties  to  deny  the  fact. 
United  States  v.  Bradley,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
843,  1836 ;  and  see,  also.  United  States 
Bank  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  64.  Sure- 
ties of  municipal  treasurer  were  estopped 
to  show  that  tlie  election  of  the  treasurer 
was  unauthorized  because  the  time  of  the 
election  had  not  been  fixed  and  the  duties 
of  the  office  prescribed  by  ordinance. 
Paducah  v.  Cully,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  823, 
1873 ;  and  see  Herman  on  Estoppel,  for 
further  illustrations  of  this  subject. 

■^  Allegheny  County  v.  Van  Campen, 

3  Wend.  49,  1829;  People  v.  Holmes,  2 
Wend.  281 ;  26.  615 ;  Fellows  v.  Oilman, 

4  Wend.  414  ;  Lawton  v.  Erwin,  9  Wend. 
288 ;  Cornell  v.  Barnes,  1  Denio,  35. 

Bond  without  seals,  held  valid  as  a 
common  law  obligation.  Board  of  Ed- 
ucation V.  Fonda,  77  N.  Y.  350 ;  s.  p. 
U.  S. ;;.  Linn,  15  Pet.  290  ;  U.  S.  v.  Hodson, 
10  Wall.  395;  Morse  u.  Hodsden,  5  Mass. 
318;  Thomas  v.  White,  12  Mass.  369; 
Bank  v.  Smith,  5  Allen,  415. 

3  Postmaster  General  v.  Rice,  Gilpin, 
554 ;  Montville  v.  Haughtun,  7  Conn. 
643 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Wolbert,  6  Bin- 
ney,  292 ;  Baby  v.  Baby,  8  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  76. 


§  21G.] 


OATH   AND    OFFICIAL   BOND. 


243 


make  the  obligee  named  a  trustee  for  the  persons  interested  in 
the  due  performance  of  the  condition. ^  Thus,  an  action  may 
be  maintained  on  a  bond  given  to  the  "  selectmen  "  instead  of  to 
the  "  town,"  by  a  town  treasurer,  conditioned  for  the  faithful 
performance  of  his  duties.^ 


>  Thomas  v.  White,  12  Mass.  369;  5 
lb.  314  ;  Kavanaugh  v.  Sanders,  8  Greenl. 
(Me.)  442;  Sweetzer  i'.  Hay,  2  Gray,  49, 
and  cases  there  cited. 

2  Sweetzer  v.  Hay,  2  Gray,  49 ;  Horn 
V.  "Whittier,  6  N.  H.  88.  A  bond  given 
by  the  treasurer  of  a  county  for  tlie  faith- 
ful performance  of  his  official  duties,  to 
the  board  of  supervisors  of  the  same 
county,  is  a  good  and  valid  bond,  not- 
withstanding there  may  be  no  statute  re- 
quiring one.  Supervisors  v.  Cotfinbury, 
1  Mich.  355 ;  People  v.  Johr,  22  Mich. 
461, 1871.  The  fact  tliat  there  is  already 
a  valid  official  bond  witli  solvent  sureties 
does  not  preclude  a  county  court  from 
taking  from  a  delinquent  county  officer, 
by  way  of  security  for  his  delinquency,  a 
bond  and  mortgage  on  real  estate.  Tur- 
ner V.  Clark  Co.,  67  Mo.  248,  1878. 

It  is  competent  for  the  legislature,  in 
exacting  official  bonds  and  prescribing 
their  conditions,  to  require  that  they  shall 
be  conditioned  for  the  faithful  perform- 
ance of  all  duties  tliat  may  be  imposed 
by  subsequent  statutes  during  the  offi- 
cer's continuance  in  office;  and  this  hav- 
ing been  done  by  a  general  statute,  the 
sureties  on  an  official  bond,  conditioned 
as  required  by  the  statute,  are  liable  for 
their  principal's  default  in  reference  to 
additional  duties  subsequently  imposed, 
unless  the  statute  imposing  such  duties 
shows  an  intention  tliat  they  shall  not  be 
so  liable.     Morrow  v.  Wood,  56  Ala.  1. 

Municipal  corporations  may  sue  on 
official  bonds  of  public  officers  when  in- 
terested therein.  State,  etc.  v.  Norwood, 
12  Md.  177,  1858.  In  an  action  on  the 
official  bond  of  an  officer  appointed  by  a 
municipal  corporation,  reciting  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  principal  as  such  officer, 
neitlier  he  nor  his  sureties  can  set  up  the 
invalidity  of  his  appointment  as  a  de- 
fence to  an  action  for  moneys  collected. 
Hoboken  v.  Harrison,  1  Vroom  {?>()  N.  J. 
L.),  73;  Seiple  v.  Elizabeth,  .3  Dutch.  (N. 
J.)  407.     Sureties  on  official  bond  of  cle 


facto  municipal  officer  are  liable  for  mon- 
eys collected  by  him  ;  and  this  though  he 
was  an  officer  which,  in  point  of  fact,  the 
corporation  could  not  create.  1  Vroom 
(30  N.  J.  L.),  73,  supra.  A  surety  in  an 
official  bond  of  an  officer  whose  term  is 
limited  to  a  year,  is  not  liable  beyond  the 
year,  though  the  officer  continues  by  law 
until  a  successor  is  provided.  Dover  v. 
Twombly,  42  N.  H.  59, 1860  ;  Chelmsford 
Co.  V.  Demorest,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  1,  1856; 
Mayor  v.  Horn,  2  Harring.  (Del.)  190, 
1833 ;  Regina  v.  McRae,  5  Upper  Can. 
P.  R.  309.  A  change  in  a  statute  by  which 
the  time  for  the  annual  settlements  of 
county  collectors  is  fixed  a  month  later, 
and  additional  time  is  allowed  in  which 
to  pay  after  settlement,  releases  the  sure- 
ties on  a  collector's  bond  executed  before 
the  change.  The  effect  is  to  postpone 
the  state's  right  of  action  against  the 
collector.  The  rule  that  an  extension  of 
time  given  the  principal  releases  the 
surety  applies  between  the  state  and  an 
individual.  State  v.  Roberts,  68  Mo.  234. 
Sureties  upon  an  official  bond  are  not 
liable  for  a  defalcation  of  their  principal, 
occurring  during  a  term  preceding  that 
for  which  the  bond  was  given.  Paducah 
V.  Cully,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  323,1872;  Bis- 
sell  v.  Saxton,  77  N.  Y.  191 ;  Meyers  v. 
U.  S.,  1  McLean,  498 ;  Mahaska  v.  In- 
galls,  16  Iowa,  81 ;  Townsend  v.  Everett, 
4  Ala.  607  ;  U.  S.  v.  Boyd,  5  How.  50; 
Bruce  v.  U.  S.,  17  How.  447 ;  Mclntyre 
V.  School  Trustees,  3  III.  App.  77 ;  Arl- 
ington V.  Merrick,  2  Saund.  403 ;  Over- 
acre  V.  Garrett,  5  Lans.  150 ;  Rochester 
V.  Randall,  105  Mass.  295;  Bramford  !'. 
Isles,  3  Exchq.  380 ;  Austin  v.  French,  7 
Met.  120 ;  Kingston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Decker, 
33  Barb.  196;  Dedham  Bank  v.  Chicker- 
ing,  3  Pick.  335 ;  Blake  r.  Buffalo,  etc.  56  N. 
Y.  485;  McClusky  v.  Cromwell,  11  N.  Y. 
598;  Miller  v.  Stewart,  9  Wheat.  702. 
As  to  a  breach  of  an  official  bond,  see 
La  Pointe  v.  O'Malley,  46  Wis.  35. 

It  is  no  objection  to  the  bond  that  it 


244  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IX. 

Duration  of  Official  Term. 

§  217.  (156)  It  was  a  settled  rule  of  law  respecting  the  old 
covporations  in  England  that  the  office  of  the  mayor  or  other 
head  officer  was  annual,  and  absolutely  expired  at  the  end  of  the 
year ;  and  that  without  an  express  clause  in  the  charter,  he  could 
not  hold  over  until  his  successor  was  provided.  The  right,  in 
such  case,  to  hold  over  did  not  exist  by  implication,  and  was  not 
an  incident  to  the  office.^  In  some  charters,  however,  it  was  in 
terms  provided  that  tlie  mayor  or  other  chief  officer,  though 
elected  for  a  year,  should  hold  until  his  successor  was  chosen."'^ 
When  this  right  existed  it  was  frequently  abused,  by  neglecting 
to  hold  an  election  on  the  charter  day,  by  which  means  the  officer 
continued  his  term.  It  was  this  abuse  that  gave  rise  to  the 
Statute  of  Anne,  which  enacted  "  that  no  person  in  such  annual 
office  for  one  whole  year  should  be  capable  of  being  chosen  into 
the  same  office  for  the  year  immediately  ensuing,"  and  imposed  a 
fine  upon  every  such  officer  who  "  should  voluntarily  and  unlaw- 
fully obstruct  and  prevent  the  choosing  of  another  person  to 
succeed  into  such  office  at  the  time  appointed  for  making  another 
choice."  ^  Under  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  the  provision 
is,  that  the  mayor  shall  be  elected  each  year,  at  the  meeting  fixed 
for  the  ninth  of  November,  and  shall  "  continue  in  his  office  for 
one  whole  year,"  *  and  by  an  amendment,  until  his  successor  shall 
have  accepted  the  office  of  mayor,  and -made  and  subscribed  the 
requisite  oath;^  and  subsequently,  the  Statute  of  Anne  above 
mentioned  was  repealed,  as  being  no  longer  necessary.^ 

was  executed  before  the  appointment  to  v.  Harrison,  18  Upper   Can.   Q.  B.  603 ; 

office  was  made.     Essex  v.  Strong,  8  Up-  Whitby   v.  Fhnt,    9   Upper   Can.    C.  P. 

per  Can.  L.  J.  15  ;  s.  c.  21  Upper  Can.  Q.  449  ;  Todd  v.  Perry  et  al.,  20  Upper  Can. 

B.  149.      The   imposition   of  additional  Q.  B.  649. 

taxes  to  those  assessed  at  the  time  of  tak-  ^  Rex  v.  Atkyns,  4  Mod.  12;  Hex  v. 

ing  the  security  and  the  increase  of  risk  Earle,  1    Str.  627 ;  Mayor  of  Durham's 

thereby  has  been  held  not  to  violate  a  Case,  1  Sid.  33  ;  Rex  v.  Thornton,  4  East, 

bond  given  for  the  general  performance  308  ;  Foot  v.  Prowse,  1    Str.  625  ;  s.  c.  3 

of  duties  and  payment  of  moneys.     Bev-  Bro.  P.  C.  169  ;  Willc.  293 ;  Glover,  173. 

erely  v.  Barlow  et  al.,  10  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  ^  /^. .  Rex  v.  Phillips,  1  Str.  394. 

178  ;  s.  c.  7  Upper  Can.  L.  J.  117.     Nor  ^  9  Anne,  ch.  xx,  sec.  8. 

is  it  a  defence  that  the  money  received  *  Sand  6  Will.  IV.  cb.  Ixxvi.  sec.  49; 

by  the  treasurer  was  not  demanded  by  arite,  sec.  35,  and  notes ;  Reg.  v.  McGowan, 

the    government,    which     was     entitled  12  Ad.  &  E.  869. 

thereto.     Essex  v.  Park,  11  Upper  Can.  ^  6  and  7  Will.  IV.  ch.  cv.  sec.  4. 

C.  J.  478.    Nor  are  irregularities  in  the  *>  3  and  4  Vict.  ch.  xlvii. 
mode  of  appointment  a  defence.  Whitby 


§219.]  DURATION   OF   OFFICIAL  TERM,  245 

§  218.  (157)  At  common  laiv,  the  office  of  an  alderman^  jurat, 
capital  burgess,  or  other  member  of  a  select  body,  is  a  franchise 
for  life,  though  by  prescription  or  charter  it  may  be  limited  to  a 
definite  period,  but  the  office  was  so  much  in  the  nature  of  a 
freehold  that  there  was  an  implied  right  to  hold  over,  unless  it 
was  otherwise  provided.^  So  with  respect  to  recorder,  town 
clerk,  and  the  like  officers,  the  duration  of  the  office  depended 
upon  the  particular  charter,  but  presumptively  it  was  not  limited, 
and  their  offices  were  so  much  in  the  nature  of  a  freehold  that  if 
they  are  "  eligible  for  a  year "  and  are  constituted  in  general 
terms,  they  do  not  expire  with  the  year,  but  the  possessors  are 
entitled  to  hold  over  until  others  are  elected.  But  it  is  consid- 
ered that  if  they  are  "  eligible  for  a  year  owZ^,"  the  office  ipso 
facto  determines  on  the  expiration  of  a  year.^ 

§  219.  (158)  In  this  country,  however,  a  public  office  is  not 
considered  as  being  in  the  nature  of  the  grant  or  contract,  and 
the  officer,  as  against  the  public,  has  no  freehold  or  property  in 
the  office ;  and  it  is  almost  an  invariable  provision  of  law  that 
all  officers  shall  be  elected  or  appointed  for  a  fixed  and  definite 
period.  To  guard  against  lapses,  sometimes  unavoidable,  the 
provision  is  almost  always  made  in  terms  that  the  officer  shall  hold 
until  his  successor  is  elected  and  qualified.  But  even  without  such 
a  provision,  the  American  courts  have  not  adopted  the  strict  rule 
of  the  English  corporations  which  disables  the  mayor  or  chief 
officer  from  holding  beyond  the  charter  or  election  day,  but  rather 
the  analogy  of  the  other  corporate  officers  who  hold  over  until 
their  successors  are  elected,  unless  the  legislative  intent  to  the 
contrary  be  manifested.^  Thus  in  Vermofit  it  is  held,  —  there 
being  no  statute  to  the  contrary,  and  such  having  been  the  prac- 
tice,—  that  school  officers  elected  at  the  annual  meeting  hold 
over  until  others  are  elected  at  another  annual  meeting,  whether 
more  or  less  than  a  year  from  the  time  of  their  election.* 

1  Rex  w.  Doncaster,  2  Ld.  Rayni.  1564;  land,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  96;  South  Bay, 
Foot  V.  Prowse,  supra.  etc.  Co.  v.  Gray,  30  Me.  547 ;  Elmendorf 

2  Willc.  296,  pi.  706;  Rex  v.  Durham,  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  ISew  York,  25  Wend. 
10  Mod.  147 ;  Dighton's  Case,  1  Vent.  82.  (N.  Y.)  698.     And  see  cases  infra. 

i  People  V.  Rundle,  9  Johns.  147  ;  Slee  *  Chandler  v.  Bradish,  23  Vt.  416, 1851. 

t;.  Bloom,  5  Johns.  Ch.  306,  378;  2  Kent  "The  hetter  opinion,"  says  Shaw,  C. 

Com.    238;    Kelsey    v.   Wright,    1    Root  J.,  «rr/»pnc?o,  in  Overseers  of  Poor,  etc.  z;. 

(Conn.),  83;  Smith  y.  Natchez  Steamboat  Sears,  22  Pick.  122,  130,  "is,  that  town 

Co.,  1  How.  (Miss.)  479;  Lynch  v.  Laff-  officers  annualli/  chosen  hold  their  offices 


246 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  IX. 


§  220.  (159)  The  law  on  this  subject  has  been  thus  stated  by 
a  learned  American  judge :  "  Where,  in  the  charter  or  organic 
law  of  a  corporation,  there  is  an  express  or  implied  restriction 
upon  the  time  of  holding  office,  as  that  the  officers  shall  be  an- 
nually elected  on  a  particular  day,  and  that  they  shall  hold  from 
one  charter  (election)  day  till  the  next,  or  that  they  shall  be 
elected  '  for  the  year  ensuing  only^^  in  such  case  they  cannot  hold 
over  beyond  the  next  election  day  or  the  end  of  the  year."  ^ 
"  But  where,  by  the  constitution  of  the  corporation,  the  officers 
are  elected  for  a  term,  and  until  their  successors  are  elected  and 
qualified,  or  where  they  are  elected  '  for  the  year  ensuing,'  and 
the  charter  or  organic  law  contains  no  restrictive  clause,  the  offi- 
cers may  continue  to  hold  and  exercise  their  offices,  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  year,  until  they  are  superseded  by  the  election  of 
other  persons  in  their  places."^ 


until  others  are  chosen  and  quahfied  in 
their  place."  School  District  v.  Ather- 
ton,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  105,  181G ;  Dow  v. 
Bullock,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  13G,  1859.  So 
in  Illinois.  People  i'.  Fairhury,  51  111. 
149,  1869.  So  in  Connecticut,  an  officer 
elected  for  "  the  year  ensuing"  is,  in  the 
absence  of  any  other  restrictive  provision, 
entitled  to  hold  beyond  the  year,  and 
until  he  is  superseded  by  the  election  of 
another  person  in  his  place.  McCall  v. 
Byram  Manuf.  Co.,  6  Conn.  428,  1827, 
where  the  authorities  are  reviewed  and 
commented  on  by  Ilosmer,  C.  J. ;  s.  p. 
Cong.  Soc.  etc.  v.  Sperry,  10  Conn.  200 ; 
State  V.  Fagan,  42  Conn.  32,  1875  ;  Weir 
V.  Bush,  4  Litt.  (Ky.)  433,  where,  by 
statute,  an  officer  holds  for  a  given  term, 
and  "  until  his  successor  is  elected  and 
qualified."  He  continues  in  office  until 
his  successor  is  duly  elected  and  qualified, 
though  this  (from  failure  to  elect,  or  from 
other  causes)  be  after  the  expiration  of 
the  term.  Stewart  v.  State,  4  Ind.  396, 
1853 ;  Tuley  v.  State,  1  76.  500,  515 ;  Law- 
home,  in  re,  18  Gratt.  ( Va.)  85. 

1  Tuley  V.  State,  1  Ind.  (Cart.)  500, 
502,  1849,  per  Perkins,  J. ;  King  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  6  Vin.  Abr.  290 ;  Corporation  of 
Banbury,  10  Mod.  346  ;  Rex  v.  Passmore, 
3  Term  R.  199 ;  6  Petersd.  Abr.  738.  But 
whether  a  provision  merely  that  an  offi- 
cer shall  "  be  annually  elected  on  a  par- 
ticular day  "  is  an  implied  restriction  that 


he  shall  not  hold  over,  see  the  cases  in 
Vermont,  ]\fassachiisetts.  New  York,  Illinois, 
and  Connecticut,  above  cited.  The  weight 
of  authority  in  this  country  is  the  other 
way.  Where  a  city  charter  gave  the 
mayor  power  to  hold  until  his  successor 
was  elected  and  qualified,  but  denied  this 
power  to  the  members  of  the  city  council 
by  providing  that  they  should  be  elected 
for  a  specified  term,  "  and  no  longer,"  and 
that  their  seats  should  be  vacated  at  the 
end  of  such  term,  they  cannot  hold  over, 
and  their  action,  after  the  time  thus  fixed, 
is  void,  and  does  not  bind  the  corporation. 
Louisville  v.  Higdon,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  526, 
1859.  When  the  law  is  silent  as  to  the 
term,  but  requires  an  election  to  be  held 
every  two  years,  an  officer  holds  over 
until  his  successor  is  provided.  Cordiell 
V.  Frizzell,  1  Nev.  130. 

2  Per  Perkins,  J.,  Tuley  v.  State,  1  Ind. 
(Cart.)  500,  502,  1849  (action  on  official 
bond  against  sureties).  The  Queen  v. 
Owens,  2  E.  &  E.  86 ;  Frost  v.  Chester,  5 
E.  &  B.  531 ;  Foot  i'.  Prowse,  Str.  625 ; 
Queen  v.  Durham,  10  Mod.  146;  King  w. 
Lisle,  Andrews,  163;  McCall  v.  Manu- 
facturing Co.,  6  Conn.  428;  9  Ih.  536; 
10  lb.  200;  17  lb.  588;  Kelsey  v.  Wright, 
1  Root,  83;  Weir  v.  Bush,  4  Litt.  (Ky.) 
429;  People  v.  Rankle,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
147;  Vernon  Society  v.  Hills,  6  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  23;  Slee  v.  Bloom,  5  Johns.  Ch.  (N. 
Y.)  366 ;  Pender  v.  King,  6  Vin.  Abr.  296 ; 


§  222.] 


VACANCIES   IN   MUNICIPAL  OFFICES. 


247 


§  221.  (160)  As  against  the  public,  however,  officers  cannot 
found  a  valid  title  or  right  to  hold  over  upon  their  own  neglect  of 
duty.  Therefore,  where  the  charter  made  it  the  express  duty  of 
the  trustees  in  office  to  give  notice  of,  and  themselves  to  hold,  the 
annual  electioiis,  it  was  held  that  if  they  omitted  to  discharge  this 
duty,  though  inadvertently,  in  consequence  of  which  omission 
there  was  and  could  be  no  election,  that  they  were  not  entitled 
to  hold  over,  although  by  the  charter  it  was  provided  that  they 
should  continue  in  office  until  a  new  election  should  be  made  and 
their  successors  should  qualify.^ 


Vacancies  in  Municipal  Offices. 

§  222.  (161)  At  common  law  there  must  be  a  vacancy  in  the 
office  existing  at  the  time  of  the  election;  "for  one  cannot,"  says 
Mr.  Willcock,  "be  elected  to  a  corporate  office  in  reversion." ^ 
And  the  same  doctrine  has  been  recognized  in  this  country,  and 
a  vacancy  must  exist  before  an  election  to  fill  it  can  be  ordered,^ 
and  an  election  to  fill  an  anticipated  vacancy  is  not  valid  unless 
expressly  authorized  by  the  charter  or  statute.*     Elections,  how- 


2  Kent  Com.  295,  note  b ;  Hicks  i'.  Launce- 
lot,  1  Rol.  Abr.  513;  Bank  v.  Petway,  3 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  522;  Stewart  v.  State,  4 
Ind.  396;  Rex  v.  Poole,  Cas.  Temp. 
Hardw.  23,  and  Phillips  v.  Wickham,  1 
Paige  Ch.  590,  were  considered  to  have  a 
contrary  bearing.  It  was  decided,  in 
Beck  i;.  Hanscom,  9  Post.  (29  N.  H.)  213, 
222,  1854,  that  where  the  charter  or  in- 
corporating act  made  no  provision  for  the 
continuance  of  corporate  officers  in  office 
after  the  expiration  of  the  term  for  which 
they  were  elected,  they  could  not  hold 
over  until  others  should  be  chosen  and 
qualified;  citing  the  opinion  of  Chancel- 
lor Walworth,  in  Phillips  v.  Wickham,  1 
Paige,  590 ;  but  admitting  that  the  Peo- 
ple V.  Kunkle,  9  .Jolms.  (X.  Y.)  147,  and 
Trustees  v.  Hills,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  23,  held  a 
diflTerent  view.  In  People  v.  Tieman,  8 
Abb.  Pr.  359;  s.  c.  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  193, 
the  Supreme  Court,  at  special  term,  de- 
nied that  the  officer  himself  could  hold 
over  unless  authorized  by  statute,  though 
to  protect  the  public  liis  acts  are  sus- 
tained. Cocke  V.  Halsey,  16  Pet.  71. 
One  liolding  a  municipal  office,  under  a 
valid  appointment,  is  not  i)recluded  from 


continuing  to  act  thereunder  until  his  suc- 
cessor is  elected  and  qualified,  by  tlie 
mere  fact  that  he  has  taken  an  oath  and 
filed  an  official  bond  under  an  illegal 
election.  Forristal  v.  People,  3  111.  App. 
470. 

1  People  V,  Bartlett,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
422,  1831.  In  such  a  case,  being  trustees 
de  facto,  their  acts  would  be  good.  And 
their  title  would  also  be  good  except  when 
called  in  question  by  quo  warranto.  lb. ; 
Lynch  v.  Laffland,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  96, 
1867.  Validity  of  acts  of  officers  ch  facto. 
People  1-.  Stevens,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  616,  per 
Bronson,  J. ;  People  v.  Runkle,  9  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  147;  Trustees  v.  Hill,  7  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  23;  Plymouth  v.  Painter,  17  Conn. 
585;  Smith  v.  State,  19  lb.  403;  People 
V.  Bartlett,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  422;  State  v. 
Jacobs,  17  Ohio,  143;  Hinton  v.  Lindsay, 
20  Ga.  746  ;  post,  sees.  276,  892. 

2  Wilic.  Corp.  207,  pi.  526 ;  Hob.  160 ; 
Skin.  45  ;  Glover,  216. 

3  Lindsey  v.  Luckett,  20  Tex.  516; 
Biddle  i'.  Willard,  10  Ind.  63,  1857;  Peo- 
ple I'.  Wctherell,  14  Mich.  48. 

*  Biddle  v.  Willard,  sujmi.  In  this  case 
it  was  said,  that  a  resignation  to   take 


248 


MUNICIPAL  COEPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


ever,  in  advance  of  the  expiration  of  the  regular  term  of  the 
incumbent  of  an  office,  are  always  provided  for  and  held,  but 
such  cases  are  not  elections  to  vacancies  within  the  meaning  of 
the  rule  under  consideration. 

Refusal  to  serve  in  Office. 

§  223.  (162)  It  is  an  established  common  law  principle  that 
since  a  municipal  corporation  is  entitled  to  the  official  service  of 
its  eligible  members,  it  may,  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  or  incidental 
power,  pass  a  by-law  imposing  a  pecuniary  penalty  upon  such  as 
refuse^  without  legal  excuse,  an  office  to  which  they  have  been 
duly  elected.^  The  ground  of  this  doctrine  is  clearly  set  forth  by 
Lord  Holt  in  Vanacker's  Case,  and  although  all  of  his  reasoning 
is  not  applicable  to  our  American  municipal  corporations,  still  it 
is  believed  that  under  the  usual  general  welfare  clause  or  under 
their  incidental  power  to  pass  reasonable  and  necessary  by-laws, 


effect  at  a  fixed  future  time  may,  if  no 
new  rights  liave  attached,  be  withdrawn, 
even  after  acceptance,  by  the  consent  of 
the  party  accepting  ;  and  under  the  laws 
of  that  state  it  was  held  that  such  a  res- 
ignation did  not  create  a  vacancy  which 
would  authorize  an  election  at  a  period 
prior  to  the  taking  effect  of  the  resigna- 
JioD. 

There  is  no  technical  or  peculiar 
meaning  to  the  word  "  vacant,"  as  used 
in  the  constitution.  It  means  empty,  un- 
occupied, as  applied  to  an  office  without 
an  incumbent.  There  is  no  basis  for  the 
distinction  urged  that  it  applies  only  to 
offices  vacated  by  death,  resignation,  or 
otherwise.  An  existing  office,  without  an 
incumbent,  is  vacant,  whether  it  be  a 
new  or  an  old  one.  Per  Stuart,  J.,  Stock- 
ing V.  State  (vacancy  in  new  judicial  cir- 
cuit). 7  Ind.  326,  1855;  followed,  Collins 
V.  State,  8  lb.  344,  1856. 

1  City  of  London  v.  Vanacker,  1  Ld. 
Raym.  496;  8.  c.  Carth.  482;  s.  c.  12 
Mod.  272 ;  1  Salk.  142 ;  Rex  v.  Bower,  2 
DowL  &  R.  761,  842;  s.  c.  1  Barn.  & 
Cress.  587 ;  Vintners'  Co.  v.  Passey,  1 
Burr.  239;  Willc.  230;  Glover,  181;  Grant, 
211.  If  of  a  public  and  magisterial  na- 
ture, the  penalty  for  refusal  may  be  im- 
posed, though  the  person  be  also  liable  to 
be  punished  by  indictment,  or,  in  the  dis- 


cretion of  the  court,  by  criminal  informa- 
tion. London  v.  Vanacker,  1  Ld.  Raym. 
499;  Rex  v.  Grosvenor,  1  Wils.  18;  s.  c. 
2  Str.  1193;  Rex  v.  Hungerford,  11  Mod. 
132,  142 ;  Rex  v.  Woodrow,  2  Term  R. 
732 ;  Rex  v.  W^hitwell,  5  Term  R.  86 ; 
Rex  V.  Leyland,  3  M.  &  S.  184.  The 
Municipal  Corporations  Act  (5  and  6  Will. 
IV.  cli.  Ixxvi.  sec.  51)  requires  every 
qualified  person  elected  to  the  office  of 
alderman,  councillor,  auditor,  or  assessor, 
or  mayor,  to  accept  the  office  or  pay  a 
fine  to  the  borough  fund.  The  refusal  to 
take  the  requisite  oaths  is  a  refusal  of  the 
office.  Exon  v.  Starre,  2  Show.  159.  As 
there  is  a  common  law  duty  to  serve  in 
an  office  to  which  a  person  has  been  duly 
elected,  this  duty  may,  if  the  office  be 
sufficiently  important,  be  enforced  by 
mandamus,  and  the  payment  of  the  fine  is 
not  in  lieu  of  service  unless  the  statute 
or  by-law  release  him  from  service  by 
treating  the  penalty  as  compensation. 
Rex  V.  Bower,  1  Barn.  &  Cress.  585 ;  s.  c. 
2  Dowl.  &  R.  842 ;  Rex  v.  Leyland,  3 
Maule  &  Sel.  184;  Rex  v.  Woodrow,  2 
Term  R.  731;  post,  sec.  830.  By  the 
above  mentioned  provision  of  the  Muni- 
cipal Corporations  Act,  the  fine  is  in 
lieu  of  the  acceptance  of  the  office. 
Grant  on  Corp.  222. 


§  224.]  EESIGNATION   OF   MUNICIPAL  OFFICES,  249 

they  would  be  authorized,  where  such  an  ordinance  did  nrot  con- 
travene the  charter  or  statute,  or  public  legislative  policy  respect- 
ing offices,  to  impose  a  reasonable  fine  for  refusing  corporate 
offices.  In  this  country,  however,  offices  have  not  usually  been 
leotarded  as  burdens  to  be  avoided,  but  rather  as  distinctions  to 
be  coveted,  and  hence  there  has  been  little  occasion  to  call  into 
exercise  the  power  of  the  courts,  or  to  test  the  authority  of  the 
corporations  to  enforce  the  undertaking  of  their  offices.  If, 
under  the  charter  or  statute,  an  officer  has  the  right  to  resign 
or  lay  down  his  office  at  pleasure,  the  authority  to  impose  a 
fine  for  refusing  to  serve  would  probably  not  exist.^ 

Resignation  of  Municipal  Offices. 

§  224.  (163)  An  office  must  he  resigned  either  (first)  ex- 
pressly, or  (second)  by  implication.^  If  the  charter  prescribes 
the  mode  in  which  the  resignation  is  to  be  made,  that  mode 
should  of  course  be  complied  with.^  Acceptance  by  the 
corporation  is,  at  common  law,  necessary  to  a  consum- 
mation of  the  resignation,  and  until  acceptance  by  proper 
authority,  the  tender  or  offer  to  resign  is  revocable.*  The  right 
to  accept  a  resignation  is  a  power  incidental  to  every  cor- 
poration.^ It  is  also  a  common  law  principle  that  the  right  to 
accept  the  resigyiation   of  an  officer   is   incidental  to  the  power 

1  See  Willc.  133,  pi.  308  ;  Grant,  221,  *  Rex  v.  Lane,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1304;  Rex 
222  ;  Gates  v.  Delaware  County,  12  Iowa,  v.  Ripon,  supra  ;  Hazard's  Case,  2  Rol.  11 ; 
405;  United  States  v.  Wright,  1  McLean,  Jenning's  Case,  12  IMod.  402;  Rex  v.  Pat- 
509;  State,  etc.  v.  Ferguson,  31  N.  J.  L.  teson,  4  B.  &  Ad.  9;  1  Nev.  &  Mann.  G12. 
(2  Vroom),  107.  The  acceptance  may  be  by  entry  in  books, 

2  Regents  of  University  v.  Williams,  by  vote,  or  resolution,  or  by  treating  the 
9  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  3G5,  422,  1838;  Willc.  place  as  vacant  and  electing  another  to 
132,  238  ;  Grant,  268,  246,  note  e. ;  lb.  221,  fill  it,  or  ordering  an  election  if  to  be  filled 
222.  by  a  popular  vote.     Van  Orsdall  v.  Haz- 

3  Willc.  239  ;  Rex  v.  Hughes,  5  Barn,  ard,  8  Hill  (N.  Y.),  243  ;  State  v.  Ancker, 
&  Cress.  886,  896;  Rex  v.  Mayor  of  2  Rich.  (South  Car.)  245.  One  elected  to 
Ripon,  1  Ld.  Raym.  563  ;  Rex  v.  Payne,  an  office  cannot  resign  it  before  he  has 
2  Chitty,  306  ;  Reg.  v.  Morton,  4  Q.  B.  qualified  and  become  an  incumbent  of  it. 
146.  Tlie  statute  may  provide  that  the  Miller  v.  Supervisors,  etc.,  25  Cal.  93; 
officer  shall  continue  until  his  successor  is  Willc.  236. 

elected  and  qualified,  and  in  such  case  he  ^  Rex  v.  Tidderley,  1  Sid.  14  ;  Hazard's 

will  not  cease  to  be  an  officer  merely  by  Case,  supra.      The   "common   council" 

resigning  so  as  to  be  relieved   from  the  may  regulate  resignations  by  by-laws,  and 

discharge  of  liis  duties  as   such   officer,  it   may  accept  resignations,  as  it  repre- 

Badger   v.   U.  S.   (mandamus)   93    U.   S.  sents  the  corporation  at  large.    Rawlinson 

699,   1876.     See,  further,  on   this  point,  (5th  ed.)  317,  note  ;  Staniland  y.  Hopkins, 

post,  chapter  on  mandamus.  9  M.  &  W.  178;  Willc  240,  pi.  615. 


250 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[on.  IX. 


of  appointing  hini.^  If  no  particular  mode  is  prescribed, 
neither  the  resignation  nor  acceptance  thereof  need  be  in  writing, 
or  in  any  form  of  words.^ 

§  225.  (164)  An  office  may  be  impliedly  resigned  or  vacated 
b}'^  tlic  incumbent  being  elected  to  and  accepting  an  incom- 
patible office.  The  rule,  says  Parke,  J.,  in  a  leading  English  case  on 
this  subject,  that  where  two  offices  are  incompatible  they  cannot 
be  held  together,  is  founded  on  the  plainest  principles  of  public 
policy,  and  has  obtained  from  very  early  times.^  The  principle 
applies  not  only  where  the  second  office  is  the  superior  and  more 
important  one,  but  also  where  it  is  not.*  The  rule  has  been  gen- 
eralh'  stated  in  broad  and  unqualified  terms,  that  the  acceptance 
of  the  incompatible  office,  by  whomsoever  the  appointment  or 
election  might  be  made,  absolutely  determined  the  original  office, 
leaving  no  shadow  of  title  in  the  possessor,  whose  successor  may 
be  at  once  elected  or  appointed,  neither  quo  warranto  nor  amotion 
being  necessary.^ 

1  Van  Orstlall  v.  Hazard,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
243 ;  asserting,  arguendo,  the  incidental 
power  of  municipal  corporations,  as  such, 
to  accept  resignations,  and  approving  tiie 
opinion  of  Mr.  Wiilcock  (Munic.  Corp. 
240),  who  observes,  respecting  the  cases 
on  tliis  subject  :  "  I  presume  that  a  right 
to  accept  a  resignation  passes  incidentally 
with  a  right  to  elect."  See,  also.  Rex  v. 
Tidderlcy,  1  Sid.  14,  per  Hale,  Ch.  B.  ; 
Jenning's  Case,  12  Mod.  402 ;  Taylor's 
Case,  Poph.  133. 

2  Same  authorities  ;  and  see,  also.  Rex 
V.  Ripon,  1  Ld.  Raym.  563 ;  s.  c.  2  Salk. 
43.3  ;  Regina  v.  Lane,  1  Ld.  Raym.  1304  ; 
Jenning's  Case,  12  Mod.  402 ;  Regina 
V.  Gloucester,  Holt  R.  450  ;  Van  Orsdall  v. 
Hazard,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  243,  248  ;  State  v. 
Allen,  21  Ind.  516,  1863;  People  v.  Police 
Board,  26  N.  Y.  316  ;  McCunn's  Case,  19 
lb.  188,  distinguished.  Statutory  limita- 
tion on  the  right  to  resign  before  successor 
is  cliosen  and  qualified.  Badger  v.  U.  S., 
93  U.  S.,  599,  1876  ;  People  v.  Common 
Council,  77  N.  Y.  503,  approving  text. 
A  resignation  made  to  the  officer  who 
makes  the  appointment  vacates  the  office 
as  soon  as  it  is  received  ;  there  is  no 
acceptance  necessary.  Gilbert  v.  Luce, 
11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  91;  Olmsted  y.  Dennis, 
77  N.  Y.  379. 


3  Per  Parke,  J.,  Rex  v.  Patteson,  4 
Barn.  &  Adol.  9,  1832 ;  1  Nev.  &  Mann. 
012;  Regents  of  the  University  ;;.  Wil- 
liams, 9  Gill  &  Johns.  (Md.)  365.  1838  ;  1 
Kyd,  369-375 ;  State  v.  Butz,  9  S.  C.  156. 

By  the  common  law,  when  two  offices 
or  public  trusts  are  incompatible  with 
each  otlier,  a  person  holding  the  one  is 
not  disqualified  to  be  appointed  or  elected 
to  the  other,  but  his  acceptance  of  the 
second  office  is  in  law  an  implied  resig- 
nation of  the  first,  whenever  it  may  be 
resigned  by  the  mere  act  of  the  incum- 
bent witliout  the  assent  or  concurrence 
of  a  superior  authority.  Per  Gray,  C.  J. 
in  Commonwealth  v.  Hawkes,  123  Mass. 
525,  1878.  The  rule  that  one  vacates  an 
office  by  accepting  another  office  incom- 
patible therewith, —  applied  to  a  solicitor's 
acceptance  of  the  office  of  representative 
in  Congress.  State  v.  Butz,  9  S.  C.  156; 
post,  sec.  427,  note. 

4  Mil  ward  v.  Thatcher,  2  Term  R.  87, 
which  settled  tliis  point  conclusively ; 
Rex  V.  Trelawney,  3  Burr.  1615 ;  Gabriel 
V.  Clark,  Cro.  Car.  138  ;  Rex  v.  Godwin, 
Doug.  383,  note  22 ;  Willc.  240,  pi.  617  ; 
Glover,  139. 

^  Gabriel  v.  Clark,  supra ;  Verrior  v. 
Sandwich,  1  Sid.  305  ;  Milward  v.  Thatch- 
er, sujjra;  Glover,  .329;  Willc.  240,  pi.  G17. 


§  227.]  RESIGNATION   OF  MUNICIPAL  OFFICES.  251 

§  226.  (165)  The  doctrine  just  stated  is  undoubtedly  true 
where  the  acceptance  of  the  second  office  is  made  by  or  with  the 
privity  of  that  authority  whicli  has  the  power  to  accept  the  sur- 
render of  the  first  or  to  amove  from  it ;  but  "  such  acceptance 
does  not  operate  as  an  absolute  avoidance  in  cases  where  a  per- 
son cannot  divest  himself  of  an  office  by  his  own  mere  act,  but  re- 
quires the  concurrence  of  another  authority  to  his  resignation  or 
amotion,  unless  that  authority  is  privy  and  consenting  to  the  sec- 
ond appointment."  ^  If  one  holding  an  office  in  a  corporation  be 
by  that  corporation  elected  to  an  incompatible  office,  this  of  course, 
is  a  consent  on  the  part  of  the  corporation  that  the  first  office  be 
vacated ;  and  if  the  second  office  be  accepted,  the  first  is  at  once 
and  ipso  facto  determined.  But,  until  acceptance,  the  former 
office  is  not  vacated.^ 

§  227.  (166)  The  rule  under  consideration  is  not  limited  to 
corporate  offices,  but  extends,  both  in  its  principle  and  application, 
to  all  public  offices.  Thus,  if  a  judge  of  the  Common  Pleas 
accepts  an  appointment  to  the  king's  bench,  the  first  office 
is  vacated,  since  it' is  the  duty  of  the  one  to  correct  the  errors  of 
the  other.'^ 

Whether  offices  are  incompatible  depends  upon  the  charter  or 
statute,  and  the  nature  of  the  duties  to  be  performed.*     The  same 

1  Parke,  J.,  Rex  v.  Fatte son,  supra.    It  Oliver,  4  Abb.  Pr.  R.  121 ;  People  v.  Por- 

has  been  held  in  this  country,  however,  ter,  6  Cal.  26.     Denying  right  under  stat- 

tliat  an  incumbent  of  a  public  office  may  ute  to  withdraw  resignation  after  deliver- 

lay  it  down  at  his  pleasure,  and  that  the  ing  it.     State  v.  Hauss  (sheriff),  43  Ind. 

officer  to  whom  the  resignation,  by  law,  105, 1873 ;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  314. 

is  to  be  made  cannot  forbid  it  or  refuse  ^  lb.     Mil  ward  y.  Thatcher,  s!//?ra;  Rex 

it ;  and  that  when  received  by  such  offi-  v.  Pateman,  supra ;  Willc.  243,  pi.  623  ; 

cer  it   operates  to  vacate  the  office   re-  Arkwright  v.  Cantrell,  7  Ad.  &  E.  565. 

signed.     Gates  v.   Delaware   County,  12  Acceptance   necessary ;    see,   also,    State 

Iowa,  405;    United  States  v.   Wright,   1  u.  Ferguson,  31  N.J.  (2  Vroom)  Law,  107, 

McLean,  509.      The  delivery  by  a  city  1864  ;  see  Lewis  v.  Oliver,  4  Abb.  Pr.  121. 

engineer,  whose  office  was  elective,  of  a  Acceptance    of    an    incompatible   office, 

written   resignation   to  the    mayor    and  even  under  a  void  election,  puts  an  end 

council,  takes  effect  without  any  accept-  to  the  first  office  ;  and  the  officer,  on  being 

ance.     State  v.  Mayor  of  Lincoln,  4  Neb.  ousted  from  the  second  office,  cannot  be 

260,    1877.     Lake,  C.   J.,  says :  "  In  ab-  restored  to  the  first.     Rex  v.  Hughes,  5 

sence  of  statute,  there  is  no  rule  requiring  B.  &  C.  886  ;  Rex  v.  Bond,  6  D.  &  R.  333. 

acceptance  of  resignation  to  make  it  ef-  ^  Glover  on  Corp.  139. 

fective.      The   refusal   of  the   municipal  *  Milward  v.  Thatcher,  supra,  per  Bul- 

authorities  to  accept  it  will  not  compel  kr,  J.  ;  People  v.  Carrique,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.), 

the  officer  to  retain  the  office  against  his  93,  and  cases  cited  ;  Staniland  v.  Hopkins, 

will."  Jb.     Compare  State  v.  Ferguson,  2  9  M.  &  W.  178. 

Vroom  (31  N.  J.  L.)    107,  129 ;  Lewis  v.  Incompatibilihj  in   offices  exists    where 


252 


MUNICIPAL   COKPOKATIONS. 


[CII.  IX 


man  cannot  be  jiulge  and  minister  in  the  same  court,  and  hence 
the  othces  are  not  compatible.^  Where  the  recorder  is  an  adviser 
to  the  mayor,  the  two  offices  cannot  be  held  together.^  So  a  rep- 
resentative in  Congress  holds  a  public  office,  within  the  meaning  of 
a  charter  which  prohibits  an  alderman  from  holding  "  any  other 
public  office  "  ;  and  upon  his  election  to  and  acceptance  of  "  such 
public  office  "  during  his  term  as  alderman,  his  office  as  alderman 
immediately  becomes  vacant.^ 

The  proper  proceeding  is  by  mandamus  ^  to  compel  the  com- 
mon council  to  order  a  special  election  to  fill  such  vacancy,  and 
not  by  quo  ivarranto  to  try  the  title  to  such  office,  such  represent- 
ative being  neither  a  de  facto  nor  de  jure  officer. 

§  228.  (1G7)  An  office  may  be  vacated  by  abandonment.^  A 
voluntary  etiUstment  by  a  civil  officer  in  the  military  service  of  the 
United  States  for  three  years,  or  during  the  war,  vacates  the  civil 
office,  being  a  constructive  resignation  by  abandonment.^  So 
where  residence  within  the  corporation  is  necessary  in  order  to  be 
eligible  to  hold  an  office,  permanent  removal  from  the  municipal- 
ity may  undoubtedly  be  taken  as  evincing  an  intention  to  resign, 
and  as  an  implied  resignation.'^ 


the  nature  and  duties  of  the  two  offices 
are  such  as  to  render  it  improper,  from 
considerations  of  public  policy,  for  one 
incumbent  to  retain  both.  It  does  not 
necessarily  arise  when  the  incumbent 
places  himself,  for  the  time  being,  in  a 
position  where  it  is  impossible  for  him 
to  discharge  the  duties  of  both  offices. 
Bryan  v.  Cattell,  15  Iowa,  538,  1864,  per 
Wright,  C.  J. ;  and  accordingly  that  case 
held  that  the  office  of  district  attorney 
and  of  captain  in  the  volunteer  service  of 
the  United  States  were  not  legally  incom- 
patible. Two  offices  are  incompatible 
where  the  holder  cannot,  in  every  in- 
stance, discharge  the  duties  of  each. 
Per  Bailey,  J.,  Rex  v.  Tizzard,  17  Eng. 
C.  L.  193. 

1  Poph.  28,  29;  1  Sid.  305;  2  Keb. 
93 ;  Glover,  139. 

2  Willc.  241,  pi.  518 ;  Rex  v.  Marshall, 
cited,  2  B.  &  A.  341.  Clerk  of  a  school 
district  and  collector  of  the  district  were 
held  not  incompatible,  and  the  same  per- 


son may,  therefore,  be  appointed  to  both 
offices,  there  being  no  prohibition  in  the 
act.  Rowland  v.  Luce,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
135,  1819.  The  offices  of  councilman  and 
city  marshal  are  incompatible.  State  v. 
Hoyt,  2  Oregon,  24G.  See  generally  as 
to  incompatible  state  and  federal  offices, 
Respublica  n.  Dallas,  3  Yeates  (Pa.),  316; 
s.  c.  4  Dall.  229  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Binns, 
17  Sorg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  219;  Common- 
wealth V.  Ford,  5  Barr  (Pa.),  67. 

^  People  V.  Common  Council,  77  N.  Y. 
503;  People  v.  Carrique,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
93 ;  People  v.  Nostrand,  46  N.  Y.  381 ; 
People  V.  Green,  58  N.  Y.  304. 

*  Lamb  v.  Lynd,  44  Pa.  336  ;  State  v. 
Rahway,  33  N.  J.  L.  110;  Fish  v.  Weath- 
erwax,  2  Johns.  Cas.  217. 

5  Willc.  238 ;  State  v.  Allen,  21  Ind. 
516,  1863. 

6  State  V.  Allen,  21  Ind.  516,  1863. 
But  see  Bryan  v.  Cattell,  15  Iowa,  537. 

7  Willc.  238 ;  ante,  sec.  195 ;  Curry  v. 
Stewart,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  560,  1871. 


§  230.]  COMPENSATION   OF  MUNICIPAL  OFFICERS.  253 

Compensation  of  3Iunicipal   Officers. 

§  229.  (168)  We  have  had  occasion  to  discuss  the  complete 
supremacy  of  the  legislature  over  public  corporations,  limited  only 
by  express  constitutional  restraints.^  Its  authority  over  public 
offices,  which  are  created  or  authorized  solely  for  the  public  con- 
venience, is  equally  great,^  and  may  be  conferred  upon  munici- 
pal corporations  with  respect  to  municipal  offices.  The  legislature, 
in  the  absence  of  constitutional  limitation,  may  create  and  abolish 
offices,  add  to  or  lessen  their  duties,  abridge  or  extend  the  term 
of  office,  and  increase,  diminish,  or  regulate  the  compensation  of 
officers  at  its  pleasure.^ 

§  230.  (169)  There  is  no  such  implied  obligation  on  the  part 
of  municipal  corporations,  and  no  such  relation  between  them 
and  officers  which  they  are  required  by  law  to  elect,  as  will 
oblige  them  to  make  compensation  to  such  officers,  unless  the  right 
to  it  is  expressly  given  by  law,  ordinance,  or  by  contract.*  Offi- 
cers of  a  municipal  corporation  are  deemed  to  have  accepted  their 
office  with  knowledge  of,  and  with  reference  to,  the  provisions  of 
the  charter  or  incorporating  statute  relating  to  the  services  which 
they  may  be  called  upon  to  render,  and  the  compensation  pro- 
vided therefor.  Aside  from  these,  or  some  proper  by-law,  there 
is  no  implied  assumpsit  on  the  part  of  the  corporation  with  re- 

1  Ante,  ch.  iv.  and  tlie  officer  not  removed,  he  is  entitled 

2  Ante,  eh.  iv.  ;  State  v.  Douglass,  26  to  salary.  Hoke  v.  Henderson,  4  Dev. 
"Wis.  428,  1870;  s.  c.  7  Am.  Rep.  87,  and  (N.  C.)  1;  Cotton  i-.  Ellis,  8  Jones  (N. 
note.     As  to  special  constitutional  restric-  C.)  Law,  545. 

tions,  ante,  sees.  58,  60.  *  Sikes  v.   Hatfield,  13  Gray  (Mass.), 

3  Ante,  ch.  iv. ;  and  see  also  Conner  v.  347,  1859  ;  Barton  r.  New  Orleans,  16  La. 
Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  1  Seld.  5  N.  Y.  An.  317  ;  Garnier  ;;.  St.  Louis,  37  Mo. 
285,  1851 ;  affirming  s.  c.  2  Sandf.  S.  C.  554,  1866.  It  is  advisable  that  salaries 
R.  355;  Warner  y.  People,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  should  be  fi.xed  by  ordinance,  and  not 
81;  2  Denio,  272;  People  i'.  Morrell,  11  voted  as  a  matter  of  grace  and  favor. 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  563,  1839;  Phillips  v.  Smith  ?;.  Commonwealth,  41  Pa.  St.  335 ; 
Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  Devoy  v.  New  York,  39  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
(Com.  PI.)  483;  Bryan  i).CattelI,  15  Iowa,  169;  Bladen  v.  Philadelphia,  GO  Pa.  St. 
538,553,per  irnyti.C.J. ;  Coffin  y.  State,  464.  See  opinion  of  Thompson,  C.  J., 
7  Ind.  157,  1855;  People  v.  Mahaney,  13  Philadelphia  v.  Given,  lb.  136.  Munici- 
Mich.  481 ;  Turpen  r.  County  Commrs.,  pal  coi-porations  are  not  liable  for  services 
7  Ind.  172  ;  Oregon  ?\  Pyle,  1  Oregon,  performed  by  an  officer  under  .an  uncon- 
149 ;  Bird  v.  Wasco  Co.,  3  Oregon,  282,  stitutional  statute.  Meaglior  i'.  County, 
1871 ;  Cowdinr.  Huff,  10  Ind.  83;  Cooley,  5  Nev.  244,  1869  ;  post,  sec.  910;  City  of 
Const.  Lim.  276;  Butler  r.  Pennsylvania,  Central  v.  Sears,  2  Col.  588,  1875.  The 
10  How.  402 ;  Smitli  v.  New  York,  37  N.  first  sentence  of  tliis  section  of  the  text 
Y.  518,  1868  ;  Swann  v.  Buck,  40  Miss,  cited  and  applied  in  Bosworth  v.  New  Or- 
268,  1866.     While  the  office  is  continued,  leans,  20  La.  An.  494,  495, 1874. 


254 


MUNICIPAL   COEPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


spect  to  the  services  of  its  officers.  In  the  absence  of  express 
contract,  these  reguhite  the  right  of  recovery,  and  the  amount.^ 
If  the  charter  or  by-hiws  provide  for  a  pecuHar  mode  of  compen- 
sation, as,  for  example,  to  a  city  surveyor,  for  superintending 
grading  of  streets,  b}-  an  assessment  upon  the  property  owners, 
the  city  is  not  liable  before  it  collects  the  money,  if  it  makes  the 
requisite  assessments,  and  is  proceeding  with  proper  diligence  to 
enforce  them.^ 

§  231.  (170)  A  municipal  corporation  may,  unless  restrained 
by  charter,  abolish  an  office  created  by  ordinance  ;  and  may  also, 
unless  the  employment  is  in  the  nature  of  a  contract,  reduce  or 
othenvise  regulate  the  salaries  and  fees  of  its  officers,  according 
to  its  view  of  expediency  and  right.  Although  an  officer  may  be 
elected  or  appointed  for  a  fixed  period,  yet  where  he  is  not 
bound,  and  cannot  be  compelled  to  serve  for  the  whole  time, 
such  election  or  appointment  cannot  be  considered  a  contract  to 
hire  for  a  stipulated  term.  Ordinances  fixing  salaries  are  not 
in  the  nature  of  contracts  with  officers.^ 


1  Locke  V.  Central  City,  4  Col.  G5.  A 
public  officer  is  not  entitled  to  payment 
for  duties  imposed  upon  liim  by  statute 
in  tbe  absence  of  an  express  provision 
for  sucli  payment.  Jones  v.  Carmartlien, 
8M.  &\V.  805;  Askin  v.  London,  1  Up- 
per Can.  Q.  B.  292  ;  Pringle  and  McDon- 
ald, in  re,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  254  ;  Regina 
V.  Cumberlege,  36  L.  T.  N.  S.  700. 

2  Baker  v.  City  of  Utica,  19  N.  Y.  326  ; 
People  V.  Supervisors,!  Hill  (N.  Y.),3G2; 
Cumming  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Brooklyn,  11 
Paige,  696;  Jersey  City  v.  Quaife,  2 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  G3;  Andrews  v.  United 
States,  2  Story  C.  C.  203;  United  States 
V.  Brown,  9  How.  487;  Barton  v.  New 
Orleans,  IG  La.  An.  317;  McClung  v.  St. 
Paul,  14  Minn.  420,  1869;  Smith  ;.'.  Com- 
monwealth, 41  Pa.  St.  335.  "It  is  very 
plain  to  us  that  a  town  officer,  as  such, 
has  no  legal  claim  against  tlie  town  to  re- 
cover pay  for  services  rendered,  unless  by 
an  express  vote  of  the  town,  or  an  uniform 
usage  to  pay  that  particular  officer  from 
year  to  year,  for  liis  services.  And  in  the 
latter  case,  it  would  be  very  qnestionaI)le 
whether  a  recovery  at  law  could  he  had, 
if  it  had  all  along  been  left  to  the  town  to 
make  such  compensation  as  they  should 
deem  reasonable,  after  the  services  had 


been  rendered.  .  .  .  The  same  principle 
has  always  been  recognized  in  tliis  state 
in  regard  to  all  officers.  If  no  law  of  the 
state  fi.xed  their  fees  or  pay,  their  services 
must  be  gratuitous."  Per  Redjield,  J., 
Boyden  v.  Brookline,  8  Vt.  284,  1836. 
But  the  decision  (in  Boyden  v.  Brookline, 
8  Vt.  284)  does  not  extend  strictly  be- 
yond official  services;  and  when  a  town 
agent,  acting  for  the  town,  or  the  town  it- 
self, employs  an  attorney  at  law  to  prose- 
cute or  defend  suits  against  the  town,  the 
latter  is  liable  for  the  services.  And  the 
rule  is  the  same  if  the  "  town  agent," 
being  an  attorney,  renders  for  the  town 
professional  services,  in  suits  which  the 
proper  authorities  of  the  town  directed  to 
to  be  instituted.  Langdon  v.  Castleton, 
80  Vt.  285,  1858;  City  of  Central  v. 
Sears,  2  Col.  588 ;  Locke  v.  Central  City, 
4  Col.  65.  A  provision  that  a  city  marslial 
shall  have  the  same  duties,  responsibili- 
ties, and  fees  as  sheriffs  does  not  im- 
port that  he  may  recover  from  the  county 
in  which  the  city  is  located  for  services 
rendered  in  the  administration  of  the 
criminal  law.  Christ  v.  Polk  County,  48 
Iowa,  302. 

8  Commonwealth  v.  Bacon,  6  Serg.  & 
Eawle  (Pa.),  322,  1820;  followed,  Baker, 


§  232.] 


COMPENSATION   OF   MUNICIPAL  OFFICERS. 


255 


§  232.  (171)  But  where  the  services  to  be  performed  are  pro- 
fessional or  private,  rather  than  public  or  official,  an  employment 
under  an  ordinance  for  a  fixed  time,  at  a  fixed  sum  for  the  period, 
has  been  held  to  be  a  contract,  and  not  subject  to  be  impaired  by 
the  corporation.  Thus,  the  appointment  or  election  by  a  city 
council,  for  a  fixed  and  definite  period,  of  a  city  officer  —  for  ex- 
ample, a  city  engineer,  for  one  year,  at  the  rate  of  one  thousand 
dollars  per  year  —  if  accepted  by  him,  constitutes,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Massachusetts,  a  contract  between  him 
and  the  city ;  and  the  city,  in  such  a  case,  has  no  authority,  unless 
expressly  conferred,  to  abolish  or  shorten  the  term  of  office,  so  as 
to  deprive  the  officer,  without  his  consent,  of  the  right  to  com- 


V.  Pittsburgh,  4  Pa.  St.  49,  1846  (abolish- 
ing annual  salary  of  collector  of  tolls) ; 
also,  approved,  University  v.  Walden,  15 
Ala.  655,  1819;  but  distinguished,  Carr  v. 
St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  190 ;  Coraw.  v.  Mann,  5 
W.  &  S.  (Pa.)  418;  Smith  v.  County,  2 
Par.  (Pa.)  293;  Madison  v.  Kelso,  32  Ind. 
79;  Warner  v.  People,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
272 ;  Conner  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  285,  296;  Augusta  v. 
Sweeny,  44  Ga.  4G3,  1871.  Under  special 
circumstances, —  Held,  that  the  salary  of  a 
city  officer  could  be  diminished  by  the 
council.  Cox  v.  Burlington,  43  Iowa,  612, 
1876.  A  legislature  may  authorize  the 
reduction  of  the  salary  of  a  city  officer 
during  his  term.  A  statute  or  city  ordi- 
nance fixing  the  amount  of  such  salary  is 
not  in  the  nature  of  a  contract.  Love  v. 
Jersey  City,  40  N.  J.  L.  456.  Such  officer, 
by  continuing  in  office  and  receiving  war- 
rants for  monthly  payments  of  his  salary 
during  tlie  term,  waives  all  objections  to 
the  redu(;tion.  lb.  In  an  action  against 
a  city  treasurer,  on  his  official  bond,  for 
moneys  received  by  him,  he  cannot 
charge  commissions  for  the  whole  term 
at  the  rate  allowed  by  law  at  his  acces- 
sion to  office,  when  his  compensation  has 
been  changed  to  a  lower  rate  subse- 
quently. Iowa  City  v.  Foster,  10  Iowa, 
189.  Where  a  police  judge  agreed  to 
accept  the  compensation  fixed  by  the  city 
council  in  payment  of  his  services,  if  tlie 
council  would  by  a  change  of  ordinance 
provide  compensation  for  the  clerk  of  the 
court,  —  Held,  that  the  agreement  was 
based  on  a  valid  consideration  ;  but  that 


in  cases  where  judgment  was  rendered 
against  the  city  before  such  change,  no 
fees  could  be  recovered.  Crane  v.  Des 
Moines,  47  Iowa.  105;  supra,  sec.  212.  In 
Commonwealth  v.  Bacon,  supra,  it  was 
held  that  an  ordinance  which  reduced  the 
salary  of  the  mayor  after  the  commence- 
ment of  his  term  was  vahd.  The  court 
said,  "  Tins  cannot  be  considered  in  the 
nature  of  a  hiring  for  a  year,  because  it 
was  not  obligatory  on  the  mayor  to  serve 
out  the  year."  Though  an  ordinance  may 
fix  term  and  compensation  of  officer,  the 
office  may  he  abolished,  if  its  abolition  be 
not  forbidden,  or  salary  reduced.  There 
is  no  contract  between  corporation  and 
officer  that  the  service  shall  continue,  or 
the  salary  not  be  changed.  Waldraven 
V.  Memphis,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  431,  1867; 
Hoboken  v.  Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  265, 
1859.  The  power  to  abolish  municipal 
offices  was  reaffirmed,  citing  text,  in 
Butcher  v.  Camden  (fire  marshal  of  city), 
29  N.  J.  Eq.  (2  Stew.)  478,  1878.  General 
power  to  a  corporation  to  fix  the  compen- 
sation of  its  officers  does  not  authorize  it 
to  take  away  the  fees  of  an  officer,  which 
are  speciJicaHy  fixed  by  the  same  charter. 
Carr  v.  St.  Louis,  9  Mo.  190,  1845.  The 
legislature  may  provide  that  the  salary  of 
an  officer  may  be  fixed  by  one  board,  e.g., 
a  common  council,  tliougii  it  is  payable 
by  another,  e.  g.,  a  county,  or  board  of 
supervisors;  and  in  that  case,  the  latter 
have  no  authority  to  change  it  when  once 
fixed.  People  v.  Auditors  of  Wayne,  13 
Mich.  233 ;  People  v.  Wayne  Co.  Audi- 
tors, 41  Mich.  4. 


256  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  IX. 

pensation  for  the  full  period,  unless  for  misbehavior  or  unfitness 
to  discharge  the  duties  of  the  place. ^ 

§  238.  (172)  It  is  a  well  settled  rule  that  a  person  accepting 
a  public  office,  with  a  fixed  salary,  is  bound  to  perform  the  duties 
of  the  office  for  the  salary.  He  cannot  legally  claim  additional 
compensation  for  the  discharge  of  these  duties,  even  though  tlie 
salary  may  be  a  very  inadequate  remuneration  for  the  services. 
Nor  does  it  alter  the  case  that  by  subsequent  statutes  or  ordi- 
nances his  duties  within  the  scope  of  the  charter  powers  pertain- 
ing to  the  office  are  increased  and  not  his  salary.  Whenever  he 
considers  the  compensation  inadequate,  he  is  at  liberty  to  resign. 
The  rule  is  of  importance  to  the  public.  To  allow  changes  and 
additions  in  the  duties  properly  belonging  or  which  ma}'' properly 
be  attached  to  an  office  to  lay  the  foundation  for  extra  compensa- 
tion, would  soon  introduce  intolerable  mischief.  The  rule,  too, 
should  be  very  rigidly  enforced.  The  statutes  of  the  legislature 
and  the  ordinances  of  our  municipal  corporations  seldom  prescribe 
with  much  detail  and  particularity  the  duties  annexed  to  public 
offices;  and  it  requires  but  little  ingenuity  to  run  nice  distinc- 
tions between  what  duties  may,  and  what  may  not,  be  considered 
strictly  official ;  and  if  these  distinctions  are  much  favored  by 
courts  of  justice,  it  may  lead  to  great  abuse.^ 

1  Chase  f.  Lowell,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  33,  that  it  shall  be  liable  for  any  compensa- 

1856  ;  and  see  Caverlcy  i'.  Lowell,  1  Allen  tion  earned  under  the  resolution  previous 

(Mass.),  289,  1861,  as  to  ordinance   con-  to  its  repeal  or  modification.     Hiestand  w. 

stituting  a  contract  with   city  attorney.  New  Orleans,  14  La.  An.  330,  1859.     The 

These    cases,    if   really    distinguishable  court   did  not  regard  the   resolution   as 

from  the  others,  should  not,  it  is  believed,  creating  a  contract,  or,  if  so,  it  was  one  of 

be  extended,  but  the  principle  limited  to  mandate,   revocable   at  the   will  of  the 

instances  wliere  the  services  are  not  es-  principal.     //;. 

sentially   official    in    their    nature,    and  ^  Per  Potts,  J.,  in  Court  of  Errors  and 

where  the  officer  or  other  party  is  bound  Appeals,  Evans  v.  Trenton,  4  Zabr.  (24 

to  serve  for  the  fixed  and  definite  period.  N.  J.  L.)  7G0,  1853.     The  text  cited  and 

Appointment  of  police  officer  for  a  year,  approved  in  Decatur  v.  Vermillion,  77  111. 

held  not  to  create  a  contract,  and  he  was  315,  1875.     See,  al.«o,  Andrews  v.  United 

removable,    without    cause,  within   that  States,  2  Story  C.  C.  202  ;  Palmer  v.  The 

period.     Chicago  v.  Edwards,  58  111.252,  Mayor,  etc,  of  New  York,  2  Sandford  (N. 

1871.  Y.),  318  ;  Bussier  v.  Tray,  7  Serg.  &  Rawle 

A  resolution  of  the  council  empower-  (Pa.),  447;  Angell  &  Ames  on  Corp.  sec. 

ing  an  individual  to  collect  the  taxes  due  317  ;    Gilmore   v.   Lewis,    12    Ohio,  281 ; 

the  city,  at  a  given  rate  per  cent  rtn  the  Detroit  v.  Eedfield,  19  Mich.  376,  1869. 

amount  collected   for  his  compensation,  A   salaried  officer   cannot   sue   the  city 

may  be  repealed  or  modified  at  any  time  for    a    balance    of    salary    due    unless 

by  the  corporation,  on  the  sole  condition  there  has  been  some  default  on  the  part 


§  234] 


COMPENSATION   OF   MUNICIPAL   OFFICERS. 


257 


§  234.  (173)  Not  only  has  an  officer,  under  such  circumstances, 
no  legal  claim  for  extra  compensation,  but  a  promise  to  pay  him 
an  extra  fee  or  sum  beyond  that  fixed  by  law  is  not  binding,  though 
he  renders  services  and  exercises  a  degree  of  diligence  greater 
than  could  legally  have  been  required  of  him.^ 


of  the  city  in  making  the  necessary  ap- 
propriations. Waterman  v.  New  York, 
7  Daly  (N.  Y.),  489. 

A  salaried  officer  of  a  public  corpora- 
tion has  no  claim  for  compensation  extra 
his  salary,  on  Ihe  ground  that  the  duties 
of  his  office  have  been  increased,  or  new 
duties  added  since  tlie  salary  was  fixed. 
People  V.  Supervisors,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
362;  "Wendell  v.  Brooklyn,  29  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  204;  Palmer  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  318;  Covington 
V.  Mayberry,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  304;  An- 
drews V.  Pratt  (compensation  for  sale  of 
county's  railroad  stock),  44  Cal.  309, 
1872.  Special  instances,  where  a  claim 
for  compensation,  in  the  absence  of  ex- 
press provision,  has  been  sustained,  where 
the  law  has  required  a  public  officer  to 
perform  a  duty,  attended  with  trouble 
and  expense  clearly  outside  of  his  regu- 
lar official  duties,  see  People  v.  Super- 
visors, 12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  257;  Bright  v. 
Supervisors,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  242;  Mal- 
lory  V.  Supervisors,  2  Cowen  (N.  Y.),  531 ; 
lb.  533 ;  Detroit  v.  Redfield,  19  Mich.  376, 
1869.  If  a  county  attorney  goes  beyond 
the  limits  of  his  county  at  the  instance 
and  with  the  consent  of  the  county  board, 
he  may  recover  reasonable  compensation 
in  addition  to  his  salary.  Huffman  v. 
Greenwood  Co.,  23  Kan.  281 ;  Butler  v. 
Neosho  Co.,  15  Kan.  178;  Leavenworth 
Co.  V.  Brewer,  9  Kan.  .307.  Tliis  subject 
is  discussed  in  White  v.  Polk  Co.,  17 
Iowa,  413;  post,  sec.  479. 

Where  salary  is  fixed  by  ordinance,  it 
cannot  be  changed  by  a  committee  or  in- 
dividual members  of  the  corporation ; 
nor  will  tlieir  promise  to  pay  extra  com- 
pensation for  the  duties  of  the  office  be 
binding  on  the  corporation.  But  for  ser- 
vices performed  by  request,  not  part  of 
the  duties  of  his  office,  and  which  could 
as  appropriately  have  been  performed  by 
any  other  person,  such  officer  may,  in 
proper  cases,  recover  a  just  remuneration. 
Evans  v.  Trenton,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.) 
VOL.  I.  17 


764,  18-53;  s.  p.  Detroit  v.  Redfield,  19 
IMich.  376,  1869 ;  Converse  v.  United 
States,  21  How.  463.  For  services  re- 
quired by  ordinances,  the  city  attorney  is 
entitled  to  the  compensation  fixed  by  or- 
dinance, and  no  other ;  and  the  mayor,  by 
virtue  of  his  duty  to  see  that  the  "ordi- 
nances are  duly  enforced,"  cannot  bind 
the  corporation  to  pay  more  than  the 
fixed  salary  or  compensation,  and  this 
duty  does  not  authorize  that  officer  to 
employ  assistant  or  independent  counsel 
in  any  case,  at  the  expense  of  the  corpo- 
ration. Carroll  v.  St.  Louis,  12  Mo.  44, 
1849;  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall.  289, 
321,  1873;  post,  sec.  479.  Further,  as  to 
liability  of  city  to  attorneys,  see  the  chap- 
ter on  Contracts. 

1  Heslep   V.   Sacramento,  2   Cal.   580 
($10,000  voted   to   mayor  for  meritorious 
services,  held  void);  Hatch  v.  Mann,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  44;  reversing  s.  c.  9  lb. 
262;    approved.  Palmer  v.    Mayor,    etc. 
of  New  York,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  218;  Bar- 
tho  r.  Salter,  Latch,  54;  W.  Jones,  65; 
s.  c.  Lane  v.  Sewell,  1  Chitty,  175;  lb. 
295;  Morris  v.  Burdett,  1  Camp.  218;  3 
lb.  374;  Callaghan  v.  Hallett,  1  Caines 
(N.  Y.),  104;  s.  c.   Col.  &  C.  Cas.   179; 
Preston  v.  Bacon,  4  Conn.  471  ;  Shattuck 
r.  Woods,  1   Pick.   (Mass.)  175;  Bussier 
v.  Pray,  7  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  447  ;  Car- 
roll v.  Tyler,  2  Har.  &  Gill,  54  ;  Smith  v. 
Smith,  1  Bailey  (South  Car.),  70;  Debolt 
V.  Cincinnati,  7  Oiiio  St.  237  ;  Pilie  v.  New 
Orleans,  19  La.  An.  273.    Payments  re- 
ceived by  one,  knowing  the  agent  to  be 
unauthorized  to  make  them,  may  be  re- 
covered by  the  principal  as  money  wrong- 
fully had  and  received.     Tlie  people  are 
not  bound  by  acts  of  a  township  commit- 
tee, ultra  vires,  sanctioning  unlawful  pay- 
ments to  a  collector.     Demarest  v.  New 
Barbadoes,  40  N.  J.  L.  604.     The  princi- 
ple in  the  text  operates  to  deprive  a  pub- 
lic officer,  or  an  officer  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration, of  a  claim  for  a  reward  offered  for 
a  service  which  is  embraced  in  his  official 


258 


MUNICIPAL  CORrORATIONS. 


[CII.  DC. 


Liability  of  Corporation  to  the  Officer. 

§  235.  (17'4)  Where  an  officer  of  a  municipal  corporation, 
elected  by  the  people  for  a  specified  term,  is  improperlij  removed 
by  the  city  council,  he  may  sue  the  corporation  for  his  salary  and 
perquisites  for  the  time  intervening  between  his  removal  and  the 
expiration  of  his  term.^  It  is  a  defence  to  the  corporation  that 
the  officer  was  legally  removed ;  but  if  he  was  illegally  removed, 
it  is  no  answer  to  the  action  that  the  corporation,  in  making  the 
removal,  acted  judicially,  and  therefore  is  not  liable  for  the  error 
it  committed.^ 


or  legal  duties.  Gilmore  r.  Lewis,  12  Ohio, 
281,  wliere  a  constable  who  arrested  a  thief 
was  held  not  entitled  to  a  reward  ofTered 
by  the  defendant ;  s.  p.  Pool  v.  Boston, 
5  Gush.  (Mass.)  219;  the  text  cited  and 
approved.  Decatur  v.  Vermillion,  77  111. 
315,  1875.     See  ante,  ch.  vi.  sec.  139. 

1  Stadler  v.  Detroit,  13  Mich.  346, 
1805;  Shaw  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  19  Ga.  468, 
1856.  The  court,  in  considering  the  rule 
of  damaijes  in  such  a  case,  hold  that  the 
officer  cannot  recover  of  the  corporation 
counsel  fees  for  defending  himself  against 
the  charges  preferred  against  him,  but 
may  recover  such  "  damages  as  necessa- 
rily resulted  from  his  amotion  from  office, 
viz.,  Jds  salary  and  perquisites."  19  Ga. 
468,  supra.  But  the  corporation,  it  is 
suggested,  may  recoup  the  same  as  indi- 
viduals who  improperly  dismiss  servants 
employed  for  a  determinate  period.  2 
Greenl.  Ev.  sec.  261rt.  But  see  United 
States  V.  Addison,  6  Wall.  291 ;  Hoke  v. 
Henderson,  4  Dev.  (N.  C.)  1. 

2  Shaw  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  19  Ga.  468, 
1856;  Shaw  ;;.  Mayor,  etc.,  21  Ga.  280; 
sees.  c.  Mayor,  etc.  ?;.  Shaw's  Adminis- 
trator, 25  Ga.  590.  In  the  case  last  cited 
it  was  decided  that  if  the  removal  of  a 
city  officer  be  for  a  specified  cause,  not 
warranting  the  removal,  and  the  officer 
sue  the  corporation  for  his  salary,  as  a 
defence  to  such  action  it  may  aver  and 
prove  other  matters,  good  in  law,  to  jus- 
tify such  removal.  In  thus  holding,  the 
court  say  :  "  If  his  term  of  office  had  not 
expired  when  this  suit  was  instituted,  and 
he  had  moved  for  a  mandamus  to  restore 
him,  instead  of  bringing  an  action  for  his 
salary,  the  court  would  not  have  inter- 


fered, if  good  cause  for  his  removal  could 
have  been  shown,  although  he  may  have 
been  removed  without  notice.  Rex  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  2  Cowp.  523 ;  The  King 
V.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  2  Term  R.  182"  — 
per  McDonald,  J. ;  25  Ga.  590,  592.  See 
Hoboken  v.  Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  265. 
An  incumbent  was  appointed  by  the  al- 
dermen and  removed  by  the  mayor,  who 
nominated  a  successor ;  the  incumbent's 
salary  did  not  cease  until  his  successor 
was  confirmed.  White  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
New  York,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  563,  1855.  A 
person  is  not  entitled  to  the  salary  of  a 
public  office  unless  he  both  obtains  and 
exercises  the  office.  Farrell  f.  Bridge- 
port, 45  Conn.  191.  Thus,  a  city  treas- 
urer, being  indicted  for  forgery,  the  may- 
or and  council  elected  another  in  his 
stead  for  the  balance  of  his  term.  Upon 
his  acquittal,  —  Held,  that  he  could  not  re- 
cover the  salary  for  such  balance  of  his 
term.  If  the  prosecution  was  malicious, 
he  could  recover  in  tort  from  the  wrong- 
doer. Brunswick  v.  Fahm,  GO  Ga.  109. 
So  a  policeman  who  has  been  found  guilty 
of  immoral  conduct  and  discharged  from 
his  office  by  a  board  of  police  commis- 
sioners having  jurisdiction,  cannot  re- 
cover from  the  city  his  salary  for  the 
remainder  of  his  term.  It  makes  no  dif- 
ference that  the  commissioners  may  have 
erred  in  their  judgment  on  the  evidence, 
no  appeal  having  been  taken.  Queen  v. 
Atlanta,  59  Ga.  318. 

Declaring  an  office  and  the  prospective 
fees  of  the  officer  not  to  be  property,  and 
that  the  right  to  fees  grows  out  of  services 
performed,  it  was  decided  by  the  Court  of 
Appeals  that  a  municipal  officer  who  had 


§  236.] 


LIABILITY   OF   OFFICER. 


259 


Liability  of  the    Officer  to  the    Corporation  and  to    Others. 

§  236.    (1T5)    Public  officers,  elected  pursuant  to  statute  by  a 
municipal  corporation,  are  not  the  servants  or  agents  of  the  cor- 

682;  Page  v.  Hardin,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
648 ;  Bowerbank  v.  Morris,  Wail.  C.  C. 
R.  118.  In  Tlie  City  v.  Given,  00  Pa.  St. 
136,  tlie  plaintiff  acted  as  city  commis- 
sioner for  some  montlis,  wlien  it  was  de- 
cided that  lie  had  not  been  duly  elected, 
and  in  a  suit  brought  for  his  salary,  it  was 
held  that  he  could  not  recover,  because 
he  had  not  qualified  by  giving  security. 
In  an  action  by  the  rightful  officer  on  a 
supersedeas  bond  given  in  a  quo  warranto 
proceeding  by  an  intruder,  the  measure 
of  damages  is  the  full  amount  of  the 
salary  (where  the  office  has  a  fixed  salary) 
received  by  the  intruder  pending  the 
operation  of  the  supersedeas.  United  States 
V.  Addison,  6  Wall.  291.  See  People  v. 
Miller,  24  Mich.  458,  1872. 

"It  is  a  grave  question,"  says  Se^- 
mour,  C.  J.,  "  whether  a  merely  de  facto 
officer,  even  when  he  actually  performs 
the  whole  duties  of  the  office,  can  enforce 
the  payment  of  the  salary.  The  authori- 
ties seem  to  be  that  he  cannot.  State  v. 
Carrol,  38  Conn.  471 ;  Riddle  v.  Bedford 
County,  7  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),886;  Bent- 
ly  V.  Phelps,  27  Barb.  (N.  Y.)524;  People 
V.  Tiernan,  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.),  193.  How- 
ever tliis  may  be,  it  is  clear,  we  think,  that 
the  salary  of  an  officer  is  not  due  to  parties 
who  are  neither  officers  de  juio  nor  de 
facto."  Sanmiis  v.  King,  40  Conn.  298, 1873 

Respecting /('flftZ/iV//  of  an  intruder  to  the 
officer  dejure  for  salary  and  fees  received 
and  when  an  action  will  lie  for  money 
liad  and  received.  Glascock  v.  Lyons,  20 
Ind.  1;  Douglas  v.  State,  31  Ind.  479; 
Dorsey  v.  Smythe,  28  Cal.  21 ;  Stratton  v. 
Oulton,  //).  44;  City  v.  Given,  60  Pa.  St. 
136;  Allen  v.  McKean,  1  Sumn.  276; 
State  V.  Sherwood,  42  Mo.  179 ;  Hunter  y. 
Chandler,  45  Mo.  452 ;  s.  c.  10  Am.  Law 
Reg.  (N.  S.)  440,  and  note;  Boyter  v.  Dods- 
worth,  6  Term  B.  681 ;  Sadler  v.  Evans, 
4  Burr.  1984  ;  People  v.  Miller,  24  Mich. 
458.  The  right  of  set  off'm  respect  of  his 
salary  was  denied  to  a  municipal  officer 
where  it  was  the  duty  of  the  officer  to  de- 
posit all  moneys  received  in  the  treasury, 
and  where  it  was  provided  his  salary  was 
to   be  paid   in  a  specific   manner.     The 


been  kept  out  of  his  office,  and  had  not 
performed  its  duties,  could  not  maintain 
an  action  against  the  city  to  recover  the 
amount  of  fees  accruing  from  the  office. 
Smith  V.  New  York,  37  N.  Y.  518,  1868; 
Saline  Co.  v.  Anderson,  20  Kan.  298 ;  Do- 
lan  V.  Mayor,  68  N.  Y.  279;  Hadley  v. 
Mayor,  33  N.  Y.  603,  607,  per  Denio,  C. 
J.;  Benoit  v.  Wayne  County,  20  Mich. 
176,  Cooley,  J.,  dissenting.  It  has,  how- 
ever, several  times  been  decided  in  Cali- 
fornia that  the  salary  annexed  to  a  public 
office  is  incident  to  the  title  to  the  office, 
and  not  to  its  occupancy  and  exercise, 
and  that  tlie  right  to  compensation  is  not 
affected  by  the  fact  that  an  usurper,  offi- 
cer de  facto,  has  discharged  the  duties  of 
the  office.  Dorsey  v.  Smith,  28  Cal.  21  ; 
Stratton  v.  Oulton,  lb.  44  ;  Carroll  v.  Sie- 
benthaler,  37  lb.  193,  1869;  approved, 
Meagher  v.  County,  5  Nev.  244,  1869 ; 
where  a  city  physician,  who  was  duly 
elected,  but  kept  out  of  his  office  by  the 
prior  incumbent  who  drew  the  salary  for 
some  months,  was  permitted  to  collect 
his  back  salary  from  the  city.  Memphis 
V.  Woodward,  12  Heisk.  499.  See  Peo- 
ple V.  Miller,  24  Mich.  458,  1872  ;  Benoit 
V.  Wayne  County,  supra ;  Philadelphia  v. 
Given,  60  Pa.  St.  136,  per  Thompson,  C.  J. 
Right  of  municipal  officer  to  retain  his 
salary  in  his  own  hands,  denied,  where  it 
was  his  duty  to  pay  all  sums  received  into 
the  treasury.  New  Orleans  u.  Finnerty,  27 
La.  An.  681,  1875 ;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep. 
569,  referred  to  infra,  note. 

The  legal  incumbent  of  a  municipal 
office  rendering  service  is  entitled  to  com- 
pensation until  he  has  actual  notice  of 
his  removal.  Jarvis  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
New  York,  2  N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  396.  As  to 
notice  :  Equity  will  not  ordinarily  enjoin 
the  payment  of  the  salary  to  the  incum- 
bent pending  a  contest ;  the  bill  must 
show  grounds  for  equitable  relief.  Cot- 
ton V.  Price,  50  Ala.  424,  1874 ;  Bruner 
V.  Bryan  (against  interloper),  50  Ala.  523, 
1874;  Field  i;.  Commonwealth,  32  Pa.  St. 
478,  1849  ;  Ramshay,  in  re,  83  Eng.  C. 
L.  174,  1852  ;  Ilcnnen,  in  re,  13  Pet.  230 ; 
Queen   v.   Governors,  etc.,   8  Ad.  &  El. 


260  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  IX. 

poration  in  such  a  sense  as  will  enable  the  corporation,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  statute  giving  the  remedy,  to  recover  damages  against 
such  officers  for  negligence  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duty. 
If  the  corporation  can  recover  at  all  in  such  an  action,  it  can  only 
be  for  want  of  fidelity  and  integrity,  not  for  honest  mistakes. ^ 
To  protect  the  public,  however,  officers  are  usually  required  to 
give  bonds,  in  which  case  they  are,  of  course  liable  as  we  have 
seen,  according  to  the  conditions  thereof.  By  charter,  the  power 
to  ajopoint  policemen  was  conferred,  on  a  board  of  police,  com- 
posed of  the  mayor  and  recorders,  and  this  board  was  authorized 
to  discharge  policemen,  for  cause,  and  to  "  decide  on  all  police 
matters  pertaining  to  appointments,  dismissals,  etc.,  finally  and 
tvithout  appeal.'''  In  an  action  for  wages,  brought  against  the  city 
by  a  policeman,  who  claimed  that  he  had  been  appointed  for  a 
year,  and  dismissed  at  the  end  of  a  month,  without  good  cause, 
the  Supreme  Court  decided  that  the  board  having  dismissed  the 
plaintiff  for  what  it  deemed  sufficient  cause,  its  decision  was  final, 
and  the  sufficiency  of  the  cause  of  dismissal  was  not  inquirable 
into  in  the  action.^ 

§  237.  (176)  In  this  country  the  officers  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions are,  in  many  respects,  public  officers,  being  charged  with  duties 
which  concern  both  the  corporation  and  the  public  at  large.  The 
duties  and  liabilities  of  such  officers  to  the  corporation  fall  within 
the  scope  of  this  treatise,  and  have  been  considered.     But  their 

decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  in  good  faith,  the  corporation  for  which 
United  States,  allowing  equitable  set  off  he  acts  is  bound,  and  cannot  defeat  his 
in  such  cases,  were  distinguished.  New  recovery  for  the  price  of  materials  fur- 
Orleans  V.  Finnerty,  27  La.  An.  681, 1875;  nished  by  evidence  to  show  that  the  re- 
s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  569.  If  the  city  is  lia-  pairs  were  not,  in  fact,  necessary.  But  it 
ble  at  once  to  suit  by  the  officer,  why  would  be  otherwise  if  fraud  or  corruption 
deny  the  right  o(  set  off?  were  shown.  Palmer  v.  Carroll,  4  Fost. 
1  Parish  in  Sherburne  v.  Fiske,  8  Cush.  (24  N.  H.)  314, 1851.  See,  also.  People  v. 
(Mass.)  264,  266,  1851,  opinion  by  Z>ewc^,  Lewis,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  73;  Seaman  v. 
J. ;  cites  White  v.  Philipson,  10  Met.  Patten,  2  Caines  (N.  Y.),  312. 
(Mass.)  108;  Trafton  u.  Alfred,  3  Shepl.  Personal  Uahilitu  of  municipal  councillors 
(15  Me.)  258  ;  Kendall  v.  Stokes,  3  How.  to  the  corporation  for  misappropriation 
87;  Commonwealth  r.  Genther,  17  Serg.  of  its  funds;  see  municipality  of  East 
&  Rawle  (Pa.),  135;  Wilson  v.  Mayor,  Nissouri  v.  Horseman,  16  Upper  Can. 
etc.  of  New  York,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  595  ;  Q.  B.  588.  Of  treasurer  for  paying  money 
Hancock  y.  Hazzard,  12  Cush.(Mass  )  112;  on  an  illegal  order  or  resolution.  Daniels 
Minor  v.  Bank,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  46,  09.  y.  Burford,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  481. 
Where  a  surveyor  of  highways  has,  by  ^  Nolan  v.  New  Orleans,  10  La.  An. 
law,  a  discretion  as  to  the  kind  of  repairs,  106,  1856. 
and  exercises  his  best  judgment  and  acts 


§  237.] 


LIABILITY   OF   OFFICER. 


261 


individual  rights  and  their  liability  to  others,  upon  contracts  and 
for  torts,  are  not,  strictly  speaking,  embraced  in  the  plan  of  the 
work.  It  has,  however,  been  thought  that  a  brief  reference  to 
some  of  the  more  important  rules  and  adjudications  on  this  subject 
was  desirable,  and  this  has  accordingly  been  made  in  the  note.^ 


1  Suits.  —  Public  officers  have,  in 
general,  a  power  to  sue  commensurate  with 
their  duties.  If  officers  of  a  corporate 
body,  suit  should  be  brouglit  in  the  7iame 
of  the  corporation,  unless  the  statute  direct 
Otherwise.  Stock  v.  State,  6  Ind.  113; 
State  V.  Rush,  7  lb.  221 ;  Supervisors  v. 
Stimpson,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  136,  and  cases 
cited;  Todd  v.  Birdsall,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
260,  and  cases  cited  in  note  ;  Jansen  v. 
Ostrander,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  670;  Cornell 
V.  Guilford,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  510;  com- 
pare Commissioners  v.  Perry,  5  Ohio, 
57;  Barney  i;.  Bush,  9  Ala.  345;  Van 
Keuren  v.  Johnson,  3  Denio,  182 ;  Te- 
cumseh  v.  Phillips,  5  Neb.  305,  1877  ; 
Regents  of  State  University  v.  McConnell, 
5  Neb.  423,  1877.  But  it  has  been  held 
that  a  public  officer  cannot,  without  the 
aid  of  a  statute,  maintain  a  suit  in  his 
own  name,  altliough  he  may  have  taken 
a  note  or  contract  to  himself  individually, 
if  the  consideration  for  such  a  note  or  con- 
tract be  a  liability  to  the  state.  The 
ground  of  this  rule  is  public  policy  to  dis- 
courage public  officers  from  transacting 
in  their  own  name  the  business  of  the 
public.  Hunter  v.  Field,  20  Ohio,  840, 
1851;  Irish  v.  Webster,  5  Greenl.  (Me.) 
171;  Gilmore  v.  Pope,  5  Mass.  491.  If 
the  obligation  is  taken  to  the  officer  as 
agent,  or  in  his  official  capacity,  the  action 
is  properly  brouglit  in  tlie  name  of  the 
government  beneficially  interested.  Du- 
gan  V.  United  States,  3  Wheat.  172;  s.  p. 
United  States  v.  Boice,  2  McLean,  3-52 ; 
United  States  v.  Barker,  1  Paine  C.  Ct. 
152 ;  2  Parsons  on  Notes  and  Bills,  451, 
and  other  cases  cited.  An  action  by  a 
public  officer  does  not  abate  by  the  expi- 
ration of  his  term  of  office.  Tiie  suit 
may  be  continued  in  his  name  until  its 
termination,  or,  by  the  practice  in  many 
of  the  states,  his  successor  may  be  sub- 
stituted. Kellar  i;.  Savage,  20  Me.  199, 
1841;  Todd  v.  Bird.sall,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
260  ;  Ilaynes  v.  Covington,  13  Sm.  &  Mar. 
(21  Miss.)  408;  Grant  v.  Fanchcr,  5  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  309;  Colgrove  c.  Breed,  2  Denio 


(N.  Y.),  125;  Manchester  v.  Herrington, 
10  N.  Y.  164 ;  Upton  v.  Starr,  3  Ind.  538. 
Evidence. — Where  the  authority  of 
an  officer  of  a  public  corporation  comes 
incidentally  in  question  in  an  action  in 
which  he  is  not  a  party,  it  is  sufficient  to 
show  that  he  was  an  acting  officer,  and 
the  regularity  of  his  appointment  or  elec- 
tion cannot  be  made  a  question.  Proof 
that  he  is  an  acting  officer  is  prima  facie 
evidence  of  his  election  or  appointment, 
as  well  as  of  his  having  duly  qualified. 
But  if  he  relies  alone  on  proof  of  a  due 
election  or  appointment,  such  election  or 
appointment  must  be  legally  established. 
Pierce  v.  Richardson,  37  N.  H.  306,  1858 ; 
Tucker  v.  Aiken,  7  N.  H.  113;  Johnson 
V.  Wilson,  2  N.  H.  202 ;  Baker  v.  Shep- 
hard,  4  Fost.  (24  N.  H.)  212,  1851,  and 
oases  cited;  Bean  v.  Thompson,  19  N.  H. 
290;  Blake  v.  Sturdevant,  12  N.  H.  573; 
Burgess  v.  Pue,  2  Gill  (Md.),254.  An 
officer,  even  when  justifying,  may  prima 
facie  establish  his  official  character  by 
proof  of  general  reputation,  and  that  he 
acted  as  such  officer.  Johnson  v.  Stead- 
man,  3  Ohio,  94 ;  followed,  Eldred  v. 
Seaton,  5  lb.  215;  Berryman  y.  Wise,  4 
Term  R.  366 ;  Potter  v.  Luther,  6  Johns. 
431 ;  Wilcox  v.  Smith,  5  Wend.  233;  Peo- 
ple V.  McKinney,  10  Mich.  54.  But  it  is 
not  enough  to  show  that  the  officer  was 
acting  officially  in  the  particular  instance 
in  controversy  in  the  case  upon  trial,  and 
in  which  his  authority  is  questioned. 
Hall  V.  Manchester,  39  N.  H.  295,  1859. 
"  The  mere  acting  in  a  public  capacity  is 
sufficient  prima  facie  proof  of  proper 
appointment ;  but  it  is  only  prima  facie 
presumption  and  is  capable  of  being  re- 
butted." Per  Lord  Coleridge,  C.  J.,  in  Re- 
gina  V.  Roberts,  36  Law  Times  Reps.  690, 
1878;  s.  c.  6  Am.  Law  Rep.  414.  An 
acting  officer  is  estopped  to  dispute  the 
validity  of  his  own  appointment  and  elec- 
tion. State  )'.  Sellers,  7  Rich.  Law,  368; 
State  V.  Maybcrry,  3  Strob.  144. 

Acts  and  Declarations  of  officers, 
when  evidence  for  or  against  the  corpo- 


262 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


Amotion  and  Disfranchisement. 

§  238.  (177)    The  elementary  works  treat  of  Amotion   and 
Disfranchisement  together :  indeed,  formerly,  the  important  dis- 


ration.  Mitchell  c.  Rockland,  41  Me.  363 ; 
Jordan  r.  School  District,  38  lb.  18G4; 
Morrell  v.  Dixfield,  30  lb.  157 ;  County  v. 
Simmons,  5  Gilm.  (10  111.)  51G ;  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Ingles,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  037 ; 
Glidden  c.  Unity,  33  N.  II.  577 ;  Toll  Co. 
I'.  Betsworth,  30  Conn.  380;  Barnes  v. 
Pennell,  2  II.  of  L.  Cas.  497.  See  chap- 
ter on  Corporate  Records  and  Documents, 
post.  The  acts  of  the  officers  of  municipal 
corporations  in  the  line  of  their  otficial 
duty,  and  within  the  scope  of  their  au- 
thority, are  binding  upon  the  body  they 
represent;  and  declarations  and  admissions 
accompanying  such  acts  as  part  of  the 
res  gesta,  calculated  to  explain  and  unfold 
their  character,  and  not  narrative  of 
past  transactions,  are  competent  evidence 
against  the  corporation.  To  render  such 
declarations  and  admissions  evidence, 
they  must  accompany  acts,  which  acts 
must  be  of  a  nature  to  bind  the  corporate 
body.  Glidden  v.  Unity,  33  N.  H.  571, 
1856;  Perkins  v.  Railroad  Co.,  44  N.  H. 
223;  Grimes  v.  Keene,  52  N.  H.  330; 
Harpswell  v.  Phippsburg,  29  Me.  313; 
Coffin  V.  Plymouth,  49  N.  H.  173 ;  Hop- 
kinton  v.  Springfield,  12  N.  H.  328 ;  Pitts- 
field  V.  Barnstead,  12  N.  H.  328 ;  Canaan 
V.  Hanover,  49  N.  H.  415 ;  Gray  v.  Rol- 
lingsford,  58  N.  H.  1879 ;  s.  c.  21  Alb. 
L.  Jour.  16. 

Notice. — Where  the  officers  or  agents 
of  a  public  corporation  have  no  powers 
or  duties  with  respect  to  a  given  matter, 
their  individual  knowledge,  or  the  indi- 
vidual knowledge  of  the  inhabitants  or 
voters,  do  not  bind  or  affect  the  corpora- 
tion. Harrington  v.  School  District,  30 
Vt.  155, 18-58  ;  Angell  &  Ames  Corp.  sec. 
2.39 ;  Hayden  v.  Turnpike  Co.,  10  Mass. 
397.  The  mayor  is  chief  executive  offi- 
cer of  the  city,  and  notice  to  him  of  a 
nuisance  is  sufficient,  when  it  would  not 
be  to  the  clerk,  who  is  only  a  recording 
officer,  not  authorized  to  act  upon  the 
notice.  Nichols  v.  Boston,  98  Mass.  39, 
1867  ;    ante,  sees.  208,  209. 

Indictment  of  Public  and  Corpo- 
rate Officers. — "A  public  officer,"  it 
is  declared  in  North  Carolina,  "  entrusted 


with  definite  powers  to  be  exercised  for 
the  benefit  of  the  community,  who  wick- 
edly abuses  or  fraudulently  exceeds  them, 
is  punishable  by  indictment."  State  v. 
Glasgow,  North  Car.  Conf.  R.  186,  187 
(indictment  of  secretary  of  state) ;  State 
V.  Justices,  etc.,  4  Hawks  (North  Car.), 
194  (when  county  authorities  indictable 
for  non-repair  of  juil) ;  see  Paris  v.  Peo- 
ple, 27  111.  74 ;  State  v.  Commrs.  of  Fay- 
ettcville  (non-repair  of  streets),  2  North 
Car.  Law,  617;  //*.  633;  2  Murph.  371. 
But  see  as  to  street  commissioner,  Graf- 
fins  V.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa.  (Penn.  & 
W.)  502  ;  State  v.  Commrs.,  Walk.  (Miss.) 
368.  Indictment  of  municipal  officers  for 
violation  of  charter.  People  v.  Wood,  4 
Park.  Cr.  R.  144;  Hammar  y.  Covington, 
3  Met.  (Ky.)  494;  State  v.  Shelby ville,  4 
Sneed  .(Tenn),  176;  State  v.  Shields,  8 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  151;  Lathrop  v.  State,  6 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  502;  State  i;.  Burlington, 
36  Vt.  521.  Requisites  of  indictment  for 
non-performance  of  official  duty.  Waters 
V.  People,  13  Mich.  446;  State  v.  Mayor, 
11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  217;  Stater.  Commrs., 
2  Dev.  (N.  C.)  345;  3  Chitty  Crim.  Law, 
586,  606,  for  precedents  of  indictments 
against  corporations.  Criminal  informa- 
tion against  municipal  officers.  Willc. 
Corp.  315-318 ;  Rex  v.  Watson,  2  Term 
R.  204 ;  lb.  198.  Indictment  against  mu- 
nicipal corporations.  See  chapter  on  Reme- 
dies against  Illegal  Corporate  Acts,  post, 
sees.  931,  933. 

Liability  for  Moneys  received. — 
A  public  or  municipal  officer,  who  is  re- 
quired to  account  for  and  pay  over  money 
that  comes  into  his  hands,  is  liable, 
thougli  it  be  stolen  without  his  fault,  un- 
less relieved  from  this  responsibility  by 
statute.  Halbert  v.  State,  22  Ind.  125, 
1864;  Muzzy  v.  Shattuck,  1  Denio,  233; 
State  V.  Township,  28  Ind.  86  ;  Hancock 
V.  Hayard,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  112  ;  Clay  Co. 
V.  Simonsen,  1  Dak.  Ter.  403 ;  Egremont  v. 
Benjamin,  125  Mass.  15 ;  State  v.  Lew- 
enthall,  55  Miss.  589 ;  State  v.  Powell,  67 
Mo.  395;  State  v.  Gates,  67  Mo.  139; 
Inglis  V.  State,  61  Ind.  212  ;  United  States 
V.  Prescott,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  678;  Com- 


AMOTION   AND   DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


263 


§  238.] 

tinction  between  the  two  was  not  observed.     Amotion  relates 
alone  to  officers ;  disfranchisement,  to  corporators  or  members  of 


monwealth  v.  Coneley,  4  Pa.  St.  372; 
State  V.  Harper,  6  Ohio  St.  707.  And  a 
direction  to  a  public  officer  (e.  g.  a  county 
treasurer)  how  and  where  to  keep  the 
money  (e.  g.  in  a  safe  provided  by  the 
county),  if  made  by  a  board  or  autliority 
having  no  legal  control  or  power  over  the 
matter,  will  not  be  a  defence  to  such  offi- 
cer if  the  money  is  stolen  from  the  safe. 
Halbert  v.  State,  supra.  It  is  no  defence 
to  a  tax  collector  to  recover  moneys  re- 
ceived by  him,  that  he  received  the 
money  on  account  of  taxes  which  the  leg- 
islature had  no  constitutional  power  to 
impose.  Waters  i'.  States,  1  Gill  (Md.), 
302,  1843;  Thompson  v.  Stickney,  G  Ala. 
579  ;  Evans  v.  Trenton,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J. 
L.)  764.  Treasurer  held  not  entitled  to 
credit  for  money  paid  contractors  upon 
warrants  not  drawn  according  to  the 
charter.  McCormick  v.  Bay  City,  23 
Mich.  457. 

So  under  the  laws  of  Indiana  —  pro- 
viding for  the  issuance  and  sale  of  bonds 
to  complete  water-works,  —  it  is  the  duty 
of  tlie  common  council,  and  not  of  the 
city  treasurer,  to  negotiate  and  sell  such 
bonds  ;  but  he  is  liable  on  his  official  bond 
for  moneys  received  by  him  from  the  sale 
thereof,  by  whomsoever  made.  Such  duty 
cannot  be  delegated  by  the  council,  by 
ordinance  or  otherwise,  to  the  treasurer 
or  any  other  person.  Under  an  ordinance 
designating  the  city  treasurer  by  name  as 
agent  for  the  sale  of  such  bonds,  his  acts 
in  negotiating  such  sales  are  simply  those 
of  an  agent  of  the  common  council;  and 
he  is  not  liable  on  his  official  bond  for  the 
mere  sale,  assignment,  and  delivery  there- 
of by  him  pursuant  to  such  agency.  In 
an  action  on  his  official  bond  for  moneys 
alleged  to  have  been  received  by  him  as 
such  treasurer,  an  answer  that  by  the 
terms  of  the  negotiation,  which  was  ap- 
proved by  the  common  council,  the 
proceeds  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
purchaser,  to  be  used  only  as  needed 
in  constructing  the  water-works,  and  that 
the  purchaser  had  become  insolvent  wliile 
the  funds  yet  remained  in  his  hands, — 
Held,  to  be  sufficient.  In  such  case,  a 
report  by  the  treasurer  to  the  council,  as 
to   the  condition  of  the  fund,  charging 


himself  with  funds  remaining  in  the 
hands  of  the  purchaser,  —  Ueld,  not  to 
estop  him  to  deny  his  liability.  State  v. 
Hauser,  G3  Ind.  155 ;  as  to  liability  for 
misapplication  of  funds,  see  Robinson  v. 
State,  CO  Ind.  26. 

Liability   on    Contracts.  —  Public 
and  municipal  officers  are  not  personally 
liable  on  contracts  within   the  scope  of 
their  authority  and  line  of  duty,  unless  it 
is  very  apparent  that  they  intended  to 
bind  themselves  personally.     Macbeth  v. 
Haldeman,  1  Term  R.  172,  and  Hodgden 
V.  Dexter,  1  Cranch,  145,  are  the  leading 
cases.  The  question  is,  To  whom  was  the 
credit   given?     Did   the   defendant   con- 
tract in  his  public  or  private  capacity? 
See  Olney  v.  Wickes,   18  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
122,  where  the  promise  was  held  not  per- 
sonal.   Compare  King  v.  Butler,  15  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  281  ;  Gill  v.  Brown,  12  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)    385;    Walker  v.  Swartout,  Ih.  444; 
Mott  V.  Hicks,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  513;  Siief- 
field  V.  Watson,  2   Caines   (N.   Y.),  69; 
commented  on,  12  Johns.  448;  Brown  v. 
Rundlett   (full  discussion),  15  N.  H.  360, 
1844,    and    cases    cited    and    criticised ; 
Belknap  t;.  Rheinhart,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
375 ;  Adams  v.  Whittlessey,  3  Conn.  560 ; 
8  lb.  329 ;    Hammarskold  v.   Bull,  et  al. 
("state  capitol  commissioners  ")   11  Rich. 
(South  Car.)  Law,  493;  Lesley  v.  White, 
i   Speers,  31;    Young  v.  Commissioners 
of  Roads,  2   Nott   &  McC.  537  ;   Miller 
V.  Ford,  4  Rich.  (South  Car.)  Law,  376; 
s.  c.  4  Strob.  213  ;   Copes  v.  Mathews,  10 
Sm.  &  Marsh.  (18  Miss.)  398  ;  Tucker  v. 
Shorter,  17  Ga.  620 ;  Hall  v.  Cockrell,  28 
Ala.  507,  1856 ;  but  qmere,  as  to  its  cor- 
rectness.     In    Nickerson    v.    Dyer,    105 
Mass.  320,  the  agents  or  committee  of  a 
town    were   held   not    to    be   personally 
liable.     A  public  officer  contracting  with 
a  party  who  knows  the  extent  of  his  au- 
thority  is   not  personally   liable,  unless 
such  intent  is  clearly  expressed.     Broad- 
well  V.  Chapin,  2  111.  App.  511 ;  post,  ch. 
xiv.     In  the  absence  of  a  jirovision  to  the 
contrary,  an  officer  of  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration is  not  disabled  from  entering  into  a 
contract  with  it.     Municipality  v.  Cald- 
well, 3  Rob.  (La),  368,  1842.      It  is  held 
that  where  the  officei's  of  a  public  or  mu- 


264 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  IX. 


the  corporation.     Amotion,  therefore,  is  the  removal  of  an  officer 
in  a  corporation  from  his  office,  but  it  leaves  him  still  a  member 


nicipal  corporation,  acting  officially,  and 
unilcr  an  innocent  mistake  of  tlie  law,  in 
which  the  other  contracting  party  equally 
participatcil,  with  equal  opportunities  of 
knowledge,  neither  party  at  the  time 
looking  to  personal  liability,  the  officers 
are  not,  in  such  case,  personally  liable,  nor  is 
the  corporation  liable.  Houston  v.  Clay 
County  (unauthorized  contract  by  town- 
ship trustees  for  the  erection  of  a  bridge), 
18  Ind.  396,  1862;  Boardman  v.  llayne, 
29  Iowa,  339,  1870 ;  Duncan  v.  Niles,  32 
111.  532,  1863,  and  cases  cited ;  Ogden  v. 
Raymond,  22  Conn.  379,  1853;  Dameron 
V.  Irwin,  8  Ire.  Law  (N.  C),  421,  1848; 
Hite  V.  Goodman,  1  Uev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  (N. 
C.)  364,  183G;  Ives  v.  Hulet,  12  Vt.  314, 
1840;  Stone  v.  Huggins,  28  lb.  617; 
Tucker  v.  Justices,  13  Ire.  (N.  C.  Law) 
434;  Dey  v.  Lee,  4  Jones  (Law),  238; 
Tucker  v.  Shorter,  17  Ga.  620 ;  Copes  v. 
Mathews,  10  Sm.  &  Marsh.  (18  Miss.) 
398;  Hall  v.  Cockrell,  28  Ala.  507;  com- 
pare Potts  V.  Henderson,  2  Ind.  (Carter) 
327,  1850.  Liability  under  statute  of 
trustees  or  directors  of  public  works  who 
make  unauthorized  contracts.  Higgins  v. 
Livingstone,  4  Dow,  341 ;  Parrott  v.  Eyre, 
10  Bing.  283;  Wilson  v.  Goodman,  4 
Hare,  54. 

Tax  Collector's  Liability  to 
Third  Persons. — Tax  collector  liable 
in  trespass  who  seizes  without  color  of 
law  for  tax  assessment,  or  under  an  un- 
constitutional law.  McCoy  v.  Chillicothe, 
3  Ohio,  370  ;  Ragnet  v.  Wade,  4  lb.  107  ; 
Loomis  I'.  Spencer,  1  Ohio  St.  150.  But 
a  collector  whose  warrant  is  in  due  form, 
with  nothing  on  its  face  to  show  the  ille- 
gality of  the  tax  or  the  want  of  authority 
in  the  assessors  or  previous  officers,  will 
be  protected  in  executing  it,  even  though 
the  tax  be  not  lawfully  assessed.  Che- 
gary  i'.  Jenkins,  1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  37G, 
1861 ;  affirming  s.  c.  3  Sandf  Sup.  Ct.  R. 
409;  Abbott  y.  Yost,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
86  ;  Savacool  v.  Boughton,  5  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  170,  1830,  leading  case ;  Downing  v. 
Rugar,  21  Wend.  178  (warrant  of  justice 
to  overseers  of  poor) ;  Alexander  v.  Hoyt, 
7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  89 ;  Clark  v.  Halleck,  16 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  607  ;  People  v.  Warren, 
6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  440;  Webber  v.  Gray,  24 


Wend.  (N.  Y.)  440;  Loomis  v.  Spencer, 
1  Oliio  St.  153;  Little  v.  Merritt,  10  Pick. 
(Mass.)  547;  sec  Suydam  y.  Keys,  13 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  444;  Gale  v.  Mead,  2 
Denio  (N.  Y.),  160;  lb.  232;  Easton  y. 
Callender,  11  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  90;  Clark 
V.  Norton,  49  N.  Y.  243.  Liability  of  as- 
sessor. Donvin  v.  Strickland,  57  N.  Y. 
492,  1877.  See  cases  cited  in  Herman 
on  E.xecutions  to  this  proposition. 

LiAiHLiTY  OF  Public  Officers  for 
Acts  of  Subordinates.  —  Public  officers 
are  not  liable  for  the  misconduct  or  mal- 
feasance of  such  persons  as  they  are 
obliged  to  employ  ;  the  reason  here  being 
that  the  maxim  of  respondeat  superior  has 
no  application,  there  being  no  freedom  of 
choice  as  to  the  selection  and  control  of 
agents.  Bailey  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  3  Hill  (N. 
Y.),  531,  1842;  affirmed  in  error,  2  Denio, 
433,  1845;  Hall  v.  Smith,  2  Bing.  156; 
Pritchard  v.  Keefer,  53  111.  117;  Hum- 
phreys V.  Mears,  1  Man.  &  Ryl.  187  ;  Bol- 
ton V.  Crowther,  2  Dowl.  &  Ryl.  195 ; 
Harris  v.  Baker,  4  Maule  &  Selw.  27  ; 
Bacheller  v.  Pinkham,  68  Me.  253.  See 
also  Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Salk.  17  ;  Story  on 
Agency.  320,  et  seq. ;  Story  on  Bail.  300, 
302;  Martin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Hill  (N. 
Y),  545,  551;  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Furze,  3 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  612,  618.  City  liable  for 
negligence  in  making  public  improve- 
ments, tiiough  it  let  the  contract  to  a  con- 
tractor who  is  to  perform  it  under  the 
supervision  and  direction  of  the  city.  Chi- 
cago y.  Dermody,  61  III.  431;  Chicago  v. 
Joney,  60  111.  383 ;  see  post,  ch.  xxiii. ; 
Wright  V.  Hoebrook  (full  discussion),  52 
N.  H.  120,  1872;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  12. 

Liability  of  Public  Officers  for 
Acts  Judicial  in  their  Nature.  —  Offi- 
cers are  not  liable  for  honest  errors  or 
mistakes  of  judgment  as  to  acts  within 
the  scope  of  their  authority, juof/c/a/  in 
their  nature,  in  the  absence  of  malice  or 
corruption,  or  statute  imposing  the  lia- 
bility. Ramsey  i-.  Riley,  13  Ohio,  157  ; 
Steward  v.  Southard,  17  lb.  402  ;  Conwell 
y.  Emrie  (road  supervisor),  4  Ind.  200; 
Bartlett  v.  Crozier  (highway  overseer), 
17  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  439;  Freeman  v.  Corn- 
wall (highway  overseer),  10  lb.  470;  Mc- 
Connell   v.  Dewey    (road   supervisor),  6 


§  238.] 


AMOTION  AND   DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


265 


of  the  corporation.     Disfranchisement  is  to  destroy  or  take  away 
the  franchise  or  right  of  being  any  longer  a  miemher  of  the  corpo- 


Neb.  385,  1877  ;  Johnson  v.  Stanley,  1 
Root  (Conn.),  245;  Township  v.  Carey, 

3  Dutch.  (N.  J.  L.)  377;  Waters  v.  AVa- 
terman,  2  Root,  214;  Craig  v.  Burnett,  32 
Ala.  728;  State  v.  Dunnington,  12  Md. 
340;  Commissioners  v.  Nesbitt,  11  Gill  & 
J.  (Md.)  50.  Liability  where  the  officer's 
function  is  quusi  judicial.  Wilkes  v.  Din- 
man,  7  How.  89  (wiiere  the  subject  is 
much  considered,  and  malice  or  wilful 
wrong  held  to  be  essential),  Waldron  v. 
Berry,  51  N  H.  136, 1871.  The  members 
of  a  city  council  are  not  individually 
liable,  in  a  civil  or  criminal  action,  for 
acts  involving  the  e.xercise  of  discretion, 
unless  they  act  corruptly.  Walker  v. 
Hallock.  32  Ind.  239,  1869;  Baker  v. 
State,  27  Ind.  485.  Liability  oi  ministerial 
officer,  charged  by  statute  with  an  abso- 
lute and  certain  duty.  Clark  v.  Miller 
and  cases  cited.  But  see  reference  to  this 
case,  cited  by  Miller,  J.,  in  Dow  v.  Hum- 
bert, 91  U.  S.  294,  302,  1875.  Public  duty, 
not  ordinarily  enforceable  by  private 
action  against  the  officer,  unless  given  by 
statute.  Foster  v.  McKibben,  14  Pa.  St. 
168;  McConnell  v.  Dewey  (road  supervis- 
or), 5  Neb.  385,  1877.  Misapplication  of 
public  funds  by  officer.  Townsliip,  etc.  i'. 
Linn,  36  Pa.  St.  431.  Neglect  to  take  a 
bond  required  by  law.  Boggs  v.  Hamilton, 
2  Const.  (So."  Car.)  R."  381 ;  State  r. 
Dunnington,  12  Md.  340.  A  municipal 
officer  misled  into  issuing  order  not  liable 
to  the  holder.  Boardman  v.  Hayne,  29 
Iowa,  339. 

Liability  for  Torts.  —  Alvord  r. 
Barrett  (town  clerk),  16  Wis.  175;  Amer- 
ican Print  Works  v.  Lawrence,  3  Zabr. 
(23  N.  J.  L.)  590,  GOl.  No  liability  for  acts 
done  by  a  public  officer  under  lawful  au- 
thority and  in  a  proper  manner.  lb.  Full 
discussion  and  cases  cited  by  Carpenter, 
J.  s.  p.  in  s.  c.  1  Zabr.  (21  N.  J.  L.)  248, 
260,  per  Green,  C.  J.  ;  Caldins  v.  Baldwin, 

4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  007,  and  cases  cited. 
How  far  protected  by  an  unconstitutional 
statute.  lb.  Liability  for  nonfeasance  or 
misfeasance,  where  the  duty  is  specific, 
imperative,  and  not  judicial,  in  its  nature. 
Griffith  V.  Follett,  20  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  630, 
1855;  Weaver  c.  Devendorf,  3  Denio  (N. 
T.),  117;  Harmon  i\  Brotherson,  1  Denio 


(N.  Y.),  537;  lb.  595;  Adsit  v.  Brady,  4 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  630,  1843.  The  principle  on 
which  a  public  officer  is  held  personally 
liable  for  injuries  resulting  from  improp- 
er e.xecution  of  official  duties  is  well 
stated  in  Nowell  v.  Wright,  3  Allen 
(Mass.),  166.  In  Amy  v.  Supervisors,  11 
■  Wall.  136, 1870,  where  county  supervisors 
were  held  to  be  personally  liable  for  fail- 
ing to  levy  a  tax,  as  commanded  by  the 
court,  to  pay  the  plaintiii's  judgment. 
Mr.  Justice  Swai/ne,  stating  the  principle  of 
tlie  decision,  says  :  "  The  rule  is  well  set- 
tled, that  where  the  law  requires  abso- 
lutely a  ministerial  act  to  be  done  by  a 
public  officer,  and  he  neglects  or  refuses 
to  do  such  act,  he  may  be  compelled  to  re- 
spond in  damages  to  the  extent  of  the  in- 
jury arising  from  his  conduct;  mistake  of 
duty  and  honest  intentions  will  not  excuse 
the  offender."  Measure  of  damages.  Dow 
V.  Humbert,  91  U.  S.  294,  1875.  Liability 
for  fraud.  Oakland  v.  Carpenter,  13  Cal. 
540;  ante,  sec.  208,  n.;  ;jos<,  sec.  910,  n.  A 
minislei-iul  officer,  acting  in  good  faith,  is  lia- 
ble for  actual,  but  not  for  exemplary  dam- 
ages, for  illegal  acts  injurious  to  private 
persons.  Tracy  v.  Swartout,  10  Pet.  (U. 
S.)  80,  1836  (action  against  collector  of 
customs);  lb.  137;  Jenner  v.  Joliffe,  9 
Johns.  382.  As  no  one  is  bound  by  an 
unauthorized  ordinance,  the  municipal 
authorities  enacting  the  same  are  not  in- 
dividuall}'  liable  therefor.  So  held,  in  ac- 
tion by  an  ex-mayor  against  aldermen  for 
depriving  him  of  his  office.  Jones  v.  Lov- 
ing, 55  Miss.  109.  A  provision  of  law 
making  a  civil  corporation  liable  "  for 
the  illegal  doings  and  defaults "  of  its 
officers  (there  being  no  provision  that 
the  officers  shall  not  also  remain  liable) 
does  not  deprive  the  party  injured  of  his 
right  to  proceed  persona Ily  against  the 
officer  or  agent  who  committed  the  injury. 
Both  are  liable.  Rounds  v.  Mansfield,  38 
Me.  (3  Heatli)  586,  1854.  Election  offi- 
cers for  refusing  vote  when  liable.  Gor- 
don V.  Farrer,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  411 ;  Carter 
11.  Harrison,  5  Blackf.  138;  Jeffries  v.  An- 
keny,  11  Ohio,  374  ;  compare  Ramsey  u. 
Riley,  13  Ohio,  157.  See  Jenkins  v.  Wal- 
dron, 11  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  114;  Lincoln  v. 
Hapgood,   11  Mass.  350;  Bridge  v.  Lin- 


2G6  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CU.  IX. 

rivtion.^  American  municipal  corporations  are,  in  many  respects, 
essentially  different  iu  their  constitution  from  the  old  English 
municipal  corporations,  under  which  most  of  the  cases  on  the 
subject  of  Amotion  and  Disfranchisement,  usually  cited  in  the 
books,  arose.  These  cases  are  often  inapplicable  here,  and  should, 
it  is  believed  by  the  author,  be  followed  by  our  courts  as  preced- 
ents with  unusual  caution,  and  only  when  they  rest  upon  or 
declare  principles  general  in  their  nature,  and  which  embrace  in 
their  operations  municipal  institutions  possessing  the  distinctive 
characteristics  of  ours.  Here,  the  inhabitants  of  the  municipalit}' 
are  the  corporators ;  certain  of  those  inhabitants  (usually  all  of 
the  adult  male  residents)  have  the  right  to  elect  the  legislative 
or  governing  body,  and  also,  frequently',  the  other  more  impor- 
tant officers  of  the  corporation.  It  would  seem  that  the  English 
doctrine  of  disfranchisemetit  of  a  corporator  or  member  has  no 
application  to  our  municipal  corporations,  whether  the  corporator 
be  considered  the  "  inhabitant  "  or  the  "  voter." 

§  239.  (178)  Whether  the  power  of  disfranchisement  be  inci- 
dental to  the  corporation,  or  must  be  expresaly  cotiferred,  respect- 
ing which  there  is  in  England  some  contrariety  of  view,^  we  need 
not  inquire,  for  here  (were  there  no  constitutional  obstacles)  the 

coin,  14  lb,  367.     Collection   and  revenue  denies  tliat  it  is  an  incidental  right,  and 

officers  not  liable  to  the  party  paying  for  claims   tliat   the   rule   laid  down  in  the 

money  voluntarily  paid  to  them.     EUiott  second  resolution  (Bagg's  Case)  on  this 

V.  Swartout,  10  Pet.  137, 1836;  Thompson  point,  —  that  "no  freeman  of  any  corpo- 

V.  Stickney,  G  Ala.  579.     When  liable  in  ration  can  be  disfranciiised  by  the  corpo- 

trespass.     McCoy  ?;.  Chillicotlie,  3  Ohio,  ration,  unless  they  have  authority  to  do  so 

370;  Loomis  v.  Spencer,  1  Ohio  St.  153.  by  the  express  words  of  the  charter,  or  by 

Recordinq  officer.     Ramsey   v.   Riley,    13  prescription," — is  tlie  law.     Mr,  Glover 

Ohio,  157  ;  approved,  Stewart  v.  South-  simply  adopts  Mr.   Willcock's  language, 

ard,  17  lb.  402.  Glover,  335.    Mr.  Kyd's  exposition  of  the 

1  2Kyd,  50-94;  Willc.  245-276 ;  Glov-  second  resolution  in  Bagg's  Case,  2  Kyd, 
er,  ch.  xvi.  pp.  327-328;  Grant,  250,  52.  And  see  leading  case  of  Rex  r.  Rich- 
263.  And  see  2  Kent  Com.  278,  297,  ardson,  1  Burr.  517,  which  was  a  case  of 
where  amotion  and  disfranchisement  are  amotion,  but  has  been  often  taken  as 
used  as  convertible  terms.  Angell  &  asserting  an  incidental  power  to  disfran- 
Ames,  Corp.  ch.  xii.,  where  the  cases  chise  for  cause  as  well  as  amove.  Angell 
are  very  fully  collected,  and  the  doctrine  &  Ames,  sees.  408,  409 ;  see,  generally, 
of  the  English  decisions  satisfactorily  pre-  Commonwealth  v.  St.  Patrick's  Society,  2 
sented.  Binn.    (Pa.)   448,  1810;  Evans  v.  Phila- 

2  Grant,  263.  "This  right  [of  disfran-  delphia  Club,  50  Pa.  St.  107;  Hopkinson 
chisement]  has  been  but  sparingly  exer-  v.  Marquis  of  Exeter,  Law  Rep.  5  Eq.  63  ; 
cised,  though  it  is  undoubtedly  an  incident  State  v.  Georgia  Med.  Soc,  38  Ga.  608 ; 
to  every  corporation,  with,  perhaps,  some  s.  c.  8  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  533,  Mr. 
exceptions  in  cases  of  trading  and  mono-  Mitchell's  note. 

tary  bodies."    lb.  Willcock  (271,  pi.  70'j) 


§  240.]  AMOTION  AND   DISFRANCHISEMENT.  267 

legislature  never  bestows  upon  the  council,  or  governing  body 
which  represents  the  corporation,  the  right  to  disfranchise  the 
citizen  or  corporator ;  and  it  is  clear  that  such  a  formidable  and 
extraordinary  authority  does  not  exist,  and  cannot  be  exercised 
by  the  council,  as  an  incidental  or  implied  riglit.  To  burn  or 
destroy  the  charters  of  the  corporation,  or  wilfully  to  falsify  its 
books,  were  in  England  considered  such  breaches  of  duty  on  the 
part  of  a  corporator  as  would  work  a  forfeiture  of  the  corporate 
character,^  there  being,  according  to  Lord  Coke^  "  a  tacit  condi- 
tion annexed  to  the  franchise,  which,  if  he  break,  he  may  be 
disfranchised."  2  Surely,  there  is  here  no  sucli  tacit  condition 
annexed  to  the  right  of  a  resident  of  a  municipality  to  be  and 
remain  a  corporator,  though  there  may  be  a  similar  condition 
annexed  to  municipal  offices.  Wilfully  to  destroy  or  falsify  the 
charter  or  books  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  an  act  which  is 
punishable  by  the  criminal  codes  of  the  different  states ;  and  if 
the  offender  is  convicted  and  imprisoned,  it  ma}'  result  as  an 
incident  of  such  conviction  that  he  will  cease,  for  the  time,  to  be 
a  resident,  and  hence  will  cease  to  be  a  member  of  the  corpora- 
tion ;  but  the  corporation  itself  has  no  power  to  disfranchise  him, 
that  is,  to  deprive  him  of  the  privileges  and  rights,  without  absolv- 
ing him  from  the  liabilities  of  other  citizens,  while  he  remains 
within  the  limits  of  the  municipality. 

§  240.  (179)  The  power  to  amove  a  corporate  officer  from  his 
office,  for  reasonable  and  just  cause,  is  one  of  the  common  law 
incidents  of  all  corporations.^  This  doctrine,  though  declared 
before,^  has  been  considered  as  settled  ever  since  Lord  Mansfield's 
judgment  in  the  Avell  known  case  of  the  King  v.  Richardson.^ 

'  Mayor  i;.  Pilkinton,  1  Ksb.  597;  Rex  bury,  1  Queen's  Bench,  751 ;  2  Kyd,  50- 

V.   Chalke,  5  Mod.  257 ;  1   Lord  Raym.  94,   where   the   old   cases   are   digested  ; 

22G ;  Grant  Corp.  205.  Glover,  ch.  xvi. ;  Willc.  240 ;  Grant,  240 ; 

2  13  Coke,  98a.  Angell  &  Ames,  ch.  xii. ;  2  Kent  Com. 

3  Rex  V.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517  ;  Rex  297. 

i;.  Liverpool,  2  Burr.  723;  Rex  v.  Don-  «  Lord  Bruce's  Case,  2  Stra.  819,  820; 

caster,  2  Burr.  738;  Jay's  Case,  1  Vent.  Tidderley's   Case,    1    Sid.    14,  per  Hale, 

302  ;  Lord  Bruce's  Case,  2  Stra.  819  ;  Rex  C.  B. 

V.  Ponsonby,    1  Ves.  Jr.  1 ;  Rex    v.  Lyme  ^  Rex  v.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517.     "  It 

Regis,  Doug.  153 ;  Rex  v.  Tidderley,  1  Sid.  is  necessary  to  the  good  order  and  govern- 

14,  per  Hale,  C.  B. ;  Rex  v.  Taylor,  3  Salk.  niont  of  corporate  bodies  that  there  should 

231  ;'l  Roll.  Rep.  409;  s.  c.  3  Bulst.  189;  be  such  power  [amotion],  as  much  as  the 

Rex  u.  Chalke,  1  Lord  Raym.  225;  Rex  power  of  making  by-laws."    lb. 
V.  Heaven,  2  Term  R.  772 ;  Reg.  v.  New- 


268  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IX. 

It  is  there  denied  that  there  can  be  no  power  of  amotion  unless 
given  b}^  charter  or  prescription  ;  and  the  contrary  doctrine  is 
asserted,  —  that  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  from  the  nature  of 
corjiorations,  and  for  the  sake  of  order  and  government,  the 
power  is  incidentaL 

§  241.  (180)  But  the  power  to  amove,  hke  every  other  inci- 
dental power,  is  incident  to  the  corporation  at  large,  and  not  to 
any  select  body  or  particular  part  of  it,  and  unless  delegated  to 
a  select  body  or  part,  it  must  be  exercised  by  the  whole  corpora- 
tion, and  at  a  corporate  assembly  regularly  and  duly  convened.^ 
The  power  to  hold  such  an  assembly  is,  however,  implied  in  the 
power  of  amotion.^ 

§  242.  (181)  By  the  corporation  at  large,  as  here  used,  is  meant 
the  different  ranks  and  orders  which  compose  it,  including  the 
definite  and  indefinite  bodies.  The  essentials  in  such  a  corpora- 
tion of  a  valid  corporate  assembly  have  elsewhere  been  described. 
Our  corporations,  however,  have  no  ranks,  orders,  or  integral 
parts  corresponding  strictly  to  the  constitution  of  an  old  English 
corporation.  Here  the  common  council,  or  the  elective  govern- 
ing body  (whatever  name  be  given  to  it),  exercises  all  of  the 
powers  of  the  incorporated  place.  Has  the  council,  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  corporation,  the  incidental  powers  of  a  corpora- 
tion, such  as  the  power  to  amove,  or  the  power  to  ordain  by-laws  ? 
Or  is  the  council  in  the  nature  of  a  select  body,  possessing  no 
right  to  exercise  any  of  the  ordinary  incidental  powers  of  the 
corporation,  unless  expressly  authorized  by  charter  or  legislative 
grant?  The  question  not  being  judicially  settled  as  to  our  muni- 
cipal corporations,  the  opinion  is  ventured  that,  in  the  absence  of 
an  express  grant  or  statute  conferring  or  limiting  the  power,  the 

1  Lord  Bruce's  Case,  2  Stra.  819 ;  by  cliarter,  it  belongs  to  the  corporation 
Rex  V.  Lyme  Regis,  Doug.  153 ;  Rex  at  large.  Lord  Mansfield  seemed  to  be 
V.  Richardson,  supra  ;  Rex  v.  Doncaster,  of  opinion  that  it  was  competent  to  trans- 
Say.  38;  Rex  v.  Taylor,  8  Salk.  231 ;  Rex  fer  this  power  from  the  whole  body  to  a 
V.  Feversham,  8  T.  R.  356 ;  Fane's  Case,  select  body  by  an  ordinance  or  by-law. 
Doug.  153;  Willc.  246,  pi.  620;  Grant,  Bagg's  Case,  11  Co.  99a,-  Rex  v.  Rich- 
240,241;  2  Kyd,  56;  Glover,  .329;  State  ardson,  1  Burr.  539.  But  this  question 
Jj.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  536,  1856.  seems  not  to  have  been  directly  deter- 
Even  if  the  right  to  elect  an  officer  be  in  mined.  Willc.  247,  pi.  634  ;  Ih.  248,  pi.  635 ; 
a  particular  person  or  select  class,  the  State  y.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  536. 
power  to  amove  is  not  incidental  to  it,  -  Fane's  Case,  Doug.  153  ;  Rex  v. 
but  unless  expressly  changed  or  lin)itv.'d  Lj'me  Regis,  2b.  149, 


§  243.] 


AMOTION   AND    DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


269 


common  council  of  one  of  our  ordinary  municipal  corporations,  in 
the  absence  of  any  express  or  implied  restriction  in  the  charter, 
does  possess  the  incidental  power,  not  only  to  make  by-laws,  but, 
for  cause,  to  expel  its  members,  and,  for  cause,  to  remove  corpo- 
rate of&cers,  whether  elected  by  it  or  by  the  people. 

§  243.  Whatever  necessity  or  reason  exists  for  the  right  of 
amotion  at  common  law,  with  respect  to  the  corporation  at  large, 
exists  here  with  respect  to  that  authorized  body  by  which  alone 
the  corporation  acts,  and  which  exercises  all  its  powers  and 
functions.  All  of  the  inhabitants  cannot  meet  and  act  in  their 
primary  capacity,  except  in  organizations  like  the  towns  in  the 
New  England  states ;  and  if  the  right  of  amotion  exists  at  all,  it 
must  be  exercised  by  the  council  or  governing  body  of  the  cor- 
poration. If  it  does  not  exist  in  the  council,  it  cannot  be  dele- 
gated to  it  by  an  ordinance  or  by  any  act  of  the  corporation, 
though  if  the  right  does  exist,  its  exercise  may,  of  course,  he 
regulated  by  ordinance  or  by-law.^ 


1  See,  generally,  Willard's  Appeal,  4 
Rh.  Is.  597 ;  State,  etc.  v.  Trustees,  etc., 

5  Ind.  89 ;  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  II. 
p.  414;  Commonwealth  v.  St.  Patrick's 
Society,  2  Binn.  (Pa.)  448;  Common- 
wealth V.  Bussier,  5  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.), 
451 ;  Commonwealtli  v.   Guardians,  etc., 

6  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  4G9;  Common- 
wealth V.  Sutherland,  3  Serg.  &  Rawle 
(Pa.),  145;  Johns  v.  NichoUs,  2  Dall.  184; 
1  Yeates,  80 ;  People  i:  Comptroller,  etc., 
20  Wend.  (N.  Y.),  595;  State,  etc.  v. 
Lingo,  26  Mo.  496;  Fawcett  v.  Charles, 
13  Wend.  473 ;  Hoboken  i-.  Gear,  3  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  205;  People  v.  Board  of  Trade, 
45  111.  112,  18G7;  Neall  v.  Hill,  16  Cal. 
145;  State  v.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  20 
Wis.  63;  People  v.  Medical  Society,  24 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  570;  Evans  y.  Philadelphia 
Club,  50  Pa.  St.  107;  State  v.  Georgia 
Medical  Society,  38  Ga.  608 ;  a.  c.  8  Am. 
Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  533,  and  note;  Smith 
V.  Smith,  3  Desaus.  557.  But  see  State 
V.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  536, 
in  which  the  power  to  expel  a  member 
of  the  council  was  expressly  conferred, 
but  wiierc  Mr.  Justice  Potts,  delivering 
the  opinion  of  the  court,  says:  "  Tlie 
rule  is  well  settled,  that  a  corpora- 
tion  has,  at  common   law,   an   inherent 


jurisdiction  to  expel  a  member  for  suf- 
ficient cause."  After  noticing  the  of- 
fences which  will  justify  expulsion,  he 
adds  :  "  But  the  jurisdiction  in  this  case 
is  not  derived  from  the  common  law. 
The  common  council  is  not  the  corpora- 
tion, and,  whatever  powers  a  municipal 
corporation  may  have  to  amove  or  expel 
a  member  at  common  law,  it  is  clear  that 
the  corporation  itself  has  not,  by  any  by- 
law, delegated  any  of  them  to  the  com- 
mon council,  and  that  body,  therefore, 
cannot  avail  itself  of  the  common  law 
jurisdiction,  vested  as  an  inherent  right 
in  the  corporation  itself,  to  expel  a  mem- 
ber of  their  own  body.  2  Bac.  Abr.  21, 
title  Corporations ;  Wilic.  on  Corp.  629. 
The  council  derives  its  jurisdiction  from 
the  charter  of  the  corporation."  This 
case  rules  that  where,  in  express  terms, 
the  right  of  the  council  to  expel  a  mem- 
ber for  certain  causes  is  given,  it  cannot 
exercise  the  power  for  any  other  cause. 
And  it  would  seem  to  be  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  or  at  least  of  the  judge  de- 
livering the  opinion,  that  the  common 
law  power  of  expulsion  l)elonging  to  a 
corporation  could  not  be  exercised  by  tlie 
common  council,  that  body  not  being  the 
corporation  in  which  the  power  is  vested. 


270 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[ClI.  IX. 


"  §  244.  (182)  A  provision  in  a  city  charter  vesting  the  board 
'  of  aldonnou  with  the  sole  power  to  try  all  imiJeachments  of  city 
officers,  the  judgment  only  extending  to  removal  and  disquali- 
fication to  hold  any  corporate  office  under  the  charter,  is  not 
unconstitutional  as  authoiizing  the  exercise  of  judicial  powers 
by  a  legislative  or  municipal  body,  but  is  rather  the  exercise 
of  a  power  necessary  for  its  police  and  good  administration.^ 

§  245.  (183)  When  the  terms  under  which  the  power  of 
amotion  is  to  be  exercised  are  prescribed,  they  must  be  pursued 
tvith  strictness}  Whether,  if  the  power  to  expel  or  remove  be 
given  for  certain  causes,  this  excludes  the  right  to  exercise  the 
power  in  any  other  case,  will  depend  upon  the  intent  of  the 
legislature  to  be  gathered  from  a  consideration  of  the  whole 
charter  or  statute.  Power  to  appoint  "  subject  to  removal  only 
for,"  etc.,  clearly  limits  the  power  of  removal  to  the  specified 
causes.^  Express  power  of  expulsion  or  removal  for  specified 
reasons  was,  in  New  Jersey  and  in  Georgia,  considered  to  exclude 
any  implied  power,  or  to  limit  the  right  to  the  enumerated 
causes.* 


Same  principle  as  to  private  corporations. 
State  V.  Chamber  of  Commerce,  20  Wis. 
72.  Compare  People  v.  Board  of  Trade, 
45  III.  113. 

1  State  V.  Ramos,  10  La.  An.  420.  See 
People  V.  Bearfield,  35  Barb.  N.  Y.  254, 
supra,  sec.  200.  A  board  of  aldermen, 
sitting  in  a  judicial  capacity  as  a  court  of 
impeachment  to  try  charges  preferred 
against  a  city  officer  by  another  branch 
of  the  municipal  governing  body,  is  a 
court  of  limited  jurisdiction,  and  if  not 
sworn,  or  not  sworn  by  an  officer  au- 
thorized to  administer  oaths,  their  pro- 
ceedings and  judgment  of  guilty  are  void, 
and  create  no  vacancy.  Tompert  v.  Lith- 
gow,  1  Bush  (Ky.),  176,  1866.  See  Had- 
ley  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  33  N.  Y.  603,  cited  in- 
fra, sec.  253,  note. 

2  State  I'.  Lingo,  26  Mo.  (5  Jones)  496  ; 
State  V.  Trustees  of  University,  5  Ind.  77, 
89,  1854;  State  v.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  11. 
p. 414;  State  v.  Chamber  of  Commerce, 
20  Wis.  63;  Regina  v.  Sutton,  10  Mod. 
76;  Paston  u.  Urber,  Hutt.  103;  Regina 
('.  Ricketts,  7  Ad.  &  El.  966 ;  Regina  v. 
Oxford,  6  Ad.  &  El.  349  ;  Commonwealth 


V.  Sutherland,  .3  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  145 ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Shaver,  3  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  338.  In  the  Queen  v.  Sutton,  supra, 
so  strictly  was  a  clause  in  a  charter  con- 
ferring the  right  of  removal  construed, 
that  it  was  held  that  where  acts  were  to 
be  done  by  a  majority,  that  word  was  to 
be  understood  as  a  majority  of  the  whole 
corporation,  and  that  if  the  officer  whose 
removal  was  proposed  was  a  member,  it 
could  be  effected  only  by  a  majority  of  all 
the  members,  including  himself,  and  that 
his  personal  interest  did  not  exclude  him 
from  voting  as  a  member  upon  the  ques- 
tion. See,  also.  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  536 ;  Madison  v.  Korbly, 
32  Ind.  74 ;  State  v.  McGarry,  21  Wis. 
496,  where  "other  cause"  for  removal 
was  held  to  mean  "  other  like  cause." 

3  People  V.  Higgins,  15  111.  110. 

4  State  V.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N. 
J.)  536,  1856;  The  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Shaw, 
16  Ga.  172,  1854.  See  s.  c.  19  lb.  468;  21 
lb.  280 ;  25  lb.  590.  But  see  Common- 
wealth V.  St.  Patrick's  Society,  2  Binn. 
(Pa.)  441;  4  76.  448;  Angell  &  Ames, 
sec.  415.     Under  the  Illinois  statute,  it  is 


§  247.]  AMOTION   AND   DISFKANCHISEMENT.  271 

§  246.  (184)  A  charter  of  a  municipal  corporation  gave  to  the 
common  council  express  power  to  "  expel  a  member  for  disorderly 
conduct,""  and  one  of  the  aldermen,  being  guilty  of  official  cor- 
ruption in  receiving  bribes,  was,  after  a  hearing,  expelled  from 
the  council.  The  court  was  of  opinion  that  the  question  as  to 
the  right  to  expel  for  the  conduct  charged  depended  upon  the 
construction  of  the  words  "disorderly  conduct";  and  it  held  that 
receiving  bribes  for  his  official  influence  and  votes  was  disorderly 
conduct^  within  the  meaning  of  the  charter.^  In  another  case, 
the  charter  authorized  the  council  "  to  dismiss  the  marshal  for 
malpractice  in  office,  or  neglect  of  duty";  and  it  was  held  that 
the  council  could  not  remove  this  officer  for  the  crime  of  gambling, 
as  this  was  neither  malpractice  in  office  nor  official  neglect, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  charter.^ 

§  247.  (185)  The  power  to  expel  a  member  of  the  council 
does  not  authorize  a  resolution  by  it  that  "  the  president  of  the 
council  be  directed  not  to  appoint  a  certain  member  on  any  com- 
mittee, nor  call  his  name,  nor  allow  him  to  take  part  in  the 
action  of  the  board,"  since  this  would  create  no  vacancy  which 
could  be  supplied,  but  would  leave  the  seat  occupied,  while  it 
silenced  the  occupant,  and  left  his  constituents  unrepresented.^ 

held  that  the  county  authorities  do  not  the  colonial  parliament  of  Dominica  had 

possess  general  powers  of  removal,  and  not  the  inherent  privilege  of  parliament 

that    they   cannot    remove    a    treasurer  as  a  court,  and  could  not  therefore  punish 

elected  by  the  people,  except  for  causes  for  contempt ;  but   in  the   later  case  of 

specified  in   the  statute ;  but  it  may  be  Tlie  Speaker  v.  Glass,  3  Ih.  560,  it  was 

observed  that  a  county  treasurer  is  not  a  decided  that  the  delegation  of  legislative 

corporate  officer.     Clark  v.  The  People,  authority  to  the  Victoria  parliament  was 

15  111.213,185.3.     So  a  power  of  removal  broad    enough    to    include    this   power, 

conferred  upon  the  mayor  and  common  These  cases  afford  very  interesting  illus- 

council  cannot  be  exercised  by  the  coun-  trations  of  the  nature  of  the  power  to 

oil  a/one.     Charles  i'.  Hoboken,  3   Dutch,  punish  for  contempt.     Power  of  courts  of 

(N.  J.)  203.  the  United  States  to  punish  for  contempt. 

1  State  V.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  Burr's   Trial,   355 ;  U.    S.   v.  .Hudson,   7 
J.)  53G,  1856.  Cranch,  32 ;  Kearney,  in  re,  7  Wheat.  38. 

2  Mayor  v.   Shaw,  etc.,  IG   Ga.    172,  Power  of  Congress.     11  U.   S.  Stats,  at 
1854.  Large,  155;  12  lb.  333. 

Whether  the    council    possesses    the  ^  State  t;.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  .7.) 

power  to  punish  for  contempt  depends  upon  536, 1856.     See  State  v.  Cliamber  of  Com- 

the  provisions  of  the  charter.     The  power  mcrce,  20  Wis.  72.     Whctlier,   pending 

must,  as  the  author  conceives,  be  con-  proceedings   to  expel,  a  meitiber  can  be 

ferred  either  expressly  or  as  incidental  to  suspended  from  his  dutie.«,  was  a  question 

some  power  which  is  conferred,  or  it  will  not  determined  in  tlu'  case;  but  in   the 

not  exist.     In  Doyle  v.  Falconer,  1  Privy  State,  etc.  v.  Lingo,  26  Mo.  496,  1858,  it 

Council  Appeals,  329,  it  was  held  that  was  held  that  the  power  to  provide  for 


272 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


§  248.  (18G)  The  expulsion  of  a  member  of  the  common 
council  does  not  dUqualifij  him  from  being  re-elected  to  the  same 
oflBce,  unless  it  is  expressly  so  provided  by  the  charter ;  for 
where  the  law  annexes  a  disqualification  to  an  offence,  it  does  so 
in  terms.  Hence,  if  a  member  having  been  expelled,  even  for 
bribery,  be  re-elected,  he  cannot  be  expelled  a  second  time  for 
the  same  identical  act  for  which  he  had  before  been  expelled. ^ 

§  249.  (187)  It  was  held  in  a  case  in  Rhode  Island  that  q, 
clerk  of  a  scliool  committee  —  an  officer  created  by  the  school  law, 
and  necessary  to  the  organization  and  legal  action  of  the  com- 
mittee—  may,  after  an  election  by  the  committee,  be  removed 
from  office  by  the  committee,  but  only  for  cause,  as  the  statute 
gives  no  express  power  to  remove,  and  after  due  notice  and 
opportunity  given  him  to  defend  himself  upon  the  charges  pre- 
sented.2 


removing  from  office  corporate  officers 
gives  tlie  power  to  susjjeiid  from  office 
during  tlie  investigation  of  tlie  cliarges 
for  whicli  tlie  suspension  was  made.  The 
court  say,  "  The  power  to  remove  necessa- 
rily includes  the  minor  i^ower  to  suspend." 
lb.  499. 

The  charter  of  a  city  empowered  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  for  sufficient  cause 
to  remove  constables  and  police  officers. 
By  a  vote  of  the  mayor  and  aldermen, 
the  plaintiff,  a  constable  and  police  offi- 
cer, was  "  suspended  from  duty  on  the 
police,"  and  from  that  time  was  not  per- 
mitted to  perform  the  duties  of  the  office, 
although  he  was  ready  and  otfered  to  do  so, 
until  he  was  afterwards  reinstated.  It 
was  held  that  he  could  not  recover  for 
services  during  the  period  of  his  suspen- 
sion. Ladd,  J.,  says,  "  It  does  not  seem 
to  require  argument  to  show  that  the 
power  to  remove  must  include  the  power 
to  suspend."  Shannon  v.  Portsmouth, 
54  N.  H.  183,  1874  ;  Westberry  v.  Kansas 
City,  64  Mo.  493,  1877;  Wayne  Co.  v. 
Benoit,  20  Mich.  170;  Attorney  General 
V.  Davis,  44  Mo.  131 ;  Primm  v.  Caron- 
delet,  23  Mo.  22. 

Kelator  was  removed  from  the  office 
of  policeman  of  the  city  of  New  York,  by 
the  board  of  police,  under  the  charge  of 
"  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer,"  this 
being  one  of  the  offences  for  which,  under 


the  statute,  a  policeman  can  be  removed. 
The  specifications  were  that  he  was  ap- 
pointed policeman  contrary  to  law  when 
he  was  more  than  thirty  years  of  age, 
and  that  he  liad  been  appointed  after  hav- 
ing resigned  from  the  force  without  a 
vote  by  yeas  and  nays  contrary  to  the 
requirements  of  law.  It  was  held  that 
these  specifications  had  only  reference  to 
relator's  title  to  the  office  and  not  to  his 
conduct  while  an  officer,  and  did  not  au- 
thorize the  removal.  People  ex  rel.  Clapp 
V.  Board  of  Police,  72  N.  Y.  445,  1878. 
Reported  below,  5  Hun,  457. 

1  State  V.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
536,  1856.  If  the  common  council,  with- 
out authority,  suspend  a  member  from 
the  duties  of  his  office,  mandamus  is  a 
proper  remedy  to  restore  him  to  the  exer- 
cise of  his  legal  rights.  Ih. ;  Willc.  on 
Municipal  Corporations,  368,  pi.  74,  75; 
//).  377,  pi.  96;  3  Black.  Com.  110;  Rex 
V.  Barker,  2  Burr.  1206 ;  Angell  &  Ames 
on  Corporations,  sees.  702,  706. 

2  Willard's  Appeal.  4  Rh.  Is.  595,  597, 
per  Ames,  C.  J.,  who  says,  "  Such  a  power 
with  regard  to  such  an  officer,  unless  ex- 
pressly forbidden  by  law,  is  incidental  to 
the  committee  as  necessary  to  enable  it 
duly  to  perform  its  functions."  Ih.  p.  601. 
It  is  sufficient  cause  for  the  removal  of 
such  a  clerk  that  he  refuses  to  produce 
papers  which  belong  to  the  body  which 


§  251.]  AMOTION  AND   DISFRANCHISEMENT.  273 

§  250.  (188)  Where  an  officer  is  appointed  during  pleasure,  or 
where  the  power  of  removal  is  discretionary,  the  power  to  remove 
may  be  exercised  ivithout  notice  or  hearing.  But  where  the  ap- 
pointment is  during  good  behavior,  or  where  the  removal  can  only 
be  for  certain  specified  causes,  the  power  of  removal  cannot,  as 
will  presently  be  shown,  be  exercised,  unless  there  be  a  charge 
against  the  officer,  notice  to  him  of  the  accusation,  and  a  hearing 
of  the  evidence  in  support  of  the  charges,  and  an  opportunity 
given  to  the  party  of  making  defence. ^ 

§  251.  (189)  In  the  leading  case  of  the  King  v.  Richardson, 
the  point  was  decided,  as  above  mentioned,  that  a  corporation,  in 
the  absence  of  an  express  grant  of  authority,  had  the  incidental 
power  to  make  a  by-law  to  remove  officers  for  just  cause.  Lord 
Mansfield,  in  that  case,  classified  the  offences  which  would  justify 
the  exercise  of  the  power ;  and  his  judgment  therein  has  been 
followed  both  in  England  and  in  this  country,  in  cases  arising  in 
private  corporations  not  of  a  pecuniary  character.  According  to 
Lord  Mansfield,  there  are  three  sorts  of  offences  for  which  an  offi- 
cer or  corporator  may  be  discharged :  1.  Such  as  have  no  imme- 
diate relation  to  his  office,  but  are  themselves  of  so  infamous  a 

elected  him,  and  of  which  he  is  simply  land,  3  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  145;  Field 

the    custodian,   or    refuses    to    keep    or  v.  Girard  College,  54  Pa.  St.  233 ;  State  v. 

amend  the  records  when  duly  ordered  Doherty,  25  La  An.  119,  1873;  s.  c.  13 

to  do  so.    lb.  Am.  Rep.  131. 

^  Field  V.  Commonwealth,  32  Pa.  St.  It  is  the  law  in  England,  as  applied  to 
478,  1859 ;  Ramshay,  in  re,  83  Eng.  Com.  the  old  corporations,  that  causes  which 
Law,  174,  189,  1852;  Hennen,  in  re,  13  disqualify  the  person  to  be  an  officer  will 
Pet.  (U.  S.)  230;  Queen  u.  Governors,  etc.,  not  authorize  the  corporation  to  amove 
8  Ad.  &  El.  682;  Bagg's  Case,  11  Coke,  him,  but  he  must  be  ousted  by  quo  war- 
93  (6);  Rex  v.  Coventry,  1  Ld.  Raym.  ranto.  Tlie  reason  given  is  that  one  so 
891;  Dr.  Gaskin's  Case,  8  T.  R.  209 ;  Rex  disquahfied  is  not,  in  law,  a  corporate 
V.  Oxford,  1  Salk.  428 ;  Rex  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  officer,  and  hence  cannot  be  amoved  as 
1  Lev.  291;  2  Kyd,  58,  59;  Willc.  253,  such  by  the  corporation.  Rex  v.  Don- 
254;  Grant,  244;  Rex  v.  Andover,  1  Ld.  caster.  Say.  40;  Buller  N.  P.  203;  Rex 
Raym.  710;  Page  v.  Hardin,  8  B.  Mon.  v.  Lyme  Regis,  Doug.  85;  Symmers  v. 
648;  Hoboken  v.  Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  Regem,  Cowp.  .502;  ViTillc.  259,  pi.  669; 
265;  Madison  y.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74, 1869;  76.  281,  pi.  728.  And  see  Fawcett  v. 
Stadler  v.  Detroit,  13  Mich.  346,  1865.  Cliarles,  13  Wend.  473,  1835.  It  has  else- 
Charter  power  of  removal,  without  wliere  been  sliown  that  with  us  the  coun- 
cause,  at  any  time,  of  a  police  patrol  cils  of  municipal  corporations  are  often 
appointed  for  a  year,  see  Ciiicago  v.  made  judges  of  the  qualifications  of  their 
Edwards,  58  111.  252,  1871.  As  to  tlie  re-  members  and  officers,  and  this  may 
wioya/,  by  tlie  appointing  power,  of  officers,  modify  or  change  the  rule  above  men- 
the  duration  of  whose  term  is  not  fixed,  tioned,  wliich  seems  to  rest  on  narrow 
see  People  v.  Comptroller,  etc.,  20  Wend,  and  teclmical  grounds. 
(N.  Y.)  595;   Commonwealtli   v.  Sutlier- 

VOL.  I.  18 


274 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  IX. 


nature  as  to  render  the  offender  unfit  to  execute  any  public  fran- 
chise. 2.  Such  as  are  only  against  his  oath  and  the  duty  of  his 
office  as  a  corporator,  and  amount  to  breaches  of  the  tacit  condi- 
tion annexed  to  his  franchise  or  office.  3.  Offences  of  a  mixed 
nature,  —  as  being  an  offence  not  only  against  the  duty  of  his 
office,  but  also  a  matter  indictable  at  the  common  law.^  In  of- 
fences of  the  first  class  the  removal  can  only  be  made  after  there 
has  been  a  previous  conviction  in  a  court  of  law ;  and  an  amotion 
will  not  be  sustained  by  a  subsequent  conviction.^  In  offences  of 
the  second  class  the  corporation  may  try,  and  if  the  charge  is  es- 
tabhshed,  remove,  without  any  previous  or  other  proceeding  in 
the  courts.^  In  offences  of  the  third  class  the  English  judges 
have  differed  on  the  point  whether  the  officer  may  or  may  not  be 
removed  before  a  conviction  in  a  court  of  justice.  The  principal 
cases  and  the  result  on  this  point  are  briefly  stated  in  the  note.* 


1  Rex  V.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  517,  538, 
1758;  followed,  Rex  v.  Liverpool,  2  lb. 
723.  So,  also,  in  Commonwealth  v.  St. 
Patrick's  (Benevolent)  Society,  2  Binn. 
(Pa.)  441,  1810;  Commonwealth  v.  Guar- 
dians, etc.,  6  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  469, 
1821.  These  cases  adopt  Lord  Mans- 
field's classification,  and  assert  the  inher- 
ent power  of  corporations  to  expel  for 
offences  falling  within  any  of  the  three 
classes.  See,  also,  Butch.  Benef.  Assoc, 
35  Pa.  St.  151 ;  38  lb.  278 ;  Evans  v.  Phila- 
delphia Club,  50  Pa.  St.  107  ;  Society,  etc. 
V.  Commonwealth,  52  Pa.  St.  125. 

The  courts  may,  by  mandamus,  compel 
a  corporation  to  amove  an  officer ;  and  the 
result  of  the  cases  on  this  point  is  consid- 
ered to-be  that  where  the  offence  of  the 
officer  is  such  that  the  corporation  has  the 
power  to  amove,  the  court  will  only  com- 
pel it  to  do  so  where  some  one  is  injured 
by  the  omission  to  remove ;  but  where  it 
is  required  to  amove,  or  the  office  is  de- 
clared by  the  charter  or  statute  to  be  void 
if  such  an  act  be  done  or  omitted,  there 
the  court  will  compel  it  to  amove,  though 
no  one  be  shown  to  have  been  aggrieved. 
Rex  V.  Truro,  3  Barn.  &  Aid.  592;  Rex 
V.  West  Looe,  5  Dowl.  &  R.  416 ;  Rex  v. 
Totness,  lb.  483 ;  Grant  on  Corp.  243,  and 
note. 

2  Rex  V.  Richardson,  supra,  and  cases 
cited  in  last  note. 

3  Rex  V.  Richardson,  supra ;  Common- 


wealth V.  St.  Patrick's  Society,  supra,  and 
cases  cited  in  preceding  note. 

*  Rex  V.  Carlisle,  Fortesc.  200;  s.  c.  11 
Mod.  379.  In  this  case  the  corporation, 
before  conviction,  amoved  a  capital  citizen 
for  giving  a  bribe  to  a  freeman  and  offer- 
ing him  another  to  influence  his  vote  at 
the  election  for  a  mayor.  The  court's 
judgment  was  in  favor  of  the  right  to 
amove.  Although  there  might  have  been 
a  previous  conviction,  yet  this  being  a 
great  offence  against  the  duty  of  his  office, 
the  corporation  might  amove  without  a 
conviction.  In  Rex  v.  Derby,  Cas.  Temp. 
Ilardw.  155,  Lord  Hardwiche  mistook  the 
above  case  on  this  point,  and  inclined  to 
think  there  ought  to  be  a  previous  con- 
viction. And  such  seemed  also  to  be  the 
inclination  of  Holt,  C.  J.,  in  Rex  v.  Chalke, 
Comb.  397,  where  the  removal  was  before 
conviction,  for  criminally  razing  entries 
in  the  corporation  books  which  were  at 
first  proper,  but  the  point  was  not  de- 
cided. In  Haddock's  Case,  T.  Raym.  439, 
the  amotion  was  for  riotously  assembling 
and  assaulting  several  corporators,  thereby 
impeding  the  business  of  the  corporation. 
It  was  considered  that  the  offence  was 
twofold,  —  one  against  the  duty  of  his 
office  as  a  corporator,  the  other  (wholly 
disconnected)  of  a  riot.  And  as  he  might 
be  guilty  of  one  and  yet  be  acquitted  the 
other,  the  corporation  might  amove  with- 
out conviction  ;  and  the  case  is  said  to  be 


§  252.] 


AMOTION   AND   DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


275 


§  252.  (190)  Principle  and  sound  policy  require  that  the  im- 
plied power  of  removal  for  offences  against  the  corporation  be 
restricted  to  acts  of  a  serious  nature  directly  affecting  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  corporation. ^  Causes  for  removal  have,  in 
some  instances,  been  held  sufficient  in  England  which  would  not, 
probably,  be  so  regarded  in  this  country.  The  principal  English 
cases  are  given  in  the  note.  The  sufficiency  and  reasonableness 
of  the  cause  of  removal  are  questions  for  the  courts.^ 


different  from  that  of  Chalke  (supra),  for 
there  the  ofBcer  could  not  have  been 
guilty  of  the  offence  at  law  without  at 
the  same  time  having  been  guilty  of  a 
breach  of  his  duty.  The  cases  decided 
are  considered  to  favor  tliis  view,  viz.,  if 
the  act  is  criminal  and  single  in  its  nature, 
so  that  a  conviction  or  acquittal  in  the 
courts  of  law  will  necessarily  determine 
the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  party,  there 
must  be  a  conviction,  but  otherwise  there 
may  be  a  removal  without,  or  independent 
of,  a  conviction.  BuUer's  N.  P.  206  ;  Willc. 
249-252;  Glover,  331,  338;  Grant,  240; 
2  Kyd,  88-94,  where  the  prior  cases  are 
digested  and  stated.  Lord  Mansjleld,  in 
Rex  V.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  538,  leaves  the 
point  untouched.  A  removal  for  a  riot  in 
the  council  chamber,  without  a  previous 
conviction,  is  said  to  have  been  held  good. 
Rex  V.  Yates,  Style,  cited  8  Mod.  101. 
See,  further,  Earle's  Case,  Carth.  173 ; 
Rex  V.  Wells,  4  Burr.  1999 ;  Regina  v. 
Newberry,  1  Q.  B:  751;  2  Bac.  Abr. 
(Bouv.  ed.)  476,  and  cases  cited. 

1  Evans  v.  Philadelphia  Club,  50  Pa. 
St.  107 ;  Butch.  B.  Assoc,  35  Pa.  St. 
151;  38  lb.  278;  Society,  etc.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 52  Pa.  St.  125 ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Philadelpliia  Society,  5  Binn. 
(Pa.)  486;  State  v.  Common  Council,  9 
Wis.  254 ;  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Geisel,  19  Ind. 
34i ;  Same  v.  Wright,  Ih.  .316. 

•i  Rex  V.  Andover,  3  Salk.  229.  Pov- 
ertji  of  alderman,  so  that  he  could  not  /v«y 
taxes,  sufficient  cause  for  amoving  him. 
Jh.,  but  not  applical)le  here.  But  hank- 
riijitcij  insufficient  cause  of  amotion  of 
councilman.  Rex  v.  Liverpool,  2  Burr. 
723 ;  see  Rex  v.  Chitty,  5  Ad.  &  E.  609. 
Total  desertion  of  duties  of  office  sufficient 
cause.  Buller's  N.  P.  206 ;  Rex  .;.  Rich- 
ardson, 1  Burr.  541.  When  aliserire  and 
non-attendance  upon  meetings,  and  nci/lect 
of  duty,   will   be   sufficient    cause.      See 


Rex  V.  Richardson,  supra;  Rex  v.  Wells, 
4  Burr.  2004 ;  1  Hawk.  P.  C  cii.  Ixvi.  sec. 
1,  as  to  official  neglect  of  duty ;  approved 
by  Lord  Mansfield,  in  case  last  cited ; 
Lord  Bruce 's  Case,  2  Stra.  819,  and  notes  ; 
Rex  V.  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1233  ;  s.  c. 
Salk.  443  ;  Buller's  N.  P.  206,  207  ;  Lord 
Hawley's  Case,  1  Vent.  146 ;  Rex  v.  Har- 
ris, 1  Barn.  &  Ad.  936  ;  Queen  v.  Mayor, 
etc.  of  Pomfret,  10  Mod.  107 ;  2  Kyd,  65 
et  seq.,  where  the  older  cases  are  stated. 
Willc.  255-264  ;  Angell  &  Ames,  sec.  427, 
giving  summary  of  English  cases.  Much 
depends  upon  the  cause  of  the  neglect, 
and  whether  the  effect  is  to  obstruct  or 
hinder  the  business  of  the  corporation  or 
officer  from  being  done. 

Habitual  drunkenness,  disqualifying  from 
the  performance  of  duty,  is  a  sufficient 
cause  to  remove  an  alderman  or  officer 
charged  with  magisterial  functions.  Rex 
V.  Taylor,  3  Salk.  231 ;  1  Rulle,  409 ;  3 
Bulst.  190.  But  casital  intoxication,  or 
being  drunk  by  accident,  is  not  a  suffi- 
cient cause,  for  the  reason  (charitably 
allowed)  that  this  is  likely  to  happen  to 
the  best.  Rex  v.  Taylor,  supra,  A.  D. 
1616.  Old  age  is  insufficient.  Baq.  Abr. 
Corp.  E.  9;  Hazard's  Case,  2  Rolle,  11. 

il/ere  threats  or  attempts,  no  injury  re- 
sulting, not  sufficient.  Bagg's  Case,  11 
Coke,  93.  Insulting  language,  or  libel  upon 
mayor  or  officers,  held  insufficient,  on  the 
ground  that  personal  offences  are  to  be 
punished  by  law,  and  not  by  the  corpora- 
tion. Rex  V.  Oxford,  Palm.  455  ;  Bagg's 
Case,  11  Coke,  93,  96,  97,  98,  99  ;  Clark's 
Case,  2  Cro.  506 ;  Buller's  N.  P.  203 ;  Rex 
V.  Lane,  Fortesc.  275  ;  s.  c.  11  Mod.  270; 
Earle's  Case,  Carth.  174;  Willc.  261,  pi. 
G80.  See  Regina  v.  Rogers,  2  Ld.  Raym. 
777;  Innes  v.  Wylie,  1  Carr.  &  K.  257; 
Regina  v.  Treasury,  10  Ad.  &  E.  374 ;  2 
Perr.  &  D.  498. 

Official  miaronduct,  amounting  to  mis- 


276 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  IX. 


§  253.  (191)  Respecting  the  proceedings  to  amove,  it  has  al- 
ready been  observed  that  they  must  be  had  by  and  before  the 
authorized  body  duly  assembled,  in  conformity  with  the  rules  on 
that  subject,  whicli  are  elsewhere  stated. ^  The  proceeding  in  all 
cases  where  the  amotion  is  for  cause  is  adversary  or  judicial  in  its 
character  ;  and  if  the  organic  law  of  the  corporation  is  silent  as  to 
the  mode  of  procedure,  the  substantial  principles  of  the  common 
law  as  to  proceedings  affecting  private  rights  must  be  observed.^ 

§  254.  (192)  And  first,  the  officer  is  entitled  to  a  j)ersonal 
notice  of  the  proceeding  against  him  and  of  the  time  when  the 
trial  body  will  meet.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  notice,  citation, 
or  summons  set  out  the  charges  in  detail,  but  it  should  contain 


demeanor,  has  been  before  mentioned, 
and  the  cases  cited.  The  misconduct 
must,  it  seems,  specially  relate  to  tlie  ex- 
ecution of  the  oflBce.  Rex  v.  Wells,  4 
Burr.  1999;  see  Kegina  v.  Newberry,  1 
Q.  B.  751.  If  the  same  person  hold  two 
offices,  misconduct  with  respect  to  one 
will  authorize  removal  from  that  one, but 
not  from  both  ;  but  if  the  offence  is 
against  the  duties  of  both,  the  removal 
may  be  from  both.  Kex  v.  Chalke,  1  Ld. 
Raym.  226 ;  s.  c.  5  Mod.  257 ;  Eex  v. 
Doncaster,  2  Ld.  Kaym.  1566 ;  s.  c.  1 
Barnard.  265 ;  Rex  v.  Wells,  4  Burr.  1999  ; 
Rex  V.  Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad.  936.  Misemploy- 
ment  of  corporate  funds  in  his  custody  is 
not  sufficient  cause  of  amotion,  though 
generally  it  is  good  cause  of  suspension 
from  a  financial  office,  for  the  court  will 
not  grant  a  mandamus  to  restore  until  the 
accounts  are  made  up  and  submitted  to 
the  corporation.  Rex  v.  Chalke,  1  Ld. 
Raym.  266;  s.  c.  5  Mod.  259;  Rex  v. 
London,  2  Term  R.  182;  Willc.  262,  pi. 
685 ,  Angell  &  Ames,  sec.  428.  On  prin- 
ciple, it  may  be  suggested  that  if  such  a 
thing  as  an  implied  power  of  amotion 
exists  at  all,  it  should  extend  to  a  case 
where  the  financial  officer  of  a  corpora- 
tion is  misemploying  its  funds  entrusted 
to  his  safe  keeping. 

1  Rex  V.  Taylor,  3  Salk.  231  ;  Rex  v. 
Sandys,  2  Barnard.  302  ;  Taylor  v.  Glou 
cester,  1  Roll.  409 ;  s.  c.  3  Bulst.  190 
Rex  V.  Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym.  226 ;  2  Kyd 
57  ;  Grant,  245,  275 ;  Willc.  264,  pi.  691 
lb.  266,  pi.  698.     Necessity  for  vote  or 


corporate  act,  declaring  the  removal  or 
expulsion.  Commonwealth  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania, etc.  Institute,  2  Serg.  &  Rawie 
(Pa.),  141 ;  Commonwealth  v.  German 
Society,  15  Pa.  St.  251 ;  Stadler  v.  De- 
troit, 13  Mich.  346. 

Where,  by  statute,  themaj'or,  recorder, 
and  an  alderman  were  constituted  a  body 
to  try  charges  against  policemen  ap- 
pointed by  the  corporation,  with  power 
to  suspend  or  remove,  the  presence  of  the 
mayor  is  essential  to  the  constitution  of 
the  legal  body,  and  if  one  act  in  the  trial 
of  such  a  charge  as  mayor,  who  is  not 
such  de  jure  [or  de  facto\,  the  order  of  re- 
moval is  void.  Hadley  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
33  N.  Y.  603  ;  see  supra,  sec.  244.  Special 
provision  of  charter  construed  to  give  the 
power  of  removal  to  the  mayor  and  coun- 
cil, and  not  to  the  council  alone.  Charles 
V.  Hoboken,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  203. 

2  State  V.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  II.  pp. 
414,  416,  1836.  "  This  proceeding," 
(amoval  of  a  trustee  of  the  university) 
"is  essentially  adversary;  the  justice  of 
the  common  law  permits  no  investigation 
of  facts  which  may  be  followed  by  a  loss 
of  a  right  or  by  the  infliction  of  a  pen- 
alty, to  be  conducted  ex  parte."  lb.,  per 
Lane,  J.  Murdock  v.  Academy,  12  Pick. 
244;  State  v.  Trustees,  etc.,  5  Ind.  77. 
Charter  mode,  if  prescribed,  must  be  pur- 
sued, lb.;  Bacher's  Case,  20  Pa.  St. 
425;  see  People  v.  Bearfield,  35  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  254  ;  State  v.  Common  Council,  9  Wis. 
254 ;  Madison  v.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74 ;  Tom- 
pert  V.  Lithgow,  1  Bush  (Ky.),  176,  1866. 


§  254.] 


AMOTION   AND   DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


277 


the  substantial  fact  that  a  proceeding  to  amove  is  intended.^  The 
analogies  of  the  ordinary  procedure  in  the  courts  of  the  state  (in 
the  absence  of  statute  or  by-law)  may  be  followed,  respecting 
such  details  as  the  notice  or  summons,  mode  of  service,  etc.  No- 
tice may  be  dispensed  ivith:  1st.  B}^  appearance  and  answer  to 
the  charges.^  2d.  By  a  total  desertion  of  the  place,^  so  that  it  is 
not  practicable  to  give  the  notice,  as  where  the  officer  has  perma- 
nently, not  temporarily,  left  the  municipality  and  resides  con- 
stantly elsewhere  with  his  family.  Though  he  may  have  been 
absent  or  left  the  borough,  yet  if  he  return  and  be  in  the  place  at 
the  time  of  the  amotion,  he  is  entitled  to  notice.'*  If  the  amotion 
be  for  good  cause,  such  as  conviction  of  an  infamous  crime,^  or 
the  repeated  declaration  of  the  officer  that  he  would  not  discharge 
the  duties  of  his  office,^  while  it  would  be  more  regular  to  give 
the  notice,  yet  its  omission  will  not  entitle  him  to  a  mandamus  to 
be  restored  ;  for  if  restored  he  could  be  amoved  again,  and  the 
courts  will  not  order  a  restoration  where  they  can  see  that  there 
is  good  ground  of  removal,  and  that  the  order  to  restore  would 
be  without  practical  and  useful  effect.'     With  these  exceptions. 


^  Queen  v.  Saddlers'  Co.,  10  House  of 
Lords  Cases,  404  ;  State  v.  Br3'ce,  supra ; 
Rex  V.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  540 ;  Rex  v. 
Doncaster,  2  Burr.  738 ;  see  1  B.  &  Ad. 
942;  Rex  v.  Liverpool,  2  Burr. -731; 
Bagg'a  Case,  11  Rep.  99a;  Rex  v.  Wil- 
ton, 5  Mod.  2-59 ;  Exeter  v.  Clyde,  4  Mod. 
37  ;  Rex  u.  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1240 ; 
Willc.  264,  265 ;  Innes  v.  Wylie,  1  C.  &  K. 
257;  South  P.  R.  Co.,  5  Ind.  165;  People 
V.  Benevolent  Society,  24  How.  Pr.  216 ; 
Delacey  i-.  Neuse,  etc.  Co.,  1  Hawks  (N. 
C),  274;  Commonwealtli  v.  Pennsylvania 
Benef.  Institute,  2  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa), 
141 ;  Society  v.  Vandyke,  2  Whart.  (Pa.) 
309 ;  Nichols,  in  re,  6  Abb.  New  Cas.  474 ; 
8.  c.  57  How.  Pr.  30-5.  Where  the  power 
of  removal  is  vested  in  the  mayor  for 
cause,  he  acts  judicially,  and  a  writ  of 
prohibition  will  lie  against  him,  if  lie  ex- 
ceeds his  jurisdiction.  People  v.  Cooper, 
57  How.  Pr.  416.  If  the  incumbent  of  an 
office  uses  the  office  as  a  means  of  wrong- 
doing, this  is  a  good  cause  of  removal, 
though  the  acts  in  question  are  not  of  an 
official  nature.     Ih. 

2  Willc.  264;  Rex  v.  Wilton,  2  Salk. 
428;  Rex  v.  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1240; 
Rex  V.  Feversham,  8  Term  R.  356 ;  Rex 


V.  Carmathen,  1  Maule  &  Sel.  697;  s.  p. 
Commonwealth  v.  Pennsylvania  Benef. 
Institute,  2  Serg.  &  Rawle,  141. 

a  Willc.  265,  266 ;  Grant,  245 ;  Rex  v. 
Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad.  (»36  ;  Rex  v.  Shrews- 
bury, Cases  Temp.  Hardw.  151 ;  7  Mod. 
202;  Rex  v.  Toneboy,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1275; 
11  Mod.  75 ;  Rex  v.  Grimes,  5  Burr.  2601 ; 
Rex  V.  Leicester,  4  Burr.  2089. 

*  Rex  I'.  Leicester,  4  Burr.  2089. 

5  Angell  &  Ames  Corp.  sec.  422,  where 
this  opinion  is  expressed;  Grant,  265; 
Rex  V.  Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym.  226. 

«  Rex  I'.  Axbridge,  Cowp.  523;  see  2 
Term  R.  182 ;  Grant  Corp.  245. 

'  Rex  I'.  Griffiths,  3  B.  &  Aid.  735; 
see  Blagrave's  Case,  2  Sid.  6,  49,  72 ;  Rex 
V.  Rowe,  1  Show.  188  ;  s.  c.  Carth.  199 ; 
Grant,  Corp.  245.  If  one  irregularly 
amoved  for  good  cause  be  restored  by 
mandamus,  he  may  be  again  amoved  by 
regular  proceedings  de.  novo.  Taylor  v. 
Glnuv.'ester,  3  Bulst.  190 ;  Rex  v.  Ipswich, 
2  Ld.  Raym.  1233.  In  such  case  the  office 
is  vacated  from  the  time  of  the  second 
amotion;  the  proceeilings  do  not  relate 
back  to  the  former  irregular  amotion. 
Willc.  2G9,  pi.  707. 


278  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  IX. 

the  party  is  entitled  to  notice  of  the  intention  to  amove,  so  that 
he  may  liave  full  and  fair  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  his  defence. 

§  255.  (193)  There  must  be  a  charge^  or  chai-ges,  against  him, 
specifically  stated^  with  substantial  certainty ;  yet  the  technical 
nicety  required  in  indictments  is  not  necessa^3^^  And  reasonable 
time  and  opportunity  must  be  given  to  answer  the  charges  and  to 
produce  his  testimony  ;  and  he  is  also  entitled  to  be  heard  and 
defended  by  counsel,  and  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses,  and  to 
except  to  the  proofs  against  him.^  If  the  charge  be  not  denied, 
still  it  must,  if  not  admitted,  be  examined  and  proved.^  Where 
the  specific  charge  stated  is  insufficient  to  justify  the  removal,  or 
where  the  removal  is  erroneous  and  no  good  and  sufficient  ground 
therefor  appears,  the  officer  is  entitled  to  a  mandamus  to  restore 
hhn^  But  where  the  proceedings  are  in  conformity  with  the 
charter,  and  are  regular,  the  sentence  will  not  be  inquired  into 
collaterally,  nor  its  merits  examined  by  mandamus  or  action.^ 

§  256.  (194)  If  the  amotion  be  legal  and  authorized,  the  office 
becomes  ipso  facto  vacant  from  the  time  the  amotion  is  declared, 
and  another  person  may  be  elected  or  appointed  to  fill  it.     If  the 

1  Tompert  v.  Lithgow,  1  Bush  (Ky.),  tlie  same  situation  that  he  was  before  the 
176,  1866;  Rex  v.  Lyme  Regis,  Doug,  attempted  removal.  Willc.  209 ;  ywsf,  sec. 
179;  Bagg's  Case,  11  Co.  99a,-  s.  c.  1  847.  Since  there  is  an  adequate  remedy 
Roll.  225;  Glover,  334;  Willc.  267.  at  law  by  quo   warranto   {post,   ch.    xxi.) 

2  State  V.  Bryce,  7  Ohio,  part  II.  p.  or  by  mandamus  to  restore  (post,  sec. 
414,  1836;  Rex  v.  Richardson,  1  Burr.  847),  equity  will  not  enjoin  the  corporate 
640 ;  Rex  i'.  Liverpool,  2  Burr.  734  ;  Mur-  authorities  from  making  an  unlawful  re- 
dock  V.  Academy,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  244;  moval  or  appointing  a  successor.  Dela- 
where  the  requisites  of  a  vahd  proceeding  hanty  w.  Warner,  75  111.  185,  1874;  s.  c. 
to  amove  are  stated.     Rex  v.  Chalke,  1  20  Am.  Rep.  237. 

Ld.    Raym.    226 ;    Rex    v.   Derby,    Cas.  ^  Society,   etc.  v.  Commonwealth,   52 

Temp.  Hardw.  154.  Pa.  St.  125,  18G6  ;  People  v.  Bearfield,  35 

3  Rex  t'.  Feversham,  8  Term  R.  356;  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  254.  Though  the  amotion 
Harman  v.  Tappenden,  1  East,  562;  Willc.  be  illegal,  the  officers  who  took  part  in  it 
267  ;  Glover,  334  ;  Murdock  v.  Academy,  are  not  personally  liable,  unless  both  malice 
12  Pick.  (Mass.)  244.  A  municipal  offi-  and  want  of  probable  cause  be  shown, 
cer,  when  removed  by  the  corporation  Harmen  v.  Tappenden,  3  Espin.  278 ;  s.  c. 
appointing  him,  is  entitled  to  actual  notice  1  East,  555 ;  Ferguson  v.  Earl  of  Kinnoul, 
of  his  removal,  and  to  compensation  until  9  CI.  &  F.  289. 

he  receives  sucli  notice.    Jarvis  v.  Mayor,  Jurisdiction  as  to  the  election  and  amotion 

etc.  of  New  York,  2  N.  Y.  Log.  Obs.  396.  of    officers    in    corporations,    when    not 

*  Rex  V.  Ipswich,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1240;  changed  by  statute,  belongs  to  the  com- 

Madison  ;;.  Korbly,  32  Ind.  74, 1869 ;  Com-  mon  law  courts  and  not  to  equity.     At- 

monwealth  v.  German  Society,  15  Pa.  St.  torney  General  v.  Earl  Clarendon,  17  Ves. 

251,  1850 ;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch.  491 ;  Dyer,  332  ;  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22 

(N.  J.)  536.     The  restoration  puts  him  in  Iowa,  75;   ante,  sec.  202;  post,  sec.  275. 


§  256.] 


AMOTION  AND   DISFRANCHISEMENT. 


279 


removed  officer  afterward  continues  to  act,  he  is  a  mere  usurper, 
and  may  be  ousted  on  quo  warranto  and  punished.  Amotion 
from  one  office  does  not,  of  course,  affect  the  party's  title  to 
another.^ 


1  Jay's  Case,  1  Vent.  302 ;  Symmers  v. 
Regem,  Covvp.  503;  Willc.  268,  pi.  704; 
Rex  V.  Doncaster,  2  Ld.  Rayra.  1566;  1 
Barnard.  265;  Rex  v.  Chalke,  1  Ld.  Raym. 
226.  Mr.  Willcock,  2G7,  pi.  704,  whose 
language  is  adopted  by  Glover  (Corp. 
334),  states  that  if  a  person  legally 
amoved  continues  to  act,  he  is  a  mere 
usurper,  and  that  "  all  corporate  acts  in 
which  he  has  concurred  are  equally  void, 
as  though  he  had  never  been  elected  or 
admitted."  But  if  he  is  permitted  to  act 
after  amotion,  it  would  probably  be  con- 
sidered, in  this  country,  that  his  acts  would, 
as  to  third  persons,  be  valid,  like  those  of 
an  officer  de  facto.    If  the  removal  be  un- 


authorized, Mr.  "Willcock  states  the  rule 
to  be,  "  That  all  corporate  acts  in  which 
he  has  concurred  between  the  moment  of 
his  removal  and  restitution  are  of  equal 
validity  as  if  he  had  never  been  amoved," 
etc.  Willc.  269,  pi.  707.  If  he  was  regu- 
larly present  and  concurred,  it  can  well 
be  seen  how  this  should  be  so ;  but  his 
concurrence  when  not  regularly  acting, 
or  when  a  de  facto  successor  has  taken  hia 
place  and  is  acting,  would  not  seem  to 
alter  the  legal  quality  of  the  act.  In  this 
country  the  acts  of  de  facto  oflScers  are 
everywhere  considered  valid  as  respects 
the  public.  Post,  sees.  276,  892,  note; 
Gushing  v.  Frankfort,  57  Me.  541. 


280  MUNICIPAL  COEPOEATIONS.  [ca  X. 


CHAPTER  X. 

CORPOKATE  MEETINGS. 

§  257.  (195)  The  subject  of  Corporate  Meetings  will  be  con- 
sidered under  the  following  general  heads :  — 

1.  Common  Law  Requisites  of  a  Valid  Corporate  Meeting  — 
sees.  258-261. 

2.  Notice  of  Corporate  Meetings  at  Common  Law  and  under 
the  English  Municipal  Corporations  Act  —  sees.  262-265. 

3.  New  England  Town  Meetings;  Requisites  of  Notice  and 
Power  of  Adjournment —  sees.  266-269. 

4.  Constitution  and  Meetings  of  Councils,  or  of  Select  Gov- 
erning Bodies,  and  herein  of  Quorums  and  Majorities ;  Of  Inte- 
gral Parts  ;  and  of  Stated,  Special,  and  Adjourned  Meetings  — 
sees.  270-287. 

5.  Mode  of  Proceeding  when  convened  —  sees.  288-292. 

Common  Law  Requisites  of  a  Valid  Corporate  Meeting. 

§  258.  (196)  As  respects  their  mode  of  action,  municipal  cor- 
porations in  this  country  are  of  ttoo  general  classes.  In  the  one, 
as  in  the  organization  of  towns  in  the  New  England  states,  here- 
tofore adverted  to,  all  of  the  quahfied  inhabitants  meet,  act,  and 
vote,  in  person.^  In  the  other,  which  is  the  kind  that  prevails 
generally  throughout  the  states,  and  even  in  many  of  the  larger 
places  in  New  England,  the  affairs  of  the  town  or  city  are  ad- 
ministered by  a  select  or  representative  hod^,  usually  denominated 
the  council,  and  which  is  elected  by  the  qualified  voters  of  the 
incorporated  place,  not  assembled  together  in  a  meeting,  but  at 
an  election,  where  each  elector  votes  separately  and  by  ballot.^ 

§  259.  (197)  The  latter  class  of  corporations  is  properly 
municipal.     The  former  class  is  not  so  strictly  municipal  as  it 

1  Ante,  ch.  ii.  sec.  28. 

2  Ante,  ch.  ii.  sec.  28,  et  seq. ;  ante,  ch.  iv. 


§  260.]  CORPORATE   MEETINGS.  281 

is  public  in  its  character.^  Where  there  is  a  council  or  govern- 
ing body,  the  inhabitants  or  voters,  in  their  natural  capacity,  have 
no  power  to  act  for  or  bind  the  corporation,  but  the  corporation 
must  act,  and  can  be  bound  only  through  the  medium  of  this 
body.  Therefore,  authorized  acts  done  by  the  council  are  not 
their  acts,  but  those  of  the  corporation.  The  council  is  a  body 
which  is  constantly  changing ;  it  is  simply  the  agent  of  the  cor- 
poration. But  its  members,  it  has  been  well  observed,  are  not 
only  not  the  municipal  corporation,  but  are  not  even  a  corpora- 
tion.2  Whether  the  corporation  be  of  the  one  class  or  the  other, 
its  affairs  must  he  transacted  at  a  corporate  meeting^  in  the  one 
case  of  the  qualified  inhabitants,  and  in  the  other  of  the  members 
of  the  council  or  governing  body,  duly  convened  at  the  proper 
time  and  place,  and  upon  due  notice  in  cases  %vhere  notice  is 
requisite.^ 

§  260.  (198)  In  England,  prior  to  the  General  Municipal  Cor- 
porations Act  of  1835/  the  requisites  of  a  valid  corporate  meeting 
depended  upon  the  constitution  of  the  particular  corporation 
under  its  charter  or  prescrij)tive  usage.  To  constitute  a  corporate 
assembly  there  must  at  common  laiv  be  present  the  mayor  or  other 
head-officer  (he  being  considered  an  integral  part  of  the  corpora- 
tion,^ in  whose  absence  no  valid  corporate  act  could  be  done),  a 
majority  of  the  members  of  each  select  or  definite  class  (these 
classes  being  also  considered  integral  parts),  and  some  members  of 
the  indefinite  body  (indefinite  in  poiut  of  numbers)  usually  styled 
the  commonalty,  and  of  each  of  the  indefinite  classes  if  there  be 
more  than  one.^  If  there  be  no  indefinite  class,  and  the  gov- 
erning body  consist  of  a  select  or  definite  class,  the  common 
law  requisite  of  a  valid  corporate  assembly  is,  that  a  majority  of 
the  select  class  must  be  present ;  and  if  there  be  more  than  one 
such  class,  then  a  majority  of  each  of  the  select  classes  of  which 

1  Ante,  ch.  1,  sec.  9;  ante,  ch.  ii.  sees,  mayor,  see  ante,  ch.  ix.  relating  to  Muni- 
22,  25,  and  note.  cipal  Elections  and  Officers,  sec.  208. 

2  Reginau.Paramore,  10Ad.&E1.286;  6  wiUc.  52,  53,  66;  l?ex  i'.  Atkyns,  3 
see  liegina  v.  York,  2  Queen's  B.  850;  Mod.  23;  1  Rol.  Ab.  514;  Rex  v.  Carter, 
Mayor  y.  Simpson,  8  Queen's  B.  73;  ante,  Cowp.  59;  Rex  v.  Smart,  4  Burr.  2143; 
sec.  39.  Rex  v.  Gaborian,  11  East,  87,  note;  Rex 

8  Dey  V.  Jersey  City,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  412,  v.  Morris,  4  East,  2G ;  Rex  v.  Bellringer, 

18G9;  Baltimore  v.  Poultney,  25  Md.  18,  4  Term  R.  823;  Rex  v.  Miller,  6  lb.  278; 

1866.  Rex  v.  Varls,  Cowp.  250 ;  Rex  v.  Monday, 

*  Ante,  ch.  iii.  sec.  35,  et  seq.  lb.  539. 

*  Ante,  ch.  iii.  sec.  35.    Further  as  to 


282  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  X. 

the  corporation  is  constituted  ;  and  the  presence  of  the  mayor  at 
a  select  assembly  of  this  kind  is  not  necessary,  unless  it  is  ex- 
pressly required.^  But  where  a  common  council  exists  (which,  in 
contemplation  of  the  ancient  law,  is  a  meeting  of  the  body  at 
large,  or  those  of  them  who  thought  proper  to  attend,  or  were 
considered  by  their  fellow  freemen  the  men  best  fitted  to  attend), 
though  such  council  has  become  a  select  or  definite  class,  there 
the  presence  of  the  mayor  or  head  presiding  officer  is  necessary 
to  a  valid  assembly,  though  such  presence  be  not  required  by  the 
charter.2 

§  2G1.  (199)  A  majority  of  each  definite  part  means  a  majority 
of  the  number  of  members  of  which  that  part  consists,  not  merely 
a  majorit}'  of  the  existing  members  of  the  part ;  but  if  the  act  is 
to  be  done  by  an  indefinite  body  alone,  it  is  valid  if  done  at  a 
meeting  duly  convened,  although  but  a  small  fraction  of  the  whole 
body  at  large  be  present.  But  while  the  presence  of  a  majority 
of  each  definite  integral  part  was  necessary  to  a  valid  corporate 
meeting,  yet  it  is  settled  law  that  a  majority  of  those  present, 
when  legally  assembled,  will  bind  the  rest.^  Not  only  did  the 
law  of  the  old  corporations  in  England  require  the  presence  of  a 
majority  of  the  members  of  each  definite  integral  part,  but  it 
went  to  the  extreme  length  of  holding  that"  where  the  presence 
of  the  mayor  was  necessar}^  he  must  be  the  legal  mayor,  and  if  he 
be  merely  an  officer  de  facto,  and  afterwards  be  ousted  on  quo 
warrayito,  all  corporate  acts  done  under  the  sanction  of  his  ofiice 
are  voidable.*     By  reason  of  the  change  in  the  constitution  of 

1  See  authorities  cited  in  the  last  note.     Huggins,  Harper  (South  Car.),  94,  1824; 

2  Willc.  67.  Baker  v.    Young,    12   Gratt.    (Va.)    303, 

3  Rex   V.  Bellringer,  4  Term  R.  810,     1855,  approving  W^illc.  216,  pi.  546 ;  La- 

bourdette  v.  Municipality,  2  La.  An.  527, 
1847 ;  Kingsbury  v.  School  District,  21 
Met.  (Mass.)  99,  1846 ;  Damon  v.  Granby, 
2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345,  355,  1824;  Coles  v. 

&  Ad.  848  ;  Rex  v.  Headlcy,  7  Barn.  &     Trustees,  etc.  of  Williamsburg,  10  Wend. 


1792,  and  cases  cited ;  Rex  v.  Miller,  6  Ih. 
268;  Rex  v.  Monday,  Cowp.  531,  538 
Rex  V.  Devonshire,  1  Barn.  &  Cress.  609 
Rex  V.  Bower,  lb.  492 ;  Rex  v.  May,  4  B 


Cress.  496  ;  Willc.  216,  pi.  546;  Blacket  v 


(N.  Y.)  658,  1833;  Rex  v.  Greet,  8  B.  & 


Blizard,  9  Barn.  &  Cress  851 ;  Rogers,  in  C.  363;  The  Queen  ex  rel.  Hyde  v.  Barn- 
re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  526,  1827  ;  Ih.  note  a,  hart,  7  Upper  Can.  L.  J.:  The  Queen  ex 
764  ;  Willcocks,  in  re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  402,  rel.  Heenan  v.  Murray,  1  Upper  Can.  L. 
and  note  462,  463,  1827  ;  Young  v.  Buck-  J.  N.  S.  104;  2  Kent  Cora.  293 ;  Angell  & 
Ingham,  5  Oliio,  485,  489,  1832;  Buell  r.  Ames  Corp.  sec.  501. 
Buckingham,  16  Iowa,  284,  1864,  and  *  Rex  v.  Carter,  Cowp.  59;  Rex  v. 
cases  cited  ;  State  v.  Deliesseline,  1  Mc-  Ilebden,  Anstr.  391 ;  Rex  v.  Dawes,  4 
Cord    (South   Car.),   52,    1821;    State  v.  Burr.  2279;  Willc.  54,  55. 


§  263.]  NOTICE  OF   CORPORATE   MEETINGS.  283 

municipal  corporations  in  England,  wrought  by  the  Corporations 
Act  of  1835,  many  of  the  rules  respecting  corporate  meetings  are 
no  longer  applicable,  though,  as  we  shall  see,  some  of  them  still 
are.  Under  that  statute  the  corporation  acts,  and  can  only  act, 
through  the  council ;  and  it  is  provided  that  all  questions  shall 
be  decided  by  a  majority  of  all  the  councillors  present,  including 
questions  of  adjournment ;  that  one  third  part  of  the  number  of 
the  whole  council  shall  be  a  quorum  ;  that  the  mayor,  if  present, 
shall  preside,  and  if  absent,  that  a  presiding  officer  shall  be  chosen, 
who  shall  have  a  second  or  casting  vote.^ 

Notice   of  Corporate  Meetings  at    Common  Law,  and  under  the 
English   Municipal    Corporations   Act. 

§  262.  (200)  Due  notice  of  the  time  and  place  of  a  corporate 
meeting  is,  by  the  English  law,  essential  to  its  validity,  or  its 
power  to  do  any  act  which  shall  bind  the  corporation.  Respect- 
ing notice,  the  courts  in  England  adopted  certain  rules,  which, 
since  they  form  the  basis  of  much  of  the  statute  law  in  this 
country  upon  the  subject,  and  have,  in  the  main  been  followed 
by  our  courts,  and  are  founded  on  reason,  may  advantageously 
be  here  mentioned.  All  corporators  are  presumed  to  know  of 
the  days  appointed  b'y  the  charter,  statute,  usage,  or  by-laws,  for 
the  transaction  of  particular  business,  and  hence  no  notice  of 
such  meeting  for  the  transaction  of  such  business  is  necessary, 
or  for  the  transaction  of  the  mere  ordinary  affairs  of  the  corpora- 
tion on  such  days ;  yet  if  it  is  intended  to  proceed  to  any  other 
act  of  importance,  a  notice  is  necessary,  the  same  as  at  any  other 
time. 

§  263.  (201)  A  notice,  when  necessary,  must,  if  practicable, 
be  given  to  every  member  who  has  a  right  to  vote,  where  the  act 
is  one  to  be  done  by  a  body  consisting  of  a  definite  class  or  classes, 
and  it  must  be  given  by,  or  issued  hy  order  of,  some  one  Avho  has 
the  authority  to  convene  a  corporate  meeting.  But  notice  may 
be  altogether  dispensed  with  or  its  necessity  ivaived,  by  the  pres- 
ence and  consent  of  every  one  of  those  entitled  to  it.  It  must  be 
served  personally  upon  every  resident  member,  or  left  at  his  house. 

1  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.  sec.  69;  Rawlinson  on  Corp.  (5th  ed.)  136;  ante, 
ch.  iii.  sees.  35,  37. 


284  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  X, 

If  temporarily  absent,  it  ma}''  be  left  with  his  family,  or  at  his 
house  or  last  place  of  abode.  Au  order  to  serve  all  is  not  suffi- 
cient; all,  if  practicable,  must  be  served,  but  if  the  party  entitled 
to  notice  has  entirely  quit  the  municipality,  and  has  no  family  or 
house  within  its  limits,  notice  is  not  necessary.  It  must  be  served 
a  reasonable  time  before  the  hour  of  meeting,  of  which  the  court 
will  judge  from  all  the  circumstances,  including  usage. 

§  264.  (202)  The  notice  must  state  the  time  of  meeting,  and 
the  place,  if  it  be  not  the  usual  place.  It  is  not  necessary  to  state 
what  business  is  to  be  done  when  the  meeting  relates  only  to  the 
ordinary  affairs  of  the  corporation  ;  but  when  it  is  for  the  purpose 
of  electing  or  removing  officers,  passing  ordinances,  and  the  like, 
the  fact  should  be  stated,  so  that  members  may  know  that  some- 
thing more  than  the  usual  routine  of  business  will  be  transacted. 
Such  great  importance  is  attached  to  notice  that  it  can  only  be 
waived  by  universal  consent ;  but  if  every  member  of  a  select 
body  be  present  at  a  regular  or  stated  meeting  or  at  a  special 
meeting,  they  may,  if  every  one  consents,  but  not  otherwise, 
transact  any  business,  ordinary  or  extraordinary,  though  no 
notice  was  given,  or  an  insufficient  notice,  but  the  unanimity  of 
consent  should  plainly  appear  from  their  recorded  declaration, 
acts,  or  conduct.  This  unanimity  is  only  necessary  to  enter  upon 
the  business ;  once  commenced,  the  usual  rules  which  govern  the 
body  and  its  actions  apply.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  fore- 
going rules  are  not  applicable  where  they  are  in  conflict  with  the 
charter,  and  hence,  if  this  requires  a  special  notice,  it  cannot  be 
waived,  even  by  consent  of  all.  The  guild  hall  is  the  proper  place 
for  the  meeting ;  if  there  be  none,  the  meeting  should  be  at  the 
usual  place ;  and  if  at  any  other  place,  it  should  be  stated,  to 
prevent  fraud  or  surprise.  Acts  done  at  an  unusual  place  will 
be  closely  scrutinized.^ 

1  Authorities  in  support  of  the  last  and  1359;    Rex    v.   Mayor    of    Shrewsbury, 

two  preceding  sections  of  the  text:  Willc.  Cases  Temp.  Hardw.  147;  Smith  v.  Dar- 

ch.  i.  sec.  42,  et  seq.     Rex  v.  Hill,  4  B.  &  ley,  2  House  of  Lords  Cases,  789;  Grant 

C.  441;   Rex  i;.  Liverpool,  2  Burr.  734;  on    Corp.    154-156;    Glover    on    Corp. 

Rex  V.  Doncaster,  lb.  744 ;  Rex  ;;.  Theo-  eh.  viii.   pp.    146  -  173.       Formerly    the 

dorick,  8  East,  545 ;  Rex  v.  IVIay,  5  Burr,  rule   that    where    notice   was    necessary 

2682;   Rex  v.  Oxford,    Palm.   453;   Rex  every  member    must    be    notified,    was 

t;.   Grimes,   5   Burr.   2001 ;    Kynaston   i'.  applied     only    to    the    case    of    definite 

Shrewsbury,  2  Stra.  1051 ;  Musgrove  i'.  bodies,  but  it  has  more  recently  been  de- 

Nevison,  1  Stra.  584;  s.  c.  2  Ld.  Raym.  clared  to  be  applicable  to  both  select  and 


§  266.]  NEW  ENGLAND   TOWN  MEETINGS.  285 

§  265.  (203)  By  the  English  Municipal  Corporations  Act,i 
the  subject  of  meetings,  stated  and  special,  and  the  notice  and 
summons  required  are  made  matter  of  express  regulation.  It 
provides  for  everj^  borough  or  city  four  quarterly  meetings  of  the 
council  in  each  year,  to  be  held  at  a  fixed  date.  No  notice  of  the 
business  to  be  transacted  at  these  quarterly  meetings  is  necessary  ; 
but  three  days'  notice,  by  posting  on  or  near  the  town  hall,  is 
required  of  the  time  and  place  of  every  intended  meeting. 
Power  is  given  to  the  maj^or  to  call  special  meetings,  or,  on  his 
refusal,  to  five  members  of  the  council,  in  which  case  the  notice 
on  or  near  the  town  hall  shall  state  therein  the  business  proposed 
to  be  transacted  at  such  meeting,  and  in  every  case  a  summons 
(in  addition  to  the  notice)  must  be  left  at  the  usual  place  of 
abode  of  every  member  of  the  council,  or  at  the  premises  occu- 
pied by  him,  in  respect  of  which  he  is  enrolled  as  a  burgess,  at 
least  three  clear  days  before  the  meeting,  and  no  business  can  be 
transacted  not  specified  in  the  summons.  Power  to  adjourn 
meetings  is  expressly  conferred  upon  the  council  by  the  same 
section.^ 

New  England  Town  Meetings  —  Notice  and  Adjournment. 

§  266.  (204)  In  Neiv  England  the  inhabitants  are  required  to 
be  notified  or  warned  of  toivn  meetings.  The  requisites  of  such 
notice,  and  manner  of  giving  it,  are  prescribed  by  statute.  The 
provision  is  quite  general  that  the  articles  or  matters  to  be  acted 
upon  shall  be  specified  or  inserted  in  the  notice  or  warrant.  The 
courts  in  those  states  concur  in  requiring  the  statute  as  to  notice 
to  be  faithfully  observed  by  the  officers  charged  with  the  duty  of 
calling  meetings.  Meetings,  to  be  valid,  must  be  warned  or 
notified  according  to  law.  The  rule  of  the  English  courts  applied 
to  indefinite  corporate  bodies,  that  if  all  are  present  notice  may, 

indefinite  bodies   of  public  corporations,  or  regular  quarterly  meeting,   but    not 

Rex  V.  Langhorne,  4  Ad.  &  El.  538.     See,  otherwise  ;  and  lience,  a  coroner  cannot 

also,  Rex  v.  Fevcrsham,  8  Term  R.  356,  be  elected  at  such  an  adjourned  quarterly 

])er  Ld.  Kenyon,  arqnendo.  meeting  without  the  notice  and  summons 

1  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.  sec.  G9 ;  which  the  statute  requires.  Regina  v. 
ante,  sees.  35,  37.  Grimshaw,  10  Queen's  Bench,  747,  755. 

2  In  construing  this  statute,  it  has  See  Regina  v.  Thomas,  8  Ad.  &  El.  183 ; 
been  held  that  where  the  meeting  is  an  Rex  v.  Harris,  1  B.  &  Ad.  936.  As  to 
adjourned  quarterly  meeting,  notice  is  notice.  Town  Council,  etc.  v.  Court,  1 
necessary  as  to  any  business  which  was  E.  &  E.  770 ;  Regina  v.  Whipp,  4  Queen's 
not  actually  entered  upon  at  the  general  Bench,  141. 


286 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  X. 


by  unanimous  consent,  be  waived,^  is  not  regarded  as  applicable 
to  the  town  meetings  of  New  England,  and  hence  a  de  facto  meet- 
ing, not  duly  notified,  though  attended  by  all  the  voters  capable 
of  attending,  is  not  a  valid  meeting,  and  its  acts  are  void.^ 


1  Rex  r.  Theodorick,  8  East,  545 ;  ante, 
sec.  28. 

2  Hayward  v.  School  District,  2  Cush. 
(Mass.)  "419,  1848;  Moor  v.  NewfieUl,  4 
Greenl.  (Me.)  44,  1826;  School  District  v. 
Athcrton,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  105,  184G ;  Lit- 
tle V.  Merrill,  10  Pick.  (Mass  )  543;  Perry 
V.  Dover,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  206;  Keynolil 
V.  New  Salem,  6  Met.  (Mass.)  840;  Con- 
gregational Society  v.  Sperry,  10  Conn. 
200;  Rand  v.  Wilder,  11  Cush.  (Mass.) 
294,  185.3;  Stone  v.  School  District,  8 
Cush.  (Mass.)  592;  Brewster  v.  Hyde,  7 
N.  H.  206 ;  Northwood  i'.  Barrington,  9 
N.  H.  369;  Giles  r.  School  District,  11 
Fost.  (31  N.  H.)  304;  Lander  i'.  School 
District,  33  Me.  239,  1851 ;  Jordan  v. 
School  District,  38  Me.  164,  1854.  So  in 
Vermont  it  lias  been  decided  that  it  can- 
not be  sliown,  by  parol,  to  validate  the 
levy  of  tax  by  a  meeting  not  legally 
warned,  that  all  of  the  legal  voters  of  the  dis- 
trict were  present  at  tiie  meeting.  Sher- 
win  V.  Bugbee,  17  Vt.  337,  1845;  distin- 
guished by  the  court  from  Rex  v. 
Theodorick,  8  East,  543.  And  see,  also, 
Hunt  V.  School  District,  14  Vt.  300; 
Pratt  V.  Swanton,  15  Vt.  147.  Requisites 
of  notice  and  sufficieiici/.  Wyley  i\  Wilson, 
44  Vt.  404,  1872.  Under  the  legislation 
of  Connecticut,  although  it  is  held  that  the 
right  to  call  a  borough  meeting  for  any 
lawful  purpose  is  a  legal  right  of  every 
freeman,  yet  as  it  was  shared  with  all 
other  freemen  it  can  be  enforced  only  by 
a  proceeding  in  the  name  of  the  state. 
Peck  V.  Booth,  42  Conn.  271,  1875.  But 
see  post,  sees.  865,  900,  921,  923,  n.  A  tax 
voted  at  a  meeting  not  legally  warned  is 
illegal,  and  may  be  recovered  back  if  the 
party  did  not  pay  it  voluntarily.  Hideout 
V.  School  District,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  232, 
1861.  So  it  maybe  recovered  back  if  the 
assessment  is  void.  Gerry  v.  Stoneham, 
1  Allen  (Mass.),  319,  1861;  Tobey  v. 
Wareham,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  594;  post, 
ch.  xxiii.  See  3Iassachusetts  act  of  1859, 
ch.  cxviii.  limiting,  in  such  cases,  the 
plaintiff's  right  of  recovery  to  illegal  ex- 
cess of  taxation. 


Attthority  to  the  clerk  to  call  and  warn 
"  tlie  annual  meetings,"  does  not  author- 
ize him  to  call  and  warn  special  meetings; 
and  the  acts  and  doings  of  a  special  meet- 
ing tiius  called  are  wholly  void.  School 
District  v.  Atherton,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  105, 
1846.  And  authority  "to  warn"  future 
meetings  does  not  authorize  him  "  to 
call "  such  meetings.  Stone  v.  School 
District,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  592,  1851. 

As  to  proof  of  notice,  and  tlie  return  of 
the  person  or  officer  making  the  warning, 
and  what  it  shall  show,  see  State  v. 
Williams,  25  Me.  564, 1846,  and  the  Mas- 
sachusetts and  Maine  decisions  tlierein  cited 
and  commented  on.  Christ's  Church  v. 
Woodward,  21  Me.  (7  Shep.)  172,  1846; 
Fossett  V.  Bearce,  29  Me.  523, 1849 ;  Bearce 
V.  Fossett,  34  Me.  575,  1852;  Jordan  v. 
School  District,  38  Me.  164,  1854 ;  Perry 
V.  Dover,  12  Pick.  206;  Houghton  v. 
Davenport,  23  Pick.  235;  Williams  v. 
Lunenberg,  21  Pick.  75 ;  Briggs  v.  Mur- 
dock,  13  Pick.  305;  Rand  i;.Vilder,  11 
Cush.  (Mass.)  294,  1853;  Cardigan  v. 
Page,  6  N.  H.  182 ;  State  v.  Donahay,  1 
Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  404;  Hardcastle  v. 
The  State,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  352;  Detroit 
V.  R.  R.  Co.,  39  Ind.  598 ;  McPike  v.  Parr, 
51  Mo.  63;  French  v.  Edwards,  13  Wall. 
511.  In  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  17  Vt.  337, 
the  strict  view  is  held  that  the  notice  or 
warning  must  be  recorded  by  the  clerk.  If, 
as  recorded,  the  time  for  which  the  meet- 
ing was  to  be  holden  is  not  specified,  the 
defect  cannot  be  supplied  hy  parol  evi- 
dence that  in  the  original  warning  the 
hour  for  the  meeting  was  named.  This 
decision  was  not  put  upon  the  ground 
that  the  statute  expressly  required  the 
warning  to  be  recorded  (which  it  did  not), 
but  upon  the  ground  that  the  statute  in- 
tended that  the  records  should  furnish  all 
the  means  for  testing  the  validitj-  of  the 
proceedings.  See,  also,  Stevens  v.  Society, 
etc.,  12  Vt.  688,  1839;  post,  sec.  309. 
Where  the  place  of  an  annual  meeting  is 
not  fixed  by  statute  or  charter,  notice  of 
the  meeting  and  place  is  essential.  United 
States  V.  ikcKilden,  8  Rep.  Dec.  1879,  p. 


§  268.] 


NEW   ENGLAND   TOWN   MEETINGS. 


287 


§  267.  (205)  It  is,  however,  sufficient  if  the  purpose  or  object 
of  the  meeting  can  fairly  he  understood  from  the  notice  or 
warrant.^  And  where  the  statute  requires  the  time  and  place  to 
be  stated  in  the  notice,  its  requirements  must  be  observed,  and 
there  can  be  no  legal  meeting  unless  it  originally  assembles  at 
the  prescribed  time  and  place.  The  law  is  strictly  held  as  to 
the  important  particulars  of  time  and  place,  as  will  appear  by 
the  illustrations  in  the  notes.- 

§  268.  (206)  Where  the  statute  requires  the  notice  "  to 
specify  the  business  to  be  done,^^  an  omission  to  comply  with  this 

778;  3  McArthur.  Presumption  in  fa- 
vor of  legality  of  meeting  after  lapse  of 
long  time.  Peterborough  v.  Lancaster, 
14  N.  H.  382,  392.  Length  of  notice. 
Hunt  V.  School  District,  14  Vt.  300 ;  Pratt 
V.  Swanton,  15  lb.  247 ;  post,  sec.  285, 
note. 

Under  a  statute  of  New  York,  the 
notice  it  required  of  school  meetings  held 
to  be  directory  only,  and  the  want  of  no- 
tice, when  not  fraudulently  or  wilfully 
omitted,  does  not  render  the  meeting  in- 
valid, and  its  proceedings  void.  Mar- 
chant  V.  Langworthy,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  646; 
affirmed  in  error,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.),  526. 
See,  also,  Williams  v.  Larkin,  3  Denio, 
114 ;  post,  sec.  290.  Where  the  charter 
required  the  clerk  to  publish  a  notice  re- 
quiring all  persons  interested  in  and  op- 
posed to  a  local  improvement  to  attend 
before  the  council  at  a  day  named,  and 
such  notice  was  given  and  a  hearing  had, 
it  was  held  that  since  the  charter  pro- 
vided for  but  one  notice  and  one  hearing,  it 
was  a  matter  of  discretion  with  the  coun- 
cil whether  another  hearing  should  be  al- 
lowed, and  that  subsequent  action  by  the 
council  without  such  notice  or  second 
hearing  was  not,  under  the  circumstances, 
invalid.  Locke  v.  Rochester,  5  Lansing 
(N.  Y.),  11,  1871;  post,  sees.  803,  804, 
927,  n. 

1  School  District  v.  Blakeslee,  13  Conn. 
227. 

2  Sherwin  v.  Bugbee,  16  Vt.  439,  444, 
1844.  In  reference  to  town  meetings,  the 
statute  of  Vermont  requires  that  tlie  notice 
shall  be  in  writing,  and  shall  "  specify  the 
business  to  be  done,  and  the  time  and 
place  of  holding  said  meeting."  Referring 
to  this  statute,  lledjicjd,  J.  (in  Siierwin  v. 
Bugbee,    supra),   says  :    "  We    have    no 


doubt  the  place  of  holding  the  meeting 
must  be  definitely  specified.  It  would 
hardly  do  to  warn  a  meeting  to  be  held 
at  some  place  in  the  district,  or  at  a  desig- 
nated village,  or  at  one  of  two  or  more 
dwelling-houses.  So,  too,  in  regard  to 
time,  there  seems  to  be  a  propriety  in 
having  it  definitely  fixed.  If  the  day, 
only,  is  named,  the  question  immediately 
arises,  Shall  the  inhabitants  be  required 
to  attend  the  whole  day  ?  or.  When  can 
the  meeting  transact  the  business  for 
which  they  meet,  so  as  to  bind  the  absent 
members  ?  The  fact  that  the  meeting 
adjourned  to  another  day  and  hour  will 
not  help  the  matter,  on  the  obvious  prin- 
ciple that  the  adjourned  meeting  could 
have  no  more  authority  than  the  original 
meeting,  which  was  void." 

Where  it  appears  that  a  meeting  was 
held  on  the  day  appointed,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed tliat  it  was  held  at  a  suitable  time 
in  the  day,  and  pursuant  to  the  notice.  A 
meeting  should  be  opened  witliin  a  rea- 
sonable time  after  the  hour  specified;  but 
what  is  such  reasonable  time  depends 
upon  circumstances.  School  District  v. 
Blakeslee,  13  Conn.  227.  Where  a  meet- 
ing was  called  at  a  certain  school-house, 
it  was  held  to  mean  witliin  the  walls  of 
the  building.  An  assemblage  of  some  of 
the  citizens  in  the  highway  near  tlie  school- 
house,  and  an  adjournment  to  another 
place,  is  not  a  legal  meeting,  and  its 
transactions  are  not  binding,  though  the 
scliool  house  was  locked,  and  the  weather 
cold  and  no  fire  in  the  building.  Cham- 
berlain V.  Dover,  13  Me.  4G6,  1836.  See, 
also,  Haines  v.  School  District,  41  Me. 
246,  1856  ;  Kingsbury  v.  School  District, 
12  Met.  99,  1846. 


288 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  X. 


requivcment  makes  the  meeting  void,  and  it  is  held  that  a  notice 
stating  generally  "  to  do  any  proper  business,"  is  insufficient,  and 
the  acts  and  votes  of  a  meeting  held  under  it  are  of  no  binding 
or  legal  force. ^  Indeed,  the  rule  is  general  that  where  the 
statute  requires  the  business  to  be  stated  in  the  Avarrant  or 
notice,  this  is  absolutely  essential,  and  the  meeting  must  be 
confined  to  those  matters.^ 


§  269.  (207)  At  a  meeting  duly  constituted  and  organized,  a 
majority  of  the  members,  electors,  or  corporators  present,  in 
the  absence  of  any  statute  either  conferring  or  denjdng  the 
power,  have  the  implied  incidental  corporate  right  to  adjourn  the 
meeting  to  another  time,  either  on  the  same  or  to  a  future  day, 
and,  if  fairly  done,  to  another  place  within  the  corporate  limits.^ 


1  Hunt  V.  School  District,  14  Vt.  300, 
1842;  Sherwin  v.  Biigbee,  16  Vt.  439; 
s.  c.  17  Ih.  337,  444,  1844.  "  Such  meet- 
ings are  void  for  all  purposes  of  transact- 
ing business  not  specified  "  in  the  written 
notice  required  by  the  statute,  lb.  per 
Redjiehl,  J. 

2  lb.  Johnson  v.  Wilson,  2  N.  H.  202 ; 
Tucker  v:  Aiken,  7  N.  II.  113 ;  Baker  v. 
Shepherd,  4  Fost.  (24  N.  H.)  208. 

By-laws  passed  at  a  town  meeting  not 
duly  warned  (as,  for  example,  where  the 
notice  did  not  "  specify  the  objects  "  of 
the  meeting  as  required  by  statute)  are 
void.  Hayden  v.  Noyes,  5  Conn.  391, 
1824 ;  Willard  v.  Killingworth,  8  lb.  247. 
The  party  claiming  under  a  by-law  must 
show  it  was  passed  at  a  meeting  duly 
warned.  8  Conn.  247,  supra.  And  must, 
perhaps,  show  all  the  essentials  of  its 
validit}',  such  as  the  due  passage,  publi- 
cation, etc.     lb. 

Where  the  statute  requires  that  all 
matters  to  be  acted  upon  at  the  meeting 
shall  be  inserted  in  the  warrant  or  notice, 
a  failure  to  do  this  will  avoid  as  to  both 
parties  any  contract  that  may  be  made, 
or  any  act  that  may  be  done,  with  respect 
to  a  matter  not  embraced  in  the  war- 
rant or  notice.  Cornish  i'.  Pease,  18  Me. 
(6  Shep.)  184,  1841;  Spear  r.  Robinson, 
29  Me.  (14  Shep.)  531,  1849;  Little  v. 
Merrill,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  543;  Blackburn 
V.  Walpole,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  97  ;  Torrej  v. 
Millbury,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  64;  76.  75; 
Ilasdell  V.  Hancock,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  52G; 


Jones  V.  Andover,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  146, 
1829;  Kingsbury  v.  School  District,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  99,  1846;  Rand  v.  Wilder 
11  Cush.  (Mass.)  294,  1853.  But  if  the 
matter  is  embraced,  and  the  meeting  duly 
met,  it  is  no  objection  to  its  action  that  it 
was  had  near  the  close  of  the  meeting, 
and  when  a  portion  of  the  voters  had  re- 
tired. Dean  v.  Jay,  23  Me.  (9  Shep.) 
117, 1843.  Subsequent  legal  meeting  may 
rati/i/  acts  of  previous  meeting  not  duly 
notified.  Jordan  v.  School  District,  38 
Me.  104.  By  participating  in  a  meeting 
illegally  called,  a  party  is  not  estopped 
to  deny  its  legality.  School  District  v. 
Atherton,  12  Met.  (Mass.)  105. 

^  Chamberlain  v.  Dover,  13  Me.  (1 
Shep.)  466,  1836;  People  v.  Martin, 
1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  22,  1851;  Hubbard  v. 
Winsor,  15  Mich.  146;  Kimball  v.  Mar- 
shall, 44  N.  H.  465,  1863;  Goodell  v. 
Baker,  8  Cowen  (N.  Y.),  286.  Electors 
exclusive  judges  of  necessity  of  adjourn- 
ment of  town  meeting,  and  such  adjourn- 
ment to  next  day,  and  at  another  place, 
in  the  town  twenty  miles  distant,  was  con- 
sidered lawful.  lb.  Tlie  statute  provided 
that  if  at  any  annual  town  meeting  no 
place  is  fixed  by  the  electors  for  the  next 
annual  town  meeting,  such  town  meeting 
shall  be  held  at  the  place  of  the  last  an- 
nual town  meeting.  1  R.  Sts.  N.  Y.  340, 
sec.  3.  Held,  in  People  v.  Martin,  1  Seld. 
(5  N.  Y.)  22,  that  though  the  place  of 
meeting  was  thus  contingently  fixed  by 
statute,  the  electors,  beiug  duly  assembled, 


§  270.] 


CONSTITUTION   OF  COUNCILS. 


289 


Constitution  and  Meetings  of  Councils  or  Select  Governing  Bodies  ; 
and  herein  of  Quorums  and  3Iajorities,  of  Integral  Parts,  and 
of  /Stated,  Special,  and  Adjourned  3Ieetings. 

§  270.  (208)  Unlike  the  towns  of  Miv  England,  in  which  all 
the  qualified  voters  meet  and  act  in  their  primary  capacity,  the 
councils  of  cities  and  towns  are  representative  bodies,  the  num- 
ber of  whose  members  is  fixed  by  law,  and  they  are  elected  by 
the  legal  voters  of  the  incorporate  place.  This  council  is  the 
governing  body  of  the  municipal  corporation,  and  the  corporation, 
unless  it  is  otherwise  provided,  can  act  and  be  bound  only 
through  the  medium  of  the  council.^  The  charter  or  constituent 
act  of  the  place  usually  contains  provisions  as  to  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  council,  its  stated  and  special  meetings,  and  the 
notice  thereof  requisite  to  be  given,  how  many  shall  constitute  a 
quorum,  and  an  enumeration  of  its  powers.  The  usual  scheme 
of  the  organization  of  the  council  is  to  divide  the  territory  of  the 
incorporated  place  into  districts  or  w^ards,  the  voters  in  each  of 
which  elect  one  or  more  representatives  annually,  called  alder- 


might  adjourn  it  for  tlie  residue  of  the  day 
to  another  place  in  the  town.  Concluding 
his  opinion  in  this  case,  Paige,  J.,  well 
remarks :  "  I  confess  that  I  have  had 
some  difficulty  in  coming  to  this  conclu- 
sion, and  I  think  the  power  [which  is 
decided  to  exist]  of  adjourning  a  town 
meeting  to  another  time  and  place  may, 
under  peculiar  circumstances,  be  oppres- 
sively exercised,  and  lead  to  a  defeat  of 
the  popular  will.  This  power  ought  not 
to  be  exercised  except  in  a  case  of  ex- 
treme necessity."  People  v.  Martin,  1  Seld. 
(5N.  Y.)27. 

Afler  a  valid  adjournment,  acts  by  a 
portion  of  the  voters  who  remain  are 
invalid.  Kimball  v.  Lamprey,  19  N.  H. 
215.  In  ^lassachitsetts,  an  adjournment  of 
a  meeting  should  appear  of  record,  and 
parol  evidence  of  an  adjournment  to  an- 
other day.  is  held  to  be  inadmissible. 
Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  307, 
1824.  See  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  309,  and  cliapter  on  Corporate 
Records  and  Documents,  jmst,  sec.  298. 
An  adjourned  meeting  of  a  meeting  not 
legally  called  cannot  validate  the  former 
meeting  nor  itself  legally  act.  United 
States  V.  McKelden,  Vol.  VIII.  Rep.  1778, 

VOL.  I.  19 


3  McArthur.  The  statute  of  Neio  York 
(1  R.  Sts.  342)  only  requires  the  town 
meeting  to  be  kept  open  during  the  day- 
time, or  some  part  thereof,  but  not  that 
it  shall  be  kept  open  during  the  whole 
and  every  part  of  the  day,  between  the 
rising  and  setting  of  the  sun.  People  v. 
Martin,  1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  22,  1851. 

^  Central  Bridge  Corp.  i;.  Lowell,  15 
Gray  (Mass.),  106,  116,  1860,  where  an 
act  affecting  a  city  was,  by  its  terms,  to 
take  effect  on  acceptance  by  the  city,  it 
was  held  that  the  acceptance  might  be 
made  by  the  governing  body.  76.  The 
legislative  and  corporate  powers  of  a 
municipality,  whose  exercise  is,  by  the 
charter  or  constituent  act,  committed  to 
the  council  or  governing  body,  can  be 
exercised  only  at  a  corporate  meeting 
duly  held ;  and  the  corporate  will  must 
be  ascertained  by  vote  and  embodied  in 
a  definite  form.  The  form  which  the 
corporate  will  assumes  is  usually  either 
a  resolution  or  ordinance,  or  something 
equivalent  thereto.  Schumm  v.  Seymour, 
9  C.  E.  Green  (24  N.  J.  Eq.),  143 ;  State  v. 
Jersey  City,  6  Vroom  (35  N.  J.  L.),  404. 
See  chapter  on  Ordinances,  posf,  sec.  307, 
note. 


290 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  X. 


men  or  councilraen  ;  and  these,  when  duly  convened,  constitute 
the  council,  over  which  the  ma3'or  or  head  executive  officer  of 
the  corporation  presides,  sometimes  constituting  a  member  of  the 
council,  and  in  other  instances,  having  power  to  vote  only  when 
there  is  a  tie  or  to  give  a  second  vote  in  case  of  a  tie.^ 

§  271.  (209)  The  doctrine  of  the  English  courts  as  to  the  old 
corporations  in  that  country,  that  the  mayor  was  an  integral  part 
of  the  corporation,  whose  presence,  unless  otherwise  provided  in 
the  charter,  was  necessary  to  a  valid  corporate  meeting;  that, 
during  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of  mayor,  the  corporation  could  do 
no  valid  act,  unless  expressly  empowered,  except  to  elect  another 
and  thus  complete  the  body  ;  and  that  the  acts  of  the  corporation 
under  the  presidency  of  any  other  than  a  mayor  de  jure,  were 
voidable,  has,  it  is  believed,  no  application  to  the  office  of  mayor 
in  the  corporations  of  this  country.^ 

§  272.  (210)  The  right  of  the  mayor  or  other  officer  to  preside 
over  the  meeting  of  the  council  is  a  franchise,  and  may  be  tested 
by  an  information  in  the  nature  of  a  quo  warranto,^  but  cannot 

Eex  V.  Williams,  1  Burr.  402;  Willc  456, 
pi.  337;  Rex  v.  Hertford,  1  Ld.  Raym. 
426;  approved,  Commonwealth  v.  Arri- 
son,  15  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  130;  ante, 
ch.   ix.   sec.   208.      In    Cochran   v.   Mc- 


1  Power  to  preside  and  give  casting 
vote  at  meetings  of'a  religious  corpora- 
tion construed.  People  v.  Rector,  etc.,  48 
Barb.  (N.Y.)603. 

2  Infra,  sec.  284.  The  text  approved. 
Martindale  v.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411,  1876; 
Welch  V.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C.  C. 
130,  1871.  And  see  ante,  ch  ix.  as  to 
powers  and  duties  of  the  mayor,  sees.  208, 
209. 

The  presiding  officer  of  a  town  meet- 
ing, with  statute  authority  to  maintain 
order,  may  make  a  valid  order,  though  it 
be  by  parol  only,  for  the  removal  of  a  dis- 
orderly person  who  disturbs  the  business 
of  the  meeting.  Parsons  v.  Brainard,  17 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  522,  1837.  Approval  by 
the  mayor  of  proceedings  of  the  council 
may,  by  special  requirement  of  charter, 
be  essential  to  their  validity.  Graham  v. 
Carondolet,  33  Mo.  262,  1862 ;  Kepner  i: 
Commonwealth,  40  Pa.  St.  124.  When 
not.  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  Vroom  (30 
N.  J.  L.),  9-3,  148 ;  see  Dey  v.  Jersey  City, 
19  N.  J.  Eq.  412 ;  Taylor  v.  Palmer,  31 
Cal.  241;  State  v.  Newark,  1  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  399;  post,  sec.  331,  note. 

8  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75, 
1867,  and  authorities  there  cited;  Rey- 
nolds V.  Baldwin,  1  La,  An.  162,   1846; 


Cleary,  supra,  it  was  held  that  the  mayor, 
in  cities  of  the  second  class,  organized 
under  the  General  Incorporation  Act 
(Rev.  of  Iowa,  1860,  ch.  li.),  is  not  ex 
Ojfficio  a  member  of,  nor  has  he  any  right 
to  preside  over,  the  city  council;  that  the 
council  was  composed  exclusively  of  trus- 
tees or  aldermen,"  and  elected  its  own 
presiding  officer.  The  mayor  of  Neiv 
York  is  not  a  member  of  the  common 
council ;  and  the  common  council,  having 
the  power  by  statute  to  appoint  to  oflSce, 
may  exercise  it  without  the  concurrence 
of  the  mayor,  who  has  no  veto  power  upon 
the  appointment.  Achley's  Case,  4  Abb. 
Pr.  Rep.  35,  1856.  Tlie  burgess  of  a 
borough  incorporated  under  the  Pennsyl- 
vania General  Borough  Law  of  1851  has 
no  riglit  to  act  as  a  member  of  the  town 
council,  and  cannot  refuse  to  sign  ordi- 
nances regularly  passed  by  the  town 
council,  on  the  ground  that  he  was  not 
present  as  a  member  when  they  were 
adopted.  Commonwealth  v  Kepner,  10 
Phila.  (Pa.)  510. 


§  273.] 


CONSTITUTION  OF  COUNCILS. 


291 


be  determined,  at  least  ordinarily,  unless  by  statute  provision, 
on  a  bill  in  chancery  to  enjoin,  or  in  any  other  indirect  or  col- 
lateral proceeding.^ 


§  273.  (211)  Who  shall  compose  the  council  or  governing  body 
of  the  corporation  is  in  all  cases  prescribed  by  the  charter  or  in- 
corporation act,  but  the  language  used  has  been  such  as  some- 
times to  lead  to  controversy .^  The  organic  act  of  a  city  provided 
"  that  the  intendant  of  police  shall  have  a  seat  in  the  board  of 
commissioners  [the  governing  body  of  a  city  corporation],  and 
when  present  shall  preside  therein ;  in  his  absence^  the  board 
shall  appoint  a  chairman  pro  tempore.''^  It  was  held  that  the 
intendant  was  thereby  constituted  one  of  the  commissioners,  and 
had  the  right  to  participate  in  making  ordinances.^     Where  the 


1  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75, 
86,  1867  ;  Topping  r.  Gray,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
259  ;  affirming  s.  c.  9  Paige,  507  ;  Markle 
V.  Wright,  13  Ind.  548 ;  HuUman  v.  Hon- 
comp,  5  Ohio,  237  ;  People  v.  Cook,  4 
Seld.  8  N.  Y.  67;  affirming  s.  c.  14  Barb. 
257;  Mayor  v.  Conner,  5  Ind.  171  ;  Mos- 
ley  V.  Alston,  1  Pliill.  790 ;  Lord  v.  The 
Governor,  etc.,  2  Phill.  740 ;  Peabody  v. 
Flint,  6  Allen  (Mass.),  52;  Hagner  v. 
Heyberger,  7  Watts  &  Serg:  (Pa.)  104; 
People  V.  Carpenter,  24  N.  Y.  86  ;  People 
V.  Draper,  15  N.  Y.  632 ;  People  v.  Insur- 
ance Co.,  2  Johns.  Ch.  371 ;  People  v. 
Same  Co.  (quo  n-arranto),  15  Johns.  358 ; 
Demarest  v.  Wickham,  ^laj'or,  etc.,  63 
N.  Y.  320,  1875  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Bank 
{(]uo  warranto),  28  Pa.  St.  289 ;  in  chan- 
cery, lb.  379  ;  Hughes  v.  Parker,  20  N.  H. 
58 ;  Strahl,  in  re,  16  Iowa,  369 ;  Upde- 
graff  V.  Crans,  47  Pa.  St.  103 ;  Facey  v. 
Fuller,  23  Mich.  527  ;  see  Kerr  v.  Trego, 
47  Pa.  St.  292,  cited  infra,  sec.  275. 

2  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75, 
1867. 

8  Raleigh  v.  Sorrell,  1  Jones  (North 
Car.),  Law,  49,  1853.  In  this  case  the 
Supreme  Court  of  North  Carolina  admit 
(arrjuendo)  that  an  officer  —  as,  for  exam- 
ple, the  intendant  —  has  no  right,  under 
the  act  of  incorporation,  to  sit  with  the 
legislative  body  of  the  corporation,  but  if 
he  does  so  and  acts  with  them,  that  an 
ordinance  thus  passed  will  be  void,  be- 
cause the  powers  given  to  the  corporsition 
must  be  e.xercised  in  strict  conformity  to 


the  special  delegation  of  authority,  and 
because,  in  the  case  supposed,  the  ordi- 
nance is  not  passed  by  the  body  to  which 
the  power  is  given  ;  citing  Re.x  v.  Croke, 
Cowp.  26.  The  view  of  the  court  is  in 
accordance  with  the  rule  of  the  English 
courts  as  applied  to  their  corporations. 
Thus,  Mr.  Willcock  says:  "It  maybe 
unnecessary  to  add  that  whenever  a  par- 
ticular business  is  delegated  to  a  select 
body,  if  others  join  in  the  performance  of 
it,  the  act  is  void  ;  as  if  the  mayor,  alder- 
men, and  commonalty  join  in  making  a 
by-law  which  is  directed  to  be  made  bj' 
the  mayor  and  aldermen.  For  if  others 
are  allowed  to  vote,  a  by-law  might  be  es- 
tablished, although  all  those  to  whom  the 
power  is  specifically  delegated  should  be 
in  tlie  minority."  Corp.  68,  pi.  128  ;  Parry 
V.  Berry,  Comyns,  269 ;  Rex  v.  Head,  4 
Burr.  2521 ;  Hoblyn  v.  Regem,  6  Bro.  P.  C. 
520 ;  Rex  ?•.  Westwood,  4  B.  &  C.  799, 
818;  Green  v.  Durham,  1  Burr.  131. 
Whether  the  mere  fact  that  a  single 
unautliorized  person  is,  by  a  mistaken  con- 
struction of  the  charter,  allowed  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  transactions  of  a  meeting  of 
the  council,  would,  in  this  country,  be 
held  necessarily  to  avoid  them,  is  a  ques- 
tion which,  perhaps,  remains  yet  to  be 
settled.  It  lias  been  held,  that  if  persons 
who  are  not  qualified  vote  at  a  town, 
parish,  or  district  meeting,  without  objec- 
tion or  challenge  at  the  time,  proof  of  that 
fact  cannot  afterwards  be  made  witii  a 
view  to  invalidate  the  proceedings.     Sut- 


292  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  X^ 

power  to  legislate  for  the  corporation  is  vested  in  "  the  mayor 
and  councilmen,"  the  council  by  itself  cannot  legislate,  but  must 
act  in  conjunction  with  the  mayor.  In  deciding  the  point  the 
court  observes :  "  If  a  simple  resolution  [instead  of  an  ordinance] 
would  be  sufficient,  yet,  before  it  would  have  any  validity,  it 
would  necessarily  have  to  be  signed  by  the  mayor  as  a  part  of 
the  law-making  power :  the  co-ordinate  action  of  both  is  re- 
quired."^ 

§  274.  (212)  It  is  undoubtedly  true,  as  already  stated,  that  the 
corporate  authority  must  be  exercised  by  the  proper  body.  Thus, 
"where  a  town  was  organized  under  a  charter  which  vested  the 
corporate  powers  of  the  place  in  a  president  and  six  trustees, 
and  subsecfuently  a  general  incorporation  act  was  passed  which 
was  erroneously  supposed  to  apply  to  the  town,  and  under  which 
the  town  elected  different  officers  from  those  provided  in  the  ' 
special  charter,  at  a  different  time  and  constituting  a  different 
body,  it  was  held,  in  the  absence  of  legislative  ratification,  that 
this  latter  body  could  not  exercise  the  authority  of  the  corpora- 
tion, since  they  were  a  body  without  any  legal  existence,  and 
were  not  the  body  authorized  to  act  for  the  corporation.  The 
principle  that  the  acts  of  de  facto  officers  are  valid  was  considered 
not  to  be  applicable. ^ 

§  275.  (213)  Where  there  are  two  bodies,  each  of  which  claims 
to  be  the  regular  organized  council,  and  is  acting  as  such  to  the 
detriment  of  the  public,  the  body  rightfully  entitled  to  act  may 
have  an  injunction  to  restrain  the  other  from  interference  with 
them.  To  the  argument  that  in  relation  to  public  corporations 
the  attorney  general  alone  can  file  such  a  bill,  the  court  replied : 
"  We  do  not  think  so.  It  is  right  for  those  to  whom  public  func- 
tions are  entrusted  to  see  that  they  are  not  usurped  by  others."  ^ 

ton  V.  Cole,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  232,  1825.  So  3  Kerr  v.  Trego,  47  Pa.  St.  292,  1864, 

if  such  a  meeting  is  called  by  persons  per  Lowrie,    C.    J.      Compare,    however, 

acting  under  cohr  of  authority,  it  will  be  Demarest  v.  Wickham,  mayor,  etc.,  63  N. 

legal  if  no  exception  to  their  authority  is  Y.  320,  1875.     Mode  of  organizing  coun- 

taken  at  the  time.    Ih.  cils  to  which  new  members  are  to  be  ad- 

1  Saxton  V.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488,  1872,  mitted,  and  tests  in  case  of  conflicting 
Tper  Wofjner,  J.  Sequel  of  the  case,  Sex-  councils,  for  determining  which  is  the 
ton  V.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153,  1875.  legal  organization,  Kerr  v.  Trego,  47  Pa. 

2  Decorah  v.  BuUis,  25  Iowa,  12,  1868;  St.  292,  supra ;  sec.  204,  note;  sec.  272; 
Welch  V.  Ste.  Genevieve.  1  Dillon  C.  C.  sec.  256,  note. 

180,  1871 ;  infra,  sec.  276 


§  277.] 


CONSTITUTION   OF   COUNCILS. 


293 


§  276.  (214)  In  this  country  the  doctrine  is  everywhere  de- 
clared, that  the  acts  of  de  facto  officers,  as  distinguished  from  the 
acts  of  mere  usurpers,  are  valid,  and  the  principle  extends  not 
only  to  municipal  officers  generally,  but  also  to  those  composing 
the  council,  or  legislative  or  governing  body  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration.i  But  in  order  that  there  may  be  a  de  facto  officer,  there 
must  be  a  de  jure  office  ;  and  the  notion  that  there  can  be  a  de 
facto  office  has  been  characterized  as  a  political  solecism,  without 
foundation  in  reason  and  without  support  in  law ;  and,  therefore, 
a  person  cannot  claim  to  be  a  de  facto  officer  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration when  the  corporation  or  people  have,  in  law,  no  power, 
in  any  event,  to  elect  or  appoint  such  an  officer.^ 

§  277.  (215)  The  common  law  principle,  that  if  an  act  is  to 
be  done  by  an  indefinite  body  it  is  valid  if  passed  by  a  majority 
of  those  present  at  a  legal  meeting,  no  matter  how  small  a  portion 
they  may  constitute  of  the  whole  number  entitled  to  be  present, 


1  Scoville  V.  Cleveland,  1  Ohio  St.  126, 
18.53;  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25  Iowa,  12, 
1868  ;  Cochran  v.  McCleary,  22  Iowa,  75, 
84 ;  Strahl,  in  re,  16  Iowa,  360 ;  People  v. 
Stevens,  5  Hill  (N.  Y),  610 ;  State  v.  Ja- 
cobs, 17  Ohio,  14.3;  People  v.  Bartlett, 
6  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  422  ;  Pritchard  v.  People, 
1  Gilm.  (6  111.)  529  ;  People  v.  Runkle,  9 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  147;  Trustees,  etc.  v.  Hill, 
6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  2.3;  Williams  v.  School 
District,  21  Pick.  75 ;  see  Rex  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  9  Mod.  Ill ;  DeGrave  v.  Monmouth, 
4  Car.  &  P.  411 ;  Laver  v.  McGlaclilin,  28 
Wis.  364  ;  post,  sec.  892,  note  ;  Cashing 
V.  Frankfort,  57  Me.  541 ;  Lockhart  v. 
Troy,  48  Ala.  579,  1872;  Riddle  v.  Bed- 
ford, 7  S.  &  R.  (Pa  )  38G ;  People  v.  Hop- 
son,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  574;  Hamlin  v. 
Dingman,  5  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  61;  People 
V.  Nostrand,  40  N.  Y.  375;  Olmsted  c. 
Dennis,  77  N.  Y.  378.  In  a  case  in  the 
House  of  Lords,  decided  in  1851,  it  was 
held  that  an  act  done  by  a  definite  body, 
under  authority  of  parliament,  was  not 
invalid  because  officers  de  facto  joined 
with  officers  de.  jure  in  the  doing  of  it. 
The  judges  having  unanimously  declared 
this  to  be  their  opinion,  the  Lord  Chan- 
cellor said  :  Tlie  opinion  of  the  judges 
as  to  vestrymen  de  facia  and  dc  jure  was 
of  great  importance.     When  it  was  con- 


sidered that  there  were  many  persons  who 
were  charged  with  very  important  duties, 
and  whose  title  to  perform  those  duties  or 
to  exercise  the  powers  necessary  for  their 
performance  the  public  could  not  easily 
ascertain  at  the  time,  and  when  it  was 
remembered  what  inconveniences  would 
arise  if  the  validity  of  their  acts  depended 
on  the  propriety  of  the  election  of  the 
persons  who  had  to  perform  them,  the 
value  of  the  clear  enunciation  of  the  prin- 
ciple thus  made  by  the  judges  was  very 
great,  and  in  the  correctness  of  it  he 
begged  to  declare  his  entire  concurrence. 
Scadding  v.  Lorant,  5  Eng.  Law  &  Eq. 
16,  30,  per  Lord  Chancellor  Truro.  A 
person  acting  in  the  capacity  of  a  public 
officer  is  prima  facie  taken  to  be  so.  Doe 
V.  Barnes,  8  Q.  B.  1043 ;  Regina  i-.  Rob- 
erts (Crown  cases  reserved ),  30  Law  Times 
Rep.  090;  s.  c.  6  Am.  Law  Rep.  414; 
ante,  sec.  237,  note. 

2  Decorah  v.  Bullis,  25  Iowa,  15,  18, 
1808;  Hildretli's  Heirs  !7.  Mclntire's  De- 
visees, 1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  206  ;  People 
V.  White,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  520,540,  541; 
Carleton  v.  People,  10  Mich.  250  ;  Welch 
I'.  Ste.  Genevieve,  1  Dillon  C  C  130, 
1871  ;  supra,  sec.  274;  post,  ch.  xxi. ;  post, 
sec.  892. 


294  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  X. 

lias  been  deemed  applicable  to  the  towns  of  New  England.  In 
those  towns  the  corporate  power  resides,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the 
inhabitants,  or  citizens  at  large,  and  these  form  the  constituent 
body.  If  the  meeting  has  been  duly  called  and  Avarned,  those 
who  assemble,  though  less  than  a  majority  of  the  ivhole,  have  the 
power  to  act  for  and  bind  the  whole,  unless  it  is  otherwise  pro- 
vided by  law.  Those  who  remain  away  are  justly  and  conclu- 
sively presumed  to  assent  to  what  may  lawfully  be  done  by  those 
■who  attend.^ 

§  278.  (216)  The  common  law  rules  as  to  quorums  and  majori- 
ties, established  with  reference  to  corporate  bodies,  consisting  of  a 
definite  number  of  corporators,  have  also,  in  general,  been  applied 
to  the  common  council,  or  select  governing  body  of  our  municipal 
corporations,  where  the  matter  is  not  specially  regulated  by  the 
charter  or  statute.  Thus,  to  use  Mr.  Dane's  illustration,  if  the 
body  consists  of  twelve  common  councilmen,  seven  is  the  least 
number  that  can  constitute  a  valid  meeting,  though  four  of  the 
seven  may  act.^  Accordingly,  a  statute  in  reference  to  a  definite 
body,  declaring  that  a  "  majority  of  those  present  at  any  regular 
meeting  shall  be  competent "  to  transact  business,  leaves  the 
number  which  may  form  a  quorum  to  be  determined  by  the  com- 
mon law  ;  that  is,  there  must  be  at  least  a  majority  present,  and 

1  Damon  v.  Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  necessary  to  avalid  election,  applied,  and 
345,  355,  1824  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Ips-  was  not  controlled  by  the  terms  or  spirit 
wich,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  70;  Williams  v.  of  the  general  election  law  of  the  state. 
Lunenburg,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  75;  Church  State  v.  Wilmington,  3  Harring.  (Del.) 
Case,  5  Robt.  (N.  Y.)  649,  1867;  First  204,1840.  i/a?n«(/ton,  J.,  dissented,  hold- 
Parish  r.  Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  148,  ing  (and,  as  it  would  seem,  witli  reason) 
1838 ;  State  v.  Binder,  38  Mo.  450,  1806.  that  the  plurality  principle  had  been  the 

At  a  popular  election,  a  candidate  for  one  "  invariably  adopted  as  most  in  con- 

a  municipal  office   received  a  pluralitt/  of  sonance  with  our  institutions  in  all  cases 

all   the  votes  cast,  but  not  a  majority,  where  the  law  of  election  is  silent  in  this 

There  was  no  provision  of  the  charter  nor  respect."     Il>.  p.  305.     See  First  Parish 

any  by-law  on  the  subject.     The  usage  in  i;.  Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)   148.     As  to 

the  corporation  seemed  to  have  been  to  municipal  elections.     Ante,  eh.  \\. 

consider  the  person  having  the  highest  '^  5  Dane  Abr.  150 ;  Willcocks,  in  re, 

number  of  votes,  although  not  a  majority  7  Cow.   (N.  Y.),  402,  410,  1827,  note  d, 

of   the    whole,    as    duly   elected.      The  and  criticism  on  the  rule  stated  in  1  Kyd 

statute   in   relation   to  stale  elections  ex-  on  Corp.  418,  425;   2   Kent  Com.   293; 

pressly  provided  that  "plurality,  or  the  Buel  v.  Buckingham,  16  Iowa,  284,  18(34; 

highest  number  of  votes,  should  make  a  Regents,  etc.  v.  Williams,  9  Gill  &  Johns, 

choice."     Under  these  circumstances,  the  (Md.)  365;    Mills  v.   Gleason,    11    Wis. 

majority  of  the  court  were  of  opinion  that  470. 
the  common  law  rule,  that  a  mujorily  is 


§  282.]  CONSTITUTION   OF  COUNCILS.  295 

such  a  provision,  it  was  considered,  did  not  authorize  a  minority 
of  the  whole  body  to  act.^ 

§  279.  (217)  So,  if  a  board  of  viUage  trustees  consists  oi  five 
members^  and  all,  or  four,  are  present,  two  can  do  no  valid  act, 
even  though  the  others  are  disqualified,  b}^  interest,  from  voting, 
and  therefore  omit  or  decline  to  vote  ;  their  assenting  to  the 
measure  voted  for  by  the  two  will  not  make  it  valid.  If  three 
only  were  present  they  would  constitute  a  quorum,  then  the 
votes  of  two,  being  a  majority  of  the  quorum,  would  be  valid  ;2 
certainly  so  where  the  three  are  all  competent  to  act.^ 

§  280.  (218)  In  another  case,  the  power  of  amotion  was  con- 
ferred upon  a  city  council  to  be  exercised  "  by  a  vote  of  two  thirds 
of  that  body,^^  and  this  was  considered  to  give  the  power  of  re- 
moval to  two  thirds  of  a  legal  quorum.  Two  thirds  of  the  whole 
number  of  members  composing  the  council  were  held  not  to  be 
required.  The  point  was  admitted  to  be  close,  and  the  French 
text  of  the  charter  was  relied  on  as  favoring  the  conclusion 
reached.* 

§  281.  (219)  In  a  case  which  arose  in  California,  the  charter 
of  the  city  contained  a  provision  that  no  ordinance  should  be 
passed  by  the  common  council,  except  by  a  majority  of  all  the 
members  elected.  Eight  were  elected,  and  it  was  decided,  under 
the  above-mentioned  requirement  of  the  charter,  that  an  ordi- 
nance could  not  be  passed  by  a  vote  of  four  against  three,  since 
four  did  not  constitute  a  majority  of  all  the  members  elected, 
although  it  did  constitute  a  legal  quorum.^ 

§  282.  (220)  In  the  absence  of  special  provision,  the  major 
part  of  those  present,  at  a  meeting  of  a  select  body,  must  concur 

1  Willcocks,  in  re,l  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  402,  2  Qq\q^  y_  Williamsburg,  10  Wend.  (N. 

1827  ;  lb.  4G3  and  note ;  Ih.  526  and  note.  Y.),  658,  1833. 

In  Iowa,  "  all  ordinances  and  resolutions,  3  Buell  v.  Buckingham,  16  Iowa,  284, 
or  orders  for  tlie  appropriation  or  pay-  1864,  and  cases  cited, 
ment  of  money,  sliall  require  for  their  *  Warnock  v.  Lafayette,  4  La.  An. 
passage  or  adoption  the  concurrence  of  a  419,  1849.  See,  on  this  point,  Logans- 
majority  of  all  the  trustees  of  any  munici-  port  v.  Legg,  20  Ind.  315. 
pal  corporation,"  etc.  A  resolution  for  a  ^  San  Francisco  v.  Hazen,  5  Cal.  169, 
change  of  the  boundaries  of  a  city  does  1855.  See,  also,  Oakland  v.  Carpentier, 
not  require  such  majority  concurrence.  13  Cal.  540;  McCracken  y.  San  Francisco, 
Strohm  v.  Iowa  City,  47  Iowa,  42.  16  Cal.  591 ;  Piemental  v.  San  Francisco, 

21  Cal.  S51. 


296  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  X. 

in  order  to  do  any  valid  act.  Therefore,  when  it  appeared  that 
thirteen  ballots  were  cast  when  the  members  present  were  only 
entitled  to  give  twelve  votes,  of  which  seven  were  for  one  person 
and  six  for  another,  there  is  no  election,  and  the  council,  though 
it  has  declared  that  the  person  receiving  seven  votes  was  duly 
elected,  may  subsequently  rescind  its  action  and  proceed  to  a  new 
election.^  And  in  South  Carolina  the  general  rule  is  recognized, 
and  a  majority  of  the  board  of  managers  of  elections  —  having 
power,  by  statute,  to  determine  the  validity  of  contested  elec- 
tions —  is  a  quorum,  and  a  majority  of  that  quorum  may  act  and 
decide.^ 

§  283.  (221)  And,  as  a  general  rule^  it  may  be  stated  that  not 
only  where  the  corporate  power  resides  in  a  select  body,  as  a  city 
council,  but  where  it  has  been  delegated  to  a  committee  or  to 
agents,  then,  in  the  absence  of  special  provisions  otherwise,  a 
minority  of  the  select  body,  or  of  the  committee  or  agents,  are 
powerless  to  bind  the  majority  or  do  any  valid  act.  If  all  the 
members  of  the  select  body  or  committee,  or  if  all  of  the  agents  are 
assembled,  or  if  all  have  been  duly  notified,  and  the  minority  re- 
fuse or  neglect  to  meet  with  the  others,  a  majority  of  those  pres- 
ent may  act,  provided  those  present  constitute  a  majority  of  the 
whole  number.  In  other  Avords,  in  such  case,  a  major  part  of  the 
whole  is  necessary  to  constitute  a  quorum,  and  a  majority  of 
the  quorum  may  act.  If  the  major  part  withdraw  so  as  to  leave  no 
quorum,  the  power  of  the  minority  to  act  is,  in  general,  considered 
to  cease.^  But  where  the  duties  are  purely  ministerial,  and  not 
judicial,  or  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  exclude  the  idea  of  action 
as  a  body  or  board,  and  where  they  are  devolved  on  public  officers 

1  Labourdette  v.  Municipality,  2  La.  the  legislative  intent,  deduced  from  va- 

An.  527,  1847.  rious  provisions  of  the  act,  to  coranait  the 

-  State  V.  Deliesseline,  1  McCord  matter  to  the  acting  managers. 
(South  Car.),  52,  1821,  where  the  subject  3  Kingsbury  v.  School  District,  12 
is  elaborately  considered  hj  Nott,  3.;  s.  Met.  (Mass.)  99,  1846;  Day  v.  Green,  4 
p.  State  f.  Huggins,  Harper  (South  Car.)  Cush.  (Mass.)  438,  439,  1849;  Fishery. 
Law,  94, 1824, further  holding  that  where.  School  District,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  494, 
of  eighteen  managers  appointed  by  the  1849;  Coffin  i-.  Nantucket,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 
legislature,  two  refused  to  qualify,  one  269,1850;  11  Cush.  433;  Damon  y.  Gran- 
was  disqualified,  and  one  dead,  the  re-  by,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345,355,1824;  State 
maining  fourteen  (from  necessity  and  pub-  v.  Jersey  City,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  493; 
lie  convenience)  properly  constituted  the  Charles  v.  Hoboken,  lb.  203 ;  Dey  v.  Jer- 
board,  and  might  act  by  a  majority  of  sey  City,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  412,  1869;  Balti- 
the  fourteen.     The  decision  rests  upon  more  v.  Poultney,  25  Md.  18,  1866. 


§  283.] 


CONSTITUTION  OF  COUNCILS. 


297 


or  agents  rather  than  on  the  agents  of  corporations,  the  rule  above 
stated  (as  the  cases  below  referred  to  will  show)  has  been  re- 
laxed, and  in  some  instances,  deemed  wholly  inapplicable.^ 


1  With  respect  to  persons  or  officers 
appointed  by  law  to  act  judicially  in  a 
puLUc  matter,  it  is  generally  held,  there 
being  no  provision  of  statute  to  the  con- 
trary, that  where  aH  meet  and  act,  a  major- 
itij  may  decide  and  bind  the  rest,  and  this 
notwithstanding  the  express  dissent  of 
the  minority,  or  their  wrongful  with- 
drawal before  the  act  is  consummated. 
Rogers,  in  re,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  526,  1827 
(appraisal  of  damages  by  canal  apprais- 
ers), and  see  lb.  note  a,  and  the  cases 
there  cited  and  reviewed  ;  lb.  764,  expla- 
nation. See,  further,  Willcocks,  in  re,  7 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  402,  and  note  ;  lb.  462,  463; 
Young  V.  Buckingham,  5  Oliio,  485,  489, 
1832;  Charles  v.  Hoboken,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
203;  Martin  v.  Lemon,  26  Conn.  192, 
1857 ;  Astor  v.  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  567, 
580,  1875;  People  v.  Palmer  (effect  of 
death  of  one  of  the  members  or  officers), 
52  N.  Y.  84;  People  v.  Syracuse,  63 
N.  Y.  291 ;  ante,  sec.  99,  note ;  post,  ch. 
xxiii. 

The  statute  authorized  the  appoint- 
ment of  three  levee  inspectors,  and  pre- 
scribed their  duties,  which  involved  the 
exercise  of  judgment.  Held,  that  all  must 
meet  and  act,  and  that  the  action  of  a 
majority  in  the  absence  of  the  third  was 
void.  Ballard  v.  Davis,  31  Miss.  525, 
1856. 

Where  a  majority  of  a  committee  is  au- 
thorized to  act,  they  constitute  a  party 
capable  of  contracting  ;  and  another  mem- 
ber of  a  committee,  not  acting  as  such, 
but  as  an  individual,  constitutes  another 
party  capable  of  being  contracted  with. 
It  is  accordingly  held  that  a  majority  of 
such  a  committee  may  contract  with  or 
employ  one  of  their  own  number,  and  such 
contract,  if  fairly  made  and  without 
fraud  or  corruption,  will  be  binding  upon 
the  corporation.  Junkins  v.  Union  Scliool 
District.  39  Me.  220 ;  Buell  v.  Bucking- 
ham, 16  Iowa,  284;  post,  sec.  443,  note; 
ante,  sec.  292 ;  Willard  v.  Newburyjjort, 
12  Pick.  (Mass.)  227.  Compare  Smith  v. 
Albany,  01  N.  Y.  444,  1875.  But  a  con- 
tract made  by  less  than  a  majority  of  a 
committee  of  the  corporation,  though  in 


the   name   of   the    whole,   binds    neither 
party.     Post,   sec.   452.     But   it    will   be 
binding  if  the  authority   was  joint  and 
several,  or  if  ratified.     Adams  v.  Hill,  16 
Me.  (4  Sliep.)  215, 1839  ;  Kupfer  v.  South 
Parish,  etc.,  12  Mass.  185,  1815;  Allen  v. 
Cooper,  22  Me.  133,  1842.     In  Damon  v. 
Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)   345,   1842,   this 
distinction   is   taken.      If   a  public   cor- 
poration   appoints    a    committee    of   ita 
own   members,  a  majority    may    bind,  for 
such    is    the    usage    and    the    common 
law  in  relation  to  corporations.     But  if 
the   authority   is    given   to   persons    not 
members  of  the  body,  such  persons  are 
agents,  and  not  technically  a  committee, 
and   all  must  concur,   unless  it  appear 
that   it   was    intended    that   a  majority 
should  act.     See  autliorities  cited  by  So- 
licitor  General    Davis  in  same   case,  p. 
350;  Viner's  Ab.  title  Authority,  B.  pi.  7. 
Further  as  to  binding  force  of  the  act  of 
majority  of  a  committee  or  board  of  se- 
lectmen, see  Jones  v.  Andover,  9  Pick. 
(Mass.)   146;    Crommett  v.  Pearson,   18 
Me.    (6   Shep.)    344,    1841;    Junkins   v. 
School  District,  39  Me.   220,  1855;    In- 
habitants, etc.  V.  Cole,  3  Pick.   (Mass.) 
232,  244 ;  Kingsbury  v.  School  District, 
12  Met.  (Mass.)  99,  1846;  Keyes  v.  West- 
ford,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  273,  1835;  Green 
V.   Miller,    6    Johns.    (N.    Y.)    39,    1810; 
Grindley  ;;.  Barker,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  236,;jer 
Eyre,  C.  J. ;  King  v.  Boston,  3  Term  R. 
592 ;    Gutlirie  v.  Armstrong,  5  Barn.  & 
Aid.  628,  1822,  wliere  it  was  held  that  a 
power  given  to  fifteen  jointly  and  sever- 
ally was  well  executed  by  four.    A  school 
committee   appointed    according   to   and 
under  a  statute  are  public  officers  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute  which  gives  a 
majority  of  sucli  officers  authority  to  act 
for   the   whole.     Keyser   v.   School   Dis- 
trict, 35  N.  H.  477,  1857.     Where  an  au- 
thority is  given,  by  law,  to  a  committee, 
or  to  more  persons  than  one,  to  do  an  act 
of  a  public  nature,  one  alone,  unless  there 
be   something   to   show   such    intention, 
cannot   act    independently   and   without 
the  concurrence  of  the  others,  or  at  least 
of  a  majority.     If  the  act  is  ministerial,  a 


298 


MUNICIPAL  C0RP6raTI0NS. 


[CH.  X. 


§  284.  (222)  The  doctrine  of  the  English  coiu-ts  is,  that  all  of 
tlie  integral  pitrts  of  a  corporation  necessary  to  do  an  act  must 
not  only  meet,  but  remain  present  till  the  act  is  completed ;  and 
therefore  if  one  of  such  parts  deserts  or  withdraws,  though  wrong- 
fully, and  to  defeat  any  action,  before  the  act  is  consummated, 


majority  at  least  must  concur ;  but  unless 
requireil,  or  such  is  tlie  practice,  they  need 
not  act  as  a  board,  and  be  convened  or 
notified  to  be  convened  as  such.  But  if 
the  act  is  judicial  in  its  nature,  that  is, 
requiring  the  exercise  of  judgment,  unless 
special  provision  is  otherwise  made,  all 
must  meet  or  have  notice  to  meet,  a  ma- 
jority will  constitute  a  quorum,  and  a 
majority  of  the  quorum  will  be  compe- 
tent to  act.  Martin  v.  Lemon,  26  Conn. 
192,  lb57.  In  this  case  it  was  ruled  that 
one  of  a  committee  of  three  to  remove 
encroachments  on  highways  could  not  act 
alone.  Committees  of  public  corpora- 
tions have  sometimes  been  held  to  be 
governed,  with  respect  to  meeting  and 
notice,  by  different  rules  from  a  board 
which  has  necessarily  to  be  assembled  or 
convened  before  it  can  act.  And  the  acts 
of  a  majority  of  such  committees  have 
been  considered  valid,  though  some  mem- 
ber of  the  committee  was  not  notified. 
Gallup  I'.  Tracy  (town  committee  to 
stake  out  oyster  grounds),  25  Conn.  10, 
1856.  But  compare  Martin  v.  Lemon, 
26  Conn.  192.  And  see  Damon  i'.  Gran- 
by,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  315,  351 ;  Grindley  v. 
Barker,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  229;  Keeler  v. 
Frost,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  400  ;  Perry  v.  Ty- 
ner,  lb.  137.  Where  a  public  authority 
is  to  be  exercised  by  two  oflScers  —  a 
number  not  admitting  of  a  majority  — 
regularly,  both  should  act ;  yet,  to  pre- 
vent a  failure  of  justice,  it  seems  one 
may,  in  certain  cases,  as  where  the  other 
is  dead,  disqualified,  or  absent,  act  alone. 
But  certain  it  is,  that  where  one  only  acts, 
the  consent  of  the  other  will  he  p/esumed. 
This  is  an  application  of  the  strong  pre- 
sumption which  obtains  in  favor  of  the 
performance  of  official  duty.  Downing 
V.  Rugar,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  178,  1839, 
and  authorities  cited.  This  case  also 
holds  that  the  presumption  of  consent 
should  be  rebutted  only  by  the  testimony 
of  the  other  oflacer.     lb.  185.     "It  is  a 


general  principle  that  where  a  board  of 
oflicers  (for  example,  overseers  of  the 
poor)  is  constituted  to  perform  a  duty 
provided  by  law,  the  act  of  the  majority 
is  the  act  of  the  whole  body."  Per  Ben- 
nett, J.,  Walcott  V.  Walcott,  19  Vt.  37,  39, 
1840.  See,  also.  King  v.  Beesten,  3  Term 
R.  592;  Jones  v.  Andover,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
146. 

Under  the  statutes  of  Pennsylvania,  all 
powers  conferred  upon  county  commis- 
sioners may  be  legally  executed  by  two 
without  the  concurrence  of  the  third. 
Commissioners  y.Leckey,6  Serg.  &  Rawle 
(Pa),  166;  Cooper  v.  Reansbey,  8  Watts 
(Pa.),  128;  Curtis  v.  Butler  Co.,  24  How. 
435;  Jefferson  Co.  v.  Slagle,  66  Pa.  St. 
202,  where  it  is  held  that  a  contract  by 
two  county  commissioners  within  the 
scope  of  their  authority  bound  the  county, 
although  not  made  at  their  office. 

Wiiere  three  commissioners  are  ap- 
pointed to  contract  for  site  for  poor- 
house,  two  of  them  cannot  make  a  valid 
purchase.  Pulaski  Co.  i'.  Lincoln,  4  Eng. 
(9  Ark.)  320,  1849.  Action  of  less  than 
a  majority  of  commissioners  of  public 
buildings,  appointed  by  act  of  legislature, 
is  void.  Petrie  v.  Doe,  30  Miss.  698, 
1856.  A  statute  declaring  that  every 
board  of  township  trustees,  "and  the 
viemhers  thereof,"  shall  be  overseers  of 
the  poor  was  construed  to  make  each 
member  an  overseer,  with  power  to  act. 
County  Commissioners  v.  Jones,  7  Ind.  3, 
5,  1855.  When  majority  may  lawfully 
execute  powers  of  a  public  nature.  Com- 
missioners V.  Leckey,  6  Serg  &  Rawle 
(Pa.),  170;  Baltimore  v.  Turnpike,  5 
I3inn.  (Pa.),  484;  McCready  v.  Guardians, 
9  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  99;  Common- 
wealth V.  Commissioners,  9  Watts  (Pa.), 
466,  471 ;  Cooper  v.  Lampeter,  8  Watts 
(Pa.),  128;  Caldwell  v.  Harrison,  11  Ala., 
755 ;  Commissioners  v.  Tarver,  21  lb.  661 ; 
Crist  V.  Town  Trustees,  10  Ind.  4.52; 
Schenck  v.  Peay,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  267. 


§  285.] 


CONSTITUTION   OF   COUNCILS. 


299 


the  act  is  not  valid. ^  The  liability  of  this  rule  to  abuse,  since  it 
enables  one  of  the  parts  of  a  joint  meeting  or  assembly  to  defeat 
any  action  whatever,  has  led  the  courts  in  this  country  to  deny 
its  applicability  here,  or  to  apply  it  with  caution.^ 


§  285.    (223)  The  usual  division  of  the  meetings  of  corporate 
^,-.„  ,-c  JQt;Q  (^^  stated  or  regular,  and  (2)  special  meetings ;  and 


bodies  is 


1  King  V.  "Williams,  2  Maule  &  Sel 
141;  following  King  v.  Butler,  8  East, 
388;  questioning  King  v.  Norris,  1  Bar- 
nard. K.  B.  385;  cited  and  reviewed,  7 
Cow.  526,  note ;  King  v.  Miller,  7  Terra 
R.  278;  2  Kent's  Com.  292.  Mr.  Will- 
cock  vindicates  the  rule,  but  on  grounds 
not  very  satisfactory.  Corp.  53, 54.  Supra, 
sec.  271. 

2  Humphreys,  in  re,  10  Wend.  N.  Y. 
612,  1834;  People  u.  Batchelor,  22  N.  Y. 
128,  146,  per  Demo,  J.;  First  Parish  v. 
Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.),  148, 1838;  Coles 
Co.  V.  Allison,  23  111.  383. 

The  common  law  rule,  that  to  the  due 
constitution  of  a  corporate  assembly  a  majority, 
at  least,  of  each  integral  or  component 
part  or  body  must  necessarily  be  present, 
was  departed  from  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  New  Hampshire  in  the  case  of  Beck  v. 
Hanscom.  By  the  charter,  the  city  gov- 
ernment of  Portsmouth  was  vested  in  a 
mayor,  "  one  council  of  seven,  to  be 
denominated  the  board  of  aldermen, 
and  one  council  of  twenty-one,  to  be 
denominated  the  common  council,  which 
boards  should,  in  their  joint  capacity,  be 
denominated  the  city  council."  It  was 
further  provided  by  the  charter  that  a 
"majority  of  each  board  shall  constitute 
a  quorum  "  ;  that  the  two  bodies  shall  sit 
and  act  separately,  except  "  when  the  two 
are  required  to  meet  in  convention " ; 
that  at  tlie  meeting  of  the  "  city  council 
in  convention,  if  it  shall  appear  that  a 
majority  of  either  of  said  bodies  is  not 
present,"  the  members  may  compel  tlie 
attendance  of  the  absentees,  etc.  The 
board  of  aldermen  and  tlie  common  coun- 
cil separately  voted  to  meet  in  convention 
on  tlie  12th  of  June,  for  the  choice  of 
city  officers ;  V)ut  whi-n  the  time  arrived, 
only  a  minority  (tliree  out  of  seven)  of 
the  board  of  aldermen  appeared.  The 
common  council  and  these  aldermen, 
twenty-three  in  all,  being  a  majority  of 
both  boards,  proceeded  to  elect  city  offi- 


cers ;  and  it  was  held,  1st,  that  the  elec- 
tion was  valid ;  and  2d,  that  a  majority  of 
the  twenty-three  present  could  elect.  lu 
reference  to  this  decision  it  may  be  ob- 
served that  the  court  take  no  notice  of 
the  power  of  compelling  the  attendance 
of  the  absentees,  and  that  this  provision 
seemed  to  contemplate  the  presence  of  a 
majority  of  each  of  the  constituent  bodies. 
The  court  cite  and  approve  Whitside  v. 
People,  26  Wend.  634,  and  Humphreys, 
in  re,  10  Wend.  612  ;  in  both  of  which, 
however,  the  constituent  bodies,  so  to  call 
tiiem,  duly  met  but  refused  to  act.  It  is 
substantially  admitted  by  the  court  that 
the  decision  they  make  is  not  in  conform- 
ity with  the  English  rule,  but  they  con- 
sider it  to  be  the  one  "which  will  best 
enable  the  government  of  the  city  to  pro- 
ceed with  regularity  "  ;  and  that  "  after 
every  preliminary  step  has  been  properly 
taken,  the  mere  neglect  of  one  of  the 
constituent  bodies  to  carry  its  previous 
vote  into  effect  ought  not  to  hinder  the 
otlier  bodies  from  performing  the  duties 
required  by  the  charter."  Per  Gilchrist, 
C.  J.,  in  Beck  v.  Hanscom,  svpra,  9  Fost. 
(29  N.  H.)  213,  226.  In  Kimball  v.  Mar- 
shall, 44  N.  H.  465, 1863,  Bell  v.  Hanscom, 
supra,  is  approved,  and  its  doctrine  ap- 
plied to  a  different  state  of  facts. 

Effect  of  refusal  of  one  of  two  distinct 
bodies  to  go  into  a  joint  meeting,  or,  after 
being  assembled  in  joint  meeting,  to  par- 
ticipate in  "the  joint  ballot"  by  which 
officers  (by  statute)  are  to  be  removed  or 
appointed,  see,  in  court  of  errors,  Whit- 
side V.  The  People,  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  634, 
1841,  reversing  decision  of  Supreme  Court 
in  same  case,  2.3  Wend.  9.  See  act  of 
Congress  of  July  25,  1866  (14  Statutes  at 
Large,  243),  regulating  the  election  of 
United  States  senators  by  the  legislatures 
of  the  several  states  in  joint  assembli/,  con- 
taining provisions  (the  necessity  for  which 
has  been  shown  by  experience)  to  prevent 
one  of  the  bodies  from  defeating  action. 


300  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  X. 

meetings  of  either  class  possess  an  incidental  power  of  adjourn- 
ment^ from  whence  we  have  another  class  known  as  adjourned 
meetings.  The  time  of  holding  regular  or  stated  meetings  is  fixed 
by  the  charter,  or  by  ordinance  or  by-law,  passed  in  pursuance 
thereof;  and,  in  either  case,  tlie  time  thus  appointed  is  presumed 
to  be  known  to  the  members  of  the  bod}-  ;  and  unless  the  charter 
or  by-law  otherwise  provides,  it  is  their  duty  to  attend  such 
meetings  without  further  or  special  notice.  Absent  members, 
equally  with  those  who  are  present,  are  bound  by  whatever  is 
lawfully  done  at  a  regular  or  stated  meeting,  or  any  regular  and 
valid  adjourned  meeting.^ 

§  286.  (224)  If  the  meeting  be  a  special  one,  the  general  rule 
is,  unless  modified  by  the  charter  or  statute,  that  notice  is  neces- 
sary, and  must  be  personally  served,  if  practicable,  upon  every 
member  entitled  to  be  present,  so  that  each  one  may  be  afforded 
an  opportunity  to  participate  and  vote.^  By  the  charter  of  a 
city,  the  power  of  imposing  taxes  belonged  to  the  inhabitants 
assembled  in  annual  town  meeting.  It  was  provided  that  if,  at 
this  meeting,  no  tax  was  voted,  or  insufficient  tax,  the  common 
council  "  should  call  a  meeting  of  the  inhabitants,  by  advertise- 
ment or  otherwise,"  for  the  purpose  of  having  them  vote  a  tax. 
The  court  seemed  to  be  of  opinion  that  the  common  council  were 
obliged  to  specify  the  objects  of  the  call  in  their  notice,  it  being  a 

1  People  V.  Batchelor,  22  N.   Y.   128,  such  other  meetings  are  valid  if  all  the 

1860;  Smith  v.  Law,  21  N.  Y.  296;  State  members  actually  attend  and  participate 

v.  Smith  (presumptions  of  regularity),  22  in  the  proceedings,  and  they  are  otherwise 

Minn.  218,  1875;  a«fe,  sec.  266;  Hudson  regular.     State  v.   Smith,  22  Minn.  218. 

Co.  V.  State  (presumptions  of  regularity),  Presumption  that  all  members  are  pres- 

4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.),  718  ;  Insurance  Co.  ent  and  acted.     lb. 

V.  Sanders,  36  N.  H.  252.     See  and  com-  At  a  stated  meeting  of  a  select  body 

pare.  State  v.  Jersey  City,   1   Dutch.  (N.  at  which  all  the  members  are  not  present, 

J,)^  309.  it  is  not  competent,  in  the  opinion  of  the 

-  People  V.  Batchelor,  22  N.    Y.  128,  Court  of  Appeals  of    New  York,  in  the 

iS4,perSeIdm,J.;  lb.  U&,  per  Denio,  J. ;  absence  of   a  statute  or  by-law  to  that 

Rogers,  in  re,   7  Cow.   (N.   Y.)  526,  and  effect,  to  appoint  a  future  new  or  special 

cases  cited  in  valuable  note ;  Downing  v.  meeting  to   determine  independent  mat- 

Rugar,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  178;  Burgess  ters  not  taken  up,  and  which  could  not 

V.  Pue,  2  Gill  (Md.),  254  ;  Stow  v.  Wise,  legally  have  been  taken  up  at  the  stated 

7  Conn.  214;  Harding  v.  Vandewater,  40  meeting,  and  to  act  at  such  future  time, 

Cal.  77 ;  Smith  v.  Darley,  2  House  Lords  unless  n//  have  actual  notice.     If  any  one 

Cases,    789,   1849.     A  charter  provision  thus  entitled  to  notice  does  not  receive  it, 

that  the  council  shall  meet  at  such  time  and  is  not  present,   the   action  is  void, 

and  place  as  they  may  by  resolution  di-  People  v.  Batchelor,  22  N.   Y.  128,  1860; 

rect  does   not    preclude  other  meetings  to  be  read  in  connection  with  Smith  v. 

than  those  fixed  by  such  resolution,  and  Law,  21  N.  Y.  296. 


§  287.] 


CONSTITUTION   OF   COUNCILS. 


301 


special  meeting ;  and  it  decided  that  if  it  did  specify  a  particular 
purpose,  that  any  act  of  the  meeting,  "  wholly  beside  the  special 
purpose  of  the  meting  as  stated,"  was  void.^ 

§  287.  (225)  A  regular  meeting^  unless  special  provision  is 
made  to  the  contrary,  may  acljour^i  to  a  future  fixed  day ;  and  at 
such  meeting  it  will  be  lawful  to  transact  any  business  which 
might  have  been  transacted  at  the  stated  meeting,  of  which  it  is, 
indeed,  but  the  continuation.  Unless  such  be  the  special  require- 
ment of  the  charter  or  a  by-law,  the  adjourned  regular  meeting 
would  not,  it  is  supposed,  be  limited  to  completing  particular 
items  of  business  which  had  been  actually  entered  upon  and  left 
unfinished  at  the  first  meeting  ;  but  might,  if  the  adjournment  was 
general,  do  any  act  which  might  have  been  done  had  no  adjourn- 
ment taken  place.^  Where  the  meeting,  if  a  regular  one,  can  only 
act  upon  a  specific  matter,  or,  if  a  special  one,  can  only  act  upon 
matters  of  Avhich  notice  has  been  given  to  the  members,  while  it 
is  competent,  in  either  case,  to  adjourn,  the  adjourned  meeting  is, 
in  both  cases,  limited,  equally  with  the  first  meeting,  to  the  speci- 
fied matters.^ 


1  Bergen  v.  Clarkson,  1  Halst.  (N.J.) 
352,  1796.  See,  also.  Rex  v.  Liverpool, 
2  Burr.  735 ;  Rex  v.  Doncaster,  76.  738 ; 
King  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Str.  385 ;  Machell 
V.  Nevinson,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1355;  2  Bac. 
Abr.  18. 

2  Smith  V.  Law,  21  N.  Y.  296 ;  War- 
ner V.  Mower,  11  Vt.  385;  People  v. 
Batchelor,  22  N.  Y.  128 ;  Rawlinson  on 
Corp.  (5th  ed.)  136,  note;  Rex  v.  Harris, 
1  B.  &  A.  9.36  ;  Scadding  v.  Lorant,  5  Eng. 
Law  and  Equity,  16,  1851  ;  People  v. 
Martin,  1  Seid.  (5  N.  Y.)  22 ;  Street  Case, 
1  La.  An.  412  ;  Hudson  Co.  v.  State,  4 
Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  718.  Adjournment 
by  minority  to  day  appointed  for  regular 
meeting.  People  v.  Rochester,  5  Lans- 
ing (N.  Y.)  142,  1871. 

8  Scadding  v.  Lorant,  5  Eng.  Law  and 
Equity,  16 ;  s.  c.  17  Law  T.  225  H.  of 
L.  1851.  In  this  case,  the  statute  (a  local 
act)  required  notice  to  be  given  of  a 
meeting  of  vestrymen  to  be  held  for  the 
purpose  of  making  a  rate  for  the  relief  of 
the  poor.  Such  notice  was  given,  speci- 
fying the  purpose  of  tiie  meeting;  tlio 
meeting  was  held  accordingly  on  the  12th 


of  August,  wlien  it  was  resolved  that  a 
rate  should  be  made ;  but  as  the  details 
could  not  be  completed,  the  meeting  was 
adjourned,  and  at  an  adjourned  meeting 
the  matter  of  the  rate  was  completed ; 
but  the  notice  for  the  adjourned  meeting 
contained  no  mention  of  the  purpose  for 
which  the  meeting  assembled.  And  the 
question  which  the  House  of  Lords  put 
to  the  judges  in  reference  to  the  ad- 
journed meeting,  was  :  "  Supposing  the 
rate  to  be  otherwise  valid,  was  it  invalid 
by  reason  of  tlie  notice  not  stating  the 
purpose  for  which  the  [adjourfied]  meet- 
ing assembled  ?  "  Tlie  judges  answered  : 
"  We  are  unanimously  of  opinion  that 
the  rate  was  not  rendered  invalid  by  rea- 
son of  the  alleged  defect  in  the  notice  of 
the  adjourned  meeting.  It  was  sufficient 
to  give  notice  [as  required  by  the  act]  on 
the  church  door,  of  the  purpose  for  which 
the  first  meeting  was  to  be  held,  and,  that 
notice  having  been  duly  given,  we  think 
that  the  notice  so  given  extended  to  all 
the  adjourned  meetings,  such  adjourned 
meetings  being  held  for  the  purpose  of 
completing  the  unfinished  business  of  the 


302  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  X. 

3Iode  of  Proceeding  when  convened. 

§  288.  (226)  After  a  meeting  of  the  council  is  duly  convened, 
the  mode  of  proceeding  is  regulated  b}^  the  charter  or  constituent 
act,  by  ordinances  passed  for  that  purpose,  and  by  the  general 
rules,  so  fiir  as  in  their  nature  applicable,  which  govern  other  de- 
liberative and  legislative  bodies.  If  the  council  consists  of  two 
boards,  the  concurrence  of  both  is  essential  to  valid  legislation, 
and  this  concurrence  must  be  by  simultaneously  existing  bodies.-^ 
The  rule  of  legislative  bodies  consisting  of  two  branches,  that  un- 
finished business  at  the  end  of  a  session  is  discontinued,  and  must 
be  afterwards  taken  up  anew,  if  at  all,  was  considered  applicable 
to  the  legislative  acts  of  the  common  council  of  Neio  York,  com- 
posed of  a  board  of  aldermen  and  a  board  of  assistant  aldermen.^ 

§  289.  (227)  The  council  may  ascertain  facts  through  the 
medium  of  a  committee,  and  the  members  of  the  council  may, 
where  they  know  the  facts  of  their  personal  knowledge,  act 
without  further  inquir3\3  As  a  public  corporation  may  entirely 
revoke  the  powers  of  a  committee  it  has  appointed,  so  it  may  con- 
trol the  execution  of  those  powers  by  increasing  the  number  of 
the  committee.  If  the  new  members,  either  by  design  or  mis- 
first  meeting,  and  being  in  continuation  ^  Wetmore  i*.  Story,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
of  that  meeting."  And  such  was  the  414, 1856.  A  subsequent  council  is  bound 
judgment  of  the  House  of  Lords.  See,  by  knowledge  duly  communicated  to  a 
also,  King  v.  Harris,  1  Barn.  &  Ad.  936.  previous  council.  Bank  v.  Seton,  1  Pet. 
"Meetings  may  be  adjourned,  but  nothing  (U.  S.)  299,  1828.  In  Commonwealth?;, 
may  be  transacted  at  any  adjourned  Lancaster,  5  Watts  (Pa.),  152,  Gibson,  C. 
meeting  save  the  unfinished  business  of  J.,  expressed  his  opinion  to  be  that,  not- 
the  former  meeting."  Brice's  Ultra  Vires,  withstanding  a  by-law  or  rule  requires 
Green's  Am.  ed.  534,  citing  Rex  v.  Grim-  certain  corporate  acts  to  be  in  a  given 
shaw,  10  Q.  B.  747  ;  the  text,  sec.  287,  form,  and  that  alterations  of  such  by-law 
states  the  true  and  reasonable  rule,  and  or  rule  shall  only  be  made  by  a  vote  of 
unless  otlierwise  provided  and  ordered,  two  thirds  of  the  members,  yet  that  a 
the  adjourned  meeting  may  transact  any  majoritj'  may  repeal  the  by-law  or  rule, 
business  whicli  might  have  been  trans-  and  may,  witliout  such  repeal,  do  valid 
acted  by  the  regular  meeting.                        acts,   not  in   the  prescribed   form,  by  a 

Presumption    as   to   regularity   of  ad-     majority  vote, 
journment     when     proceedings     of    the  ^  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  24  How.  (U. 

adjourned  meeting  come  before  the  court.  S.)  287,  296,  per  Clifford,  J.;  Common- 
Hudson  Co.  V.  State,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  wealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  14  Pa.  St.  177,  1850. 
718;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Sortwell,  8  Allen  As  to  power  of  council  to  appoint  officers, 
(Mass.),  217;  State  v.  Jersey  City,  1  and  when  it  may  delegate  its  powers  to  a 
Dutch.  (N.  J.)  309;  State  v.  Smith,  22  committee,  lb.;  Preble  v.  Portland,  46 
Minn.  218,  1875.  Me.  241;  ante,  sec.  96. 

1  Wetmore  v.  Story,  22  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
414,  1850. 


§  291.] 


MODE   OF   PROCEEDING. 


303 


take,  are  excluded  from  acting,  the  proceedings  of  the  others  will 
be  irregular.^ 

§  290.  (228)  At  any  time  before  the  rights  of  third  persons 
have  attached,  a  council  or  other  corporate  body  may,  if  consist- 
ent with  its  charter  and  rules  of  action,  rescind  previous  votes 
and  orders.2  Thus  a  vote  levying  a  tax,  so  long  as  it  rests  in 
mere  resolution,  and  has  not  been  acted  upon,  may  be  reconsid- 
ered, and,  if  rescinded,  the  collector  cannot  legally  proceed  to 
collect  the  tax.^ 

§  291.  (229)  A  provision  of  a  city  charter,  that  the  ai/es  and 
nays  shall  he  called  and  published  whenever  the  vote  of  the  com- 
mon council  shall  be  taken  on  any  proposed  improvement  in- 
volving a  tax  or  assessment  upon  the  citizens,  was  considered,  by 
two  of  the  three  of  the  members  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 


1  Damon  v.  Granbj%  2  Pick.  (Mass.) 
345,  1824.  In  this  case  it  was  further 
held,  where  the  agents  of  a  town  con- 
tracted with  the  plaintiff  "  to  erect  a 
meeting-house  on  a  place  to  be  designated 
by  a  committee  of  the  town,"  that  the 
town  might  disagree  to  the  selection,  and 
"designate  the  place  for  themselves,  at 
any  time  before  the  ground  was  pre- 
pared," on  indemnifying  the  plaintiff  for 
any  extra  labor  or  expense  which  their 
fluctuating  proceedings  may  have  occa- 
sioned. A  notice  to  appear  before  a  com- 
mittee to  whom  a  matter,  as,  for  example, 
the  laying  out  or  altering  of  a  street,  has 
been  duly  referred,  is  equivalent  to  a 
notice  to  appear  before  the  city  council, 
as,  for  this  purpose,  the  committee  repre- 
sent the  council.  Preble  v.  Portland,  45 
Me.  241,  1858. 

2  Bigelow  V.  Hillman,  37  Me.  58;  Reiff 
r.  Conner,  5  Eng.  (10  Ark.)  241 ;  State  v. 
Hoyt,  2  Oregon,  240;  ante,  sec.  69;  Road 
Case,  17  Pa.  St.  71,  75;  New  Orleans 
V.  St.  Louis  Church,  11  La.  An.  244. 
Reconsideration  at  subsequent  meeting. 
Locke  V.  Rochester,  5  Lansinti  (N.  Y.), 
11,  1871;  Sauk  .;.  Philadelphia,  1  Pa. 
Leg.  Gaz.  Rep.  250.  "  Tiie  right  of  re- 
considerinrj  lost  measures  [at  the  same 
meeting,  or  pursuant  to  its  rules]  inheres 
in  every  body  possessing  legislative  pow- 
ers."   Per  Whelpley,  C.  J.,  Jersey  City  v. 


State,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  521,  529, 
1863  ;  Red  v.  Augusta,  25  Ga.  386.  "All 
deliberative  assemblies,  during  their  ses- 
sion, have  a  right  to  do  and  undo,  con- 
sider and  reconsider,  as  often  as  they  think 
proper,  and  it  is  the  result  only  which  is 
done."  Per  Kirkpntrick,  C.  J.,  in  State  v. 
Foster,  2  Halst.  (N.  J.)  101,  107,  1823. 
See,  also.  State  v.  Jersey  City,  3  Dutch. 
(N.J.)  536.  While  public  money  is  in 
the  possession  of  the  proper  officer,  the 
proper  authorities  have  entire  control 
over  it,  and  they  may,  so  far  as  the  offi- 
cer holding  it  is  concerned,  rescind  a 
prior  order  (not  yet  complied  with)  to 
pay  money  to  an  individual.  Tucker  v. 
Justices,  13  Ire.  (N.  Car.)  Law,  434  ;  Dey 
V.  Lee,  4  Jones  (N.  Car.)  Law,  238.  A 
resolution  is  not  invalid  because  passed 
upon  a  reconsideration  of  a  negative  vote 
moved  by  one  who  voted  originally  with 
the  minority.  Locke  v.  Rochester,  5  Lan- 
sing (N.  Y.),  11,  1871.  But  in  Sauk  v. 
Philadelphia,  8  Phila.  Rep.  (by  Wallace) 
117,  a  nisi  prins  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  it  was  held  that  the  city  councils 
having  once  voted  to  sustain  the  mayor's 
veto  of  an  ordinance  passed  by  them, 
could  not  reconsider  this  vote,  nor  take 
any  further  action  on  the  measure.  6 
Am.  Law  Rev.  720. 

3  Stoddard  v.  Gilman,  22  Vt.  568 ;  Pond 
V.  Negus,  3  Mass.  230. 


504 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS, 


[CII.  X. 


York,  notwithstanding  the  use  of  the  word  "  sJtall,'^  to  be  directory 
merely,  "  the  essential  requisite  being  the  determination  of  the 
corporation,  and  not  the  form  or  manner  of  expressing  that  deter- 
mination." ^  But  an  opposite  view  has  elsewhere,  as  we  think 
properly,  been  taken  of  similar  provisions,  the  court  regarding  the 
requirement  that  votes  shall,  in  such  cases,  be  entered  at  large  on 
the  minutes,  as  intended  to  accomplish  an  important  public  pur- 
pose, and  therefore  consider  the  requirement  as  mandatory  and 
its  observance  essential  to  valid  corporate  action.^  The  proper 
remedy  for  the  council  is  to  cause  a  nunc  pro  tunc  entry  to  be 
made.^  This  it  has  power  to  do.*  Statutory  provisions  requiring 
for  the  passage  of  municipal  ordinances  of  a  general  nature  that  they 


1  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  0,  24, 
29,  1844,  Branson,  J.,  dissenting ;  s.  c.  in 
Error,  3  Denio,  323.  Under  a  law  re- 
quiring a  vote  of  the  common  council, 
where  more  than  a  majority  is  required, 
to  "be  taken  by  the  yeas  and  nays, 
which  shall  be  entered  on  the  journal," 
the  proceeding,  to  be  valid,  must  appear 
from  the  journal  itself,  and  cannot  be 
proved  by  evidence  aliunde.  Carlton 
Street,  in  re,  16  Hun  (N.  Y.),  497.  See 
McCormick  v.  Bay  City,  23  Mich.  457, 
1871 ;  Indianola  v.  Jones,  29  Iowa,  282 ; 
Mount  Morris  Square,  in  re,  2  Hill,  20 ; 
Elmendorf  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  of  N.  Y.,  25 
Wend.  693.  The  view  expressed  in  the 
Neui  York  cases,  cited  and  approved.  St. 
Louis  V.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513,  1873 ;  per 
War/ner,  J. ;  pout,  sec.  450,  note.  In  Mor- 
rison V.  Lawrence,  98  Mass.  216,  the  grant 
of  an  important  special  power  was  con- 
strued to  require,  as  a  condition  to  its  ex- 
ercise, the  taking  of  the  ayes  and  nays, 
and  a  record  of  the  vote.  The  decision 
or  determination  of  a  question  by  a  town 
meeting  or  common  council  should  be, 
and  probably  must  be,  by  a  formal  vote  or 
resolution.  People  r.  Adams,  9  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  333,  18.32;  Denning  v.  Roome,  6 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  651,  1831.' 

2  Steckert  v.  East  Saginaw,  22  Mich. 
104,  1870,  w-here  the  purpose  of  the  re- 
quirement is  well  expounded ;  Spangler 
V.  Jacoby,  14  111.  297 ;  Supervisors,  etc.  i\ 
People,  25  111.  297  ;  Morrison  v.  Lawrence, 
supra  ;  McCormick  v.  Bay  City,  23  Mich. 
457,  1871;  Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90, 
1871.     Accordingly  a  provision  of  statute 


that  no  ordinance  for  the  improvement  of 
a  street  should  be  adopted,  except  upon 
the  report  and  recommendation  of  the 
city  board  of  iniprovements,  and  requir- 
ing that  such  report  be  recorded  in  its  pro- 
ceedings, is  mandatory,  and  the  report 
and  reconnnendation  were  held  jurisdic- 
tional and  not  provable  by  parol  evidence. 
Reynolds  v.  Schweinefus,  1  Sup.  Court, 
Cin.  (0.)  Rep.  113. 

Where  a  local  improvement  is  pro- 
posed, and  it  is  not  petitioned  for  by  a 
majority  of  the  owners  of  property  to  be 
assessed,  the  charter  declares  that  it  shall 
be  ordered  only  by  the  votes  of  at  least 
three  fourths  of  all  the  aldermen  present, 
such  A'ote  to  be  by  ayes  and  nays  on  the 
record  of  the  common  council ;  if,  when 
the  record  is  presented,  it  does  not  appear 
that  the  improvement  was  ordered  by  a 
vote  of  three  fourths  of  the  aldermen 
present,  by  vote  entered  by  aj'es  and 
nays,  tlie  ordinance  is  void,  and  judg- 
ment for  a  sale  of  the  i)roperty  to  pay  the 
local  assessment  cannot  rightfully  be 
entered.  Rich  v.  Chicago,  69  111.  286, 1871. 
Effect  of  such  a  provision  on  the  power 
to  make  a  contract  by  parol.  Indianola  v. 
Jones,  29  Iowa,  282,  1870;  post,  sec.  449 
and  note. 

3  Logansport  v.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319  ; 
Mayhew  v.  Gay  Head,  13  Allen,  129; 
Steckert  v.  East  Saginaw,  22  Mich.  104 ; 
Delphi  V.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90;  Commis- 
sioners V.  Hearn,  59  Ala.  371 ;  Musselman 
1-.  Manly,  42  Ind.  462 ;  Vawter  v.  Frank- 
lin College,  53  Ind.  88. 

*  Same  cases. 


§  292.]  MODE  OF  PEOCEEDING.  305 

be  read  on  three  different  days,  unless  three  fourths  of  all  the 
members  elected  shall  dispense  with  the  rule,  is  mandatory.  Thus 
where  two  ordinances  were  reported  for  passage,  and  the  requisite 
number  voted  in  favor  of  suspending  the  rule  for  reading  on  dif- 
ferent days,  and  the  ordinances  were  respectively  passed,  it  was 
held  that  the  vote  suspending  the  rules  applied  only  to  the  first 
ordinance,  and  that  the  second  was  not  legally  adopted.^ 

§  292.  (230)  Acts  done  when  less  than  a  legal  quorum  is  pres- 
ent, or  which  were  not  concurred  in  by  the  requisite  number, 
are  void.^  This  is  a  fundamental  rule  in  the  law  of  corporations ; 
but  whether,  in  favor  of  the  holder  of  negotiable  securities  is- 
sued, or  purporting  to  be  issued,  under  authority  conferred  by 
the  legislature,  the  corporation  might  not,  in  some  cases,  be  es- 
topped to  show  that  a  quorum  was  not  present  or  that  the  requi- 
site number  did  not  concur  in  the  act,  is  a  question  which  remains, 
perhaps,  to  be  settled.^  It  is  clear  that  members  of  a  council 
cannot  properly  act  upon  questions  in  which  their  own  pecuniary 
interest  is  directly  and  specially  involved.^  But  it  has  been  held 
in  Michigan  that  proceedings  on  the  part  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion ordering  a  paving  improvement  are  not  rendered  invalid  on 
the  ground  that  two  of  the  aldermen  who  formed  part  of  the  quo- 
rum of  the  common  council,  which  ordered  the  improvement,  and 
without  whose  presence  there  would  have  been  no  quorum,  were 
petitioners  for  the  improvement  and  owners  of  property  liable  to 
assessment  therefor.  It  might  be  otherwise,  the  court  concede, 
if  the  common  council  acted  as  commissioners  of  apportionment 
in  making  the  assessment  upon  the  property  that  was  to  bear  the 

1  Bloom  f,  City  of  Xenia,  32  Ohio  St.  presumed.  Insurance  Company  v.  Sort- 
459;  s.  p.  Morrison  v.  Lawrence,  98  Mass.     well,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  217. 

219;   State  v.  Hudson,  5  Dutch.  (N.J.)  3  gee  ante,  sec.  89;  post,  chapter  on 

478 ;  City  of  Delphi  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90.  Contracts.     Construction  of  charter  pro- 

This  is  not  the  rule  in  New  York.    Cases  vision  requiring  unanimity.    Post,  sec.  310. 

supra,  note  2.  4  Members  of  a  municipal  board  are 

2  Logansport  v.  Legg,  20  Ind.  315,  disqualified  to  vote  therein  on  proposi- 
1863 ;  Ferguson  v.  Chittenden  Co.,  1  Eng.  tions  in  which  they  have  a  direct  pecu- 
(6  Ark.)  479,  1846;  Price  v.  Railroad  niary  interest  adverse  to  the  municipality 
Company,  13  Ind.  58,  1859 ;  McCracken  they  represent.  Supervisors  v.  Hall,  47 
V.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591 ;  Piemental  Wis.  208  ;  Pickett  v.  School  Dist.,25  Wis. 
V.  San  Francisco,  21  Cal.  351 ;  State  v.  651 ;  Coles  v.  Wiiliamsburgh,  10  Wend. 
Wilkesville,  20  Oliio  St.  288.  Number  659  ;  Walworth  Bank  v.  F.  L.  &  T.  Co.,  16 
present  and  acting,  liow  proved.  13  Ind.  Wis.  629 ;  United  Brethren  Church  v. 
58,  supra.     Presence   of  quorum,   when  Vandusen,  37  Wis.  54 ;   Oconto  v.  Hall, 

Wis.  1879 ;  20  Alb.  L.  J.  352. 
VOL.  I,  20 


306 


MUNICIPAL   COKPORATIONS. 


[CH.  X. 


burden,  or  on  the  confirmation  of  a  report  in  which  the  interest 
of  these  aldermen  was  directly  involved.^ 


1  Steckcrt  v.  East  Saginaw,  '22  Mich. 
104,  1870,  where  the  reasons  for  the  dis- 
tinctions taken  are  clearly  stated  by 
Cooley,  J.  In  the  same  state  it  was  also 
held  that  the  mayor  of  a  city,  who  was  a 
practising  lawyer,  might  lawfully  be  em- 
ployed, when  there  was  no  collusion  or 
fraud,  and  no  doubt  as  to  the  necessity 
and  value  of  hia  services,  by  a  resolution 


of  the  council  to  appear  and  defend  a  suit 
against  the  city,  and  that  he  could  recover 
the  value  of  his  services.  Niles,  Mayor, 
etc.  V.  Muzzy,  33  Mich.  61,  1875 ;  s.  o. 
20  Am.  Hep.  G70. 

Right  of  corporation  to  contract  with  its 
officers  or  councilmen.  Ante,  sec.  283,  note 
3,  and  cases  cited ;  post,  sec.  443,  note. 


§  294.]  COEPOKATE  KECORDS.  307 


CHAPTER  XI. 

CORPORATE    RECORDS     AND    DOCUMENTS.  —  CUSTODY.  —  RIGHT 

OF    INSPECTION. 

§  293.  (231)  Corporations  have  the  incidental  power^  if  the 
regular  clerk  is  temporarily  absent,  to  appoint  a  private  person  a 
clerk  pro  tem.,  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  entries  of  what  is 
transacted  at  the  corporate  meeting.  His  entries,  made  by  the 
direction  of  the  corporate  authorities,  or  entries  made  by  the 
regular  clerk  from  memoranda  furnished  by  the  clerk  pro  tem.j 
are  competent  evidence  of  the  proceedings  of  the  meeting.^ 

§  294.  (232)  The  clerk  or  officer  of  a  New  England  town,^ 
who  has  made  an  erroneous  record,  may,  while  in  office  (but  not 
afterwards),  or  after  a  re-election  to  the  same  office,  amend  the 
same  according  to  the  truth,  being  liable,  like  a  sheriff  who  amends 
his  return,  for  any  abuse  of  the  right,  as,  where  he  makes  a 
fraudulent  or  untruthful  amendment,  the  town  is  not  concluded 
or  bound  by  an  erroneous  record,  whether  made  by  design  or 
accident,  unless  when  it  would,  on  general  principles,  be  es- 
topped.^ 

1  Hutchinson  v.  Pratt,  11  Vt.  402,  2  ^^fg^  ggcs.  29,  .30,  as  to  New  England 
1839.  See  also  Rex  v.  Mothersell,  1  Stra.  towns.  New  Haven,  etc.,  Railroad  Co.  v. 
93,  also  referred  to  infra.  Sufficiency  of  Chatham,  42  Conn.  445. 
memoranda.  Louisville  v.  MeKegney,  7  ^  Ctiss  r.  Bellows,  11  Fost.  (31N.  H.) 
Bush  (Ky.),  651,  1870.  Failure  of  clerk  501,  1855;  Harris  v.  School  District,  8 
to  take  oalh  of  office  does  not  invalidate  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  58,  66.  1853;  Gibson  v. 
his  record.  Stebbins  v.  Merrit,  10  Cush.  Bailey,  9  N.  H.  168 ;  Whittier  v.  Varney, 
(Mass.)  27;  ante,  sec.  214.  Signature  of  10  N.  H.  291 ;  Wells  v.  Battelle,  11  Mass. 
chairman  to  minutes  aflS.xed  at  a  day  sub-  477 ;  Low  v.  Pettingill,  12  N.  H.  340 ; 
sequent  to  the  meeting  held  .sufficient,  Pierce  r.  Richardson,  87  N.  H.  306  ;  Seam- 
under  a  statute  requiring  the  minutes  of  nion  v.  Scamnion,  8  Fost.  (28N.  H.)  429  ; 
corporate  meetings  to  be  signed  by  tlie  President,  etc.  v.  O'Malley,  18  111.  407, 
chairman.  Miles  v.  Bough,  .3  Gale  &  D.  1857;  Mott  i-.  Reynolds,  27  Vt.  (1  Wms.) 
119;  Inglis  v.  Railway  Co.,  16  Eng.  Law  206,  1855;  Boston  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Pom- 
&  Eq.  55.  See  also  chapters  relating  to  fret,  20  Conn.  590,  1850 ;  compare  Cov- 
Corporate  Meetings  and  Corporate  Offi-  ington  y.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  295,  below 
cers  ;  post,  sec.  331 ;  Logansport  r  Crock-  cited.  The  necessity  and  reasonableness 
ett,  64  Ind.  319,  approving  text.  of  the  doctrine    stated   in  the  text  are 


308 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XI. 


§  205.  (233)  In  a  case  in  Vermont,  the  clerk  of  the  town, 
pending  the  trial,  amended  the  record  by  adding  his  signature  as 
clerk  to  the  record  of  the  warning  for  the  meeting  in  question. 
His  right  to  do  so,  though  he  had  meantime  been  out  of  office, 
but  was  again  restored,  was  sanctioned  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
JRedJield,  C.  J.,  remarking :  "  We  think,  in  general,  it  must  be 
regarded  as  the  right  of  the  clerk  of  a  town  or  other  municipal 
corporation,  while  having  the  custody  of  the  records,  to  make 
any  record  according  to  the  facts.     His  having  been  out  of  office. 


thus  expounded  by  Parker,  C.  J.,  in 
Wells  (,'.  Battelle,  11  Mass.  477,481,  1814: 
"  We  have  had  frequent  occasion  to  per- 
ceive the  great  irregularity  which  prevails 
in  the  records  of  our  towns  and  otlier  mu- 
nicipal corporations ;  and  the  courts  have 
always  been  desirous  to  uphold  these  pro- 
ceedings, where  no  fraud  or  wilful  error 
was  discoverable.  Too  much  strictness 
on  subjects  of  this  nature  would  tlirow 
the  whole  body  politic  into  confusion 
(Kellar  v.  Savage,  17  Me.  444).  For  it 
cannot  be  expected  that,  in  all  corpora- 
tions, persons  will  be  every  year  selected 
who  are  capable  of  performing  their  duty 
with  the  exactness  which  would  be  use- 
ful or  convenient.  .  .  .  The  first  entry 
made  by  the  clerk  here  [tiiat  an  officer 
was  sworn  into  office]  was  certainly  de- 
fective, but  the  defect  is  properly  cured 
by  the  subsequent  entry  of  the  existing 
clerk,  he  being  the  same  person  that  offi- 
ciated at  the  time  of  the  first  entry.  He 
will  be  sufficiently  watched  by  interested 
parties,  to  render  a  deviation  from  truth 
neither  safe  nor  easy."  The  doctrine  of 
the  case  in  11  Mass.  477,  was  followed 
and  applied  in  Chamberlain  v.  Dover,  13 
Me.  466,  1836,  where  it  was  further  held 
that  the  municipal  body  was  not  bound 
by  an  erroneous  record  of  a  clerk,  even 
though  the  plaintiffs,  confiding  in  its  cor- 
rectness, had  made  a  building  contract 
with  the  "contracting  and  building  com- 
mittee "  named  in  the  record.  The  meet- 
ing in  this  case,  which  attempted  to  con- 
fer this  power  upon  the  committee,  was 
not  a  legal  one,  because  not  held  at  the 
time  and  place  appointed;  and  it  was 
considered  by  the  court  that  the  plaintiff's 
remedy  was  against  the  committee  and 
not  against  the  town,  if  the  former  acted 
without  authority      See  further  as  to  cor 


recting  and  amending  records,  Williams 
!•.  School  District,  21  Pick.  75,  holding 
that  where  two  different,  but  not  contra- 
dictory records  were  made  up  by  the 
clerk  from  memoranda  taken  at  the  meet- 
ing that  both  were  originals  and  compe- 
tent testimony. 

Clerk  cannot  amend  records  after  he  is  out 
of  office.  School  District  v.  Atherton,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  105,  1846;  Hartwell  v.  Lit- 
tleton, 13  Pick.  (Mass.)  229,232,  1832; 
Contra,  to  the  effect  that  he  may  amend, 
though  out  of  office  at  the  time,  see  Gib- 
son V.  Bailey,  9  N.  H.  108,  1838 ;  Gibson 
V.  Bailey  followed  in  Missouri  in  one  case, 
Kiley  v.  Cranor,  51  Mo.  541,  543,  1873. 
But  may,  while  he  is  in  office.  Bishop  v. 
Cone,  3  N.  11.  513,  1821 ;  Hoag  v.  Durfey, 
1  Aiken  (Vt.),286,  1826;  Chamberlain  v. 
Dover,  13  Me.  466,  1836.  That  successor 
cannot  ma^ke  the  amendment.  State  v. 
Williams,  25  Me.  555,  561 ;  29  Ih.  523 ; 
Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  397. 
But  the  corporation  might,  in  proper  cases, 
authorize  the  successor  to  supply  the 
omitted,  or  correct  the  erroneous  entry. 
Hutchinson  v.  Pratt,  11  Vt.  402,  419. 

In  New  Hampshire  it  is  the  practice  to 
allow  these  amendments  only  upon  the 
order  of  the  Supreme  Court  or  Court  of 
Common  Pleas  by  the  officer  by  whom 
they  were  made,  even  after  he  has  ceased 
to  hold  the  office.  A  clear  case  must  be 
made  out.  The  court  do  not  permit  any 
erasures  or  interlineations  of  the  original 
record,  but  require  the  amendment  to  be 
written  upon  a  separate  piece  of  paper, 
signed  by  the  proper  officers,  and  with  it 
a  copy  of  the  order  allowing  the  amend- 
ment ;  and  this  paper  is  annexed  to  the 
original  record.  Pierce  v.  Richardson,  37 
N  H.  306,  311,  per  Bell,  J. 


§  296.]  CORPORATE  RECORDS.  309 

and  restored  again,  could  not  deprive  him  of  that  right.  But 
even  an  officer  could  not  alter  or  amend  a  record  upon  the  testi- 
mony of  third  persons  ordinarily,  and  ought  not  to  do  it  upon 
his  own  recollection,  unless  in  very  obvious  cases  of  omission  or 
error,  of  which  the  present  might  fairly  be  regarded  as  one,  prob- 
ably. Such  amendments  should  ordinarily  be  made  by  the  origi- 
nal documents  or  minutes."  ^ 

§  296.  The  right  of  the  cleric  ex  parte  to  amend  the  records  of  the 
proceedings  of  town  corporations  was  very  thoroughly  considered 
in  a  case  in  Connecticut?  The  statute  of  that  state  requires 
town  clerks  to  keep  the  record  books  of  their  respective  towns 
and  to  enter  truly  all  the  votes  and  proceedings  of  the  town. 
The  town  clerk  made  an  entry  showing  that  at  a  town-meeting 
held  in  1843,  the  town  assumed  to  the  plaintiff  a  liability  to  com- 
mence January  1,  1844.  If  the  time  thus  stated  was  the  true 
time,  the  plaintiff  had  a  cause  of  action  against  the  town.  In 
1849  the  clerk,  not  upon  his  own  personal  knowledge,  nor  upon 
any  written  memorandum,  but  on  the  information  of  others  (with 
the  correctness  of  which,  however,  he  was  perfectly  satisfied), 
amended  the  record  so  as  to  show  that  the  liability  of  the  town 
was  not,  by  the  vote,  to  commence  until  April  1,  1844.  If  this 
was  the  true  time,  the  plaintiff  had  no  cause  of  action.  The 
majority  of  the  court  (three  judges  against  two)  held  that  the 
clerk,  still  continuing  in  office,  was  competent  to  amend  the  rec- 
ord ;  that  this  power  is  derived  solely  from  his  official  character 
and  does  not  depend  on  the  permission  of  the  court  in  which  the 
record  is  offered  as  an  instrument  of  evidence,  nor  on  inquiry  into 
the  truth  of  it  as  originally  made,  or  as  amended,  and  that  such  a 
record  is,  in  such  an  action,  conclusive  evidence  of  its  own  truth. 
The  dissenting  judges,  without  denying  the  power  of  amendment 
in  all  cases,  were  of  opinion  that  in  view  of  the  lapse  of  time,  the 

1  Mott  V.  Reynolds,  27  Vt.  (1  Wms.)  ments  of  the  records  of  the  proceedings 

206,   208,  1855.      Amendments   in   open  of    a    common     council     in    Comieclicut, 

court   of  town   record   by   clerk   of   the  when  it  can  be  made  by  the  clerk  and 

town  pending  trial,  to  which  the  clerk  is  when  by  order  of  court  upon  mandamus,  is 

a  party,  and  to  meet  a  parti(;ular  deci-  considered  in     Samis    v.  King,  40  Conn, 

sion  of  the  court,  disregarded.    ITadley  v.  298,  1873.     Parties  to  mandamus  to  com- 

Chamberlain,    11   Vt.   G18,   1889.      Com-  pel  the  clerk  of  a  city  to  amend  record, 

mented  on  and  distinguished.      Mott  v.  Farrell  v.   King,    41    Conn.   448,    1874 ; 

Reynolds,  27  Vt.  (1  Wms.)  200,  1855.  Logansport  v.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319,  ap- 

'^  Boston  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Pomfret,  20  proving  text. 
Conn.  590,  1850.     The  subject  of  amend- 


310  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XI. 

absence  of  written  memoranda,  or  personal  recollection  by  the 
clerk,  the  clerk  had  no  authority  to  make  the  amendment,  and 
that  the  correct  course  would  have  been  to  have  made  application 
to  the  proper  court  by  legal  process,  e.  g.,  mandamus^  to  correct 
the  mistake  in  the  record,  if  one  existed,  and  thus  give  the  oppo- 
site interested  party  an  opportunity  to  show  that  the  record  was 
already  right.  It  would  seem,  under  the  special  circumstances, 
tliat  the  dissenting  view  was  the  better  one. 

§  297.  (234)  Where  the  clerk  makes  up  the  record  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  council,  and  it  is  read  and  approved  at  the  same 
or  at  a  subsequent  meeting,  the  author  doubts  his  authority,  on 
his  own  motion  to  amend  it  afterwards  without  the  direction  of  the 
council.  The  council,  unless  private  rights  have  attached,  may, 
doubtless,  order  the  record  of  its  own  proceedings,  even  after  it 
has  once  been  approved,  to  be  corrected  according  to  the  facts. 
The  Court  of  Appeals  of  Kentucky^  without  determining  the  ex- 
tent of  the  power  of  the  same  council  at  a  subsequent  meeting,  to 
correct  errors  and  omissions  in  the  journal  entry  of  proceedings 
at  a  previous  meeting,  decided  that  this  could  not  be  done  hy  an 
entirely  neiv  hoard  in  respect  to  the  official  action  of  iheiv  prede- 
cessors ;  and  it  was  accordingly  held  that  where  the  records,  as 
kept,  showed  only  that  in  August,  1854,  an  ordinance  was  re- 
ported, a  new  council  could  not,  in  1856,  add  to  the  records  words 
showing  that  the  ordinance  had  passed^  nor  could  the  fact  of  its 
passage  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evidence.^ 

§  298.  (235)  Parol  evidence  may,  if  necessary,  be  admitted  to 
apply  a  resolution  or  recorded  vote  of  a  town  to  its  proper  subject 
matter,^  but  not,  in  general,  to  explain,  enlarge,  or  contradict  its 

1  Covington  v.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  v.  Gayhead,  13  Allen,   129;    Steckert  v. 

'295,  1858;  see,  also,  Lexington  v.  Head-  East  Saginaw,  22  Mich.  104;   Delphi  v. 

ley,  5  Biisli  (Ky.),  508,  1869;   Graham  v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90. 

Carondolet,  33  Mo.  202;  State  v.  Jersey  -  Baker  v.  Windham,  13  Me.  (1  Shep.) 
City,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  93,  148,  and  74,  1836.  In  this  case  the  town  of  Wind- 
chapters  on  Corporate  Meetings  and  Ordi-  ham  entered  upon  its  records  the  follow- 
nan  ces, /;os^  sec.  310;  ante,  sec.  290.  A  ing:  "Voted  to  indemnify  BenJ.  Baker 
public  corporation  may,  like  every  court  in  his  costs  in  the  action  against  A.  Small, 
of  record,  amend  its  records  nunc  pro  tunc,  which  have  or  may  arise  in  the  same  on 
Commissioners  v.  Hearn,  59  Ala.  371  ;  account  of  Grai/  line."  In  an  action  by 
Musselman  i'.  Manly,  42  Ind.  462 ;  Vawter  Baker  against  the  town  to  recover  costs 
V.  Franklin  College,  53  Ind.  88;  Logans-  of  a  suit  which  he  had  brought  against 
port  V.  Crockett,  64  Ind.  319;   May  hew  Small,  parol  evidence  was  adjudged   to 


§  299.]  CORPORATE  RECORDS.  311 

terms  or  meaning,  in  respect  to  matters  (as,  for  example,  laying 
out  a  highway  or  street)  regularly  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
town  or  its  officers  and  where  the  entry  of  record  is  made  in  pur- 
suance of  law.i  Where  the  record  of  a  meeting  states  that  "  the 
inhabitants  met  and  adjourned  the  meeting,"  parol  evidence  may 
be  admitted  to  show  when  and  where  the  meeting  was  held,  how 
many  were  present,  and  how  many  afterwards  came,  and,  finding 
no  meeting,  went  home.^ 

§  299.  (236)  Parol  evidence  in  a  collateral  action  cannot  be 
received  to  contradict  the  records  of  a  public  corporation,  required 
by  law  to  be  kept  in  writing,  or  to  show  a  mistake  in  the  matters 
as  therein  recorded.  Thus,  if  the  records  of  a  school  district  show 
that  the  district  voted  to  authorize  their  clerk  to  call  and  warn 
"  their  annual  meetings,"  parol  evidence  in  an  action  by  the  dis- 
trict is  not  admissible  to  prove  that  the  real  vote  of  the  district 
was  to  authorize  the  clerk  to  call  and  warn  all  district  meetings.^ 
So,  where  the  record  of  a  town  stated  the  warning  to  have  been 
on  the  17th,  and  the  meeting  to  have  been  held  on  the  19th  of 
January,  parol  evidence  cannot  be  admitted  to  show  that,  by 
mistake,  the  clerk  inserted  the  "  19th"  instead  of  the  "  29th." 
The  remedy  is,  to  have  him  correct  the  record,  if  in  office,  ac- 
cording to  the  truth.* 

have  been  rightly  admitterl  to  show  that  (Mass.)  .397.     Where  a  statute  requiring 

Baker  brought  the  action  in   his  name  a  record  to  be  made  of  the  persons  sworn 

against  Small,  on  account  of   the   Gray  into  office  is  directory,  if  the  record  is 

line,  at  the  request  of  the  selectmen  of  not  made,  the   fact   may   be  shown  by 

Windham,  for  the  purpose  of  settling  a  parol  or  other  competent  evidence.     Kel- 

disputed  line  between  that  and  the  ad-  lar  v.  Savage,  17  Me.  (5  Shep.)  444,  1840. 

joining  town,  with  the  express  agreement  In  the  M.  E.  Corporation  i'.  Herrick,  25 

that  the  town  should   pay  all  costs,  and  Me.  354,  it  was  held,  that  to  establish  a 

to  show  that  these  facts  were  before  the  resulting  trust  in  the  corporation   [with 

town  when  the  vote  was  passed,  and  also  respect  to  lands],  it  could  not  prove  the 

to  show  that  the  suit  so  instituted  was  authority  of  the  committees  to  act  for  it 

conducted  under  the  advice  and  direction  by  parol  evidence ;  the  authority  should 

of  the  authorities  of  the  town.  appear,  and  could  only  be  shown  by  its 

1  Manning  v.  Fifth  Parish,  etc.,  6  Pick,  records.  Further,  as  to  what  facts  may 
(Mass. )  16;  Crommett  i-.  Pearson,  18  Me.  be  shown  by  parol,  Bath  v.  County 
344;  Covington  v.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  Commrs.,  36  Me.  74;  35  lb.  373;  Smith 
295;  Cabot  v.  Britt,  36  Vt.  .349;  Lexing-  v.  County  Commrs,  42  Me.  395;  Long  v. 
ton  V.  Ileadley,  5  Bush  (Ky.),  508,  1869 ;  Battle  Creek,  39  Mich.  323 ;  ante,  sec.  268, 
post,  sec.  310;  ante,  sec.  291.  and  note  ;  post,  sec.  310. 

2  Chamberlain  v.  Dover,  13  Me.  466,  3  School  District  v.  Atherton,  12  Met. 
1836.  But  parol  evidence  of  an  adjourn-  (Mass.)  105,  1846  ;  Morrison  v.  Lawrence, 
ment  to  another  day  cannot  be  given  so  98  Mass.  219;  Mayhew  v.  Gayhead,  13 
as  to  validate  acts  done  on  the  day  ad-  Allen  (Mass.),  129. 

journed  to.      Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  *  Durfey  v.  Hoag,  1  Aiken  (Vt.),  286, 


312 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XI. 


§  300.  (237)  But  a  distinction  has  sometimes  been  drawn  be- 
tween evidence  to  contradict  facts  stated  on  the  record  and  evi- 
dence to  show  facts  omitted  to  be  stated  upon  the  record.  Parol 
evidence  of  the  latter  kind  is  receivable  unless  the  law  expressly 
and  imperatively  requires  all  matters  to  appear  of  record,  and 
makes  the  record  the  only  evidence.^  Thus,  in  a  well-considered 
case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,^  it  was  held  that 


1826.  So  in  Connecticut,  if  a  town  cor- 
poration makes  an  erroneous  record  of  its 
proceedings,  tliis  cannot  be  contradicted 
in  a  collateral  action.  In  such  an  action 
the  record  is  conclusive.  If  false,  and  the 
corporation  will  not  correct  the  record,  a 
party  interested  may,  by  mandamus,  com- 
pel it  to  make  the  correction.  Boston 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Pomfret,  20  Conn.  500, 
1850.  Upon  this  point,  all  the  judges, 
though  differing  on  other  points,  seemed 
to  agree.  So,  on  an  appeal  from  an  assess- 
ment for  a  city  street,  —  Held,  that  parol 
evidence  was  not  admissible  to  prove  that 
the  common  council  agreed  to  an  arrange- 
ment proposed  by  tiie  appellant  and  recom- 
mended by  the  committee  on  streets,  that 
in  consideration  of  his  opening  and  grad- 
ing certain  streets  without  expense  to  the 
city,  he  should  not  be  called  on  to  pay 
any  assessment  when  the  street  in  ques- 
tion should  at  some  future  time  be  laid 
out.  It  seems  that  such  an  agreement, 
however  proved,  would  be  of  no  validity. 
Gilbert  v.  New  Haven,  40  Conn.  102, 1873; 
post,  ch.  xix. ;  supra,  sec.  295. 

Purchasers  of  such  paper  [bonds  issued 
by  cities  for  stock  in  railroads]  look  at  the 
form  of  the  paper,  the  law  which  author- 
ized it  to  be  issued,  and  the  recorded  pro- 
ceedings on  which  it  is  based.  Therefore, 
as  against  purchasers,  the  record  cannot 
be  contradicted  by  parol  evidence.  Per 
Clifford,  J.,  inBissell  v.  Jeffersonville  (ac- 
tion on  municipal  bonds),  24  How.  (U.  S) 
287,  298.  See  chapter  on  Contracts, /ws/, 
as  to  the  rights  of  holders  of  such  securi- 
ties. 

1  Moor  v.Newfield,  4  Greenl.  (Me.)  44, 
1826.  "  The  only  legal  mode  of  proving 
facts  on  record  is  by  the  record  itself,  or 
by  an  attested  copy  of  it."  lb.  per  Mellen, 
C.  J. ;  School  District  v.  Atherton,  12 
Met.  (Mass.)  105,  113, 1847,  per  Deweij,  J. ; 
Langsdale  v.  Bonton,  12  Ind.  467  ;  India- 
napolis V.  Imberry,  17  Ind.  175, 179 ;  Del- 


phi V.  Evans  (referring  to  previous  cases), 
30  Ind.  90, 1871 ;  Bigelow  ;;.  Perth  Amboy, 

I  Dutch.  (N.J.)  297,  1855;  Gearhart  v. 
Dixon,  1  Pa.  St.  224,  1845.  Where  the 
law  or  charter  requires  the  clerk  to  keep  a 
journal  of  all  of  the  acts  and  proceedings 
of  the  city  council,  that,  or  a  copy,  is  the 
proper  evidence  of  the  official  doings  of 
the  body.     City  of  Lowell  v.  Wheelock, 

II  Cush.  (Mass.)  391,  1853;  Harris  v. 
Whitcomb,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  433;  Morri- 
son V.  Lawrence,  98  Mass.  219;  Louisville 
V.  McKegney,  7  Bush  (Ky.),  651,  1870; 
post,  sec.  310. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Kansas,  advert- 
ing to  the  distinction  in  the  text,  sustained 
the  introduction  of  parol  testimony  as  a 
vieans  of  establishing  in  part  the  passage  of 
an  ordinance.  Troy  v.  Atchison,  etc..  Rail- 
road Co.,  13  Kan.  70,  1874;  s.  c.  11  Kan. 
519.  The  exact  point  decided  appears 
from  the  syllabus  settled  by  the  judges, 
and  which  is  as  follows  :  Where  a  city 
fails  to  provide  any  book  for  the  record 
of  its  ordinances,  but  its  ordinances,  after 
their  passage  and  approval,  are  placed 
and  kept  on  file  in  the  office  of  the  city 
clerk,  and  a  third  party  obtains  a  duly 
certified  copy  of  an  ordinance  so  placed 
and  kept  on  file,  and  acts  in  good  faith 
upon  such  ordinance,  and  is  induced 
partly  thereby  to  make  large  expendi- 
ture of  money,  in  a  subsequent  contro- 
versy between  the  city  and  such  third 
parties  or  their  assigns  the  rule  of  equita- 
ble estoppel  will  apply  to  the  city,  and 
the  due  passage  and  existence  of  said 
ordinance  may  be  shown  by  parol  testi- 
mony. Troy  V.  Atchison,  etc.,  Railroad 
Co.  et  al,  13  Kan.  70,  1874. 

2  Bank,  etc.  v.  Danbridge,  12  Wheat. 
64.  Delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
Mr.  Justice  Story,  arguendo,  makes  these 
important  observations  :  "  Would  the 
omission  of  the  corporation  to  record  its 
own  doings  have  prejudiced  the  rights  of 


§  301.] 


CORPORATE  RECORDS. 


313 


the  acts  of  a  corporation  might  be  proved  otherwise  than  by  its 
records  or  some  written  document,  even  although  it  was  its  duty 
"to  keep  a  fair  and  regular  record  of  its  proceedings."  The 
statute  did  not  prescribe  that  nothing  but  a  recorded  vote  or 
written  document  should  bind  the  corporation  or  be  received  as 
evidence.  Such  written  evidence  was  not  deemed  indispensable 
unless  positively  required.  The  direction  to  keep  a  record  was 
regarded  as  director3^ 

§  301.  (238)  Where  the  records  of  a  municipal  corporation 
have  been  so  carelessly  and  imperfectly  kept  as  not  to  show  the 
adoption  of  a  resolution  or  other  acts  of  the  city  council,  and 
there  is  no  written  evidence  in  existence,  parol  testimony  may  be 
admitted,  e.  g.^  to  show  that  certain  work  was  done  by  authority 


the  party  relying  upon  the  good  faith  of 
an  actual  vote  of  the  corporation  ?  If  such 
omission  would  not  be  fatal  to  the  plaintiff 
in  suits  against  the  corporation  (as,  in  our 
opinion,  it  would  not  be),  it  establishes  the 
fact  that  acts  of  the  corporation,  not 
recorded,  may  be  established  by  parol 
proofs,  and,  of  course,  by  presumptive 
proofs.  In  reason  and  justice,  there  does 
not  seem  any  solid  ground  why  a  corpo- 
ration may  not,  in  case  of  the  omission 
of  its  officers  to  preserve  a  written  record, 
give  such  proofs  to  support  its  rights  as 
would  be  admissible  in  suits  against  it  to 
support  adverse  rights.  The  true  ques- 
tion in  such  case  would  seem  to  be,  not 
which  party  was  plaintiff  or  defendant, 
but  whether  the  evidence  was  the  best 
the  nature  of  the  case  admitted  of,  and 
left  nothing  behind  in  the  possession  or 
control  of  the  party  higher  than  secondary 
evidence.  .  .  .  We  do  not  admit,  as  a  gen- 
eral proposition,  that  the  acts  of  a  corpo- 
ration are  invalid  merely  from  an  omission 
to  have  them  reduced  to  writing,  unless 
the  statute  creating  it  makes  such  writing 
indispensa])le  as  evidence,  or  gives  to  them 
an  obligatory  force.  If  the  statute  im- 
poses such  restriction,  it  must  be  obeyed." 
(12  Wheat.  69,  74.)  The  same  principle 
was  applied,  in  the  case  of  the  United 
States  V.  Fillehrown,  7  Pet.  28,  to  the  acts 
of  boards  of  public  agents  or  officers,  and 
it  was  in  that  case  accordingly  held  that 
the  board  of  commissioners  of  the  navy 
hospital  fund,  not  being  required  by  law 


to  reduce  its  proceedings  to  writing  in 
order  to  make  them  binding,  oral  evidence 
of  such  proceedings  (no  record  having 
been  made)  was  competent.  Langsdale 
V.  Bonton,  12  Ind.  4G7. 

"  It  appears  to  us  that  in  the  absence 
of  all  record,  it  might  be  competent  for 
the  defendants  (trustees  and  collector  of 
the  corporation  justifying  under  its  pro- 
ceedings) to  show,  by  parol,  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  meeting.  Where  there  is  a 
record,  it  cannot  be  added  to  or  varied  by 
parol.  Taylor  r.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.) 
403.  But  where  there  is  an  omission  to 
make  records,  the  rights  of  other  persons, 
acting  under  or  upon  the  faith  of  a  vote 
not  recorded,  ought  not  to  be  prejudiced. 
And  it  would  seem  that  the  right  in  such 
a  case  is  reciprocal  in  the  corporation  and 
in  tliose  who  claim  adversely  to  it."  Per 
Williams,  C.  J.,  Hutchinson  v.  Pratt,  11 
Vt.  402,  421.  But  compare  Stevens  v. 
Eden,  etc.  Society,  12  Vt.  688;  16  lb. 
439;  17/6.  337. 

The  rights  of  creditors,  or  of  third  per- 
sons, cannot  be  prejudiced  by  the  nerjlect 
of  the  council  to  keep  proper  minutes ; 
against  the  corporation,  what  the  council 
in  fact  did  may  be  shown  by  evidence 
aliunde  the  record  kept  by  it.  Bigelow  v. 
Perth  Amboy,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  297, 1855  ; 
San  Antonio  i-.  Lewis,  9  Tex.  G9,  1852. 

Proof  of  the  action  and  orders  of  a 
municipal  hoard  of  health,  see  chapter  on 
Ordinances,  post,  sec.  371,  note. 


314 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XI. 


of  the  city,  by  proving  the  passage  of  a  resolution  of  the  council, 
the  appointment  of  a  committee  to  make  the  expenditure,  their 
report  after  the  work  was  done,  and  its  adoption  by  the  council.^ 

§  302.  (239)  Mandamus  is  an  appropriate  remedy  for  the 
duly  elected  and  authorized  officer  of  a  public  or  municipal 
corporation  to  compel  the  delivery  to  him  by  his  predecessor,  or 
by  an  usurper,  of  the  books,  papers,  records,  and  seal  pertaining 
to  the  office.^     And  such  a  corporation  may  maintain  replevin  in 


1  Ross  V.  Madison,  1  Ind.  (Carter)  281, 
1848 ;  Langsdale  v.  Bonton,  12  Ind.  4G7 ; 
Indianapolis  v.  Imberry,  17  Ind.  175, 179; 
Delplii  V.  Evans  (reviewing  previous 
cases),  36  Ind.  'JO,  1871.  In  the  same 
state,  however,  county  commissioners  and 
township  trustees  are  required  by  law  to 
keep  a  true  record  of  their  proceedings, 
and  it  is  held  that  they  "  can  only  speak 
by  their  record"  when  legally  assembled. 
County  Conimrs.  v.  Chitwood,  8  Ind.  504, 
507,  1851 ;  Trustees  v.  Osborne,  9  Ind. 
458.  So,  in  Maine,  "  school  districts  are 
required  by  law  to  keep  an  account  of 
their  proceedings  by  a  sworn  clerk,  and 
such  proceedings  can  be  proved  only  by 
the  record  or  a  copy  thereof  duly  authen- 
ticated." Jordan  v.  School  District,  38 
Me.  164,  1854.  The  records  of  public  or 
quasi  corporations  are  not,  in  Ohio,  con- 
sidered to  be  "  of  that  absolute  verity 
that  any  person  shall  be  estopped  to  show 
the  truth  in  consequence  of  any  mat- 
ter which  they  contain  "  or  omit  to  con- 
tain ;  and  it  was  accordingly  adjudged 
that  the  fact  whether  an  official  bond  was 
received  or  refused  and  rejected  may  be 
shown  by  parol  evidence,  on  which  point 
the  record  was  silent.  Westerhaven  v. 
Clive,  5  Ohio,  136,  1821,  as  to  records  of 
township  trustees.  See  Green  ?'.  State,  8 
Ohio,  310,  1838,  in  wliich  it  was  queried 
whether  the  county  commissioners  could 
appoint  an  agent  by  parol  or  only  by 
record.  In  loiva,  it  has  been  held  that 
where  no  record  entry  is  made  such  an 
appointment  may  be  shown  by  parol  tes- 
timony and  that  the  agent  acted  accord- 
ingly. Poweshiek  County  v.  Ross,  9  Iowa, 
511 ;  Atheam  v.  District,  33  Iowa,  105, 
1871 ;  and  see  ace.  Ross  v.  Madison,  1 
Ind.  (Carter)  281;  compare  Meeker  v. 
Van   Rensselaer,  15  Wend.  397.     Where 


recording  is  not  required  by  charter  or 
law,  resolutions  of  a  council  are  admissi- 
ble in  evidence,  although  not  recorded. 
Darlington  v.  Commonwealth,  41  Pa.  St. 
08.  See  post,  sec.  310;  Louisville  v. 
McKegney,  7  Bush  (Ky.),  651,  construing 
charter  as  to  requisites  of  the  journal  re- 
quired to  be  kept  by  each  board  of  the 
council. 

-  Proprietors  of  Church  v.  Slack,  7 
Cush.  (Mass.)  226,  239,  1851;  Common- 
wealth y.  Athearn,  3  Mass.  285;  Rex  v. 
Wlldman,  2  Strange,  879;  King  v.  In- 
gram, 1  W.  Bl.  50;  King  v.  Round,  4  Ad. 
&  El.  139 ;  Cranford  v.  Powell,  2  Burr. 
1013;  Rex  v.  Claphara,  1  Wils.  305;  3 
Bl.  Com.  310  ;  Kimball  v.  Lamprey,  19  N. 
II.  215,  1848,  where  the  above  authorities 
are  cited  and  digested  by  Gilchrist,  C.  J.; 
Taylor  v.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  397; 
Parish,  etc.  v.  Stearns,  21  Pick.  (Mass.) 
148,  156;  Bates  v.  Plymouth,  14  Gray 
(Mass.),  163 ;  Perkins  v.  Weston,  3  Cush. 
(Mass.)  549. 

The  following  points  have  been  ruled 
in  respect  to  corporations  in  England  :  If 
the  custody  of  their  documents  belong  to 
one  of  their  officers  in  virtue  of  his  office, 
the  corporation  cannot  compel  him  to  de- 
liver them  up,  but  may  require  that  he 
submit  them  to  their  inspection  whenever 
they  think  proper.  Rex  v.  Ipswich,  2  Ld. 
Raym.  1238 ;  Rex  v.  Pigram,  2  Burr.  767 ; 
Willc.  345;  Glover,  260.  Sometimes  the 
custody  of  these  documents  is  entrusted 
to  the  town  clerk  or  other  officer,  mcrel}^ 
as  the  servant  of  the  corporation,  in  which 
case  they  maj^  appoint  another  to  receive 
them ;  and  if  they  are  not  delivered  over 
after  demand,  the  corporation  may  obtain 
possession  of  them  by  an  action  of  detinue 
or  the  court  will  compel  a  delivery  by 
mandamus.     lb.     If  the  predecessor  in  of- 


§  303.] 


CORPORATE  RECORDS. 


315 


its  name  for  the  possession  of  its  record  ;  and  this  action  is  main- 
tainable against  a  stranger  or  any  officer  or  person  not  legally 
entitled  to  the  custody  of  the  records.^ 

§  303.  (240)  Concerning  the  right  to  inspect  corporate  docu- 
ments and  papers^  the  following  points  have  been  ruled  as  stated 
by  Mr.  Willcock :  Every  corporator  has  a  right  to  inspect  all  the 
records,  books,  and  other  documents  of  the  corporation,  upon  all 
proper  occasions  ;  and  if,  upon  application  for  that  purpose,  the 
officer  who  has  the  custody  refuse  to  show  them,  the  court  will 
grant  a  mandamus  to  enforce  his  right.^  One  who  has  a  prima 
facie  title  to  a  corporate  office  has  a  right  to  inspect  such  docu- 
ments as  relate  to  that  title,  and  may  obtain  a  mandamus  for  this 
purpose  before  any  suit  has  been  instituted. ^  A  corporator  has  a 
right  to  inspect  these  documents,  to  obtain  information  as  to  his 
rights,  whether  in  dispute  with  a  stranger  or  the   corporation 


fice,  or,  lie  being  dead,  his  personal  rep- 
resentative, or  another  person  having 
possession  of  corporate  documents  under 
him,  refuse  to  deliver  them  over  to  the 
successor  or  the  corporation,  on  a  proper 
application,  the  court  will  grant  a  man- 
damus to  compel  him  to  do  so.  Eex  v. 
Nottingham,  1  Sid.  31 ;  Anonymous,  1 
Barnard.  402;  Willc.  345;  Glover,  260. 
This  writ  is  said,  indeed,  to  lie  to  any  per- 
son, whether  stranger  or  corporator,  who 
happens  to  be  in  possession  of  the  books 
of  a  corporation,  and  who  refuses  to  de- 
liver them  up.  Proprietors  of  Church  v. 
Slack,  7  Cush.  (Mass.)  226,  1851,  per 
Fletcher,  J.;  Rex  v.  Ingram,  1  W.  Bl.  50; 
Willc.  246  ;  Glover,  231  ;  post,  ch.  xx. 

1  Parish,  etc.  v.  Stearns,  21  Pick. 
(Mass.)  148;  School  District  f.  Lord,  44 
Me.  374,  —  replevin  for  records  of  dis- 
trict. The  court,  holding  that  rejilevin 
would  lie,  say :  "  The  action  is,  there- 
fore, rightfully  brought,  and  may  be 
maintained  if  the  defendant  was  not  the 
legal  clerk  of  the  district."  Per  Rice,  J., 
44  j\Ie.  374,  384.  The  rhiht  or  title  of 
an  office  cannot  be  detcrmineil  by  a  civil 
action  between  the  respective  claimants, 
as  by  an  action  of  replevin  for  the  official 
books  and  papers,  and  until  the  issue  as 
to  the  right  is  determined,  ])y  rjuo  w(trrnnto 
or  other  proper  proceeding,  no  suit  in 


replevin  can  be  maintained  by  one  claim- 
ant against  the  other  for  the  possession  of 
the  appurtenances  of  the  office.  Des- 
mond V.  McCarty,  17  Iowa,  525.  In  La 
Grange  v.  State  Treasurer,  24  Mich.  466, 
the  court  decided  that  replevin  does  not 
lie  for  papers  filed  in  a  public  office.  Post, 
sec.  848. 

2  Rex  V.  Shelley,  3  Terra  R.  142 ;  Rex 
V.  Babb,  76.  580 ;  Harrison  v.  "Williams,  3 
Barn.  &  Cress.  162 ;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  5  D. 
&  R.  484  ;  Willc.  347 ;  Glover,  262.  Any 
person  sufficiently  interested  is  entitled  to 
inspect  entries  in  books  of  pubhc  corpora- 
tions relating  to  public  matters  of  the 
corporation,  where  the  evidence  is  re- 
quired in  a  civil  action.  Grant  Corp.  311. 
See,  also,  People  v.  Cornell,  47  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  329,  in  which  it  is  held  that  a  corpo- 
rator without  any  special  or  private  inter- 
est has  the  right  to  inspect  and  take 
copies  of  all  public  documents  and  rec- 
ords, under  reasonable  restrictions  to 
secure  the  safety  of  the  originals. 

3  Rex  V.  Newcastle,  2  Stra.  1223;  Rex 
V.  Lucas,  10  East,  235 ;  Rex  v.  Purnell,  1 
Wils.  242  ;  Rex  v.  Bridgcman,  2  Str.  1203; 
People  i\  Mott,  1  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  247; 
Cockburn  v.  Bank,  13  La.  An.  289;  Peo- 
ple V.  Walker,  9  Mich.  328;  People  v. 
Cornell,  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  329;  post,  ch. 

XX. 


316 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XI. 


itself,  or  anj'  of  its  members.^  When  the  corporator's  application 
to  inspect  is  founded  on  his  general  right,  he  has  a  mandamus, 
but  when  it  is  founded  on  a  suit  pending,  he  obtains  a  rule.'^  In 
an  action  by  one  corporation  against  another,  rules  were  made 
absolute  for  each  corporation  to  inspect  so  much  of  the  books  and 
records  as  related  to  the  subject  in  dispute.^  The  motion  for  the 
rule  to  ins])i'd  and  to  have  copies  should  be  supported  by  affidavits 
showing  the  foundation  of  the  claim,  the  application,  the  proper 
officer,  and  his  refusal.  Tlie  rule  will  require  the  expense  attend- 
ing obedience  to  be  borne  by  the  applicant,  and  will,  in  proper 
cases,  allow  the  officer  a  remuneration  for  his  trouble.  If  the 
officer  disobey,  without  sufficient  reason,  the  rule  to  allow  an  in- 
spection or  to  give  copy  of,  or  to  produce  corporate  documents, 
the  court  will  grant  an  attachment  against  him.* 


§  004.  (241)  A  public  or  municipal  corporation,  required  by 
law  to  keep  a  record  of  its  public,  or  official  proceedings,  may 
itself  use  such  records  as  evidence  in  suits  to  which  it  is  a  party ; 
but  the  records  must  first  be  properly  authenticated.^    Indeed,  in 


^  Edwards  v.  Vesey,  Cas.Temp.  Hardw. 
128;  Rex  v.  Babb,  3  Term  R.  580 ;  Rex  v. 
Bridgeman,  2  Stra.  1203  ;  Grant  on  Corp. 
312. 

The  English  rule  is  that  the  right  to 
inspect  tlie  auditor's  report  is  extended 
to  "  any  inhabitant  or  ratepayer."  Tlie 
diflFerence-  between  an  inhabitant  and  a 
ratepayer  is  that  "  inhabitant  "  means  a 
resident,  whether  a  ratepayer  or  not,  and 
that  a  "  ratepayer  "  is  a  person  wiio  pays 
taxes,  whether  a  resident  or  not.  The 
King  V.  North  Curry,  4  B.  &  C.  961. 
Mere  colorable  residence  is  insufficient 
to  constitute  a  person  an  inhabitant.  The 
King  V.  Sargent,  5  Term  R.  4G6  ;  The  King 
V.  Duke  of  Richmond,  6  Term  R.  500  ; 
Bruce  v.  Bruce,  2  B.  &.  P.  229,  n  ;  The 
King  V.  iMitcholl,  10  East,  511 ;  Whithorn 
V.  Thomas.  7  M.  &  G.  1. 

2  Rex  0.  Shelley,  3  Term  R.  142. 

3  ^Mayor  of  London  v.  Lyme  Regis,  1 
H.  Bl.  206  ;  Mayor,  etc.  of  Soutliampton 
V.  Graves,  8  Term  R.  502. 

*  Willc.  352,  353 ;  Grant,  311  et  seq. 
See,  also,  People  v.  Mott,  1  How.  (N.  Y.) 
Pr.  247;  Cockburn  v.  Bank,  13  La.  An. 
289 ;  People  v.  Walker,  9  Mich.  328. 

5  School  District  v.  Blakeslee,  13  Conn. 


227,  1839;  Denning  v.  Roome,  6  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  651 ;  Wood  v.  Jefferson  County 
Bank,  9  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  205;  State  v.  Van 
Winkle,!  Dutch.  (N.J.)  73;  McFarlane 
V.  Insurance  Company,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
392;  Turnpike  Company  v.  McKean,  10 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  154.  Denning  v.  Roome, 
above  cited,  holds  that  the  original  minutes 
or  records  of  the  corporation  of  a  city 
were  competent  evidence  of  corporate 
acts,  without  further  proof  of  their  verity. 
Records  of  corporation  held  admissible, 
though  not  required  by  law  to  be  kept, 
and,  where  defective,  exj^lainable  by  parol 
evidence.  Gearhart  v.  Dixon,  1  Pa.  St. 
224,  1845;  Adams  v.  Mack,  3  N.  H.  493, 
499,  per  Richardson,  C.  J. 

The  following  points  have  been  de- 
cided respecting  English  corporations : 
Where  charters  or  corporation  books  are 
to  l)e  given  in  evidence,  being  records  or 
instruments  of  a  public  nature,  they  may 
themselves  be  produced ;  and  examined 
copies  of  their  contents  may  also  be  given 
in  evidence.  The  Court  of  King's  Bench 
will  not  make  a  rule  to  produce  the  origi- 
nals, unless  it  be  shown  by  affidavit  that 
a  new  entry,  rasure,  or  some  other  cir- 
cumstance, renders  an  inspection  neces- 


§  304.] 


COKPORATE  EECORDS. 


317 


actions  generally,  including  actions  against  agents  or  officers  of 
the  corporation,  as  individuals,  the  original  minutes  or  records  of 
the  corporation  are  competent  evidence  of  the  acts  and  proceed- 
ings of  the  corporation.  Duly  authenticated  copies  have  often 
been  received  in  evidence  where  the  original  document  or  pro- 
ceeding was  of  a  public  nacure.^ 


sary.  To  give  books  this  public  charac- 
ter, it  must  appear,  if  they  be  questioned, 
that  they  have  been  publicly  kept,  and 
that  entries  have  been  made  by  the  proper 
oflBcers ;  not  but  that  entries  made  by 
other  persons  may  be  good,  if  the  town 
clerk  be  sick  or  refuses  to  attend,  which, 
however,  must  be  proved,  and  the  reason 
why  they  were  not  made  by  the  proper 
oflBcer  shown.  Rex  v.  Mothersell,  1  Stra. 
93 ;  Brocas  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  London,  1 
Stra.  307 ;  Rex  v.  Gwyn,  Mayor,  etc.,  1 
Stra.  401 ;  Willc.  343 ;  Glover,  2-58 ;  Rex 
V.  Smith,  1  Stra.  126 ;  Grant,  318.  Who- 
ever produces  the  book  must  establish  its 
authority  before  he  delivers  it  in,  and 
may  be  required  to  show  where  it  has 
been  kept,  and  how  it  came  to  his  pos- 
session. Rex  V.  Mothersell,  1  Stra.  93; 
Rex  V.  Thetford,  12  Vin.  Abr.  90,  p.  16 ; 
Willc.  344;  Glover,  258.  A  book  contain- 
ing minutes  of  some  corporate  acts  which 
occurred  ten  years  ago,  entirely  written 
by  the  relator's  clerk,  who  was  not  an 
officer  of  the  corporation,  and  appearing 
never  to  have  been  kept  among,  or  es- 
teemed as,  one  of  the  corporate  docu- 
ments, or  even  seen  before  the  present 
application  for  an  information,  is  not  ad- 
missible as  a  corporate  document.  Rex 
f.  Mothersell,  1  Stra.  93.  Nor  is  the 
copy  of  a  letter  made  fifty  years  ago  and 
found  in  the  corporation  chest,  but  the 
original  must  be  first  accounted  for,  as 
though  it  had  been  found  in  the  possession 
of  a  private  person.  Rex  v.  Gwyn,  1  Stra. 
401.  Nor  are  entries  of  a  private  nature,  in 
the  public  books  of  a  corporation,  evi- 
dence for  them  in  support  of  a  right 
which  they  claim,  for  this  were  allowing 
the  party  to  fabricate  evidence  for  them- 
selves. Rex  V.  Debenham,  2  B.  &  Ad. 
187;  Marriage  v.  Lawrence,  3  B.  &  Ad. 
144;  Grant  on  Corp.  318,  319  and  cases; 
2  Phil.  Ev.  122 ;  Angell  &  Ames  Corp. 
sec.  679 ;  Willc.  344. 

1  Denning  v.  Roome,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 


651,  1831 ;  citing  Owings  v.  Speed,  5 
Wheat.  424 ;  Rex  v.  Mothersell,  1  Stra. 
93 ;  12  Vm.  Abr.  90,  pi.  16.  See  also. 
People  ;;.  Adams,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  333; 
Wood  V.  Jefferson  County  Bank,  9  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  194,  205;  Angell  &.  Ames  on 
Corp.  sec.  679  ;  Turnpike  Co.  v.  McKean, 
10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  1.54.  In  Denning  v. 
Roome,  supra,  the  defendant  was  sued  in 
his  individual  capacity  for  removing,  by 
order  of  the  city  council,  a  certain  fence 
erected  by  the  plaintiff.  The  defendant 
(although  it  was  argued  tliat,  being  the 
agent  of  the  corporation,  the  latter  should 
be  considered  as  the  party  and  its  own 
records  as  incompetent  in  its  own  favor 
to  justify  its  acts)  was  allowed  to  show 
by  the  records  of  the  corporation  that 
the  fence  was  on  a  portion  of  the  public 
street. 

The  clerk  of  a  city  or  town  is,  by  law, 
the  proper  certifying  officer  to  authenti- 
cate copies  of  the  votes  and  ordinances 
thereof.  Such  copies  are  admissible  in 
evidence  without  preliminary  proof,  as  in 
ordinary  instruments,  of  the  genuineness 
of  the  clerk's  signature,  but  are,  of 
course,  only  prima  facie  evidence,  and 
they  may  be  shown  to  be  inaccurate,  false, 
or  forged.  Commonwealth  v.  Chase,' 6 
Cush.  (Mass.)  248, 1850.  Where  the  orig- 
inal document  is  of  a  public  nature,  and 
would  be  evidence  if  produced,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  show  the  document  itself, 
for  it  may  be  required  at  many  places  at 
the  same  time  ;  for  that  reason  an  imme- 
diate sworn  copy,  made  by  the  proper 
officer,  will  be  admitted.  Rex  v.  Lord 
George  Gordon,  Doug.  593  ;  1  Phil.  Ev. 
405;  Willc.  344;  Glover,  259.  Grant, 
318,  lays  down  the  rule  generally,  that 
sworn  copies  of  public  entries  in  books  of 
public  corporations  are  admissible  wher- 
ever the  originals  would  be,  and  the  cor- 
poration will  not  be  compelled  to  produce 
their  books  in  court  except  for  reasons 
shown.    It  has,  however,  been  held  that 


118 


MUNICIPAL  COIirORATIONS. 


[CII.  XL 


§  305.  (242)  An  admission  by  a  corporation  of  a  fact  or  of  a 
liability,  duly  and  properly  made,  is,  of  course,  evidence  against 
it.  But  a  municipal  corporation,  by  accepting^  that  is,  receiving 
the  report  of  a  committee  of  inquiry,  does  not  admit  the  truth  of 
the  facts  stated  therein  ;  and  such  a  report,  though  accepted  by  a 
vote  of  the  corporation,  is  not  admissible  in  evidence  against  it.^ 
In  an  action  of  assumpsit  against  a  town  corporation,  to  support 
his  cause  of  action,  the  plaintiff  produced  the  books  of  the  cor- 
poration, by  which  it  appeared  that  the  sum  demanded  in  the 
declaration  had  been  allowed  by  the  council  to  the  plaintiff  on 
the  5th  of  September,  on  final  settlement,  at  which  time  the 
plaintiff  was  president  and  assented  to  the  settlement.  The  de- 
fendant contended  that  the  resolution  had  been  passed  by  mis- 
take, and  offered  to  show,  by  the  same  books,  the  passage,  three 
days  afterwards,  in  the  plaintiff's  absence,  of  a  resolution  rescind- 


the  by-laws  of  a,  corporation,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  special  provision,  must  be 
proved  by  the  production  of  the  by-laws 
themselves,  as  these  are  tlie  primary  evi- 
dence. Lumbard  v.  Aldrich,  8  N.  H.  31; 
Moor  V.  Newfield,  4  Greenl.  (Me.)  44; 
Hallovvell  Bank  v.  Hamlin,  14  Mass.  178. 
So,  of  the  votes  of  a  corporation,  tiie 
record  is  the  best  evidence.  Haven  v. 
Asylum,  13  N.  H.  532.  See  also.  Man- 
ning V.  Parish,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  6  ;  Taylor 
y.  Henry,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  403;  Greeny. 
Indianapolis,  25  Ind.  490.  It  may  be  re- 
marked that  there  are  statutes  in  various 
states  under  which  certified  copies  would 
be  receivable  in  evidence  instead  of  the 
originals.  Licenses  from  a  city  or  town 
authorizing  persons  to  pursue  particular 
employments,  etc.,  need  not  be  in  writing. 
Boston  V.  Shaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  415, 
1830. 

1  Dudley  v.  "Weston,  1  Met.  (Mass.) 
477,  1846  ;  followed  by  Collins  v.  Dorches- 
ter, 6  Gush.  (Mass.)  396,  18.50  ;  and  both 
relating  to  defective  highways.  In  the 
King  V.  Hardvvick,  11  East,  578,  a  rated 
parishioner  made  a  confession,  which 
was  admitted  in  evidence  against  the  par- 
ish, on  the  ground  that  the  parish  was  an 
aggregate  corporation  or  company,  of 
which  he  was  a  member  ;  compare  May- 
or, etc.  ?.'.  Long,  1  Camp.  68.  But  this  is 
not  the  law  in  this  country,  and  it  may  be 
safely  laid  down  that  the  admission  of  a 


corporator  cannot  be  received  against  the 
body.  Hartford  Bank  v.  Hart,  3  Day 
(Conn.),  493,  denying  King  v.  Hardwick, 
supra ;  Osgood  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  3  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  612,  628.  But  the  admission  of 
an  officer  when  made  in  the  ordinary 
course  of  his  official  duty,  and  within  the 
scope  of  his  powers,  may  be  admissible 
against  the  corporation.  Peyton  v.  Hos- 
pital, 3  C.  &  P.  363 ;  Angell  &  Ames  on 
Corp.  sec.  309;  11.  sec.  659;  ante,  sec. 
237,  note. 

Notice  to  corporator  or  member  is  not 
notice  to  the  corporation ;  it  should  be 
formally  given  as  such  to  the  authorized 
head  or  proper  officer.  Powles  v.  Page, 
3  Com.  B.  31 ;  Edwards  v.  Railroad  Co., 
1  Myl.  &  Cr.  659  ;  Grant  Corp.  315.  Lan- 
cey  brought  an  action  for  libel  against  the 
mayor  and  clerk  of  the  city  of  Bangor 
for  the  following  statement  contained  in 
their  annual  report :  "  Balance  due  from 
John  Lancey,  Collector,  $6,004.50."  The 
balance  was  shown  to  be  less.  It  was 
held  that  there  was  no  presumption  of 
law  that  the  officers  of  a  city  or  town 
knew  tlie  contents  of  the  city  records  and 
no  rule  of  law  obliging  them  to  be  ac- 
quainted therewith  ;  and  unless  the  de- 
fendants made  the  publication  maliciously 
they  were  entitled  to  a  verdict.  Laucey 
V.  Bryant,  30  Me.  (10  Shep.)  466,  1849; 
ante,  sec.  237,  note. 


§  305.]  CORPORATE  RECORDS.  319 

ing  the  amount  of  the  plaintiff's  account.  It  was  held  that  the 
subsequent  resolution  was  not  competent  evidence,  the  court 
basing  this  opinion  on  the  proposition  that  the  books  of  a  corpo- 
ration are  evidence  against,  but  not  in  its  favor,  in  an  action 
against  the  corporation  by  a  stranger.^ 

1  Mayor  v.  Wright,  2  Port.  (Ala.)  230,  1835,  citing  1  Stark  Ev.  292;  but  is  not 
the  proposition  too  broadly  stated? 


320  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XU. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 

§  306.  (243)  This  subject  will  be  considered  under  the  fol- 
lowing heads : — 

1.  Definition,  General  Nature,  and  Common  Law  Requisites 
of  Ordinances  —  sees.  307-830. 

2.  Of  the  Signing,  Publication,  and  Recording  —  sees,  331- 
335. 

3.  Of  the  Power  to  impose  Fines,  Penalties,  and  Forfeitures 
—  sees.  336-353. 

4.  On  Whom  Binding,  and  Notice  thereof  —  sees.  354-356. 

5.  Ordinances  relating  to  the  Licensing,  Taxing,  and  Regu- 
lation of  Amusements  and  Occupations,  including  the  Sale  of 
Intoxicating  Liquors  —  sees.  357-365. 

6.  Ordinances  relating  to  Public  Offences  —  sees.  366-368. 

7.  Ordinances  relating  to  the  Public  Health,  Safety,  and  Conve- 
nience :  Herein  of  Hospitals,  Cemeteries,  and  Burials  ;  Nuisances  ; 
Markets  and  Inspection  Regulations ;  Dangerous  Occuptions  and 
Practices  ;  and  of  the  Police  Power  and  General  Welfare  Clauses 
in  Charters  —  sees.  369-407. 

8.  Mode  of  enforcing  Ordinances :  Herein  of  Actions  and  Pro- 
secutions, and  their  Nature  ;  Mode  of  pleading  Ordinances ; 
Requisites  of  Complaints  to  enforce  Ordinances ;  Construction, 
Defences,  Evidence,  etc. — sees.  408-422. 

Definition^    General   Nature,   and    Common    Law    Requisites   of 

Ordinances. 
§  307.  (244)  Definition.  — Under  the  general  term  of  ordinances 
have  been  sometimes  included  all  the  regulations  by  which  a  cor- 
poration is  governed,  including  special  charter  or  statute  regula- 
tions, as  well  as  by-laws.  In  this  country,  the  term  "  ordinance  " 
is  not  usually  applied,  if  ever,  to  charters  or  acts  of  the  legislature 
respecting  municipal  corporations,  regulating  their  powers  and 


§  307.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


321 


mode  of  action,  but  is  limited  in  its  application  to  the  acts,  in 
the  nature  of  local  laws,  passed  by  the  proper  assembly  or  gov- 
erning body  of  the  corporation.  Indeed,  in  general  and  profes- 
sional use  the  terra  ordinance  is  almost,  if  not  quite,  equivalent  in 
meaning  to  the  term  hy-lmv,  and  is  the  word  most  generally  used 
to  denote  the  by-laws  adopted  by  municipal  corporations.  Ac- 
cording to  Lord  Coke,  the  word  by  or  bye  signifies  a  habitation ; 
and  thence  a  by-law  in  England,  and  a  by-law  or  ordinance  in  this 
country,  may  be  defined  to  be  the  law  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
corporate  place  or  district,  made  by  themselves  or  the  authorized 
body,  in  distinction  from  the  general  law  of  the  country  or  the 
statute  law  of  the  particular  state.^ 


1  Willc.  73  ;  2  Kyd,  95,  98. 

Definition  and  Nature  of  Ordinances  or 
By-Laws. — In  a  case  in  Massachusetts, 
denying  to  towns  in  that  state  power  un- 
der the  statute  to  prohibit  by  ordinance 
the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquor,  Mr.  Cliief 
Justice  Shaw  observed  that  the  term 
"  by-law  "  has  a  limited  and  peculiar  mean- 
ing, and  is  used  to  designate  such  ordi- 
nances or  regulations  which  a  corporation, 
as  one  of  its  legal  incidents,  has  power  to 
make  with  respect  to  its  own  members 
and  its  own  concerns.  In  respect  to  mu- 
nicipal and  quasi  corporations,  this  mean- 
ing lias  been  somewhat  extended,  but 
even  here  the  word  is  used  to  designate 
such  ordinances  and  regulations  as  have 
reference  to  legitimate  and  proper  muni- 
cipal or  corporate  purposes.  There  is  a 
broad  distinction  between  the  power  of 
a  public  corporation  to  make  "  by-laws  " 
and  the  general  power  to  make  "  laws  : " 
authority  to  make  the  former  does  not 
include  the  power  to  legislate  upon  gen- 
eral subjects.  Commonwealth  v.  Turner, 
1  Cush.  (Mass.)  493.  A  municipal  by-laiv, 
according  to  the  definition  of  a  distin- 
guished English  judge,  is  a  rule  obliga- 
tory over  a  particular  district,  not  being 
at  variance  with  the  general  laws  of  the 
realm,  and  being  reasonable  and  adapted 
to  the  purposes  of  the  corporation  ;  and 
any  rule  or  ordinance  of  a  permanent 
character  which  a  corporation  is  empow- 
ered to  make,  either  by  the  common  or 
statute  law,  is  a  by-law.  Per  Parke,  B., 
19  Law  J.  (N.  S),  Q.  B.  135. 

Resolutions  and  Ordinances  discrimi- 
nated. —  A  resolution  is  an   order   of  the 

VOL.  I.  21 


council  of  a  special  and  temporary  char- 
acter ;  an  ordinance  prescribes  a  perma- 
nent rule  of  conduct  or  government. 
Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio  St.  96,  103, 
per  Scott,  J,  Where  the  charter  commits 
the  decision  of  a  matter  to  the  council 
and  is  silent  as  to  the  mode,  the  decision 
may  be  evidenced  by  a  resolution,  and 
need  not  necessarily  be  by  an  ordinance. 
State  V.  Jersey  City,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  49.3, 
1859.  In  State  v.  Bayonne,  6  Vroom 
(35  N.  J.  L.),  335,  resolutions  and  ordi- 
nances are  discriminated,  and  the  latter 
said  to  require  more  solemnity  than  the 
former.  A  resolution  adopted  by  a  city 
council,  not  approved  by  the  mayor,  and 
not  published  in  the  manner  required  by 
the  charter,  has  not  the  effect  of  an  ordi- 
nance. City  of  Central  v.  Sears,  2  Col.  588, 
1875.  The  legislative  powers  of  a  city 
council,  as  in  fixing  the  compensation  of 
city  officers  (it  was  held,  construing  the 
charter),  must  be  exercised  by  ordinance, 
when  this  is  intended  to  be  permanent. 
lb.  A  resolution  has  ordinarily  the  same 
effect  as  an  ordinance,  as  both  are  legisla- 
tive acts.  Sower  v.  Philadelphia,  35  Pa. 
St.  231,  1860  ;  Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisco, 
6  Cal.  190.  Where  the  power  to  make 
ordinances  and  by-laws  is  general,  and 
no  form  in  which  these  shall  be  enacted 
or  passed  is  prescribed,  it  was  held  that 
an  ordinance  containing  a  prohibition  and 
annexing  a  penalty  was  valid,  notwith- 
standing it  purported  by  its  terms  to  be  a 
resolution.  In  substance  it  was  an  ordi- 
nance or  regulation,  and  the  form  in  which 
it  was  passed  did  not  make  it  void.  Mu- 
nicipality V.  Cutting,  4  La.  An.  365,  1849. 


:oo 


MUNIOirAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XIL 


§  308.  (245)  Authority  delegated  to  3Iunicipalities  —  Nature 
of  Ordinances  —  Repeal.  —  Although  the  proposition  that  the  legis- 
lature of  II  state  is  alone  competent  to  make  laws  is  true,  yet  it 
is  also  settled  that  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  delegate 
to  municipal  corporations  the  power  to  make  by-laws  and  ordi- 
nances,^ with  appropriate  sanctions,  which,  when  autliorized,  have 


By  one  section  of  the  charter  the  council 
was  authorized  to  make  "by-hivvs,  ordi- 
nances, resolutions,  and  regulations,"  and 
by  another  "  by-laws  and  ordinances " 
were  to  be  submitted  to  the  mayor  for 
his  approval,  and  it  was  held  that  there 
was  no  sucli  distinction  as  to  require  that 
"  by-laws  and  ordinances "  must,  and 
"  regulations  and  resolutions  "  need  not, 
be  submitted  to  the  mayor,  to  be  approved 
by  him.  Kempner  v.  Commonwealth,  40 
Pa.  St.  124.  The  words  "  regulation," 
"resolution,"  and  "ordinance,"  as  used 
in  the  charter,  defined  by  Lowrie,  C.  J.  Ih. 
Construction  of  particular  charter  pro- 
visions when  corporate  purpose  may  be 
expressed  in  the  form  of  a  resolution. 
State  V.  Elizabeth  (acceptance  of  dedica- 
tion), 8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  432  ;  State  v. 
Jersey  City  (building  sewers),  3  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  493;  Ih.  185,196  ;  State  v.  Jersey 
City  (signature  of  ma3'or),  1  Vroom  (30 
N.  J.  L.),  148;  States.  Trenton,  7  Vroom 
(3G  N.  J.  L. ),  499,  503.  Instances  wliere  an 
ordinance  was  held  essential.  State  v. 
Bayonne  (grading  street),  6  Vroom  (35 
N.  J.  L.),  335;  lb.  205;  Cross  v.  Morris- 
town  (alteration  of  width  of  street  and 
sidewalk),  3  C.  E.  Green  (N.  J.),  305; 
State  V.  Bergen  (appointment  of  commis- 
sioners to  assess  damages),  4  Vroom  (33 
N.  J.  L.),  39,  72  ;  ante,  sec.  258,  note. 

Mode  of  exercising  Power.  —  Where 
the  power  to  do  certain  acts  or  pass  cer- 
tain ordinances  is  conferred  upon  the 
council,  but  the  particular  mode  of  exer- 
cising the  power  is  not  prescribed,  this 
may  be  done  by  ordinance,  and  any  mode 
may  be  adopted  which  does  not  infringe 
the  charter  or  general  law  of  the  land. 
Thus,  for  example,  power  was  given  to  a 
city  "  to  levy  and  collect  a  special  tax," 
not  specifying  the  mode  of  collection. 
Held,  that  an  ordinance  requiring  tiie 
mayor  to  enforce  the  collection  of  the  tax 
by  suit,  in  the  nature  of  an  action  for 
debt,  was  valid,  as  it  did  not  violate  the 


charter  or  the  general  law.  Cincinnati 
V.  Gwynnc,  10  Ohio,  192 ;  Markle  v. 
Akron,  14  Ohio,  580,  1846.  Prescribed 
mode  essential.  Crosse  v.  Morristown, 
18  N.  J.  Eq.  305;  post,  ch.  xix. 

1  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  18  Ga.  580,  1855;  St. 
Paul  V.  Coulter,  12  Minn.  41,  180G  ;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Duquet,  2  Yeates  (Pa.), 
493 ;  Hill  v.  Decatur,  22  Ga.  203 ;  State 
V.  Clark,  8  Post.  (28  N.  H.)  176, 
1854;  Milne  v.  Davidson,  5  Martin  (La.), 
586,  1827;  Marble  v.  Akron,  14  Ohio, 
586,  590,  1846  ;  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Morgan,  7 
Martin  (La.  0.  S.)  1,  per  Martin,  J.  ;  Tri- 
gally  V.  Memphis,  6  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  382, 
1869 ;  Metcalf  v.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo.  103, 
1847.  That  such  a  power  may  be  dele- 
gated to  municipal  corporations  is  admit- 
ted even  in  those  states  which  deny  the  va- 
lidity of  what  are  known  as  Local  Option 
Laws.  Wall,  in  re,  48  Cal.  279,  1874  ;  s.  c. 
17  Am.  Rep.  425;  ante,  sec.  44,  note; 
Glovers ville  v.  Howell  (local  option  as  to 
sale  of  intoxicating  liquors),  70  N.  Y. 
287,  1877  ;  Gilbert  Elevated  Railway  Co. 
in  re,  70  N.  Y.  361,  1877  ;  Covington  v. 
East  St.  Louis,  78  111.  548,  1875.  In 
Strauss  v.  Pontiac,  40  111.  301,  1866,  the 
Supreme  Court  held  that  a  provision  in  a 
town  charter  forbidding  any  person  from 
doing  a  certain  act,  fixing  the  amount  of 
fine,  and  prescribing  the  penalty,  was  a 
complete  enactment  of  itself ;  that  an  or- 
dinance to  tlie  same  effect  was  void,  and 
tliat  a  party  could  be  prosecuted  only 
under  the  charter,  and  not  under  the  or- 
dinance. In  view  of  the  general  authority 
given  in  the  same  charter  to  make  all 
ordinances  necessary  to  carry  into  effect 
the  powers  granted  in  the  cliarter,  the 
correctness  of  tiiis  decision  may  admit  of 
fair  debate,  although  it  is  undoubtedly 
true  that  no  ordinance  is  necessary  where 
the  prohibition  in  the  charter  is  complete, 
the  penalty  fixed,  and  the  remedy  pre- 
scribed.    Ashton  V.  Ellsworth,  48  lU.  299. 


§  308.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


323 


the  force,  in  favor  of  the  municipality  and  against  persons  bound 
thereby,  of  laws  passed  by  the  legislature  of  the  state. ^    A  penalty 


1  Heland  r.  Lowell,  3  Allen  (Mass.), 
407,  1862 ;  Church  v.  City,  etc.,  5  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  538,  1826  ;  St.  Louis  v.  Boffinger, 
19  Mo.  13,  15, per  Gamble,  J.;  St.  Louis  v. 
Bank,  49  Mo.  574;  Jones  v.  Ins.  Co.,  2 
Daly  (N.  Y'.),  307;  McDermott  v.  Board 
of  Police,  5  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  422,  1857; 
Mason  v.  Shawneetown,  77  111.  533,  1875  ; 
Des  Moines  Gas  Co.  r.  Des  Moines  (city 
of),  44  Iowa,  508 ;  s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep.  756, 
citing  text ;  State  v.  Tryon,  39  Conn. 
183,  1872 ;  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis 
Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  citing  text ;  Starr 
V.  Burlington,  45  Iowa,  87.  A  city 
council  is  "a  miniature  general  assem- 
bly, and  their  authorized  ordinances  have 
the  force  of  laws  passed  by  the  legisla- 
ture of  the  state."  Per  Scott,  J.,  Ta3-lor 
1-.  Carondolet  (forfeitiu-e  clause  in  lease), 

22  Mo.  10.5,  1855;  St.  Louis  v.  Foster,  52 
Mo.  513,  1873.  In  Hopkins  v.  Mayor  of 
Swansea,  4  M.  &  W.  621,  640,  Lord  Abln- 
ger  said:  "The  by-law  has  the  same 
effect  within  its  limits,  and  with  respect 
to  the  persons  upon  whom  it  lawfully 
operates,  as  an  act  of  parliament  has 
upon  the  subjects  at  large."  Valid  ordi- 
nances of  corporations  are  as  binding  on 
the  corporators  and  inhabitants  of  the 
place  as  the  general  laws  of  the  state 
upon  the  citizens  at  large.  Milne  v. 
Davidson,  5  Martin  (La.),  586,  1827. 
And  therefore  it  has  been  held  that 
contracts  between  the  inhabitants  of  a 
city,  in  violation  of  the  express  provis- 
ions of  a  valid  ordinance  of  a  municipal 
corporation,  are  illegal,  and  cannot  be 
enforced.  Milne  v.  Davidson  (lease  of 
house  for  private  hospital),  5  Martin 
(La.),  586,  1827;  Heland  v.  Lowell,  3 
Allen  (Mass.),  407,  1867;  but  compare 
Baker  v.  Portland,  58  Me.  199;  s.  c.  10 
Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  559,  and  see 
Judge  Redjield's  note.  And  see  also  Hee- 
ny  V.  Sprague,  11  R.  I.  456,  1877;  s.  c. 

23  Am.  Rep.  502.  Holding  that  no  pri- 
vate action  for  damages  impliedly  exists 
in  favor  of  a  person  injured  by  a  breach 
of  duty  imposed  by  a  municipal  by-law 
against  tlic  person  who  violated  the  by- 
law. A  distinction  between  by-laws  and 
statutes  suggested  and  discussed  by  Dnr- 
fee,  C  J. ;   see  Johnson  v.  Simonton,  43 


Cal.  242,  1872.  The  courts  will  not  en- 
join the  passage  of  unautliorized  ordi- 
nances, and  will  ordinarily  act  only  when 
steps  are  taken  to  make  them  available. 
Chicago  V.  Evans,  24  111.  52,  1860;  Smith 
r.  McCarthy,  56  Pa.  St.  359  ;  Des  Moines 
Gas  Co.  V.  Des  Moines  (city  of),  44  Iowa, 
505,  1870;  s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep.  756,  distin- 
guishing Davis  V.  Mayor,  14  N.  Y.  506 ; 
People  V.  Sturtevant,  9  N.  Y'.  203.  But 
if  a  party  is  injuriously  affected  by 
an  ordinance,  he  may  have  its  validity 
judicially  determined  before  it  is  at- 
tempted to  be  executed.  State  v.  Pater- 
son,  34  N.  J.  Law,  163 ;  State  v.  Jersey 
City,  lb.  31,  390,  1870.  But  see  Sheridan 
V.  Calvin,  78  111.  237. 

The  jurisdiction  of  every  council  is 
not  only  to  be  confined  to  the  municipality 
the  council  represents,  but  is  to  be  exer- 
cised, when  not  otherwise  provided  for, 
by  bylaw.  When  a  corporation  is  duly 
erected,  the  law  tacitly  annexes  to  it  the 
power  of  making  by-laws  or  private  stat- 
utes. This  power  is  included  in  every 
act  of  incorporation ;  for,  as  is  quaintly 
observed  by  Blackstone,  "  as  natural  rea- 
son is  given  to  the  natural  body  for  the 
governing  it,  so  by-laws  or  statutes  are  a 
sort  of  political  reason  to  govern  the  body 
politic."  1  Bl.  Com.  476.  Though  the 
power  to  make  by-laws  is  unquestion- 
ably an  incident  of  every  corporation, 
it  is  rarely  left  to  implication ;  but  is 
usually,  as  in  the  present  case,  conferred 
by  the  express  terms  of  the  act  of  par- 
liament. A  by-law  is  a  rule  obligatory 
over  a  particular  district,  not  being  at 
variance  with  the  general  laws,  and 
being  reasonably  adapted  to  the  pur- 
poses of  the  corporation.  Gosling  v. 
Veley  et  al.,  19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  135.  A 
by-law  has  the  same  force,  within  the 
limits  of  the  municipality,  and  with  re- 
spect to  the  persons  upon  whom  it  law- 
fully operates,  as  an  act  of  parliament 
has  upon  the  people  at  large.  Hopkins  v. 
Swansea,  4  M.  &  W.  621  ;  The  Queen  v. 
Osier,  32  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  224.  The 
courts  upon  general  principles  recognize 
judicially  what  municipal  councils  are 
competent  to  do,  and  hold  that  it  is  not 
necessary  for  them  to  recite  in  a  by-law 


324  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

imposed  by  an  ordinance  authorized  by  the  legislature  for  the 
doing  of  certain  specified  acts  amounts  to  a  prohibition,  and  the 
prohibited  acts  become  thereby  unlawful. ^ 

§  309.  (246)  Ordinances  being  among  the  most  important 
and  solemn  acts  of  a  corporation,  it  is  essential  to  their  validity 
that  they  shall  be  adopted  hy  the  proper  hody^  duly  assembled,  and 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  charter.  What  is  necessary  to 
constitute  a  valid  corporate  meeting,  and  the  manner  of  perform- 
ing valid  corporate  acts,  are  subjects  treated  of  in  another  chap- 
ter.2  When  the  mode  of  enacting  ordinances  is  prescribed,  it 
must  be  pursued.  Thus,  if  the  charter  provides  that  no  by-law 
shall  be  passed  unless  introduced  at  a  previous  regular  meeting, 
this  is  a  restriction  on  the  power,  and  must  be  observed ;  and, 
accordingly,  an  ordinance  for  opening  a  street  was  adjudged  void, 
on  the  ground  that  the  name  of  one  of  the  commissioners  was 
changed  without  laying  the  ordinance  over  until  another  meeting.^ 
So  where  by  the  charter  the  mayor  is  part  of  the  law-making 
power,  his  concurrence  in  legislative  action  is  essential  to  its  valid- 
ity.* Municipal  ordinances,  otherwise  valid,  may,  like  an  act  of 
the  legislature,  be  adopted  to  take  effect  in  future  and  upon  the 
happening  of  a  contingent  event.^     The  ordaining  clause  of  an 

all  that  is  requisite  to  show  tliat  they  cited.     Construction  of  similar  restriction 

have  proceeded  regularly  in  passing   it.  requiring  previous  publication.    Douglass 

Grierson  v.  Ontario,  9  Upper  Can.  Q.  R.  in  re,  46  N.  Y.  42;  N.  Y.  etc.  School,  in  re, 

623;  Fisher  y.Vaughan,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  47  N.  Y.  55G;  Dubuque  v.  Wooton,  28 

B.  492;  The  King  v.   Harrison,  3  Burr.  Iowa,  571.     Where  a  statute  requires  that 

1328  ;   Roman  Catholic  Cliurch   v.  Balti-  no  vote  shall  be  taken  upon  an  assessment 

more,  6  Gill  (-Md.),  394;    Stuyvesant  v.  ordinance  or  resolution  until  it  has  been 

New  York,  7    Cow.  (N.   Y.)    588;  Harr.  published  three  days,  a  resolution  passed 

Munic.  Manual,  4th  ed.  without  such  prior  publication  was  held 

1  Johnson  v.  Simonton  (swill  milk  or-  illegal,  and  the  assessment  founded  upon 
dinance  of  San  Trancisco),  43  Cal.  242,  it  void.  Addison  Smith,  in  re,  52  N.  Y. 
1872.  Thus  a  city  ordinance,  duly  au-  526.  The  provision  is  held  to  be  manda- 
thorized,  imposing  a  penalty  for  feeding  tory.  Phillips,  in  re,  60  N.  Y.  16;  Little 
distillery  slops  to  cows,  and  also  for  vend-  in  re,  60  N.  Y.  343;  Anderson,  in  re,  00 
ing  the  milk  of  cows  so  fed,  amounts  to  an  N.  Y.  457  ;  Douglass,  in  re,  45  N.  Y.  42  ; 
authoritative  prohibition  in  both  respects  ;  State  v.  Hoboken,  38  N.  J.  L.  110;  State 
and  the  acts  thus  prohibited  are  illegal.  lb.  v.  Smith,  22  Minn.  218. 

2  Ante,  chap.  x.  «  Saxton  v.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488,  1872; 

3  State  V.  Bergen,  33  N.  J.  Law,  39,  Saxton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153,  1875; 
1868,  distinguished  from  State  v.  Jersey  therefore  a  resolution  without  ma3^or'8 
City,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  448,  where  tlie  vari-  signature  ordering  local  improvements  is 
ance  was  immaterial.  See  Cooley  Const,  a  nullity.  Ih.  Irvin  v.  Devors,  65  Mo. 
Lim.    139,    as   to   constitutional    require-  625,  1877. 

ment  that  bills  shall  be  read  on  successive  5  Baltimore   v.   Clunet,    23   Md.    449, 

days  before  their  passage  and  cases  there     1865;  Railway  Company  v.  Baltimore,  21 


§  310.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


325 


ordinance  has  been  held,  under  the  circumstances  stated  in  the 
note,  not  to  be  essential  to  its  validity,  although  the  charter  con- 
tains a  provision  requiring  such  a  clause  and  prescribing  the 
form,  the  court  considering  the  provision  to  be  directory  only.^ 

§  310.  (247)  In  the  absence  of  required  record  evidence  of  the 
passage  of  an  ordinance^  it  is  not  competent,  except  possibly  under 
peculiar  circumstances,  to  establish  its  adoption  by  extrinsic  testi- 
mony ;2  but  where  unanimity  is  necessary  to  legal  authority  to 
make  an  order,  and  an  order  is  entered,  it  will  be  presumed,  when 
the  contrary  does  not  appear,  that  it  was  made  with  the  required 
unanimity.^ 


Md.  93,  1863;  State  v.  Kirkley,  29  Md. 
85, 1868 ;  ante,  sec.  44.  See  Troy  v.  Atchi- 
son, etc.  Railroad  Co.,  13  Kan.  70,  1874; 
sec.  300,  note.  Another  common  but 
erroneous  belief  is,  that  a  municipal  coun- 
cil can  by  order  or  resolution  do  that 
which,  if  done  through  a  by-law  or  ordi- 
nance would  be  illegal.  This  it  cannot 
do.  No  municipal  council  can  do  that 
informally  which  it  has  no  power  to  do 
directly  and  formally.  Daniels  v.  Bur- 
ford,  lb  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  478.  A  by-law, 
order,  or  resolution  which  revives  an  illegal 
by-law  is  of  course  itself  illegal.  Canada 
Co.  V.  O.xford,  9  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  567.  An 
order  or  resolution  duly  signed  and  sealed 
is  virtually  a  by-law  or  ordinance,  but 
many  orders  and  resolutions  pass  by  mere 
vote,  without  being  thus  authenticated. 
The  municipal  rules  of  proceeding  gen- 
erally require  more  formal  steps  to  be 
taken,  in  passing  a  by-law  or  ordinance, 
than  in  adopting  an  order  or  resolution. 
Municipal  corporations,  however,  may 
become  liable  as  wrong-doers  for  things 
done  by  direction  of  the  councils  without 
by-laws.  Croft  v.  Peterborougli,  5  Upper 
Can.  C.  P.  35 ;  Nevill  v.  Ross,  22  Upper 
Can.  C.  P.  487 ;  Darby  v.  Crowland,  38 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  338;  Lewis  v.  Ciiy  of 
Toronto,  39  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  343.  The 
power  to  make  by-laws  or  ordinances 
necessarily  supposes  the  power  to  enforce 
them  by  pecuniary  penalties,  competent 
and  proportionable  to  the  offence.  In 
construing  a  by-law,  etc.,  the  court  will 
look  at  the  whole  of  it,  to  ascertain  its 
meaning,  and  construe  one  part  with  an- 
other or  other  parts,  so  as,  if  possible, 
to  give  full  effect  to  the  whole.     Cameron 


and  East  Nissouri,  in  re,  13  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  190. 

1  St.  Louis  V.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513,  1873. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  having 
decided  in  the  Pacific  Railroad  v.  Gov- 
ernor, 23  Mo.  353,  and  Girardeau  v. 
Riley,  52  Mo.  424,  1873,  that  the  validity 
of  a  statute,  duly  authenticated,  could  not 
be  impeached  by  showing  a  departure 
from  the  forms  prescribed  in  the  consti- 
tution in  the  passage  of  laws,  applied  the 
same  principle  to  the  passage  of  ordi- 
nances. Therefore,  although  the  charter 
required  that  the  style  of  ordinances  shall 
be,  "  Be  it  ordained,"  etc.,  yet  this  is  di- 
rectory ;  and  omitting  the  enacting  clause, 
or  using  an  imperfect  enacting  clause 
does  not  invalidate  the  ordinance.  St. 
Louis  V.  Foster,  supra.  As  to  the  con- 
flicting decisions  in  respect  to  whether  the 
forms  prescribed  in  constitutions  to  be 
observed  in  the  enactment  of  laws  are 
imperative  or  directory  only,  see  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.  ch.  vi. 

2  Covington  v.  Ludlow,  1  Met.  (Ky.) 
295,  1858.  See  ante,  sees.  301,  266,  note, 
297;  post,  sec.  335. 

3  Lexington  v.  Headley,  5  Bush  (Ky.), 
508,  1869;  Covington  v.  Boyle,  6  Bush 
(Ky.),  204, 1869  ;  McCormick  v.  Bay  City, 
23  Mich.  457,  1871 ;  see  Steckert  v.  East 
Saginaw.  22  Mich.  104 ;  post,  sec.  800. 
The  final  action  of  a  city  council,  or  other 
deliberative  body,  on  any  measure,  is 
shown  by  its  adjournment  thereon,  the 
public  promulgation  of  its  action,  or  sub- 
sequent proceedings  inconsistent  with  a 
purpose  to  review.  State  v.  Van  Buskirk, 
40  N.  J.  L.  463. 


326  MUNICIPAL   COKPORATIONS.  [CH.  XH. 

§  311.  It  is  well  settled  that  the  judicial  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment cannot  institute  an  inquiry/  into  the  motives  of  the  legis- 
lative department  in  the  enactment  of  laws.  Such  an  inquiry 
would  not  only  be  impracticable  in  most  cases,  but  the  assump- 
tion and  exercise  of  such  a  power  would  result  in  subordinating 
the  legislature  to  the  courts,  ^  In  analogy  to  this  rule  it  is  doubt- 
less true  that  the  courts  will  not,  in  general,  inquire  into  the 
motives  of  the  council  in  passing  ordinances.^  But  it  would  be 
disastrous,  as  we  think,  to  appl}'  the  analogy  to  its  full  extent. 
Municipal  bodies,  like  the  directories  of  private  corporations, 
have  too  often  shown  themselves  capable  of  using  their  powers 
fraudulently,  for  their  own  advantage  or  to  the  injury  of  others. 
We  suppose  it  to  be  a  sound  proposition  that  their  acts,  whether 
in  the  form  of  resolutions  or  ordinances,  may  be  impeached  for 
fraud  at  the  instance  of  persons  injured  thereby. 

§  312.  (248)  Accordingly,  in  Ohio,  in  a  case  where  the  legis- 
lature chartered  a  gas  comjmny,  reserving  the  power  of  control, 
and  subsequently  empowered  the  city  council  to  regulate  the  price 
of  gas,  the  court  considered  the  intention  to  be  to  limit  the  com- 
pany to  a  fair  and  reasonable  price,  and  that  it  must  be  fairly 
exercised ;  and  if,  in  the  colorable  exercise  of  the  power,  a  majority 
of  the  members,  for  a  fraudulent  purpose,  combined  to  fix  the 
price  at  a  rate  at  which  they  knew  it  could  not  be  made  and  sold 
without  loss,  their  action  would  not  bind  the  company,  and  in 
such  a  case,  their  good  faith,  it  was  held,  might  be  inquired  into.^ 

§  313.  Where  the  officers  of  a  municipal  corporation  are  in- 
vested with  legislative  powers,  they  are  exempt  fro7n  individual 

1  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  186,  187,  wliere  Fletcher  v.  Peck,  6  Crancli,  87;  Bank  v. 
many  of  the  cases  are  collected.  United  States,  1  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  553. 

2  Freeport  v.  Marks,  59  Pa.  St.  25.3;  The  courts  will  not  inquire,  even  on  the 
Buell  V.  Ball,  20  Iowa,  282  (collateral  ac-  complaint  of  the  state,  into  the  motives 
tion  between  third  persons).  It  being  which  governed  members  of  the  legis- 
well  settled  that  the  courts  may  decide  lature  in  the  enactment  of  a  law,  or  allow 
upon  the  reasonableness  of  ordinances,  to  be  shown,  for  the  purpose  of  defeating 
they  will  in  general  judge  of  these,  what-  the  operation  of  the  law,  that  it  was 
ever  their  purpose,  by  considering  tlieir  passed  by  fraud,  corruption,  and  bribery 
nature  and  effect,  ratlier  than  by  institut-  of  the  members.  Wright  v.  Defrees,  8 
lug  an  inquiry  into  the  motives  of  the  Ind.  298;  followed,  McCuUoch  v.  Slate, 
members  of  the  council;  although  where  11  lb.  424,  431,  18.58;  s.  p.  Sunbury,  etc., 
the  latter  is  material,  it  may  in  the  au-  Railroad  Co.  v.  Cooper,  7  Am.  Law  Reg. 
thor's  judgment  be  done.  158,  18.58;   Cooley  Const.  Lim.  135,136, 

3  State  V.  Cincinnati  Gas  Company,  18  186,  208. 
Ohio   St.  262,  1868,   distinguished  from 


§  314] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


327 


liabUltn  for  the  passage  of  any  ordinance  within  their  authority, 
and  their  motives  in  reference  thereto  will  not  be  inquired  into ; 
nor  are  they  individually  liable  for  tlie  passage  of  any  ordhiance 
not  authorized  by  their  powers ;  for  such  ordinance  is  void,  and 
need  not  be  obeyed.^ 

§  314.  (249)  Since  a  valid  by-law  never  becomes  obsolete,  it  re- 
mains in  force  until  repealed  by  the  legislature  or  the  corporation. 
The  power  to  make  includes  the  power  to  repeal  without  refer- 
ence to  the  people  of  the  municipality,^  The  repeal  cannot 
operate  retrospectively  to  disturb  private  rights  vested  under  it.^ 
Therefore,  the  legislature  having  authorized  a  religious  corpora- 
tion to  establish  a  cemetery  within  the  limits  of  a  city,  on  obtain- 
ing the  consent  of  the  city,  and  such  consent  having  been  given, 
the  city  authorities  cannot,  after  their  consent  has  been  acted 
upon,  repeal  the  resolutions  giving  it,  and  enjoin  the  religious  cor- 
poration from  the  use  of  the  cemetery,  unless,  indeed,  it  is  shown 
to  be  an  actual  nuisance,  detrimental  to  the  health  of  the  city, 
in  which  case  its  police  and  governmental  powers  might  doubtless 
be  exercised.^ 


1  Jones  V.  Loving,  55  Miss.  109;  Paine 
V.  Boston,  124  Mass.  486;  Freeport  v. 
Marks,  59  Pa.  257  ;  Baker  v.  State,  27 
Ind.  485;  Commrs.  v.  Ducket,  20  Md. 
468;  Weaver  v.  Devendorf,  3  Denio  (N. 
Y.),117 ;  Pike  v.  Megam,  44  Mo.  491. 

2  Kansas  City  v.  Wiiite,  69  Mo.  261 ; 
The  King  v.  Ashwell,  12  East,  22;  Tlie 
King  V.  Bird,  13  East,  367  ;  Great  Western 
Railway  Co.  and  North  Cayuga,  in  re,  23 
Upper  Can.  C.  P.  28 ;  Bloomer  v.  Stolley. 
5  McLean,  158;  Santo  el  al.  v.  State  of 
Iowa,  2  Iowa,  165 ;  Bank  of  Chenango  v. 
Brown,  26  N.  Y.  467 ;  Magee  v.  State,  4 
Ind.  302;  Rice  v.  Foster,  4  Harring.  (Del.) 
479;  The  People  v.  Collins,  3  Mich.  347. 

3  Rex  i;.  Ashwell,  12  East,  22 ;  3  Term 
R.  198;  The  King  v.  Bird,  13  East,  379; 
Terre  Haute  v.  Lake,  43  Ind.  480,  1873 ; 
State  V.  City  Clerk,  etc.,  7  Ohio  St.  355 ; 
S-toddard  v.  Gilman,  22  Vt.  508 ;  Pond  v. 
Negus,  3  Mass.  230;  ante,  ch.  x. ;  State  v. 
Graves,  19  Md.  351, 1862;  Bigelow  v.  Hill- 
man,  37  Me.  52 ;  Reiff  v.  Conner,  5  Eng. 
(10  Ark.)  241 ;  Road,  in  re,  17  Pa.  St.  71, 
75;  Cunningham  v.  Almonte,  21  Upjier 
Can.  C.  P.  459 ;  Railroad  Co.,  etc.,  in  re,  23 


Upper  Can.  C.  P.  28.  An  act  changing  an 
incorporated  town  into  a  city  does  not  of 
itself  repeal  pre-existing  ordinances.  Per 
Strong,  J.,  Trustees  of  Academy  v.  Erie, 
31  Pa.  St.  515,  1858;  an<e,  sec.  85,  note. 
Subsequent  constitutional  provision  or  legis- 
lative enactment,  in  conflict  with  existing 
bj'-Iaws,  renders  the  latter  void.  Mobile 
V.  Dargan,  45  Ala.  310,  1871. 

*  New  Orleans  v.  St.  Louis  Church,  11 
La.  An.  244,  1856,  distinguished  from 
Presbyterian  Church  y.  Mayor,  £  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  538 ;  Musgrove  v.  Catholic  Church,  10 
La.  An.  431 ;  ante,  sec.  97.  The  repeal  of 
an  ordinance  puts  an  end  to  a  pending  prose- 
cution under  the  repealed  ordinance,  unless 
there  be  a  saving  clause.  The  contrary 
rule  as  to  state  statutes  held  not  to  apply 
to  by-laws  or  ordinances.  Naylor  v. 
Galcsburg,  56  111.  285,  1870 ;  Kansas  City 
V.  Clark,  68  Mo.  588.  The  fact  that  an 
ordinance  directing  a  certain  street  im- 
provement to  be  made  was  repealed, 
held,  to  be  conclusive  in  favor  of  a  per- 
petual injunction,  restraining  the  con- 
tractor or  the  city  from  proceeding. 
Kaime  v.  Ilarty,  4  Mo.  App.  357. 


328  MUNICIPAL   COKPOKATIONS.  '    [cil.  XII. 

§  315.  (250)  Modi' of  conferring  the  Poioer — Construction  of 
Grants  of  Authority.  —  Municipal  charters,  or  incorporating  acts, 
are  sometimes  silent  as  to  the  power  to  pass  by-laws  or  ordinances  ; 
and  where  this  is  the  case,  the  municipal  body  has  the  power, 
incidental  to  all  corporations,  to  enact  appropriate  by-laws.  Oc- 
casionally, the  charter  or  incorporating  act,  without  any  specific 
enumeration  of  the  purposes  for  whicli  by-laws  may  be  made, 
contains  a  general  and  comprehensive  grant  of  power  to  pass  all 
such  as  may  seem  necessary  to  the  well-being  and  good  order  of 
the  place.  More  frequently,  however,  tlie  charter  or  incorporat- 
ing act  authorizes  the  enactment  of  by-laws  in  certain  specified 
cases  and  for  certain  purposes ;  and  after  this  specific  enumera- 
tion a  general  provision  is  added,  that  the  corporation  may 
make  any  other  by-laws  or  regulations  necessary  to  its  welfare, 
good  order,  etc.,  not  inconsistent  with  the  constitution  or  laws  of 
the  state.  This  difference  is  essential  to  be  observed,  for  the 
power  which  the  corporation  would  possess  under  what  may,  for 
convenience,  be  termed,  "  the  general  welfare  clause,"  if  it  stood 
alone,  may  be  limited,  qualified,  or,  when  such  intent  is  manifest, 
impliedly  taken  away  by  provisions  specifying  the  particular  pur- 
poses for  which  by-laws  may  be  made.  It  is  clear  that  the  gen- 
eral clause  can  confer  no  authority  to  abrogate  the  limitations 
contained  in  special  provisions. 

§  316.  When  there  are  both  special  and  general  provisions,  the 
power  to  pass  by-laws  under  the  special  or  express  grant  can  only 
be  exercised  in  the  cases  and  to  the  extent,  as  respects  those 
matters,  allowed  by  the  charter  or  incorporating  act ;  and  the 
power  to  pass  by-laws  under  the  general  clause  does  not  enlarge 
or  annul  the  power  conferred  by  the  special  provisions  in  relation 
to  their  various  subject  matters,  but  gives  authority  to  pass  by- 
laws, reasonable  in  their  character,  upon  all  other  matters  within 
the  scope  of  their  municipal  authority,  and  not  repugnant  to  the 
constitution  and  general  laws  of  the  state. ^     And  it  has  been  very 

1  State  V.  Ferguson,  33  N.  H.  424,  therefore  not  sustainable  under  the  gen- 
1856,  where  this  subject  is  ably  treated  eral  welfare  clause  of  the  charter, 
in  a  judgment  delivered  by  Mr.  Justice  "The  power  to  make  by-laws,  when 
Foster,  liolding  a  by-law  of  the  city  of  not  expressly  given,  is  implied  as  an  inci- 
Concord,  in  relation  to  the  sale  of  intoxi-  dent  to  tlie  very  existence  of  a  corpora- 
eating  liquor,  invalid  as  contravening  the  tion  ;  but  in  the  case  of  an  express  grant 
special   provisions   of   the    charter,   and  of  the  power  to  enact  by-laws  limited  to 


§  317.] 


MUNICIPxVL   ORDI^TANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


329 


properly  held  that  a  special  grant  of  power  to  a  municipal  cor- 
poration to  adopt  ordinances  on  enumerated  subjects  connected 
with  municipal  concerns  is  in  addition  to  the  incidental  power  of 
the  corporation.^ 

§  317.  (251)  Ordinances  cannot  enlarge  or  change  the  Charterer 
Statute.  —  Since  all  of  the  powers  of  a  corporation  are  derived  from 
the  law  and  its  charter,  it  is  evident  that  no  ordinance  or  hy-laio  of 
a  corporation  can  enlarge,  diminish,  or  vary  its  powers."^     A  similar 


certain  specified  cases  and  for  certain  pur- 
poses, the  corporate  power  of  legislation 
is  confined  to  the  objects  specified,  all 
others  being  excluded  by  implication." 
Per  Sawyer,  J.,  arguendo,  in  State  v.  Fer- 
guson, 33  N.  H.  424,  430,  1856 ;  citing  2 
Kyd  on  Corp.  102;  Angell  &  Ames  on 
Corp.  177;  and  Child  r.  Hudson's  Bay 
Co.,  2  P.  Wnis.  207.  The  true  rule  in 
such  cases  may,  perhaps,  be  correctly  ex- 
pressed to  be,  that  tlie  enumeration  of 
special  cases  does  not,  unless  the  intent 
be  apparent,  exclude  the  implied  power 
any  further  than  necessarily  results  from 
the  nature  of  the  special  provisions. 
Heisembrittle  v.  Charleston,  2  McMullen 
(So.  Car.),  2.33;  Wadleigh  v.  Oilman,  3 
Fairf.  (12  Me.)  408;  State  v.  Clark,  8 
Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  176,  and  comments  in  33 
N.  H.  432;  State  v.  Freeman,  38  N.  H. 
426  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Turner,  1  Cush. 
(Mass.)  493;  Collins  v.  Hatch,  18  Ohio, 
523;  see  New  Orleans  v.  Philipi  (taxa- 
tion), 9  La.  An.  44;  Indianapolis  v.  In- 
dianapolis Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  citing 
text. 

In  Geonjia,  the  Superior  Courts  adopt 
the  following  as  the  true  rule  for  ascer- 
taining the  extent  of  the  power  of  a  city  to 
pass  ordinances.  "  The  city  council  is 
restrained  to  such  matters,  whether  spe- 
cially enumerated  or  included  under  gen- 
eral grant,  as  are  indifferent  in  themselves, 
such  matters  as  are  free  from  constitu- 
tional objection  and  have  not  been  the 
subject  of  general  legislation  ;  or,  as  it  is 
expressed  in  the  charter,  are  not  repug- 
nant to  the  constitution  or  laws  of  the 
land."  Dubois  v.  Augusta  (health  ordi- 
nance), Dudley  (Ga.)  Kep.  30,  1831; 
Williams  v.  Augusta  (powder  ordinance), 
4  Ga.  509,  514,  1848.  Power  to  pass 
necessary  by-laws   is   incidental,  but   this 


power  is  limited  not  only  by  the  terms, 
but  the  spirit  and  design,  of  the  charter, 
and  the  general  principles  and  policy  of 
the  common  law.  Taylor  v.  Griswold,  2 
Green  (N.  J.),  222, 1834  ;  Mount  Pleasant 
V.  Breeze,  11  Iowa,  399, 1860,  per  Wriyht,  J. 
A  power  to  pass  ordinances  to  "  im- 
prove the  morals  and  order  "  of  the  peo- 
ple does  not  authorize  an  ordinance  to 
"  punish  "  the  offence  of  keeping  houses 
of  ill-fame.  Whether  the  legislature  can 
constitutionally  confer  power  upon  cities 
to  punish  acts  made  crimes  by  the  laws 
of  the  state,  not  decided.  Chariton  v. 
Barker,  Iowa,  1880,  Beck,  J.;  s.  c.  11 
Cent.  Law  J.  358. 

1  State  V.  Morristown,  33  N.  J.  L. 
57,  1868.  Depue,  J.  in  his  opinion,  dis- 
tinguishes such  a  case  from  Norris  v. 
Staps,  Hobart,  210,  where  the  corporation 
was  created  by  the  Crown,  and  where  it 
was  held  that  a  special  clause  in  the  let- 
ters patent,  authorizing  the  corporate  body 
(a  fellowship  of  weavers)  to  make  by- 
laws, did  not  add  to  implied  powers,  and 
that  its  by-laws  were  subject  to  the  gen- 
eral law  of  the  realm  and  subordinate  to 
it.  "  But,"  he  adds,  "  a  special  grant  of 
power  to  a  municipal  corporation  is  an 
entirely  different  thing;  it  is  a  delegation 
of  authority  to  legislate  by  ordinance  on 
the  enumerated  subjects,  and  does  add  to 
the  powers  incident  to  the  creation  of  the 
corporation.  The  numerous  instances,  in 
our  own  state,  of  the  grant  of  such 
powers  in  relation  to  the  opening  and  im- 
provement of  streets,  the  making  of 
sewers,  and  the  assessment  of  taxes, 
afford  illustrations  of  this  distinction. 
lb.  62. 

2  Thompson  i^.  Carroll,  22  How.  422, 
1859 ;  Andrews  v.  Insurance  Co.,  37  Me. 
256, 1854 ;  Thomas  v.  Hiciimond,  12  Wall 


MUNICIPAL   CORrOKATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


rule  obtains  in  EngLincl,  where  it  is  held  that  neither  the  king's 
charter  nor  any  by-hiw  can  introduce  an  alteration  in  rules  which 
have  been  prescribed  to  a  corporation  by  an  act  of  parliament.^ 
By-laws  are,  in  their  nature,  strictly  local,  and  subordinate  to  the 
general  laws. 

§  318.  (252)  Ordinance  need  not  recite  AntTiority  to  pass 
it.  —  It  is  not  essential  to  the  validity  of  an  ordinance  executing 
powers  conferred  by  the  legislature  that  it  should  state  the 
power  in  execution  of  which  the  ordinance  is  passed.  If  it  state 
no  particular  power  as  its  basis,  it  will  be  judicially  regarded  as 
emanating  from  that  power  which  would  have  warranted  its 
passage.  If  two  such  powers  exist,  it  may  be  imputed  to  either, 
in  conformity  to  which  its  provisions  and  prerequisites  show 
that  it  has  been  adopted.  If,  in  these  respects,  in  accordance 
with  both,  no  injustice  can  result  in  regarding  it  as  the  offspring 
of  both  or  either  of  the  powers.^ 


349,  1871.  "A  power  vested  bj'  legisla- 
tion in  a  city  corporation,  to  make  by- 
laws for  its  own  governtnent  ami  the 
regulation  of  its  own  police,  cannot  be 
construed  as  imparting  to  it  the  power  to 
repeal  the  [general]  laws  in  force,  or  to 
supersede  their  operation  by  any  of  its 
ordinances.  Such  a  power,  if  not  ex- 
pressl}^  conferred,  cannot  arise  by  mere 
implication,  unless  the  exercise  of  the 
power  given  be  inconsistent  with  the  pre- 
vious law,  and  does  necessarily  operate 
as  its  repeal  pro  tanto.  Nor  can  the  pre- 
sumption be  indulged,  that  the  legislature 
intended  that  an  ordinance  passed  by  the 
city  should  be  superior  to,  or  take  the 
place  of,  the  general  law  of  the  state 
upon  the  same  subject."  Simpson,  C.  J., 
RIarch  v.  Commonwealth,  12  B.  Men. 
(Ky.)  25,  29, 1851.  "  Huckster  "  means  a 
petty  dealer  or  retailer  of  small  articles 
of  provisions,  etc.,  and  an  ordinance  can- 
not enlarge  the  ordinary  meaning  so  as 
to  embrace  "  any  person  not  a  farmer  or 
butcher  who  should  sell,  or  offer  for  sale, 
any  commodity  not  of  his  own  manu- 
facture," and  subject  such  person  to  a 
penalty ;  it  not  being,  says  Ranneij,  J., 
"part  of  the  franchise  of  municipal  cor- 
porations to  change  the  meaning  of  Eng- 
lish words."  Mayor  v.  Cincinnati,  1  Oliio 
St.  2G8,  272,  1853.     "Butcher"  defined. 


Henback  v.  State,  53  Ala.  523,  1875 ;  s.  c. 
25  Am.  Rep.  650;  18  Alb.  Law  Jour.  304. 

1  Rex  V.  Miller,  6  Term  R.  277 ;  Rex 
V.  Barber  Surgeons,  1  Ld.  Rayra.  585.  It 
has  even  been  said  that  the  general  as- 
sembly cannot  authorize  a  municipal  cor- 
poration to  repeal,  by  ordinance,  a  statute 
of  the  state.  Haywood  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  12 
Ga.  404,  per  Lumpkin,  J.  But  it  may  pro- 
vide that  on  the  passage  of  an  ordinance 
of  a  certain  character,  the  state  law  on 
the  subject  shall  not  be  in  force  in  the 
corporate  limits.  State  v.  Binder,  88  Mo. 
450 ;  post,  ch.  xxiii. 

2  PerDorsey,  C.  J.,  Methodist  P.  Church 
V.  Baltimore,  6  Gill  (Md.),  391,  1848. 
Under  power  to  pass  an  ordinance  if 
found  necessary,  the  necessity  for  its  enact- 
ment, being  implied  from  its  mere  pas- 
sage, need  not  be  recited  in  the  ordinance, 
nor  averred  in  proceedings  to  enforce  it. 
Stuyvesant  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  588;  s.  p.  Young  v.  St. 
Louis,  47  Mo.  492,  1871.  This  case  re- 
affirmed In  Kiley  v.  Forsee,  57  Mo.  890, 
1874.  But  the  charter  may  be  imperative 
in  requiring  the  necessity  to  be  expressed 
by  ordinance  or  resolution;  so  held  in 
Hoyt  V.  East  Saginaw,  19  Mich.  39,  1869. 
So,  in  England  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  preamble  to  a  by-law  should  state  the 
reasons  for  making  it.     Rex  i'.  Harrison, 


§  319.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


331 


§  819.  (253)  3Iust  he  Reasonable  and  Lawful. — In  England, 
the  subjects  upon  whicli  by-laws  maj'  be  made  were  not  usually 
specified  in  tlie  king's  charter,  and  it  became  an  established 
doctrine  of  the  courts  that  every  corporation  had  the  implied  or 
incidental  right  to  pass  by-laws  ;  but  this  power  was  accompanied 
with  these  limitations,  namely,  that  every  by-law  must  be  reason- 
able, not  inconsistent  with  the  charter  of  the  corporation,  nor 
with  any  statute  of  parliament,  nor  with  the  general  principles  of 
the  common  law  of  the  land,  particularly  those  having  relation 
to  the  liberty  of  the  subject  or  the  rights  of  private  property.^  In 
this  country  the  courts  have  often  affirmed  the  general  incidental 
power  of  municipal  corporations  to  make  ordinances,  but  have 
always  declared  that  ordinances  passed  in  virtue  of  the  implied 
power  must  be  reasonable,  consonant  with  the  general  powers 
and  purposes  of  the  corporation,  and  not  inconsistent  with  the 
laws  or  policy  of  the  state.^ 


3  Burr.  1328.  See,  also,  Grierson  v.  On- 
tario, 9  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  623 ;  Fisher  v. 
Vaughan,  10  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  492.  If  a 
municipal  corporation  attempt  to  act  ac- 
cording to  a  statute  not  in  force  this  does 
not  invalidate  their  proceedings,  if  the 
same  are  in  accordance  witli  existing 
statutes.  State  v.  Jersey  City,  3  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  4'.)3. 

1  Sutton's  Hospital  Case,  10  Rep.  31  a; 
Feltmakers  v.  Davis,  1  Bos.  &  P.  98, 100 ; 
Norris  v.  Stops,  Hob.  211;  Rex  v.  Maid- 
stone, 3  Burr.  1837  ;  Com.  Dig.  Franch. 
F.  10 ;  London  v.  Vanacre,  1  Ld.  Raym. 
496;  2  Kyd,  ch.  iv.  sec.  10,  p.  95,  and 
cases  cited  ;  Bac.  Abr.  tit.  By-law. 

2  Must  be  reasonable.  Kip  v.  Patter- 
son, 2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  298;  Dayton  v. 
Quigley  (citing  text),  29  N.  J.  Eq.  77, 
1878  ;  Conimrs.  v.  Gas  Co.,  12  Pa.  St.  318, 
1859;  Fisher  v.  Harrisburg,  2  Grant  (Pa.) 
Cases,  291,  1854  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Rob- 
ertson, 5  Cush.  (Mass.)  438, 1850;  Waters 
V.  Leech,  3  Ark.  110;  Mayor  r.  'Winfield, 
8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  707,  1848.  Text  ap- 
proved. Frank,  in  re,  52  Cal.  006.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Steffce,  7  Bush  (Ky.),  161, 
1870;  People  v.  Tliroop,  12  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)l&.3,  186,  1834;  Mayor  v.  Beasley,  1 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  232, 1839  ;  State  v.  Free- 
man, 38  N.  H.  420, 1859  ;  White  i-.  Mayor, 
etc.,  2  Swan  (Tenn.),  3G4,  1852;  Pedrick 
V.  Bailey,  12  Gray  (Mass.),  161  :  Dunham 


V.  Rochester,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  462;  Clason 
V.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  316,  1872;  Tug- 
man  V.  Chicago,  78  111.  405,  1875.  An 
ordinance  requiring  druggists  to  furnish 
quarterly  verified  statements  of  the  kind 
and  quantity  of  intoxicating  liquors  sold, 
to  whom,  etc.,  was  held  unreasonable  and 
oppressive.  Clinton  (city  of)  v.  Phillips, 
58  111.  102;  s.  c.  11  Am.  Rep.  52. 

The  trustees  of  public  schools  had  stat- 
utory authority  to  direct  what  branches 
should  be  taught,  and  to  adopt  and  en- 
force ail  necessary  rules  and  regulations 
for  the  management  and  government  of 
schools.  A  candidate  for  admission 
passed  a  satisfactory  examination  in  ev- 
erj'tliing  but  grammar,  and  was  refused 
admission  on  tliat  account.  Held,  a  rule 
or  regulation  denying  liim  admission  ou 
that  account  was  unreasonable,  and  that 
mandamus  would  lie  to  compel  his  admis- 
sion to  study  the  other  branches.  Trus- 
tees V.  People,  etc.,  87  111.  303;  s.  p.  Ruli- 
son  V.  Post,  79  111.  567. 

Ordinance  may  be  shown  to  be  un- 
reasonable, as  that  one  for  building  a  side- 
walk was  unnecessary  and  oppressive,  it 
being  located  in  an  uninhabited  portion  of 
the  city  and  disconnected  with  any  other 
street  or  sidewalk.  Corrigan  v.  Gage,  68 
Mo.  541. 

Must  not  conflict  with  the  charter  or  stat- 
ute, or  be  repufjnant  to  fundamental  rights. 


332  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XU. 

§  320.  (254)  3Iust  not  he  Oppressive.  —  The  principle  of  law, 
that  ordinances  passed  under  the  general  authority  to  enact  all 
such  as  will  be  necessary,  must  be  reasonable,  or  they  may  be 
void,  is  well  illustrated  by  a  case  in  Pennsylvania}  A  municipal 
corporation  passed  two  ordinances  in  relation  to  a  gas  company, — 
a  private  corporation,  with  a  special  charter  autliorizing  the  con- 
struction and  maintenance  of  suitable  gas-works  within  the  limits 
of  the  municipal  corporation,  and  the  use  of  the  streets  for  the  lay- 
ing down  of  pipes.  The  first  ordinance  prohibited  the  gas  company 
from  opening  paved  streets  from  December  to  March  in  each 
year,  for  the  purpose  of  laying  gas  mains.  This  ordinance  the 
court  considered  to  be  reasonable,  in  view  of  the  difficulty  of  re- 
pairing the  paved  streets  during  the  winter  months.  And  the 
other  ordinance  prohibited  tlie  gas  company  from  opening  a  paved 
street  at  any  time,  for  the  purpose  of  laying  pipes  from  tlie  main 
to  the  opposite  side  of  the  street.  The  court  say :  "  The  effect 
of  this  ordinance  is  to  compel  the  company  to  construct  two 
mains,  one  on  each  side  of  the  street,  instead  of  one ;  thereby 
materially  increasing  the  expense  to  the  company,  and  conse- 
quently enhancing  the  price  of  gas  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  dis- 
trict." And  this  ordinance  was  declared  to  be  void.  So,  where 
the  city  owns  water-works,  its  by-laws  in  respect  to  the  supply  of 

Dubois   V.   Augusta    (health   ordinance),  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  205;  City  Council  y.  Blu- 

Dudley  (Ga.)  Hep.  30,  1831;  Williams  v.  jamin,  2  Strob.  (South  Car.)  508;    City 

Augusta  (powder  ordinances),  4  Ga.  509,  Councils.  Aherns,4/6.  241 ;  Heisembrittle 

1848;  Adams  v.  Mayor,  etc.  (liquor  stat-  Ads.  v.  City  Council,  2  McMul.  (South 

Tite),  29  Ga.  56;   Taylor  v.  Griswold,  2  Car.)  233;  City  Council  v.  Goldsmith,  2 

Green  (N.  J.),  222, 1834;  New  Orleans  v.  Speer  (South  Car.),  435;  State  v.  Welch, 

rhilipi  (taxation),  9  La.  An.  44;  Perdue  36  Conn.  215. 

V.  Ellis  (liquor  traffic),  18  Ga.  586;  Hay-  An  ordinance  prohibiting  any  aurt/oneer 

wood  V.  Mayor,  12  Ga.  404;  Paris  v.  Gra-  to  make  any  sale  "  except  to  the  highest 

ham  (tax  on  dram-shops),  33  Mo.  94;  St.  bidder"  was  held  void  for  want  of  legis- 

Louis  V.  Cafferata,  24  Mo.  94 ;  St.  Louis  lative   or  charter  authority  to  enact  it. 

V.  Pentz,  11  Mo.  61 ;  Carr  v.  St.  Louis  (fee  of  Martin,  in  re,  27  Ark.  467,  1872.     An  ordi- 

officers),  9  Mo.  190,  1845  ;  Marietta  (.'.  Fear,  nance  prohibiting  heavy  awnings  over  side- 

ing  (estray  animals),  4  Ohio,  427,  1831  ;  walks,  without  consent  of  municipal  au- 

CoUins  V.    Hatch   (animals  at  large),  18  thorities,  is  reasonable  and  valid.    Pedrick 

O  do,  52;],  1819  ;  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  v.  Bailey,  12  Gray  (Mass.),  161.     Under 

V.  Nichols  (inspection  laws),  4  Hill  (N.  the  general  welfare  clause  an  ordinance 

Y.),  209, 1843  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Turner  forbidding  sale  of  lemonade,  cake,  etc.  at 

(liquortraffic),l  Cush.  (Mass.)  493,  1848;  a    temporary   stand    without    paying    a 

Phillips  V.  Wickam,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.)  Ch.  license  tax  is  unauthorized  and  unreason- 

590  ;  Howard  v.  Savannah,  T.  Charlt.  R.  able.     Barling  v.  West,  29  Wis.  307  ;  s.  c. 

173;  Smith  r.  Knoxville,  3  Head  (Tenn.),  9  Am.  Rep.  576 ;  post,  sec.  387. 
245, 1859;  Cowen  v.  West  Troy,  43  Barb.  ^  Commissioners  of  North  Liberties  v. 

(N.'y.)  48,  1864 ;  Petersfield  v.  Vickers,  3  Gas  Co.,  12  Pa.  St.  318,  1849. 


§  321.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  333 

■water  to  the  citizens  must  be  reasonable  ;  and  a  supply  cannot 
be  refused  on  the  application  of  the  owner  because  the  tenant 
was  in  arrears  for  water  supplied  to  him  while  he  occupied  an- 
other house  owned  by  another  landlord.^ 

§  321.  (255)  Courts  will  declare  void  ordinances  that  are  op- 
pressive in  their  character.  Thus,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Tennes- 
see, in  a  judgment  which  reflects  credit  upon  the  tribunal  that 
pronounced  it,  declared  void  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Memphis 
which  ordered  the  arrest,  imprisonment,  and  fine  of  all  free  ne- 
groes who  might  be  found  out  after  ten  o'clock  at  night,  within 
the  limits  of  the  corporation.^  So,  an  ordinance  forbidding,  under 
penalty,  the  "knowingly  associating  with  persons  having  the 
reputation  of  being  thieves  and  prostitutes,"  can  only  be  sustained 
by  construing  it  to  require  proof  of  complicity,  actual  or  intended, 
with  the  persons  named  in  the  complaint  as  the  reputed  thieves 
and  prostitutes ;  otherwise  it  would  be  void,  as  an  invasion  of  the 
right  of  personal  liberty.^  So,  where  the  common  council  of  Bal- 
timore, by  ordinance,  forbade  any  person  to  erect  or  maintain  any 
steam-engine  or  boiler  without  authority  from  the  mayor,  and  au- 
thorized the  mayor,  upon  six  months'  notice,  to  revoke  any  permit 

1  Dayton  v.  Quigley,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  (2  he  is  entitled  to  relief  in  this  court.    High 

Stew.)  77,  1878;  see  cases  cited  in  report-  on  Inj.  sec.  787." 

er's  note  at  end  of  the  opinion.  The  ^  Mayor  y.  AVinfield, 8  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
Chancellor  in  substance  says :  "  The  767,  1848.  The  oppressiveness  and  in- 
water-works  belong  to  the  municipality,  equality,  alleged  to  invalidate  a  by-law, 
and  are  for  the  benefit  of  the  inhabitants  must  be  nuide  apparent  to  the  court. 
of  the  city.  The  inhabitants  are  entitled  Mayor  v.  Beasley,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  232, 
to  the  use  of  the  water  on  compliance  1839;  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547, 
with  reasonable  regulations.  The  use  of  1869.  A  by-law  prohibiting sw/nenmHi'nf/ai 
the  water  for  the  complainant's  tenants  is  large  in  a  city  is  presumptively  reasonable 
necessary  to  the  full  enjoyment  by  him  as  a  sanitary  or  police  regulation.  Com- 
of  his  property.  To  refuse  to  furnish  nionwealth  v.  Patch,  97  Mass.  221 ;  Corn- 
water  to  his  tenant  there  unless  the  com-  monwealth  v.  Bean,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  52. 
plainant  pays  a  debt  due  from  the  tenant  Ordinances  to  regulate  callings  and 
to  tlie  city  for  water  furnished  to  liim  trades  must  not  be  unreasonable,  partial, 
elsewhere,  on  premises  not  belonging  to  in  restraint  of  trade  or  in  contravention 
tlie  complainant,  would,  obviously,  be  to  of  public  policy.  Frank,  in  re,  52  Cal. 
compel  him  to  pay  the  tenant's  debt  as  a  006, 1877.  Thus  a  statute  forbidding  the 
condition  precedent  to  obtaining  the  water  reservation  of  seats  at  public  exhibitions, 
for  his  premises  wliile  occupied  by  the  upon  the  sale  of  tickets  of  admission, 
tenant.  The  regulations  must  be  reason-  after  the  opening  of  the  doors  is  an  un- 
able. 1  Dill,  on  Mun.  Corp.  sees.  319,  constitutional  interference  with  private 
320.  The  refusal  to  furnish  water  to  property.  Dist.  of  Columbia  v.  Saville, 
complainant  is,  under  the  circumstances,  1  McArthur,  581. 
unjustifiable,  and  is  an  injury  for  which  ^  gt.  Louis  v.  Fitz,  53  Mo.  582,  1873. 


334  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XII. 

to  use  or  maintain  a  steam-engine  or  boiler,  and  that  thereupon 
the  same  should  be  removed,  under  a  heavy  penalty  for  failure  to 
remove  it,  in  action  to  restrain  the  prosecution  of  a  suit  for  the  pen- 
alty by  one  maintaining  a  steam-engine  after  notice  to  remove  the 
same  by  the  mayor,  it  was  held  that,  by  itself,  a  stationary  steam- 
engine  is  not  a  nuisance  ;  and  that  an  ordinance  which  commits  to 
the  unrestrained  will  of  a  single  public  officer  a  power  over  the  use 
of  steam  within  a  citj^  practically  absolute,  so  that  he  might  pro- 
hibit its  use  altogether,  the  exercise  of  Avhich  may  proceed  from 
enmity  or  prejudice,  from  partisan  zeal  or  animosity,  from  favor- 
itism and  other  improper  influences,  and  motives  eas}^  of  conceal- 
ment and  difficult  to  be  detected  and  exposed,  hardly  falls  within 
the  domain  of  law,  and  is  void  and  inoperative.^ 

§  322.  (256)  3Iust  be  Impartial,  Fair,  and  General.  —  As  it 
would  be  unreasonable  and  unjust  to  make,  under  the  same 
circumstances,  an  act  done  by  one  person  penal,  and  if  done  by 
another  not  so,  ordinances  which  have  this  effect  cannot  be  sus- 
tained. Special  and  unwarranted  discrimination^  or  unjust  or 
oppressive  interference  in  particular  cases  is  not  to  be  allowed. 
The  powers  vested  in  municipal  corporations  should,  as  far  as 
practicable,  be  exercised  by  ordinances  general  in  their  nature 
and  impartial  in  their  operation.^ 

1  Baltimore  v.  Radccke,  49  Md. ;  s.  c.  nance  when  passed  is  a  judicial  act,  im- 

21  Alb.  Law  Jour.  117.  posing  pecuniary  burden  and  loss  on  the 

-  Russ  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  12  railroad  company,  and  is  subject  to  review 

N.  Y.  Leg.  Obs.  38;  White  v.  Mayor,  2  by  courts  which  will  determine  whether 

Swan    (Tenn.),   364,   1852;    De   Ben    v.  the  power  conferred  was  exercised  in  a 

Girard,  4  La.  An.  30 ;  Chicago  v.  Rumpff,  legal  and  reasonable  manner.      State  v. 

45  111.   90 ;    Mayor,   etc.   of    Hudson   v.  East  Orange,  41  N.  J.  L.  127.    Ordinances 

Thorne,  7  Paige,  261.     Tiie  doctrine  of  should  be  general,  or,  at  all  events,  not 

the  text  approved  and  applied.     Tugman  discriminating  in  their  operation.     They 

V.  Chicago,  78  III.  405,  1875.      An   ordi-  may,  it  is  said,  impose  fines  on  persons 

nance  prohibiting   a   particular   railroad  violating  tlieir  provisions  within  the  cor- 

corporation  by  name  from  running  loco-  poration  or  within  a  designated  district 

motives  by  steam  on  a  specified  street  is  therein,  or  in   a   certain  street ;  but  an 

valid  and  does  not  contravene  the  princi-  ordinance  naming  one  individual  and  di- 

ple  stated  in  the  te.xt.  Richmond,  etc.  Rail-  recting  him  to  do  certain  acts  with  respect 

road  Co.  i\  Richmond,  96  U.  S.  521, 1877;  to  a  building  alleged  to  be  a  nuisance, 

8.  c.  10  Chicago  Legal  News,  379.     So  an  and  in  dcfivult  of  compliance,  imposing  a 

ordinance  compelling  a  railroad  company  fine  of  a  specific  amount  upon  him,  was 

to    station  flagmen    wherever    the    rail-  held  to  be  unreasonable,  contrary  to  com- 

road  may  cross  streets,  etc.,  is  a  valid  ex-  nion   right,   and   void.      Municipality  v. 

ercise  of  legislative  power,  as  a  police  Blineau,  3  La.  An.  688,  1848.     Compare 

regulation  for  the  safety  of  the  public  Bozant  v.  Campbell,  9   Rob.   (La.)  411, 

and  passengers  on  the  trains.     Such  ordi-  1845,  where,  without  repealing  an  ordi- 


§  324]  MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OK  BY-LAWS.  335 

§  323.  (257)  May  regulate,  hut  not  restrain  Trade. — In  Eng- 
land, certain  customs  prevail  in  prescriptive  corporations  restric- 
tive of  freedom  trade  and  against  common  right.  Such  customs, 
from  long  usage  and  unknown  origin,  are  regarded  in  the  light  of 
regulations  prescribed  by  a  charter  which  is  supposed  to  have 
existed,  but  is  lost.  Such  customs,  while  not  favored  by  the 
English  courts,  are  yet  held  legal,  but  must  be  incontrovertibly 
established.  But  by  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1835  (5 
&  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.  sec.  14) ,i  exclusive  rights  of  trading 
have  been  aboHshed,  and  it  is  enacted  "that,  notwithstanding 
such  custom  or  by-law  [to  the  contrar}^],  every  person  in  any 
borough  may  keep  any  shop  for  the  sale  of  all  lawful  wares  and 
merchandise,  by  wholesale  or  retail,  and  use  every  lawful  trade, 
occupation,  mystery,  and  handicraft,  for  hire,  gain,  sale,  or  other- 
wise, within  any  borough." 

§  324.  (258)  In  this  country  corporations  derive  all  their 
powers  from  legislative  acts  of  comparatively  modern  date,  and 
prescriptive  customs,  in  restraint  of  trade  or  against  common 
right,  are  unknown.  No  inconsiderable  portion  of  the  cases  in 
the  old  books  in  England  relate  to  these  customs,  their  validity 
and  mode  of  proof,  but  they  are  in  the  main  inapplicable  to  the 

nance  prohibiting  private  hospitals,  the  fact  that  certain  persons  were  engaged  in 

grant  of  permission  to  one  or  more  indi-  a  particular  kind  of  business  in  a  given 

viduals  to  erect  such  hospitals  was  sus-  locality,  at  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  an 

tained.    And  see,  also.  Commonwealth  v.  ordinance,  would  not  authorize  the  muni- 

Goodrich,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  545,  where  a  cipal  corporation,  by  such  ordinance,  to 

municipal  regulation,  limited  in  its  char-  permit  such  persons   to   continue  their 

ter,  was   considered   valid.      Ordinances  business,  whilst  it  prohibited  others  from 

may  be  adapted  to  the  varying  municipal  engaging  in  the  same  business  in  the  same 

necessities  and  exigencies.     Covington  v.  locality.     Tugman  v.  Chicago,  78  111.  405, 

East   St.  Louis,  78  111.  548,  1875 ;  post,  1875.  ' 

sec.  394.  In  exercising  its  power  to  re-  A  statute  authorizing  municipal  au- 
quire  adjacent  lot  owners  to  make  local  thorities  to  license  and  regulate  such 
improvements,  the  corporation,  it  has  callings,  trades,  and  employments  as  the 
been  held  in  Tennessee,  must  not  act  in  a  public  good  may  require  will  empower 
partial  and  oppressive  manner ;  therefore  them  to  exact  a  license  for  revenue  pur- 
it  cannot  select  particular  individuals  by  poses,  if  that  construction  is  not  incon- 
name,  and  require  them  to  construct  sistent  with  the  wliole  charter  and  the 
pavements  or  local  improvements  in  front  general  legislation  of  the  state.  An  ordi- 
of  their  lots,  and  omit  otlicrs  in  the  same  nance  fixing  one  rate  of  license  for  selling 
improvement  district,  if  this  be  done  goods  which  are  within  or  in  transit  to  the 
without  good  cause  or  reason  for  the  dis-  city,  and  another  rate  for  goods  not  within 
tinction.  White  r.  Mayor,  etc.,  2  Swan  or  in  transit  to  the  city,  is  in  vahd.  Frank, 
(Tenn.),  364, 185'2;  post,  sec.  799.  in  re,  52  Cal.  606;  s.  v.  Mayor  v.  Althorp, 
1  Ante,  ch.  iii.  sec.  35  and  note.     The  6  Coldw.  554. 


336  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XII, 

present  period  and  to  the  institutions  in  this  country,  where  free- 
dom in  the  choice  and  pursuit  of  all  occupations  never  has  been 
denied.  The  iuapplicabilit}'  of  tlie  English  decisions  is  noticed 
by  Mr.  Justice  Dewey  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Miusachuiictts  in  an  important  case  involving  the  valid- 
ity of  an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Boston  regulating  the  use  of 
hackney  coaches  and  other  vehicles  within  the  city.  He  observes 
that  "  in  the  arguments  addressed  to  the  court,  the  question  was 
somewhat  discussed  as  to  the  power  incident  to  municipal  corpo- 
rations to  create  by-laws  of  the  character  here  adopted ;  and  a 
reference  was  made  to  various  cases  in  the  English  courts,  where 
questions  of  this  nature  had  arisen.  Upon  examination  of  those 
cases  they  will  be  found  less  important  and  less  satisfactory  as 
guides  here,  inasmuch  as  it  is  quite  obvious  that  in  many  of  them, 
and  particularly  those  where  the  ordinance  seemed  most  question- 
able as  not  being  within  the  ordinary  exercise  of  municipal  au- 
thority, the  by-laws  were  sustained  upon  the  ground  of  ancient  and 
long-continued  usage,  ripening  into  a  prescriptive  right  on  the  part 
of  the  municipal  corporation."  But  "  no  such  ground,"  he  adds, 
"  can  be  urged  here  ;  and  the  present  ordinance,  if  sustained  at 
all,  must  be  shown  to  be  authorized  by  the  express  provision  of 
the  charter,  or  be  derived  as  an  incidental  power  resulting  from 
its  incorporation  as  a  city,  or  be  found  in  some  general  or  sj)ecial 
statute."  ^ 

§  325.    (259)    Must  not  contravene  Common  Right.  —  An  ordi- 
nance cannot  legally  be  made  which  contravenes  a  common  right, 

1  Commonwealth  r.  Stofkler,  2  Cush.  tlie  city,  by  reasonable  by-laws,  to  require 
(Mass.)  562,  568,  1848.  See  as  to  English  inhabitants,  whose  business  is  local  and 
decisions,  remarks  of  Rhodes,  J.,  in  Herzo  carried  on  within  the  city,  to  obtain  a 
V.  San  Francisco,  33  Cal.  134,  145,  18G7.  license  before  exercising  certain  employ- 
In  the  case  first  cited  the  court  decided  nients.  Per  Dewey,  J.,  Commonwealth  v. 
that  the  business  of  carri/iyirf  persons  for  Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  502,  575;  see 
hire  from  town  to  town  in  stage-coaches  also  Napman  v.  People,  19  Mich.  352, 
and  omnibuses  is  not  so  far  a  territorial  1869;  Barling  v.  "West,  29  Wis.  307;  s.  c. 
or  local  occupation  as  will  authorize  one  9  Am.  Rep.  576,  1871;  Hayes  i;.  Apple- 
city,  unless  it  has  express  and  direct  au-  ton,  24  Wis  542;  post,  sec.  303. 
thority  so  to  do  from  the  legislature,  to  Whenever  a  by-law  seeks  to  aZ^er  a  we?/ 
pass  an  ordinance  requiring  the  inhabi-  settled  and  fundamental  principle  of  the  com- 
tants  of  other  towns  to  obtain  from  it  a  mon  law,  or  to  establish  a  rule  interfering 
license  before  exercising  that  employment  with  the  rights  of  individuals  or  the  pub- 
in  carrying  persons  to  or  from  it.  Such  lie,  the  power  to  do  so  must  come  from 
an  ordinance  was  considered  to  be  an  un-  plain  and  direct  legislative  enactment, 
necessary  restraint  upon  business,  and  is  Taylor  v.  Griswold,  2  Green  (N.  J  ),  222, 
not  binding  upon  citizens  of  other  places.  1834 ;  ante,  sec.  89  and  note. 
The  court  does  not  question  the  right  of 


§  326.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS.  337 

unless  the  power  to  do  so  be  plainly  conferred  by  legislative  grant ; 
and  in  cases  relating  to  such  a  right,  authority  to  regulate,  con- 
ferred upon  towns  of  limited  powers,  has  been  held  not  necessarily 
to  include  the  power  to  prohibit.^  Thus,  in  Connecticut,  it  is  held 
that  every  one  has,  presumptively,  a  common-law  right  to  fish  in 
navigable  rivers,  and  that,  thougli  every  town  may,  by  statute, 
have  the  power  to  make  by-laws  to  regulate  fisheries  of  clams  and 
oysters  within  its  limits,  yet  this  power  does  not  authorize  a  by- 
law prohibiting  all  persons  except  its  own  inhabitants  from  taking 
shell-fish  in  a  navigable  river,  within  the  limits  of  such  town  ; 
such  a  by-law,  being  in  contravention  of  a  common  right,  is  void.^ 

§  326.  (260)  But  there  is,  however,  no  common  right  to  do 
that  which,  by  a  valid  law  or  ordinance,  is  prohibited  ;  and  hence 
courts  will  not  declare  an  authorized  ordinance  void  because  it 
prohibits  what  otherwise  might  lawfully  be  done.  In  discussing 
the  subject,  Mr.  Justice  Evans  illustrates  it  in  this  wise  :  "  If  there 
was  no  law  interfering,  the  butcher  might  kill  his  beeves  and  hogs 
in  the  street.  If  the  butcher  could  do  it,  any  man  might,  and  it 
might,  therefore,  be  said  to  be  a  common  right ;  but  when  the  law 
prohibited  it,  it  was  no  longer  a  common  right.  A  legal  restraint 
may  be  imposed  on  a  few  for  the  benefit  of  the  many."  ^  There- 
fore, while  ordinances  which  unnecessarily  restrain  trade  or  ope- 
rate oppressively  upon  individuals  will  not  be  sustained,  yet  such 
as  are  reasonably  calculated  to  preserve  the  public  health  are  valid 
although  they  may  abridge  individual  liberty  and  individual  rights 
in  respect  of  property.  Accordingly  in  a  populous  city  an  ordi- 
nance is  valid  as  a  sanitary  regulation  which  prohibits  the  pur- 
chasing of  carcasses  of  dead  animals  for  boiling,  steaming,  or  ren- 
dering the  same,  and  the  rendering  and  steaming  of  the  same, 
within  the  city,  except  in  certain  enumerated  cases  and  under 
specified  conditions  of  a  reasonable  character.* 

1  Taylor  v.  Griswold,  2  Green  (N.  J.),  v.  West,  29  Wis.  307,  1871;  s.  c.  9  Am. 
222  1834.  Rep-  576 ;  see  post,  sec.  387 ;  ante,  see.  89. 

2  Hayden  v.  Noyes,  5  Conn.  391, 1824 ;  ^  Per  Evans,  J.,  in  City  Council  v. 
Peckv.  Lockwood,5Day(Conn.),22;  Wil-  Ahrens.  4  Strob.  (So.  Car.)  Law,  241, 
lard  V.  Killingworth,  8  Conn.  247  ;  Clason  257, 1850 ;  City  Council  v.  Baptist  Church, 
V.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  310.  The  general  lb.  306,  310 ;  Peoria  v.  Calhoun,  29  111.  317, 
welfare  clause  does  not  authorize  tlie  im-  1862 ;  St.  Paul  v.  Coulter,  12  Minn.  41, 
position  of  a  license  tax  for  engaging  in  a  1866. 

lawful  business,  —  sale  of  lemonade,  cake,  *  State  v.  Fisher,  52  Mo.  174,  1873. 

at  temporary  stands  on  sidewalk.   Barling 

VOL.  I.  22 


MUNICIPAL  COKPORxVTIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


§  327.  (261")  Valldlti/  is  for  the  Court,  and  not  the  Jury,  to 
determine.  —  AVhether  an  ordinance  be  reasonable  and  consistent 
with  the  hiw  or  not  is  a  question  for  the  court,  and  not  the  jury, 
and  evidence  to  the  latter  on  this  subject  is  inadmissible.  But  in 
determining  this  question  the  court  will  have  to  regard  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  city  or  corporation,  the  objects 
souo-ht  to  be  attained,  and  the  necessity  which  exists  for  the  ordi- 
nance. Regulations  proper  for  a  large  and  prosperous  city  might 
be  absurd  or  oppressive  in  a  small  and  sparsely  populated  town 
or  in  the  country.     An  unreasonable  by-law  is  void.i 

§  328.  (262)  Legislative  Authority  to  adopt  Unreasonable  Or- 
dinances.—  Where  the  legislature,  in  terms,  confers  upon  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  the  power  to  pass  ordinances  of  a  specified  and 


1  Bacon  Abr.  tit.  Bij-Lnw;  Common- 
wealth i;.  Worcester,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  462, 
1862;  Paxson  v.  Sweet,  1  Green  (N.  J.), 
196,  1832;    Vandine,  Petitioner,   etc.,   6 
Pick.  (Mass.)  187, 1828;  Boston  v.  Shaw, 
1  Met.  (Mass.)  130,  135,  1840;   Austin  v. 
Murray,  16  Pick.  (Mass.)  121,  125,  1834; 
Hudson  I'.  Thorne,  7  Paige  (N.  Y. )  Cli.  261 ; 
Commonwealth r.  Stodder,  2Cush.  (Mass.) 
562,   575,  1848;    Commonwealth  v.  Gas 
Co.,  12  Pa.  St.  318  ;  Dunham  v.  llochester, 
6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  462,  465,  1826;  Buffiilo  v. 
Webster,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  100;    Brook- 
lyn V.  Breslin,  57  N.  Y.  591.  596,  1874; 
Frank,  in  re,  52  Cal.  606,  approving  text. 
"  Where  the  municipal  legislature  has 
authority  to  act,  it  must  be  governed,  not 
by  our  discretion,  but  by  its  own  ;  and  we 
shall  not  be  hasty  in  convicting  them  of 
being  unreasonable  in  the  exerci.se  of  it." 
Per  Loiurie,  J.,  Fisher  v.   Harrisburg,  2 
Grant  (Pa.)    Cases,  291,  1854;    s.  p.  St. 
Louis  V.   Weber,   44    Mo.    547.      "  The 
courts,"  says  Dewey,  J.,  "  doubtless  have 
tlie  power  to  deny  effect  to  a  by-law  ob- 
noxious to  the  objection  that  it  is  unrea- 
sonable.    It  is,  however,  a  power  to  be 
cautiously  exercised,"  especially  where 
the  question  is  a  practical  one,  —  for  ex- 
ample, the  length  of  time  which  ought  to 
be  allowed  to  vehicles  to  remain  in  the 
street,  and  as  to  which  the  city  authori- 
ties, it  is  to  be  presumed,  can  judge  bet- 
ter than  the  court.      Commonwealth  v. 
Robertson,   5   Cush.   (Mass.)    4.38,    442, 
1850.     See,  also,  Vintners  v.  Passey,  1 


Burr.  239 ;  Workingham  v.  Johnson,  Cas. 
Temp.  Hardw.  285 ;  Poulter's  Co.  v.  Phil- 
lips, 6  Bing.  N.  C.  314 ;  St.  Paul  v.  Coulter, 
12  Minn.  41 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Patch,  97 
Mass.  221. 

The  doctrine  of  the  text  that  the  valid- 
ity of  a  by-law  is  in  all  cases  a  question 
for  the  court  and  that  evidence  to  the 
jury  is  inadmissible,  has  been  denied  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  which, 
in  Clason  v.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  316, 
1872  (involving  the  validity  of  an  ordi- 
nance to  protect  tlie  harbor,  and  also  the 
city,  from  inundation  by  preserving  the 
shore  or  beach),  considered  it  to  be  no 
violation  of  principle,  in  a  case  where  the 
reasonableness  of  tlie  ordinance  depended 
upon  extrinsic  facts,  to  submit  testimony 
to  the  jury  bearing  upon  the  reasonable- 
ness of  the  requirements  of  the  ordinance. 
But  tlie  argument  of  the  counsel  for  the 
city,  tliat  this  view  makes  the  same  by-law 
"  valid  in  one  case  and  invalid  in  another, 
according  to  the  varying  weight  of  testi- 
mony and  the  varying  views  of  juries," 
seems  unanswerable,  and  the  text  states 
probably  the  true  doctrine.  See  Glover 
on  Corp.  297,  and  cases  in  this  note. 

Tlie  fact  that  certain  provisions  of  an 
ordinance  are  void  does  not  authorize  the 
court  to  declare  void  those  provisions 
which  relate  to  the  subject-matter  of  the 
ordinance,  when  they  are  distinct  and 
separate  from  those  which  are  void  and 
useless.    State  v.  Hardy,  7  Neb.  377. 


§  329.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAW'S.  339 

defined  character,  if  the  power  thus  delegated  be  not  in  conflict 
with  the  constitution,  an  ordinance  passed  pursuant  thereto  can- 
not be  impeached  as  invalid  because  it  would  have  been  regarded 
as  unreasonable  if  it  had  been  passed  under  the  incidental  power 
of  the  corporation,  or  under  a  grant  of  power  general  in  its  nature. 
In  other  words,  what  the  legislature  distinctly  says  may  be  done 
cannot  be  set  aside  by  the  courts  because  they  may  deem  it  un- 
reasonable or  against  sound  policy.  But  where  the  power  to 
legislate  on  a  given  subject  is  conferred,  and  the  mode  of  its  exer- 
cise is  not  prescribed,  then  the  ordinance  passed  in  pursuance 
thereof  must  be  a  reasonable  exercise  of  the  power,  or  it  will  be 
pronounced  invalid.^ 

§  329.  (263)  3Iust  be  consistent  with  Public  Legislative  Policy. 
—  The  rule  that  a  municipal  corporation  can  pass  no  ordinance 
which  conflicts  with  its  charter  or  any  general  statute  in  force  and 
applicable  to  the  corporation  has  been  before  stated.  Not  only 
so,  but  it  cannot,  in  virtue  of  its  incidental  power  to  pass  by- 
laws, or  under  any  general  grant  of  that  authority,  adopt  by-laws 
which  infringe  the  spirit  or  are  repugnant  to  the  policy  of  the 
state  as  declared  in  its  general  legislation.  This  principle  is  well 
exemplified  by  a  case  in  Ohio,^  in  which  incorporated  towns  were, 
by  statute,  prohibited  from  subjecting  stray  animals  owned  by 
persons  not  residents  of  such  towns  to  their  corporation  ordi- 
nances. It  was  held  that  an  ordinance  operating,  not  on  the  animals 
but  on  the  non-resident  owner,  in  the  shape  of  a  penalty,  violated 
the  spirit  of  the  statute,  and  was  void.  So,  in  a  later  case  in  the 
same  state,  it  was  shown  that  the  general  policy  of  the  state  was  to 
allow  animals  to  run  at  large ;  and  it  was  ruled  that  a  municipal 
corporation,  with  power  to  pass  "  all  by-laws  deemed  necessary 

1    Peoria  v.  Callioun,  29  III  317,  1862 ;  ments   of  the  legislature.     To   say  that 

St.  Paul  V.  Coulter,  12  Minn.  41,  186(5 ;  such  a  law  is  of  unusual  tendency  is  dis- 

Brooklyn  v.  Breslln,  57  N.  Y.  591,  596,  respectful    to    the    legislature,   who,   no 

1874 ;  posl,  sec.  420.     Speaking  of  a  pro-  doubt,  designed   to   promote  the  morals 

vision  of  the  charter  of  the  city  of  St.  and  health  of  the  citizens.     Whether  the 

Louis,  authorizing  the  city  authorities  "to  ordinance   in   question    is   calculated   to 

regulate,"  and,  by  construction,  to   per-  promote   the   object   is  a  question  with 

mit    bawdy   houses,  and    the    objection  which  the  courts  have  no  concern  "  when 

made  by  counsel  to  an  ordinance  licens-  tlie  legislative  will  has  been  plainly  ex- 

ing  such    houses,  Naplon,  J.,  says  :  "  It  pressed.     State   v.  Clark,  54  Mo.  17,  36, 

is  naked  assumption  to  say  that  any  mat-  1873. 

ter  allowed  by  the  legislature  is  against  -  Marietta   v.  Fearing,  3   Ohio,  427, 

public   policy.     The  best   indications  of  1831. 
public  policy  are  to  be  found  in  the  enact- 


340  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

for  the  well-regulation,  health,  cleanliness,  etc.,"  of  the  borough, 
and  with  power  to  "  abate  nuisances,"  liad  no  authority  to  pass  a 
by-law  restraining  cattle  from  running  at  large,  such  a  by-law 
being  in  contravention  of  the  general  law  of  the  state.^ 

§  330.  (264)  The  general  statutes  of  the  state  abolished  the 
system  of  inspecting  hay,  and,  in  the  place  of  it,  the  seller  was 
required  to  prepare  the  article  for  market  in  a  particular  manner, 
at  the  peril  of  being  subjected  to  certain  designated  penalties. 
In  other  words,  he  was  at  liberty  to  dispose  of  his  hay  without 
inspection  if  he  chose  to  do  so.  Under  tliese  circumstances,  it 
was  decided  that  a  city  ordinance,  prohibiting  the  sale  of  pressed 
hay  without  inspection^  was  void,  because  it  conflicted  with  the  laws 
of  the  state  upon  the  same  subject.^ 

Of  the  Signing,  Publication,  and  Recording  of  Ordinances. 

§  331.  (265)  Signing,  Publication,  and  Recording.  —  When 
ordinances  are  required  to  be  published  before  they  shall  go  into 
effect,  this  requirement  is  essential,  and  the  publication  must  be 
in  the  designated  mode.  Until  such  publication  be  made,  or 
until  they  have  gone  into  operation,  no  penalty  can  be  enforced 
under  them.^     Whether  the  mayor's  signature  is  essential  to  the 

1  Collins  V.  Hatch,  18  Ohio,  523,  1849.  Sunday.    Followed,  Thompson  v.  Mount 

"BVitm  Illinois  it  has  been  decided  that  a  Vernon,  11  lb.  688,  adjudging   an  ordi- 

town,  authorized  by  its  charter  to  declare  nance  to  be  invalid  because  inconsistent 

what  should  be  nuisances,  and  to  provide  with  the  liquor  law  of  the  state.     And 

for  the  abatement  thereof  by  ordinance,  see  Adams  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  29  Ga.  56;  Sill 

may  pass  an  ordinance  declaring  swine  ?-.  Corning,  1  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  297; 

running  at  large  within  the  corporation  Cincinnatiw.Gwynne,  10  Ohio,  192;  Wood 

to  be  nuisances,  and   providing  for  the  r.  Brooklyn,  14  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  425;  Markle 

taking   up   of    the   same,  etc.,   and   this  v.  Akron,  14  Ohio,  586  ;  Thomas  v.  Rich- 

though  under  the  laws  of  the  state  the  mond,  12  Wall.  349,  1870.     But  a  corpo- 

owners  of  stock  may  lawfully  allow  it  to  ration  may,  in  some   cases,  consistently 

run  at  large  upon  the  common,  the  court  with  general  law,  further  regulate  by  or- 

regarding  tlie  power  named  in  the  charter  dinance   subjects    already   regulated   by 

as  abridging  or  limiting  any  right  of  com-  statute.     Huddleson  i'.  Kuffin,  6  Ohio  St. 

mon  which  might  otherwise  exist.     Rob-  G04  ;  Rogers   v.  Jones,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

erts  V.  Ogle,  30  111.  459,  1863.     By-laws  237;  State  v.  Welch,  30  Conn.  215,  1869. 

which  contravene  the  policy  of  the  gen-  2  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  r.  Nicliolls, 

eral  statutes  of  the  state,  by  undertaking  4    Hill   (N.   Y.),   209,    1843.     Compare, 

to  punish  acts  which  those  statutes   au-  Mayor  v.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.), 

thorize,  are  void.     Canton  i;.  Nist,  9  Ohio  156;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

St.  439,  holding  void   a  by-law,  which,  287.     Construction  of  power  to  appoint 

disregarding  the  statutory  exceptions  of  weighmasters.     Hoffman  v.  Jersey  City, 

cases  of  necessity,  charity,  etc.,  prohibited  34  N.  J.  L.  172,  1870. 

the   opening   of    shops   for  business  on  ^  Barnett  v.  Newark,  28  111.  62,  1862 ; 


533.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OK  BY-LAWS. 


341 


validity  of  an  ordinance  depends  upon  the  charter ;  but  unless 
made  essential,  such  provisions,  where  the  ordinance  is  duly  en- 
acted, have  sometimes  been  regarded  as  directory.^ 


§  382.  (266)  Where  alternate  modes  of  publication  of  a  by-law 
are  allowed  by  statute,  and  the  statute  requires  the  corporation 
to  direct  which  mode  shall  be  adopted,  a  publication  made  by 
order  of  the  clerk,  without  direction  from  or  selection  of  the 
mode  having  been  made  by  the  corporation,  is  not  valid.^ 

§  333.  (267)  A  municipal  charter  required  every  ordinance  to 
he  published  for  the  space  of  twenty  days  in  at  least  one  news- 


Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  2  Iowa,  90,  1855 ; 
Higley  v.  Bunce,  10  Conn.  567,  1835. 
Specified  mode  of  publishing  tlie  proceed- 
ings of  the  council  is  essential.  State  v. 
Hoboken,9  Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.),  110;  lb. 
113;  Hoboken  v.  Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
265.  Failure  to  publish  ordinance  held 
not  to  affect  validity  of  bonds  issued 
under  a  subsequent  act  authorizing  the 
corporation  to  incur  a  debt.  Amey  v. 
Allegheny  City,  24  How.  364;  Clark  v. 
Janesville,  10  Wis.  136,  1859;  State 
V.  Newark,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  303; 
People  V.  San  Francisco,  27  Cal.  655. 

1  Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Oliio  St.  96, 
101,  103,  1860;  Striker  v.  Kelly,  7  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  9;  Elmendorf  v.  Mayor  of  New 
York,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  693.  See,  how- 
ever, Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  supra ;  State 
V.  Newark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  399;  State  v. 
Hudson,  5  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  475;  Kepner  v. 
Commonwealth,  40  Pa.  St.  124;  State 
V.  Jersey  City,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  93 ; 
Creighton  v.  Manson,  27  Cal.  613  ;  Taylor 
V.  Palmer,  31  Cal.  241 ;  Dey  v.  Jersey 
City,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  412;  State  v.  Jersey 
City,  1  Vroom  (30  N.  J.  L.),  03;  lb.  148 ; 
State  V.  Newark,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  185, 
1876;  Gas  Co.  v.  San  Francisco,  6  Cal. 
190.  See  ante,  chapter  on  Corporate 
Meetings,  sec.  293.  Signing  minutes  not 
equivalent  to  signing  resolution,  when 
latter  is  essential.  Graham  v.  Caronde- 
let,  33  Mo.  262, 1862.  When  to  be  signed. 
Miles  V.  Bough,  3  Gale  &  D.  119;  Inglis 
V.  Railway  Co.,  16  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  55. 
A  legislative  provision  requiring  the  pre- 
siding officer  of  the  council  to  sirpi  all  or- 
dinances   is  directory  in  its  nature.      If 


regularly  passed,  an  ordinance  is  valid, 
though  not  thus  authenticated.  It  is,  of 
course,  competent  for  the  legislature  to 
make  the  signature  an  essential  condition 
of  validity.  Blanchard  v.  Bissell,  11  Ohio 
St.  96,  101,  103,  1860;  Fisher  v.  Graham, 
1  Cin.  (0.)  113,  1870;  ante,  sec.  293.  See 
State  V.  Newark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  399. 
Signature  of  mayor  not  essential  under 
general  incorporation  laws  of  Indiana. 
Martindale  v.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411,  1876. 
No  municipal  ordinance  is  binding  unless 
signed  by  the  maj'or  and  promulgated 
in  the  English  language.  Breaux's  Bridge, 
in  re,  30  La.  An.  1105  ;  ante,  sec.  271,  note. 
2  Higley  v.  Bunce  (restraining  cattle), 
10  Conn.  435;  s.  c.  lb.  567,  1835.  The 
language  of  the  statute  was  this  :  "  Such 
by-laws  shall  not  be  in  force  until  pub- 
lished four  weeks  in  a  newspaper  printed 
in  such  town,  or  in  the  town  nearest  to 
such  town  in  which  a  newspaper  is 
printed,  or  in  some  other  newspaper  gen- 
erally circulated  in  the  town  where  such 
bj--law  is  made,  as  the  town  shall  direct." 
Rev.  1821,  p.  4-58.  Held,  that  the  town 
must  point  out  one  of  the  three  descrip- 
tions of  newspapers  in  which  the  by-law 
sliould  be  printed.  lb.  Mode  of  publi- 
cation under  the  general  incorporation 
law  of  Illinois  of  1872.  Byars  v.  Mt. 
Vernon,  77  111.  467,  1875.  Special  pro- 
visions construed.  Phillips,  in  re,  60  N. 
Y.  16,  1875  ;  Bassford,  in  re,  50  N.  Y.  509, 
1872.  Certificate  of  city  clerk  of  due 
publication  not  competent  evidence  unless 
made  so  by  statute.  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Engle,  76  111.  317,  1875. 


342  MUNICIPAL   COErORATIONS.  [CH.  XII, 

paper  before  it  should  go  into  effect;  and  it  was  held  that  an 
ordinance  would  go  into  force  in  twenty  days  after  its  publication 
in  the  first  number  of  the  paper;  that  twenty  days  need  not 
intervene  between  the  first  and  last  insertions ;  that  it  is  clearly 
sufficient  if  it  be  published  in  each  number  of  the  paper  issued 
within  the  twenty  days,  and  probably  sufficient  if  there  is  but  one 
insertion,  twenty  days  after  which  the  ordinance  will  go  into 
effect.^  Where  an  ordinance  has  been  once  duly  published,  and 
it  is  afterwards  included  in  a  revision  or  digest  of  ordinances,  no 
additional  publication  is  necessary .^ 

§  334.  (2G8)  A  charter  provided  that  no  ordinance  should  be 
in  force  until  published  in  some  newspaper  of  the  place,  and  also 
declared  that  ordinances  should  be  sufficiently  proved  in  any 
court  (among  other  modes)  by  a  printed  copy  taken  from  the 
newspaper  or  printed  pamphlet  in  which  the  same  had  been  pub- 
lished, provided  the  same  purports  to  have  been  done  by  author- 
ity of  the  corporation.  Under  this  provision,  tiie  production  of  a 
newspaper  published  in  the  town,  containing  what  appears  as  an 
ordinance,  with  a  caption,  "Published  by  Authority,"  duly 
signed,  is  evidence  of  the  existence  and  adoption  of  the  ordi- 
nance.3  So,  where  the  charter  provides  that  ordinances  published 
by  authority  of  the  corporation  shall  be  received  in  evidence 

^  Hoboken  v.  Gear,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  in  force  before  it  was  made."    St.  Louis 

265,  1859.     Wiiere  a  city  is  required  to  v.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  509.     Exception  to 

promulgate  its  ordinances,  it  is  sufficient  to  rule  see  Emporia  r.  Norton,  10  Kan.  236, 

publish  them  in  the  newspaper  in  which  1876. 

the    ordinances    are    usualljj    published,  3  Block   v.   Jacksonville,   36   111.   301, 

though  there  may  be  other   newspapers  1865.     Authorized  book  of  ordinances  is 

within  the  city.     Truchelut  v.  City  Coun-  prima  facie  evidence  of  due  passage  and 

oil,   1   Nott   &  McC.   (South   Car.)   227,  publication  of  the  ordinances  therein  con- 

1818.  tained.     Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  426, 

2  St.  Louis  V.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513,  1873.  1871;  s.  c.  12  Am.  Kep.  423.     See  Pende- 

"It  would  be  of  the  most   mischievous  gast  y.  Peru,  20  111.  51.     Proof  of  publica- 

consequence  to  hold  that  the  revision  of  a  tion    under    special    charter    provision, 

law  had  the  effect  of  making  the  revised  President,  etc.  v.  O'Malley,  18  111.  407 ; 

law  entirely  original,  to  be  considered  as  Moss  v.  Oakland,  88  111.  109.    In  an  action 

though  none  of  its  provisions  had  effect  against  a  city,  plaintiff  need  not  prove 

but   from  the  date  of  the  revised  law.  the  publication  of  an  ordinance  offered 

When  a  former  provision  is  included  in  a  in  evidence  where  he  shows  that  the  city 

revised  law,  it  is  only  thereby  intended  to  had   for   several  years   acted   upon  the 

continue   its   existence,   not  to   make   it  ordinance  as  in  force.     Atchison  v.  King, 

operate  as  an  original  act  to  take  effect  9  Kan.  550,  1872;  State  v.  Atlantic  City 

from  the  date  of  the  revised  law.     The  (burden  of  proofj,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.), 

revision  has  not  the  effect  to  break  the  99,  106. 
continuity  of  those  provisions  which  were 


§  336.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  343 

without  further  proof,  a  book  of  ordinances,  purporting  to  be 
thus  published,  is  competent  evidence,  without  further  authenti- 
cation ;  but  it  is  not,  of  course,  conclusive.^ 

§  335.  (269)  A  provision  in  a  statute  changing  an  incorpo- 
rated town  into  a  city,  that  the  existing  town  ordinances  shall 
remain  in  force  provided  they  shall  be  recorded  within  four 
months  thereafter,  is  merely  directory,  and  such  ordinances  are 
valid,  though  not  recorded  within  the  designated  period.^  Nor 
is  it  a  valid  objection  to  a  municipal  ordinance  that  it  is  recorded 
in  print  (being  printed  and  pasted  in  the  proper  book),  and  not 
in  manuscript.^ 

Of  the  Poiver  to  Impose  Fines,   Penalties,   and  Forfeitures. 

§  336.  (270)  Common  Law  Principles  adopted.  —  That  by-laws 
or  ordinances  may  not  be  inoperative  or  useless,  it  is  necessary 
that  some  penalty  should  be  annexed  to  the  breach  of  them  ;  and 
it  is  settled  in  England,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of 
Magna  Charta,  that  without  the  express  sanction  of  parliament, 
no  by-law  can  be  enforced  by  disfranchisement  of  the  offender, 
or  by  his  imprisonment,  or  by  forfeiture  of  his  goods  or  property. 
Under  incidental  power  to  pass  by-laws,  a  corporation  may,  in 
England,  annex  pecuniary  penalties  of  a  certain  fixed  and  reason- 
able character,  but  without  express  authority  given  by  a  statute, 
the  only  penalty  it  can  prescribe  is  a  pecuniary  one,  usually 
called  a  fine.  Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  or  special 
custom  justifying  it,  a  by-law  cannot  give  a  power  of  distress  and 
sale  of  the  goods  of  the  offender,  since  such  a  power  is  contrary 
to  the  common  law.  And  where  a  corporation  is  empowered  to 
enforce  its  by-laws  in  a  special  manner,  as  by  fine,  it  is  limited  to 
the  manner  prescribed.  These  safe,  salutary,  and  enlightened 
principles  of  law  have  been  recognized  by  the  American  courts 
as  applicable  to  the  ordinances  of  our  municipal  corporations, 
as  the  cases  to  which  reference  will  be  made  fully  show. 

1  St.  Louis  V.  Foster,  52  Mo.  513, 1873.  Parol  evidence  of  resolutions  is  competent 
"^  Trustees  of  Academy  v.  Erie,  31  Pa.  where  the  charter  does  not  require  them 
St.  515,  18-58;  Aniey  v.  Allegheny  City,  to  be  recorded,  and  no  record  thereof  has 
24  How.  304.     See  chapter  on  Corporate  been    made.      Darlington    v.   Common- 
Records  and  Documents,  ante.  wealth,  41  Pa.  St.  68.    See  ante,  sec.  310. 
3  Ewbanks  v.  Ashley,  36  111.  177, 1864. 


344  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

§  337.  ('271)  By  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act,  the  suhject 
of  by-laws  and  their  penalties  is  regulated.  It  is  declared  "  that 
it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  council  of  any  borough  to  make  such 
by-laws  as  shall  to  them  seem  meet  for  the  good  rule  and  govern- 
ment of  the  borough,  and  for  the  prevention  and  suppression  of 
all  such  nuisances  as  are  not  already  punishable  in  a  summary 
manner  by  virtue  of  an  act  in  force  throughout  such  borough, 
and  to  appoint,  hy  such  hy-laivs,  such  fines  as  they  shall  deem 
necessary  for  the  prevention  and  suppression  of  such  offences ; 
provided  that  no  fine,  to  be  so  appointed,  shall  exceed  the  sum  of 
five  pounds,  and  that  no  such  by-law  shall  be  made,  unless  at  least 
two  thirds  of  the  whole  number  of  the  council  shall  be  present."^ 
Respecting  the  fines  mentioned  in  this  section,  Mr.  Rawlinson 
suggests  the  inquiry  whether  it  be  necessary  or  not  that  the 
exact  amount  of  each  fine  should  be  mentioned  in  the  by-law, 
the  limit,  to  wit,  bl.,  being  fixed  by  the  act.  It  is  contended,  he 
observes,  by  some  persons,  that  the  amount  may  be  left  open, 
and  that  a  by-law,  enacting  that  the  offence  shall  be  punishable 
by  a  fine  not  less  than  10s.  and  not  exceeding  bl,  would  be  valid. 
This  would  be  convenient,  but  some  have  doubted  whether  the 
corporation  could  enforce  it  by  the  usual  common-law  remedies, 
viz.,  by  an  act  of  debt  or  assumpsit.  It  is  believed,  he  adds,  that 
by-laws  have  invariably  fixed  the  exact  sum  ;  but,  nevertheless, 
it  would  seem  that  a  fine  of  bl,  with  power  to  the  mayor  or  other 
officer  to  reduce  it  to  any  sum  not  exceeding  a  specified  amount, 
would  be  good.2  j^  this  country,  the  practice,  if  not  general, 
is  at  least  not  uncommon,  to  prescribe  limits  to  fines,  and  allow 
them  to  be  imposed  within  those  limits,  at  the  discretion  of  the 
magistrate  or  court  entrusted  with  jurisdiction  to  hear  complaints 
for  breaches  of  municipal  ordinances.^ 

1  5  &  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.  sec.  90;  ner  the  discretion  has  been  exercised. 
ante,  sec.  35  and  note  ;  post,  sec.  408.  The  King )).  Dimpsey,  2  Term  R.  96  ;  The 

2  Rawlinson  on  Corp.  (5th  ed.)  165,  King  i'.  Symonds,  1  East,  189  :  Boothroyd, 
166,  note ;  post,  sec.  341 ;  Piper  v.  Chappell,  in  re,  15  M.  &  W.  1  ;  Tiie  King  v.  Scale, 
14  M.  &  W.  624  ;  Peters  v.  London,  2  Up-  8  East,  668,  573  ;  The  King  v.  Smith,  5 
per  Can.  Q.  B.  543  ;  Fennell,  in  re,  24  Up-  M.  &  S.  133 ;  Tlie  Queen  v.  Jolinson,  8 
per  Can.  Q.  B.  238,  243  ;  Snell,  in  re,  30  Q.  B.  102  ;  Wray  v.  Toke,  12  Q.  B.  492; 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  81.  see  also,  The  King  i\  Wyatt,  2  Ld.  Rayd. 

3  In  England  it  is  held  that  where  1478  ;  The  King  v.  Priest,  6  Term  R.  5-38. 
the  statute  gives  a  discretion,  either  It  was  held  in  New  Jersey,  where 
as  to  the  amount  of  the  penalty  or  its  the  charter  authorized  the  council  to  en- 
application,  the  justice  must,  on  the  force  their  ordinances  by  a  penalty  not 
face  of  the  conviction,  show  in  what  man-  exceeding  fifty  dollars,  that  the  council 


§  339.] 


MUNICIPAL   OEDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


345 


§  338.  (272)  Implied  Poiver  to  annex  Pecuniary  Penalties.  — 
Since  an  ordinance  or  by-law  without  a  penalty  would  be  nuga- 
tory,^ municipal  corporations  have  an  implied  2)ower  to  provide 
for  their  enforcement  by  reasonable  and  proper  fines  against 
those  who  break  them.^  So  the  right  to  make  by-laws  gives  to 
the  corporation,  without  any  express  grant  of  power,  the  inci- 
dental right  to  enforce  them  by  reasonable  pecuniary  penalties. 
What  is  reasonable  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  offence  and 
the  circumstances.^ 


§  339.  (273)  Charter  Mode  governs.  —  Where  the  charter  or 
organic  act  prescribes  the  maimer  in  which  by-laws  are  to  be  en- 
forced, or  the  sanctions  or  puriisJiments  to  be  annexed  to  their 
violation,  this  constructively  operates  to  negative  the  right  of 
the  corporation  to  proceed  in  any  other  manner  or  to  inflict  any 
other  punishment.     Thus,  in  the  leading  case  "*  on  this  subject, 


must  prescribe  a  precise  penalty  for  each 
offence,  and  therefore  an  ordinance  declar- 
ing a  penalty  for  its  violation  not  exceed- 
ing fifty  dollars  was  void.  State  v.  Zeigler, 
3  Vroom  (32  N.  J.  L.),  262  ;  but  see  post, 
sees.  341,  410. 

1  State  V.  Cleveland,  3  Rh.  Is.  117. 
But  no  penalty  can  be  enforced  for  an  il- 
legal exaction.  Mayor  v.  Avenue  Kail- 
road  Co.,  33  N.  Y.  42;  32 /i.  201.  '' Mu- 
nicipal fine"  as  used  in  the  constitution  of 
California,  means  a  fine  imposed  by  local 
laws  of  particular  places,  such  as  incor- 
porated towns  and  cities,  and  not  a  fine 
imposed  by  the  general  laws  of  the  state. 
People  V.  Johnson,  30  Cal.  98,  1866. 

2  Fisher  v.  Harrisburg,  2  Grant  (Pa.) 
Cas.  291,  1854  ;  Barter  v.  Commonwealth, 
3  Pa.  (Pen.  &  W.)  253;  Trigally  v.  Mem- 
phis, 6  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  382,  1869.  The 
amount  must  be  reasonable.  Zylstra  i-. 
Charleston,  1  Bay  (So.  Car.),  382.  The 
penalty,  says  Mr.  Willcock,  must  be  im- 
posed on  the  person  who  violates  the 
by-law.  Thus,  if  goods  be  sold  by  an  un- 
authorized person  within  the  city,  the 
penalty  must  be  imposed  on  the  seller, 
and  not  on  the  buyer ;  for  how  can  he  dis- 
tinguish between  those  autliorized  to  sell 
and  those  who  are  not  ?  Willc.  on  Corp. 
154,  pi.  300,  370  ;  Cadden  v.  Estwick,  1 
Salk.  143,  102  ;  s.  c.  6  Mod.  124;  and  see, 
also,  Fazakerley  v.  Wiltshire,  1  Stra.  469. 


The  rule  stated  above,  as  to  the  person 
on  whom  penalties  must  be  imposed,  may 
be  extended  or  enlarged  by  express  pro- 
visions of  the  organic  act  of  the  corpo- 
ration. 

3  Mayor,  etc.  of  Mobile  v.  Yuille,  3 
Ala.  137,  1841.  A  penalty,  although 
small,  fixed  on  every  stroke  of  the  ham- 
mer which  an  unauthorized  person  uses 
in  his  trade  of  a  goldsmith,  is  unreason- 
able. Willc.  154,  pi.  368.  Same  princi- 
ple, Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  v.  Or- 
drenaux,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  122,  1815. 

*  Kirk  V.  Nowill,  1  Term  R.  118,  124, 
1786,  per  Mansfield  and  Buller:  followed 
in  Hart  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
571,  588,  606,  1832 ;  Cotter  v.  Doty,  5 
Ohio,  394,  1832 ;  Heise  v.  Town  Council, 
6  Rich.  (So.  Car.)  Law,  404,  1853;  Miles 
V.  Chamberlain,  17  Wis.  446,  1863.  In 
Hart  V.  Mayor,  supra,  it  was  accordingly 
decided  that  a  corporation  having  author- 
ity "  to  inflict  penalties  for  the  violation 
of  any  by-law,  not  exceeding  $25  for  any 
one  offence,"  could  not  pass  a  by-law 
subjecting  property  to  seizure  and  sale,  or 
forfeiting  it,  even  though  it  was  used  con- 
trary to  the  by-law  which  was  in  other 
respects  valid,  the  remedy  for  enforcing 
their  by-laws  having  been  specified.  Hart 
V.  Mayor,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571  ;  ante, 
sec.  248;  post,  sec.  818. 

Where  specific  modes  of  procedure  and 


346  MUNICIPAL   CORPOEATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

the  cluirtev  prescribed  in  what  manner  by-laws  should  be  en- 
forced, namely,  by  fine  and  (Dncrciainent,  or  either,  and  it  was 
decided  that  the  corporation  was  precluded  from  declaring  a  for- 
feiture of  property,  or  from  inflicting  any  other  punishment ;  and 
the  doctrine  of  this  case  has  been  everywhere  followed  in  the 
courts  of  this  country. 

§  340.  (274)  A  charter  of  a  city  specifically  enumerated 
various  powers,  which  the  council  was  expressly  authorized  to 
enforce  by  a  penalty  not  exceeding  one  hundred  dollars  for  their 
violation ;  and  the  same  charter  empowered  the  council  to  pre- 
vent and  remove  encroachments  upon  the  streets,  but  was  silent 
as  to  the  imposition  of  penalties  for  a  violation  of  its  provisions. 
The  council  passed  an  ordinance  imposing  a  continuing  penalty 
of  ten  dollars  a  day  for  every  day's  failure  to  remove  an  encroach- 
ment, after  notice  ;  and  it  was  held,  and  properly  so,  that  it  pos- 
sessed no  power  to  impose  such  a  penalty,  but  the  decision  was 
put  upon  the  ground  that  the  specific  enumeration  of  the  powers 
which  might  be  rendered  effectual  by  penal  provisions  was  an  im- 
plied exclusion  of  the  right  to  impose  any  penalties  whatever  in 
other  cases.^ 

penalties  are  prescribed  against  persons  v.  Metzker,  21  111.  205,  1859.  A  party- 
failing  to  take  out  license  for  keeping  cannot  enjoin  the  collection  of  a  fine  and 
drinking-liouses,  as  fines,  suits,  and  prose-  costs  imposed  for  the  violation  of  a  city 
cutions,  a  municipal  corporation,  in  the  ordinance,  on  the  ground  of  there  being 
absence  of  express  grant,  has  no  right  to  no  offence  charged  or  cause  of  action 
close  the  doors  of  a  drinking-house  sum-  stated  before  tlie  mayor.  The  remedy  iu 
viarily,  because  the  keeper  has  failed  to  Indiana  in  such  case  is  by  appeal.  Schwab 
take  out  a  license.  Bolte  v.  New  Orleans,  v.  Madison,  49  Ind.  329,  1874. 
10  La.  An.  321,  1855.  That  a  municipal  i  Grand  Rapids  v.  Hughes,  15  Mich, 
corporation  cannot  annex  other  or  greater  54^  18G6.  Whether  there  is  such  an  im- 
penulties  than  those  authorized  in  its  or-  plied  exclusion  must  depend  in  each  case 
ganic  act,  that  power  to  punish  by  upon  the  supposed  intention  of  the  legis- 
"  fine "  is  exclusive,  and  that  it  is  not  lature,  to  be  gathered  from  a  survey  of 
competent  to  order  a  forfeiture  in  addi-  the  whole  charter.  Tlie  authority  to 
tion,  see  Schroder  v.  City  Council,  2  adopt  an  ordinance  implies  the  right  to 
Const.  Rep.  (So.  Car.)  72G  ;  s.  c.  3  Brev.  enforce  it  by  proper  pecuniary  penalties, 
533,  1815 ;  McMullen  v.  City  Council,  1  and  this  right  exists  unless  excluded  by 
Bay  (So.  Car.),  46 ;  Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  other  provisions  of  the  charter.  In  31ary- 
lb.  382 ;  New  Orleans  i'.  Costello,  14  La.  land  it  is  held  when  a  municipal  corpor- 
An.  37;  Columbia  v.  Hunt,  5  Rich.  (So.  ation  is  seeking  to  enforce  an  ordinance 
Car.)  550,  558 ;  Kennedy  v.  Sowden,  1  Mc-  which  is  void,  a  court  of  equity  has  juris- 
Mul.  (So.  Car.)  328;  compare  Crosby  v.  diction,  at  the  suit  of  any  person  who  is 
Warren,  1  Rich.  (So.  Car.)  Law,  385.  injuriously  affected  thereby,  to  stay  its 
An  ordinance  treated  as  wholly  void  be-  execution  by  injunction.  Baltimore  v. 
cause  it  fixed  the  minimum  fine  for  an  Radecke,  49  Md. ;  s.  c.  21  Alb.  Law  Jour. 
offence  at  five  dollars  when  the  law  re-  117. 
quired  it  to  be  three  dollars.     Petersburg 


§  342.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  347 

§  341.  (275)  Penalty  may  he  ivithin  Fixed  Limits.  —  A  mu- 
nicipal corporation,  with  power  to  pass  by-laws  and  to  affix  pen- 
alties, may,  if  not  prohibited  by  the  charter,  or  if  the  penalty  is 
not  fixed  by  the  charter,  make  it  discretionary,  within  fixed 
limits,  for  example,  "  not  exceeding  fifty  dollars."  This  ena- 
bles the  tribunal  to  adjust  the  penalty  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  particular  case,  and  is  just  and  reasonable.  The  older  Eng- 
lish authorities,  so  far  as  they  hold  such  a  by-law  void  for  un- 
certainty, are  regarded  as  not  sound  in  principle,  and  ought  not 
to  be  followed.^ 

§  342.  (276)  Single  Offence  cannot  he  made  Double.  —  As  the 
power  to  pass  ordinances  and  to  punish  for  their  violation  must 
be  reasonably  exercised,  the  corporation  cannot  multiply  one 
offence  into  many,  and  punish  for  each.  Thus,  where  an  author- 
ized ordinance  prohibited  "  any  person  from  cutting  down  and 
making  use  of  cedar  and  other  trees,"  within  a  specified  locality, 
a  complaint,  charging  the  defendant  "  with  having  cut  down  a 
cedar  tree  at  various  times,  and  that  he  continued  to  do  so,  from 
time  to  time,  until  he  had  committed  one  hundred  violations  of 
the  ordinance,  by  cutting  down  one  hundred  cedar  trees,"  was 
held  to  set  forth  but  a  single  offence ;  for,  said  the  court,  "  the 
matter  charged  is  a  trespass  with  a  continuando,  which  in  law  is 
but  one  offence,  and  it  may  well  be  that  every  tree  cut  by  the 
defendant  was  cut  on  one  day,  and,  under  the  ordinance,  the 
cutting  of  more  trees  than  one,  at  one  time,  would  be  but  one 
offence."  2 

1  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Phelps,  27   Ala.  55,  Seaming  v.  Conger,  3  Leon.  7;  Moore, 

1855,  overruling,  on  this  point,  Mayor,  75;  Bendl.  159  ;  Davis  r.  Lowden,  Carth. 

etc.  V.  Yuille,  3  lb.  137  ;  compare  Commrs.  29.    A  penalty  fixed  either  by  the  char- 

V.  Harris,  7  Jones  (Law),  281.     See,  also,  ter  or  by-law  is  essential.    Bowman  y.  St. 

Piper  V.  Chappell,  14    Mees.  &  W.  623,  Jolin,  47  111.   337;  Ashton  t;.  Ellsworth, 

649,  1845  ;  Butchers'  Co.  v.  Bullock,  3  B.  48  111.  299  ;  supra,   sees.    837,  338  ;  post, 

&  Pul.  434;  Grant  on  Corp.  84  ;  Fennell,  sec.  343.     The  old  English  rule  stated  ia 

in  re,  24  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  238.     A  by-law  the   text   was   followed    in    New  Jersey 

fixing  one  penalty  for  the  first  offence,  (State  v.  Zeigler,  3  Vroom  (32  N.J.  L.), 

and  a  larger  for   the  second,  and  a  still  202,  ante,  sec.  337),  but  the  reason  of  the 

larger  one  for  every  subsequent  offence,  matter  and  the  general   practice  in  this 

does  not  appear  to  be  bad  for  uncertainty,  country  is  otherwise,  and   the   text  un- 

Butchers'  Co.  v.  Bullock,  supra.     Where  doubtcdly  states  correctly  the  Araericau 

the  penalty  is  fixed  by  by-law,  it  can  only  doctrine. 

be  changed  by  the  same  authority  which  -  State  v.  Moultrieville,  Rice  (So.  Car.) 

affixed  it.     Kcx  v.  Ashwell,  12  East,  29;  Law,  158,  1839. 


348  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XII. 

§  343.  (277)  Where  there  is  a  limitation  upon  the  corporation 
as  to  the  amount  of  penalties  to  be  imposed  for  the  infraction  of 
by-laws,  tliey  cannot  exceed  the  limit  diiectly,  nor  can  they  do 
so  indirectly  by  multiplying  what  is  in  substance  one  offence 
into  several,  or  subdividing  one  transaction  or  violation  into  a 
number  of  offences,  and  annexing  a  penalty  to  each.^  But  where 
each  offence  is  distinct,  and  the  punishment  for  each  is  within  the 
power  of  the  corporation  to  impose,  the  punishment  is  not  made 
illegal,  though  the  separate  fines  in  the  aggregate  exceed  the  limit 
allowed  by  the  charter,  and  are  imposed  by  the  same  magistrate 
or  tribunal  at  one  sitting.^ 

§  344.  (278)  By  its  charter,  the  power  of  a  city  corporation  to 
impose  fines  for  breaches  of  its  ordinances  was  limited  to  one 
hundred  dollars.  By  the  charter  the  city  had  also  the  power  to 
regulate  the  inspection  of  flour,  and  passed  an  ordinance  by  which 
any  person  selling  flour  without  inspection  should  be  fined  "  five 
dollars  for  each  barrel  so  sold."  It  was  held  that  this  ordinance, 
as  to  the  penalty,  was  valid  so  far  as  to  authorize  a  fine  not  ex- 
ceeding one  hundred  dollars  ;  that  if  a  single  sale  exceeded  twenty 
barrels,  the  fine  could  be  but  one  hundred  dollars,  while  if  it  was 
less  than  twenty  barrels,  the  fine  would  be  five  dollars  on  each 
barrel.  The  court  observed  that  a  recovery  on  a  single  trans- 
action where  more  than  twenty  barrels  were  sold  would  bar  any 
future  proceeding  for  the  balance.^ 

§  345.  (279)  Power  of  forfeiture  must  he  expressly  conferred. 
—  A  corporation,  under  a  general  power  to  make  by-laws, 
cannot  make  a  by-law  ordaining  a  forfeiture  of  property.  To 
warrant  the  exercise  of  such  an  extraordinary  authority  by  a  local 
and  limited  jurisdiction,  the  rule  is  reasonably  adopted  that  such 
authority  must  be  expressly  conferred  by  the  legislature.^     And 

1  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  v.  Ordre-  2  Heise    v.    Town    Council,   6    Rich, 

naux,  12  Jolins.  (N.  Y.)  122,  1815  (penalty  (So.  Car.)  Law,  404  (fines  for  violating 

for  illegally  keeping  powder),  citing  and  liquor    ordinance) ;     compare     State    v. 

approving  opinion  of  Lord  Mansfield  in  Town  Council  of  Moultrieville,  supra. 

Crepps  V.  Darden,  Cowp.  640.      See  also,  ^  Chicago  v.  Quimby,  38  111.  274, 1865. 

Hart  V.   Mayor,  etc.,   9   Wend.  571,  588,  *  Kirk  i-.  Nowill,  1  Term  R.  118,  124, 

606,  1832 ;  Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  1  Bay  per   Mansfield  and   Buller,   followed    by 

(So.  Car.),  382,  1794;  vide  Stokes  v.  Cor-  Court  of  Errors  of  New  York,  in  Hart  v. 

poration  of  New  York,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  Mayor,  etc.  of  Albany,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

87.  Continuing oflfence.  Marshall y.  Smith,  571,  588,  per  Sutherland,  J.;  p.  605,  per 

L.  R  8  C.  P.  416.  Edmonds,  Senator;  2  Kyd  on  Corp.  110; 


§  346.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  349 

even  if  the  power  to  declare  a  forfeiture  is  conferred,  still  no  per- 
son can,  by  ordinance,  be  deprived  of  his  property  by  forfeiture 
without  notice  or  without  legal  investigation  or  adjudication  ;  an 
ordinance  in  violation  of  this  principle  is  void,  as  "  contrary  to 
the  genius  of  our  laws  and  institutions.  "  ^  In  England  the  power 
of  municipal  corporations  to  impose  a  forfeiture  for  offences 
created  by  ordinances  or  by-laws  has  been,  in  many  cases,  sanc- 
tioned by  usage,  without  any  express  power  in  the  charter  to 
impose  the  forfeiture.  But  in  this  country,  inasmuch  as  corpora- 
tions derive  all  their  power  from  charter  or  act  of  the  legislature, 
the  right  to  inflict  a  forfeiture  must  be  plainly  given,  and  cannot 
be  derived  from  usage.^ 

§  346.  (280)  Power  to  fine  does  not  include  Poiver  to  forfeit. — 
How  strictly  the  courts  hold  that  municipal  corporations  cannot 
pass  by-laws  ordaining  ?^.  forfeiture  is  strikingly  illustrated  by  the 
case  of  Heise  v.  The  Town  Council  of  Columbia.  The  town 
council  had  power  to  enforce  obedience  to  their  ordinances  "  by 
fine,  not  exceeding  tifty  dollars."  Special  authority  was  given  to 
municipal  corporations  to  grant  licenses  to  retail  liquor.  The 
council  passed  an  ordinance  relating  to  this  subject,  the  penalty 
for  violating  which  was  a  "  fine  of  not  more  than  fifty  dollars 
for  each  offence,  and  also  a  forfeiture  of  the  license.''^  It  was 
held  that  the  license  which  was  granted  and  paid  for  was  essen- 
tially property ;  that  the  council  could  only  impose  fines,  and  that 
it  had  no  power  to  ordain  a  forfeiture  of  the  license,  there  being 
(in  the  opinion  of  the  court)  no  difference  between  the  forfeiture 
of  a  license  and  of  goods  and  chattels.^ 

Willcock  on  Municipal  Corporations,  180,  1841 ;  Miles  v.  Chamberlain,  17  Wis.  446 

pi.   449 ;  Angell  «Sb    Ames  on  Corp.  sec.  Donovan   v.    Vlcksburg,    29    Miss.   247 

360;  Cotter  v.  Doty,  5  Ohio,  394,   1832;  Cincinnati  i-.  Buckingham,  10  Ohio,  257 

White  V.   Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  67,  pout,  sec.  348. 

1856 ;  Clerk  r.  Tucket,  3  Lev.  281;  Leey.  i  Cotter  y.    Doty,   5   Ohio,   384,   398; 

Wallis,  1  Kenyon,    292  ;  Adley  v.  Reeves,  Eosebaugh  v.  SafRn,  10  Ohio,  32,  1840. 
2  Maule   &   8.  GO;   Phillips  v.  Allen,  41  -  Taylor  v.   Carondelet,  22  Mo.   105, 

Pa.  St.  481.     In  further  illustration,  see  112;    Kirk  v.  Nowill,    1    Term   R.    118; 

Maj'or,  etc.  I'.  Ordrenaux,  12   Johns.  (N.  Adley  v.   Reeves,    1    Maule  &   Sel.   60; 

^Y.)  122;  Pliillips  i-.  Allen,  41  Pa.  St.  481 ;  Varden  v.  Mount,  15  Bush  (Ky.),  1879, 

Dunham  v.   Rochester,  5  Cowen  (N.  Y.),  citing  sec.  345. 

462,  1826  ;  Baxter  v.  Commonwealth,   3  ^  Heise  v.  Town  Council,  etc.,  6  Rich. 

Pa.  (Pen.  &AV.)  253;  Bergen  y.  Clarkson,  (So.  Car.)  Law,  404,  185.3.     As  to  revo- 

1  Halst.  (N.J.)   352;  Taylor  i».  Caronde-  cation   of  unexpired  license   for   sale   of 

let  (forfeiture  of  lease),  22  Mo.  105,  112;  intoxicating   liquors.   State  v.    Cook,   24 

Mayor,  etc.  of  Mobile  v.  Yuille,  3  Ala.  137,  Minn.  247,  1877.     License  to  sell  liquor 


350  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS,  [CH.  XII. 

§  C47.  (281)  Judicial  Procedure  Necessary  in  some  Instances. 
—  An  ordinance  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  authorizing  without 
any  prior  judicial  proceedings,  a  sale,  under  the  orders  of  the 
mayor,  of  all  property  suffered  to  remain  on  the  levee  beyond  a 
specified  period,  is  invalid,  since  it  makes  the  corporation  judges 
and  parties  in  the  same  cause,  and  enforces  a  forfeiture,  and 
divests  the  owner  of  his  property  without  a  trial  in  due  course  of 
law.  Such  a  power  is  not  similar  to  that  exercised  by  a  corpora- 
tion in  removing  nuisances,  as  that  power  arises  from  necessity 
and  ceases  with  that  necessity.  It  would  be  competent  for  the 
corporation  to  ordain  that  the  property  should  be  removed  at 
the  expense  of  the  proprietor,  and  to  recover  these  expenses, 
and  any  fine  which  might  be  imposed,  by  judicial  proceed- 
ings. ^ 

§  348.  (282)  Forfeiture  of  Animals  at  Large.  — The  right  to  de- 
nounce a  forfeiture  against  animals  running  at  large  in  a  town  or 
city,  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  ordinances  forbidding  it,  must  be 
plainly  conferred  or  it  will  not  be  held  to  exist.  This  is  in  accord- 
ance with  the  rule  of  the  English  courts,  that  a  statute  will  not  be 
taken  to  invest,  by  implication,  a  municipal  corporation  with  the 
extraordinary  powers  of  forfeiting  the  property  of  the  subject,  and 
that,  if  it  be  intended  that  any  such  power  shall  be  given,  it  must 
be  by  express  words  to  that  effect.  The  cases  agree  in  holding  that 
when  the  power  to  denounce  the  forfeiture  against  such  animals 

under  the  laws  of  tlie  state  is  not  a  con-  declaring  that  vested  rights  shall  not  be 

tract,  and  may  be  terminated  by  a  repeal  divested   unless   for  purposes   of  public 

of  the  law.     Fell  v.   State,  42  Md.   71,  utility   and  for   adequate    compensation 

1875;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  83.     The  revo-  previously  made.     It   may  be  observed 

cation   by  a  municipal   corporation  of  a  that  the  court,  without  any  special  dis- 

license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors  upon  cussion,  assumed  that  power  "  to  regu- 

certain  specified  conditions,  a  violation  of  late  everytliing  which  relates  to  bakers  " 

which,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  li-  gave  authority  to  denounce  a  forfeiture  of 

cense,  should  have  the  effect  to  revoke  it,  bread   baked  contrary  to  the  provisions 

is  not  a  forfeiture  beyond  the  powers  of  of   the    ordinance   of   the  cit3^     See,  on 

the  corporation.    Hurber  v.  Braugh,  43  this  point,  Mayor,  etc.  of  Mobile  v.  Yuille, 

Iowa,  514,  1876.  3  Ala.  137,   1841.    Assize   of   bread  has 

1  Lanfear  v.  Mayor,  4  La.    97,  1831.  been   deemed   necessary  from   an   early 

Compare  with  Guillotte  v.  New  Orleans,  period  in  England,  Burns,  Justice.     Title 

12  La.  An.  432,  1857,  in  which  it  was  held  "Bread,"  construction  of  English  statute 

that  an  ordinance  providing  a  forfeiture,  regulating  sale  of  bread.    Queen  i'.  Wood, 

for  the   use   of  the   city   workhouse,  of  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  5-59;  Queen  y.  Kennett,  L. 

bread  illegally  baked  in  violation  of  an  R.  4  Q.  B.  567 ;  Bread  Co.  v.  Gregg,  L. 

authorized  by-law  of  the  corporation,  is  R.  8  Q.  B.  355. 
not  contrary  to  a  constitutional  provision 


§  350.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  351 

is  given,  there  should  be  notice,  either  actual  or  constructive,  or 
prior  legal  proceedings.  The  view  of  the  courts  will  be  best 
understood  by  referring  to  some  of  the  cases  upon  the  subject.  In 
Mississippi,  an  ordinance  authorizing  the  seizure  and  sale  of  hogs 
running  at  large,  without  notice  or  trial,  or  opportunity  for  trial, 
and  providing  that  one  half  of  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  should 
go  to  the  hospital  and  the  other  half  to  the  city  marshal,  was 
held  to  be  in  violation  of  the  constitutional  provision  that  no  per- 
son "  can  be  deprived  of  his  property  but  by  due  course  of  law," 
and  securing  right  to  a  jury  trial. ^ 

§  349.  (283)  In  a  similar  case  in  Ohio,  GrimJce,  J.,  de- 
livering opinion  of  the  court,  observes :  "  The  ordinance  com- 
mands the  marshal  to  seize  and  impound  the  hogs,  and  then, 
without  any  reserve,  zvitJiout  any  notice,  by  means  of  which  the 
owner  might  be  able  to  exculpate  himself,  directs  them  to  be 
sold  and  the  proceeds  placed  in  the  city  treasury.  Such  an  ordi- 
nance is  as  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  charter  (  Cincinnati )  as 
it  is  alien  from  the  general  genius  of  our  institutions."  ^ 

§  350.  (284)  In  JVorth  Carolina  the  general  principle  was  de- 
clared that  an  ordinance  of  an  incorporated  town  which  author- 
izes the  property  of  one  man  to  be  taken  from  him  and  given  to 
another,  without  any  notice  to  the  owner  or  trial  of  his  rights, 
was  unlawful.  The  town  authorities,  under  power  given  to 
make  ordinances  for  the  removal  of  nuisances  and  for  the  good 
government  of  the  town,  passed  an  ordinance  to  this  effect : 
"  That  every  hog  at  large  in  the  said  town  shall  be  taken  up  and 
penned,  and  advertised  to  be  sold  on  the  third  day ;   and  unless 

1  Donovan  v.  Vicksburg,  29  Miss.  (7  lain,  17  Wis.  446,  1863;  supra,  sees.  338, 

Cush.)  247,  1855;  Poppen  v.  Holmes,   44  339. 

IlL  362;  Daist  v.  People,  51  111.  286;  2  Rosebauglw-.  Saffin,  10  Ohio,  32,  37, 
Heisey.  Columbia,  6  Rich.  404;  Whitfield  1840.  However  it  may  be  when  the  pow- 
V.  Longest,  6  Ire.  (N.  C.  Law)  268;  Mc-  er  to  forfeit  without  notice  or  prior  legal 
Kee  y.  McKee,  8  B.  Mon.  (Kentucky)  proceedings  is  exjilkilli/  conferred,  it  is 
433;  Jarman  v.  Patterson,  7  Mon.  (Ken-  clear  that  the  power,  nnless  plainly  and 
tucky),  647;  Varden  r.  Mount,  15  Bush  expressly  given,  cannot  be  exercised  with- 
(Kentucky),  1879 ;  s.  c.  10  C.  L.  J.  73.  out  such  notice  and  previous  adjudica- 
Power  to  impose  penalties  on  the  owners  tion  ;  but  with  these  the  remedy  may,^if 
of  animals  running  at  large  excludes,  by  needful,  be  "  prompt  and  strong."  Cm- 
implication,  the  power  to  enforce  a  by-  cinnati  v.  Buckingham,  10  Ohio,  257,  262, 
law  upon  the  subject  in  any  other  way,  per  Lane,  C.  J.  What  is  a  runninq  at 
as,  for  example,  by  a  sale  of  the  ani-  large.  Kinder  v.  Gillespie,  63  111.  88, 1872 ; 
mals  found  at  large.     Miles  v.  Chamber-  Case  v.  Hall,  21  111.  632. 


352  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XII. 

the  owner  should  paj^  the  charges  (specified  in  the  ordinance) 
for  taking  up  and  keeping  such  hog,  and  a  sale  is  effected,  the 
money  arising  therefrom,  after  paying  the  charges,  shall  he  paid 
over  to  the  owner  of  the  said  hog."  The  validity  of  this  ordi- 
nance was  drawn  in  question,  and  two  points  were  ruled  by  the 
Supreme  Court :  1.  That  the  ordinance  was  reasonable,  and  the 
corporation,  under  the  power  above  referred  to,  had  authority  to 
pass  it ;  2.  That  it  sufficiently  provided  for  notice  to  the  owner 
by  the  impounding  of  the  animal,  and  the  three  days'  public 
advertisement,  and  that  personal  notice  was  not  necessary.^  In  a 
subsequent  case  in  the  same  court  a  similar  ordinance  was  sus- 
tained. It  was  objected  that  it  was  invalid,  because  it  provided 
for  no  judicial  decision  condemning  the  property  to  be  sold. 
This  objection  the  court  regarded  as  insufficient,  "  since  the 
owner  may,  if  he  choose,  have  a  full  investigation  of  the  case 
by  bringing  an  action  of  replevin,  as  in  any  other  case  of  dis- 
tress." 2 

§  351.  (285)  In  South  Carolina  it  has  been  held  that  under 
authority  to  enforce  by-laws  by  fine^  an  ordinance,  otherwise 
legal,  which  authorized  the  marshal  to  kill  hogs  running  at  large, 
contrary  to  the  ordinance,  and  appropriate  them  to  his  own  use, 
was  void.^ 

1  Shaw  V.  KennetJy  (North  Car.),  Term  to  different  owners  are  sold  at  once.  lb. ; 

R.  158,  1817  ;  Helen  v.  Noe,  3  Ire.  (N.  C.  ante,  sec.  116. 

Law)  493, 1843.  Same  principle.  Spitlcry.  ^  McRae   r.  O'Lain,  cited  Kennedy  y. 

Young,  Go  Mo.  42,  1876,  holding  tliat  such  Sowden,  1  McMulIen  (South  Car.)  Law, 

an  ordinance  was  unautliorized  as  a  sani-  328.     But  authority  to  impose  "Jines  and 

tary  or  police  regulation  under  power  to  penalties  "  autliorizes  a  fine  against  tliose 

abate  nuisances.  wlio   violate    the     ordinance    forbidding 

-  Whitfield  V.  Longest,  6  Ire.   (Law)  hogs  running  at  large,  and   the  seizure, 

268,1846.  In  7o;ra  a  similar  ordinance  was  impounding,  and   sale    (upon  notice)  of 

sustained.    Gosselink  v.  Campbell,  4  Iowa,  tlie  animals  to  pay  the  fine,  whether  they 

296,    1856 ;    Gilchrist  v.    Schmidling,    12  belong    to     residents    or    non-residents. 

Kan.  263,  1873.    Contra,  Willis  v.  Legris,  Kennedy  v.  Sowden,  supra ;  s.  p.  Crosby 

45  111.  289,  1867  ;  Bullock  w.  Geomble,  7^'.  r.  Warren,   I    Rich.    (South   Car.)  Law, 

218  ;  Poppen  v.  Holmes,  44  111.  360.     But  385,   1845,  Wardlaw,  J.,  dissenting ;  Mc- 

see    Hart   v.    Mayor,  etc.  of  Albany,  9  Kee   v.   McKee,  8   B.    Mon.    (Ky.)   433, 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571,   1832;  White  v.  Tall-  1848;  see  Kinder  v.   Gillespie,  63  111.  88, 

man,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  67,  1856  ;  Phillips  1872.     But  it  seems  doubtful,  upon  the 

V.  Allen,  41  Pa.  St.  481.     Power  must  ^e  principles  adopted  in  the  construction  of 

strictly  pursued,  or  the  sale  will  be  void,  powers  of  this  character,  whether  author- 

and   the   officer   a   trespasser.      Clark  v.  ity  to  impose  fines  and  penalties  extends 

Lewis,  35  111.  417.     See  Friday  v.  Floyd,  any  further  than  to  the  imposition  oi  pe- 

63  111.  50,   1872,  three  judges  dissenting,  cuniarii  Jines  and  penalties.     See  Mayor  of 

Sale  is  void  where  two  animals  belonging  Mobile  y.  Yuille,  3  Ala.   137;    White  v. 


§  353.] 


MUNICIPAL   OEDINANCES   OE  BY-LAWS. 


35J 


§  352.  (286)  Equity  will  not  ordinarily  relieve  against  Valid 
Forfeitures.  —  A  forfeiture  imposed  by  a  municipal  corporation, 
under  legislative  autliority  for  a  violation  of  a  valid  by-law,  and 
inflicted  as  a  penalty  for  such  violation,  cannot  be  relieved  against 
in  equity,  unless,  perhaps,  where  peculiar  circumstances  furnish 
grounds  for  equitable  interposition,  the  general  doctrine  being 
that  equity  may  relieve  against  forfeitures  declared  by  contract, 
but  not  against  those  expressly  declared  or  authorized  by  statute.^ 

§  353.  (287)  Po2oer  to  enforce  hy  Imprisonment  must  he  ex- 
pressly given.  —  In  this  country  it  is  not  unusual  to  provide,  in 
the  organic  act  of  municipal  corporations,  that  if  fines  for  viola- 
tion of  by-laws  or  ordinances  are  not  paid,  the  offender  may  be 
committed  to  prison  for  a  limited  period.  And  in  respect  to 
some  offences  public  in  their  character,  the  power  to  imprison  in 
the  first  instance  is  often  conferred.^  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to 
add  that  unless  the  authority  be  plainl}"-  given,  it  does  not  exist ; 
and  when  given,  before  it  can  be  exercised  there  must  be  a  judi- 
cial ascertainment  by  a  competent  tribunal  or  magistrate  of  the 
guilt  of  the  party .^ 


Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.J.)  67,  1856.  The 
power  to  forfeit,  like  the  power  to  tax, 
should  be  given  either  expressly,  or,  at  all 
events,  by  necessary  implication.  And  it 
has  been  held  that  it  cannot  be  implied 
from  the  power  "to  impose  reasonable 
fines,"  and  to  cause  "all  such  fines  and 
all  such  forfeitures  and  penalties  as  may 
be  incurred  under  the  laws  and  ordi- 
nances of  the  corporation  to  be  assessed, 
levied,  and  collected."  Cotter  v.  Doty,  5 
Ohio,  395,  1832. 

1  Taylor  v.  Carondelet,  22  Mo.  105 
(forfeiture  clause  in  lease) ;  Peachy  v. 
Somerset,  1  Str.  447  ;  Gorman  v.  Low,  2 
Edw.  Ch.  324 ;  Keating  v.  Sparrow,  1 
Ball  &  Beat.  367  ;  State  v.  Kailroad  Co., 
8  How.  (U.  S.)  534. 

2  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa.  (Pen. 
&  W.)  253,  1831;  New  Orleans  v.  Cos- 
tello,  14  La.  An.  37  ;  Burlington  v.  Kellar, 
18  Iowa,  59 ;  London  v.  Wood,  12  Mod. 
686  ;  Bab  v.  Clerke,  Moore,  411  ;  Clarke's 
Case,  5  Co.  64 ;  1  Roll.  Abr.  364 ;  Com. 
Dig.  By-Law, E.  1 ;  Chilton  v.  Kailway  Co., 
16  M.  &  W.  212;  King  v.  Merchant  Tai- 
lors' Co.,  2  Lev.  200. 


3  Burnett,  in  re,  30  Ala.  461,  1857. 
Charter  power  to  punish  violations  of  or- 
dinances "  by  fines,  imprisonment,  labor, 
or  other  penalty  prescribed  by  ordinance" 
will  authorize  the  city  council  to  pre- 
scribe as  punishment  either  fine  or  im- 
prisonment (not  both),  and  not  even 
imprisonment  as  means  of  enforcing  pay- 
ment of  a  fine.  Brieswick  v.  Brunswick, 
51  Ga.  639,  1874 ;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Pep.  240. 
Fines  for  the  violation  of  ordinances,  held 
under  special  cliarter  provisions,  collecti- 
ble by  commitment  of  the  persons,  or  by 
fieri  fitcias.  Huddleson  v.  RuflHin,  G  Ohio 
St.  604.  The  power  to  punish  offenders 
by  fine  or  imprisonment,  conferred  upon 
a  municipal  corporation,  does  not  include 
tlie  autliority  to  coerce  the  payment  of  a 
fine  by  imprisonment.  Brieswick  v. 
Brunswick,  51  Ga.  639,  1874.  Authority 
to  enforce  penalties  for  violations  of  ordi- 
nances by  "  distress  and  sale  "  of  property 
must  be  expressly  or  plainly  granted. 
Wliite  V.  Tallman,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  67, 
1856  ;  Bergen  v.  Clarkson,  1  Halst.  (N.  J.) 
352.  A  law  authorizing  a  municipal  cor- 
poration to  recover  a  fine  for  breach  of 


VOL.  I. 


23 


354  MUNICIPAL   COEPORATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

On  tvliom  Ordinances  are  binding,  and  lolio  must  notice  them. 

§  354.  (288)  Who  hound.  —  In  Enghmd  iha  by-laws  of  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  bind  not  only  the  members,  but,  if  they  are 
general  in  their  nature  and  purposes,  and  not  limited  to  any  par- 
ticular class  or  description,  but  intended  to  extend  to  all  persons 
coming  within  the  local  jurisdiction  of  the  corporation,  they  bind 
all,  whether  members  or  strangers,  and  all  must  take  notice  of 
them  at  their  peril.  And  by-laws  made  by  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion with  respect  to  a  liberty  or  franchise  granted  them,  with 
local  jurisdiction  beyond  the  limits  of  the  municipality,  are  as 
binding  upon  persons  going  into  the  liberty  as  the  by-laws  of  the 
city  upon  those  who  come  within  its  walls.^ 

§  355.  (289)  So,  also,  in  this  country  it  is  settled  that  valid 
ordinances  bind  not  only  the  inhabitants  of  the  corporation,  but 
also  strangers  or  non-residents  coming  within  its  limits.  Tliese, 
for  the  time  being,  are  regarded  as  inhabitants,  and  liable  in  the 
same  manner  for  violations  of  ordinances.^  So  far  is  plain.  But 
suppose  a  person  living  without  the  limits  of  the  corporation 
suffers  his  cattle  or  property  to  stray  into  it  and  violate  its  ordi- 

a  police  regulation  does  not,  without  ex-  Godb.  252.     An  ordinance  passed  in  1834, 

press    provision    therefor,  authorize    the  proliibiting  the  erection  of  "  stables,  etc., 

arrest  and   criminal   prosecution   of  the  in  the  interior  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans, 

offender.     State  v.  Ruff,  30  La.  An.  497.  or  any  of  its  incorporated  suburbs,"  held 

And  in  England,  likewise,  such  a  power  not  to   extend  to  the  city  of  Lafayette, 

cannot  be  conferred  by  the  crown,  and  subsequently  added,  by  act  of  the  legisla- 

can  only  exist  by  authority  of  parliament  ture,  to  tlie  city  of  New  Orleans.     New 

or  a  special  custom.     Gierke  v.  Tucker,  Orleans  v.  Anderson,  9  La.  An.  323,  1854. 
3  Lev.   281;  s.   c.  2  Vent.  183;   Lee  v.  2  Heland  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen  (Mass.), 

Wallis,  1  Kenyon,    295;     Sayer,     263;  407,    1862;  Whitfield  v.  Longest,  6  Ire. 

Adley   v.    Reeves,  2   Maule   &    Sel.    60;  (Law)   268,   1840;    approving   Pierce    v. 

Willc.  179;  Glover,  311,     Verbal  order  Bartram,  Cowp.  269.     See  also  Buffalo 

of  police  magistrate  will  not  justif}' police  v.    Webster,     10    Wend.     (N.    Y.)     99; 

officer  in  holding  a  person  in  custody  for  Commrs.    of    Wilmington    v.    Roby,    8 

the  non-payment  of  a  fine  imposed  for  Ire.     (Law)     250 ;      Commrs.    of     Ply- 

the  breach   of    a   municipal    ordinance,  mouth   v.  Pettijohn,  4  Dev.  (Law)  591; 

Board   of  Trustees   y.  Sciu-oeder,  58  111.  Strauss    v.  Pontiac,   40     III.   301,   1866; 

353,  1871.  City  Council  v.  Pepper,  1  Rich.  (South 

1  AVillc.  105,  107;  Glover,  289,   290;  Car.)    Law,    364,    1845;     City    Council 

London  v.  Vanacre,  1  Ld.  Raym.  498;  v.  King,  4   McCord  (South  Car.),  487; 

Salk.  143;  Pierce  I'.  Bartram,  Cowp.  270;  Marietta     v.    Fearing,     4      Ohio,     427, 

Fazakerley   r.    Wiltshire,    1    Stra.   462 ;  1831 ;  Dodge   v.   Gridley,  10  Ohio,   173 ; 

Kirk  7;.  Nowill,  1  Term  R.  118;  Butcher  Homey  v.    Sloan,   1   Smith   (Ind.),  136; 

Co.  V.  Mercy,  1  H.  Bl.  370.     Do  not  bind  Kennedy  v.  Sowden,  1  McMuUen  (South 

beyond  limits  of  authorized  jurisdiction.  Car.),    323.      Taxation   of   nonresidents 

See  3  Mod.  158 ;  T.  Jones,  144  ;  2  Brownl.  using  streets.  Post,  sec.  682,  note. 
177;    Hob.   211;  Hutt.  6;    11  Rep.  53; 


§  356.] 


MUNICIPAL   OEDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


355 


nances.  Here  two  questions  ma}^  arise  :  1st.  Can  such  property, 
being  within  tlie  corporation,  be  dealt  with  the  same  as  if  it  be- 
longed to  an  inhabitant  of  the  corporation  ?  It  is  held  that  it 
can.^  2d.  Can  such  non-resident  owner  be  made  amenable  per- 
sonally to  a  penalty  to  the  corporation?  In  other  words,  has  a 
corporation  power,  unless  expressly  conferred,  to  provide  for  col- 
lecting a  penalty  from  a  non-resident  who  suffers  his  property  to 
violate  an  ordinance,  but  who  himself  was,  at  the  time,  without 
the  corporate  limits  ?  This  remains,  perhaps,  to  be  settled, 
though  it  is  certain  that  ordinances  will  not  be  construed  to  ex- 
tend to  persons  living  without  the  corporation  and  not  being 
within  it,  unless  such  an  intention  plainly  appears.^ 

§  356.  (290)  Notice.  —  All  persons  upon  whom  ordinances  are 
binding  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  them.^  But  where  a  party 
is  liable  to  a  penalty  if  he  does  not  do  a  given  act  upon  notice,  a 
newspaper  notice  is  not  sufficient,  unless  that  mode  is  pointed  out 
by  the  law,  or  general  power  is  given  to  the  corporation  embrac- 


1  Whitfield  V.  Longest,  6  Ire.  (Law) 
268,  ISie  ;  Gosselink  v.  Campbell,  4  Iowa, 
296,  300,  1856 ;  Reed  i-.  People,  1  Park. 
Cr.  Rep.  481.  The  point  was  also  ruled 
the  same  way  in  Spitler  v.  Young,  63  jNIo. 
42, 187G ;  but  the  ordinance  was  construed 
not  to  apply  to  a  case  where  the  hogs 
owned  outside  of  the  corporation  escaped 
from  a  pen  in  consequence  of  a  flood,  over 
which  the  owner  had  no  control,  which 
washed  the  pen  away,  and  where  the 
owner  was  using  diligence  to  reclaim 
them.  Wagner,  J.,  says,  "  While  the  hogs 
in  this  case  were  found  in  the  streets,  yet 
they  were  not  there  witliin  the  meaning 
and  spirit  of  the  ordinance,  which  was 
designed  to  prohibit  hogs  from  running 
at  large  in  the  ordinary  sense." 

2  piymoutii  V.  Pettijohn,  4  Dev.  (Law) 
591.  Inability  to  punisli  non-resident 
owner  criminally  in  respect  to  property 
within  corporate  limits,  see  Reed  v.  Peo- 
ple, 1  Park.  Cr.  Rep.  481.  Power  "  to 
make  such  prudential  rules  and  regula- 
tions as  may  seem  necessary  for  the  bet- 
ter improving  of  the  common  lands  of  a 
town,"  etc.,  extends  only  to  regulations 
as  between  those  wlio  have  tlie  right  to 
enjoy  them  in  common,  but  does  not  con- 
fer the  power  of  imposing  a  penalty  for 


trespasses  by  strangers;  for  such  acts  the 
town  must  pursue  its  common-law  rem- 
edy. Foster  v.  Rlioads,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
191,  1821.  See,  also,  People  v.  Works, 
7  W^^nd.  (X.  Y.)  486;  HoUaday  v.  Marsh, 
3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  142.  City  held  not  to 
have  power  to  require  a  license  tax  from 
non-resident  owners  of  wagons  engaged 
in  hauling  into  and  out  of  the  city  for 
hire.  St.  Charles  v.  Nolle,  51  Mo.  122, 
1872.  See  Index,  Vehicles.  Ordinances 
cannot  have  an  extra-territorial  effect, 
unless  the  power  be  plainly  conferred 
upon  the  corporation.  Strauss  i-.  Pontiac 
(liquor  ordinance),  40  111.  301,  1866  ;  Gos- 
selink V.  Campbell,  4  Iowa,  296  ;  Robb  v. 
Indianapolis,  38  Ind.  49,  1871 ;  Chicago 
Packing  Co.  i'.  Chicago,  88  111.  221,  1878. 
Whetlier  a  party  resides  within  the  limits 
embraced  by  an  ordinance  is  a  question 
of  fact.  Board  v.  Pooley,  11  La.  An. 
743;  Police  Jury  i-.  Villaviabo,  12  lb 
788;  New  Orleans  v.  Boudu,  14  Ih.  .303. 

"*  Palm^'ra  v.  Morton  (sidewalk  ordi- 
nance), 25  Mo.  593.  18G0  ;  Buffalo  v. 
Webster,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  99,  1833. 
See  Reed  v.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  Rep. 
481 ;  City  of  London  v.  Vanacre,  12  Mod. 
270,  272;  Glover  on  Corp.  207,  290;  poa, 
sees.  606,  803. 


356 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


ing  within  it  the  authority  to  prescribe  the  kind  and  manner  of 
notice.^ 

Ordinances  RcJating  to  the  Licensing^  Regulation^  and  Taxing  of 
Anuisements  and  Occvpatiotis,  Including  the  Sale  of  Intoxicating 
Liquors. 

§  357.  (291)  Nature  of  License  Power.  —  Charters  not  un- 
frequently  confer  upon  the  corporation  the  power  "  to  license 
and  regulate  "  or  to  "  license,  regulate,  and  tax  "  certain  avoca- 
tions and  employments,  and  to  "  tax  and  restrain  "  or  "  prohibit  " 
exhibitions,  shows,  places  of  amusement,  and  the  like,  and  unless 
there  is  some  specific  limitation  on  the  authority  of  the  legislature 
in  this  respect,  such  provisions  are  constitutional.^  Where,  by 
the  charter  of  a  city,  the  power  to  license  a  particular  occupation 
within  its  limits  is  given  to  the  common  council,  such  power  in- 
volves the  necessity  of  determining  with  reasonable  certainty 
both  the  extent  and  duration  of  the  license  and  the  sum  to  be 


^  Keckeley  v.  Commissioners  of  Roads, 
4  McCord  (S.  Car.),  257,  1828. 

2  City  I'.  Clutch,  6  Iowa,  546,  1858. 
In  Mayor,  etc.  of  Mobile  v.  Yuille,  3  Ala. 
137,  1841,  it  was  determined  that  there 
was  nothing  in  the  constitution  of  the 
state  which  would  invalidate  a  grant  of 
power  to  a  municipal  corporation  "  to 
license  bakers,  and  rerjitldte  the  ivei<jht  and 
price  of  bread,  and  to  prohibit  the  baking, 
for  sale,  except  by  those  licensed."  Such 
a  grant  of  power  does  not  unlawfully  in- 
terfere with  the  riglit  of  citizens  to  pur- 
sue their  lawful  occupations.  In  the  City 
of  Boston  V.  Schaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
415,  1830,  it  was  decided  that  it  is  compe- 
tent for  the  legislature  to  grant  a  city  or 
town  power  to  require  the  payment  of 
money  as  the  condition  of  exercising  par- 
ticular employments,  e.  g.  giving  theatri- 
cal or  other  exhibitions.  This  is  not  in 
the  nature  of  a  tax,  wliich  must  be  gen- 
eral, but  of  an  excise  on  special  vocations. 
Approved,  Cincinnati  r.  Bryson,  15  Ohio, 
625;  New  Orleans  v.  Turpin  (auctioneers), 
13  La.  An.  56,  1858;  Municipality  v. 
Dubois  (livery-stable  keeper),  10  lb.  56; 
Charity  Hospital  v.  Stickney,  2  La.  An. 
550  ;  Slaughter  v.  Commonwealth,  13 
Gratt.  (Va.)  767;  Carrol  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
12  Ala.  173 ;  Merriam  v.  New  Orleans, 


14  La.  An.  318;  Wynne  v.  Wright,  1 
Dev.  &  B.  (N.  Car.)  Law,  19  ;  The  Mayor, 
etc.  V.  Hartridge,  8  Ga.  23 ;  Cincinnati 
V.  Bryson,  15  Ohio,  625,  dissenting  opin- 
ion of  Burchard,  J. ;  Collins  v.  Louisville, 
2  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  134;  Tlie  Germania  v. 
State,  7  Md.  1;  The  State  v.  Roberts,  11 
Gill  &  Johns.  (Md.)  506;  Sears  v.  West, 
1  Murph.  (N.  Car.)  291;  People  v.  Thur- 
ber,  13  111.  557 ;  Savannah  v.  Charlton, 
36  Ga.  460,  1867.  Forbidding  driving  of 
carts  without  license.  Who  are  cartmen? 
Brooklyn  v.  Breshn,  57  N.  Y.  591,  1874; 
post,  sees.  785,  791 ;  see  chapter  on  Taxa- 
tion, post ;  ante,  sec.  115  ;  Kniper  v.  Louis- 
ville, 7  Bush  (Ky.),  599. 

These  cases  show  some  diversity  of 
opinion  as  to  the  right  to  tax  particular 
emploijments  as  distinguished  from  prop- 
erty ;  but  the  correct  view,  it  is  submitted, 
is  this  :  Unless  specially  restrained  by 
the  constitution,  the  legislature  may  pro- 
vide for  the  taxing  of  any  occupation  or 
trade,  and  may  confer  this  power  upon 
municipal  corporations.  But  such  taxes 
are  apt  to  be  inequitable,  and  the  principle 
not  free  from  danger  of  great  abuse. 
Hence  ordinances  of  this  character  ought 
not  to  be  sustained,  unless  the  authority 
be  expressly  or  otherwise  unequivocally 
conferred. 


OOi 


•] 


MUNICIPAL   OEDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


357 


paid  therefor  ;  and  must  be  exercised  b}^  the  common  council,  and 
cannot  be  delegated  by  it,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  any  person  or 
authority.^  Concerning  useful  trades  and  employments,  a  dis- 
tinction is  to  be  observed  between  the  power  to  "  license  "  and 
the  power  to  "  tax."  In  such  cases  the  former  right,  unless  such 
appears  to  have  been  the  legislative  intent,  does  not  give  the  au- 
thority to  prohibit,  or  to  use  the  license  as  a  mode  of  taxation 
with  a  view  to  revenue,  but  a  reasonable  fee  for  the  license  and 
the  labor  attending  its  issue  may  be  charged.  Respecting  amuse- 
ments, exhibitions,  etc.,  the  authority  of  the  corporation  under 
the  power  to  license  has  been  regarded  as  greater  than  when  the 
same  word  is  employed  as  to  trades  and  occupations.^     Words  of 


1  Darling  v.  St.  Paul,  19  Minn.  389, 
1872.  Compare  this  case,  however,  with 
Decorah  v.  Dunstan,  38  Iowa,  90, 1874,  in 
which  it  was  held  that  wliere  an  incorpo- 
rated town  had  the  power  to  regulate 
and  license  auction  sales,  etc.,  and  to  pass 
all  ordinances  necessary  to  exercise  that 
power,  an  ordinance  autliorizing  tlie  mayor 
to  fix  tiie  amount  of  the  license  within  a 
specified  sum  was  held  not  to  be  invalid. 
The  general  doctrine  on  the  subject  of  the 
delegation  of  municipal  powers  is  else  wliere 
discussed  ;  and  the  line  drawn  between 
duties  of  a  ministerial  and  executive  char- 
acter which  may  be  delegated,  and  legisla- 
tive or  discretionary  powers  which  may 
not  be  delegated.  Ante,  sec.  96  ;  post, 
sees.  716,  780. 

2  Ash  V.  People,  11  Mich.  347  ;  ante, 
sec.  115;  Youngblood  y.  Sexton  (distinc- 
tion between  license  and  taxation),  32 
Mich.  406,  1875;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  654; 
St.  Paul  V.  Treager,  25  Minn.  248,  1878. 
Power  "  to  exact  license  money  "  and  "  to 
regulate  "  the  sale  of  liquors  held  not  to 
confer  power  to  prohibit  the  sale  thereof. 
Sweet  V.  Wabash,  41  Ind.  7,  1872.  Free- 
holders V.  Barber,  2  Halst.  (N.  ,T.)  64  ;  Car- 
roU  i;.  Tuscaloosa,  12  Ala.  (N.  S.)  173; 
Greensboro  v.  MuUins,  13  Il>.  341 ;  State 
V.  Roberts,  11  Gill  &  Johns.  (Md.)  500; 
City  Council ;;.  Ahrens,  4  Strob.  (So.  Car  ) 
241;  Kip  V.  Patterson,  2  Dutch.  (N.J.) 
298;  Portland  v.  O'Neill,  1  Oregon, 
218;  Bennett  r.  Birmingham,  31  Pa.  St. 
15;  Commonwealth  i'.  Stodder,  2  Cush. 
(Mass  )562;  Day  >-.Green,4  Cush.  (Mass.) 
433  ;  Dunluim  r.  Rochester,  5  Cow.  (X.  Y.) 


462  ;  Lawrenceburg  v.  West,  16  Ind.  337 ; 
Cheney  v.  Shelby  ville,  18  Ind.  84 ;  Leaven- 
worth V.  Booth  (construing  words  "  license 
tax  "),  15  Kan.  627, 1875 ;  AVelch  v.  Hotch- 
kiss  (building  license  fee  of  fifty  cents  sus- 
tamed),  39  Conn.  140,  1872;  s.  c.  12  Am. 
Rep.  383;  post,  sec.  405,  note.  St.  Paul  v. 
Treager,  25  Minn.  248,  approving  text  ; 
Bennett  v.  People,  30  111.  389;  East  St. 
Louis  V.  Wehrung,  46  III.  392 ;  Savannali 
V.  Charlton,  36  Ga.  400;  Darling  i-.  St. 
Paul,  19  Minn.  389, 1872,  citing  text ;  post, 
ch.  xix. 

Distinction  between  taxation  and  police 
rerjulution  well  stated  by  Depite,  J.,  in  State 
V.  Hoboken,  33  N.  J.  L.  280,  1869;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Markiiam,  7  Bush  (Ky.), 
486,  1870;  State  v.  Cassidy,  22  Minn.  312; 
pmst,  sec.  768;  see,  also.  Kip  v.  Patterson, 
2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  298;  Mayor  v.  Avenue 
Railroad  Company,  32  N.  Y.  261 ;  33  lb. 
42,  distinguished  and  questioned  in  Frank- 
ford  Railway  Company  ;•.  Pliiladelphia, 
58  Pa.  St.  119,  1868;  Johnson  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 60  Pa.  St.  445;  Freeholders  v.  Bar- 
ber, 2  Halst.  (N.  J.)  64.  Differencre  be- 
tween tax  and  a  license  to  exercise  par- 
ticular callings  upon  making  pecuniary 
compensation  for  the  privilege.  People 
V.  Thurber,  13  111.  557;  Mount  Carmel  v. 
Wabash  Co.,  50  111.  69;  Kniper  i-.  Louis- 
ville, 7  Bush  (Ky.  ),  599.  Smith  v.  City 
of  Madison,  7  Ind.  86,  1855,  so  far  as  it 
holds  tliat  authority  "  to  suppress  and  re- 
strain "  bowling  saloons  confers  the  power 
to  license  and  tux  them,  cannot,  as  it 
seems  to  us,  be  sustained.  Mayor,  etc.  v. 
Beai^Iey,   1    Ilumpli.    (Tenn.)    240,   holds 


358 


MUNICIPAL  COKPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


this  character,  however,  do  not  always  have  exactly  the  same 
meaning,  and  the  intention  of  the  legislature  in  using  them  must 
often  be  gathered  from  tlie  whole  charter  and  the  general  legisla- 
tion of  the  state  respecting  the  subject-matter. 

§  358.  (  292)  In  harmony  with  the  foregoing  principles,  it  has 
been  held  that,  under  authority  "  to  license  and  regulate  "  dray- 
men, etc.,  a  municipal  corporation  may,  by  ordinance,  require  a 
license  to  be  first  taken  out,  and  cliarge  a  reasonable  sum  for  is- 
suing the  same  and  keeping  the  necessary  record,  but  cannot,  by 
virtue  of  this  authority',  without  more,  levy  a  tax  upon  the  occu- 
pation itself;  and,  under  the  power  to  regulate^  it  may  make 
proper  police  regulations  as  to  the  mode  in  which  the  employment 
shall  be  exercised. ^ 


that  power  in  a  charter  to  regulate  and 
restrahi  tippling-houses  did  not  confer  the 
power  to  tax  them.  Construction  of  word 
"restrain"  (Emporia  v.  Vohiier,  12  Kan. 
622,  G30,  1874)  held  not  to  be  synony- 
mous with  tlie  words  "  prohibit"  or  "  sup- 
press." Approving  text.  Frank,  m  ?-e,  52 
Cal.  606;  Hudson,  etc.  v.  Hoboken,  41  N. 
J.  L.  71. 

One  who  sells  his  own  goods  at  public 
auction,  as  well  as  one  who  sells  another's, 
is  an  "auctioneer,"  allowing  the  common 
council  of  any  municipality  to  require  a 
license,  etc.  Goshen  v.  Kern,  63  Ind.  408. 
The  power  thus  conferred  on  a  common 
council  is  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regula- 
tion. Ih. 

1  Cincinnati  v.  Bryson,  15  Ohio,  625, 
1846.  As  to  correctness  of  application  of 
the  principle  of  law  to  the  facts,  qucere. 
Consult,  in  connection  with  the  above 
case,  Mays  v.  Cincinnati,  1  Ohio  St.  268, 
1853;  with  which  compare  Cincinnati  v. 
Buckingham,  10  Ohio,  261 ;  and  see  cases 
cited  supra,  sec.  357 ;  Mays  v.  Cincinnati, 
supra,  cited  by  Cornell,  J.,  in  St.  Paul  v. 
Treager,  25  Minn.  248,  1878.  An  act  to 
regulate  and  license  the  keeping  of  dogs 
was  regarded  as  an  exercise  of  the  police, 
and  not  the  taxing  power  of  the  state, 
and  not  to  be  within  the  constitutional 
provision  requiring  miiformilg  of  taxation. 
Carter  v.  Dow,  16  wis.  298,  1862 ;  Ten- 
liey  V.  Lenz,  lb.  566.  In  the  case  last 
cited,  Paine,  J.,  observes :  "  We  cannot 
assent  to  the  position  that,  if  the  sum  re- 


quired for  a  license  exceeds  the  expense  of 
issuing  it,  the  act  transcends  the  licensing 
power,  and  imposes  a  tax.  By  such  a 
theory  the  police  power  would  be  shorn 
of  all  eiBciency.  .  .  .  We  have  no  doubt, 
therefore,  that  the  legislature  may,  in 
regulating  any  matter  that  is  a  proper 
subject  of  the  police  power,  impose  such 
sums  for  licenses  as  will  operate  as  partial 
restrictions  upon  the  business,  or  upon 
the  keeping  of  the  particular  kinds  of 
property  regulated."  See,  also,  Fire  De- 
partment V.  Helfenstein,  16  Wis.  136. 
Special  constitutional  provisions  in  refer- 
ence to  taxation  have  been  held  to  have 
no  reference  to  license  taxes.  Leaven- 
worth V.  Booth,  15  Kan.  627,  635,  636, 
1875 ;  Anderson  v.  Kerns  Drain  Co.,  14 
Ind.  201 ;  Bright  v.  McCullough,  27  Ind. 
223,  232  ;  People  v.  Coleman,  4  Cal.  46. 

The  law  recognizes  property  in  dogs, 
and  a  city  ordinance  requiring  the  owner  of 
such  property  to  obtain  a  license  to  keep 
the  same,  and  subjecting  him  to  arrest, 
fine,  and  imprisonment  for  not  procuring 
such  license,  is  invalid.  Washington  v. 
Mays,  1  Mc Arthur,  53;  Harrington  v. 
Miles,  11  Kan.  480.  See  on  this  general 
subject,  State  v.  Cymis,  26  Ohio  St.  400; 
Ward  V.  State,  48  Ala.  161 ;  post,  sec.  768 ; 
ante,  sec.  141. 

The  legislature  may,  for  police  pur- 
poses, prescribe  the  limits  of  municipal 
bodies,  enlarging  or  contracting  them  at 
pleasure,  and  give  them  power  to  pass  or- 
dinances to  prevent  nuisances  to  operate  be- 


§  359.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


359 


§  359.  (293)  So  authority  to  a  city  to  adopt  rules  and  orders 
"  for  the  due  regulation  of  omnibuses,  stages,  etc.,"  was  held  not  to 
authorize  the  adoption  of  an  ordinance  requiring  the  payment  of  a 
tax  or  duty  on  each  carriage  licensed,  varying  from  one  to  twenty 
dollars,  according  to  the  different  kinds  of  carriages,  and  the 
stands  occupied.  This  was  regarded  as  a  direct  tax  upon  the 
vehicle  used  or  its  owner,  and  not  necessary  to  secure  the  objects 
of  the  above  grant  of  power  to  the  city.^     So  where,  under  an 


yond  their  boundaries.  Thus  a  packing 
house  wJiich  has  been  hcensed  by  the  town 
where  it  is  located,  but  within  one  mile 
of  the  corporate  limits  of  a  city,  does  not 
exempt  tiie  same  from  an  ordinance  of 
that  city  requiring  it  to  be  licensed  by 
that  municipality.  The  person  using  the 
establishment  is  liable  to  be  charged  a 
license  by  both  the  town  and  city.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  Co.  V.  Chicago,  88  III.  221. 

In  Ash  V.  People,  11  Mich.  317,  1863, 
it  appeared  that,  by  its  charter,  authority 
was  given  to  a  city  to  erect,  establish, 
and  regulate  markets  and  market-places, 
and  to  license  and  regulate  butchers  and 
shop-keepers  at  any  other  place  in  the 
city,  for  tiie  sale  of  meats,  etc.,  and  to  au- 
thorize the  mayor  to  grant  such  licenses 
and  to  prescribe  the  sum  of  money  to  be 
paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  city  therefor. 
An  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping  of 
meat-shops  outside  of  the  public  markets 
without  a  license,  and  requiring  the  pay- 
ment of  a  license  fee  of  five  dollars,  was 
sustained,  although  the  amount  exceeded 
the  expense  of  making  and  registering 
the  license.  The  court  denied  that  the 
fee  demanded  was  a  tax,  and  regarded  it 
as  but  a  reasonable  compensation  for  the 
additional  expense  of  municipal  supervi- 
sion over  the  business  at  the  place  licensed. 

A  ferrif  license  fee  of  fifty  dollars  was 
held  not  to  be  a  tax,  within  the  meaning  of 
the  term,  as  used  in  the  constitution  of 
Michigan  and  the  charter  of  the  city  of  De- 
troit. Ciiilvers  v.  People,  11  Mich.  43, 
1862;  an^e,  sec.  115.  "  The  power  to  li- 
cense and  regulate  carries  with  it  the  right 
to  require  the  payment  of  a  [reasonable] 
sum  in  consideration  of  the  license." 
Per  Wright,  J.,  in  State  v.  Herod,  29  Iowa, 
123,  1870.  Whenever  a  municipal  cor- 
poration is  authorized  to  make  by-laws 
relative  to  a  given  subject,  and  to  require 


of  those  who  desire  to  do  any  act  or  trans- 
act any  business  pertaining  thereto  to 
obtain  a  license  therefor,  the  reasonable 
cost  of  granting  such  licenses  may  be 
properly  charged  to  the  persons  procur- 
ing them,  although  the  power  to  do  so  is 
not  expressly  given  in  the  charter.  Welch 
V.  Hotchkiss,  39  Conn.  140,  1872 ;  post, 
ch.  xix,  sec.  768. 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Stodder,  2  Cush. 
(Mass.)  562,  572, 1848  ;  distinguished  from 
Boston  V.  Schaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  415, 
as  to  licenses  for  theatrical  exhibitions. 
Power  to  the  city  council  of  Charleston 
to  make,  inter  alia,  "  such  ordinances  re- 
specting streets,  carriages,  wagons,  carts, 
drays,  etc.  as  to  them  shall  seem  expedi- 
ent and  necessary,"  was  held  to  authorize 
an  ordinance  requiring  all  persons  who 
drive  for  hire  any  cart,  dray,  wagon,  or 
omnil)US,  within  tlie  cit\',  to  take  out  a 
license,  and  to  require  the  vehicle  to  be 
numbered,  or  on  failure  to  do  so  to  pay  a 
fine.  City  Council  v.  Pepper,  1  Rich. 
(South  Car.)  Law,  364,  1845.  A  street- 
sprinkling  cart  is  a  "public  vehicle"  on 
which  a  license  tax  is  properly  imposed. 
St.  Louis  V.  Woodruff,  4  Mo.  App.  169. 
A  similar  ordinance,  imposing  annual 
charge  on  each  car  of  a  street-railway 
company,  was  sustained  as  a  police  regu- 
lation. Frankford  Railway  Company  v. 
Philadelphia,  58  Pa.  St.  119,  1868;  s.  p. 
Johnson  v.  Philadelphia,  69  Pa.  St.  445. 
A  municipal  corporation  may  under  its 
ordinary  powers  of  local  government  pass 
ordinances  requiring  a  street-railway 
company  incorporated  by  legislature,  and 
having  its  rails  down  and  in  use  through 
the  streets,  under  legislative  sanction,  to 
make  its  tracks  conform  to  the  grade, 
keep  in  repair  the  space  between  the 
rails,  to  remove  snow  and  the  like.  But 
it  has  no  power  to  require  such  a  com- 


360 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


act  authorizing  the  trustees  of  a  village  corporation  to  make  or- 
dinances "  in  relation  to  hucksters,  and  for  the  good  government 
of  the  village,*'  it  was  held  that  an  ordinance  was  unauthorized 
which  required  that  hucksters  should,  before  exercising  their  em- 
plo3'ment,  take  a  license,  and  be  taxed  a  sum  varying  from  five  to 
thirty  dollars.^ 

§  360.  (294)  On  the  other  hand,  the  power  to  "  license,  regu- 
late, and  restrain  amusements,"  it  was  admitted  or  taken  for 
granted,  would  authorize  an  ordinance  taxing,  or  requiring  exhib- 
itors to  pay  a  specific  sum  for  the  privilege,  this  being  considered 
as  a  means  of  regulating  and  restraining  them.^  So  a  grant  of 
power  to  a  city  or  town  to  license  exhibitions  "  on  such  terms  and 
conditions  as  to  it  may  seem  just  and  reasonable,"  authorizes  it 
to  exact  money  for  the  license  ;  it  is  not  confined  to  regulating 
time  and  place,  establishing  police  regulations,  etc.^ 


pany  so  organized  to  take  out  a  license 
and  pay  license  fee  as  a  means  of  taxa- 
tion, unless  power  is  given  to  resort  to 
licenses  and  license  fees  for  revenue  pur- 
poses. A  provision  in  the  charter,  grant- 
ing power  "  to  license  and  regulate,"  does 
not  authorize  the  exaction  of  license  fees 
for  revenue  purposes.  Power  to  license 
when  specially  given  in  a  charter  is  never- 
theless a  police  power.  Tlie  exaction  of 
license  fees  for  revenue  purposes  is  the 
exercise  of  the  power  of  taxation.  The 
distinction  between  tiie  power  to  license 
as  a  police  regulation  and  the  same  power 
as  a  revenue  measure  is  of  the  utmost 
importance.  If  granted  with  a  view  to 
revenue,  the  amount  of  tax,  if  not  limited 
by  charter,  is  in  the  discretion  and  judg- 
ment of  the  authorities;  if  given  as  a  police 
power,  it  must  be  exercised  as  a  means  of 
regulation  only  and  cannot  be  used  as  a 
source  of  revenue.  North  Hudson  Railway 
Co.  V.  Hoboken,  41  N.  J.  L.  71 ;  Mayor  v. 
Avenue  Railroad  Co.,  32  N.  Y.  261.  Power 
to  license,  tax,  and  regulate  horse  rail- 
roads, hackney  carriages,  etc.,  does  not 
extend  to  ta.xation  of  private  vehicles  used 
by  a  merchant  or  manufacturer.  St. 
Louis  V.  Grove,  46  Mo.  574,  1870.  Nor 
does  power  to  license,  tax,  and  regulate 
authorize  the  grant  of  an  exclusive  right 
to  run  omnibuses  within  the  limits  of  the 
city.  Logan  v.  Pyne,  43  Iowa,  524, 187G  ; 
Snyder  v.  Lawrence  (hackney  coach, 
what  is),  8  Kan.  82,  1871. 


1  Dunliam  v.  Rochester,  5  Cowen.  (N. 
Y.)  462,  466,  1826.  See  further,  Index, 
Markets. 

Under  a  charter  authorizing  the  license 
of  wagons,  etc.,  and  requiring  owners  and 
keepers  of  wagons,  etc.,  usincj  them  in  the 
city,  to  take  out  a  license,  all  hucksters, 
gardeners,  etc.,  who  are  not  residents  and 
tax-payers  of  other  towns  may  be  com- 
pelled to  take  out  a  license.  Frommer  v. 
Richmond,  31  Gratt.  646.  A  city  has  no 
right  to  require  that  persons  owning  vehi- 
cles for  hire  within  its  limits  and  who 
have  paid  their  city  licenses  shall  obtain 
from  the  city,  at  a  certain  fixed  and  ex- 
orbitant price,  the  plates  which  an  ordi- 
nance of  the  city  has  prescribed  for  the 
convenient  identification  of  the  vehicles. 
Such  an  exaction  is  another  license  in 
disguise,  and  therefore  unconstitutional. 
Walker  r.  New  Orleans,  31  La.  An.  828. 

2  Hodges  V.  Mayor,  2  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
61.  See  also.  Carter  v.  Dow,  16  AVis. 
299;  Tenney  v.  Lenz,  lb.  567.  Speaking 
of  this  subject,  Mr.  Justice  Cooky  ex- 
presses it  as  his  opinion  that,  where  the 
right  to  impose  license  fees  to  operate  as 
a  restriction  upon  the  business  or  thing 
licensed  can  be  fairly  deduced  from  the 
taxing  power  conferred  upon  the  corpora- 
tion, it  should  be  done,  rather  than  to 
derive  the  right  solely  from  tlie  power  to 
regulate.     Const.  Lim.  202,  note. 

3  Boston  V.  Sehaffer,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
415,  1830;   distinguished  from  Common- 


§  3G2.] 


'municipal  ordinances  or  by-laws. 


361 


§  861.  (295)  Right  must  he  plainlu  conferred. — Even  the 
right  to  license  must  be  plainly  conferred,  or  it  will  not  be  held 
to  exist.  Thus,  power  to  make  "by-laws  relative  to  hucksters, 
grocers,  and  victualling  shops  "  does  not  authorize  the  corporation 
to  exact  a  license  from  persons  carrying  on  such  business.  Nor 
does  the  general  power  to  pass  prudential  by-laws,  not  inconsist- 
ent with  the  laws  of  the  state,  confer  the  authority  to  demand  a 
license.^ 


§  362.  (296)  Monopolies  Invalid.  —  The  power  to  license  and 
regulate  a  lawful  and  necessary  business  will  not  give  the  corpo- 
ration the  power  to  make  contracts  which  create  or  tend  to 
create  a  monopoly .'-^ 


wealth  V.  Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562, 
572,  1848. 

1  Dunham   v.  Rochester,  5  Cow.   (N. 
Y.)  462,  1826;  Commonwealth  v.  Stodder, 

2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  1848;  Mays  v.  Cm- 
cinnati,  1  Ohio  St.  268,  1853 ;  Gale  v.  Kala- 
mazoo (market-house  contract),  23  Mich. 
344,  1871 ;  s.  c.  0  Am.  Rep.  80  ;  St.  Paul 
V.  Treager,  25  Minn.  248,  1878.  By-laws 
requiring  a  license,  which  may  be  so  heavy 
as  to  amount  to  a  prohibition,  were  justly 
considered  to  be  in  restraint  of  trade, 
whicli  the  general  law  favors,  and  in  this 
case  were  adjudged  void,  "  both  for  want 
of  jurisdiction  "  in  the  corporation  to  pass 
them,  and  for  want  of  "  conformity  to  the 
general  law."  1  Ohio  St.  268.  Where 
the  charter  gave  the  corporation  the 
power  "to  license  bakers,  and  to  prohibit 
sales  of  bread  except  by  those  licensed," 
the  court  doubted  wliether  under  tliis, 
aside  from  the  taxing  power  of  the  corpo- 
ration, an  ordinance  could  be  supported 
which  required  twenty  dollars  to  be  paid 
by  the  baker  for  a  license,  although  it 
admitted  that  the  corporation  could  re- 
quire a  fee  for  issuing  and  registering  the 
license.     Mayor,  etc.  of  Mobile  v.  Yuille, 

3  Ala.  137,  1841.  Statutory  conditions 
precedent  must  be  complied  with  to  make 
a  license  valid  ;  and  licenses  are  generally 
considered  personal,  erasing  witii  the  life 
of  the  license,  and  not  transferable  with- 
out consent.  Munsell  i'.  Temple  (grocery 
license),  3  Gilm.  (8  111.)  00;  Lewis  v. 
United  States,  Morris  (Iowa),  l'J9 ;  Lom- 
bard V.  Cheever  (ferry  license),  lb.  473; 


Brunette  v.  Mayor,  9  La.  An.  430.  As  to 
power  to  revoke  licenses.  Towns  v.  Talla- 
hassee, 11  Fla.  130, 1866.  "Junk  shops," 
defined  by  O'Neall,  C.  J.,  "  to  be  a  place 
where  odds  and  ends  are  purchased  or 
sold,"  and  cities  are  often  empowered  to 
exact  a  license  from  keepers  thereof. 
City  Council  v.  Goldsmith,  12  Rich. 
(South  Car.)  Law,  470,  1860.  Shows  de- 
fined :  McKee  v.  Town  Council,  Rice 
(South  Car.)  Law,  24.  Licensed  auctioneer 
held  not  liable  to  the  payment  of  a  pawn- 
broker's license,  under  a  city  ordinance. 
Hunt  1-.  Philadelphia,  35  Pa.  St.  277. 

2  Chicago  V.  Rumpff,  45  111.  90,  1867. 
In  this  case,  under  a  power  granted  to  the 
city,  in  its  charter,  to  regulate  and  license 
the  slaughtering  of  animals  within  the 
corporate  limits,  the  common  council 
passed  an  ordinance,  whereby  a  particu- 
lar building  was  designated  for  the  slaugh- 
tering of  all  animals  intended  for  sale  or 
consumption  in  the  city,  the  owners  of 
which  were  granted  the  exclusive  right,  for 
a  specified  period,  to  have  all  such  ani- 
mals slaughtered  at  their  establishment, 
they  to  be  paid  a  specific  sum  for  the 
privilege  by  all  persons  exercising  it,  and 
to  have  the  option  of  accepting  such 
proposition,  but  which  was  not  to  take 
effect  until  they  executed  a  certain  bond 
therein  required ;  and  it  was  held  that 
this  action  of  the  corporate  authorities 
could  not  be  regarded  as  regulating  or 
licensing  the  business,  but  was  simply  a 
conditional  proposition,  which,  if  accepted, 
would  constitute  a  contract.     It  was  also 


302 


MUNICIPAL  CORrOKATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


§  060.  (297)  Intoxicating  Liquors.  —  The  authority  of  munici- 
palities to  lirense,  tax,  restrain,  or  prohibit  the  trattic  in  or  sale 


heUltliat  tills  contract  tended  to  create  a 
monopoly,  and  was  therefore  void.     And 
tlie  opinion  was  expressed  that,  under  the 
charter,  authority  was    conferred  simply 
to  pass  ordinances  to  locate  and  construct, 
and  to  regulate,   license,  restrain,  abate, 
or   prohibit    slaughtering  establishments 
within  the  prescribed  limits  ;  and  to  that 
end   the    corporate    authorities   may   so 
regulate    the   business  as  to   prohibit  its 
exercise,  except  in   a  particular    place ; 
but   the  spot  so  designated  must  be  open 
to  the  enjoyment   of  all   persons   alike, 
upon  the  same  terms  and  conditions.     A 
monopoly    cannot   be    implied,  but  must 
rest   upon  express  grant.      Canal  Co.  v. 
Railroad    Co.,    11  Leigh    (Va.),   42,  per 
Tucker,  President.     A  city  charter  grant- 
ing the  city  the  right   to  "exercise  and 
enjoy  all  the  rights,  immunities,  powers, 
and  privileges  appertaining  to  a  municipal 
corporation,"  and  to    "  license,  tax,  and 
regulate  hackney  carriages,  omnibuses," 
etc.,  does  not  authorize  the  city  authori- 
ties to  grant  to  one  person  the  sole  and 
exclusive  right  to  run  omnibuses  in  the  city. 
Logan  V.  Pyne,  43  Iowa,  524,  187G ;  s.  c. 
22  Am.  Eep.  261 ;   Gale  v.  Kalamazoo,  23 
Mich.   344,   1871 ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Kep.  80,  in 
which  the   opinion  of   Cooky,  J.,  will  be 
found  to  be  highly  instructive.     Monopo- 
lies are  odious  to  the  law.     A  monopoly 
is  when  the  sale  of  any  merchandise  or 
commodity  is   restrained  to  one  or  to  a 
certain  number  (11  Co.  86),  and  has  three 
inseparable    consequents,  —  the    increase 
of  the  price,  the  badness  of  the  wares,  the 
impoverishment  of  others.     lb.     By  stat- 
ute, 21  Jac.  I.  ch.  iii.,  all  monopolies  and  all 
commissions,  grants,  licenses,  etc.,  to  any 
person,  etc.,  for  any  sale,  buying,  selling, 
making,  working,   using  of  a  thing,  etc., 
are  void.     And  any  one  grieved,  etc.,  may 
have  an  action  on  the  statute,  and  recover 
treble    damages    and   double  costs.     So 
monopolies  are  contrary  to  Magna  Charta. 
2  Inst.  63.  By  statute,  381<:dw.  III.  a  mer- 
chant may  freely  deal   in  all  manner  of 
merchandise.     The  statute  of  21  Jac.  II. 
does  not  extend  to  letters  patent  for  in- 
ventions, etc.     The  first  part  of  this  sec- 
tion is  simply  a  declaration  of  the  common 
law.     Whenever  a  by-law  seeks  to  alter 


a  well-settled  and  fundamental  principle 
of  the  common  law,  or  to  establish  a  rule 
interfering  with  the  rights  of  individuals 
or  the  public,  the  power  to  do  so  must 
come  from  jjlain  and  direct  legislative  en- 
actment.    Legal  restraints  in  the  form  of 
regulations,  may,  however,   be   imposed 
upon  the  few  for  the  benefit  of  the  many. 
It   is   sometimes   difficult    to    determine 
when  a  by-law  is  in  restraint  of  trade, 
and  when  it  is  a  mere  regulation  of  trade. 
The   former  is   illegal,  the    latter  legal. 
The  following  have  been  lield  to  be  bad, 
as  in  restraint  of  trade :  That  no  member 
should  sell  the  barrel  of  any  hand-gun, 
etc.,  ready  proved,  to  any  person  of  the 
trade  not  a  member  in  London,  or  within 
four  miles  thereof     The   Master,  etc.,  of 
Gunmakers,  etc.,  v.  Fell,  Willes.  384.  No 
member  should  strike  his  stamp,  or  mark 
on  the  barrel  of  any  person  not  a  member 
of  the   company,  etc.     lb.      That  every 
person  not  being  already  free  of  the  city, 
occupying,  using,  or  exercising,  or  who 
shall   occup3%    use,  or  exercise   the   art, 
trade,  or  mystery  of  a  butcher  within  the 
said  city  or  its  liberties,  shall  take  upon 
himself  the  freedom  of  the  Company  of 
Butchers,  and  that  if  any  person  or  per- 
sons   (except   such   as  are  already  free, 
etc.)   shall  use  the  trade  of  a  butcher,  not 
being  free  of  this  company,  he  shall  pay, 
etc.     Harrison  v.   Godnian,  1    Burr.   12. 
So  as  "  to  persons  using  the  occupation  of 
music  and  dancing."     Eobinson  v.  Gros- 
court.  5  Mod.  104.    That  no  person  should 
erect  any  booth,  for  the  purpose  of  any 
show    or   public    entertainment,   in    any 
public  place  within  the  borough,  without 
license    from   the  mayor,  which  license 
should  not   be  given  at  or  for  any  other 
time  than  during  the  annual  fairs,  if  three 
inhabitant  householders,  residing  within 
100  yards   of  the   place   intended   to  be 
used,  should  have  previously  memorialized 
the  mayor  to  withhold  such  license,  etc. 
Elwood  V.  Bulloch,  6  Q.  B.  383.    So  where 
it  was  provided  that  those  only  to  whom 
licenses  were  granted  should  have  slaugh- 
ter houses  within  the  city.     Nash  &  Mc- 
Cracken,  in  re,  33  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  181. 
Or  that  none  but  three  persons  appointed 
by  the  city  should  sweep  for  hire  or  gain 


§  363.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


363 


of  intoxicating  liquors^  is  so  differently  conferred,  and  so  largely- 
influenced  by  the  general  legislation  and  policy  of  the  state  on 
the  subject  that  the  decisions  relating  to  it  are  mostly  of  local 
application.  Sometimes  the  state  laws  are  manifestly  intended 
to  repeal  or  modify  prior  special  charter  provisions,  which  gave 
the  control  of  the  matter  to  the  local  authorities ;  ^  and  at  other 
times  incorporated  places  have,  by  the  course  of  legislation,  been. 
excepted  from  the  general  operation  of  the  state  laws,  and  have 
been  allowed  to  license,  regulate,  or  prohibit  the  traffic,  as  they 
deemed  best.^ 


any  chimney  or  flue  in  the  city.  The 
Queen  v.  Johnson,  38  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
549.  Prohibiting  the  use  of  canals  on 
Sundays.  Tlie  Calder  and  Hebble  Navi- 
gation Co.  V.  Pilling,  14  JI.  &  W.  76  ; 
prohibiting  licensed  tavern-keepers  from 
having  a  light  in  their  bars.  Kegina  v. 
Belmont,  35  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  298.  Power 
of  the  legislature  to  grant  or  autliorize 
the  granting  of  monopolies,  or  exclusive 
privileges  as  affected  by  the  13th  and 
14th  amendment  to  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion, see  Slaughter-house  Cases,  16  Wall. 
36,  1872 ;  post,  ch.  xviii.  as  to  gas  compa- 
nies ;  post,  sec.  385,  note. 

1  State  V.  Harris,  10  Iowa,  441 ;  Bur- 
lington I'.  Kellar,  18  Iowa,  59 ;  Hammond 
v.  Haines,  25  Md.  541. 

2  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  18  Ga.  586  ;  Trustees 
V.  Keeting,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.),  341 ;  Phillips 
V.  Tecumseh,  5  Neb.  305, 1877.  Construc- 
tion of  charters  in  connection  with  state 
laws  on  the  subject.  Town  Council  v. 
Harbers,  6  Rich.  (South  Car.)  Law,  96; 
Jb.  404 ;  State  i'.  Estabrook,  6  Ala.  653 ; 
West  V.  Greenville,  39  Ala.  69  ;  Adams  v. 
Mayor,  29  Ga.  56;  Chaslain  v.  Town 
Council,  29  Ga.  333  ;  Cuthbert  v.  Conley, 
32  Ga.  211;  State  v.  Garlock,  14  Iowa, 
444;  Harris  v.  Intendant,  etc.,  28  Ala. 
577  ;  Robinson  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  156;  Pekin  v.  Smelzel,  21  111. 
464;  State  v.  Plunkett,  3  liarr.  (N.  J.)  5; 
both  held  consistent  and  able  to  stand  to- 
gether. Byers  v.  Olney,  16  111.  35  ;  Page 
V.  State,  11  Ala.  849  ;  lienefield  v.  Hines, 
13  La.  An.  420;  Louisville  v.  McKean,  18 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  9;  Dietz  v.  City,  1  Col. 
323,  1871 ;  Burckholter  v.  McConnells- 
ville,  20  Ohio  St.  308;  Baldwin  Co.  v. 
Liquor  Dealers,  42  Ga.  325;  State  v. 
Sherman,  20  Mo.  205. 


A  general  power  in  a  city  or  town 
charter  to  prohibit  the  sale  of  intoxicat- 
ing liquors  is  sufficient  to  authorize  the 
adoption  of  an  ordinance  for  any  partial 
prohibition  deemed  advisable.  Under  a 
section  giving  the  exclusive  power  to 
license,  prohibit,  or  regulate  in  any  manner 
they  may  see  fit,  the  sale,  etc.,  of  liquors 
within  the  said  city,  an  ordinance  prohib- 
iting the  sale,  etc.,  in  less  quantities  than 
five  gallons,  is  valid  and  may  be  enforced. 
Where  the  power  is  conferred  on  the  mu- 
nicipalities by  the  legislature  it  is  wholly 
discretionary  with  the  municipality  to 
license  and  regulate,  or  partially  or  en 
tirely  prohibit  the  traffic.  Gunnarssohn  v. 
Sterling,  92  111.  569;  Goddard  v.  Jackson- 
ville, 15  111.  588 ;  Kettering  v.  Jackson 
ville,  50  111.  39;  Pekin  v.  Smelzel,  21  111 
464 ;  Harbaugh  r.  Monmouth,  74  111.  371 
Schwuehow  v.  Chicago,  68  111.  444;  Bald 
win  V.  Murphy,  82  111.  485 ;  Byers  v. 
Olney,  16  111.  35  ;  Martin  v.  People,  88 
111.  390.  Liquor  license  fee  held  not  a 
tax,  in  the  constitutional  sense  of  the 
term,  compelling  uniformity  of  taxation. 
East  St.  Louis  v.  Wehrung,  46  111.  392. 
Special  provision  of  charter  construed  not 
to  give  power  to  prohibit  absolutely  the  sale 
of  liquor  in  the  town.  Hill  v.  Decatur, 
22  Ga.  203.  A  state  law  providing  for 
the  assessment  of  a  specified  tax  on  liquor 
dealers,  the  money  raised  to  be  devoted 
to  towns  and  cities  in  which  the  business 
was  carried  on,  was  held  to  be  a  tax  and 
not  a  licensing  of  the  sale,  and  not  to  be 
unconstitutional  because  unjust  or  un- 
equal, nor  because  the  municipality  had 
no  voice  in  the  levy.  Youngblood  v. 
Sexton,  32  Mich.  406,  1875;  s.  c.  20  Am. 
Rep.  G54. 


164 


MUNICIPAL   COnrORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


§  364.  (208)  Where  there  are  general  laws  of  the  state  re- 
specting the  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  a  public  corporation,  by 
virtue  of  a  general  power  "  to  make  all  by-laws  that  may  be  neces- 
sary to  preserve  the  i)eace,  good  order,  and  internal  police  "  there- 
in, is  not  autiiorized  to  )»ass  an  ordinance  requiring  a  corporate 
license,  and  punishing  persons  who  sell  such  liquors  without  being 
thus  licensed.^ 

§  365.  (299)  In  the  absence,  however,  of  controlling  general 
legislation,  power  to  a  city  to  pass  "  in  general,  every  other  by- 
law or  regulation  that  shall  appear  to  the  city  council  requisite  and 
necessary  for  the  security,  welfare,  and  convenience  of  the  city, 
or  for  preserving  the  peace,  order,  and  good  government  within 
the  same,"  was  held  to  authorize  an  ordinance  (and  the  same  is 
constitutional)  to  prevent  shopkeepers,  unless  licensed  by  the  city, 
from  keeping  spirituous  liquors  in  their  shops  or  in  any  adjacent 
room. 2 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Turner,  1  Cash. 
(Mass.)  493,  1848.  The  limitations  on 
such  a  general  power  to  make  by-laws, 
discussed  by  Shaw,  C.  J.  As  to  text,  see 
Commonwealth  v.  Dow,  10  Met.  (Mass.) 
382,  1845.  General  welf\ire  clause  does 
not  authorize  a  municipal  corporation  to 
pass  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  retail 
of  intoxicating  liquors,  when  this  is  re- 
pugnant to  the  state  laws  on  the  subject. 
Burnett,  in  re,  30  Ala.  461,  1857.  But 
under  a  different  state  of  general  legisla- 
tion, see  State  v.  Clark,  8  Foster  (28  N. 
H.),  176,  1851;  Heiscmbrittle  r.  City  of 
Charleston,  2  McMullen  (South  Car.), 
233  ;  State  v.  Ferguson,  33  N.  H.  424, 
1851 ;  distinguished  from  and  commenting 
on  the  above  cases.  State  v.  Freeman,  38 
N.  H.  42G,  approving  and  following  State 
V.  Clark,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  176  ;  Megowan 
r.  Commonwealtii,  2  Met.  (Ivy.)  3,  1859. 
Where  there  is  no  legislation  authoriz- 
ing township  officers  incorporated  under 
general  laws  of  the  state  to  regulate  and 
license  tlie  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors,  or 
to  exact  a  fee  for  such  license,  there  is  no 
power  in  the  board  of  trustees  either  to 
pass  an  ordinance  reqtiiring,  or  to  grant, 
a  license  for  this  purpose.  A  provision 
limiting  the  amount  that  may  be  charged 
for  liquor  licenses  by  cities   and   towns 


does  not  give  the  power.  They  have 
just  such  powers  as  the  law  has  conferred 
upon  the  board,  and  none  other.  Walter 
V.  Columbia  City,  61  Ind.  24 ;  Cowley  v. 
Rushville,  60  Ind.  327  ;  McFee  v.  Green- 
field, 62  Ind.  21. 

Ordinance  ultra  vires.  License  to  sell 
liquors  at  retail.  Subsequent  ordinance  re- 
strictimj  sale  invalid.  A.  obtained  a  license 
to  sell  liquors ;  subsequently  an  ordi- 
nance was  passed  prohibiting  the  sale 
of  liquor  during  the  continuance  of  di- 
vine service,  at  any  time  thereafter  to  be 
held  by  any  denomination  of  Christian 
people  within  the  corporate  limits,  pro- 
viding that  tlie  prohibition  should  cover 
the  entire  appointed  time  for  divine  wor- 
ship from  its  commencement  to  its  final 
close,  and  on  all  protracted  occasions 
covering  intermissions  by  day  and  night: 
Held  invalid,  as  the  element  of  time  was 
not  fixed  by  the  corporate  will,  but  left  to 
a  casual  and  incidental  control,  dependent 
upon  the  will  and  pleasure  of  the  various 
denominations  of  Christian  people  and  ig- 
noring all  others.  Gilliam  v.  Wells,  21 
Alb.  Law  Jour.  319;  Ga.  1880. 

2  Heiscmbrittle  v.  City  Council,  2  Mc- 
Mullen (So.  Car.)  Law,  233,  1842.  Fol- 
lowed and  affirmed.  City  Council  v.  Ah- 
rens,4  Strob.  (So.  Car.)  Law,  241,  1850. 


§  3G6.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


365 


A  corporation  whose  charter  contained  the  general  welfare 
clause,  and  also  specific  power  "  to  license  persons  to  retail  spir- 
ituous liquors,  and  to  prohibit  persons  from  selling  without  such 
license,"  and  was,  it  seems,  silent  as  to  the  amount  which  might 
be  demanded  for  a  license,  was  adjudged  competent  to  enact  an 
ordinance  demanding  S500  as  a  fee  for  a  retail  license.^ 

Power  by  its  charter  to  a  city  "  to  tax,  or  entirely  suppress,  all 
petty  groceries,"  was  held,  in  connection  with  other  provisions  of 
the  charter  expressly  authorizing  certain  other  subjects  to  be 
licensed,  not  to  confer  upon  the  corporation  the  power  to  grant 
licenses  for  retailing  vinous  liquors,  and  to  demand  a  sum  of 
money  therefor.^ 


Ordinances  Relating  to  Public  Offences. 

§  366.    (300)    Distinction  between  Laics  and  By-Laivs —  Con- 
current Prohibitions,  etc.  —  Statute  law  and  by-laws  are  intended 


See  City  Council  v.  Baptist  Churcli (giving 
preamble  to  charter  in  question),  lb.  306, 
308.  A  town  had  exclusive  authority 
over  the  sale  of  liquors  therein,  and  it 
was  held  that  power  to  "  regulate,  re- 
strain, and  suppress  shops  and  places  for 
the  sale  of  ardent  spirits  by  retail " 
amounted  to  an  authority  to  forbid  the 
sale ;  for  if  tliere  is  a  sale  it  must  be 
made  in  some  shop  or  place.  Clinton- 
Tille  17.  Keeting,  4  Denio  (X.  Y.),  341, 
1847;  Thomas  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  9  Ohio, 
290.  Construction  of  charter  provisions, 
holding  that  the  sale  of  intoxicating  li- 
quors might  be  declared  a  nuisance  by  tlie 
municipal  authorities.  Block -v.  Jack- 
sonville. 36  111.  301 ;  Goddard  v.  Same,  15 
76.  588 ;  Byers  v.  Trustees,  etc.,  16  lb. 
35;  Pekin  v.  Smelzel,  21  lb.  464. 

1  Perdue  v.  Ellis,  19  Ga.  586,  1855. 
But  see  Burnett,  in  re,  30  Ala.  461,  and 
compare  that  with  Intendant  v.  Chandler, 
6  Ala.  899.  See  also  St.  Louis  r.  Smith, 
2  Mo.  113  ;  where  tliere  was  charter  pow- 
er to  "restrain  and  prohibit  tippling- 
houses,"  and  the  corporation  was  held 
entitled  to  impose  a  license  fee.  Power 
to  "tax  "  and  "restrain  "  sale  of  liquor 
includes  power  to  grant  licenses.  Mt. 
Carmel  r.  Wabash  County,  50  III.  60, 
1869.  Where  authority  was  conferred 
upon  a  corporation  to  suppress  and  pro- 
hibit the  sale  of  intoxicating  drinks,  as 
well  as  to  license  the  same,  an  ordinance 


which  imposes  a  penalty  for  selling  such 
drinks  without  license,  which  penalty  ex- 
ceeds that  fixed  by  the  general  law  of  the 
territory',  is  reasonable.  Deitz  v.  City  of 
Central,  1  Col.  323,  1872. 

-  Leonard  v.  Canton,  35  Miss.  (6  George) 
189,  1858.  Power  "  to  prohibit  tippling- 
houses,"  does  not  authorize  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  sales  of  beer  by  brewers. 
Strauss  v.  Pontiac,  40  111.  301,  1806.  Pro- 
hibition in  ordinance  to  sell  liquors  with- 
out license  held  not  to  apply  to  sales  by 
manufacturers,  but  to  retail  dealers.  St. 
Paul  I'.  Troyer,  3  Minn.  291. 

Under  a  law  requiring  a  majority  of 
citizens  to  petition  for  a  license  to  the  city 
council  a  license  granted  upon  a  petition 
signed  by  a  less  number  is  void  and  af- 
fords no  protection.  Eureka  v.  Davis, 
21  Kan.  578 ;  and  the  mayor  is  not 
bound  to  sign  any  license  so  ordered. 
Welsford  r.  Weidlein,  23  Kan.  GOl ;  s.  p. 
State  I'.  Young,  17  Kan.  414;  Ins.  Co.  v. 
State,  9  Kan.  210 ;  Eureka  v.  Davis,  21 
Kan.  578 ;  Wabaunsee  Co.  v.  Muhlen- 
backer,  18  Kan.  129 ;  Bouldin  v.  Balti- 
more, 15  Md.  13.  Cannot  compel  its  issue 
by  mandamus.  State  v.  Commrs.,  Harper 
Co.  23  Kan.  4.5G.  Where  there  is  no  law 
governing  the  amount,  it  is  a  question  of 
expediency,  of  which  the  city  authorities 
are  tiie  sole  judge.  Goldsmith  v.  New 
Orleans,  31  La.  646. 


oOQ  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XII. 

to  meet  different  wants  and  exigencies  and  to  serve  different  pur- 
poses. The  former,  Avhen  general  in  its  nature  and  operation,  is 
intended  to  furnish  a  rule  for  the  government  of  the  people  of  the 
state  everywhere.  The  latter,  made  by  the  corporation  under 
derivative  authority,  are  local  regulations  for  the  government  of 
the  iuliabitants  of  the  incorporated  place  ;  and  of  course  they 
must  be  void,  unless  specially  authorized  by  the  charter  or  organic 
act  of  the  corporation,  when  they  are  repugnant  to,  or  inconsist- 
ent with,  the  general  law  of  the  land.  No  implied  power  to  pass 
by-laws,  and  no  express  general  grant  of  the  power,  can  author- 
ize a  bj'-law  which  conflicts  either  with  the  national  or  state  con- 
stitution, or  with  the  statute  of  the  state,  or  with  the  general 
principles  of  the  common  law  adopted  or  in.  force  in  the  state. 

§  367.  (301)  The  laws  of  the  state  operate  within  the  limits 
of  municipal  corporations  and  upon  their  inhabitants  the  same  as- 
elsewhere,  unless  it  is  otherwise  clearly  provided  in  the  charter, 
or  by  some  statute  of  the  state ;  and  unless  so  provided,  in  case 
of  conflict  between  laivs  and  hy-laws,  the  latter  must  give  way. 
But  the  state  may,  and  as  to  local  matters  frequently  does,  except 
municipal  corporations  from  the  operation  of  its  laws,  and  either 
provides  a  special  law  for  them  or  authorizes  them  to  provide 
special  regulations  for  themselves ;  and  when  this  is  done  there  is 
no  conflict.  But  these  local  laws  and  regulations  are  at  all  times 
subject  to  the  paramount  authority  of  the  legislature.  Questions 
of  difficulty  have  arisen  in  consequence  of  grants  of  power  to 
municipal  corporations  to  make  ordinances  respecting  matters  and 
acts  already  regulated  by  general  statute  and  if  criminal  in  their 
nature,  punishable  under  the  laws  of  the  state.  Hence,  the  same 
act  comes  to  be  forbidden  by  general  statute,  and  by  the  ordi- 
nance of  a  municipal  corporation,  each  providing  a  separate  and 
different  punishment.  The  same  transaction  may,  if  complex  in 
its  nature,  be  in  one  part  of  it  an  offence  against  the  general  law, 
and  in  another  against  the  by-law,  but  such  cases  present  no  diffi- 
culty. But  can  the  same  act  be  twice  punished,  once  under  the 
ordinance  and  once  under  the  statute  ?  The  cases  on  this  subject 
cannot  be  reconciled.  Some  hold  that  the  same  act  may  be  a 
double  offence,  one  against  the  state  and  one  against  the  corpora- 
tion. Others  regard  the  same  act  as  constituting  a  single  offence, 
and  hold  that  it  can  be  punished  but  once,  and  may  be  thus  pun- 
ished by  whichever  party  first  acquires  jurisdiction. 


§  368.]  MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  367 

§  368.  (302)  In  view  of  the  somewhat  strict  construction 
of  grants  of  corporate  powers,  elsewhere  explained  and  illus- 
trated, and  of  the  subordinate  nature  and  purposes  of  by-laws, 
the  following  rules,  although  seeming  to  rest  on  sound  principles, 
are,  in  view  of  the  decisions,  stated  with  some  distrust  of  their 
entire  correctness :  I.  A  general  grant  of  power,  such  as  mere 
authority  to  make  by-laws,  or  authority  to  make  by-laws  for  the 
good  government  of  the  place,  and  the  like,  should  not  be  held 
to  confer  authority  upon  the  corporation  to  make  an  ordinance 
punishing  an  act  —  for  example,  an  assault  and  battery — which 
is  made  punishable  as  a  criminal  offence  by  the  laws  of  the  state. 
The  intention  of  the  state  that  the  general  laws  shall  not  extend 
to  the  inhabitants  of  municipal  corporations,  or  that  these  corpo- 
rations shall  have  the  power,  by  ordinance,  to  supersede  the  state 
law,  will  not  be  inferred  from  grants  of  power  general  in  their 
character ;  nor  will  such  authority  in  the  corporation  be  held  to 
exist  as  an  implied  or  incidental  right.  II.  Where  the  act  is,  in 
its  nature,  one  which  constitutes  two  offences,  one  against  the 
state  and  one  against  the  municipal  government,  the  latter  may 
be  constitutionally  authorized  to  punish  it,  though  it  be  also  an 
offence  under  the  state  law;  but  the  legislative  intention  that 
this  may  be  done  should  be  manifest  and  unmistakable,  or  the 
power  in  the  corporation  should  be  held  not  to  exist.  III.  Where 
the  act  or  matter  covered  by  the  charter  or  ordinance,  and  by  the 
state  law,  is  not  essentially  criminal  in  its  nature,  and  is  one 
which  is  generally  confided  to  the  supervision  and  control  of  the 
local  government  of  cities  and  towns,  but  is  also  of  a  nature  to 
require  general  legislation,  the  intention  that  the  municipal  gov- 
ernment should  have  power  to  make  new,  further,  and  more 
definite  regulations,  and  enforce  them  by  appropriate  penalties, 
will  be  inferred  from  language  which  would  not  be  sufficient 
were  the  matter  one  not  specially  relating  to  corporate  duties, 
and  fully  provided  for  by  the  general  laws.  Such  are  the  general 
principles  to  be  extracted  from  the  authorities,  but  the  exact  state 
of  the  law  will  more  satisfactorily  appear,  and,  indeed,  can  only 
be  seen  by  reference  to  the  adjudicated  cases ;  accordingly,  the 
leading  ones  upon  the  subject  are  stated  in  the  note,^  and  in  some 

1  Smith,  in  re,  Hempstead,  201,  1832 ;  86,  1874 ;  New  Orleans  v.  Miller,  7  La. 

Mayor,  etc.  of  Savannah  v.    Hussey,   21  An.  651,  1852;  jNIuniclpality  v.  Wilson,  5 

Ga.  80,  1857;  Brownville  v.  Cook,  4  Neb.  lb.  747;  State  v.  Cowan,  20  Mo.  330  (fu- 

101,  1875;  St.  Charles  v.  Meyer,  68  Mo.  rious  driving);  St.  Louis  v.  Cafferata,  24 


568 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


of  its  aspects  the  matter  is  further  considered  in  the  chapter  on 
Municipal  Courts. 


Mo.  94  (Sunday  ordinances);  Aniboy  v. 
Sleeper,  ol  111.  4',»'.i ;  State  v.  Ledford,  3 
Mo.  102 ;  Independence  r.  Moore,  32  Mo. 
392;  McLaughlin  v.  Stevens,  2  Crancli 
C.  C.  R.  148;  St.  Louis  v.  Bentz,  11  Mo. 
Gl  (ordinance  against  vagrants);  United 
States  r.  Holly,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  K.  65(5; 
Jeflerson  City  v.  Courtinire,  9  Mo.  683 
(ordinance  against  riots);  Davis  v.  State, 
4  Stew.  &  Port.  (Ala.),  83;  State  v. 
Phnikett,  3  Harrison  (N.  J.),  5,  1840; 
Rice  V.  State,  3  Kan.  141, 18G5  ;  Rogers  v. 
Jones,  I  Wend.  (N.  Y.),2«l;  Mayor,  etc. 
of  New  York  r.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N. 
Y.),  150  ;  Borough  of  York  v.  Forscht,  23 
Pa.  St.  391 ;  March  r.  Commonwealth,  12 
B.  Mon.(Ky.)  25  ;  Commissioners  v.  Har- 
ris, 7  Jones  (Law)  281 ;  Brooklyn  v.  Toyn- 
bee,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  282;  Davenport  v. 
Bird  34  Iowa,  524,  1872;  Zylstra  v. 
Charleston,  1  Bay  (South  Car.),  382; 
Petersburg  v.  ]Metzker,21  111.  205,  1859; 
Howe  V.  Plainfield,  8  Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.), 
145  ;  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa.  253 ; 
State  V.  Clark,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  54;  State 
V.  Pollard,  6  Rh.  Is.  290  ;  People  v.  Jack- 
son, 8  Mich.  110;  post,  sec.  411. 

Treating  of  the  constitutional  question 
involved,  Mr.  Justice  Coole;/  remarks  that, 
although  the  decisions  are  not  uniform, 
the  clear  weight  of  authority  is,  "  that 
the  same  act  may  constitute  an  offence 
both  against  the  state  and  the  municipal 
corporation,  and  both  may  punish  it  witli- 
out  violation  of  any  constitutional  prin- 
ciple." Const.  Lim.  199 ;  s.  p.  March  v. 
Commonwealth,  12  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  25,  29, 
per  Sitnpson,  C.  J. ;  Howe  v.  Plainfield, 
supra ;  Brown ville  r.  Cook,  4  Neb.  101, 
1875.  In  England  a  by-law  imposing  a 
penalty  on  a  corporator,  for  refusing  to 
serve  in  a  corporate  office,  is  valid,  not- 
withstanding the  party  may  be  indicted 
for  the  same  refusal,  as  he  may  be  in  all 
cases  of  municipal  offices  necessar3'  or 
proper  to  carry  on  the  government  of  the 
corporation.  Grant  on  Corp.  82.  A  dis- 
tinction was  there  early  made  between 
grave  offences  classified  as  ])!eas  of  tbe 
crown,  and  triable  upon  an  issue  of  not 
guilty  between  the  king  and  the  defend- 
ant, and  lesser  or  petty  offences  punish- 
able by  fine  or  amerciament  upon  present- 


ment in  court  Icet,  or  inferior  jurisdictions, 
See  Hale,  P.  C.  vol.  1.  ch.  Hi. ;  vol.  II.  ch. 
xi.\. ;  Norton's  Com.  London,  370,  453; 
post,  sec.  433. 

In  (Jeon/ia  tbe  general  welfare  clause 
in  a  charter  was  decided  not  to  authorize 
the  passage  of  an  ordinance  prescribing  a 
different  mode  of  trial  and  punishment  in 
addition  to  that  provided  for  by  the  gen- 
eral criminal  code  of  the  state,  for  har- 
boring and  enticing  seamen.  Savannah 
V.  Hussey,  21  Ga.  80,  1857.  The  power 
of  municipal  corporations  to  legislate  re- 
specting offences  fully  covered  by  the 
state  law  is  denied,  and  the  general  sub- 
ject is  largely  and  satisfactorily  discussed, 
and  it  is  well  remarked  that,  in  such 
cases,  "tlie  law  of  the  state  is  the  law  of 
the  corporation ;  and  they  cannot  make 
another  law  for  themselves."  The  fol- 
lowing is  extracted  from  the  opinion  de- 
livered by  a  very  able  judge :  — "  Under 
tbe  general  grant  of  power  (to  pass  all 
such  ordinances  as  may  seem  necessary 
for  the  security,  welfare,  etc.,  of  tlie  city) 
the  city  authorities  may  cover  all  [proper] 
cases  not  provided  for  by  the  paramount 
authorities  of  the  state.  All  those  or- 
dinances regulating  cemeteries,  com- 
mons, markets,  vehicles,  fires,  exhibitions, 
lamps,  licenses,  water-works,  watch,  po- 
lice, city  taxes,  city  officers,  health,  nui- 
sances, etc.,  are  legitimate  and  proper. 
Nay,  I  might  go  further,  and  concede 
that  where  a  state  law  defines  an  offence 
generally,  and  prescribes  a  punishment 
without  reference  to  the  place  where  it  is 
committed,  in  town  or  country,  and  the 
act,  when  committed  in  the  streets  and 
public  places  of  the  city,  would  be  attend- 
ed with  circumstances  of  aggravation, 
such  as  an  affray,  for  instance,  the  corpo- 
rate authorities,  with  a  view  to  suppress 
this  special  mischief,  might  probably  pro- 
vide against  it  by  ordinance.  But  this  is 
going  quite  far  enough."  But  I  deny 
that  "a  municipal  corporation  can  legis- 
late criminaliter  upon  a  case  fully  covered 
by  the  state  law,  though  aware  that  decis- 
ions may  be  found  to  support"  that  view. 
Per  Lumpkin,  J.,  in  Savannah  v.  Hussey, 
21  Ga.  80,  86,  1857.  And  it  is  settled  in 
Georgia,   that  where  an  act  amounts  to 


§  369.] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


369 


Ordinances  relating  to  the  Public  Healthy  Safety,  and  Convenience. 

§  369.(303)  Health  Ordinances — Hospitals  and  Burials.  —  Our 
municipal  corporations  are  usually  invested  with  power  to  pre- 


an  indictable  offence  it  cannot  be  punished 
under  municipal  ordinances,  but  the  of- 
fender must  be  bound  over  to  the  proper 
court;  if  it  does  not  amount  to  an  indict- 
able offence  the  offender  may  be  punished 
under  the  ordinances  of  the  municipality, 
and  if  it  is  a  nuisance,  steps  may  also  be 
taken  to  have  it  abated.  Vason  v.  Au- 
gusta, 38  Ga.  542,  1868 ;  Reich  v.  State, 
53  Ga.  73,  1874. 

But  in  Alabama  it  is  held  that  a  muni- 
cipal corporation,  with  power  to  enact 
ordinances  "for  the  good  government  of  the 
place,  not  contravening  the  laws  of  the 
state,"  may  pass  an  ordinance  imposing  a 
fine  for  an  assault  and  battery  within  its 
limits,  and  a  punishment  under  the  state 
law  for  tlie  same  act  is  no  bar  to  a  prose- 
cution under  the  ordinance.  Collier,  C.  J., 
delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  says  : 
"The  object  of  the  power  conferred  by 
the  charter,  and  the  purpose  of  the  ordi- 
nance itself,  was  not  to  punish  an  offence 
against  the  criminal  justice  of  the  coun- 
try, but  to  provide  a  mere  police  regulation 
for  the  enforcement  of  good  order  and 
quiet  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation. 
.  .  .  The  offences  against  the  corporation 
and  the  state  are  distinguishable  and 
wholly  disconnected,  and  the  prosecution 
at  the  suit  of  each  proceeds  upon  a  differ- 
ent hypotliesis  :  the  one  contemplates  the 
observance  of  the  peace  and  good  order 
of  the  city  ;  the  other  has  a  more  enlarged 
object  in  view,  —  the  maintenance  of  the 
peace  and  dignity  of  the  state."  Mayor, 
etc.  of  Mobile  v.  Allaire,  14  Ala.  400, 
1848.  If  the  principle  stated  in  the  text 
be  correct,  the  soundness  of  this  decision 
under  the  powers  conferred  upon  the  cor- 
poration may  admit  of  doubt,  but  the 
same  view  had  been  previously  taken  in 
the  same  court  in  The  Mayor,  etc.  of 
Mobile  V.  Rouse  (liquor  law),  8  Ala.  515, 
1845;  and  see  Moore  v.  State,  10  Ala. 
411 ;  Greensboro  v.  Mullins,  13  Ala.  341. 
An  offence  committed  against  the  proper 
police  regulations  of  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion, which  at  the  same  time  offends 
against   the   penal  laws,  can  legally  be 

VOL.  I.  24 


prosecuted  for  either,  and  a  prosecution 
under  one  will  be  no  bar  to  a  legal  prose- 
cution under  the  other.  Hamilton  v.  State, 
3  Tex.  App.  643, 1878.  Extent  of  police 
power.  Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331 ; 
ante,  sees.  141,  144,  357,  358.  In  Ohio  an 
ordinance  prohibiting  singing,  speech- 
making,  etc.,  in  the  streets  was  held  valid. 
Trimble  v.  Bucyrus,  Ohio  St.  21  Alb. 
Law  Jour.  76. 

Authority  to  pass  ordinances  "  to  pre- 
serve the  health  and  comfort  of  the  town," 
does  not  empower  the  corporation  to  pass 
an  ordinance  to  prevent  or  punish  breaches 
of  the  peace.  Raleigh  v.  Dougherty,  8 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  11, 1842;  see  chapter  on 
Municipal  Courts,  post. 

Where  gambling  and  the  keeping  of 
gambling-houses  are  made  public  offences 
by  the  state  laws,  offenders  may  be 
prosecuted  in  the  state  courts  for  the 
violation  of  these  laws,  notwithstanding 
the  organic  acts  of  cities  may  give 
to  the  city  council  power  "  to  restrain, 
prohibit,  and  suppress  games  and 
gambling-houses."  In  thus  holding,  the 
court  adds,  "  It  is  not  necessary,  in 
this  case,  to  decide  whether  both  the 
state  and  the  city  can  punish  for  the 
same  act ;  but  we  have  no  doubt  that 
the  one  which  shall  first  obtain  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  person  of  the  accused  may 
punish  to  the  extent  of  its  power."  Rice 
V.  State,  3  Kan.  141,  1865.  The  same 
point  has  been  decided  the  same  way  in  a 
late  case  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Min- 
nesota.  State  v.  Crummey,  17  Minn.  72, 
1871.  Gambling  being  punishable  under 
the  general  law,  a  city  council  "  invested 
with  authority  to  make  ordinances  to  se- 
cure the  inhabitants  against  fire,  against 
violations  of  the  law  and  the  public  peace 
to  suppress  riots,  gambling,  drunkenness, 
indecent  and  disorderly  conduct,  to  pun 
ish  lewd  behavior  in  public  places,  .  . 
and,  generally,  to  provide  for  the  safety 
prosperity,  and  good  order  of  the  city,' 
possesses,  by  virtue  thereof,  no  power  to 
make  the  keeping  of  any  gambling  device 
a  misdemeanor,  and  to  punish  the  same. 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


serve  the  lieialtli  and  Scifety  of  the  inhabitants.     This  is,  indeed, 
one  of  the  chief  purposes  of  local  government,  and  reasonable 


Mount  Pleasant  v.  Breeze,  11  Iowa,  399, 
1860.  This  ease  was,  in  a  recent  opinion 
(1880)  of  tlie  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa, 
doubted,  but  adliered  to. 

Police  officers  in  Indiana  held  to  have 
no  power  to  seize  and  destroy  gambling 
apparatus  without  an  ordinance  being 
passed,  but  no  opinion  was  expressed  as 
to  the  validity  of  such  an  ordinance. 
Ridgeway  v.  West,  GO  Ind.  371,  1878. 
Power  to  suppress  gambling- houses. 
Society  v.  Musgrove,  44  Miss.  820 ;  s.  c. 
7  Am.  Rep.  723  ;  Moore  v.  State,  48  Miss. 
147;  s.  c.  12  Am.  Rep.  867. 

In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  where  the 
same  act  (as,  for  example,  furious  driving 
in  highways  and  public  places)  is  a  viola- 
tion of  a  valid  municipal  ordinance  and 
of  the  general  criminal  statutes  of  the 
state,  the  offender  can  be  punished  but 
once,  and  hence,  to  an  indictment  in  the 
state  court,  he  may  plead  a  former  con- 
viction under  the  ordinance  of  the  muni- 
cipal corporation.  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo. 
330,  1860.  But  qucere.  The  opinion  in 
this  case  assumes,  without  discussion, 
that  the  offence  is  single.     76. 

The  later,  and  it  would  seem  the  cor- 
rect doctrine  on  this  subject,  is  thus  ex- 
pressed by  Wa(jner,  J.,  in  The  State  v. 
Gordon,  60  Mo.'383,  385,  1875:  — 

"  The  legislature  has  the  undoubted 
right,  in  reference  to  statutory  misde- 
meanors, to  say  in  what  particular  juris- 
diction they  shall  be  tried,  and  to  make 
that  jurisdiction  exclusive  of  all  others. 
When  the  power  to  hear  and  determine 
these  minor  offences  is  given  to  a  municipal 
corporation,  but  no  words  of  exclusion  or 
restriction  are  used,  the  remedies  between 
the  state  and  corporation  will  be  construed 
to  be  concurrent ;  but  where  the  manifest 
intention  is  that  the  prosecution  shall  be 
limited  exclusively  to  one  jurisdiction, 
that  intention  must  prevail." 

In  State  v.  Wister,  62  Mo.  592,  1876, 
the  defendant,  indicted  for  keeping  a 
bawdy  house,  pleaded  autrefois  convict 
upon  a  complaint  before  the  city  recorder. 
As  the  charter  did  not  confer  upon  the 
city  exclusive  cognizance  of  this  class  of 
offences  the  plea  was  held  bad,  although 
the  recorder  was  invested  with  "  exclusive 


jurisdiction  of  all  cases  arising  under 
any  ordinance  of  the  city."  8.  p.  State 
r.  ilarper,  58  Mo.  531.  In  State  v.  Gor- 
don, GO  Mo.  383,  the  charter  in  terms 
conferred  exclusive  jurisdiction  on  the 
municipal  authorities  in  respect  of  a  cer- 
tain class  of  misdemeanors,  in  which  was 
included  the  one  in  question   in  this  case. 

In  Nebraska  the  doctrine  is  maintained 
that  "  the  same  act  may  constitute  an  of- 
fence against  both  the  state  and  the 
municipal  government,  and  both  may 
punish  it  without  infringing  any  constitu- 
tional right."  Brownville  v.  Cook,  4  Neb. 
101,  105,  1875,  per  Lake,  C.  J.  In  this 
case  an  ordinance  was  sustained  punish- 
ing "  wilful,  malicious,  and  mischievous 
meddling  with  or  trespasses  upon  prop- 
erty." The  ordinance  was  more  specific 
than  the  criminal  code  of  the  state  on  this 
subject,  but  this  was  not  made  the  basis 
of  the  decision. 

In  Minnesota  it  is  held  that  the  legisla- 
ture may  authorize  a  city  to  impose  new 
and  additional  penalties  for  acts  (in  this 
case  the  selling  of  liquors  on  Sunday)  al- 
ready made  penal  by  the  general  laws  of 
the  state.  State  v.  Ludwig,  21  Minn. 
202. 

"  The  principle  established  by  the 
weight  of  authority,  and  we  think  in  ac- 
cordance with  sound  reason,  is  that  the 
legislature  of  the  state  may  authorize  a 
municipal  government  to  impose  new  and 
additional  remedies  for  acts  already  pen- 
al by  the  laws  of  the  state.  Per  McMil- 
lan, C.  J.,  citing  State  v.  Charles,  16 
Minn.  474 ;  Brooklyn  v.  Toynbee,  31 
Barb.  282 ;  1  Dillon  on  Mun.  Corp.  sec. 
368  ;  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  p.  199  and  notes 
1  and  2." 

In  Slaughter  v.  People,  2  Doug. 
(Mich.)  334,  the  principle  was  decided 
that  it  was  not  competent  to  punish,  un- 
der a  city  ordinance,  an  act  which  was 
indictable.  Illustrating  the  difference 
between  prosecutions  under  special  penal 
provisions  of  a  city  charter,  of  acts  with 
specified  fines  and  penalties  affixed  by 
the  charter,  but  which  acts  are  breaches 
of  the  law  of  the  state  wherever  com- 
mitted, and  ordinary  prosecutions  under 
municipal  ordinances,  see  Wayne  Coun- 


§  369.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


371 


by-laws  in  relation  thereto  have  always  been  sustained  in  Eng- 
land as  within  the  incidental  authority  of  corporations  to  ordain. 
It  will  be  useful  to  illustrate  the  subject  by  reference  to  some 
of  the  adjudged  cases. ^  An  ordinance  of  a  city  prohibiting,  under 
a  penalty,  any  person,  not  duly  licensed  therefor  by  the  city 
authorities,  from  "removing  or  carrying  through  any  of  the 
streets  of  the  city  any  house-dirt,  refuse,  offal,  or  filth,"  is  not 
improperly  in  restraint  of  trade,  and  is  reasonable  and  valid. 
Such  a  by-law  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  monopoly,  but  is  founded 
upon  a  wise  regard  for  the  public  health.  It  was  contended  that 
the  city  could  regulate  the  number  and  kind  of  horses  and  carts 
to  be  employed  by  strangers  or  unlicensed  persons,  as  well  as 
they  could  those  of  licensed  persons,  but  practically  it  was  con- 
sidered that  the  main  object  of  the  city  could  be  better  accom- 
plished by  employing  men  over  whom  they  have  entire  control, 
night  and  day,  who  are  at  hand,  and  able  from  habit  to  do  the 
work  in  the  best  way  and  at  the  proper  time.^ 


ty  V.  Detroit,  17  Mich.  390,  1868 ;  People 
V.  Detroit,  18  Mich.  445,  18G9  ;  People  v. 
Jackson,  8  Mich.  110;  post,  ch.  xiii. 

In  Indiana  it  was  first  held  that  where 
the  act  complained  of  is  indictable  as  a 
criminal  offence  against  the  laws  of  the 
state,  a  person  could  not  be  punished  for 
such  act  under  or  by  virtue  of  tlie  ordi- 
nances of  a  city.  City  Council  of  Indi- 
anapolis V.  Blythe,  2  Ind.  (Carter)  75, 
1850.  In  this  case  the  city  unsuccess- 
fully sought  to  recover  a  penalty  pre- 
scribed by  ordinance  for  an  assault  and 
battery  committed  by  the  defendant  with- 
in the  city.  Same  principle,  City  of 
Madison  v.  Hatcher,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  341, 
1846.  But  these  cases  were  overruled 
by  Ambrose  v.  State,  6  Ind.  851,  in  which 
it  was  held  that  a  single  act  might  con- 
stitute two  offences,  one  against  tlie  state 
and  one  against  tlie  municipal  govern- 
ment, and  "  that  each  might  punish  in  its 
own  mode,  by  its  own  officers,  the  same 
act  as  an  offence  against  each."  Perkins, 
J.,  in  Waldo  v.  Wallace,  12  Ind.  582, 
1859,  where  prior  cases  in  that  state  are 
referred  to.  See,  also,  Lawrenccburg  v. 
West,  10  Ind.  337 ;  Fox  v.  State,  5  How. 
410;  Moore  v.  People,  14  How.  13;  post, 
Bee.  432. 

In  Louisiana,  municipal  corporations  are 
held  to  have  no  power  to  impose  a  penal- 


ty on  that  which  is  made  punishable  as  a 
criminal  offence  by  the  laws  of  the  state. 
But  it  is  admitted  that  there  is  a  class  of 
offences  against  public  order  not  made 
punishable  by  the  state  law,  which  it  is 
within  the  power  of  such  corporation  to 
suppress.  New  Orleans  v.  Miller,  7  La. 
An.  651,  1852  ;  Municipality  v.  Wilson, 
5  lb.  747.  This  case  seems  to  concede 
tliat  tlie  city  corporation  cannot  punish 
for  an  act  identical  with  that  punished  by 
the  state  law.  See,  also,  Commrs.  v.  Har- 
ris, 7  Jones  (Law),  281  ;  People  v.  Jack- 
son, 8  Mich.  110.  The  charter  of  a  city 
authorized  the  common  council  to  pass 
ordinances  upon  certain  subjects  pertain- 
ing to  the  police,  good  order,  and  welfare 
of  the  city,  and  provided  that  a  violation 
of  certain  of  such  ordinances  should  be 
a  misdemeanor  and  might  be  prosecuted 
before  the  police  court  of  the  city  like 
other  offences,  which  court  might  inflict 
the  penalty  named  in  such  ordinance,  pro- 
vided that  no  penalty  should  exceed  the 
sum  of  fifty  dollars  for  a  single  offence. 
It  was  held  that  the  charter  did  not  at- 
tempt to  confer  upon  the  common  council 
the  power  to  define  and  determine  crime, 
and  was  not  therefore  unconstitutional. 
State  V.  Tryon,  39  Conn.  183,  1872. 

1  Ante,  ch.  vi.  sees.  141,  142,  144. 

2  Vandine,  in  re,  G  Pick.  (Mass.)  187, 


372 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


§  370.  (304)  Authority  by  cliarter  to  pass  ordinances  respect- 
ing the  harbors  and  wharves,  and  ^  every  other  by-hiw  necessary 
for  the  security,  welfare,  and  convenience  of  the  city,"  gives  to 
the  city  council  power  to  pass  a  health  ordinance  requiring  boats 
coming  from  infected  places  to  anchor  before  landing  and  to  sub- 
mit to  an  examination,  provided  such  ordinance  be  not  repugnant 
to  the  general  law  of  the  state.  And  it  was  further  held  that  a 
general  law  of  the  state,  prohibiting  "  any  person  coming  into  the 
state  from  an  infected  place,  and  in  violation  of  quarantine  regu- 
lations," was  not  repugnant  to  and  did  not  render  the  ordinance 
invalid.^ 

§  371.  (305)  Hospitals.  —  Authority  to  the  corporation  of 
New  Orleans  "  to  pass  such  by-laws  as  they  shall  deem  necessary 
to  maintain  the  cleanliness  and  salubrity  of  the  city,"  was  consid- 
ered, in  view  of  its  extensive  nature,  certain  provisions  of  the 
civil  code,  and  the  liability  of  the  city  to  epidemics,  as  confer- 
ring power  npon   the  city   council  to  prohibit  the  erection  and 


1828 ;  commented  on  in  Commonwealth 
tj.Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  575,  576, 
1848.  In  Zylstra  v.  Corporation  of 
Charleston,  1  Bay  (So.  Car.),  882,  1794, 
Mr.  Justice  Waties  (one  of  the  most  ac- 
complished of  early  American  judges), 
speaking  of  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the 
making  of  soap  or  candles  contrary  to 
the  mode  prescribed  and  within  the  limits 
of  the  city,  says,  "  I  am  willing  to  admit 
that  the  by-law  itself  is  a  valid  one.  If 
it  restrained  an  inoffensive  trade  it  would 
not  be  so ;  but  it  is  made  to  restrain  one 
that  is  both  offensive  and  dangerous.  It 
is,  therefore,  calculated  to  guard  the  com- 
fort and  safety  of  the  citizens ;  and  the 
benejit  of  a  liy-Jaw  is,  (jenerally,  the  touch- 
stone of  its  validity."  The  courts  will  not 
interfere  with  the  legitimate  exercise 
by  municipal  bodies  of  their  police  powers 
by  which  the  peace,  health,  comfort,  and 
general  welfsire  are  secured  or  promoted. 
Weil  V.  Ricord,  9  C.  E.  Green  (24  N.  J. 
Eq.),  169. 

Power  to  a  city  council  to  compel  the 
owners  and  occupants  of  slaughter-houses 
to  cleanse  and  abate  them  whenever  ne- 
cessary for  tlie  health  of  the  inhabitants, 
was  considered  not  to  authorize  an  ordi- 
nance entirely  prohibiting  the  slaughter- 


ing of  animals  within  certain  limits  of  the 
city.  Wreford  v.  People,  14  Mich.  41, 
1865  ;  see  Metropolitan  Board  of  Health, 
37  N.  Y.  6G1 ;  Shrader,  in  re,  3-3  Cal.  279, 
1867.  In  Cronins  v.  People,  decided  by 
the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Neio  York,  Oct. 
12, 1880  (reported  in  full  in  22  Alb.  Law  J. 
430),  it  appeared  that  by  the  charter  of  the 
city  of  Albany,  the  common  council  was 
authorized  by  ordinance  "  to  regulate  the 
erection,  use,  and  continuance  of  slaughter- 
houses." It  was  held  that  the  power  to 
"  regulate,"  as  thus  used,  gave  the  council 
tlie  right  to  determine  and  fix  the  limits 
and  localities  within  which  new  slaugh- 
ter-houses may  be  erected,  and  from  which 
they  may  be  excluded,  and  also  to  prohibit 
their  continuance  whenever  and  wherever 
they  endanger  the  health  and  comfort  of 
the  community,  of  which  the  common 
council  was  to  judge  for  itself,  and  its  judg- 
ment was  implied  from  the  ordinance,  and 
not  be  recited  in  it.  Powers  with  respect 
to  privies.  Gregory  v.  Railroad  Co.,  40  N. 
Y.  273.  Powers  under  legislative  au- 
thority with  respect  to  swill  milk.  John- 
son V.  Simonton,  43  Cal.  242,  1872. 

1  Dubois  V.  Augusta,   Dudley    (Ga.), 
30,  1831 ;  ante,  sec.  144. 


§  372.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


573 


maiutenance  of  private  hospitals  :  the  court  admitting  that  the 
same  question  had  been  decided  otherwise  by  tribunals  governed 
by  the  common-law  jurisprudence.^ 


§  372.  (306)  Cemeteries  and  Burials.  —  The  public  health, 
comfort,  and  convenience  are  concerned  in  the  proper  regulation 
of  burials  ;  and  the  evils  resulting  from  its  neglect  are  especially 
to  be  apprehended  in  the  crowded  populations  of  cities.  Power 
to  regulate  this  matter  may  properly  be  conferred  upon  munici- 
pal corporations.  And  such  power  will  be  held  to  be  given  by 
authority  to  make  police  regulations  or  to  pass  by-laws  respecting 


^  Milne  r.  Davidson,  5  Martin  (La.), 
410,  1827. 

As  to  citij  hospitals,  see  Vionet  v. 
Municipality,  4  La.  An.  42 ;  Bozant  t-. 
Campbell,  9  Rob.  (La.)  411;  City  Coun- 
cil V.  Boyd,  1  Const.  Rep.  A.  D.  1817 
(South  Car.),  352;  Tucker  v.  Virginia 
Citj',  4  Nev.  20.  Municipal  corporation 
may  found  hospitals  for  the  poor  under 
39  EUz.  ch.  V. ;  Newcastle,  in  re,  12  Clark 
&  Fin.  402. 

Quarantine  ordinances  of  a  municipal 
corporation,  passed  by  virtue  of  a  grant 
of  power  from  the  state,  whereby  passen- 
ger vessels  are  required  to  remain  in 
quarantine  for  a  specitied  period,  are  not 
repugnant  to  the  commerce  clause  of  the 
federal  constitution.  St.  Louis  v.  McCoy, 
18  Mo.  238,  18.53 ;  s.  p.  St.  Louis  v.  Bof- 
finger,  19  lb.  13  ;  Metcalf  v.  St.  Louis,  11 
Jb.  103.  In  modern  usage,  quarantine  is 
not  confined  to  vessels  having  on  board 
the  plague,  but  extends  to  vessels  hav- 
ing on  board  other  contagious  diseases. 
Per  Tenney,  C.  J.,  Mitchell  v.  Rockland, 
41  Me.  363,  1850;  s.  c.  again,  45  Me. 
49G,  1858 ;  ante,  sec.  144. 

Boards  of  health.  —  An  ordinance  creat- 
ing and  giving  to  the  board  of  healtii  "  gen- 
eral supervision  over  the  health  of  the 
cit\-,"  and  "  all  necessary  power  to  carry 
the  ordinance  into  effect,"  was  considered 
to  include  the  power  to  rent  a  building 
for  a  temporary  hospital,  to  protect  the 
city  from  an  apprehended  visitation  of 
the  cholera,  and  to  make  the  corporation 
liable  for  the  rent,  altiiough  it  did  not 
become  necessary  to  use  the  house. 
Aull  V.  Le.xington,  18  Mo.  401,  1853. 
Power  of  board  of  health.     Frend  v.  Den- 


nett, 4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  576;  Barton  v.  New 
Orleans,  16  La.  An.  317  ;  Hutton  v.  Cam- 
den, 39  N.  J.  L.  122,  1876 ;  Ferguson  v. 
Selnia,  43  Ala.  398,  1869;  Tugman  v. 
Chicago,  78  III.  405,  1875 ;  Belcher  v.  Far- 
rar,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  325;  Hazen  v. 
Strong,  2 .  Vt.  427  ;  Commissioners  v. 
Powe,  6  Jones  (Law),  134;  Wilkinson 
V.  Albany,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  H.)  9.  The 
powers  of  a  board  of  health  held  to  be 
advisory  and  executive,  not  legislative, 
and  a  resolution  of  the  board  that  a  speci- 
fied tannery  was  a  nuisance  was  unau- 
thorized and  void.  State  v.  Trenton,  7 
Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.),  283.  Such  a  board 
held  not  to  have  the  power  to  absolutely 
prohibit  carrying  on  a  lawful  business 
not  necessarily  a  nuisance.  Weil  v.  Ric- 
ord,  9  C.  E.  Green  (24  N.  J.  Eq.),169. 
Regularly  the  orders  of  a  board  of  health, 
directing  the  abatement  of  a  nuisance, 
should  be  in  writing.  Such  orders  may 
be  proved  by  the  minutes  of  the  board, 
by  the  written  orders  themselves,  or  by 
being  recited  in  the  proceedings  of  the 
Corporation  of  which  the  board  of  health 
are  members.  How  far  parol  evidence 
may  be  received  of  such  orders,  when 
it  appears  that  no  record  or  written  evi- 
dence ever  existed,  is  not  free  from 
doubt.  Meeker  v.  Van  Rensselaer,  15 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  397,  1836,  where  parol 
evidence  of  this  kind  was  held  inadmissi- 
ble by  the  Supreme  Court.  But  see,  in 
Court  of  Errors,  Van  Wormer  v.  Mayor, 
18  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  169,  affirming  s.  c.  15 
Wend.  263.  See  also,  People  v.  Adams,  9 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  333;  6  lb.  651;  ante,  ch. 
xi. ;  Health  Department  v.  Knoll,  70  N. 
Y.  530,  1877. 


374 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOIL\.TIONS. 


[cH.  xn. 


the  health,  good  government,  and  welfare  of  the  place.^  Power 
to  city  corporation,  after  enumerating  various  objects,  "  in  gen- 
eral to  pass  every  other  by-law  that  to  it  shall  seem  requisite  and 
necessary  for  the  security,  welfare,  and  convenience  of  the  city," 
etc.,  was,  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  South  Carolina,  considered 
to  give  authority  to  regulate  the  burial  of  the  dead,  and  particu- 
larly to  prevent  the  establishment  of  new  burial  grounds  within 
the  limits  of  the  city,  and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  organ  of  the 
court,  also  to  regulate  the  time  of  burial,  the  manner  of  inter- 
ment so  as  to  prevent  noxious  effluvia,  and  to  prohibit  interments 
in  the  private  gardens,  yards,  and  by-places  of  the  city.^  But  as 
every  by-law  must  be  reasonable,  an  arbitrary  or  unnecessary  or 
oppressive  restraint  upon  the  right  of  burying  the  dead  is 
invalid.^ 


§  373.    (307)    Where  the  burden  to  support  a  public  cemetery 
is  required  to  be  borne  by  all  the  citizens,  an  ordinance  throwing 

1  Bogert  V.  Indianapolis,  13  Ind.  134, 
1859,  per  Perkins,  J. ;  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York  V.  Slack,  3  Wheel.  Cr.  Cas.  237, 
1824  ;  Presbyterian  Church  v.  Mayor,  etc. 
of  New  York,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  538,  1820; 
ante,  sec.  142,  note ;  Coates  v.  Same,  7 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  582,  1827;  Austin  v.  Mur- 
ray, 16  Pick.  (Mass.)  121,  1834;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Fahey,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  408, 
1850 ;  New  Orleans  v.  St.  Louis  Church, 
11  La.  An.  244,  1856;  distinguished  from 
Presbyterian  Church  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
New  York,  supra ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Goodrich,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  546;  ante, 
sees.  141,  142.  The  power  of  disinter- 
ment may  be  delegated  by  the  legislature 
to  municipalities.  Kincaid's  Appeal,  66 
Pa.  St.  411,  1870. 

2  City  Council  v.  Baptist  Church,  4 
Strob.  (South  Car.)  Law,  306,  309,  1850, 
per  Frost,  J. ;  s.  p.  Bogert  v.  Indianapolis, 
13  Ind.  134,  per  Perkins,  J. ;  New  Orleans 
V.  St.  Louis  Church,  11  La.  An.  244;  dis- 
tinguished from  5  Cowen,  538,  supra; 
Musgrove  v.  Catholic  Church,  10  La.  An. 
431. 

8  Austin  V.  Murray,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
121,  1834;  Coates  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  585;  Common- 
wealth V.  Fahey,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  408, 
1850. 

The  law  of  burials,  in  some  of  its  rela- 


tions to  property  and  municipal  rights, 
was  ably  considered  by  the  Hon.  Samuel 
B.  Ruggles,  referee,  in  the  matter  of  the 
opening  of  Deekman  Street,  in  New  York 
City,  whose  report,  establishing  the  fol- 
lowing principles,  was  confirmed  by  the 
Supreme  Court ;  1.  In  this  country, 
corpses  and  their  burials  are  not  matters 
of  ecclesiastical  cognizance.  2.  That  the 
right  to  bury  a  corpse  and  preserve  its 
remains  is  a  legal  right,  belonging,  in  the 
absence  of  testamentary  disposition,  ex- 
clusively to  the  next  of  kin,  and  includes 
the  right  to  select  and  change  the  place 
of  sepulture  at  pleasure.  3.  If  place  of 
burial  is  taken  for  public  use  the  next  of 
kin  may  claim  indemnity  for  expense 
of  removing  and  suitably  re-interring 
their  remains.  Beekman  Street,  in  re,  4 
Bradf.  (N.  Y.)  503,  532,  1856;  Bogert  v. 
City  of  Indianapolis,  13  Ind.  134,  1859, 
per  Perkins,  J.  Many  cases  relating  to 
the  law  of  cemeteries  are  collected  in  Mr. 
Thompson's  note  to  Louisville  v.  Nevin, 
19  Am.  Rep.  78,  79,  1874;  s.  c.  10  Bush 
(Ky.),  549.  See,  also,  Brick  Church,  in  re, 
3  Edw.  Ch.  Rep.  (N.  Y.)  155.  Laying 
streets  and  highways  through  cemeteries. 
Cemetery  Assoc,  v.  New  Haven,  43  Conn. 
234,  1875;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep.  643;  and 
note  and  cases  cited.  Trustees  v.  Walsh, 
57  111.  363;  s.  c.  11  Am.  Rep.  21.    Local 


§  374.]  MUNICIPAL   OKDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  375 

that  burden  upon  a  particular  class  is  unreasonable  and  void.^ 
Cemeteries  in  cities  are  not  ^^er  se  nuisances,  but  special  circum- 
stances may  make  them  so.  It  is  not,  however,  sufficient  that 
they  affect  the  market  value  of  property  in  the  vicinity .^  A  city 
corporation  had  power,  by  charter,  "  to  establish  cemeteries  or 
burial  places  within  or  without  the  city."  It  was  held  that  this 
would  authorize  the  city  to  establish  cemeteries  of  its  own,  and 
regulate  them ;  but  that  it  did  not  empower  the  council  to  sub- 
ject to  the  control  of  the  city  sexton  cemeteries  other  than  those 
belonging  to  the  city,  nor  to  pass  an  ordinance  prohibiting  lot 
owners  in  private  cemeteries,  though  within  the  city  limits,  from 
entering  to  bury  without  the  permission  of  the  city  sexton,  to  be 
obtained  only  by  paying  him  the  price  of  digging  a  grave.^  Cer- 
tain statutes  of  JVeiv  York,  authorizing  incorporated  rural  ceme- 
tery associations  to  condemn  lands  for  cemetery  purposes,  where 
no  right  on  the  part  of  the  public  to  buy  lots  or  bury  their  dead 
there,  or  to  fix  the  price  of  lots,  is  secured,  were  held  to  be  un- 
constitutional, on  the  ground  that  the  use  was  private  and  not 
public* 

§  374.  (308)  Nuisances,  and  of  the  Power  to  ])revent  and 
abate. — It  is  to  secure  and  promote  the  public  health,  safety, 
and  convenience  that  municipal  corporations  are  so  generally  and 
so  liberally  endowed  with  power  to  prevent  and  abate  nuisances. 
This  authority  may  be  constitutionally  conferred  on  the  incorpor- 
ated place,  and  it  authorizes  its  council  to  act  against  that  which 
comes  within  the  legal  notion  of  a  nuisance  ;  but  such  power,  con- 
ferred in  general  terms,  cannot  be  taken  to  authorize  the  extra- 
judicial condemnation  and  destruction  of  that  as  a  nuisance  which, 
in  its  nature,  situation,  or  use,  is  not  such.^     Speaking  upon  this 

assessments  for  improvements  of  adjoin-  re,  66  N.  Y.  569;  overruling  s.  c.  5  Hun, 

ing  streets.     Louisville  v.  Nevin,  10  Bush  482. 

(Ky.),  549,  1874;  s.  c.  19  Am.  Rep.  78.  5  Crosby  v.  Warren,  1   Rich.  (South 

See  on  this  point, /)os<,  sec.  776.  Car.)  385;  Roberts  r.  Ogle,  30  111.  459; 

1  Beurojohn  y.  Mayor,  etc.,  27  Ala.  58,  Salem  v.  Railroad  Co.,  98  Mass.  431; 
1855.  Dingley  v.  Boston,  100  Mass.  544;  Van 

2  New  Orleans  v.  St.  Louis  Church,  11  Dyke  v.  Cincinnati,  1  Disney  (Ohio),  532; 
La.  An.  244,  1856 ;  Musgrove  ;;.  Same,  10  Lake  View  v.  Letz,  44  111.  81 ;  Wreford 
lb.  431;  Lake  View  v.  Letz,  44  111.  81,  v.  People,  14  Mich.  41,  18(i5;  State  v. 
1867.  Jersey  City,  5  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  170.     That 

*  Bogert  V.  Indianapolis,  13  Ind.  134,  which  is  authorized  by  legislative  author- 
1859.  ity  cannot  be  declared  a  nuisance  by  a 

*  Deansville  Cemetery  Association,  in    city  corporation,   lb.    The  power  to  abate 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


subject  in  a  very  recent  case,  where  a  city,  under  authority  to 
prevent  and  restrain  encroachments  on  rivers  running  through  it, 


nuisances  is  a  portion  of  police  authority 
necessarily  vested  in  tlie  corporation  of 
all  populous  towns.     Kennedy  c.  I'helps, 
10  La.  An.  227,  per  Buchanan,  J.     Nui- 
sances   are   of    two    kinds, —  public    or 
common  nuisances,  which   affect  people 
generally,  and    private  nuisances,  which 
may  be  defined  as  anything  done  to  the 
hurt  of  the  lands,  tenements,  or  heredit- 
aments of   another.      Russell  on  Crimes, 
4th   Ed.  435.     That   which   affects  only 
three   or  four   persons  is  a  private  and 
not    a  public   nuisance.      The    King    v. 
Lloyd,  4  Esp.  200.    The  term  "  nuisance  " 
is  well  understood,  and   means   literally 
annoyance,  —  any  thing  that  worketh  hurt. 
The  King  v.   White,   1  Burr.  333;    The 
King  V.  Davey,  5  Esp.  217 ;   Burditt  v. 
Swenson,  17  Tex.  489.     It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  constitute  a  nuisance  to  show  that 
the  smell,  etc.,  produced   should   be  un- 
wholesome.    It  is  enough  if  it   renders 
the  enjoyment  of   life  and  property  un- 
comfortable.    Per  Lord  Mansjield,  in  The 
King  V.  White  et  ah,  1  Burr.  337 ;   The 
King  V.  Neill,  2  C.  &  P.  485 ;  St.  Helen's 
Chemical     Co.    v.    Corporation    of     St. 
Helen's,  L.  R.  1  Ex.  Div.  196.     "  If  there 
be  smells  offensive  to  the  senses,  that  is 
enough,  as  the  neighborhood  has  a  right 
to  fresh  and  pure  air."     Per  Abbott,  C.  J., 
The  King  v.  Neill,  2  C.  &  P.  485.     "  The 
only  question  therefore  is,  Is  the  business 
(slaughter-house),  as   carried  on  by  the 
defendant,  productive  of  smells  to  persons 
passing  along  the  public  highway  1  "     lb. 
A  by-law  providing  "  that  no  person  shall 
keep  a   slaughter-house  within    the  city 
-without  a  special  resolution  of  the  coun- 
cil" is  bad,  tending  to  create  a  monopoly. 
Nash    &    McCracken,   in   re,    33    Upper 
Can.  Q.  B.  181.      So  a  by-law  imposing  a 
fine  upon  every  person  "  who  shall  keep 
or  suffer  to  be  kept,  any  swine  within  the 
said  borough  from  1st  February  to  31st 
October  inclusive,  in  any  year.  "   Everett 
V.  Grapes,  3  L.  T.  N.  S.  669.    A  resolution 
or  license  from  the  corporation  held  to  be 
no  defence  to  a  prosecution  for  a  public 
nuisance.  The  King  v.  Cross,  2  C.  &  P.  483. 
"  This  certificate  is  no  defence ;  and  even 
if  it  were,  a  license  from  all  the  magis- 
trates in  the  county  to  the  defendant  to 


slaughter  horses  in  this  very  place,  it 
would  not  entitle  tiie  defendant  to  con- 
tinue the  business  there  one  hour  after  it 
became  a  public  nuisance  to  the  neighbor- 
hood. ...  If  the  defendant's  slaughtering 
house  was  so  conducted  as  to  be  a  public 
nuisance  at  common  law,  the  parish 
might  at  any  time  have  caused  it  to  be 
removed ;  and  I  am  clearly  of  opinion 
that  in  this  case  it  was  so  conducted  as  to 
be  a  nuisance  at  common  law,  and  that 
the  defendant  would  not  have  been  and  is 
not  entitled  to  any  compensation."  It 
was  in  this  case  proved  that  smells  pro- 
ceeded from  the  slaughter-house  which 
were  a  great  nuisance  to  persons  passing 
along  the  public  highway.  If  a  certain 
noxious  trade  is  already  established  in  a 
place  remote  from  habitation  and  public 
roads,  and  persons  afterwards  come  and 
build  houses  within  reach  of  its  noxious 
effects,  or  if  a  public  road  be  made  so 
near  to  it  that  the  carrying  on  of  the 
trade  becomes  a  nuisance  to  the  persons 
using  the  road,  in  those  cases  the  party 
would  be  entitled  to  continue  his  trade, 
because  his  trade  was  legal  before  the 
erection  of  the  houses  in  the  one  case, 
and  the  making  of  the  road  in  the  other. 
Per  Abbott,  C.  J.,  in  The  King  v.  Cross,  2 
C.  &  P.  484.  But  quwre  ?  But  if  the  man 
so  situated  increase  the  nuisance  bj'  the 
manner  or  extent  to  which  he  carries  on 
the  trade,  he  is  liable  to  indictment.  The 
King  V.  Watts,  M.  &  M.  281 ;  The  King  v. 
Neville,  1  Peake,  92.  In  countries,  how- 
ever, where  great  works  are  carried  on, 
which  are  the  means  of  developing  nation- 
al wealth,  persons  must  not  stand  on  ex- 
treme rights.  Bamford  v.  Turnley,  3  B. 
&  S.  62-66 ;  Tipping  v.  St.  Helen's  Smelt- 
ing Co.,  4  B.  &  S.  608 ;  s.  c.  11  II.  L.  C. 
642  ;  Gaunt  v.  Fynney,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  Ap.  8 ; 
Harrison  v.  Good,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  338;  Sal- 
vin  V.  North  Branchepcth  Canal  Co.,  L. 
R.  9  Chy.  705;  Ball  v.  Ray,  L.  R.  8  Chy. 
467 ;  Broder  v.  Saillard,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  Div. 
692. 

But  a  private  individual  cannot  justify 
damaging  the  property  of  anotlier  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  a  public  nuisance  unless 
it  do  him  a  special  and  particular  injury. 
Dimes  v.  Petley,  15  Q.  B.  276 ;  Arnold  v. 


§  374.] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS, 


377 


commenced  summary  proceeding  to  remove  a  private  wharf,  an 
eminent  judge  uses  this  language  :    "  But  the  mere  declaration  by 


Holbrook,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  96 ;  The  Mayor, 
etc.  of  Scarborough  v.  Rural  Sanitary 
Authority  of  Scarborough,  L.  R.  1  Ex. 
Div.  344.  A  distinction  must  be  drawn 
between  a  house  which  is  a  nuisance  per 
se,  and  one  that  is  only  a  nuisance  by  rea- 
son of  its  use  or  abuse.  In  the  latter  case 
there  is  no  legal  right  to  destroy  the  prop- 
erty. In  several  parts  of  England  public 
slaughter-houses  are  established,  under  a 
provision  that  "  no  person  shall  slaughter 
any  cattle  or  dress  any  carcass  for  sale  as 
food  for  man  in  any  place  within  the 
limits  other  than  a  slaughter-house."  It 
was  held  that  the  enactment  only  applied 
to  the  slaughtering  of  beasts  intended  by 
the  person  slaughtering  the  same  for  sale 
for  human  food.  Elias  v.  Nightingale,  8 
E.  &  B.  098  ;  see  further,  Anthony  t-.  The 
Brecon  Markets  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Ex.  1G7 ;  re- 
versed, L.  R.  7  Ex.  399.  An  indictment 
will  lie  for  a  public  nuisance,  but  not  for 
a  private  nuisance.  The  King  v.  Atkins, 
8  Burr.  1706.  That  which  is  not  of  pub- 
lic concern  is  a  mere  civil  injury.  The 
King  V.  Storr,  3  Burr.  1698;  The  King  v. 
Johnson,  1  Wils.  325.  The  non-repair  of 
a  private  road,  even  by  a  public  body,  is 
not  indictable.  Tlie  King  v.  Richards,  8 
T.  R.  634 ;  The  King  v.  Trafford,  1  B.  & 
Ad.  874.  The  writ  quod  permittat  lay  at 
common  law  to  prostrate  a  public  nui- 
sance (Palmer  v.  Poultney,  2  Salk.  458), 
and  after  judgment  on  an  indictment  for 
a  nuisance,  a  writ  of  prostration  may 
still  be  issued.  The  King  v.  Newdigate, 
Comb.  10;  Houghton's  Case,  Sir  T.  Boyd, 
215;  Vin.  Abr.  "  Nuisance,"  A.  lb.  "  Che- 
min,"  Fitz.  Nat.  Brev.  124;  The  Queen 
V.  Haynes,  7  Ir.  L.  R.  2.  An  action  on 
the  case  will  lie  for  the  continuance  of  a 
nuisance  after  recovery  for  its  erection. 
Rosewell  v.  Prior,  1  Salk.  460.  Though 
an  indictment  for  a  nuisance  is  in  form  a 
criminal,  it  is  in  substance  a  civil  pro- 
ceeding remedial  in  its  object.  The  King 
V.  Sadler,  4  C.  &  P.  218 ;  Holmes  v.  Wil- 
8on,  10  A.  &  E.  503  ;  Douglass,  in  re,  3  Q. 
B.  825;  Thompson  v.  Gibson,  7  M.  &  W. 
456 ;  The  Queen  v.  Chorley,  12  Q.  B.  515 ; 
The  King  v.  Russell,  3  E.  &  B.  942; 
The  Queen  v.  Loughton,  3  Smith,  575  ; 
The    Queen    i;.    Lincomb,   2   Chit.   214. 


Upon  an  indictment  for  a  continuing 
nuisance  —  such  as  a  wall  across  a  high- 
way—  the  proper  judgment  is,  that  it  be 
abated  (The  King  i'.  Stead,  8  T.  R.  142; 
The  King  v.  Yorkshire,  7  T.  R.  467),  and 
when  the  court  is  satisfied  before  judg- 
ment that  a  nuisance  has  been  abated, 
the  judgment  need  not  be  pronounced. 
The  King  v.  Incledon,  13  East,  164;  The 
Queen  v.  Paget,  3  F.  &  F.  29.  The  prac- 
tice followed  is  to  respite  judgment  until 
it  be  seen  whether  or  not  the  nuisance  is 
abated,  and  if  not  to  inflict  a  heavy  fine 
to  compel  the  abatement.  There  may  be 
an  indictment  for  the  continuance  of  a 
nuisance  (The  Queen  v.  May  bury,  4  F. 
&  F.  90),  and  in  such  a  case  the  former 
judgment  is  conclusive  that  the  locus  in 
quo  was  a  highway,  and  that  the  erection 
upon  it  was  a  nuisance.  This  being  so, 
upon  proof  of  the  continuance  of  the  nui- 
sance, the  jury  must  find  the  defendant 
guilty.  See  further,  Regina  v.  Jackson, 
40  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  290. 

As  to  the  right  of  an  adjoining  owner 
to  recover  damages  for  a  private  injury 
resulting  from  a  public  nuisance  in  a  public 
highway,  where  there  is  a  direct  and  par- 
ticular damage,  such  as  that  arising  from 
unreasonable  obstruction  to  the  access 
to  his  premises  from  the  highway.  Fritz 
V.  Hobson,  19  Am.  Law  Reg.  615,  1880, 
and  note. 

Ringing  of  bells,  blowing  of  horns,  and 
other  unusual  noises,  are  treated  as  nui- 
sances. They  may  or  may  not  be  nui- 
sances according  to  circumstances.  It  is 
in  the  power,  however,  of  the  corporation 
at  any  time  to  treat  all  such,  when  in 
streets  and  public  places,  as  nuisances, 
and  prevent  them.  It  is  difficult  to  de- 
scribe, though  easy  to  imagine,  such  "  an 
unusual  noise  "  as  would  be  a  nuisance. 
Some  examples  may,  however,  be  given. 
The  noise  of  a  tinsmith  in  carrying  on 
his  trade,  if  in  a  neighborhood  where 
there  is  a  number  of  offices,  and  of  suffi- 
cient magnitude  to  prevent  the  occupants 
from  following  their  lawful  business,  will, 
if  it  affect  a  considerable  number  of  in- 
habitants, be  deemed  a  public  nuisance. 
The  King  v.  Lloyd,  4  Esp.  200. 

A  circus,  the  performances  in  which 


MUNICIFAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


the  city  council  that  a  certain  structure  was  an  encroachment  or 
obstruction  did  not  make  it  so,  nor  could  such  declaration  make 
it  a  nuisance  unless  it  in  fact  had  that  character.  It  is  a  doctrine 
not  to  be  tolerated  in  this  country  that  a  municipal  corporation, 
■without  any  general  laws  either  of  the  city  or  of  the  state,  within 
which  a  given  structure  can  be  shown  to  be  a  nuisance,  can,  by 
the  mere  declaration  that  it  is  one,  subject  it  to  removal  by  any 
person  supposed  to  be  aggrieved,  or  even  by  the  city  itself.  This 
would  place  every  house,  every  business,  and  all  the  property 
m  the  cit}',  at  the  uncontrolled  will  of  the  temporary  local 
authorities."  ^ 


were  to  be  carried  on  for  eight  weeks 
near  tlie  plaintiff's  liouse,  and  the  per- 
formances, whicli  took  place  every  even- 
ing, lasted  from  about  half-past  seven  till 
half-past  ten  o'clock.  The  noise  of  the 
music  and  shouting  in  the  circus  could  be 
distinctly  lieard  all  over  the  house,  and 
was  so  loud  that  it  could  be  heard  above 
the  conversation  in  the  dining-room, 
though  the  windows  and  shutters  were 
closed.  This  was  held  to  be  a  nuisance. 
Inchbald  v.  Kobinson,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  App. 
388.  If  a  man  builds  a  rolling-mill  close 
to  inhabited  cottages,  so  that  the  vibra- 
tion produced  by  the  hammers  cracks  the 
walls  of  the  cottages,  and  the  noise  of  the 
mill  causes  them  to  become  and  remain 
uninhabited,  the  rolling-mill  will  be  a 
nuisance.  Scott  v.  Frith,  4  F.  &  F.  349 ; 
8.  c.  10  L.  T.  N.  S.  240. 

A  shooting  ground  near  a  public  high- 
way, where  persons  come  to  shoot  with 
rifles  at  pigeons,  targets,  etc.,  may  be  a 
nuisance.  The  King  i'.  Moore,  3  B.  &  Ad. 
184.  So,  by  means  of  powder,  working 
stone  quarries  near  the  public  streets  and 
dwelling-houses.  The  Queen  i'.  Mutters, 
10  Cox,  G  ;  Harr.  Munic.  Man.  4th  ed. 

A  corporation  has  no  more  right  to 
license  or  maintain  a  nuisance  than  an  indi- 
vidual would  have,  and  for  anuisance  main- 
tained upon  its  property  the  same  liability 
attaches  against  a  city  as  to  an  individual. 
Haag  V.  Co.  Commrs.,  60Ind.  511 ;  Peters- 
burg V.  Applegarth,  28  Gratt.  (Va.)  321 ; 
Brayton  v.  Fall  River,  113  Mass.  218; 
Franklin,  etc.  Co.  v.  Portland,  67  Me.  4P>; 
Harper  v.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  365 ;  Wood 
on  Nuisances,  sec.  742.  A  city  was  held 
liable  for  erecting  a  pest-house  whereby 


plaintifTs  premises  became  unhcalthful 
and  infected  with  the  same  disease,  and 
the  occupancy  rendered  unsafe  and  un- 
pleasant. Hiblett  V.  Nashville,  12  Ilcisk. 
684.  May  pass  ordinances  to  prevent  as 
well  as  remove.  Gregory  v.  Railroad  Co., 
40  N.  Y.  273 ;  see  Wood  on  Nuisances, 
sees.  740,  741,  and  cases  cited.  A  city 
held  to  have  no  power  to  destroy  a  dam 
across  a  creek  within  its  limits  as  a  nui- 
sance. Clark  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Syracuse, 
13  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  32.  Abatement  by  indi- 
viduals and  public  officers.  Marsh  &  Co.  v. 
Van  Keuren,  8  C.  E.  Green  (23  N.  J.  Eq.), 
251 ;  Meeker  y.  Van  Rensselaer,  15  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  397.  Destruction  of  building  by 
mob.  Brightman  v.  Bristol,  65  Me.  426 ; 
8.  c.  20  Am.  Rep.  711. 

1  Per  Miller,  J.,  Yates  v.  Milwaukee, 
10  Wall.  497,  1870 ;  Fieri  v.  Shieldsboro, 
42  Miss.  493 ;  Underwood  v.  Green,  42  N. 
Y.  140  ;  Darst  v.  People,  62  111.  306, 1869  ; 
Miller  v.  Burch,  32  Tex.  209,  1869; 
Everett  v.  Council  Bluffs,  46  Iowa,  66, 
1877,  approving  Yates  v.  Milwaukee; 
Pye  V.  Peterson,  45  Tex.  312,  1876; 
s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  608,  approving  Yates  v. 
Milwaukee.  A  person  sick,  even  with 
contagious  disease,  in  his  own  house  or 
at  a  hotel,  is  not  a  nuisance.  Boom  v. 
Utica,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  104,  1848. 

Works  that  amount  to  a  private  nui- 
sance, causing  actual  damage  to  private 
persons,  cannot  be  justified,  under  a  li- 
cense from  the  city  council,  to  erect 
them.  But  the  fact  of  such  license  is 
evidence  of  great  but  not  conclusive 
weight  in  favor  of  the  party  erecting  and 
owning  the  works  claimed  to  be  a  nui- 
sance.  Ryan  v.  Copes,  11  Rich.  (So.  Car.) 


§  375.] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


379 


§  375.    (309)    Power  to  municipal  corporation  to  make  "  by- 
laws relative  to  nuisances  generally  "  has  been  decided  to  author- 


Law,  217,  1858.  A  pigsty  in  a  populous 
place  is,  per  se,  a  nuisance.  Commrs.  v. 
Vansickle,  Bright.  (Pa.)  69.  Livery  sta- 
ble in  a  town  is  not,  per  se,  a  nuisance,  it 
depends  upon  its  location  and  tlie  man- 
ner in  whicli  it  is  built,  kept,  or  used. 
Aldrich  v.  Howard,  7  Rh.  Is.  87  ;  s.  c.  8 
//;.  246;  Burditt  v.  Swenson,  17  Tex.  489, 
1856;  Morris  v.  Brower,  Anthon's  N.  P. 
(N.  Y.)  368;  Flint  v.  Russell,  5  Dillon  C. 
C.  R.  151,  1879 ;  Harrison  v.  Brooks,  20 
Ga.  537,  1856  ;  Wood  on  Nuisances,  sees. 
528,  529 ;  Packard  v.  Collins,  23  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  444;  Shiras  v.  Olinger,  Iowa,  20  Alb. 
Law  Jour.  45,  56.  Nor  a  liberty  pole.  Al- 
legheny V.  Zimmerman,  10  Pitts.  Leg. 
Jour.  168 ;  Dargan  v.  Waddell,  9  Ire.  (N.  C. 
Law)  244  ;  Kirkman  v.  Handy,  11  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  406;  Coker  v.  Birge,  10  Ga.  336. 
A  tannery  is  not,  per  se,  a  nuisance.  State  v. 
Cadwalader,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.),283. 
Brick-making :  Wanstead,  etc.  v.  Hill,  13 
C.  B.  (N.  S.)  479.  Slaughter-house:  Du- 
bois I'.  Budlong,  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  700; 
Atty .-General y.  Steward  (5.  C.  E.  Green), 
20  N.  J.  Eq.  415.  Powder-house,  with 
large  quantities  of  powder  therein,  locat- 
ed in  a  city,  is  a  nuisance.  Cheatham  v. 
Shearn,  1  Swan  (Tenn.),  213,  216  ;  Durae- 
snil  V.  Dupont,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  800.  The 
manufacturing  and  keeping  large  quanti- 
ties of  gunpowder  in  towns  or  closely  in- 
habited places  is  an  indictable  offence  at 
common  law.  The  King  ».  Williams,  1 
Russ.  321 ;  The  King  v.  Taylor,  2  Str. 
1167;  Crowder  y.  Tinkler,  19  Ves.  617. 
Planing  mill :  Rhodes  v.  Dunbar,  57  Pa. 
St.  274 ;  Duncan  v.  Hayes,  22  N.  J.  Eq. 
25,  1871.  As  to  gas-works:  Cleveland  v. 
Gaslight  Co.,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  201.  Steam 
Jlouring  mill:  Gilbert  v.  Showerman,  23 
Mich.  448.  Stock-yards:  lb.  296;  Ash- 
brook  V.  Commonwealth,  1  Bush  (Ky.), 
139.  Porcpi  oil/uctorij :  Broughton  v.  Bris- 
tol, 65  Me.' 426,  1876;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Rep. 
711 ;  Privies  :  Wahle  v.  Reinbach,  76  111. 
322.  Gas  companies:  Cleveland  v.  Citi- 
zens' Gas  Co.,  5  C.  E.  Green  (20  N.  J. 
Eq.),  203.  Potteries:  Ross  v.  Butler,  19 
N.  J.  Eq.  294.  Flouring  Mill:  Under  the 
power  to  prevent  nuisances  and  danger- 
ous manufactories,  a  municipal  corpora- 


tion cannot,  on  petition  of  citizens,  deal 
with  a  flouring  mill  as  a  nuisance,  unless 
it  is  shown  by  the  record  to  fall  within 
some  law  or  ordinance  previously  passed. 
Lake  v.  Aberdeen,  57  Miss.  260.  In 
Louisiana,  where  the  civil  code  (art. 
655)  provides  that  works,  etc.,  causing 
annoyance  "  shall  be  regulated  by  the 
rules  of  the  police  or  the  customs 
of  the  place "  where  located,  an  ordi- 
nance of  a  city  council  ordering  a 
blacksmith  shop  to  be  closed  as  a  nui- 
sance is  authorized  by  law,  and  may  be 
carried  into  effect  by  an  injunction,  pro- 
cured by  the  city  in  its  corporate  name 
restraining  the  owner  from  continuing  the 
shop.  New  Orleans  v.  Lambert,  14  La. 
An.  247,  1859. 

Power  of  municipal  corporations  to  re 
move  nuisances,  and  how  far  their  decis- 
ion as  to  fact  of  nuisance  is  conclusive. 
Welch  V.  Stowell,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  332; 
Kennedy  v.  Board  of  Health,  2  Pa.  St. 
366;  Commrs.  y.  Vansickle,  Bright.  (Pa.) 
69 ;  Green  v.  Savannah,  6  Ga.  1 ;  Rob- 
erts V.  Ogle,  30  111.  459  ;  Clark  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  13  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  32;  Saltonstall  v. 
Banker,  8  Gray  (Mass.),  195;  Kennedy  v. 
Phelps,  10  La.  An.  227  ;  Green  v.  Under- 
wood, 42  N.  Y.  140;  Mayor  of  Hudson  r. 
Thorne,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.),  261;  Salem  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  98  Mass.  431 ;  Chicago  v. 
Saflein,  49  111.  172 ;  Babcock  v.  Buffalo,  56 
N.  Y.  268  ;  Darst  v.  People  (intoxicating 
liquors),  51  111.  286,  1869.  The  power  of 
municipal  corporations,  with  respect  to 
nuisances,  is  treated  in  the  chapter  xxii.  of 
Mr.  Wood's  work  on  the  Law  of  Nuisances. 
Instance  of  refusal  by  a  court  of  chancery 
to  interfere  with  the  municipal  authori- 
ties in  removing  nuisances.  Ferguson  v. 
Selma,  43  Ala.  398,  1869. 

Under  the  English  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  the  council  of  any  borough  is 
empowered  to  make  by-laws  for  the  good 
rule  and  government  of  the  borough,  and 
the  prevention  and  suppression  of  nuisances 
(ante,  sec.  3.37);  and  it  is  held  that  this 
power  respecting  the  suppression  of  nui- 
sances is  confined  to  the  suppression  and 
prohibition  of  acts  which,  if  done,  must 
necessarily  and  inevitably  cause  a  nui- 


580 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


thorize  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping,  in  any  manner 
whatsoever,  of  a  howling-alley  for  gain  or  hire,  such  a  place  being 
a  piibHc  nuisance  at  connnon  law.^  So  under  power  to  pass 
by-laws  to  prevent  and  remove  nuisances,  an  ordinance  may  be 
passed  inflicting  a  fine  on  any  person  who  should  exhibit  a  stud- 
horse in  the  streets  of  the  corporation.^ 


sance,  and  it  does  not  empower  tlie  coun- 
cil to  impose  penalties  for  tlie  doinj^  of 
tilings  which  may  or  may  not  be  a  nui- 
sance according  to  circumstances.  Thus, 
where  the  town  council  iuiposed  a  fine 
upon  every  person  who  should  "keep  or 
sutler  to  be  kept  any  swine  within  the 
borougl),  between  the  first  of  May  and 
the  first  of  October,"  it  was  held  that  the 
by-law  was  wholly  invalid,  as  the  keep- 
ing of  a  pig  did  not  necessarily  create  a 
nuisance.  Addison  on  Torts,  34,  citing 
Everett  v.  Grapes,  3  Law  T.  R.  N.  S.  Q.  B. 
669;  Wanstead  Local  Board  v.  Hill,  13 
C.  B.  N.  S.  479. 

1  Tanner  v.  Albion,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  121, 
1843;  followed,  Updyke  v.  Campbell,  4 
E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  570, 1855;  The  Peo- 
ple V.  Sargeant,  8  Cow.  (N.Y.)  139,  which 
held  that  a  room  kept  for  the  playing  of 
billiards  was  not  a  public  nuisance,  though 
a  profit  was  made  of  it,  commented  on  and 
distinguished,  and  by  Cowen,  J.,  doubted, 
in  5  Hill,  supra.  Whether  a  ball  alley 
could  be  prohibited  under  the  general  au- 
thority to  pass  by-laws  relative  to  good 
government,  etc.,  was  alluded  to,  but  not 
determined.  See  Jackson  v.  People,  9 
Mich.  Ill;  Smith  v.  Madison,  7  Ind.  86. 
In  the  State  v.  Hull,  32  N.  J.  158,  1807,  it 
was  held  that  a  ten-pin  alley  kept  for 
gain  and  public  use  in  a  town  is  not,  per 
se,  a  nuisance.  The  law  on  the  subject  is 
very  fully  examined  in  the  opinion  of 
Beasley,  C.  J.,  and  the  case  of  Tanner  v. 
Albion,  supra,  reviewed  and  disapproved. 
Where  a  city  has,  by  its  charter,  the 
power  to  determine  whether  bowling 
alleys  should  be  allowed,  and,  if  so,  under 
what  restrictions,  an  ordinance  requiring 
them  to  be  closed  at  a  certain  hour  is 
valid.  State  v.  Hay,  29  Me.  (15  Shep.) 
457, 1849 ;  State  v.  Freeman,  38  N.  II.  426  ; 
supra,  sec.  368,  note.  A  statute  of  Mis- 
souri designed  to  suppress  gambling  in 
St.  Louis  authorized  the  police  to  seize 
gaming  tables  and  gaming  devices  used 


for  gambling,  and  made  it  the  duty  of  the 
president  of  tiie  police  to  cause  the  same 
to  be  publicly  destroyed.  This  could  be 
done  without  notice  to  the  owner  or  any 
semblance  of  judicial  investigation.  The 
statute  was  declared  unconstitutional  as 
depriving  the  owner  of  such  gambling 
tables,  etc.,  of  his  property  without  due 
process  of  law.  Lowry  v.  Rainwater,  Mo., 
1879,  not  yet  reported ;  s.  c.  21  Alb. 
Law  Jour.  72;  Fisher  v.  McGirr,  1  Gray 
(Mass.),  1;  Hibbard  v.  People,  4  Mich. 
126 ;  Lincoln  i'.  Smith,  27  Vt.  354.  Un- 
der authority  to  pass  such  ordinances  as 
the  council  "  may  consider  fit  and  proper 
to  remove  nuisances  or  causes  of  disease," 
etc.,  it  was  held  that  the  city  of  Savannah 
might  prohibit  the  growing  of  rice  within 
the  corporate  limits,  as  being  injurious  to 
the  health  of  the  city,  and  abate  the  same, 
and  that  such  an  ordinance  was  valid  as 
a  police  regulation.  Green  v.  Savannah, 
6  Ga.  1,  1849.  City  held  to  have  no 
power  to  license  a  keno  table  to  be  kept 
for  gaming.  Schuster  v.  State,  48  Ala. 
199,  1872.  Where  proceedings  in  respect 
to  nuisances  are  instituted  by  order  of  the 
city  council,  chancery  will  not  enjoin  or 
interfere,  "  unless  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion have  clearly  transcended  their  pow- 
ers." Kennedy  v.  Phelps,  10  La.  An.  227, 
1855  (building  for  curing  hides) ;  s.  p. 
Milne  v.  Davidson  (private  hospital),  5 
Mar.  (La.)  580, 1827;  Potter  v.  Menasha, 
30  Wis.  492,  1872;  post,  sec.  405,  note. 

2  Nolin  V.  Mayor,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  163, 
1833.  Under  power  "  to  prevent  and  re- 
move nuisances,"  a  corporation  may,  if  a 
vacant  building  is  so  used  as  to  endanger 
by  fire  the  property  of  others,  or  the  health 
of  the  community,  declare  the  same  a  nui- 
sance and  notify  owner  to  abate  it,  and  if 
he  fails,  the  individual  officer  of  the  cor- 
poration who  abates  the  nuisance  may,  on 
being  individually  sued,  justify  the  act. 
Harvey  v.  Dewoody,  18  Ark.  252,  1856. 

Where  a  city  council  has  authority 


§  376.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


381 


§  876.  (310)  Power  "to  suppress  haivdy  houses'"  gives  the 
corporation  authority,  by  implication,  to  adopt,  by  ordinance,  the 
proper  means  to  accomplish  the  end ;  and  among  the  methods 
which  may  be  adopted  is  one  forbidding  the  owners  of  houses 
from  renting  or  letting  the  same  for  this  purpose,  or  with  knowl- 
edge that  they  are  to  be  thus  used.^  But  power  to  the  common 
council  of  a  city  "  to  make  all  such  by-laws  as  it  may  deem  ex- 
pedient for  effectually  preventing  and  suppressing  houses  of  ill- 
fame,"  does  not  authorize  the  council  to  decide  that  a  given 
house  is  kept  for  that  purpose,  nor,  if  kept  for  that  purpose, 
does  it  authorize  the  council  to  order  it  to  be  demolished  ;  nor, 


under  its  charter  to  prevent  and  remove 
all  nuisances  within  tlie  city,  "  sucli  as 
all  decayed  and  dilapidated  houses  and 
structures  calculated  to  produce  disease 
of  any  kind,  or  unfit  for  use  or  habita- 
tion, etc.,  a  court  of  chancery  will  not  in- 
terfere to  prevent  the  removal  of  such 
nuisance  unless  it  appears  tliat  the  com- 
plainant's right  is  illegally  assailed,  or 
threatened  with  an  irreparable  injury, 
and  there  is  no  sufficient  remedy  at  law. 
Ferguson  v.  Selma,  43  Ala.  398,  1869.  In 
this  case  the  court  denied  an  injunction 
to  prevent  the  removal  by  the  city  au- 
thorities of  two  old  dilapidated,  substan- 
tially valueless  houses,  on  a  lot  in  an 
improving  and  flourishing  part  of  the  city, 
which  were  filthy,  and  crowded  with  filthy 
tenants,  and  which  had  also  been  con- 
demned as  a  nuisance  by  the  board  of 
health  of  the  city.  lb. ;  infra,  sec.  377, 
note.  But  a  city  under  a  charter  author- 
izing the  common  council  "  to  regulate  all 
wharves  on  the  shore  of  the  Oliio  River, 
adjoining  said  city,"  cannot  by  ordinance 
define  the  line  of  high-water  mark,  and 
declare  the  erection  of  buildings  below 
Baid  line  a  nuisance,  and  impose  a  fine 
upon  persons  erecting  such  buildings  on 
their  own  lands.  Evansville  v.  i\Iartin, 
41  Ind.  145,  1872. 

If  a  sewer  is  declared  to  be  a  private 
nuisance  to  property ,  the  owner  is  entitled 
to  an  injunction  against  the  city  as  he 
would  be  against  a  private  individual ; 
but  a  court  in  granting  such  injunction 
will  postpone  its  operation  a  reasonable 
time  in  order  to  enable  the  city  to  take 
adequate  measures  to  remove  the  nui- 
sance without  unnecessary  injury  to  the 


public  health  or  interests.  Haskell  v.  New 
Bedford,  108  Mass.  208;  Boston  Roll- 
ing Mills  V.  Cambridge,  117  Mass.  396; 
Attorney-General  v.  Birmingham,  4  K.  & 
J.  528 ;  Spokes  v.  Banbury,  L.  R.  1  Eq. 
42 ;  Goldsmid  v.  Turnbridge,  L.  R.  1  Eq. 
161 ;  Attorney-General  v.  Bradford.  L.  R. 
2  Eq.  71 ;  Attorney-General  v.  Colney,  etc., 
L.  R.  4  Ch.  146 ;  Breed  v.  Lynn,  126  Mass. 
367. 

^  Childress  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  8  Sneed 
(Tenn.),  347,  1855.  Construction  of 
power  "  to  regidate  or  suppress  bawdy- 
houses."  State  V.  Clark,  54  Mo.  17, 1873; 
State  V.  DeBar,  58  Mo.  395,  1874;  com- 
mented on  ante,  sec.  87,  note ;  post,  sec. 
436.  Power  to  make  by-laws  relative  to 
nuisances  gives  authority  to  impose  pen- 
alties on  the  keepers  of  houses  of  ill-fame, 
and  on  persons  owning  houses  used,  with 
their  knowledge,  for  this  purpose.  McAlis- 
ter  V.  Clark,  S3  Conn.  91,  1865;  see  Ely 
V.  Supervisors,  36  N.  Y.  297 ;  Shaffer  v. 
INIumina,  17  Md.  331,  1861.  In  prosecu- 
tions for  keeping  bawdy-houses,  the  law, 
it  has  been  said,  so  far  relaxes  the  ordi- 
nary rule  that  common  reputation  as  to 
the  character  of  the  defendants,  and  of 
the  houses  wiiicli  they  keep,  is  admissible. 
State  V.  McDowell,  Dudley  (So.  Car.) 
Law,  346.  Keeping  house  of  ill-fame, 
what  ?  Queen  v.  Rice,  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  21. 
Sufficient  to  charge  that  the  defendant 
did  on,  etc.,  in  the  city  of,  etc.,  keep  a 
common  disorderly  bawdj'-house  on  a 
specified  street  in  said  city  as  a  place  of 
resort,  for  both  men  and  women  of  lewd 
character.  Queen  v.  Monro,  22  Upper 
Can.  Q.  B.  44. 


382 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


if  thus  demolished,  will  it  justify  the  officers  of  the  city  who 
did  it,  in  execution  of  the  ordinance  and  resolution  of  the 
council.^ 


§  377.  (311)  A  city  charged  by  law  with  the  duty  of  prevent- 
ing obstructions  of  a  river  within  its  limits  may,  by  its  own  act, 
and  without  proceeding  by  indictment,  abate  or  remove  any- 
thing which  obstructs  the  free  and  public  use  of  the  river,  such 
as  a  floating  storehouse,  calculated  to  remain  stationary  in  the 
water,  and  which  exclusively  occupies  a  portion  of  the  river,  such 
a  structure  being  a  public  nuisance.^  It  is  no  answer  to  this 
right  of  abatement  that  room  enough  is  left  for  the  public,  or  that 
the  structure  is  beneficial ;  ^  or  that  the  party  erecting  it  is  the 
owner  of  the  adjacent  lots.* 

§  378.  (312)  But  under  the  power  to  abate  nuisances,  prop- 
erty lawfully  erected  and  existing,  or  a  house  which  is  only  a 
nuisance  because  occupied  by  a  business  which  is  such,  cannot 


■     1  Welch  V.  Stowell,  2  Doug.   (Mich.) 
332, 1846.   In  Enr/land  municipal  corpora- 
tions have  the  power  to  prevent   indecent 
public  exposure  of  the  person  and  other  indecent 
exhibitions.  In  order  to  render  a  person  lia- 
ble to  an  indictment  for  indecently  expos- 
ing his  person  in  a  public  place,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  exposure    should  be 
made  in  a  place  open  to  the  public.     The 
Queen  v.  Thallman,  9  Cox  C.  C.  388  ;  s.  c. 
9  L.  T.  N.  S.  425.   If  the  act  is  done  where 
a  great  number  of  persons  may  be  offend- 
ed by  it,  and  several  see  it,  it  is  sufficient. 
76.      If  the  indictment,  however,  charge 
the  offence  to  have  been  committed  on  a 
highway,  such  an  indictment  will  not  be 
sustained  by  evidence  that   the   offence 
was  committed  in  a  place  near  the  high- 
way, though   in  full  view   of   it.      The 
Queen  v.  Farrell,  9  Cox  C.  C.  446.      An 
indecent  exposure  m  a  place  of  public 
resort,  if  actually  seen  by  only  one  per- 
son, no  other  person  being  in  a  position 
to  see  it,  is  not  an  indictable  offence.    The 
Queen  i'.  Webb,  1  Den.  C.  C.  338;    The 
Queen  v.   Watson,  2    Cox    C.   C.   376; 
The  Queen  v.  Farrell,  9  Cox  C.  C.  446. 
A  party  was  indicted  for  an  indecent  ex- 
posure in  an  omnibus,  several  passengers 
being  therein.   Held,  a  public  place.   The 


Queen  v.  Holmes,  3  C.  &  K.  3G0.  But  a 
urinal,  with  boxes  or  divisions  for  the 
convenience  of  the  public,  though  situ- 
ated in  an  open  market,  was  held  not  to 
be  a  public  place  within  the  meaning  of 
the  allegation.  Tlie  Queen  i'.  Orchard,  3 
Cox  C.  C.  248.  Keeping  a  booth  in  a 
public  place  containing  an  indecent  ex- 
hibition for  hire,  is  an  indictable  offence. 
Eegina  v.  Saunders,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  Div.  15. 
2  Hart  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Albany,  9 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571, 18.32,  —  a  valuable  and 
very  carefully  considered  case,  affirming 
s.  c.  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  Ch.  213;  People  v. 
Vanderbilt,  28  N.  Y.  390.  See  Dutton  v. 
Strong,  1  Black,  23.  The  corporate  body 
may  abate  or  remove  the  nuisance  ;  but 
without  express  authority  cannot  ordain  a 
forfeiture  of  the  structure,  or  seize  and  sell  it, 
or  convert  the  materials  to  their  own  use. 
Hart  V.  Mayor,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  571,  609, 
supra. 

3  lb.  Eespublica  v.  Caldwell,  1  Dal. 
150;  King  v.  Russell,  6  East,  427 ;  King 
V.  Cross,  3  Camp.  224 ;  King  v.  Jones,  3 
Camp.  229. 

*  Hart  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
571,  608  ;  Strange  R.  1247  ;  3  Bac.  Abr. 
686 ;  1  Hawk.  P.  C.  363,  note  1. 


§  379.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


583 


be  destroyed  or  demolished.     The  public  can  proceed  by  indict- 
ment, or  the  business  carried  on  in  the  house  be  suppressed.^ 

§  379.  Finally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  the  extent  of  muni- 
cipal authority  over  nuisances  depends,  of  course,  upon  the  pow- 
ers conferred  in  this  regard  upon  the  municipality.  They  may 
be  general  or  specific  or  both.  The  authority  to  preserve  the 
health  and  safety  of  the  inhabitants  and  their  property,  as  well 
as  the  authority  to  prevent  and  abate  nuisances,  is  a  sufficient 
foundation  for  ordinances  to  suppress  and  prohibit  whatever  is 
intrinsically  and  inevitably  a  nuisance .^  The  authority  to  declare 
what  is  a  nuisance  is  somewhat  broader,  but  neither  this  nor  the 
general  authority  mentioned  in  the  last  preceding  sentence  will 
justify  the  declaring  of  acts,  avocations,  or  structures  not  injuri- 
ous to  health  or  property  to  be  nuisances.^  Much  must  necessa- 
rily be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  municipal  authorities,  and  their 
acts  will  not  be  judicially  interfered  with  unless  they  are  mani- 


1  Clark  V.  Syracuse,  13  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
82;  Welch  v.  Stowell,  2  Doug.  (Mich.) 
332,  1846 ;  Miller  v.  Burch,  32  Tex.  209, 
1869;  s.  c.  5  Am.  Rep.  242.  When 
equity  will  interfere  to  prevent  and  re- 
move nuisances  which  affect  the  public 
generally.  People  v.  St.  Louis,  5  Gilm. 
(10  111.)  372  ;  Hoole  v.  Attorney  General, 
22  Ala.  190;  Attorney  General  v.  Gas 
Co.,  19  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  639 ;  Aldrich  v. 
Howard,  7  Rh.  Is.  87  ;  Zabriskie  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  2  Beasley  Ch.  (N.  J.)  314;  Jer- 
sey City  1-.  Hudson,  lb.  420;  Attorney 
General  v.  Brown,  9  C.  E.  Green  (24  N. 
J.  Eq.),  89 ;  Wood  on  Nuisances,  ch.  xxv  ; 
Dumesnil  v.  Dupont,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
800,  1857.  A  city  council  may,  by  reso- 
lution, direct  its  officers  to  proceed  against 
a  specified  establishment  as  a  nuisance, 
and  cause  tlie  same  to  be  abated  under  a 
general  ordinance  of  the  corporation  ;  this 
is  a  different  thing  from  passing  an  ordi- 
nance inflicting  a  fine  upon  a  particular 
person  for  keeping  a  nuisance,  which  can- 
not bo  lawfully  done.  Kennedy  v.  Phelps, 
10  La.  An.  227,  1855.  See  Common- 
wealth V.  Goodrich,  13  Allen  (Mass.), 
545 ;  Municipality  v.  Blineau,  3  La.  An. 
688.  The  power  to  abate  nuisances  must 
be  reasonably  exercised,  so  as  to  do  the 
least  practicable  injury  to  private  rights. 


State  V.  Newark,  5  Vroora  (38  N.  J.  L.), 
264  ;  Wood  on  Nuisances,  sec.  741.  Power 
to  suppress  gambling-houses  does  not,  -it  is 
apprehended,  authorize  the  corporation 
to  demolish  the  houses  so  used.  All  com- 
mon gaming-houses  are  nuisances  in  the 
eye  of  the  law,  being  detrimental  to  the 
pubhc,  as  they  promote  cheating  and 
other  corrupt  practices,  and  entice  num- 
bers of  persons  to  idleness,  whose  time 
might  be  otherwise  employed  for  the  good 
of  the  community.  1  Hawk.  P.  C.  cap. 
32,  s.  4  ;  Bosley  v.  Davies,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B. 
Div.  84;  Brodie  &  Bowman ville,  3  Upper 
Can.  Q.  B.  580  ;  Harrison  Munic.  Manual, 
4th  ed.  As  to  liability  of  a  city  authorized 
to  abate  nuisances  for  failure  to  exercise 
the  power.  Kiley  v.  Kansas,  69  Mo.  102  ; 
Parker  v.  Macon  City,  39  Ga.  729  ;  Bas- 
sett  V.  St.  Joseph,  53  Mo.  290.  Where  a 
municipal  corporation  does  an  act,  lawful 
in  itself,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  create  a 
nuisance,  it  is  liable  in  the  same  manner 
tliat  an  individual  would  be.  Judge  v. 
l\Ieriden,.38  Conn.  90, 1871 ;  Railroad  Co. 
V.  Norwalk,  37  Conn.  109  ;  Mooty  v.  Dan- 
bury,  45  Conn.  550,  1878. 

2  Ante,  sees.  141,  144,  309,  et  seq.,  374; 
post,  sec.  396  and  note. 

8  Supra,  sec.  374  and  notes. 


384  MUNICIPAL   COKPOKATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

festly  unreasonable  and  oppressive  or  unwarrantably  invade 
private  rights  or  clearly  transcend  the  powers  granted  to  them/ 
in  which  case  the  contemplated  action  may  be  prevented  or  the 
injuries  caused,  redressed  by  appropriate  suit  or  proceedings. 
As  there  is,  in  such  cases,  a  judicial  remedy  in  favor  of  the  citizen, 
so  on  principle  the  right  of  the  corporate  authorities  to  resort  at 
their  election  to  the  courts  in  proper  cases  to  aid  them  when  the 
citizen  is  in  the  wrong  should,  in  the  author's  judgment,  be  also 
recognized.2  It  is  not  unusual  to  invest  the  municipal  council 
with  special  authority  in  respect  of  particular  avocations,  trades, 
acts,  omissions,  and  structures,  with  a  view  to  conserve  the 
public  health  and  safety,  of  which  many  examples  have  been 
given  in  the  notes  to  this  chapter.  The  terms  in  which  such 
authority  is  conferred  measure  its  scope,  but  in  view  of  the  end 
for  which  it  is  given  it  is  not  subjected  to  a  hostile  or  even  a 
narrow  construction.^ 

§  380.  (313)  Markets,  and  of  the  Poiver  to  establish  and  regu- 
late.—  The  states,  under  their  police  power,  may  delegate  to 
municipal  corporations  the  authority  to  establish,  or  authorize 
the  establishment  of  markets ;  and  it  is  competent  to  such  cor- 
porations, under  proper  grants  of  power,  to  enact  ordinances  for- 
bidding sales  and  purchases  of  marketable  articles,  except  at 
designated  market-places.  The  extent  of  the  power  possessed 
by  a  particular  corporation  depends  upon  its  charter.  In  Eng- 
land the  regulation  of  markets  by  by-laws  has  long  been  exercised, 
and  such  by-laws  are  sustained  as  being  reasonable,  and  condu- 
cive to  the  health  and  good  government  of  the  municipality.^ 

1  Ante,  sees.  04,  95,  319,  320,  et  seq.  England  as  to  markets  and  market  tolls. 

2  /?|/;a,  sec.  405,  note.  The  principles  Definition.  —  A  market  is  a  franchise  or 
upon  which  courts  of  equity  interfere  hy  liberty  deriA'ed  from  the  crown,  by  grant, 
injunction  in  the  case  of  nuisances  are  or  i)rescription  which  presupposes  a  grant, 
clearly  stated  by  Ld.  Chancellor  Z>?w(///(am  2  Black.  Com.  37.  "It  is  a  designated 
in  Earl  of  Ripon  v.  Hobart,  3  Mylne  &  place  in  a  town  or  city  to  which  all  per- 
Keene,  169,  179.  See  also  Flint  v.  Rus-  sons  can  repair  who  wish  to  buy  or  sell 
sell,  5  Dillon,  151,  where  the  authorities  articles  there  exposed  for  sale."  Per 
are  collated.  Breese,  J.,  Caldwell  v.  Alton,  33  111.  416. 

8  Post,  sec.  396  and  note.  Under  the   police  power  it  is  competent 

*  Pierce  y.  Bartram,  Cowp.  270  ;  Player  for  the   legislature    to    prohibit    private 

V.  Jenkins,  1  Sid.  284  ;  Rex  x\  Cottrell,  1  markets  within  a  reasonable  designated 

B.  &  Ad.  67,  1817.     See  also  Mosley  v.  distance  of  the  public  market.     New  Or- 

Walker,  7  Barn.  &  Cress.  40  ;  Mayor,  etc.  leans  v.  Stafford,  27  La.  An.  417;  s.  c. 

V.  Pedley,  4  Barn.  &  Adol.  397  ;  Grant  on  21  Am.  Rep.  563. 
Corp.  166,  as  to  exclusive  privileges  in  "  A  municipal  market  consis\,&  :     1.  In  a 


§  381.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


385 


In  this  country  the  practice  is  almost  universal  on  the  part  of  the 
legislature  to  confer  upon  the  municipal  agencies  more  or  less 
authority  with  respect  to  markets  and  market-places,  and  such 
grants  are  not  so  strictly  construed  as  those  which  invest  the 
corporation  with  powers  of  a  more  extraordinary  or  unusual 
character ;  at  least,  such  is  the  case  unless  a  monopoly  in  favor 
of  private  individuals  is  sought  to  be  sustained,  against  which 
the  courts  strongly  lean.^ 

§  381.  (314)  Power  to  build  and  establish.  —  Incorporated 
cities  and  towns  may  have  the  power  to  build  market-houses 
without  an  express  grant.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  a  town 
having  authority  "  to  make  by-laws  for  managing  and  ordering 
its  prudential  affairs"  has  power  —  the  court  looking  somewhat 
to  usage  and  custom  to  ascertain  what  subjects  of  common  in- 
terest are  embraced  under  the  iexm., '■'- prudentiaV  —  to  appro- 
priate money  for  the  erection  of  a  market-house,  and  to  raise  the 
amount  by  taxation.  This  power,  it  was  admitted,  more  clearly 
exists  in  the  case  of  large  towns  and  populous  villages.^ 


place  for  sale  of  provisions  and  articles  of 
daily  consumption.  2.  Convenient  fix- 
tures. 3.  A  system  of  police  regulations, 
fixing  market  hours,  making  provisions 
for  lighting,  watching,  cleaning,  detect- 
ing false  weights  and  unwholesome  food, 
and  other  arrangements  calculated  to 
facilitate  the  intercourse  and  ensure  the 
honesty  of  buyer  and  seller.  4.  Proper 
officers,  to  preserve  order  and  enforce 
obedience  to  the  rules."  Per  Lane,  C.  J., 
Cincinnati  if.  Buckingham,  10  Ohio,  257, 
1840. 

1  Wartman  v.  Philadelphia,  33  Pa.  St. 
202,  209,  1854;  LeClaire  v.  Davenport, 
1.3  Iowa,  210  ;  White  v.  Kent,  11  Ohio  St. 
550;  St.  John  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New- 
York,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.),  315 ;  Ash  v.  People, 
11  Mich.  347  ;  St.  Louis  v.  Jackson,  25 
Mo.  37  :  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547, 
18G9  ;  Nightingale,  in  re,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 
168 ;  Congot  v.  New  Orleans,  16  La.  An. 
21 ;  Buffalo  v.  Webster,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
99 ;  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  12  Wis.  G73 ; 
Bethune  v.  Hughes,  28  Ga.  560;  distin- 
guished. Bodkins  v.  Robinson,  53  Ga.  013, 
1875;  Ketchura  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  350; 
Municipality  v.  Cutting,  4  La.  An.  336  ; 

VOL.  I.  25 


New  Orleans  v.  Guillotte,  12  La.  An. 
818  (corporate  partnership  with  indi- 
viduals);  State  V.  Lieber,  11  Iowa, 
407  ;  Dubuque  v.  Miller,  11  Iowa,  588 ; 
Morano  i'.  Mayor,  2  La.  An.  218  ;  St.  Paul 
V.  Coulter,  12  Minn.  41 ;  Atlanta  v.  White, 
33  Ga.  229. 

The  power  to  establish  and  regulate 
markets,  like  most  other  municipal  pow- 
ers, is  a  continuing  one,  and  markets  once 
established  may  be  abandoned  or  changed 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  corporation,  and 
the  tax-payers  or  property  owners  can- 
not restrain  the  action  or  determination 
of  the  council  entrusted  by  the  charter 
with  the  exercise  of  the  power.  Gall 
V.  Cincinnati,  18  Oliio  St.  563,  1869. 

2  Spaulding  v.  Lowell,  23  Pick.  (Mass.) 
71,  1839.  If  the  real  and  principal  ob- 
ject is  the  building  of  a  market-house, 
the  appropriation  of  a  portion  of  the 
building  for  other  purposes,  as  the  hold- 
ing of  courts,  does  not  render  the  erection 
of  the  building  illegal.  If,  however,  the 
building  of  the  market-house  is  merely 
colorable,  that  is,  done  for  the  purpose  of 
accomplishing  distinct  and  unauthorized 
objects,  it  would,  says  Chief  Justice  Shaw, 


386  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XU. 

§  382.  (315")  Power  conferred  upon  a  municipality  "  to  estab- 
lish and  regulate  markets,"  authorizes,  as  a  necessary  incident, 
the  purchase  of  ground  upon  which  to  erect  a  market  building.* 
If  the  title  to  land  purchased  for  the  erection  of  a  market-house 
be  taken  by  the  municipal  corporation  in  fee,  no  length  of  use 
of  the  same  for  a  market  will  dedicate  it  for  market  purposes ; 
and  the  markets  may  be  abandoned  or  changed  at  the  will  of  the 
council,  and  the  land  thus  acquired  and  held  be  sold.^  It  is  inci- 
dent to  the  general  power  to  build  a  market  to  determine  upon 
the  form,  dimensions,  and  style  of  the  edifice,  and  therefore  to 
employ  an  architect  to  prepare  plans,  specifications,  etc.^ 

§  383.  (316)  But  power  to  a  municipal  corporation  to  estab- 
lish markets  and  build  market-houses  will  not  give  the  authority 
to  build  them  on  a  public  street.  Such  erections  are  nuisances 
though  made  by  the  corporation,  because  the  street,  and  the  en- 
tire street,  is  for  the  use  of  the  whole  people.  They  are  nui- 
sances when  built  upon  the  streets,  although  sufficient  space  be 
left  for  the  passage  of  vehicles  and  persons.  Such  erections  may, 
it  seems,  be  legalized  by  an  express  act  of  the  legislature.  But 
unless  so  legalized,  a  nuisance  erected  and  maintained  by  a  pub- 

probably  be  treated  as  an  abuse  of  power  according  to  the  convenience  of  the  in- 

and  a  nullity.     lb.    Power  "to  appoint  habitants  for  the  time  being.    Dixon  i'. 

market-places  and  to  regulate  the  same  "  Robinson,  3  Mod.   108;  Curwen  «.  Salk- 

was  held,  in  connection  with  a  general  eld,  3  East,  588  ;  The  King  v.  Cotterill,  1 

welfare  clauge,  to  authorize  the  corpora-  B.  &  Al.  G7  ;    Wortley  v.  The  Notting- 

tion  to  build  a  market-house.      Smith  v.  liam  Local  Board,  21  L.  T.  N.  S.  582. 

Newbern,  70  N«r.  Car.  14,  1874;  s.  c.  16  And  this  applies,  although  the  limits  of 

Am.  Rep.  766.  the  town  be  afterwards  extended  and  tlie 

1  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  356 ;  market  established  within  the  extended 
17  N.  Y.  449;  Caldwell  v.  Alton,  33  111.  limits.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Dorchester  v. 
416.  It  is  immaterial  whether  this  power  Ensor,  L.  R.  4  Ex.  335.  But  this  is  sub- 
is  conferred  in  express  or  direct  terms,  ject  to  the  rights  of  any  persons  owning 
or  given  only  as  part  of  the  power  to  property  adjoining  the  site  of  the  old 
make  by-laws,  ordinances,  etc.  Per  Sel-  market.  Ellis  v.  The  Corporation  of 
den,  J.,  in  Ketchum  v.  Buffalo,  14  N.  Y.  Bridgenorth,  4  L.  T.  N.  S.  112  ;  2  Johns. 
356,  362.  Purchase  of  land  for  market.  &  H.  67  ;  15  C.  B.  N.  S.  52;  Harr.  Munic. 
People  V.  Lowber,  28  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  65;  Manual,  4th  ed. 

s.  c.  more  fully,  7  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  158;  3  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 

Gale  V.  Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344,  1871.  17  N.  Y.   449,   1858.     His  unauthorized 

2  Gall  V.  Cincinnati,  18  Ohio  St.  563,  employment  by  a  committee  is  ratified 
1869.  Construction  of  market-grants  in  by  a  resolution  of  the  council  passed  with 
England  Where  according  to  the  grant  notice  of  the  facts,  adopting  his  plans, 
of  a  market  it  was  to  be  held  in  a  drawings,  etc.,  and  he  may  recover  of 
town,  the  grantee  might  from  time  to  the  city  for  the  labor  and  service  of  pre- 
time  remove   the   place   for   holding  it  paring  them.    76. 


§  385.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR   BY-LAWS.  387 

lie  corporation  may  be  proceeded  against,  criminally  or  other- 
wise, the  same  as  if  erected  by  private  persons.' 

§  384.  (317)  Every  municipal  corporation  which  has  power 
to  make  by-laws  and  establish  ordinances  to  promote  the  general 
welfare  and  preserve  the  peace  of  a  town  or  city  may  fix  the 
time  or  places  of  holding  public  markets  for  the  sale  of  food,  and 
make  such  other  regulations  concerning  them  as  may  conduce  to 
the  public  interest.^  The  right  to  establish  a  market  includes  the 
right  to  abandon  it,  or  shift  it  to  another  place  when  the  public 
convenience  demands  it,  and  of  this  the  council  is  the  judge.^ 

§  385.  (318)  Nature  of  Power  to  establish  and  regidate.  — 
A  city  corporation  was  invested  by  its  charter  with  power  "  to 
erect  market-houses,  to  establish  markets  and  market-places,  and 
to  provide  for  the  government  and  regulation  thereof,"  and  it 
was  at  first  decided,  and  in  the  author's  judgment  properly  de- 
cided, by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  that  this  did  not 
authorize  the  corporation  to  pass  an  ordinance  delegating  to  an 
individual  the  right  to  erect  market-houses,  and  to  charge  rent 
for  the  use  of  the  stalls  therein,  reserving  to  itself  no  power  to 
control  the  same,  and  that  the  corporation  could  not  compel  per- 
sons to  go  to  such  markets ;  but  subsequently  this  ruling  was 
reversed,  and  it  was  held  that  such  an  ordinance  was  valid,  and 
that  the  city  had  the  power  to  authorize  the  erection  of  market- 
houses  by  an  individual,  and  to  declare  the  same  a  public  market, 
and  to  covenant  to  protect  the  owner  in  the  exclusive  privilege 
thereof ;  and  that  the  city  was  liable  for  failing  to  protect  him  by 
the  passage  of  the  requisite  ordinances,  he  having,  on  the  faith  of 
the  ordinance,  erected  an  expensive  market-house.* 

'  Wartman  v.  Philadelphia,  33  Pa.  St.  Princeton  (injunction  refused),  4  Halsted 

202,  210,  1854  ;  St.  John  v.  New  York,  3  Ch.  309,  320. 

Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  483;   State  v.  Mobile,  5  2  p^  B/ncI-,  C.  J.,  Wartman  v.  Phila- 

Port.   (Ala.)  279,  1837;   Commonwealth  delphia,  33  Pa.  St.  202,  209,  1854.    Note 

V.  Rush,  14  Pa.  St.  (2  Harris)  186  ;  Com-  his   observations   in   this  case  upon  the 

monwealth    v.    Bowman,    3    Pa.   St.   (3  necessity  and  convenience  of  markets. 

Barr)    202,  206.     See  chapter  on  Streets,  ^  lb.  "  The  right  to  establish  markets  is 

post,  sees.  G57,  660.     Under  the  constitu-  a  branch  of  the  sovereign  power,  and  the 

tion  of  New  Jerspy,  the  legislature  cannot  right  to  regulate   them    is   necessarily   a 

authorize  a  market  in  the  public  streets  power  of  municipal  police"    Per Eustes, 

without   providing  compensation  to  ad-  C.  J.,  Municipality  v.  Cutting,  4  La.  An. 

joining  lot  owners.     State  v.  Laverack,  835. 

34  n!  J.   Law,    201,    1870;    Higgins  v.  *  Le  Claire  u.  Davenport,  13  Iowa,  210, 


388 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


§  386.  (319)  Construction  of  Special  Potvers  in  Relation  to 
Markets.  —  Power  to  make  "  b3--la\vs  relative  to  the  public  mar- 
kets," etc.,  ■while  it  would  not  authorize  a  corporation  entirely  to 
prohibit  the  sale  of  meats,  etc.,  within  its  limits,  because  this 
would  be  in  general  restraint  of  trade,  will  nevertheless  authorize 
a  by-law  forbidding  the  haivkiiig  about  or  selling  hy  retail  meats, 
etc.,  except  at  the  public  markets  and  within  certain  limits  about 
the  same.^     The  courts  differ  somewhat  in  their  construction  of 


18G2 ;  overruling  Davenport  v.  Kelly,  7 
Iowa,  102.  It  may  bo  suggested  that  the 
right  to  pass  such  an  ordinance,  and  the 
liability  for  failing  to  pass  others,  may 
admit,  at  least,  of  fair  debate,  in  view  of 
the  surrender  by  the  city  of  its  charter 
powers,  and  its  inability  in  law  to  make 
binding  contracts  with  reference  to  tiie 
future  exercise  of  its  legislative  author- 
ity. The  soundness  of  this  suggestion  is 
confirmed  by  the  decision  in  Gale  v. 
Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344,  1871,  post, 
ch.  xxiii.  In  the  Kelly  case,  supra,  the 
point  was  decided,  and  is  not  overruled, 
that  the  charter  power  to  establish  mar- 
kets, etc.,  conferred  upon  the  council  the 
authority  to  prohibit  the  exposing  and 
oflFering  for  sale  meat  in  any  otlier  places 
than  those  the  ordinance  designated.  Ash 
*  V.  People,  11  Mich.  347 ;  Patch  v.  Pender- 
gast,  15  Md.  2.51. 

A  city  in  granting  a  license  and  sell- 
ing to  a  party  the  right  to  occupy  a  stall 
in  the  market  does  not  iwplieclli/  contract 
to  protect  the  lessee  from  competition  by 
unlicensed  persons  ;  nor  can  such  a  con- 
tract be  implied  against  the  corporation 
from  the  existence  of  an  ordinance  prohib- 
iting the  same  ;  and  the  failure  of  tlie  offi- 
cers of  the  corporation,  though  wilful,  to 
enforce  the  ordinance  against  unlicensed 
sellers,  is  no  defence  to  a  bond  given  by 
the  lessee  for  the  payment  of  stall  rent. 
Peck  V.  Austin,  22  Texas,  261,  1858. 
Nor  does  a  city  owning  and  leasing  a 
market-house  impliedly  engage  or  cove- 
nant that  it  will  not  exercise  its  power  to 
establish  markets  by  erecting  other  mar- 
ket-houses and  leasing  them  to  others  ;  if 
it  does  so,  the  injury  to  the  first  lessees  is 
damnum  absque  injuria.  Congot  v.  New 
Orleans,  16  La.  An.  21,  1861.  A  muni- 
cipal corporation  may  contract  for  build- 
ing a  market-house    with  an  individual 


or  corporation,  conceding  in  consideration 
of  such  building,  and  the  use  of  part  of 
the  same,  exclusive  market  privileges  in 
such  city,  with  rights  to  lease  stalls,  col- 
lect rents,  and  exemption  from  taxes  for 
twenty-one  years  ;  but  a  purchaser  at  a 
sale  under  a  judgment  against  the  owner 
takes  only  the  right  of  the  owner  bound 
by  the  judgment,  but  this  will  not  affect 
the  rights  of  the  cit}'  to  use  of  the  rooms 
contracted  for,  of  which  it  had  posses- 
sion.    Palestine  v.  Barnes,  50  Tex.  539. 

As  to  duty  of  corporation  where  they 
sell  or  farm  out  an  exclusive  privilege  to 
vend  articles,  to  enforce  ordinances  de- 
signed to  protect  the  privilege.  La  Rosa 
V.  Mayor,  4  La.  An.  24 ;  Same  v.  Same,  1 
lb.  126  ;  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Peyroux,  6  Martin 
(La.),  155;  Griffin  v.  Mayor,  5  Martin 
(La.),  279.  City  corporation  cannot  agree 
to  abdicate  its  legislative  powers  in  re- 
lation to  markets,  nor  contract  to  create 
a  monopoly.  Gale  v.  Kalamazoo,  23  Mich. 
344,  1871;  ante,  sec.  362. 

1  Buffalo  V.  V^^ebster,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
100,  1833.  Chief  Justice  Savage  affirms, 
arguendo,  that  such  an  ordinance  would 
be  valid  under  the  common  law  power  of 
corporations  to  make  by-laws  for  the  gen- 
eral good  of  the  corporation.  lb.  Ap- 
proving Pierce  v.  Bartram,  Cowp.  269 ; 
following  Bush  v.  Seaburjj,  8  Johns.  (N. 
y.)  418,  1811,  and  distinguished  from 
Dunham  v.  Rochester,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
462  ;  Shelton  v.  Mobile,  30  Ala.  540, 1857. 
"  The  fixing  the  place  and  times  at  which 
markets  shall  be  held  and  kept  open," 
says  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York  in 
Bush  V.  Seabury,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  418, 
"  and  the  prohibition  to  sell  at  other 
places  and  times,  are  among  the  most 
ordinary  regulations  of  a  city  or  town 
police,  and  would  naturally  be  included 
in  the  general  power  to  pass  by-laws  rel- 


§  386.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


389 


the  extent  of  power  to  establish  and  regulate  markets,  as  will  be 
seen  by  the  cases  cited  in  the  note.^ 


ative  to  the  public  markets.  If  the  cor- 
poration liad  not  the  power  in  question, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  wliat  useful  purpose 
could  be  effected,  or  what  object  was  in- 
tended, by  the  grant  of  power  to  pass 
laws  'relative  to  the  public  markets.'" 

1  Power  to  make  ordinances  concern- 
ing "  markets,  health,  and  good  order  "  of 
the  town  autliorizes  an  ordinance  pro- 
hibiting the  sale  of  butcher's  meat  within 
the  corporate  limits,  excepting  at  the 
public  market.  Winsboro  v.  Smart,  11 
Eich.  (South  Car.)  Law,  551,  1858.  It 
seems  the  defendant  was  convicted, 
though  he  sold  the  meat  inside  his  own 
blacksmith  shop.  Such  ordinances  are 
sustained,  says  the  court,  on  the  ground 
that  they  are  not  in  restraint  of  trade, 
but  a  proper  regulation  of  it.  lb.  Leg- 
islative power  to  a  city  "  to  erect  market- 
houses,  establish  markets  and  market- 
places, and  provide  for  the  government 
and  regulation  thereof,"  authorizes  an 
ordinance  with  a  pecuniary  penalty,  pro- 
viding that  fresh  beef  shall  not  be  sold  in 
the  city  less  than  by  the  quarter  at  any 
other  than  the  market-place  during  mar- 
ket hours.  Bowling  Green  v.  Carson,  10 
Bush  (Ky.).  64,  1873.  So,  in  the  city  of 
St.  Louis  V.  Jackson,  25  Mo.  37,  1857, 
where  it  appeared  that  the  city,  under 
proper  authority,  had  erected  a  public,  or 
city,  market-house,  and  that  by  its  char- 
ter it  had  power  also,  "  to  regulate,"  b}^  or- 
dinance, the  sale  of  meats,  it  was  held 
that  this  gave  the  city  authority  to  pro- 
vide, by  ordinance,  that  "  no  person,  not 
a  lessee  of  a  stall  in  the  market,  shall 
sell,  or  offer  for  sale,  meat  in  less  quanti- 
ties than  one  quarter."  The  court  con- 
sidered such  an  ordinance  as  reasonable, 
highly  proper,  and  not  in  restraint  of 
trade,  and  not  embraced  in  the  reasoning 
in  the  case  of  Dunham  v.  Trustees  of 
Rochester,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  402;  s.  p.  see, 
also,  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo.  547, 1860; 
Le  Claire  v.  Davenport,  13  Iowa,  210; 
D.avenport  v.  Kelly,  7  Iowa,  102;  Ash  v. 
People,  11  Mich.  347.  But  in  Caldwell 
V.  Alton,  .33  111.  416,  1864,  where  the  city, 
by  its  charter,  had  power  "  to  establish  and 
regulate  markets,"  and   under   the   jjower 


passed  an  ordinance  forbidding,  during 
market  hours,  the  sale  of  vegetables  out- 
side the  limits  of  the  market,  it  was  held 
that  the  city  could  not  restrain  a  regular 
dealer  or  merchant  from  vending  vegeta- 
bles at  his  place  of  business  outside  of 
market  limits  during  any  part  of  the  day, 
such  a  restraint  of  trade  being  unreason- 
able. The  court  reviewed  many  of  the 
cases  in  other  states  on  this  subject,  and 
were  of  opinion  that  the  power  to  regulate 
could  only  extend  to  the  market  limits, 
and  that  these  limits  could  not,  under 
this  power,  be  made  to  extend  through- 
out the  city.  The  court  adhered  to  its 
views  in  a  subsequent  case  in  which  it 
was  held  that  power  "  to  erect  market- 
houses,  establish  markets  and  market- 
places, and  provide  for  the  government 
and  regulation  thereof,"  does  not  au- 
thorize the  council  of  a  large  and  growing 
town  to  fix  upon  one  market-place,  and 
prohibit  all  persons  at  all  hours  of  the 
day  from  selling  fresh  meats  elsewhere. 
Such  an  ordinance  was  regarded  as  un- 
reasonable, in  restraint  of  trade,  and 
tending  to  create  a  monopoly.  It  was 
admitted,  however,  that  if  the  ordinance 
had  fixed  a  reasonable  number  of  hours 
each  day  in  which  the  prohibition  should 
operate,  leaving  persons  free  to  sell  out- 
side of  market  hours,  it  would  probably 
be  unobjectionable.  Bloomington  v.  Wahl, 
46  111.  489, 1868.  So,  in  Bethune  v.  Hughes, 
28  Ga.  560, 1859,  the  court,  leaning  against 
exclusive  privileges,  held  that  power  by 
the  charter  to  the  corporation  "  to  estab- 
lish and  keep  up  a  public  market  in  the 
city  for  the  sale  of,"  etc.,  does  not  confer 
upon  the  city  power  to  pass  an  ordinance 
prohibiting  the  sale  of  marketable  articles 
elsewhere  than  at  the  market-place.  Dis- 
tinguished, Baskins  v.  Robinson,  53  Ga. 
613,  1875;  s.  p.  St.  Paul  v.  Laidler,  2 
Minn.  190,  1858 ;  commented  on  and  dis- 
approved in  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo. 
547,  1809;  see  St.  Paul  v.  Coulter,  12 
Minn.  41.  Charter  power  to  a  city  "to 
establish  public  markets  and  other  public 
buildings,  and  make  rules  and  regulations 
for  the  government  of  the  same,  to  ap- 
point suitable  officers  for  overseeing  and 


390 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS; 


[CH.  XII. 


§  387.  (320)  In  a  ■well-considered  case  in  Massachusetts  it  is 
decided  that  a  city  corporation  has  the  clear  right  to  prohibit,  by- 
ordinance,  the  occupation  of  a  stand,  for  the  vending  of  commodi- 
ties, in  the  streets.  It  may  thns  prohibit  not  only  its  own  inhabi- 
tants, but  others.  It  may  make  the  prohibition  absolute,  or  it 
may  make  it  conditional  on  obtaining  license  or  permission.  It 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regulation,  and  does  not  violate  pri- 
vate rights  or  improperly  restrain  trade.^ 


regulating  such  markets  and  to  restrain 
all  persons  from  interrupting  or  inter- 
fering with  tlie  due  observance  of  such 
rules  and  regulations,"  does  not  confer 
upon  its  conuuon  council  authority  to 
pass  an  ordinance  prohibiting  "  every 
farmer,  gardener,  or  person  producing 
vegetables  "  from  selling  the  same  in  and 
along  its  streets  without  first  procuring 
an  annual  license  from  the  city  authori- 
ties, paying  therefor  into  the  city  treas- 
ury the  sum  of  twenty-five  dollars.  St. 
Paul  V.  Treager,  25  Minn.  248,  1878.  The 
nature  of  the  power  "  to  establish  public 
markets,"  etc.,  is  very  satisfactorily  dis- 
cussed in  this  case  by  Cornell,  .J.  An 
ordinance  regulating  tlie  killing  and  bleed- 
ing of  meats  is  authorized  by  power  to 
regulate  butchers,  the  place  and  mode  of 
selling,  and  to  prevent  unlicensed  persons 
from  acting  as  butchers.  City  of  Brook- 
lyn V.  Cleves,  HiU  &  Denio  (N.  Y.),  Suppl. 
231,  1843.  Under  power  to  regulate  the 
vending  of  meats,  a  conviction  under  an 
ordinance  forbidding  the  sale  of  unwhole- 
some meats  and  other  provisions  cannot 
be  sustained  for  selling  putrid  eggs. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Rochester  v.  Rood,  Hill  & 
Denio  (N.  Y.),  Suppl.  146. 

By  the  Municipal  Act  of  Canada  the 
council  may  pass  by-laws  "  for  establish- 
ing and  regulating  all  markets ;  for  pre- 
venting or  regulating  the  sale  by  retail  in 
the  public  streets  of  any  meat,  vegetables, 
fruit,  or  beverages ;  for  regulating  the 
place  and  manner  of  selling  and  weighing 
butcher's  meat,  fish,  hay,  straw,  fodder, 
wood,  and  lumber,  etc.  Harr.  Munic. 
Manual,  2d  ed.  p.  228.  The  following 
cases,  digested  by  Mr.  Harrison,  show  the 
judicial  construction  of  the  act. 

The  power  under  the  act  is  to  regu- 
late all  markets  established,  apparently 
including  those  established  by  the  Crown, 
as  well  as  those  established  by  municipal 


authority.  "  Regulation  must  of  neces- 
sity include  the  appropriation  of  one  or 
more  parts  of  the  market  for  one  purpose, 
and  other  part  or  parts  for  other  purposes  ; 
of  providing  that  free  passage  through  the 
market  be  kept  open  for  ready  access  to 
shops,  stalls,  or  other  places  where  difler- 
ent  commodities  are  exposed  for  sale.  Per 
Draper,  C.  J.,  in  Kelly  and  the  Corporation 
of  the  City  of  Toronto,  23  Upper  Can.  Q. 
B.  420." 

A  by-law  enacting  "  that  no  butcher 
or  other  person  shall  cut  up  or  expose  for 
sale  any  fresh  meat  in  any  part  of  the 
city  except  in  the  shops  and  stalls  in  the 
public  markets,  or  at  such  places  as  the 
Standing  Connnittee  on  Public  Markets 
may  appoint,"  was  held  good.  lb.  But 
a  by-law  enacting  "  that  no  person  should 
expose  for  sale  any  meat,  fish,  poultry, 
eggs,  butter,  cheese,  grain,  hay,  straw, 
cord-wood,  shingles,  lumber,  flour,  wool, 
meal,  vegetables,  or  fruit  (except  wild 
fruit),  hides  or  skins,  within  the  town,  at 
any  place  but  the  public  market,  without 
having  first  paid  the  market  fee  thereon 
as  therein  provided,  except  all  hides  and 
skins  from  animals  slaughtered  by  the 
licensed  butcher  of  the  corporation,  hold- 
ing a  stall  in  the  market,"  was  held  bad. 
Fennell  and  the  Corporation  of  the  Town 
of  Guelph,  in  re,  24  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  238, 
Also,  "that  meat,  ^sh,i>ouhri/,  eggs,  cheese, 
grain,  hay,  straw,  cord-wood,  shingles,  lum- 
ber, flour,  wool,  meal,  tsegetahles,  or  fruit 
(except  wild  fruit),  should  not  be  exposed 
for  sale  within  tlie  municipality,  except  in 
the  market,  before  12  o'clock,  noon,"  was 
held  bad  as  to  the  articles  mentioned  in 
italics.     11). 

1  Nightingale,  in  re,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 
168,  1831.  In  this  case  the  ordinance 
of  the  city  (Boston)  provided  "that  no 
inhabitant  of  the  city  of  Boston,  or  of 
any  town  in  the  vicinity  thereof,  not  offer- 


§  390.] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


391 


§  888.  (321)  But  authority  to  erect  a  market,  and  power  "  to 
regulate  the  general  police,"  and  "to  preserve  the  peace  and 
good  order  of  the  city,"  do  not  authorize  the  corporation  to  im- 
pose a  tax  for  revenue  purposes  upon  persons  occupying  market- 
stands  in  the  streets,  or  selling  produce  therein.  Such  a  power 
must  be  plainly  conferred  or  it  will  not  be  held  to  exist.^ 

§  389.  (322)  The  right  to  regulate  markets  established  by  a 
city  under  its  charter  is  one  of  municipal  police.  The  city  au- 
thorities may  say  what  articles  shall  or  shall  not  be  sold  at  the 
public  markets,  and  may  impose  penalties  on  those  who  violate 
their  ordinances.  They  may  for  example,  prohibit  groceries  and 
oysters  from  being  sold  at  the  public  markets,  and  require  oys- 
ters, which  have  a  great  tendency  to  putrefaction,  to  be  sold  at 
certain  designated  stands,  and  prevent  their  being  sold  else- 
where.^ 

§  390.  (323)  Inspection  Ordinances.  —  A  municipal  corpora- 
tion, says  Mr.  Willcock,  may  regulate  the  manner  of  carrying  on 


ing  for  sale  the  produce  of  his  own  farm, 
etc.,  should,  without  the  permission  of 
the  clerk  of  Faneuil  Hall  market,  be  suf- 
fered to  occupy  any  stand  with  cart,  sleigh, 
or  otherwise,  for  the  purpose  of  vending 
commodities  in  either  of  the  streets  men- 
tioned in  the  first  section  of  this  ordi- 
nance," etc.  It  was  objected  against  this 
ordinance  that  it  was  void  :  1.  Because 
it  was  partial,  not  operating  upon  all  the 
citizens  of  tlie  state  equally.  2.  Because  it 
was  uncertain,  the  term  ''vicinity"  be- 
ing indefinite.  And,  3.  Because  it  was 
in  restraint  of  trade.  But  neither  of  these 
objections  was  considered  tenable.  The 
validity  of  such  an  ordinance  was  again 
affirmed  by  the  same  court  in  Common- 
wealth V.  Rice,  9  Met.  (Mass.)  2.53,  1845. 
See  this  case  also  as  to  requisites  in  certain 
respects  of  complaints  for  the  violation 
of  such  an  ordinance,  and  as  to  what  acts 
will  be  deemed  to  be  violations.  See 
supra,  sec.  319,  note  ;  Shelton  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  of  Mobile,  30  Ala.  540,  1857  ;  Wart- 
man  V.  Philadelphia,  33  Pa.  St.  202,  1854. 
An  ordinance  forbade  the  sale  of  fresh 
meats  except  by  persons  licensed,  but 
contained  a  proviso  in  favor  oi  farmers, 
authorizing  them  to  sell  meats,  the  pro- 
diice  of  their  own  farms.  The  evident 
object  was  considered  to  be  to  protect 


licensed  butchers,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
allow  farmers  to  come  in  and  sell  the 
produce  of  their  own  farms.  It  was  held 
that  an  unlicensed  butcher  was  not  a 
"farmer"  within  the  meaning  of  the pro- 
viso,  although  the  meats  which  he  sold 
came  from  sheep  fattened  on  his  farm,  if 
the  farm  was  only  a  convenient  append- 
age to  his  business  as  a  butcher.  Roch- 
ester V.  Pettinger,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  265, 
1837 ;  St.  Paul  v.  Traeger,  25  Minn.  248, 
1878,  cited  supra,  sec.  386,  note. 

1  Kip  V.  Patterson,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
298,  1857.  This  power,  it  was  said,  would 
authorize  "  the  renting  of  stalls  in  the 
market-house,  and  perhaps  of  even  pro- 
hibiting sales  in  the  public  streets."  lb. 
per  Elmer,  J. 

2  Municipality  v.  Cutting,  4  La.  An. 
335, 1849 ;  Morano  v.  JMayor,  2  La.  An. 
218.  Power  of  city  to  vacate  leases  and 
stalls  in  public  market,  under  ordinance 
reserving  the  right,  see  City  Council  v. 
Goldsmith,  2  Speer's  (South  Car.)  Law, 
428.  Occupant  of  city  market  failing  to 
pay  rent  in  advance,  according  to  con- 
tract, held  a  tenant  at  will.  Dubuque  v. 
Miller,  11  Iowa,  583.  Control  over  ten- 
ants. Walpper  v.  Philadelphia,  38  Pa. 
St.  203. 


392 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


trade  within  a  municipality  so  far  as  to  prevent  monopolies  or  the 
sale  of  unfit  connnodities,  and  to  ensure  proper  conduct  in  those 
who  practise  it  within  their  jurisdiction.^  In  general,  it  may  be 
said  that  incorporated  cities  and  larger  towns  in  this  country 
have  conferred  upon  them  the  power  to  pass  ordinances  regulat- 
ing, to  a  reasonable  extent,  the  mode  in  which  the  traffic  of  the 
place  shall  be  conducted ;  but  they  can  exercise  no  powers  in 
this  respect  not  conferred.^  Laws  requiring  articles  to  be  in- 
spected or  weighed  and  measured  before  being  sold  are  in  the 
nature  of  police  regulations,  and  are  valid  in  the  absence  of  spe- 
cial constitutional  provisions.  When  reasonable  in  their  nature, 
they  are  not  regarded  as  being  in  restraint  of  trade.^ 


1  Willc.  Corp.  142,  pi.  332. 

2  Nightingale,  in  re,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 
168;  Stokes  v.  New  York,  14  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  87  ;  Raleigh  v.  Sorrell,  1  Jones  (North 
Car.)  Law,  49;  Chicago  v.  Quimby,  38 
III.  274,  1858;  Howe  v.  Norris,  12  Allen 
(Mass.),  82;  Libbey  v.  Downey,  5  Allen 
(Mass.),  299;  Collins  v.  Louisville,  2  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  134,  1841.  Power  to  appoint 
measurers  of  wood,  and  affix  a  reasonable 
allowance  to  them,  does  not  justify  the 
imposition  of  a  tax  for  revenue.     lb. 

2  Cooley  Const.  Lim.  59G ;  Raleigh  v. 
Sorrell, s»/7m ,•  Stokes  v.  New  York, supra; 
Page  V.  Fazakerly,  36  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  392; 
Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  v.  Nichols,  4 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  209,  1843;  compare  Mayor 
V.  Hyatt,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  156; 
Rogers  v.  Jones,  1  "Wend.  (N.  Y.)  237; 
Yates  V.  Milwaukee,  12  Wis.  752.  The 
system  of  inspection  laws,  and  the  hosts  of 
officers  which  they  engendered,  were  con- 
sidered by  the  constitutional  convention 
of  Neiv  York  to  entail  annoyances  and 
burdens  upon  the  community  sufficient  to 
outweigh  any  benefits  resulting  from 
them;  and  the  constitution  of  1846  (art. 
V.  sec.  8)  abolished  all  such  offices  and 
forbade  the  legislature  to  re-create  them, 
in  this  language:  "All  offices  for  the 
weighing,  measuring,  culling,  or  inspect- 
ing of  any  merchandise,  produce,  manu- 
facture, or  commodity  whatever,  are  here- 
by abolished,  and  no  such  offices  shall 
hereafter  be  created  by  law."  See  Tink- 
ham  V.  Tapscott,  17  N.  Y.  144,  147,  1858, 
where  the  origin,  scope,  and  purpose  of 
this  provision  are  very  satisfactorily  dis- 
cussed by  Deuio,  J.     In  Illinois  it  is  held 


that  inspection  power  conferred  upon  a 
board  of  trade,  to  be  exercised  when  re- 
quested by  its  members,  may  co-exist 
with  like  power  in  the  city  authorities  to 
be  exercised  in  all  cases  when  requested. 
Chicago  V.  Quimby,  38  111.  274,  1858. 

The  following  cases  are  referred  to  as 
showing  the  solicitude  of  the  law  to  pre- 
serve the  public  health  ;  but  in  this  coun- 
try the  power  of  municipal  corporations 
in  this  respect  depends  on  their  charters 
or  other  legislative  provision. 

Knowingly  to  expose  for  sale  in  a  pub- 
lic market  meat  which  is  not  fit  for  hu- 
man food  is  indictable.  Regina  v.  Steven- 
son, 3  F.  &  F.  106 ;  so  knowingly  taking 
unfit  meat  to  public  market  for  sale.  The 
Queen  v.  Jarvis,  lb.  108 ;  but  in  eitlier 
event  the  knowledge  of  the  unfitness  of 
the  food  is  essential  to  the  creation  of  the 
offence.  Regina  v.  Crawley,  lb.  109.  The 
offimce  is  a  nuisance  at  common  law. 
Shillito  V.  Thompson,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  Div. 
12.  Each  single  act  of  exposure  of  tainted 
meat  is  a  distinct  oflfence.  Hartley,  in  re, 
31  L.  J.  M.  C.  232.  A  salesman  who 
sells  in  a  public  market  meat  which  is 
afterwards  found  to  be  unfit  for  human 
food,  but  which  he  has  no  means  of  know- 
ing or  reason  to  suspect  was  other  than 
good  and  wholesome  meat,  is  not  liable 
to  an  action  upon  an  implied  warranty  or 
for  money  had  and  received.  Emmerton 
V.  Mathews,  7  H.  &  N.  586  ;  but  a  person 
who  sends  animals  destined  for  human 
food  to  a  public  n)arket  for  sale,  impliedly 
represents  that  they  are,  so  far  as  he 
knows,  not  infected  with  any  contagious 
disease  dangerous  to  life  or  health. 


§  393.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES  OR  BY-LAWS.  393 

§  391.  (324)  Power  to  a  city  "  to  regulate  the  public  market, 
and  to  pass  such  other  ordinances  as  shall  seem  meet  for  the  im- 
provement and  good  government  of  the  city,"  authorizes  an  ordi- 
nance requiring  oats,  hay,  etc.,  to  be  weighed  by  the  public 
weighmaster  before  being  offered  for  sale,  and  imposing  a  penalty 
for  its  violation. 1 

§  892.  (325)  A  grant  to  the  common  council  of  "  all  powers, 
rights,  etc.,  incident  to  municipal  corporations  and  necessary  to 
the  proper  government  of  the  same,"  might  authorize  a  city  to 
prevent  the  sale  of  bread  made  out  of  unwholesome  flour,  and, 
as  a  consequence,  to  provide  for  its  inspection,  but  it  would  not 
give  the  power  to  regulate  the  assize,  that  is,  the  weight  and  price 
of  bread,  for  the  latter  is  a  power  not  absolutely  necessary  for  the 
proper  government  of  a  city.  Power,  however,  to  a  city,  "  to 
regulate  everything  which  relates  to  bakers,"  does  authorize  an 
ordinance  regulating  the  weight,  size,  and,  it  seems,  the  price,  of 
bread,  and  the  forfeiture  of  bread  illegally  baked ;  and  such  an 
ordinance,  it  has  been  held,  is  not  in  violation  of  any  provision 
of  the  constitution  of  Louisiaiia? 

§  393.  (326)  Police  Regulations  respecting  the  Public  Peace 
and  Safety.  —  Our  city  governments  usually  possess  the  power, 
either  by  express  grant  or  by  virtue  of  their  authority,  to  make 
by-laws  relating  to  the  public  safety  and  good  order  of  the  inhab- 
itants, to  regulate  the  rate  of  speed  of  travel  in  the  public  streets  ; 
the  route  or  streets  over  which  omnibuses,  stage-coaches,  drays, 
etc.,  may  run ;    the  time  of  day  in  which  the  streets   may  be 

1  Kaleigh   v.  Sorrell,  1  Jones  (North  ing  every  person  selling  meat  or  articles 

Car.)  Law,  49,  1853;  approving  Nightin-  of  provision  by  retail,  whether  by  weight, 

gale's  Case,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  168  ;  Stokes  count,  or  measure,  should  provide  himself 

V.  Corporation  of   New  York,  14  Wend,  with  scales,  weiglits,  and  measures,  but 

(N.  Y.)  87.     This  power  was  also  held  to  that  no  spring  balance,  spring  scale,  spring 

authorize   tlie   creation   of   the   office  of  steelyards,  or  spring  weighing  machine 

weiglimaster  and  tlie  payment  of  his  sal-  sliould  be  used  for  any  market  purpose, 

ary.     1  Jones,  49,  sufira.     Construction  of  was  lield  valid.    Snell  and  Belleville,  in  re, 

ordinance  as  to  weighing  liay  on  public  30  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  81. 

scales.    Goss  v.  Corporation,  etc.,  4  Sneed  ^  Guillotte  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An. 

(Tenn.),  62  ;  Yates  v.  Milwaukee,  12  Wis.  432,  1857  ;  Page  v.  Fazakerly,  3G  Barb. 

752.     Construction  of  statute  as  to  mode  (N.  Y.)  392.     But  as  to  forfeiture,  quaere, 

of  measuring  grain.     Fmzier  v.  Warfield,  in   absence   of   express   power,   and   see 

13  Md.  270.     Of  ordinance  as  to  survey  Phillips  v.  Allen,  41  Pa.  St.  481;  Mayor, 

of  lumber  before  sale.     Briggs  v.  Boat,  7  etc.  of  Mobile  v.  Y'uille,  3  Ala.  139. 
Allen  (Mass.),  287.     An  ordinance  requir- 


394 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


used  for  certain  purposes ;  to  interdict  stoppages  in  the  street  to 
the  delay  of  others;  to  exclude  vehicles  of  all  kinds  from  enter- 
ing upon  or  passing  over  the  sidewalks,  etc.,  etc.  The  public 
safety  and  convenience  may  require  regulations  of  this  character  ; 
but  they  must  not,  unless  made  by  virtue  of  specific  authority, 
be  unreasonable  or  improperly  in  restraint  of  trade.^  Power  to 
make  by-laws   for   "  the   good   rule   and  government "  of  the 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Stodder,  2  Cush. 
(Mass.)  562,  1848,  where  the  subject  of 
the  power  of  cities  over  streets,  partic- 
ularly in  reference  to  omnibuses,  is  fully 
considered  by  Mr.  Justice  Dewey;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Robertson,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 
438,  1850,  as  to  stoppages  in  streets  con- 
trary to  ordinance ;  Baker  v.  City  of 
Boston,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  184,  1831;  Van- 
derbilt  v.  Adams,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  349;  76. 
385;  Austin  v.  Murray,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
12G.  Power  to  a  city  "  to  regulate  the 
running  of  railroad  cars  "  authorizes  the 
adoption  of  an  ordinance  prohibiting 
the  propulsion  of  cars  by  steam  within 
the  corporate  limits.  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Buffalo,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  209,  1843. 

Power  to  the  city  of  Richmond  to 
make  "  ordinances,  not  contrary  to  the 
constitution  and  laws  of  the  state,  as 
shall  be  thought  necessary  for  the  good 
ordering  and  government "  of  its  inhab- 
itants, was  considered  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  to  imply  the 
power  to  ordain  and  establish  suitable 
police  regulations,  and  that  includes  the 
power  to  prohibit  the  use  of  locomotive 
engines  propelled  by  steam  on  the  public 
streets,  when  such  action  does  not  inter- 
fere with  any  vested  rights;  and  legis- 
tive  authority  to  a  specified  railway 
company  to  construct  its  road  "from 
some  point  within  the  corporation  of 
Richmond  to  be  approved  by  the  com- 
mon council,"  does  not  give  it  a  vested 
right  to  the  use  of  a  particular  street  free 
from  municipal  control,  when  the  city,  in 
consenting  to  such  use,  reserved  its  char- 
tered powers  in  that  behalf.  Richmond, 
etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Richmond,  90  U.  S. 
521, 1877.  Special  charter  construed  to  au- 
thorize an  ordinance  for  filling  a  street, 
although  it  is  covered  by  a  plank  road 
laid  under  special  legislative  authority. 
State  V.  Jersey  City,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  444 ; 


post,  chapter  on  Streets,  sec.  713.  In 
Napman  v.  People,  19  Mich.  352,  1869,  a 
lawful  arrangement  between  a  railroad 
company  and  an  omnibus  company  as 
to  the  delivery  of  passengers  was  held  to 
be  beyond  municipal  interference. 

A  by-law  prohibiting  rapid  driving  in 
the  streets  of  a  city  by  carters  and  oth- 
ers is  not  in  restraint  of  trade,  and  is 
reasonable  and  valid ;  and  in  a  prosecu- 
tion for  its  violation,  it  is  not  necessary 
to  prove  that  any  individual  was  actually 
endangered  by  the  fast  driving.  As  the 
mayor  and  aldermen  have  no  authority 
to  give  a  person  permission  to  violate  an 
ordinance,  evidence  of  such  permission, 
as  well  as  evidence  of  the  defendant's 
general  character  as  a  careful  driver,  is 
inadmissible.  Commonwealth  v.  Wor- 
cester, 3  Pick.  (Mass.)  462,  1826;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Stodder,  2  Cush.  (Mass.) 
562,  570,  1848  ;  Washington  v.  Nashville, 
1  Swan  (Tenn.),  177.  Commented  on. 
McBean  v.  Chandler,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
349,  1872;  post,  chapter  on  Streets,  sec. 
713.  Where  an  intent  to  injure  is  not  made 
an  essential  ingredient  of  the  offence  of 
rapid  driving  under  the  ordinance  the 
intent  necessary  to  a  criminal  assault  and 
battery  is  not  supplied  by  a  mere  intent 
to  violate  the  ordinance.  Commonwealth 
V.  Adams,  114  Mass.  323;  s.  c.  19  Am. 
Rep.  362. 

Tiiere  is  no  obligation,  in  the  absence 
of  a  valid  municipal  by-law  or  statute, 
on  the  part  of  people  to  keep  roofs  clear  oj 
snoiv,  or  to  detain  the  snow  so  that  it  can- 
not slide  into  the  street,  though  there 
may  be,  it  seems,  such  a  faulty  construc- 
tion of  roof  as,  on  proof  thereof,  would 
involve  a  liability  on  the  part  of  the 
owner  or  occupier  for  accidents.  Lazarus 
V.  Toronto,  19  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  13,  per 
Robinson,  C.  J.      See  post,  ch.  xxiii. 


§  395.]  MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  395 

borough  (^ante,  sec.  337),  has  reference  to  the  government  of  the 
borough  as  a  corporation,  and  the  making  of  regulations  for  carry- 
ing into  effect  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  incorporated.  {Post, 
sec.  408.)  General  powers  of  this  character,  without  more, 
do  not  enable  a  town  council  to  carry  out  any  unreasonable  ideas 
of  general  good  government,  and  to  impose  penalties  for  the  doing 
of  things  which  are  not  prohibited  by  any  public  statute,  nor  by 
the  common  law.^ 

§  394.  (327)  Under  a  general  power  to  make  "  needful  and 
salutary  by-laws,"  a  city  ordinance  of  Boston,  requiring  the  ten- 
ant or  occupant,  or,  in  case  there  shall  be  no  tenant,  the  owners 
of  buildings  bordering  on  certain  streets,  to  clear  the  snow  from 
the  sideivalks  adjoining  their  respective  buikUngs,  is  reasonable 
and  valid.  It  was  objected  against  this  ordinance  that  it  violated 
the  fundamental  maxim,  that  all  burdens  and  taxes  laid  upon  the 
people  for  the  public  good  shall  be  equal.  The  objection  was 
overruled.  And  it  was  justly  regarded  by  the  court  as  in  the 
nature  of  a  police  regulation,  requuing  a  duty  to  be  performed 
highly  salutary  and  advantageous  to  the  citizens  of  a  populous 
and  closely  built  city,  and  imposed  upon  the  persons  named  be- 
cause they  are  so  situated  that  they  can  promptly  and  conve- 
niently perform  it ;  and  it  is  laid  not  upon  a  few,  but  upon  a 
numerous  class,  and  equally  upon  all  who  are  within  the  descrip- 
tion composing  the  class  and  who  commonly  derive  a  peculiar 
benefit  from  the  duty  required.  It  would  doubtless  be  otherwise 
if  the  ordinance  arbitrarily  imposed  this  duty  upon  the  mechanics 
or  merchants,  or  any  other  class  of  citizens  between  whose  con- 
venience and  the  labor  required  there  is  no  natural  relation.^ 

§  395.  (328.)  The  power  to  make  "  salutary  by-laws,"  with 
respect  to  the  use  of  streets,  will,  it  seems,  authorize  a  city  to 
pass  by-laws  regulating  the  removal  of  buildings  and  the  tempo- 
rary use  of  the  streets  and  highways  for  that  purpose.^ 

'  Addison  on  Torts,  34 ;  Rex  v.  West-  In  Illinois  it  is  held  that  a  city  has  no 

wood,  4  B.  &  C.     781 ;  Reg.  v.  Wood,  5  power  by  ordinance  to  compel  an  abutter, 

Ell.  &  Bl.  55;  post,  sec.  408.  under  penalty,  to  remove  the  snow  from 

2  Goddard,  in  re,  16  Pick.  (Mass.)  504,  tlie  sidewalk  within  a  certain  time.     He 
1835;    Union  Railway  Co.  r.  Cambridge,  ha.s  no  more  interest  in  such  removal  than 
11  Allen  (Mass.),  287;  Kirby  v.  Boylston  any  other  citizen.     Gridley  v.  Blooming- 
Market    Assoc,   14   Gray    (Mass.),  252;  ton,  88  111.  554. 
post,  ch.  xxiii.  note  and  cases  cited.  ^  j)ay  v.  Green,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  433, 


596 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


^  396.  (329)  Ordinances  under  Police  Power  and  General 
Welfare  Clause.  —  Other  illustrations  of  what  a  municipal  cor- 
poration may  do  under  the  general  welfare  clause  in  its  organic 
act,  or  under  its  police  power  or  its  implied  right  to  pass  by-laws, 
or  under  a  general  grant  of  authority  for  that  purpose,  may  be 
here  given. 

Under  authority  "  to  ordain  and  publish  such  acts,  laws,  and 
regulations,  not  inconsistent  with  the  constitution  and  laws  of 
the  state  as  shall  be  needful  to  the  good  order  of  the  city,"  it  can, 
says  Howard,  J.,  "  subject  to  these  restrictions  and  certain  statute 
regulations,  establish  all  suitable  ordinances  for  administering 
the  government  of  the  city,  the  preservation  of  the  health  of  the 
inhabitants,  and  the  convenient  transaction  of  business  within  its 
limits,  and  for  the  performance  of  the  general  duties  required  by 
law  of  municipal  corporations."  ^ 

§  397.  (330)  Power  to  pass  such  ordinances  "to  maintain 
the  peace,  good  government,  and  order  of  the  city,  and  the  trade, 
commerce,  and  manufactures  thereof,  as  the  council  may  deem 
expedient,  not  repugnant  to    the    constitution   and  laws  of  the 


437,  per  Shaw,  C.  J.  And  wliere  such  a 
by-law  proliibits  the  moving  without  a 
license  granted  by  the  mayor  and  alder- 
men, a  license  granted  by  the  mayor  is 
void,  even  though  the  board  of  aldermen, 
by  a  vote,  had  previously  undertaken  to 
delegate  the  power  to  grant  such  license 
to  the  mayor  alone.  The  by-law  con- 
templates that  the  mayor  and  aldermen 
sliould  act  unitedly  as  one  body.     lb. 

1  Per  Howard,  J.,  State  v.  Merrill,  37 
Me.  (2  Heath)  229, 1853.  Such  would  un- 
doubtedly be  the  proper  construction  if 
this  were  the  only  power  given  to  the  city 
to  pass  ordinances  or  by-laws.  It  should 
then  be  somewhat  liberally  construed. 
But  if  such  a  general  grant  is  given  in 
connection  with,  or  at  the  end  of,  a  long 
list  of  specific  powers,  perhaps  so  ex- 
tended a  construction  might  not  then  be 
due  to  it.  The  power  conferred  by  gen- 
eral welfare  clause  is  restricted  by  refer- 
ence to  other  provisions  of  the  charter  or 
constituent  act.  City  Council  i'.  Plank 
Road  Co.,  31  Ala.  76, 1857 ;  Mount  Pleas- 
ant V.  Breeze,  11  Iowa,  399,  400, 1860,  per 
Wright,  J. 

A  city  government  imder  the  usual 


grants  of  power  has  the  general  author- 
ity to  so  regulate  the  use  and  enjoyment 
of  private  property  in  the  city  as  to  pre- 
vent its  proving  pernicious  to  the  citizens 
generally,  and  may,  when  the  use  to  which 
tiie  owner  devotes  his  property  becomes  a 
nuisance,  compel  him  to  cease  so  to  use  it, 
and  punish  him  for  refusing  to  obey  its 
ordinances  and  regulations  concerning 
such  use.  Louisville  City  Railway  Co. 
V.  Louisville,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  415,  1871. 

The  statute  of  California,  authorizing 
supervisors  of  San  Francisco  "  to  make 
all  regulations  which  may  be  necessary 
or  expedient  for  the  preservation  of  the 
public  iiealth,"  is  within  the  constitutional 
power  of  the  legislature  to  enact;  and 
under  it  the  supervisors  may  pass  an  ordi- 
nance against  feeding  cows  on  distillery 
slops,  and  vending  the  milk  of  cows  thus 
fed.  Johnson  v.  Simonton,  43  Cal.  242, 
1872;  ante,  sees.  141,  144,  3G9,  374,  379. 

A  common  council  has  power  to  adopt 
a  penal  ordinance  requiring  auctioneer  to 
procure  license  from  the  city.  This  power 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  police  regulation. 
Goshen  v.  Kern,  63  Ind.  468.  See  fur- 
ther, Index,  title  License. 


§  399.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


397 


state, "  authorizes  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the  keeping  open  of 
stores^  shops,  and  places  of  business  on  Sunday,  if  its  provisions 
do  not  conflict  with  state  legislation. i  But  the  general  welfare 
clause  does  not  authorize  a  city  to  construct,  or  aid  in  construct- 
ing, a  plank  road  or  toll  bridge  built  by  a  private  company  beyond 
the  corporate  limits  of  the  city.^ 

§  398.  (331)  The  general  welfare  clause  to  pass  ordinances 
for  the  good  government,  etc.,  of  the  corporation,  does  not  au- 
thorize an  ordinance  requiring  the  proprietor  of  a  theatre,  circus, 
or  other  exhibition  licensed  by  the  corporation  to  pay  a  peace  or 
police  officer  of  the  place  two  dollars,  or  any  sum,  for  each  night's 
attendance  upon  such  place  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  order. 
Such  an  ordinance  is  unreasonable,  and  can  only  be  passed  when 
'  clearly  authorized.^ 

399.  (332)  Where  a  city  corporation  is  authorized  "  to  or- 
dain such  laws  not  inconsistent  with  the  constitution  and  laws  of 
the  state  as  shall  be  needful  to  the  good  order  of  the  city,"  it  may 
pass  an  ordinance  imposing  a  penalty  upon  any  person  who  shall 


1  St.  Louis  V.  Cafferata,  24  Mo.  94, 
1856  ;  see  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Ih.  330 ;  State 
V.  Ams  (constitutionality  of  Sunday  laws 
affirmed),  20  Mo.  214;  s.  p.  Frolichstein 
V.  Mobile,  40  Ala.  725,  1867 ;  Hudson  v. 
Geary,  4  Rh.  Is.  485, 1857  ;  Specht  r.  Com- 
monwealth,-8  Pa.  St.  312;  Cincinnati  v. 
Rice,  15  Ohio,  225;  Karwiscli  v.  Atlanta, 
44  Ga.  204, 1871.  In  the  case  of  the  City 
Council  V.  Benjamin,  2  Strob.  (So.  Car.) 
Law,  508,  1846,  it  was  decided  by  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  South  Carolina  tliat 
an  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Charleston, 
prohibiting  "  public  exposures  for  sales, 
or  sales  of  merchandise,  on  Sunday,"  was 
not  a  violation  of  that  section  of  tlie  state 
constitution  which  declares  that  "the  free 
exercise  and  enjoyment  of  religious  pro- 
fession or  worship,  without  discrimination 
or  preference,  shall  forever  hereafter  be 
allowed  within  this  state  to  all  mankind." 
In  that  case  the  defendant  was  a  Jew,  and 
the  city  was  not  denied  to  be  possessed  of 
all  tlie  power  on  the  subject  which  the 
legislature  could  constitutionally  bestow. 
In  the  case  of  Columbia  t-.  Duke  and 
Marks,  cited  2  Strob.  530,  and  approved, 


a  similar  decision  was  made  at  nisi  prius 
by  Mr.  Justice  Martin.  And  in  this  last 
case  it  was  further  ruled,  that  power  in 
the  charter  to  "  establish  such  by-laws  as 
may  tend  to  the  quiet,  peace,  safety,  and 
good  order  of  the  inhabitants,"  authorized 
the  passage  of  such  an  ordinance.  Under 
"  full  power  to  pass  such  ordinances  as  the 
city  council  shall  deem  expedient  for  the 
government  of  the  city,  not  contrary  to 
the  constitution  of  the  state  or  the  United 
States,"  a  city  may  prohibit,  within  its 
limits,  the  sale  of  liquor  on  Sunday. 
Megowan  v.  Commonwealth,  2  Met.  (Ky.) 
3,  1859;  State  v.  Welch,  36  Conn.  215, 
1869.  In  Shreveport  (city  of)  v.  Levy, 
26  La.  An.  671,  1874;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Rep. 
553,  an  ordinance  forbidding  the  sale  of 
goods  on  Sunday,  but  excepting  those  per- 
sons keeping  their  places  closed  on  Satur- 
day was  held  to  be  unconstitutional  as 
giving  to  Jews  a  privilege  denied  to  others. 

2  City  Council  v.  Plank  Road  Co.,  31 
Ala.  70, 1857;  ante,  sec.  161. 

3  Waters  v.  Leech,  3  Ark.  110,  1840; 
supra,  sec.  319;  post,  sec.  663. 


398  MUNICIPAL  COKPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIL 

mutilate  or  destroy  any  ornamental  tree  planted  in  the  streets^ 
lanes,  or  other  public  places  within  the  limits  of  the  city."  Such 
an  oj'dinance  is  not  inconsistent  with  a  state  law  punishing  the 
malicious  or  wanton  destruction  of  trees  growing  for  ornament  or 
use.  Under  the  ordinance  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  or  prove 
that  the  mutilation  was  malicious  or  wanton,  and  it  would  seem 
to  be  considered  that  it  was  no  defence  that  the  tree  alleged  to  be 
mutilated  was  upon  the  street  in  front  of  the  lot  of  the  accused, 
who  owned,  subject  to  the  public  easement,  at?  medium  filum  vice} 

§  400.  (333)  Under  a  general  power  to  pass  "  any  other  by- 
laws for  the  well-being  of  the  city,"  its  council  may,  b}'  ordi- 
nance, prohibit  saloons,  restaurants,  and  other  places  of  public 
entertainment,  to  be  kept  open  after  ten  o'clock  at  night.  The 
objections  that  such  a  by-law  was  unreasonable,  and  deprived  the 
citizen  of  the  constitutional  right  of  "  acqiiiring  property,"  were 
not  considered  to  be  well  taken.  It  regulates,  but  does  not  de- 
prive the  party  of  his  rights.^ 

§  401.  (334)  Power  "  to  regulate  the  police  of  the  city,"  and 
to  pass  ordinances  not  inconsistent  with  law,  authorizes  an  ordi- 
nance for  arresting  and  fining  vagra7its,  although,  by  the  general 
law  of  the  state,  vagrants  may  be  proceeded  against  before  a 
justice  of  the  peace,  the  court  considering  that  this  did  not  forbid 
the  corporation  from  making  a  local  regulation  on  the  same  subject 
not  in  conflict  with  the  general  law.^ 

1  State  V.  Merrill,  37  Me.  (2  Heath)  "  It  is  an  unavoidable  consequence  of  city 
329,  1853.  Contra,  as  to  right  of  adjoin-  ordinances,  that  they  in  some  degree  in- 
ing  owner.  Lancaster  v.  Richardson,  4  terfere  with  the  unlimited  exercise  of 
Lansing  (N.  Y.),  136,  1871 ;  see  post,  sec.  private  rights."  Per  Bell,  J.,  in  State  v. 
663,  note.  The  case  in  Maine  is  a  quite  Freeman,  38  N.  H.  428  ;  State  v.  Welch, 
liberal  construction  of  the  words  good  36  Conn.  215,  1869.  In  further  support 
order.  But  it  is  necessary  that  cities  of  text.  Platteville  v.  Bell,  43  Wis.  488, 
should  have  such  an  authority,  and  the  1878. 

power  to  pass  the  ordinance  could,  per-  ^  St.  Louis  v.  Bentz,  11  Mo.  61,  1857 ; 
haps,  be  sustained  as  incidental  to  the  distinguished  from  Jefferson  City  ij.  Court- 
power  of  the  city  over  its  streets  and  mire,  9  lb.  68.3,  which  was  a  summary 
public  places.  Post,  chapter  on  Streets,  proceeding  for  an  indictable  offence.  See 
Further  as  to  shade  trees.  Pos^,  sec.  663,  State  v.  Cowan,  29  Mo.  330;  Byers  v. 
note.                                                       -  Commonwealth,  42  Pa.  St.  89,  per  Strong, 

2  The  State  v.  Freeman,  38  N.  H.  426,  J. ;  Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331,  1861  ; 
1859;  following  and  approving  on  this  supra,  sec.  440 ;  pos<,  sec.  427,  note, 
point.  State  v.  Clark,  8  Fost.  (28  N.  II.)  A  statute  by  which  "  two  or  more  over- 
176;  Morris  v.  Rome,  10  Ga.  532,  1851;  seers  of  the  town"  were  authorized   to 
Hudson  V.  Geary,  4  Rho.  Is.  485,  1857.  commit  to  the  workhouse  until  discharged 


§404] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


399 


§  402.  (335)  By  virtue  of  its  police  power  a  municipal  cor- 
poration may  pass  an  ordinance  imposing  a  fine  upon  the  owner 
of  any  animal  found  estray  or  at  large  within  the  limits  of  the 
corporation.^ 

§  403.  (336)  If  a  municipal  corporation  has,  by  its  charter, 
power  to  pass  ordinances  to  preserve  the  peace  and  good  order  of 
the  place,  this  gives  it  authority  to  provide  for  the  punishment,  in 
the  manner  allowed  by  its  charter,  of  persons  who  shall  rescue,  or 
attempt  to  rescue  prisoners  from  the  custody  of  municipal  officers.^ 
Bub  the  general  power,  though  expressly  conferred,  to  enact  by- 
laws for  the  good  government  of  the  town,  does  not  confer  the 
power  to  levy  taxes  of  any  kind,  not  even  upon  retailers  of  ardent 
spirits.^ 

§  404.  (337)  General  Welfare  Clause  continued. —  The  gen- 
eral welfare  clause,  in  a  charter  empowering  the  city  council  to 


by  law,  by  writing  under  their  hands,  to 
be  there  employed  and  governed  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  and  orders  of  the  house," 
etc.,  "  all  persons,  able  of  body  to  work, 
and  not  having  estate  or  means  other- 
wise to  maintain  themselves,  who  refuse 
or  neglect  to  do  so,  live  a  dissolute,  va- 
grant life,  and  exercise  no  ordinary  call- 
ing or  lawful  business  sufficient  to  gain 
an  honest  livelihood,"  does  not  violate 
the  constitutional  right  to  "  life  and  lib- 
erty," or  the  right,  in  "  criminal  proceed- 
ings, to  be  heard  by  counsel,  confronted 
with  witnesses,"  etc.  Tlie  court  did  not 
regard  it  as  a  criminal  proceeding,  but  as 
a  reformatory  or  correctional  one,  so  far 
as  the  person  proceeded  against  was  con- 
cerned, and  designed  to  protect  the  com- 
munity from  becoming  chargeable  with 
the  person's  support.  Adeline  Nott's 
Case,  11  Me.  208,  1834;  s.  p.  Portland 
V.  Bangor,  42  Me.  403,  1856,  Rice,  J., 
dissenting.  It  is  now  admitted  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Maine  that  this  statute 
is  in  conflict  with  the  14th  amendment  of 
the  constitution,  "  That  no  state  shall 
deprive  any  person  of  life,  liherti/,"  etc., 
"  without  due  process  of  law,"  and  that 
Nott's  case  and  Portland  v.  Bangor,  sM/ara, 
are  no  longer  the  law.  Now  there  can  be 
no  restraint  of  liberty  without  first  hav- 
ing a  judicial  investigation  of  the  charge. 
Portland  v.  Bangor,  65  Me.  120,  1876 ;  s. 


c.  20  Am.  Rep.  681.  See  Byers  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 42  Pa.  St.  89 ;  post,  sec.  427, 
note  ;  sec.  433.  In  a  late  case  in  Illinois, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  that  state  decided 
that  the  act  creating  the  Reform  School 
was  unconstitutional,  and  that  the  act,  so 
far  as  it  restrained  liberty  for  any  cause 
except  actual  crime,  was  in  violation  of 
the  Bill  of  Rights.  People  v.  Turner,  10 
Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  3(36,  and  approving 
note  of  Judge  Redjield ;  s.  c.  55  III.  280; 
People  V.  Weisenbach  (power  to  bind  out 
children),  60  N.  Y.  385. 

1  Municipality  v.  Blanc,  1  La.  An.  385, 
1846 ;  Case  v.  Hall,  21  111.  632  ;  Common- 
wealth V.  Bean,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  52; 
Commonwealth  v.  Curtis,  9  Allen  (Mass.), 
266 ;  Roberts  v.  Ogle,  30  111.  4.59  ;  McKee 
V.  McKee,  8  B.  Men.  (Ky.)  433,  1848; 
Waco  V.  Powell  (hogs  at  large),  32  Texas, 
258,  1869;  ante,  sec.  321,  note;  supra,  sec. 
348.  Construction  of  ordinance  prohib- 
iting the  sujferitifj  of  animals  to  run  at 
large,  and  what  must  be  shown  to  subject 
a  person  to  liability  under  such  an  ordi- 
nance. Collinsville  v.  Scanland,  III.  Sup. 
Court,  1872;  Knider  v.  Gillespie,  03  III 
88, 1872. 

2  Independence  v.  Moore,  32  Mo.  392, 
1862. 

8  Commrs.  of  Ashvillc  v.  Means,  7  Ire. 
(N.  C.  Law)  406,  1847  ;  Burnett,  in  re,  30 
Ala.  461,  1857 ;  post,  ch.  xix. 


400 


MUNICJPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


pass  such  other  ordinances  as  aj)pear  necessary  for  tlie  security  of 
the  city,  autliorizos  an  ordinance  regulating  the  mode  of  keeping 
and  the  sale  oi gunpoivdcr  within  the  limits  of  the  corporation,  such 
as  requiring  all  gunpowder  brought  into  the  city  to  be  conveyed 
to  the  public  magazine  of  the  city,  except  when  it  is  to  be  retailed, 
and  then  to  be  kept  in  limited  quantities  and  in  secure  canisters. 
And  it  was  so  held,  notwithstanding  the  point  was  made  in  argu- 
ment that  the  general  welfare  clause  in  the  charter  could  not 
enlarge  the  powers  of  the  corporation  further  than  is  necessary 
to  carry  into  effect  the  specific  grants  of  power.^ 


§  405.  (338)  Municipal  corporations,  general,  with  power  to 
provide  for  the  safety  of  their  inhabitants,  may  prohibit  the 
throwing  of  heavy  or  dangerous  articles  from  the  upper  stories 
of  buildings  into  the  streets  or  open  spaces  near  them,  where 
persons  are  in  the  habit  of  passing ;  and  may,  where  this  is  con- 
sistent with  the  general  and  special  legislation  applicable  to  the 
municipality,  establish  fire  limits^  and  prevent  erection  therein-  of 
wooden  buildings? 


1  Williams  v.  Augusta,  4  Ga.  500, 
1848;  Frederick  v.  Augusta,  4  lb.  561, 
where  the  charter  of  Augusta  is  more 
fully  given. 

2  City  Council  v.  Elford,  1  McMullen 
(South  Car.).  Law,  234,  1841;  Brady?;. 
Insurance  Company,  11  Mich.  425  ;  Doug- 
las V.  Commonwealth,  2  Rawle  (Pa.), 
262;  Wadleigh  v.  Oilman,  12  Me.  403; 
Vanderbilt  v.  Adams.  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
349,  352,  per  Woodrnff",  J.,  arguendo.  In 
Pye  V.  Peterson,  45  Tex.  312,  1876;  s. 
c.  23  Am.  Rep.  608,  the  conclusion  was 
reached  in  view  of  the  legislation  of  the 
state  that  a  general  grant  of  power  to  a 
city,  "  to  ordain  such  ordinances,  not  in- 
consistent with  the  laws  of  the  state,  as 
shall  be  needful  for  the  government,  inter- 
ests, welfare,  and  good  order  of  the  cor- 
poration," did  not  authorize  the  city  to 
establish  fire  limits  and  to  prevent  the 
erection  of  wooden  buildings  within  such 
limits.  The  text  is  referred  to  and  it  is 
admitted  that  it  is  supported  by  Wad- 
leigh V.  Oilman,  and  on  the  other  hand, 
the  Mayor  of  Hudson  v.  Thorne  is  con- 
sidered as  opposed  to  it.  Of  course  the 
question  in  each  case  must  be  decided  in 
view  of  all  the  legislation  of  the  state 


bearing  upon  it.  The  text  in  this  edition 
has  been  slightly  modified.  The  preven- 
tion of  fires  in  towns  and  cities  is  pecu- 
liarly a  matter  for  local  regulation  and  is 
universally  so  regarded.  Ante,  sees.  141, 
143.  It  belongs  to  the  ordinary  police 
powers  of  a  city,  and  unless  such  a  course 
is  inconsistent  with  the  legislation  of  the 
state  touching  the  subject  (as  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Gould  shows  it  to  have  been  in 
Texas),  it  seems  to  us  to  be  presump- 
tively authorized  by  a  general  grant  of 
power  to  provide  for  the  safety  and 
welfare  of  the  inhabitants. 

A  court  of  equity  tuill  not  enjoin  the 
erection  of  a  wooden  building  within  the 
fire  limits  although  such  erection  is  for- 
bidden by  ordinance.  St.  Johns  (village 
of)  V.  McFarlan,  33  Mich.  72,  1875;  s.  c. 
20  Am.  Rep.  671.  Marston,  J.  says  :  "  A 
court  of  chancery  has  no  jurisdiction  to 
restrain  the  threatened  violation  of  a 
village  ordinance,  unless  the  act  threat- 
ened to  be  done,  if  carried  out  will  be  a 
nuisance.  ...  If  a  proper  ordinance  was 
framed  with  an  appropriate  penalty,  we 
think  the  remedy  at  law  would  be  found 
adequate."  Equity  will  not  enjoin  at  the 
instance  of  the  municipality  itself,  even 


§  406.] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


401 


§  406.  (339)    Under  authority  to  make  police  regulations,  or 
to  pass  by-laws  for  the  good  rule  and  government  of  the  corpora- 


where  tlie  ordinance  directs  such  a  suit  to 
be  brouglit  against  any  person  about  to 
erect  a  wooden  building  contrary  to  its 
provisions.  Wanpun  v.  Moore,  34  Wis. 
450,  1874  ;  s.  c.  17  Am.  Rep.  446.  Lyon, 
J.,  says  tliat  "equity  will  not  lend  its 
aid  to  enforce  by  injunction  the  by-laws 
or  ordinances  of  a  municipal  corporation, 
restraining  an  act,  unless  the  act  is  shown 
to  be  a  nuisance  per  se.  High  on  Injunc. 
sec.  788  ;  Mayor,  etc.  i-.Thorne,  7  Paige, 
261 ;  Phillips  v.  Allen,  41  Pa.  St.  481." 

In  Massuc/iHsetts,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  city  or  town  is  held  entitled  to  main- 
tain a  bill  in  equity  to  prevent  the  carry- 
ing on  of  trades  or  occupations  therein 
which  are  intrinsically  nuisances,  con- 
trary to  the  regulations  which  the  town 
or  city,  by  delegated  authority  from  the 
legislature,  is  authorized  to  make.  Win- 
throp  v.  Farrar  (offensive  trade),  11  Allen 
(Mass.),  398.  So  where  a  statute  pro- 
hibited the  use  in  cities  and  towns  of  a 
specified  size,  of  any  building  not  then  so 
in  use,  for  carrying  on  the  business  of 
"  slaughtering  cattle,"  etc.,  without  the 
permission  of  the  municipal  or  town 
authorities,  it  was  held  that  act  was  con- 
stitutional as  an  exercise  of  the  police 
power,  and  that  the  town  or  city  might, 
in  the  corporate  name,  file  a  bill  in  equity 
to  restrain  the  use  of  a  building  therein 
for  tlie  prohibited  purpose  where  the 
required  consent  of  the  local  authorities 
had  not  been  obtained.  Watertown  i-. 
Mayo,  109  Mass.  305,  1872  ;  s.  c.  12  Am. 
Rep.  694.  No  solid  reason,  in  the  au- 
thor's judgment,  exists,  why,  in  proper 
cases,  a  municipal  corporation  may  not 
resort  to  a  court  of  equity  to  aid  it  in 
enforcing  its  public  duties  to  preserve 
the  health  and  property  of  the  inhabi- 
tants ;  and  by  proper  cases  is  meant  those 
which  fall  within  some  recognized  head 
of  equity  jurisdiction. 

In  Connrciicut,  where  the  city  charter 
autliorized  the  common  council  of  a  city 
to  make  ordinances  to  protect  a  city  from 
fire,  and  to  establish  districts  within 
which  it  should  not  be  lawful  without  a 
license  to  erect,  enlarge,  or  place  any 
wooden  building,  the  council  passed  an 
ordinance  establishing  a  fire  district  and 

VOL.  I.  26 


forbidding  the  erection  or  placing  of  any 

wooden  building  therein,  without  license 
given  by  the  board  of  aldermen,  declaring 
that  such  building  should  be  deemed  a 
common  nuisance,  and  making  it  the 
duty  of  certain  officers  after  reasonable 
notice,  to  abate  it,  and  it  was  held  that 
the  ordinance  was  fully  authorized  by  the 
cliarter  and  was  reasonable.  Hine  v. 
New  Haven,  40  Conn.  478,  1873.  In  the 
case  of  a  building  erected  witliout  license 
within  the  fire  limits  of  a  city  in  violation 
of  such  an  ordinance,  it  is  not  sufficient 
reason  for  the  interference  of  a  court  of 
equity  by  injunction  at  the  instance  of  the 
owner  that  he  had  obtained  the  consent 
individually  of  a  majority  of  the  alder- 
men, notice  being  given  him  that  the 
board  when  in  session  might  refuse  its 
assent,  as  it  afterwards  did ;  nor  that  he 
had,  after  placing  the  building,  covered 
it  with  a  sheathing  of  iron  and  tinned  the 
roof,  before  proceedings  were  instituted 
against  him,  and  had  by  further  work 
upon  it  during  the  pendency  of  the  pro- 
ceedings made  it  substantially  fire  proof. 
The  city  authorities  were  considered  by 
the  court  to  be  the  proper  judges  as  to 
how  far  these  facts  should  affect  their 
action.  The  court  expressed  the  further 
view  that  the  prompt  enforcement  of  an 
ordinance  establishing  fire  limits  in  a 
city  is  important  to  the  public  safety, 
and  a  court  of  equity  ought  not  to  inter- 
fere, in  a  case  like  that  before  the  court, 
bj-  injunction  to  prevent  such  enforce- 
ment, but  leave  the  party  aggrieved  to 
his  legal  remedy,  if  he  is  entitled  to  any 
remedy.  Nor  was  it  a  reason  for  the  in- 
terference of  chancery  that  the  building 
erected  in  such  fire  limits  has  become 
real  estate,  since  it  has  become  so  by  the 
unlawful  act  of  the  owner,  and  is  such 
only  in  the  most  technical  sense,  and  the 
value  of  the  building  can  be  easily  ascer- 
tained and  proved.     lb. 

"Where  the  ordinance  passed  under  the 
autliority  above  referred  to  provided  that 
no  person  shall  build  or  enlarge  any 
building  within  the  fire  limits,  without  a 
license  first  issued  by  tlie  fire  marshal, 
for  which  a  license  fee  of  fifty  rents  was  re- 
quired to  be  paid,  it  was  held  that  the 


402 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XII. 


tion,  it  has  the  power  to  require  hoisUvays  inside  of  stores  (usually 
places  of  public  resort)  to  be  inclosed  by  a  railing,  and  closed  by 
a  trap-door  after  business  hours  each  day.  It  was  justly  regarded 
as  a  reasonable  police  regulation  not  unnecessarily  interfering 
with  private  rights.^ 


§  407.  (340)  Power  "to  prevent  disturbances  and  disorderly 
assemblages,  and  maintain  the  good  government  of  the  city," 
authorizes  it  to  take  measures  to  prese7've  the  peace  and  to  pro- 
tect the  lives  and  property  of  the  citizens,  and  the  acts  of  the 
city  in  procuring  a  loan  of  arms  and  giving  a  bond  for  their  re- 
turn are  valid  and  binding  upon  it.^     Authority  to  preserve  the 


license  fee  thus  required  was  not  a  reve- 
nue tax,  in  any  proper  sense,  but  rather  a 
reasonable  sum  collected  of  the  party 
interested  for  the  purpose  of  defraying  in 
part  the  expense  of  issuing  and  recording 
the  license,  and  that  the  power  to  require 
such  a  fee  was  conferred  by  the  charter 
by  intendment,  as  convenient  if  not  essen- 
tial, to  full  enjoyment  of  the  powers  ex- 
pressly granted.  Welch  v.  Hotchkiss,  39 
Conn.  140,  1872. 

As  to  license  fee,  see  ante,  sees.  857,  358. 

Instance  of  a  want  of  power  to  restrict 
erection  of  wooden  buildings.  Mayor, 
etc.  V.  Thorne,  7  Paige,  261 ;  Pye  v.  Peter- 
son, s«/5m;  Alexander  v.  Town  Council, 
54  Miss.  659;  approving  text.  Cities 
may  constitutionally  be  authorized  to 
prevent  the  erection  of  icooden  buildings  in 
certain  portions  thereof.  Respublica  v. 
Duquet,  2  Yeates  (Pa.),  493.  In  Wad- 
leigh  V.  Oilman,  supra,  it  was  decided  that 
the  removal  of  a  wooden  building  to  the 
prohibited  district,  or  even  from  one  part 
of  the  district  to  another,  was  within  the 
meaning  of  the  term,  erection,  as  used  in 
the  ordinance.  "  The  mischief,"  says 
Weston,  C.  J.,  "  did  not  consist  in  the  act 
of  erecting,  but  in  the  continuance  of  the 
erection.  The  ordinance  did  not  meddle 
with  erections  as  they  stood ;  this  would 
have  transcended  their  power."  Differ- 
ence between  "erecting"  and  "repair- 
ing." Brady  v.  Insurance  Co.,  11  Mich. 
425,  449,  opinion  of  Campbell,  J. ;  Brown 
T.  Hunn,  27  Conn.  332;  Booth  v.  State,  4 
Conn.  65;  Tuttle  v.  State,  76.  68;  Stewart 
V.  Commonwealth,  10  Watts  (Pa.),  307. 
Remedy  against  wrong-doer,  by  private 


action  in  favor  of  an  adjoining  owner 
specially  injured  by  a  violation  of  a  stat- 
ute in  relation  to  tlie  erection  of  wooden 
buildings.  Aldrich  v.  Howard,  7  R.  I. 
199.  See  Index  — FiVe.  A7ite,  sec.  109. 
A  municipal  corporation  has  inherent 
power,  independent  of  legislative  grant,  to 
forbid  the  erection,  and  compel  the  re- 
moval of  buildings  formed  of  combustible 
materials,  within  the  densely  built  up 
parts  of  a  town.  Monroe  v.  Iloffman,  29 
La.  An.  651. 

1  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York  v.  Wil- 
liams, 15  N.  Y.  502,  1859.  Johnson,  J., 
observes :  "  The  danger  is  not  confined 
to  the  owner  and  ordinary  occupants  of 
the  building.  The  ordinance,  in  that  re- 
spect, stands  on  the  same  footing  as  a 
regulation  prohibiting  a  well  or  cistern  in 
a  man's  yard  unprotected  bj'  curb  or  cover, 
the  reasonableness  of  which  could  not  be 
doubted.  In  case  of  fire,  these  openings 
would  tend  directly  and  powerfully  to 
allow  the  fire  to  extend  through  all  parts 
of  the  building,  and  if  left  uncovered, 
would  also  tend  to  endanger  those  whom 
duty  might  require  to  enter  to  effect  the 
extinguishment  of  the  fire."  Paige,  J., 
considered  the  ordinance  the  same  in 
principle  as  fire  laws,  prescribing  the 
height,  thickness  of  walls,  and  materials 
of  building  within  the  city. 

2  State  V.  Buffalo,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  434, 
1842;  New  Orleans  v.  Costello,  14  La. 
An.  37.  An  ordinance  against  disorderly 
conduct  has  no  reference  to  a  simple  tres- 
pass on  a  vacant  lot,  though  committed 
in  an  attempt  to  assert  an  adverse  right 
to  the  property.    Mayor,  etc.  v.  Barton, 


§  408.]  MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  403 

peace  and  quiet  of  the  place  authorizes  an  ordinance  forbidding 
"  all  disorderly  shouting,  dancing,  etc.,  in  the  streets  and  public 
places,"  though  such  conduct  violates  no  existing  state  law.^ 

Mode  of  enforcing  Ordinances. 

§  408.  (341)  Civil  Actions  and  Complaints.  —  In  the  old  cor- 
porations in  England,  by-laws  were  usually  made  in  virtue  of 
their  implied  power;  they  did  not  extend  to  matters  criminal  in 
their  nature,  and  could  only  be  enforced,  unless  by  virtue  of  a 
statute  or  valid  custom,  by  fines  or  pecuniary  penalties,  com- 
monly for  a  small  sura,  and  always,  or  almost  always,  in  a  fixed 
or  certain  amount.-  So,  by  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of 
1835,  the  council  are  empowered  to  make  such  by-laws  as  to 
them  shall  seem  meet  for  the  good  rule  and  government  of  the 
borough,  and  for  the  prevention  and  suppression  of  all  such 
nuisances  as  are  not  punishable  by  act  of  parliament  in  force  in 
the  borough,  and  to  appoint  such/wes  as  they  shall  deem  neces- 
sary for  the  prevention  and  suppression  of  such  offences,  with  the 
proviso  that  no  fine  shall  exceed  the  sum  of  five  pounds.^  The 
act  provides  that  prosecutions  for  a  breach  of  by-laws  made 
under  it  shall  be  commenced  within  three  months  after  the  com- 
mission of  the  offence ;  that  the  charge  shall  be  made  on  oath ; 
that  a  summons  shall  issue  and  be  served,  with  power  to  the 
magistrate  to  proceed  without  the  appearance  of  the  defendant, 
or  to  issue  a  warrant  for  his  arrest ;  that,  if  convicted,  the  penalty 
shall  be  paid  either  immediately  or  within  such  period  as  the 
magistrate  shall  think  fit ;  that  it  may  be  levied  by  distress  and 
sale  of  the  goods  and  chattels  of  the  offender,  and  for  want  of 
sufficient  distress  the  offender  may  be  imprisoned  for  a  term  not 
exceeding  one  month ;  the  imprisonment  to  cease  upon  payment 

47  Ala.  84,  1872.    A  municipal  legislative  tlie  court,  "must  be  left  to  the  judgment 

body,  empowered  by  law  to  proliibit  or  and  discretion  "  of  the  corporate  authori- 

suppress  practices  against  (/oorf  morals  or  ties.  //;.;  Stater.  Bell,  13  Ire.  (N.C.  Law), 

public  decency,  may,  by  ordinance,  punish  378;  post,  ch.  xiii. 

the  utterance  of /)rq/(uie /an7«a/7e,  whether  '^  Gee  v.  Wilden,  Lutw.  1320,  1324; 
uttered  frequently  or  only  once  by  the  Wood  v.  Searl,  Bridg.  139  ;  Piper  v.  Chap- 
same  person.  The  decision  of  the  coun-  pell,  14  M.  &  W.  624  ;  Rawlinson  on  Corp. 
cii  that  profane  language  is  against  good  065,  note.  See  po.s<,  chapter  on  Municipal 
morals  will  not  be  judicially  reviewed.  Courts.  Construction  of  ordinance  in  re- 
Delaney,  in  re,  43  Cal.  478,  1872.  spect  to  disturbing  public  peace. — Chari- 
ly Washington  r.  Frank,  1  Jones  (N.  C)  vari,  St.  Charles  v.  Meyer,  58  Mo.  86. 
Law,  4.36,  1854.  As  to  what  regulations  ^  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  ch.  Ixxvi.  sec.  90 ; 
of  this  kind  are  necessary,  "  Much,"  says  ante,  sees.  35,  336,  337,  393. 


404  MUNICIPAL   COrxPOKATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

of  the  sum  due.^  It  is  sus^gested  that  the  remedy  thus  prescribed 
is  cumuhitive,  and  will  not  debar  the  corporation  from  availing 
itself  of  the  usual  common  law  mode  of  enforcing  a  by-law  by 
action  of  debt  or  assumpsit.^  But  the  point  seems  not  to  have 
been  yet  adjudged. 

§  400.  (342)  Aside  from  statutory  regulation,  the  general 
method  of  enforcing  a  by-law  in  England  is,  as  just  stated,  by 
bringing,  in  the  name  of  the  proper  party  or  corporation,  an 
action,  in  the  proper  court,  against  the  person  who  has  violated 
the  by-law,  to  recover  the  penalty  which  it  imposes,  and  this  action 
may  be  either  debt  or  assumpsit.  By  the  common  law,  assumpsit 
may  be  maintained  for  the  breach  of  any  duty  which  the  defend- 
ant has  been  legally  liable  to  perform  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  the 
law  implying  a  promise  to  perform  the  particular  act,  and  hence 
no  principle  was  violated  in  holding  that  assumpsit  would  lie  to 
recover  the  penalty  of  a  by-law.  As  the  penalty  was  for  a  sum 
certain,  and  was  considered  to  be  in  the  nature  of  liquidated 
damages,  an  action  of  debt  would  also  lie  to  recover  the  amount 
of  the  penalty ;  but  where  the  by-law  itself  provided  that  the 
penalty  should  be  recovered  by  debt,  then  that  form  of  action 
alone  could  be  maintained.  But,  aside  from  statute  authority  or 
a  valid  custom,  it  was  not  competent  for  the  by-law  to  provide 
that  its  penalty  should  be  recovered  by  "  distress  and  sale  "  of 
goods,  that  being  contrary  to  the  common  law.^ 

§  410.  (343)  In  this  country^  the  courts  hold  that  where  the 
mode  of  enforcement  is  prescribed  by  the  charter,  that  mode  must 


1  Ih.  sec.  139;  sees.  187-103;  snpra,  constitutional  limit.  Keokuk  r.  Dressell, 
sec.  266.  47  Iowa,  597. 

2  Rawlinson  on  Corp.  {5th  ed.)  167,  ^  willc  1G4-181  ;  1  Saund.  PI.  &  Ev. 
note.  See  Adley  r.  Reeves,  2  Maule  &  683;  2  Wheat.  Selw.  1178;  2  Chitty  PI. 
Sel.  61 ;  Bodwic  v.  Fennell,  1  Wils.  233.  401,  where  form  of  declaration  in  debt  is 
On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Grant  is  of  opin-  given;  Adiey  v.  Reeves,  2  M.  &  S.  60. 
ion  that  the  remedy  prescribed  by  the  The  law  implies  a  promise  on  the  part  of 
act  is  exclusive,  and  supersedes  the  com-  a  corporator  to  pay  all  penalties  incurred 
mon-law  remedy  of  debt  or  assumpsit  for  for  his  violation  of  by-laws ;  and  if  the 
the  amount  of  the  fine  or  penalty.  Grant  mode  of  enforcing  such  penalties  is  not 
on  Corp.  364 ;  supra,  sees.  337,  341.  A  pointed  out,  the  corporation  may  sue 
city  ordinance  prescribing  a  term  of  im-  therefor  in  any  competent  court.  Colum- 
prisonment  which  may,  but  does  not  bia  v.  Harrison,  2  Const.  (South  Car.) 
necessarily  exceed  that  authorized  by  the  Rep.  213,  per  Nott,  J. ;  supra,  sees.  336- 
constitution,  may  be  enforced  witliin  the  346. 


§  411] 


MUNICIPAL   OEDINAXCES   OR   BY-LAWS. 


405 


be  pursued ;  ^  but  if  the  mode  or  form  of  action  is  not  prescribed, 
then  the  recovery  of  the  penalty  or  fine  for  the  violation  of  a  valid 
municipal  ordinance  may  be  as  at  common  law,  by  an  act  of  debt 
or  assumpsit,  or  where  these  forms  are  abrogated,  by  a  civil  action 
in  substance  the  same.^  And  where  such  an  action  is  brought, 
the  proceeding  is  civil  and  not  criminal,  and  the  rules  of  proced- 
ure in  civil  cases,  unless  otherwise  provided,  are  applicable  to 
it.^  The  penalties  to  ordinances  are  often  fixed  upon  a  movable 
scale,  and  this  would  appear  to  be  done  under  the  supposition  that 
they  will  be  enforced,  not  by  a  common-law  action  in  the  common- 
law  courts  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  penalty,  but  by  a  complaint 
or  proceeding  before  the  proper  municipal  magistrate,  who  will, 
within  the  prescribed  limits,  determine  the  amount  of  the  fine  or 
penalty  to  be  paid,  by  reference  to  the  circumstances  of  the  par- 
ticular case.* 

§  411.  (344)    Nature  of  Proceeding^  Civil  or  Criminal. — Where, 
instead  of  a  civil  action  to  recover  the  pecuniary  fine  or  penalty, 

1  Weeks  v.  Foreman,  1  Harris  (N.  J.), 
237,  1837 ;  State  v.  Zeigler,  3  Vroom  (32 
N.  J.  L.),  262;  E\¥banks  v.  Ashley.  36  111. 
177,  1864;  Israel  t'.  Jacksonville,  1  Scam. 
(2  111.)  290;  Williamson  c.  Common- 
wealth, 4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  146,  151,  1843. 
An  action  may  be  brought  for  the  fines 
and  penalties  incurred  for  the  violation  of 
ordinances,  and  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  fine  be  assessed  before  the  suit  is 
brought.  King  v.  Jacksonville,  2  Scam. 
(3  III.)  306.  In  Weeks  v.  Foreman,  1 
Harris.  (N.  J.)  237,  1837,  it  was  held  that, 
although  certain  corporate  officers  were 
er-o^c/o  j ustices  of  the  peace  within  the 
cit}-,  with  power  to  take  cognizance  of 
violations  of  by-laws,  tiiey  could  not  en- 
tertain or  try  actions  of  debt,  to  recover  a 
debt  or  penalty  for  a  breach  of  an  ordi- 
nance, although  it  was  conceded  that  they 
had  jurisdiction  of  the  quasi  criminal  pro- 
ceeding, founded  upon  a  complaint  or 
information,  resulting  in  what  is  tech- 
nically called  a  conviction ;  but  qiuere. 
Supra,  sees.  336-353. 

-i  Ewbanks  i.  Ashley,  36  111.  178, 1804; 
Israel  v.  Jacksonville,  1  Scam.  (2  111.) 
290;  Coates  v.  Mayor,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
585,  008,  1827.  Unless  it  is  otherwise 
provided  by  statute  or  charter,  it  is  con- 
sidered that  corporations  have  an  inherent 
power  to  provide  for  the  recovery  of  a 


penalty  by  an  action  of  debt  in  their  own 
courts.  Hesketh  v.  Braddock,  3  Burr. 
1858 ;  Barter  v.  Commonwealtii,  3  Pa. 
(Pen.  &  W.)  253;  supra,  sec.  341. 

3  lb. ;  Municipality  v.  Cutting,  4  La. 
An.  335 ;  Lewiston  v.  Proctor,  27  111.  414, 
1860 ;  Quincy  v.  Ballance,  30  111.  185 ; 
Davenport  v.  Bird,  34  Iowa,  524,  1872; 
Williamson  v.  Commonwealth,  4  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  146, 151, 1843  ;  Jenkins  v.  Cheyenne. 
1  Wy.  Ter.  287. 

*  Ante,  sees.  337,  341.  If  the  statute 
under  which  the  conviction  takes  place 
applies  the  penalty  with  certainty,  it  is 
sufficient  for  the  justice  to  award  the 
penalty  to  be  paid  and  applied  according 
to  law".  The  King  v.  Barrett,  1  Salk.  383 ; 
The  King  v.  Seale,  8  East,  573 ;  The  King 
V.  Thompson,  2  T.  R.  18  ;  The  Queen  v. 
Hyde,  21  L.J.  Mag.  Cas.  94;  Boothroyd, 
in  re,  15  M.  &  W.  1 ;  The  Queen  v.  Crid- 
land,  7  E.  &  B.  853 ;  The  Queen  v.  John- 
son, 8  Q.  B.  102;  see  also  The  Queen  v. 
Glossop,  4  B.  &  A.  616  ;  Brown  v.  Nichol- 
son, 5  C.  B.  N.  S.  468;  Seamen's  Hos- 
jiital  V.  Liverpool,  4  Ex.  180;  Wray  i>. 
Ellis,  1  E.  &  E.  276.  If  tliere  be  any 
material  variance  between  the  conviction 
and  the  statute  as  to  the  appropriation  of 
the  penalty,  the  conviction  will  be  bad. 
Griffith  V.  Harries,  2  M.  &  W.  335;  Chad- 
dock  y.  Wilbraham  et  ai,  5  C.  B.  645. 


40 G  MUNICIPiVL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

the  proceeding  is  in  tlie  nature  of  a  complaint  for  the  viohition 
of  the  ordinance,  this  has  sometimes  been  considered  to  be  a 
criminal  or  quasi  criminal,  and  not  a  civil,  proceeding.  The 
cases  on  this  subject  are  not  harmonious,  but  the  difference  in 
them,  to  a  large  extent,  depends  upon  the  character  of  the  act  or 
offence  charged,  the  nature  of  the  charter,  and  the  legislation  in 
the  particular  state  as  to  the  extent  of  jurisdiction  intended  to  be 
conferred  upon  the  municipal  authorities.^  The  constitution  of 
Georgia  declares  that  ''  trial  by  jury,  as  heretofore  used  in  this 
state,  shall  remain  inviolate."  It  was  claimed  that  the  legislature 
could  not  constitutionally  confer  on  the  city  council  the  power  to 
pass  an  ordinance  inflicting  a  fine  for  its  violation,  where  the  guilt 
of  a  party  was  to  be  tried  by  the  council,  without  a  jury.  The  court 
held  that  the  objection  was  not  sound,  observing  that  violations 
of  ordinances  are  not  criminal  cases  within  the  meaning  of  the 
state  constitution,  and  "  that,  inasmuch  as  the  right  of  trial  by 
jary  existed  in  England,  and  was  secured  by  Magna  Charta,  and 
municipal  corporations  in  that  country  enforced  their  by-laws  by 
pecuniary  penalties  in  a  summary  manner^  and  the  same  right 
being  conferred  upon  similar  corporations  in  this  state  anterior  to 
the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  and  constantly  exercised,  "  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury,  as  heretofore  used  in  this  state,  was  not 
violated  by  the  city  council  of  Augusta,  by  the  imposition  of  the 
penalty  for  the  breach  of  the  local  police  regulations  of  that 
city 


"  2 


1  Wayne  County  v.  Detroit,  17  Mich,  cited,  the  extent  of  the  right  of  jury  trial 
390;  People  v.  Detroit,  18  Mich.  445;  at  common  law  is  learnedly  e.xamined  by 
Davenportr.  Bird,  34  Iowa,  524, 1872;  see  Mv.SnsXice  Strong.  See,  also,  Dunsmore's 
chapter  on  Municipal  Courts,  pos^-  supra,  Appeal,  52  Pa.  St.  374;  Rhines  v.  Clark, 
sees.  347,  366,  368,  and  note.  51  Pa.  St.  96,  1865.     Compare  Plimpton 

2  Williams  u.  Augusta  (gunpowder  or-  v.  Somerset,  33  Vt.  283,  1860;  see  post, 
dinance),  4  Ga.  509,  1848,  per  Warner,  J.,  Municipal  Courts,  sec.  432,  et  seq.  A  stat- 
approving  Low  v.  Commrs.  of  Pilotage,  ute  requiring  security  for  costs,  in  prose- 
R.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.)  316;  Flint  River  cutions  for  "penal  statutes,"  does  not 
Steamboat  Co.  v.  Foster,  5  Ga.  194;  embrace  prosecutions  under  city  ordi- 
Floyd  V.  Commrs.,  etc.,  14  Ga.  354 ;  Kip  nances  which  impose  penalties  for  their 
r.  Patterson,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  298;  Keeler  violation,  such  ordinances  not  being 
V.  Milledge,  4  Zab.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  142;  "statutes"  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331.  "Sum-  act.  Lewiston  v.  Proctor,  27  111.  414, 
mary  convictions  for  pettj' offences  against  1860;  8.  p.  Quincy  v.  Ballance,  30  lb.  185. 
statutes  were  always  sustained,  and  they  Further,  as  to  the  nature  of  the  proceed- 
were  never  supposed  to  be  in  conflict  with  ing  and  kind  of  process.  Alton  v.  Kirsch, 
the  common-law  right  to  a  trial  by  jury."  68  111.  261,  1873;  and  see,  also,  Munici- 
Per  Strong,  J.,  Byers  v.  Commonwealth,  pality  f.  Cutting,  4  La.  An.  335;  Ewbanks 
42  Pa.  St".  89,  94,  1862.     In  the  case  last  v.  Ashley,  36  111.  177;  Wayne  County  v. 


§  413.] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


407 


§  412.  (345)  On  the  other  hand,  in  Massachusetts,  prosecu- 
tions for  breaches  of  by-laws  or  ordinances  made  to  enforce  police 
regulations  are  regarded  as  substantially  public  prosecutions,  and 
in  such  prosecutions  it  is  competent,  though  confessed  not  to  be 
very  just,  to  disallow  the  defendant  costs.  Applying  this  doc- 
trine, it  is  held  that  a  statute  providing  that  prosecutions  for 
violations  of  city  ordinances  in  the  name  of  the  state  or  common- 
wealth is  not  unconstitutional,  notwithstanding  the  result  is  that 
the  defendant  does  not  recover  costs  on  acquittal.^ 

§  413.  (346)  Mode  of  pleading  Ordinances.  —  The  courts,  unless 
they  are  the  courts  of  the  municipality,  do  not  judicially  notice  the 


Detroit,  17  Mich.  390;  People  v.  Detroit, 
18  Mich.  445,  construing  the  phrase  "  penal 
laws,"  as  used  in  the  Michigan  constitu- 
tion. Phrase  "municipal fine,"  in  tlie  con- 
stitution of  California,  construed.  People 
»;.  Jolinson,  30  "Cal.  98,  1866.  Violations 
of  ordinances  imposing  fines  and  penalties 
are  in  the  nature  of  torts,  and  actions  for 
such  violations  may  be  prosecuted  against 
one  or  more  of  the  offending  parties; 
they  need  not  all  be  joined.  President, 
etc.  V.  Holland,  19  111.  271,  1857.  The  de- 
fendant  in  such  a  prosecution  cannot  raise 
the  question  whether  the  charter  of  the 
city  is  forfeited.  Whalen  v.  Macomb,  76 
111.  49,  1874. 

1  GodJard,  in  re,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
504,  1835;  Commonwealth  v.  Worcester, 
3  Pick.  (Mass.)  462.  "If,"  says  Chief 
Justice  Shaw,  in  the  case  first  cited,  "  the 
prosecution  were  to  enforce  a  private  right 
by  the  city,  there  would  be  weight  in  the 
objection,  and  it  would  stand  on  different 
grounds."  16  Pick.  508 ;  see  Common- 
wealth V.  Gay,  5  Pick.  (Mass.)  44;  Com- 
monwealth V.  Fahey,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  408. 
Similar  observations  in  relation  to  mak- 
ing sidewalks,  by  Ford,  J.,  in  Paxon  v. 
Sweet,  1  Green  (N.  J.),  196,  200,  1832. 
So,  in  New  Hampshire,  a  public  prosecu- 
tion for  an  offence  made  penal  by  a  city 
ordinance  because  of  its  supposed  evil 
consequences  to  society  —  as,  for  exam- 
ple, tlie  offence  of  unlawfully  keeping  a 
bowling  alley  —  is  considered  to  be  a 
criminal,  and  not  a  civil,  proceeding. 
State  V.  Stearns,  11  Post.  (31  N.  H.)  106, 
1855.  In  Alabama  such  a  prosecution  is 
considered  quasi  criminal,  and  the  rlcfend- 
ant  cannot  testify  in  his  own  beliaif  as  he 
niay  m  a  civil  action.      Mobile  r.  Jones, 


42  Ala.  630,  18G8  ;  Fink  v.  Milwaukee,  17 
Wis.  26,  1863,  is  decided  upon  the  basis 
that  a  prosecution  of  a  party  for  the  vio- 
lation of  a  city  ordinance,  where  the  pen- 
alty is  a  fine,  is  a  criminal  prosecution  to 
which  the  bill  of  rights  applies,  which  de- 
clares that  "  in  all  criminal  prosecutions, 
tlie  accused  shall  be  entitled  to  demand 
the  nature  and  cause  of  the  accusation 
against  him."  But  a  principle  so  broad, 
it  is  believed  by  the  author,  can  hardly  be 
maintained  where  the  act  charged  is  not 
a  crime  at  common  law  or  in  its  essential 
nature.  See  chapter  on  Municipal  Courts, 
post.  In  Indiana  an  action  to  recover  the 
penalty  of  a  by-law,  though  a  warrant  for 
the  arrest  of  the  defendant  be  issued  and 
served,  is  considered  to  be  a  civil  suit,  and 
governed  by  the  rules  of  practice  in  such 
suits.  Goshen  v.  Croxton,  34  Ind.  237, 
1870,  and  notes. 

In  Emporia  v.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622, 
1874,  it  was  decided  that  the  provision  of 
the  constitution,  that  all  prosecutions  shall 
be  in  the  name  of  the  state,  did  not  include 
prosecutions  by  a  municipality  in  its  own 
courts  for  a  violation  of  its  ordinances, 
and  that  such  prosecutions  might  be  in 
the  name  of  the  municipality.  But  in 
Weitzel  v.  Concordia,  14  Kan.  446,  1875, 
it  was  held,  without  professing  to  over- 
rule the  previous  decision,  tliat  a  prosecu- 
tion in  a  municipal  court,  under  a  city 
ordinance,  for  a  matter  made  penal  by 
the  laws  of  the  state  or  because  of  its  evil 
consequences  was  a  criminal  proceeding. 
Wiietlier  the  rule  would  be  the  same  if 
the  i)rosecution  was  to  enforce  a  private 
right  of  the  city,  the  court  left  open  for 
further  consideration.  Ante,  sees.  366- 
£61. 


40S 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


ordinances  of  a  municipal  corporation,  unless  directed  by  charter 
or  statute  to  do  so,^  Therefore,  such  ordinances,  when  sought 
to  be  enforced  by  action,  or  when  set  up  by  the  defendant  as  a 
protection,  should  be  set  out  or  stated  in  substance  in  the  plead- 
ing. It  is  not  sufficient  that  they  be  referred  to  generally  by 
the  title  or  section.  It  is,  however,  believed  to  be  sufficient,  in 
the  absence  of  special  legislative  provision  prescribing  the  man- 
ner of  pleading,  to  set  forth  the  legal  substance  of  that  part  of 
the  ordinance  alleged  to  have  been  violated,  it  being  advisable, 
for  purposes  of  identification,  to  refer  also  to  the  title,  date,  and 
section.  The  liberal  rules  of  pleading  and  practice  which  char- 
acterize modern  judicial  proceedings  should  extend  to,  and 
doubtless  would  be  held  to  embrace,  suits  and  prosecutions  to 
enforce  the  by-laws  or  ordinances  of  municipal  corporations.^ 


1  Trustees  y.Leffler,  23  111.  90;  Mooney 
V.  Bennett,  19  Mo.  551, 1854  ;  New  Orleans 
V.  Bondo,  14  La.  An.  303, 1859  ;  Marker  v. 
Mayor,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  199,  1837  ;  Case 
V.  Mobile,  30  Ala.  538,  1857  ;  People  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  New  York,  7  How.  Pr.  R. 
(N.Y.)  81,  1851 ;  Cox  v.  St.  Louis,  11  Mo. 
431,  1848 ;  Garvin  v.  AVells,  8  Iowa,  286 ; 
Goodrich  v.  Brown,  30  Iowa,  291,  1870. 
In  England,  when  an  action  on  a  by-law 
founded  on  a  custom  is  brought  in  a  court 
of  the  municyjality  the  court  will  take  judi- 
cial notice  of  it,  but  in  an  action  in  the 
Superior  Courts  the  custom  and  the  by-law 
must  be  set  out,  for  these  courts  will  not 
take  notice  of  them.  Willc.  166,  pi.  403 ; 
lb.  172,  pi.  423 ;  lb.  173,  pi.  425 ;  Broad- 
nac's  Case,  1  Vent.  196  ;  Barber  Surgeons 
V.  Pelson,  2  Lev.  252 ;  Norris  v.  Staps, 
Hob.  211.  In  Conboy  v.  Iowa  City,  2 
Iowa,  90,  it  was  held  that  tlie  mayor,  on 
whom  was  conferred  exclusive  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  violation  of  the  ordinances  of 
the  city,  was  authorized  to  take  judicial 
notice,  ex  officio,  of  the  city  ordinances. 
The  provision  of  a  city  charter  that  its 
published  and  printed  ordinances  shall  be 
received  in  evidence  in  all  courts  without 
proof  does  not  dispense  with  the  neces- 
sity of  making  them  part  of  the  record  in 
order  to  bring  them  to  the  knowledge  of 
an  appellate  court.  Cox  v.  St.  Louis,  11 
Mo.  431,  1848;  New  Orleans  v.  Bondo,  14 
La.  An.  303,  1859. 

2  Marker    v.  Mayor,    etc.   17    Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  199,  1837.    Text  cited,  Emporia 


V.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622,  628,  1874.  See 
Stokes  V.  Corporation  of  New  York,  14 
Wend.  (N.Y.)  87;  Mooney  v.  Kennett, 
19  Mo.  551,  1854.  In  justifying,  the  de- 
fendant must  set  out  in  his  plea  or  answer 
the  ordinance,  or  so  mucli  thereof  as  will 
show  on  what  the  defence  rests.  lb. ; 
Keeler  v.  Milledge,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.) 
142,  1857.  It  is  suflBcient  to  set  out  the 
substance  of  that  part  of  the  ordinance 
w^hich  has  been  violated,  witli  a  reference 
to  the  title,  date,  and  section.  lb.  Ap- 
proved, Kip  V.  Patterson,  2  Dutch.  (N.J.) 
298.  Regularly,  the  by-law  or  its  sub- 
stance should  be  set  forth.  Case  v.  Mo- 
bile, 30  Ala.  538,  1857;  Charleston  v. 
Chur,  2  Bailey  (South  Car.),  1G4.  De- 
fective pleading  of  an  ordinance  held  to 
be  waived  by  a  plea  of  not  guilty  and 
going  to  trial  on  the  merits.  State  v. 
Welch,  21  Minn.  22.  In  Ewjland,  the 
by-law  itself  must  be  fully  set  out  in  an 
action  of  debt  upon  it,  and  not  by  way  of 
recital ;  but  in  assumpsit  upon  the  same 
by-law,  latitude  is  allowed.  Willcock, 
173,  pi.  425.  But  in  this  country  it  is 
said  that  "  it  is  not  necessary  to  hold  to 
the  strictness  anciently  required."  Keeler 
V.  Milledge,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  142. 
In  Missouri  by  statute,  fines  and  penalties 
accruing  to  any  town  may  be  recovered 
by  civil  action  ;  but  the  complaint,  while 
it  need  not  contain  all  the  requisites  of  an 
indictment,  must  specify  the  offence  with 
reasonable  certainty.  St.  Louis  v.  Smith, 
10  Mo.  438.    This  is  the  true  rule.    Hence 


§  414] 


MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


409 


§  414.  (347)  Requisites  of  Complaints.  —  Under  a  charter  au- 
thorizing "  complaint "  to  be  made  of  the  viohition  of  ordinances, 
but  not  prescribing  the  mode  or  requisites,  a  complaint  is  not  in 
the  nature  of  an  information  by  a  common  informer,  and  the 
same  strictness  is  not  required  as  in  an  information  or  indictment. 
"  It  is  sufficient  if  it  sets  out  with  clearness  the  offence  charged, 
and  the  substance  of  that  part  of  the  ordinance  which  has  been 
violated,  with  a  reference  to  the  title,  date,  or  section."  ^ 


a  complaint  charging  only  that  "  the  de- 
fendant committed  an  offence  [naming  it] 
contrary  to  an  ordinance  of  the  town  "  is 
insufficient.  Memphis  u. O'Connor,  53  Mo. 
468,  1873.  So  a  charge  that  "  the  defen- 
dant knowingly  associated  with  thieves 
previous  to  August  21,  1871,"  is  too 
vague,  no  place  being  named  and  the 
names  of  the  thieves  not  being  given. 
St.  Louis  V.  Fitz,  53  Mo.  582,  1873.  In 
Indiana,  before  the  act  of  1867,  it  was 
necessary  to  file  with  complaint  copy  of 
ordinance  or  section  thereof  alleged  to 
have  been  violated.  Green  v.  Indianapo- 
lis, 25  Ind.  490;  Whitson  v.  Franklin,  34 
Ind.  392,  1870.  Unless  required  by  law 
or  ordinance  a  complaint,  not  under  oath, 
will  not  necessarily  vitiate  the  proceed- 
ings if  the  magistrate  has  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject.  Alton  v.  Kirsch,  68  111.  261, 
1873.  Several  breaches  of  an  ordinance 
may  be  sued  for  in  one  suit,  if  tlie  judg- 
ment does  not  exceed  the  amount  of  the 
magistrate's  jurisdiction.  Hensalt  v.  Pe- 
tersburg, 63  III.  Ill,  1872.  Where  a 
charter  provides  that  "  a  warrant  shall 
issue  in  favor  of  a  city  ....  for  a  vi- 
olation of  any  ordinance  when,  etc.,  or 
upon  affirmation  by  tlie  city  attorney, 
there  is  no  authority  for  a  deputy  city 
attorney  to  swear  to  a  complaint ;  power 
thus  provided  must  be  exercised  by  the 
city  attorney  in  person."  Kansas  City  v. 
Flanagan,  69  Mo.  22. 

1  Keeler  (•.  Milledge,  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J. 
L.)  142,  1857.  Approved,  Kip  v.  Patter- 
son, 2  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  298  ;  City  Council  v. 
Seeba,  4  Strob.  (South  Car.)  Law,  319; 
Commonwealth  v.  Bean,  Thach.  (Mass. 
Crim.  Cas.)  85.  Compare  Fink  v.  Mil- 
waukee, 17  Wis.  26,  1863 ;  see,  also.  Com- 
monwealth V.  Bean,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  52; 
Deitz  V.  City,  1  Col.  323 ;  Napman  v. 
People,    19   Mich.  352,  1869;  Goshen  v. 


Croxton,  34  Ind.  2.39,  1870;  Whitson 
V.  Franklin,  34  Ind.  392, 1870.  Where  the 
process  did  not  state  what  ordinance  had 
been  violated,  nor  the  time  or  manner, 
the  proceedings  were  held  defective. 
State  V.  Trenton,  7  Vroom  (36  N.  J.  L.), 
283.  The  complaint  need  not  state  the 
number  of  the  section  violated.  Meyer 
V.  Bridgeton,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  160. 
The  ordinance  need  not  be  recited  in  full. 
Emporia  v.  Volmer,  12  Kan.  622,  1874; 
Goldthwaite  v.  Montgomery,  50  Ala.  486, 
1874;  St.  Louis  v.  Smith,  10  Mo.  438. 
By  statute,  prosecutions  for  the  violations 
of  the  ordinances  of  Boston  may  be  pros- 
ecuted in  the  name  of  the  common- 
wealth ;  and  it  is  decided  that  in  a 
complaint  for  such  a  violation  it  is  not 
sufficient  that  it  concludes  "  against  the 
form  of  the  by-laws  of  the  said  city,"  but 
it  must  conclude  also  against  the  form  of 
the  statute.  Commonwealth  v.  Gay,  5 
Pick.  (Mass.)  44,  1827;  Commonwealth 
j>.  Worcester,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  462,  1826. 
Complaint  must  be  in  the  name  of  the 
treasurer  of  the  city  or  town,  and  not  in 
that  of  the  commonwealtli,  for  violation 
of  health  ordinances,  since  the  statute  of 
1849.  Ch.  ccxi.  sec.  7 ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Fahey,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  408,  1850. 
Policemen,  marshals,  and  other  officers 
of  a  municipal  corporation,  where  such  a 
course  is  not  repugnant  to  the  constitu- 
tion or  general  law  of  the  state,  may  be 
empowered  by  an  ordinance  to  arrest  of- 
fenders without  icarrant,  for  breaches  of 
ordinances  committed  in  their  presence. 
Bryan  v.  Bates,  15  111.  87 ;  Main  v.  Mc- 
Carty,  15  111.  442;  State  v.  Lafferty,  5 
Harring.  (Del.)  491.  A  city  ordinance 
providing  that  any  person  who  shall  re- 
fuse to  obey  an  order  at  a  fire  given  by 
any  officer  duly  autliorized,  "may  be 
arrested  and  detained  in  custody  until  the 


410 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XII. 


§  415.  (348)  111  ail  action  or  proceeding  to  recover  a  penalty 
for  the  violation  of  a  by-law  or  ordinance  of  a  corporation,  the 
declaration  or  complaint  should  state  facts  which  make  the  liability 
of  the  defendant  distinctly  to  appear.^  And  regularly,  as  before 
stated,  the  by-law  should  be  set  forth  or  its  substance  stated,  the 
breach  and  the  plaintiff's  right  to  sue  for  the  penalty.  But  where 
the  charter  or  organic  act  of  the  corporation  will  be  judicially 
noticed,  it  cannot  be  necessary  to  set  out,  as  it  has  been  held  to 
be  in  England,  the  authority  of  the  corporation  to  make  the  by- 
law.2 


§  416.  (349)  Where  the  penalty  is  given  in  general  terms,  it 
is  understood  to  be  to  the  use  of  the  corporation,  and  the  action 
or  jDrosecution  must  be  by  and  in  the  name  of  the  corporation.^ 
In  England  it  was  the  practice,  in  many  cases,  to  appoint  in  the 
by-law  the  penalty  to  be  sued  for  in  the  name  of  the  chamberlain, 
treasurer,  or  some  other  officer  of  the  corporation ;  and  though 
the  power  of  thus  suing  for  the  penalty  could  not  be  given  to  a 
mere  stranger,  yet  it  was  not  absolutely  necessary  that  the  pen- 


Jire  is  extinguished,"  is  unconstitutional, 
because  the  person  is  deprived  of  his  lib- 
erty without  due  process  of  law,  and  be- 
cause his  right  to  trial  by  jury  is  invaded. 
Tile  court  distinguish  between  an  arrest 
of  this  kind  and  where  the  purpose  of  the 
arrest  is  preliminary  to  and  contemplates 
a  judicial  examination.  Judson  v.  Rear- 
don,  16  Minn.  4^1,  1871.  Under  the 
charter  of  Newark  a  violator  of  an  ordi- 
nance of  that  city  cannot,  witliout  his 
consent,  be  brought  into  court  for  trial, 
unless  by  a  warrant  or  summons.  New- 
ark V.  Murphy,  40  N.  J.  L.  145;  ante, 
sees.  210,  211 ;  Mitchell  y.  Lemon,  34  Md. 
176,  1870;  Butolph  v.  Blust,  5  Lansing 
(N.  Y.),  84,  1871.  Requisites  of  warrants 
for  the  violation  of  municipal  ordinances. 
White  V.  Washington,  2  Cranch  Cir.  C. 
337.  Other  cases :  lb.  .356  ;  lb.  459  ;  4  lb. 
103 ;  lb.  582;  Prells  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan. 
426,  1871.  A  penalty  cannot  be  imposed 
without  notice.  Alexandria  v.  Bethehem, 
5  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  375,  377.  Sufficiency  of 
notice  to  the  accused  under  special  charter 
provisions.  4  Zabr.  (24  N.  J.  L.)  142, 
supra.  Essentials  of  summary  convic- 
tions. Commonwealth  v.  Borden,  61  Pa. 
St.  272. 


1  Saund.  PI.  &  Ev.  324 ;  Comyn  Dig. 
tit.  Pleader  (2  W.  11);  Feltmakers  v. 
Davis,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  98 ;  Piper  v.  Chap- 
pell,  14  M.  &  W.  623 ;  Case  v.  Mobile,  30 
Ala.  538,  1857 ;  Coates  v.  Mayor,  7  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  585,  608,  1827,  where  the  sub- 
stance of  a  declaration  in  debt  is  given  ; 
Charleston  v.  Chur,  2  Bailey  (Soutii  Car.), 
164 ;  Krickle  v.  Commonwealth,  1  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  361,  1841.  Pleader  need  not 
negative  exception  in  a  proviso  to  the 
enacting  clause  of  an  ordinance  or  in  a 
subsequent  section,  this  being  a  matter  of 
defence.  Lynch  v.  People,  16  Mich.  472, 
1868.  See  Roberson  v.  Lambertville,  9 
Vroom  (38  N.  J,  L.),  69;  McGear  v. 
Bridgeton,  4  Vroom  (33  N.J.  L.),  213; 
Far  well  v.  Smith,  1  Harr.  (N.  J.)  133. 
The  conviction  must  be  for  the  same  of- 
fence for  whicii  the  defendant  is  pros- 
ecuted.   Columbus  V.  Arnold,  30  Ga.  517. 

2  Norris  v.  Staps,  Hob.  211. 

3  Bodwic  V.  Fennell,  1  Wils.  233 ; 
Vintners'  Co.  v.  Passey,  1  Burr.  235  ; 
Glover,  313;  2  Kyd,  157;  Graves  v.  Col- 
by, 9  Ad.  &  El.  356 ;  Williamson  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  146,  151, 
1843 ;  ante,  ch.  viii. 


§  417.]  MUNICIPAL   ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  411 

alty  should  be  given  to  the  corporation,  but  it  might  be  given  to 
the  informer.^  Whenever  the  mode  of  enforcing  obedience  to  a 
by-law  is  prescribed  by  such  by-law,  that  mode  must  be  strictly 
pursued,  and  the  plaintiff  (where  the  rules  of  common-law  plead- 
ing prevail)  must  be  the  party  to  whom  the  penalty  is  given. 
Where  it  is  given  to  the  chamberlain  for  the  use  of  the  corpora- 
tion, the  action  must  be  in  the  name  of  the  chamberlain,  and  not 
in  that  of  the  corporation.  And  when  the  chamberlain  may  sue, 
he  need  not  set  out  his  election  or  appointment,  but  may  aver 
generally  that  he  is  chamberlain,  and  set  forth  his  right  to  sue 
and  to  recover.2  Unless  the  ordinance  show  that  it  was  intended 
that  no  action  for  a  penalty  should  lie  without  a  previous  demand, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  aver  one.^  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  aver  that 
the  defendant  had  notice  of  the  ordinance,  for  this  is  conclusively 
presumed  with  respect  to  all  on  whom  it  is  binding.* 

§  417.  (350)  3Iode  of  Procedure,  Defences,  Evidence,  etc.  —  In 
prosecutions  to  enforce  ordinances,  the  ordinary  rules  of  evidence 
apply,  except  so  far  as  specially  modified  by  statute ;  and  it  is 
not  competent  for  a  municipal  corporation,  without  express  au- 
thority, to  make  or  alter  the  rules  of  evidence  or  of  law.^  It  is, 
however,  competent  for  a  city  to  provide  by  general  ordinance, 
after  suit  commenced  to  recover  a  penalty  for  acting  without  a 
license,  that  the  granting  of  a  license,  though  by  its  terms  it  takes 
effect  from  a  day  previous  to  the  commission  of  the  offence,  shall 
not  (as  might  otherwise  be  the  case)  release  or  waive  the  penalty.^ 

1  Glover,  313,  314,  315;  Feltmakers  y.  Scam.  (5  111.)  78.  The  defendant's  ad- 
Davis,  1  Bos.  &  P.  101  ;  Bodwic  v.  Fen-  mission  of  a  violation  of  an  ordinance  is 
nell,  1  Wils.  233  ;  Tottendell  v.  Glazby,  competent  evidence.  Columbia  v.  Harri- 
2  Wils.  26G;  Hesketh  v.  Braddock,  3  son,  2  Const.  R.  (So.  Car.)  213,  1818. 
Burr.  1848;  Wood  v.  Searl,  Bridg.  141  ;  «  City  Council  v.  Smidt,  11  Rich.  (So. 
Graves  v.  Colby,  9  Ad.  &  El.  356.  Car)  Law,  343;  City  Council  v.  Corlies, 

2  Harris  v.  VVakeman,  Say.  225  ;  Ex-  2  Bailey  (So.  Car.),  189.  Commented  on 
on  V.  Starre,  2  Show.  159.  Under  con-  by  O'Neall,  J.,  in  City  Council  v.  Feck- 
stituent  act,  town  treasurer  held  entitled  man,  3  Rich.  (So.  Car.)  Law,  385.  And 
to  sue  in  his  own  name  for  penalties,  see  case  last  cited  as  to  other  circum- 
Watts  V.  Scott,  1  Dev.  (Nor.  Car.)  291 ;  stances,  in  which  it  was  held  tliat  a  prior 
Commonwealth  v.  Fahey,  5Cush.  (Mass.)  penalty  was  not  waived  by  a  subsequent 
408,  18-30.  acceptance  of  the  amount  of  a  license  for 

3  Butchers  v.  Bullock,  3  Bos.  &  P.  434,  a  year. 

437  A  license  granted  by  a  de  fnrto  officer 

*  London  v.  Barnardston,  1  Lev.  16  ;  of  a  municipal  corporation  is  valid  ;  if  the 
James  v.  Putney,  Cro.  Car.  498.  city  receives  and  retains  the  money,  it  is 

*  City  Coimcil  v.  Dunn,  1  McCord  estopped  from  maintaining  an  action  for 
(So.   Car.),   333;     Fitch  v.   Pinckard,  4  selling  liquor  without  license.    Martel  y. 


412  MUNICIPAL   COKPOKATIONS.  [CH.  XII. 

§  418.  (351)  111  proceedings  to  enforce  ordinances,  the  illegality 
of  the  corporate  organization  cannot  be  shown  to  defeat  a  recovery  ; 
in  such  a  collateral  proceeding,  evidence  that  the  corporation  is 
acting  as  such  is  all  that  is  required.^ 

§  419.  (352)  The  legislature  may  ratify  ordinances  not  other- 
wise binding ;  and  offenders  should  thereafter  be  prosecuted 
under  the  ordinances,  and  not  under  the  validating  act.^ 

§  420.  (353)  In  prosecutions  or  actions  to  enforce  ordinances, 
or  in  considerinfj  the  question  of  their  validity,  courts  will  give 
them  a  reasonable  construction,  and  will  incline  to  sustain  rather 
than  to  overthrow  them,  and  especially  is  this  so  where  the 
question  depends  upon  their  being  reasonable  or  otherwise. 
Thus,  if  by  one  construction  an  ordinance  will  be  valid,  and  by 
another  void,  the  courts  will,  if  possible,  adopt  the  former.  But 
an  ordinance  which  transcends  the  power  vested  in  the  body 
which  passed  it  is  void,  and  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by  plea 
or  answer  to  an  action  to  recover  the  jjenalty  or  other  proceed- 
ings to  enforce  it.^     Its  validity  may  also  be  tested  in  proper 

East  St.  Louis,  94  III.  67,  1880  ;  s.  c.  21  by  subsequent  legislation.  But  see  cases 
Alb.  L.  J.  195.  cited  post,  sec.  814,  note.  And  in  New 
Any  positive  acts  [infra  vires]  by  muni-  Jersei/  also  it  has  been  frequently  held  that 
cipal  officers  which  may  have  induced  the  legislature  may  validate  informal  or 
the  action  of  the  adverse  party,  and  wliere  irregular  municipal  action,  when  the  mat- 
it  would  be  inequitable  to  permit  the  ters  dispensed  with  or  cured  did  not  re- 
corporation  to  stultify  itself,  by  retracting  late  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts, 
what  its  officers  had  done,  will  work  an  Bergen  v.  State,  3  Vroom  (32  N.J.  L.), 
estoppel.  Martel  y.  East  St.  Louis,  94  111.  490;  State  v.  Union,  4  Ih.  (33  N.  .J.  L.) 
67;  Roby  W.Chicago,  64  111.  477;  Rail-  350;  State  r.  Newark,  6  Vroom  (34  N.  J. 
road  Co.  v.  Joliet,  79  III.  39;  Logan  Co.  L.),  236. 
V.  Lincoln,  81  III.  156.  ^  Commonwealth  v.  Robertson,  5  Gush. 

1  Hamilton  v.  Carthage,  24  111.  22;  (Mass.)  438,442, 1850;  Vintners  y.Fassey, 
Mendota  i',  Thompson,  20  111.  197 ;  Coles  1  Burr.  239 ;  Poulters  Co.  v.  Phillips,  6 
County  V.  Addison,  23  111.  383;  Decorah  Bing.  (N.  C.)  314,  323;  Tailors  of  Ips- 
V.  Gillis,  10  Iowa,  234;  Kettering  v.  wicli,  11  Rep.  54  a;  Norris  n.  Staps,  Hob. 
Jacksonville,  50  111.39;  Tisdale  v.  Min-  211;  Tobacco,  etc.  Co.  v.  Woodroffe,  7 
onk,  46  111.  9,  1867.  B.  &  C.  838;  Moir  v.  Munday,  Sayer,  181, 

2  Truchelut  v.  City  Council,  1  Nott  &  185  ;  Rounds  v.  Mumford,  2  Rh.  Is.  154, 
McC.  (So.  Car.)  227,  1818  ;  Lennon  y.  New  1852.  Where  the  legislature  has  con- 
York,  55  N.  Y.  361,  1874 ;  ante,  ch.  iv.  sec.  f erred  full  and  exclusive  jurisdiction  on  a 
79,  and  note.  Logansport  v.  Crockett,  municipal  corporation  over  a  certain  sub- 
64  Ind.  319,  approving  text.  In  State  v.  ject,  the  acts  of  the  corporation  will  be 
Plainfield,  9  Vroom  (38  N.  J.  L.),  95,  where  supported  by  every  fair  intendment  and 
an  ordinance  was  void  for  want  of  proper  presumption.  Baltimore  v.  Clunet,  23 
notice  to  the  persons  interested,  it  was  Md.  449, 1865.  The  title  and  the  body  of 
held  that  the  error  could  not  be  remedied  the  ordinance  may  be  taken  together  to 


§  421.] 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS. 


413 


cases  by  suits  against  the  corporation  or  its  officers  for  acts  done 
under  it,^  or  by  a  return  to  a  mandamus  where  the  party  justifies 
his  refusal  to  comply  with  the  writ  on  the  ground  that  the  ordi- 
nance is  invahd,^  or,  as  elsewhere  shown,  by  bill  in  chancery  to 
enjoin  proceedings  thereunder. 

§  421.  (354)  If  part  of  a  by-law  he  void,  another  essential  and 
connected  part  of  the  same  by-law  is  also  void.^  But  it  must  be 
essential  and  connected  to  have  this  effect.  Thus,  if  an  ordinance, 
or  even  the  same  section  of  an  ordinance,  contains  two  separate 


give  it  the  necessary  certainty  to  sustain 
it.  Martindale  r.  Palmer,  52  Ind.  411, 
1876.  In  view  of  the  inartificial  character 
of  town  by-laws,  they  are  especially  en- 
titled to  a  reasonable  construction.  Whit- 
lock  V.  West,  26  Conn.  406 ;  Willc.  Mun. 
Corp.  159,  pi.  382.  By-laws  with  penal- 
ties are  not  properly  penal  statutes.  The 
penalty  is  in  the  nature  of  liquidated 
damages,  established  as  such  in  lieu  of 
damages  which  a  court  would  be  autlior- 
ized  to  assess.  Tlierefore  the  strict  rules 
by  which  the  validity  of  penal  statutes 
are  to  be  tested  are  not  to  be  applied  to 
the  by-laws  or  ordinances  of  municipal 
corporations.  It  is  well  remarked  tliat 
"  the  by-laws  of  very  few  of  these  corpo- 
rations could  stand  such  a  test.  They 
should  receive  a  reasonable  construction, 
and  their  terms  must  not  be  strictly  scru- 
tinized for  the  purpose  of  making  them 
void."  Per  Eiistis,  C.  J.,  Municipality  v. 
Cutting,  4  La.  An.  335 ;  Merriam  v.  New 
Orleans,  14  Ih.  318 ;  s.  p.  Loze  ;•.  Mayor, 
etc.,  2  La.  427.  If,  however,  the  ordi- 
nance is,  in  its  nature,  higldy  penal,  it  will 
be  construed  strictly,  and  it  must  clearly 
embrace  the  offence  charged.  Krickle  v. 
Commonwealth,  1  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  261, 
1841.  Contemporaneous  construction 
often  of  great  weight  in  interpreting 
doubtful  provisions.  State  v.  Severance, 
49  Mo.  401,  1872;  ante,  sec.  93,  note;  sec. 
184,  note. 

^  1  Moir  V.  Munday,  Sayer,  181,  18-5. 
St.  Charles  v.  Meyer,  58  Mo.  86,  1874. 
See  protective  provisions  to  corporate 
oflBcers  and  agents  in  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act,  5  and  6  Will.  IV.  cli.  Ixxvi. 
Bees.  132, 133.     In  the  Canadian  Municipal 


Act  (sec.  198,  Harrison's  Munic.  Man.  2d 
ed.  p.  145)  there  is  what  the  author 
would  suppose  to  be  a  very  useful  pro- 
vision to  test  summarily  the  validity  of 
by-laws,  to  the  effect  that  a  resident  of  a 
municipality  or  any  other  person  inter- 
ested in  a  by-law,  order,  or  resolution 
may,  within  one  year,  apply  to  either  of 
the  superior  courts  of  common  law  to 
have  it  quashed,  and  the  court,  after 
notice  to  tlie  corporation,  may  quash  the 
bylaw,  order,  or  resolution,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  for  illegality  ;  and  it  is  further 
provided  (sec.  205),  that  in  case  anything 
has  been  done  under  such  illegal  by-law, 
order,  or  resolution,  which  gives  Einy  per- 
son a  riglit  of  action,  no  action  shall  be 
brought  until  one  month's  notice  thereof 
be  .given  to  the  corporation,  and  such 
action  must  be  brought  against  the  corpo- 
ration and  not  against  any  person  acting 
under  the  by-law,  order,  or  resolution. 
Construction  of  provision,  see  Harrison's 
Munic.  Man.  (2d  ed.)  pp.  148,  1-53. 

-  Re.x  V.  Harrison,  3  Burr.  1.322  ;  Grant 
on  Corp.  89.  An  ordinance  may  be  void 
for  uncertainty  in  its  provisions,  as,  for 
e.xample,  one  which  alters  street  grades, 
without  referring  to  any  plan  or  estab- 
lishing new  grades.  Kearney  v.  Andrews, 
2  Stock.  (N.  J.)  70. 

s  Austin  V.  Murray,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
121,  126,  1834,  Com.  Dig.  By-law,  ch. 
vii.;  Rex  v.  The  Co.,  etc.,  8  Term  R. 
356.  See  Commonwealth  v.  Stodder,  2 
Cush.  (Mass.)  562,  1848;  Fisher  v.  Mc- 
Girr,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  1 ;  Warren y.  Mayor, 
etc.,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  84  ;  Commonwealth 
V.  Hitchings,  5  Gray  (Mass.),  482. 


414 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[cH.  xn. 


prohibitions  relating  to  different  acts,  with  distinct  penalties  for 
each,  one  of  which  is  valid  and  the  other  void,  the  ordinance 
may  be  enforced  as  to  that  portion  of  it  which  is  valid.^ 


§  422.  (355)  When  not  specially  regulated  by  charter  or  stat- 
ute, the  proof  of  ordinances  must  be  by  the  production  of  the 
originals  or  the  books  in  which  they  are  registered,  as  these  are 
the  primary  evidence.^  Printed  copies,  or  authenticated  copies, 
are  often  made  competent  evidence  by  the  legislature. 

§  423.  As  all  municipal  corporations  exercise  only  delegated 
and  limited  powers  in  the  absence  of  statutory  authority  to  that 


k 


1  Commonwealth  v.  Dow,  10  Met. 
(Mass.)  882,  18i5;  Amesbury  v.  Insur- 
ance Co.,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  596;  Warren 
V.  Mayor,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  84;  Shelton  v. 
Mayorof  Mobile,  etc.  (market  ordinance), 
30  Ala.  540,  1857;  Rogers  v.  Jones,  1 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  237 ;  Thomas  v.  Mount 
Vernon,  9  Ohio,  290;  1  Stra.  469  ;  Sir  T. 
Eaym.  288,  294 ;  Sayer,  256  ;  1  B.  &  Ad. 
95 ;  7  Term  R.  549.  "  If  a  by-law  be 
entire,  each  part  having  a  general  influ- 
ence over  the  rest,  and  one  part  of  it  be 
void,  the  entire  by-law  is  void."  Will- 
cock  on  Corp.  160,  pi.  384;  approved, 
Municipality  v.  Morgan,  1  La.  An.  Ill, 
116,  1846.  "But  if  a  by-law  consist  of 
several  distinct  and  independent  parts, 
although  one  or  more  of  them  may  be 
void,  the  rest  are  equally  valid,  as  though 
the  void  clauses  had  been  omitted."  Will- 
cock,  161,  pi.  389 ;  Fazakerly  v.  Wiltshire, 
11  Mod.  353 ;  Lee  v.  Walls,  1  Kenyon, 
295.  In  a  leading  case,  Rex  v.  The  Co. 
of  Fishermen,  8  Term  R.  356,  Lord  Ken- 
yon said*  "  With  regard  to  the  form  of 
the  by-law  indeed,  though  a  by-law  may 
be  good  in  part  and  bad  in  part,  yet  it 
can  be  so  only  when  the  two  parts  are 
entire  and  distinct  from  each  other."  Ap- 
proved, Municipality  v.  Morgan,  1  La. 
An.  Ill,  116,  1846.  It  is  stated  in  Grant 
on  Corporations,  88,  that  it  is  "now  fully 
settled  that  a  by-law  that  is  void  in  part 
is  void  wholly  ;  e.  g.  if  the  penalty  be  un- 
reasonable the  rest  of  the  by-law  is 
vitiated  thereby,  and  becomes  wholly  in- 
operative and  null."  Citing  Com.  Dig. 
By-Law,  ch.  vii. ;  Colchester  v.  Godwin, 


Carter,  121 ;  Ellwood  v.  Bullock,  6  Q.  B 
383  ;  Clarke  v.  Tuckett,2  Vent.  182  ;  Rex. 
V.  Atwood,  4  B.  &  Ad.  481.  But  the  rule 
in  the  text  is  well  sustained,  and  is  rea- 
sonable ;  and  it  is  not  true  that  the  void 
part  of  a  by-law  will  make  null  complete 
and  independent  parts  of  the  same  by- 
law which  would  otherwise  be  good. 
State  V.  Clark,  54  Mo.  17,  30,  1873.  The 
act  authorizing  a  sewerage  system  being 
unconstitutional  in  part,  so  that  the 
scheme  adopted  could  not  be  made  avail- 
able, tlie  undertaking  was  arrested.  State 
r.  Chamberlain,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.), 
388. 

2  Lumbard  v.  Aldrich,  8  N.  H.  31  ; 
Stevens  v.  Chicago,  48  111.  498 ;  Moor  v. 
Newfield,  4  Greenl.  (Me.)  44;  Hallowell 
Bank  v.  Hamlin,  14  Mass.  178 ;  Case  of 
Thetford,  12  Vin.  Abr.  90.  See  chapter 
on  Corporate  Records  and  Documents, 
ante.  Proof  may  be  made  by  the  clerk 
that  he  posted  up  copies  of  an  ordinance 
appearing  on  the  records,  without  pro- 
ducing such  copies  or  accounting  for 
their  absence.  Teft  v.  Size,  5  Gilm. 
(10  111.)  432.  As  to  promulgation  and 
publication  of  ordinance.  Charleston  v. 
Chur,  2  Bailey  (South  Car.),  164;  Kit- 
tering  v.  Jacksonville,  50  111.  39 ;  supra, 
sees.  331-335  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Engle,  76 
111.  317,  1875. 

Where  the  charter  provides  that  the 
printed  volume  of  City  Ordinances  shall 
be  evidence  in  all  courts,  the  ordinances 
printed  therein  will  be  judicially  noticed 
the  same  as  public  statutes.  Napman  v. 
People,  19  Mich.  352.  1869 ;  ante,  sec.  83. 


§  423.]  MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES   OR  BY-LAWS.  415 

effect,  courts  are  authorized  to  indulge  in  no  presumptions  in 
favor  of  the  validity  of  their  ordinances,  especially  where  these 
abridge  general  or  common-law  rights,  or  impose  burdens  or  pen- 
alties upon  the  inhabitants.^ 

1  Schott  V.  People,  89  HL  195,  and  cases  cited  throughout  this  chapter. 


416  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIII. 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

MUNICIPAL  COURTS. 

Municipal  Courts  in  Englaiid  and  at  Common  Law. 

§  424.  (356)  A  municipal  corporation  may,  at  common  law, 
enjo}"  the  franchise  of  holding  a  court ;  and  corporation  or  muni- 
cipal courts,  which  were  local  or  inferior  jurisdictions,  were  not 
uncommon.!  They  were  treated  as  the  tribunals  of  the  corpora- 
tion, but  since  courts  of  justice  are  for  the  public  benefit,  words 
in  a  charter  permitting  the  corporation  to  hold  a  court  are  imper- 
ative ;  2  and  the  right  cannot  be  lost  by  a  non-user ;  and  there- 
fore the  mere  disuse,  for  two  hundred  years,  of  a  court  granted  to 
a  corporation  by  charter  is  no  answer  to  a  rule  for  a  mandamus 
commanding  them  to  hold  it,  though  it  was  alleged  that  there 
were  no  sufficient  funds  for  the  purpose.^ 

§  425.  The  common-law  doctrine  respecting  municipal  courts 
was  settled  to  be  that  the  municipal  corporation  could  bring  no 
action  therein  against  a  stranger  where  the  effect  would  be  to 
benefit  the  corporation  or  increase  its  funds,  for  that  would  be 
to  make  the  corporation  itself  both  judge  and  party,  which  an  in- 
flexible and  fundamental  maxim  of  the  common  law  prohibited  ; 
and  the  same  principle  was  considered  to  operate  to  disqualify 
corporators  to  sit  as  jurors  in  such  cases  ;  but  this  objection  did 
not  apply  when  both  parties  were  corporators.* 

1  Inst.   114;  4  lb.  87,   224;   Cro.  Jac.  the   court  for  the  benefit  of  the   inhab- 

313 ;  Haddock's  case,  T.  Raym.  435.  itants.     Ih. ;  Grant  on  Corp.  34. 

-  Rex  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Hastings,  5  B.  ^  Regina   v.    Mayor,  etc.  of  Wells,  4 

&  Aid.  592.    The  language  of  the  charter  Dowl.  P.  C.  562. 

was  "that  the  mayor  may  for  the  pur-  *  Hesketh  v.  Braddock,  3  Burr.  1856- 
pose  hereafter  have  and  hold  and  have  1868;  Grant  on  Corp.  194;  London  v. 
power  to  hold  a  court  of  record,"  and  it  Wood,  12  Mod.  674 ;  1  Salk.  398 ;  Bos- 
was  lield  that  these  words,  though  per-  worth  v.  Budgen,  7  Mod.  461  ;  Rex  v. 
missive  in  form,  were  imperative,  and  Rogers,  2  Ld.  Raym.  778;  Willc.  on 
that  tlie  corporation  was  bound  to  hold  Corp.  157,  165. 


§  427.]  MUNICIPAL   COURTS.  417 

§  426.  The  English  Municipal  Corporation  Act  of  1835  pro- 
vides for  the  establishment  of  borough  courts,  defines  their  juris- 
diction and  powers,  makes  burgesses  or  citizens  competent  jurors, 
contains  an  express  provision  that  no  witness  or  magistrate  shall 
be  incompetent  or  disqualified  by  reason  of  his  being  liable  ic 
contribute  to  the  fund  of  the  corporation,  and  regulates  in  gen 
eral  the  proceedings  therein  for  violation  of  by-laws  or  ordinances, 
and  the  collection  and  enforcement  of  penalties.^ 

It  may,  however,  be  observed  that  under  the  act  the  power  to 
make  by-laws  is  limited,  and  does  not  extend  to  acts  criminal  in 
their  nature,  and  which  are  punishable  by  criminal  statutes  ir. 
force  throughout  the  realm. 

American  Corporation  Courts  —  Constitutional  Provisions. 

§  427.  (357)  In  this  country  it  is  usual  to  provide  in  the 
charter  or  organic  act  of  a  municipal  corporation  for  a  local  or 
special  tribunal,  called  by  different  names,  such  as  the  mayor's 
court,  recorder's  court,  city  court,  and  the  like  ;  and  which  is  in- 
vested with  jurisdiction  over  complaints  and  prosecutions  for  the 
violation  of  the  ordinances  of  the  corporation,  and  often,  for  pub- 
lic convenience,  with  special  civil  and  limited  criminal  jurisdiction 
under  the  laws  of  the  state. 

It  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  provide  for  the  establish- 
ment of  these  inferior  courts,  and  to  invest  them  with  such  meas- 
ure of  power  and  jurisdiction  as  may  be  deemed  expedient,  if  no 
provision  of  the  constitution  of  the  particular  state  be  infringed.^ 

1  5  and  6  Will.  iv.  ch.  Ixxvi,  sees.  90,  ing  the  city  court  of  Mobile,  which  is  in- 
91-118-134,  270-341,  1835.  vested    with    criminal    jurisdiction,   and 

2  State  V.  Mayor  of  Charleston,  14  from  whose  judgment  an  appeal  lies,  to 
Rich.  (So.  Car.)  Law,  480;  State  i;.  Hel-  be  constitutional,  and  defining  meaning 
frid,  2  Nott  &  McCord  (So.  Car.),  233,  of  inferior  court.  lb. ;  Perkins  v.  Corbin, 
1820;  Callahan  v.  New  York,  66  N.  Y.  45  Ala.  103,  1871;  holding  a  city  court 
656, 1876.  Full  discussion  of  legislative  to  be  an  inferior  court  within  the  mean- 
power  to  create  inferior  courts,  and  define  ing  of  the  constitution  which  may  be 
jurisdiction,  lb.  ;  Gray  v.  The  State,  2  created  and  abolished  at  the  pleasure  of 
Barring.  (Del.)  76,  1835.  Mayor's  court  the  legislature,  and  that  the  abolition  of 
an  inferior  court  within  meaning  of  state  the  court  carries  with  it  the  office  of  the 
constitution.  lb.  ;  Egleston  v.  City  Coun-  Judge.  New  Orleans  v.  Costello,  14  La. 
cil.l  Const.  (So.  Car.)  R.  45,  1818.  As  An.  37;  Myers  v.  People,  26  111.  173; 
to  official  character  of  city  recorder.  lb. ;  Davis  v.  Woolnough,  9  Iowa,  104 ;  Peo- 
Schroder  v.  City  Council,  2  Const.  R.  pie  v.  Wilson,  15  111.  389 ;  State  v.  May- 
726 ;  8.  c.  3  Brev.  533 ;  Tesh  v.  Com-  nard,  14  111.  420 ;  Beesman  v.  Peoria,  16 
monwealth,  4  Dana  (Ky.),  522;  Nugent  111.  484:  Holmes  v.  Finklenburg,  54  111. 
r.  The  State,  18  Ala.  521,  1821.     Hold-  203,   1870 ;    Van   Swartow  v.   Common- 

VOL.  I.  27 


418 


MUNICIPAL   CORrORATIOXS. 


[CII.  XIII. 


§  428.    (358)    Wo  have  elsewhere  shown  that  the  courts  have 
uniformly  held  that  it  was  competent  for  the  state  legislatures  to 


wealth,  24  Pa.  St.  131,  1854 ;  Tierney  v. 
Dodge,  9  Minn.  1(56 ;  St.  Peter  v.  Bauer, 
10  Minn.  3'J7,  1872;  Burns  v.  La  Grange, 
17  Texas,  415,  185G;  Slattery,  in  re,  3 
Ark.  484 ;  lb.  5G1 ;  Graliani  v.  State,  1 
Pike  (1  Ark.)  171  ;  Floyd  r.  Commission- 
ers, 14  Ga.  354,  1853 ;  State  r.  Gutticr- 
rez,  15  La.  An.  190;  Muscatine  y.  Stock, 
7  Iowa,  505  ;  Richmond  Mayoralty  Case, 
lOGratt.  (Va.)  673,  1870.  The  superior 
court  of  the  city  of  San  Francisco  is  con- 
stitutional. Scale  V.  Mitchell,  5  Cal.  403  ; 
Assault  V.  Austin,  3(3  Cal.  691 ;  Hickman 
r.  O'Neal,  10  Cal.  294.  The  constitution 
oiCalifomia  as  amended  in  1862  author- 
ized the  legislature  to  establish  "  re- 
corder's or  other  inferior  courts  in  any 
incorporated  city  or  town  "  ;  and  it  was 
held,  in  view  of  the  prior  decisions  in  the 
state  just  cited,  that  the  municipal  crim- 
inal court  ot  the  city  and  county  of  San 
Francisco  was  an  inferior  court,  and  con- 
stitutional. People  V.  Nyland,  41  Cal.  129, 
1871  ;  Stratman,  in  re,  39  Cal.  517,  1870. 
The  Hustings  Court  of  Richmond  is 
constitutional.  Chahoon's  case,  21  Graft. 
(Va.)  822,  1871 ;  Richmond  Mayoralty 
Case,  19  Gratt.  (Va.)  673,  1870.  Judi- 
ciary article  of  State  Constitution  of 
New  York  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  certain 
city  courts  construed.  Landers  v.  Staten 
Island,  etc.,  Railroad  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  450, 
1873. 

Under  a  constitutional  provision  declaring 
that  "the  judicial  ;)0!fer  shall  be  vested 
in  a  Supreme  Court,  in  district  courts, 
and  in  justices  of  the  peace,"  an  act  con- 
ferring judicial  powers  on  the  mayor  of  a 
city  was  considered  void,  and  it  was  held 
that  for  violations  of  its  ordinances  the 
corporation  should  resort  to  the  judicial 
tribunals  organized  under  the  constitu- 
tion. Lafon  V.  Dufrocq,  9  La.  An.  350, 
1854.  But  see  The  State  v.  Young,  3 
Kan.  445,  1866,  where  a  provision  in  an 
organic  act  that  tlie  judicial  power  shall 
be  vested  exclusively  in  a  Supreme  Court, 
district,  probate,  and  justice  courts,  was 
held  not  to  prohibit  the  legislature  from 
establisliing  municipal  courts  for  tlie  en- 
forcement of  municipal  regulations  and 
ordinances.  And  this  seems  to  be  the 
correct  view.     Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md. 


331.     In  Hutchings  i\  Scott,  4  Halst.  (N. 
J.)  218,  1827,   the   objection   was  made 
that  the  legislature  could  not  constitu- 
tionally confer  the   powers   of  justices  of 
the  peace  on  the  mayor,  recorder,  or  aldermen 
of  a  city  or  borough,  the  argument  being 
that  since  tlie  constitution  provided  for 
the  appointment  of  justices  of  the  peace 
only,  and   not  for  corporate  ofRi'crs,  offi- 
cers exercising  tiie  autliority  and  powers 
of  a  justice  of  the  peace  should  be  ap- 
pointed as   such ;  but  the  objection   was 
not  sustained.     In  Illinois,  mayors  of  cit- 
ies cannot,  it  is  held,  be  constitutionally 
invested  with  judicial  power.   The  State, 
etc.  V.  Maynard,  14  III.  420;  Beesman  v. 
Peoria,  16  111.  484.     By  the  genera!  law 
of  Indiana  of  1857,  for  the  incorporation 
of  cities,  mayors,  in  addition  to  tlieir  du- 
ties proper,  have,   "  within  the  limits  of 
cities,  the  jurisdiction  and   powers  of  a 
justice  of  the  peace  in  all  matters,  civil 
and  criminal,  arising  under  the  laws  of 
the  state,  and  for  crimes  and  misdemean- 
ors a  jurisdiction  co-extensive  with  the 
county."    The  constitution  of  the  same 
state  (art.  VII,  sec.  16)  declared  that  "  no 
person  elected  to  any  judicial  office  shall, 
during  the  term, -be  eligible  to  any  office 
of   trust  or  profit  under  the  state,  other 
than  a  judicial  office."     One  Wallace  was 
elected  mayor  of  Indianapolis,  and  within 
his  term  he  resigned  and  received  a  ma- 
jority of  votes  for  sheriff  of  the  county. 
It  was  held   by  the    Supreme   Court   of 
Indiana  (Waldo  v.  Wallace,  12  Ind.  569, 
18.59;    Gulick   v.   New,    14  Ih.   93)    that 
Wallace   was   a   "judicial   officer,"   and 
therefore  ineligible  to  the  office  of  sheriff; 
that  the  voters  of  the  county  were  charge- 
able with  notice  of  his  ineligibility ;  that 
votes  cast  for  him  were  therefore  ineffect- 
ual, and  that  his  competitor,  having  re- 
ceived the  greatest  number  of  legal  votes, 
though  not  a  majority  of  the  ballots,  was 
duly  elected.     Notwithstanding  the  great 
consideration  which  these  cases  received, 
I  venture,  with  great  deference,  to  state 
that  it  is  by  no  means  clear  to  my  mind 
that  the  mayor  was  a  "judicial  officer," 
within  the  meaning  of  the  constitution. 
See,  as  bearing  upon  the  above  decision, 
and  illustrative  of  the  nature  of  the  office 


§  428.] 


MUNICIPAL  COURTS. 


419 


create  municipal  corporations  with  powers  of  local  government, 
and  to  authorize  them  to  adopt  ordinances  or  by-laws,  with  appro- 


of  mayor,  Howard  v.  Shoemaker,  35 
Ind.  Ill,  1871;  Morrison  v.  McDonald, 
21  Me.  550,  1842;  State  v.  Maynard, 
14  111.  419,  1853;  Commonwealth  v. 
Dallas,  4  Dallas,  229;  s.  c.  more  fully, 
8  Yeates  (Pa.),  300,  1801;  State  v.  Wil- 
mington, 3  Harring.  (Del.)  294,  1839. 
Authority  of  a  mayor  under  a  statute  in- 
vesting him  with  the  powers  of  a  justice 
of  the  peace.  State  v.  Perkins,  4  Zabr.  (24 
N.  J.  L.)  409  ;  1  Harr.  (N.  J.)  237  ;  Howe 
V.  Plainfield,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  145; 
State  V.  Zeigler,  3  Vroom  (32  N.  J.  L.), 
262;  explained,  McConvill  v.  Jersey 
City,  10  Vroom  (39  N.  J.  L.),  38,  42.  See 
Baton  Rouge  c.  Deering,  15  La.  An.  208. 
A  constitutional  provision  as  to  eligibility 
"  to  the  office  of  judge  of  any  court  of  the 
state,"  etc.,  and  requiring  a  two  years' 
residence  "  in  the  division,  circuit,  or 
county,"  was  considered  to  have  no  refer- 
ence to  the  office  of  recorder  of  a  city. 
The  People  v.  Wilson,  15  111.  389. 

In  Michigan  under  constitutional  pro- 
visions, dividing  the  state  into  judicial 
circuits,  and  establishing  circuit  courts' 
as  the  courts  of  general  original  jurisdic- 
tion, but  authorizing  the  establishment, 
by  the  legislature,  of  municipal  courts  in 
cities  :  Held,  that  the  original  purpose  of 
such  municipal  courts  was  not  to  destroy 
or  materially  change  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  circuits,  but  to  relieve  them  of  part 
of  the  increased  litigation  resulting  from 
the  growth  of  large  cities.  Such  courts 
cannot  have,  in  any  class  of  cases,  a  juris- 
diction territorially  coextensive  with  the 
limits  of  the  county,  much  less  of  the 
entire  state.  They  were  designed  to 
meet  the  wants  of  the  cities  wherein  they 
are  established.  A  statute  which  seeks 
to  give  a  municipal  court  jurisdiction, 
where  original  process  is  served  within 
the  city,  thougii  neither  party  is  a  resi- 
dent, as  where  service  is  had  anywhere 
in  the  county,  if  plaintiff  resides  in  the 
city,  is  unconstitutional  and  void.  Grand 
Rapids,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Gray,  38 
Mich.  461,  1878. 

The  constitution  of  Nevada  provided 
that  "the  legislature  may  also  establish 
courts  for  municipal  purposes  on!'/,  in  in- 
corporated cities  and  towns,"  and  it  was 


held  that  an  act  authorizing  the  city  re- 
corder to  exercise  the  duties  of  commit- 
ting magistrates  in  respect  to  offences 
against  the  public  laws  of  the  state  was  in 
conflict  with  the  constitution.  Meagher 
V.  County,  5  Nev,  244,  1869.  The  consti- 
tution of  Maryland  contains  a  provision 
that  "  the  judicial  power  of  the  state  shall 
be  vested  in  a  court  of  appeals,  in  circuit 
courts,  in  such  courts  for  the  city  of  Balti- 
more as  may  be  hereafter  prescribed,  and 
in  justices  of  the  peace,"  and  it  was  held 
that  the  legislature  might  authorize  mu- 
nicipal courts  to  try  and  punish  disorderly 
persons  and  lewd  women  within  the  cor- 
porate limits,  and  generally  to  authorize 
the  corporate  authorities  to  exercise  police 
powers,  which  were  distinguished  from  the 
ordinary  judiciary  powers  of  the  state. 
Shafer  v.  Mumma,  17  Md.  331,  1861. 
Further  as  to  construction  of  constitution 
of  Maryland  as  to  judicial  powers  of 
mayors.  Hagerstown  v.  Dechert,  32  Md. 
369,  1869. 

Under  the  constitution  of  North  Caro- 
lina "  special  courts  "  are  authorized  "  for 
the  trial  of  misdemeanors  in  cities  and 
towns  where  they  may  be  necessary"; 
and  it  was  lield  to  be  no  objection  to  an 
act  of  the  legislature  that  it  did  not  au- 
thorize the  officers  of  such  court  to  try 
persons  charged  with  misdemeanors,  but 
only  to  bind  them  over.  State  v.  Pen- 
der, 66  No.  Car.  313,  1872.  But  under 
the  constitution  the  legislature  cannot 
confer  upon  mayors  the  judicial  powers 
of  justices  of  the  peace  in  civil  actions. 
Edenton  v.  Wool,  65  Ih.  379. 

The  amendment  of  the  constitution  of 
Massachusetts  of  1821  provided  that  "  no 
judge  of  any  court  of  this  commonwealth 
shall  at  the  same  time  hold  the  office  of 
governor,  etc.,  or  have  a  seat  in  the  sen- 
ate or  house  of  representatives."  A 
judge  of  a  police  court  for  the  city  of 
Lynn  was  elecjted  a  member  of  the  house 
of  representatives,  and  took  his  seat  as 
such.  Police  courts  were  created  after 
the  adoption  of  the  constitutional  amend- 
ment in  question,  and  were  vested  at 
first  with  the  same  civil  and  criminal  ju- 
risdiction as  justices  of  the  peace.  The 
courts  thus  established  were  organized 


420 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIII. 


priate  penalties  for  their  violation.  The  power  to  do  this  includes, 
by  fair  implication,  the  power  to  authorize  violations  of  ordi- 
nances (where  the  acts  are  not  criminal  in  their  nature)  to  be 
tried  and  determined  in  a  summary  manner  by  a  local  or  corpor- 
ation tribunal. 

§  4*29.  The  distinction  between  statute  law  and  municipal  by- 
laws has  been  pointed  out,  and  the  subject  of  concurrent  pro- 
hibitions of  the  same  act  by  the  general  law  and  by  the  local 
ordinances  of  a  municipality  treated  in  the  chapter  on  Ordi- 
nances. The  distinction  is  there  drawn,  and  is  to  be  observed 
between  acts  not  essentially  criminal,  relating  to  municipal  po- 
lice, and  those  intrinsically  criminal,  and  which  are  made  punish- 
able by  the  general  laws  of  the  state.  The  pecuniary  penalties 
which  are  annexed  to  violations  of  the  former  class,  the  legisla- 
ture may,  we  think,  authorize  the  corporation  to  enforce  in  its 
own  name,  by  civil  action  or  by  complaint,  and  provision  need 


judicial  tribunals,  having  attributes  and 
exercising  judicial  functions  independent- 
ly of  tiie  magistrates  designated  to  hold 
them,  and  were  thus  distinguished  from 
justices  of  the  peace,  on  whom  person- 
ally certain  judicial  powers  are  conferred 
by  law ;  and  the  judges  of  such  courts 
must,  by  the  constitution,  be  appointed 
during  good  behavior  instead  of  for  seven 
years,  as  in  the  case  of  justices  of  the 
peace.  It  was  held  that  a  police  court  was 
a  court  of  the  commonwealth  within  the 
constitutional  amendment,  and  that  the 
judge  tliereof  vacated  his  office  as  such 
judge  by  accepting  another  official  trust 
incompatible  therewith.  Commonwealth 
V.  Hawkes  (71(0  warranto),  123  Mass.  525, 
1878.  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Gray's  opinion 
will  be  found  highly  instructive. 

In  Wisiconsin,  says  Hyan,  C.  J.,  in  The 
State  V.  Lockwood,  43  Wis.  403, 1878,  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury  upon  information  or 
indictment  for  crime  is  secured  by  the 
constitution  and  cannot  be  waived ;  and 
the  trial  of  an  information  by  a  judge  of 
a  municipal  court  without  a  jury  was 
held  not  to  be  a  legal  trial,  and  the 
judgment  of  the  municipal  magistrate 
was  declared  to  be  void.  The  chief  jus- 
tice says  in  substance  that  a  plea  of  not 
guilty  to  an  information  or  indictment  for 


crime,  whether  felony  or  misdemeanor, 
puts  the  accused  upon  the  country,  and 
can  be  tried  by  a  jury  only.  The  rule  is 
universal  as  to  felonies ;  not  quite  so  as 
to  misdemeanors.  But  the  current  of 
authority  appears  to  apply  it  to  both 
classes  of  crime ;  and  this  court  holds 
that  to  be  safer  and  better  alike  in  prin- 
ciple and  practice.  Cooley's  Const.  Lim. 
819,  410,  n.  :  Proffatt's  Jury  Tr.  sec.  113; 
Neales  v.  State,  10  Mo.  498 ;  State  v. 
Mansfield,  41  Mo.  470;  Commonwealth 
V.  Sliaw,  1  Pittsburg  (Pa.),  492.  In  the 
latter  case  will  be  found  a  collection  of 
authorities  bearing  on  the  question  of 
waiver  of  the  right  to  a  jury  trial  in 
criminal  cases. 

The  constitution  of  Illinois  of  1870  pro- 
vides that  "the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  as 
heretofore  enjoyed,  shall  remain  inviolate." 
Under  this  provision,  the  vagrant  act,  deny- 
ing to  persons  arrested  for  vagrancy  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury,  was  considered  by 
McAllister,  J.,  in  view  of  the  previous 
legislation  and  constitutional  provisions 
referred  to  by  him,  to  be  unconstitutional. 
Scully  and  O'Leary,  in  re,  11  Chicago  Legal 
News,  27,  1878.  See  ante,  sec.  401 ;  post, 
sec.  433.  Defendant  may  waive  statute 
State  V.  Kaufman,  51  Iowa,  578. 


§  429.] 


MUNICIPAL  COURTS. 


421 


not  necessarily  be  made  that  they  shall  be  prosecuted  in  the 
name  of  the  people  or  of  the  state.^ 


1  Barter  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Pa.  (Pen. 
&  W.)  253;  Weeks  v.  Foreman,  1  Harri- 
son (N.  J.),  237;  Ewbank  y.  Ashley,  86 
111.  177;  Williams  v.  Augusta,  4  Ga.  509; 
Floyd  V.  Commissioners,  li  Ga.  354  ;  Kip 
V.  Patterson,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.j  298;  Lew- 
iston  V.  Proctor,  23  III.  533 ;  State  v. 
Jackson,  8  Mich.  110.  See  State  v.  Stearns, 
11  Fost.  (31  N.  H.)  106;  Goddard,  Peti- 
tioner, 16  Pick.  (Mass.)  504  ;  Fink  v.  Mil- 
waukee, 17  Wis.  26.  The  legislature  may 
enact  that  suits  for  the  violation  of  muni- 
cipal ordinances  shall  be  prosecuted  in 
the  name  of  the  people  of  the  state.  Pills- 
bury  V.  Brown,  47  Cal.  478,  1874. 

The  constitution  of  the  state  of  Iowa 
contains  this  provision  :  "  The  stjde  of 
all  process  shall  be  '  Tiie  State  of  Iowa,' 
and  all  prosecutions  shall  be  conducted  in 
the  name  and  by  the  authority  of  the 
same."  Constitution  of  Iowa,  Art.  V. 
sec.  8.  The  charter  of  the  city  of  Dav- 
enport in  terms  authorized  prosecutions 
for  violations  of  municipal  ordinances  to 
be  instituted  in  the  name  of  the  city,  and 
it  was  contended  that  this  portion  of  the 
charter  was  in  conflict  with  the  above 
quoted  provision  of  the  constitution.  But 
the  Supreme  Court,  in  the  case  of  Dav- 
enport V.  Bird,  34  Iowa,  524,  1871,  held 
otherwise.  It  was  a  prosecution  in  the 
name  of  the  city  against  the  defendant 
for  a  violation  of  an  ordinance  of  a  po- 
lice nature,  but  for  whicli,  under  the 
charter,  the  city  was  authorized  to  punish 
by  a  limited  fine  and  imprisonment.  In 
giving  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Miller,  J., 
says  :  "  Is  it  necessary,  under  tlie  con- 
stitution, that  all  prosecutions  for  viola- 
tions of  municipal  police  ordinances  shall 
be  conducted  in  the  name  anil  h\j  the  au- 
thoriti/  of  the  state  of  Iowa  ?  Or,  in  other 
words,  is  that  clause  of  tiie  city  charter 
of  Davenport,  which  directs  that  'all 
suits,  actions,  and  prosecutions  be  insti- 
tuted, commenced,  and  prosecuted  in  the 
name  of  the  cili/  of  Davenport,'  in  conflict 
with  the  constitutional  provision  before 
referred  to  ?  We  are  of  opinion  that  it  is 
not.  Tills  clause  of  the  constitution  oc- 
curs in  Art.  V.,  which  treats  of  the  judi- 
cial department  of  tlie  government.  This 
article  vests  and  defines  the  judicial  power 


of  the  state,  establishes  the  tenure  of 
office  of  the  judges,  and  defines  the  mode 
of  their  election ;  fixes  their  salary  and 
limits  tlie  number  of  judicial  districts ; 
provides  for  the  election  of  an  attorney 
general,  and  other  matters  pertaining  to 
the  judicial  arm  of  the  state,  among  which 
is  the  clause  under  consideration.  From 
all  this,  it  seems  manifest  that  the  re- 
quirement '  that  all  prosecutions  shall  be 
conducted  in  the  name  of  "  The  state  of 
Iowa'"  contemplates  such  criminal p-ose- 
culions  as  shall  be  instituted  and  prosecu- 
ted before  the  tribunals  which  are 
provided  for  in  that  article  of  the  consti- 
tution under  the  statutes  of  the  state.  It 
is  fitting  and  appropriate  that  prosecu- 
tions for  violations  of  the  criminal  laws 
of  the  state  should  be  carried  on  in  the 
name  of  the  government.  But  there  is 
no  fitness  or  propriety  in  requiring  the 
state  to  be  a  party  to  every  petty  prose- 
cution under  the  police  regulations  of  a 
municipal  corporation.  Such  a  construc- 
tion of  this  article  of  the  constitution 
seems  to  us  unwarranted,  and  not  intended 
by  the  f  ramers  of  the  constitution.  It  was 
held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsyl- 
vania that  the  word  process,  in  the  12th 
section  of  the  5th  article  of  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  state  of  Pennsylvania,  which 
Ijrovides  that  'the  style  of  all  process 
shall  be  the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,' 
was  intended  to  refer  to  such  writs  only 
as  should  become  necessary  to  be  issued 
in  the  course  of  the  exercise  of  that  judi- 
cial power  which  is  established  and  pro- 
vided for  in  the  article  of  the  constitution, 
and  forms  exclusively  the  subject-matter 
of  it.  On  the  same  principle,  we  are  of 
opinion  that  the  word  'prosecutions,'  in 
the  8th  section  of  Art.  V.  of  our  constitu- 
tion, was  intended  to  refer  only  to  such 
criminal  prosecutions  under  state  laws  as 
should  be  cognizable  by  the  judicial  power, 
which  is  established  and  provided  for  in 
tliat  article,  and  that  it  was  not  intended 
to  include  prosecutions  under  ordinances 
of  municipal  corporations  cognizable  be- 
fore local  police  magistrates." 

And  tiie  same  view  is  held  by  the  Court 
of  Ajipeals  of  Keniucly.  Williamson  v. 
Commonwealth,   4   B.    Mon.    (Ky.)    146, 


422  MUNICIPAL  CORrORATIONS.  [CH.  XIII. 

§  430.  (359)  In  creating  local  tribunals,  however,  and  in  pre- 
scribing their  jurisdiction,  it  is  essential  that  the  legislature 
should  keep  in  view  two  cardinal  considerations  :  First.  That  these 
inferior  courts  will  have  only  such  jurisdiction,  and  can  exercise 
only  such  powers,  as  are  expresdij  given  or  necessarily  implied. 
Fair  doubts  as  to  the  extent  of  jurisdiction  are  resolved  against  the 
corporation ;  to  this  effect  are  all  the  authorities.  Second.  Re- 
gard should  also  be  had  to  constitutional  provisions  intended  to 
secure  the  liberty  and  protect  the  rights  of  the  citizen.  The 
state  constitutions  contain  the  substance  of  the  provisions  of 
Magna  Charta  to  the  effect  that  no  citizen  shall  be  deprived  of  life, 
liberty,  or  property  but  by  the  judgment  of  his  peers  or  by  the 
law  of  the  land,  and  also  provisions,  more  or  less  extensive,  se- 
curing the  right  of  trial  by  jury.  These  and  other  provisions  of 
the  fundamental  law  cannot  be  violated  in  acts  of  the  legislature 
establishing  and  fixing  the  jurisdiction  of  the  corporation  court  or 
tribunal.^ 

Citizens  Competent  to  be  Local  Judges^  Jurors^  and  Witnesses. 

§  431.  (360)  The  maxim  of  the  common  law  above  adverted 
to,  that  no  one  shall  be  a  judge  in  his  own  case,  has  no  just  appli- 
cation to  legislation  creating  municipal  courts,  and  investing  them 
with  jurisdiction  to  try  complaints  for  breaches  of  municipal  or- 
dinances. The  mayor,  though  a  citizen  of  the  corporation,  may 
be  clothed  with  judicial  powers  of  this  character,  and  the  inhabi- 
tants, though  interested  in  a  minute  degree  in  the  recovery,  are, 
or  at  least  may  be  declared,  competent  witnesses.  In  this  respect 
the  common-law  rules  have  not  been  adopted  and  applied  by  the 
American  courts  to  our  municipal  corporations ;  ^  or  the  courts 

1843.     Iw  Nebraska  the  constitution  pro-  290,   1839;    Commonwealth   v.   Read,   1 

vides  that  "all  process  and  other  proceed-  Gray  (Mass.),  475;  The  Mayor  v.  Long, 

ing  shall  run  in  the  name  of  the  state,"  31   Mo.    369,    1801;    Commonwealth    v. 

and  this  was  held  to  include  prosecutions  Ryan,  5  Mass.  90 ;  Cooley  Const.  Lira, 

under  municipal   ordinances,   where   the  410,  412. 

penalty  was  fine  and  imprisonment;  but  In  the  City  Council  v.  Pepper,  1  Rich. 
qimre.  Brownsville  v.  Cook,  4  Neb.  101,  (So.  Car.)  Law,  364,  1845,  the  defend- 
1875.  As  to  mode  of  enforcement  and  ant,  a  non-resident  of  the  city,  was  pros- 
requisites  of  complaints,  vide  chapter  on  ecuted  in  the  city  court,  established  by 
Ordinances,  sec.  408.  act  of  the  legislature,  for  violation  of  a 

1  Zylstra  I).  The  Corporation  of  Charles-  city  ordinance.     The  defendant  made  the 

ton,   1  Bay  (So.  C),  382,  1794;  People  v.  point  that,  as  the  judge  of  that  court,  the 

Slaughter,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  334,  1842.  sheriff  and  jurors  were  corporators,  and 

*  Thomas  v.  Mount  Vernon,  9  Ohio,  therefore  interested  in  the  penalty,  they 


§431.] 


MUNICIPAL   COUKTS. 


423 


have  considered  the  common-law  doctrine  as  to  the  disqualifying 
effect  of  interest  upon  jurors  and  witnesses  as  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly abrogated  by  the  usual  legislative  or  charter  provisions 
for  the  constitution  of  municipal  courts,  and  investing  them  with 
jurisdiction  to  hear  and  try  certain  actions  by  and  against  the 
municipality.  But  a  distinction  has  been  well  drawn  between 
corporation  courts  proper  and  the  usual  courts  of  record  ;  and  in 
respect  of  ordinary  actions  in  the  latter  class  of  courts,  a  tax- 
payer of  a  municipahty  is  incompetent  to  serve  as  a  juror  in  a 
case  where  thq  municipality  is  a  party  unless  made  competent 
by  legislative  provision,  expressly  or  by  implication.^ 


were  incompetent  to  try  the  cause.  In 
holding  this  objection  unsound,  the  Court 
of  Appeals,  after  alluding  to  Ilesketh  v. 
Braddock,  3  Burr.  1847,  relied  on  by  the 
defendant,  remarks  :  "  The  statutory  au- 
thority given  to  the  city  court  to  try  all 
offenders  against  city  ordinances,  impli- 
edly declares  that,  notwithstanding  the 
common-law  objection,  it  was  right  and 
proper  to  give  it  the  power  to  enforce  the 
city  laws  against  all  oflfenders.  The  in- 
terest is  too  minute,  too  slight  to  excite 
prejudice  against  a  defendant;  for  the 
judge,  sheriff,  and  jurors  are  members  of  a 
corporation  of  many  thousand  members. 
"What  interest  of  value  have  they  in  a  fine 
of  twenty  dollars  ?  It  would  put  a  most 
eminent  calculator  to  great  trouble  to 
ascertain  the  very  minute  grain  of  in- 
terest which  each  of  these  gentleman 
might  have.  To  remove  so  shadowy 
and  slight  an  objection,  the  legislature 
thought  proper  to  clothe  the  city  court, 
consisting  of  its  judge,  clerk,  sheriff  and 
jurors,  with  authority  to  try  the  defend- 
ant, and  he  cannot  now  object  to  it."  Per 
O'Neall  J.,  City  Council  v.  Pepper,  1 
Rich,  (So.  Car.)  Law,  364,  1845.  City 
Council  V.  King,  4  McCord  (So.  Car.) 
487  ;  Corwein  v.  Hames,  11  Jolms.  (N.  Y.) 
76,  1814.  The  mayor  is  not  disqualified 
from  presiding  in  the  mayor's  court, 
before  which  the  proceedings  are  held, 
from  the  fact  that  he  is  the  owner  of  a 
lot  on  the  street  sought  to  be  widened. 
The  Mayor  v.  Long,  31  Mo.  .309,  1861. 

1  Divenny  v.  Ehnira,  51  N.  Y.  506, 1873. 
This  was  action  of  tort  in  the  Supreme 
Court  against  the  city  of  Elmira  for  dam- 
ages to  tlie  plaintiff  caused  by  a  defective 


sidewalk,  which  the  city  was  bound  to 
repair.  The  question  was  whether  a 
taxpayer  of  the  city  was  a  competent 
juror.  It  was  held  by  the  Commission 
of  Appeals  that  at  common  law  the  in- 
terest of  such  a  juror  would  be  a  sufficient 
objection  unless  removed  by  statute, 
and  that  as  respects  the  defendant  city 
it  had  not  been  thus  removed.  Mr. 
Commissioner  Earl,  in  delivering  the 
judgment  of  the  court,  said:  "The 
charter  of  Elmira  provides  for  the  elec- 
tion of  justices  of  the  peace,  clothed  with 
authority  to  hear  and  try  actions  in  the 
same  manner  as  justices  of  towns,  and  the 
city  may  sue  before  such  justices  to  re- 
cover penalties  and  forfeitures,  and  such 
suits  must  be  tried  like  civil  actions  before 
justices  of  towns.  The  defendants  in  such 
action  may,  of  course,  demand  jury  trials, 
and  jurors  must  be  summoned  from  the 
city,  and  cannot  be  summoned  elsewhere. 
Hence,  it  may  be  well  that  in  such  actions 
before  justices  of  the  peace  the  incompe- 
tency of  juries  on  account  of  interest  is, 
by  implication,  removed,  for  otherwise 
the  justices  would  be  practically  deprived 
of  jurisdiction,  to  try  the  causes  which 
are  authorized  to  be  commenced  before 
them.  Commonwealth  v.  Ryan,  5  Mass. 
90.  But  there  is  no  such  practical  ditfi- 
culty  in  courts  of  record  held  in  the  city, 
and  hence  there  is  no  reason  for  holding 
that  in  actions  tried  in  them,  in  which 
the  city  is  interested,  the  incompetency 
of  jurors  on  account  of  interest  has  been 
removed.  I  therefore  conclude  that  the 
common-law  rule  of  incomj)etency  on  ac- 
count of  interest  applied  to  tliese  jurors, 
and   that  they  were  properly  challenged 


424 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIII. 


Summary  Proceedings  may,  in   Certain   Cases,  he    authorized. — 

Jury  Trial. 

§  432.  (3G1)  Proceedings  for  the  violation  of  municipal  ordi- 
nances are  frequently  summary  in  their  character,  and  it  has  been 
made  a  question  how  far  statutes  or  charters  authorizing  such 
proceedings  are  valid,  especially  where  no  provision  is  made  for 
trial  by  jur}'.  This  must  depend  upon  the  constitution  of  the 
state  and  the  extent  to  which  the  power  of  the  legislature  is 
therein  restricted.  Offences  against  ordinances  properl}^  made  in 
virtue  of  the  implied  or  incidental  power  of  the  corporation,  or  in 
the  exercise  of  its  legitimate  police  authority  for  the  preservation 
of  the  peace,  good  order,  safety,  and  health  of  the  place,  and 
which  relate  to  minor  acts  and  matters  not  embraced  in  the 
public  criminal  statutes  of  the  state,  are  not  usually  or  properly 
regarded  as  criminal,  and  hence  need  not  necessarily  be  prose- 
cuted by  indictment  or  tried  by  a  jury^      An  act  of  the  legis- 


and  excluded.  Whatever  inconvenience 
may  flow  from  such  a  holding  may  be 
remedied  by  the  legislature.  We  must 
administer  the  law  as  we  find  it."  51  N. 
Y.  512.  And  it  has  also  been  elsewhere 
decided  that  in  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages against  a  municipality,  a  resident 
taxpayer  is  not  competent  to  sit  as  a 
juror  if  challenged  for  cause.  Fulweiler 
V.  St.  Louis,  61  Mo.  479, 1876;  Rose  v.  St. 
Charles,  49  Mo.  509 ;  Johnson  v.  Ameri- 
cus,  46  Ga.  80,  1872 ;  contra,  Omalia  v. 
Olmstead,  5  Neb.  446,  1877. 

1  Williams  v.  Augusta,  4  Ga.  509, 
1848 ;  approved,  Floyd  v.  Commissioners, 
14  Ga.  858,  1853 ;  Vason  v.  Augusta,  38 
Ga.  542,  1868 ;  State  v.  Guttierrez,  15  La. 
An.  190 ;  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn.  166, 
186;  See  St.  Peter  v.  Bauer,  19  Minn. 
327,  332,  1872,  where  the  text  is  cited  and 
the  subject  considered  by  Riplfi/,  C.  J., 
Byers  v.  Commonwealth,  42  Pa.  St.  89 ; 
1  Bish.  Cr.  Pr.  sec.  758;  State  v.  Conlin, 
27  Vt.  318.  Thus,  in  New  Jersei/,  it  is 
held  that  legislative  authority  to  munici- 
pal courts  to  punish  violations  of  ordi- 
nances by  a  limited  fine  and  imprison- 
ment, without  providing  for  a  trial  by 
jury,  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  constitu- 
tional provision  that  "the  right  of  trial 
by  jury  shall  remain  inviolate."  McGear 
V.   Woodruff;  33   N.  J.  Law,  213,  1868; 


Johnson  v.  Barclay,  1  Ilarr.  (N.  J.)  1;  s. 
p.  Howe  1-.  Plainfiekl,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J. 
L.),  145;  People  u.  Justices,  74  N.  Y.  406; 
18  Alb.  Law  Jour.  254,  1878 ;  ante,  sees. 
366,  412,  413. 

Treating  of  this  subject,  Mr.  Sedgwick 
says:  "Extensive  and  summary  police 
powers  are  constantly  exercised  in  all  the 
states  of  the  Union  for  the  repression  of 
breaches  of  the  peace  and  petty  offences ; 
and  these  statutes  are  not  supposed  to 
conflict  witli  tlie  constitutional  provisions 
securing  to  the  citizens  a  trial  by  jury." 
Stat,  and  Const.  Law,  548,  549;  Cooley 
Const.  Lim.  596.  In  Williams  v.  Augusta, 
supra,  proceedings  before  a  city  council 
for  violations  of  its  ordinances,  although 
punishable  by  fine,  were  considered  not 
to  be  "  criminal  cases  "  within  the  meaning 
of  the  constitution  of  Georgia,  vesting  the 
jurisdiction  of  all  criminal  cases  in  tri- 
bunals other  than  corporation  courts,  the 
court  being  of  opinion  that  the  term 
"  criminal  cases,"  as  used  in  the  constitu- 
tion, had  reference  to  such  acts  and  omis- 
sions as  are  in  violation  of  the  public  laws 
of  the  state,  and  not  to  violations  of  local 
ordinances  made  for  the  internal  police 
and  government  of  the  city.  In  the  state 
last  named  the  settled  rule  is  that  the 
same  act  cannot  be  twice  punished, — 
once  by  the  municipality  and  once  by  the 


§  433.] 


MUNICIPAL   COURTS. 


425 


lature  authorizing  the  arrest  of  professional  thieves  and  burglars 
frequenting  any  railroad  depot,  etc.,  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia, 
and  their  commitment  by  the  mayor,  without  a  tiial  by  jury,  is 
not  in  conflict  with  the  provision  of  the  constitution  of  the  state 
which  guarantees  "that  trial  by  jury  shall  be  as  heretofore,  and 
the  risrht  thereof  remain  inviolate."  ^ 


§  433.  The  fourteenth  amendment  to  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  contains  a  provision  similar  to  that  found  in  many 
of  the  state  constitutions,  "  that  no  state  shall  deprive  any  per- 
son of  hfe,  liberty,  etc.,  without  due  process  of  law."  ^  Thus 
the  principles  of  3Iagna  Charta,  memorable  in  their  origin,  historic 
in  their  associations,  and  luminous  with  the  light  of  liberty,  are 


state,  —  and  the  rule  is  adopted  that  the 
municipal  power  ends  where  the  right  to 
indict  under  state  authority  exists,  as  any 
other  rule  would  deprive  the  accused  of 
the  right  to  a  jury  trial.  Jenkins  v. 
Thomasville,  35  Ga.  145,  1866 ;  Vason  v. 
Augusta,  supra ;  Savannah  v.  Hussey,  21 
Ga.  80,  1857.  So  in  Mkhtrjan :  People  v. 
Slaughter,  2  Doug.  (Mich  )  334,  1842. 
Otherwise  in  Kentucky:  Williamson  r. 
Commonwealth,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  14(3, 
1843  ;  ante,  sees.  368,  411. 

1  Byers  v.  Commonwealth,  42  Pa.  St. 
89.  In  this  case  the  extent  of  the  right 
of  trial  hy  jury  at  common  law  is  thor- 
oughly examined  in  a  valuable  opinion 
by  Stionrf,  J.,  now  one  of  the  justices  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  validity  of  summary  convictions 
sustained.  See  chapter  on  Ordinances, 
ante,  sees.  366,  408,  411.  The  doctrine 
may  be  considered  as  settled  in  Pemisyl- 
vania  that  municipal  corporations  are  not 
within  the  constitutional  guaranty  of  jury 
trial,  and  that  the  right  to  a  trial  by  jury 
may  be  witliheld  by  the  legislature  from 
new  offences,  and  from  n<w  jurisdictions 
created  by  statute  without  common  law 
powers,  and  from  proceedings  out  of  the 
course  of  the  common  law.  Rliines  v.  Clark, 
51  Pa.  St.  96,  1865,  per  Wooda-ard,  C.  J. ; 
Dunsmore's  Appeal,  52  Pa.  St.  374, 1866  ; 
Ewing  V.  Filley,  43  Pa.  St.  384,  1862; 
Van  Swartow  v.  Commonwealth,  24  Pa. 
St.  131,  1854.  See  Barter  v.  Common- 
wealth, 3  Pa.  (Pen.  &  W.)  253,  1831. 
Such  a  constitutional  provision  does  not 


apply  in  Neio  York  to  petty  offences 
made  triable  by  statute  before  a  court  of 
special  sessions.  People  v.  Justices,  74 
N.  Y.  406,  1878 ;  18  Alb.  Law  Jour.  254. 
A  different  view  is,  to  some  extent,  taken 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont  under 
the  constitution  of  that  state,  whose  lan- 
guage is,  that  "  when  an  issue  of  fact 
proper  for  cognizance  of  a  jury  shall  be 
joined  in  a  court  of  law,  the  parties  have 
a  right  to  trial  by  jury  which  ought  to  be 
held  sacred."  In  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
a  public  corporation,  although  the  liabil- 
ity on  the  corporation  be  created  by 
statute,  is  entitled  to  a  jury  trial,  and 
therefore  a  statute  providing  for  a  com- 
pulsory and  final  reference  of  a  case,  in 
its  nature  one  at  common  law,  is  void, 
and  the  constitution  applies  to  all  contro- 
versies fit  to  be  tried  by  a  jury,  although 
the  particular  right  was  created  by  statute 
enacted  after  the  adoption  of  the  consti- 
tution. Plimpton  V.  Somerset,  33  Vt.  283, 
1860.  It  would,  perhaps,  be  going  too 
far  to  say  that  municipal  corporations  are 
not  in  any  case  within  the  constitutional 
guaranty  of  a  trial  by  jury,  and  yet  it 
would  not  follow  that  provision  might 
not  be  made  for  the  trial  in  a  summary 
way,  before  municipal  courts,  of  petty  or 
police  offences.  People  v.  Justices,  74  N. 
Y.  406;  18  Alb.  Law  Jour.  254,  1878; 
ante,  ch.  iv. ;  supra,  sees.  366-368,  411,  412. 
2  Construed  Portland  v.  Bangor  (va- 
grants), 05  Me.  120,  1876;  s.  c.  20  Am. 
Rep.  681 ;  ante,  sec.  401. 


420  MUNICIPAL  COKPOKATIONS.  [CII.  XIII. 

part  of  the  fundamental  law  of  this  country,  and  they  cannot  be 
contravened  in  the  powers  granted  to  municipalities,  nor  in  the 
jurisdiction  with  which  municipal  courts  are  invested,  nor  in  the 
proceedings  therein  authorized.  One  of  the  questions  which 
most  frequently  arises  is  whether  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  a 
trial  by  jury,  and  the  cases  on  this  subject  cannot  all  be  rec- 
onciled.^ The  general  principles  applicable  to  its  solution,  how- 
ever, are  plain.  Violations  of  municipal  by-laws  proper,  such  as 
fall  within  the  description  of  municipal  police  regulations,  as  for 
example  those  concerning  markets,  streets,  water-works,  city 
officers,  etc.,  and  which  relate  to  acts  and  omissions  that  are  not 
embraced  in  the  general  criminal  legislation  of  the  state,  the 
legislature  may  authorize  to  be  prosecuted  in  a  summary  manner 
by  and  in  the  name  of  the  corporation,  and  need  not  provide  for 
a  trial  by  jury.  Such  acts  and  omissions  are  not  crimes  or  mis- 
demeanors to  which  the  constitutional  right  of  trial  by  jury  ex- 
tends. In  England  violations  of  municipal  by-laws  where  the 
penalty  is  a  fine,  or  by  authority  of  parliament  a  fine  and  impris- 
onment, have  always  been  prosecuted  in  a  summary  manner, 
although  3Iagna  Charta  secures  the  right  of  trial  by  jury. 

The  distinction,  then,  is  between  offences  known  as  pleas  of 
the  crown,  where  the  trial  must  be  by  jury,  and  petty  offences 
punishable  by  fine  or  amerciament  in  the  inferior  jurisdictions.^ 
And  a  by-law  with  appropriate  penalties  is  not  necessarily  in- 
valid, because  the  party  may  also  be  indicted  for  the  same  act.^ 
So,  here,  where  the  act  or  omission  sought  to  be  punished  by 
imprisonment  under  a  municipal  ordinance  is  in  its  nature  not 
peculiarly  an  offence  against  the  municipality,  but  rather  against 
the  riublic  at  large,  where  it  falls  within  the  legal  or  common-law 
notion  of  a  crime  or  misdemeanor,  and  especially  where,  being  of 
such  a  nature,  it  is  embraced  in  the  criminal  code  of  the  state, 
there  the  constitutional  guaranties  intended  to  secure  the  liberty 
of  the  citizen  and  the  right  to  a  trial  by  jury  cannot  be  evaded  by 
the  nature  of  the  powers  vested  in  the  municipal  corporation  or 
the  nature  of  the  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  the  municipal  courts. 
If  no  imprisonment  for  the  violation  of  the  ordinance  is  author- 

1  Ante,  sees.  366-368  and  cases  in  note  ;  3  Grant  on  Corp.  82 ;  ante,  sec.  368, 
sees.  408-414  and  notes  ;  sees.  427,  428.        note. 

2  Ante,  sec.  368  and  authorities  cited 
in  note. 


§  434.]  MUNICIPAL  COURTS.  427 

ized,  it  is  clear  that  the  prosecution  is  not  criminal  and  there  is 
no  constitutional  right  to  a  trial  by  jury.  But  if  a  limited  im- 
prisonment on  default  of  paying  a  fine,  or  even  as  part  of  the 
punishment,  is  authorized  by  the  legislature,  this  does  not  neces- 
sarily make  the  case  one  to  which  the  right  of  a  jury  trial  extends. 
The  question  depends  rather,  we  think,  upon  the  intrinsic  nature 
of  the  offence.  It  is  very  generally  agreed  in  this  country  that 
certain  minor  or  petty  offences  may  be  summarily  prosecuted 
and  tried  without  indictment  or  a  jury,  but  there  is  a  class  of 
cases  so  near  boundary  line  that  the  courts  have  differed  as  to 
which  side  of  it  they  belong.^  On  the  principles  here  laid  down 
those  which  most  commonly  present  themselves  may  be  satisfac- 
torily determined. 

§  434.  (362)  Where  the  legislature  undertakes  to  confer  upon 
the  courts  of  the  corporation,  or  where  the  corporation  seeks  to 
give  its  court  summary  jurisdiction  to  try  persons  for  acts  which 
are  indictable,  or  are  criminal  offences,  it  not  unfrequently  hap- 
pens that  some  provision  of  the  constitution,  designed  to  protect 
the  rights  or  liberty  of  the  citizen,  is  violated.  Thus,  under  a 
constitution  declaring  "  that  no  freeman  shall  be  put  to  answer 
any  criminal  charge,  but  by  indictment,"  etc.,  and  "  that  no  free- 
man shall  be  convicted  of  any  crime  but  by  the  unanimous 
verdict  of  a  jury  of  good  and  lawful  men  in  open  court,  as  here- 
tofore used,"  an  act  of  the  legislature  which  gives  to  an  officer  of 
an  incorporated  town  the  power  of  trying  assaults  and  batteries, 
or  other  crimes,  is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Xorth 

1  Ante,  sees.  366,  368  and  note,  408  punishable  ;  such,  for  instance,  as  keep- 
er se^.,  414,427,  428.  The  following  refer-  ing  open  house  after  certain  hours,  and  a 
ence  to  some  additional  authorities,  Eng-  variety  of  breaches  of  police  regulations 
lish  and  Canadian,  respecting  the  ques-  which  will  readily  occur  to  the  mind  of  any 
tion.  What  is  a  crime?  is  taken  from  Chief  one.  Per  Baron  Martiti  s.  c.  06.  Where 
Justice  Harrison's  Municipal  Manual  for  the  proceeding  is  conducted  with  a  view 
the  Province  of  Ontario  (4th  ed.  1878),  p.  and  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  redress 
311 : —  for  the  violation  of  a  private  right  only, 

"If  imprisonment  may  in  the  first  in-  the  proceeding  is  a  civil  one;  but,  on  the 

stance  follow  the  conviction,  tlie  proceed-  other  hand,  where  the  proceeding  is  di- 

ing  is  in  general  looked  upon  as  a  criminal  rected  for  the  punishment  of  an  offence 

one.  Prr  PlatfB.,  AttoTney-GcneTa.\  v.Rad-  which   militates   against  the   general   in- 

loff",    10    Exchq.    84.     There  are    many  tercst   of  the   community,   and    for    the 

crimes,  properly  so  called,  which  are  lia-  punislmicnt    of  the    infraction    of   some 

ble  to  be  punished  on  summary  conviction,  public  duty,  such  proceeding  is  a  crim- 

But  there  area  vast  number  of  acts,  which  inal     proceeding.      Per    Sir    Alexander 

in  no  sense   are   crimes,  which   are  also  Cockburn  in   arguing    same  case,   p.   86. 


428 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIII. 


Carolina,  void,  because  it  violates  both  of  these  provisions  of  the 
constitution. 1 

§  435.  (363)  A  similar  view  was  taken  in  the  state  of  Arkan- 
sas, the  constitution  of  which  provided  that  "  no  man  shall  be 
put  to  answer  au}^  criminal  charge  but  by  presentment,  indict- 
ment, or  impeachment "  ;  and  it  was  held  that  the  legislature 
could  not  confer  upon  the  corporation  courts  of  a  city  the  power 
to  punish  an  assault  and  battery  —  this  being  a  criminal  charge 
—  without  presentment  or  indictment ;  and  it  was  consequently 
decided  that  the  judgment  of  conviction  of  such  a  court  for  an 
assault  and  batteiy  is  coram  non  judice,  and  constitutes  no  bar  to 
a  prosecution  by  indictment  in  the  courts  of  the  state  for  the 
same  offence.^ 

§  436.  (364)  The  same  doctrine  was  declared  in  Michigan. 
The  constitution  of  that  state  contained  a  provision  that  "  no 
person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  criminal  offence  unless  on 
the  presentment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  cases  cognizable  by  jus- 
tices of  the  peace,"  etc. ;  and,  by  the  statutes  of  the  state,  the 


It  is  not  an  easy  matter  to  draw  a 
line,  and  so  be  able  to  decide  on  whicii 
side  of  it  each  case  sliould  be  placed. 
Reference  may  be  made  to  the  foUow- 
ing  cases  :  Attorney-General  v.  Bowman, 
2  B.  &  P.  532,  n  ;  Attorney-General  i'. 
Siddam,  1  C.  &  J.  220 ;  Huntley  v.  Lus- 
combe,  2  B.  &  P.  530 ;  Rackham  v.  Bluck, 
n  Q.  B.  691  ;  Cobbet  v.  Slowman,  9 
Exchq.  633 ;  Eggington,  m  re,  2  E.  &  B 
717;  Sweeny  v.  Spooner,  3  B.  &  S.  329 
Reeve  v.  Wood,  5  B.  &  S.  364: 
Attorney-General  v.  Sullivan,  32  L.  J 
Exchq.  92;  Easton's  Case,  12  A.  &  E 
645 ;  Cattel  r.  Ireson,  E.  B.  &  E.  91 
Morden  v.  Porter.  7  C.  B.  N.  S.  641 
Hearne  v.  Garton,  2  E.  &  E.  66  ;  Parker  v. 
Green,  2  B.  &  S.  299;  Lucas  &  Mc 
Glashan,  in  re,  29  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  81 
The  Queen  v.  Boardman,  30  Upper  Can 
Q.  B.  553;  The  Queen  v.  Roddy,  41 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  291." 

1  State  V.  Moss,  2  Jones  (N.  C.)  Law, 
66,  1854.  See  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn. 
166,  1864.  The  constitution  of  Louisi- 
ana (art.  103)  requires  that  "  prosecutions 
shall  be    by  indictment    or    information. 


The  accused  shall  have  a  speedy  trial  by 
an  impartial  jury  of  the  vicinage."  An- 
other article  (124)  provides  that  "the 
mayors,  recorders,  etc.,  may  be  commis- 
sioned, and  the  legislature  may  vest  in 
them  such  criminal  jurisdiction  as  may 
be  necessary  for  the  punishment  of 
minor  crimes  and  offences,  as  the  police 
and  good  order  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans 
may  require."  It  was  held  that  art. 
103  laid  down  the  general  rule,  to  which 
art.  124  was  an  exception,  and  that 
under  the  latter  article  it  was  competent 
for  the  legislature  to  provide  for  the 
prosecution  of  minor  offences,  witiiout 
indictment  or  jury  trial,  in  the  Recorder's 
Court."  State  v.  Guttierrez,  15  La.  An. 
190,  1860. 

2  Rector  v.  State,  6  Ark.  (1  Eng.)  187, 
1845;  Durr  v.  Howard,  6  Ark.  461; 
Lewis  V.  State,  21  Ark.  211.  But  it  is 
held  in  the  same  state  that  a  corporation 
court  may  punish  a  person  for  using  ob- 
scene language  in  the  streets,  because 
such  an  offence  is  not  declared  criminal 
by  any  statute  of  the  state.  Slattery, 
in  re,  3  Ark.  484. 


§  438.]  MUNICIPAL  COURTS.  429 

keeping  of  a  bawdy  house  was  declared  to  be  an  offence  punish- 
able by  fine  and  imprisonment.  Under  this  state  of  the  law  the 
city  of  Detroit  was  empowered  by  the  legislature  "  to  make  all 
such  by-laws  and  ordinances  as  may  be  deemed  expedient  by  the 
common  council  for  effectually  preventing  and  suppressing  houses 
of  ill-fame  within  the  limits  of  the  city."  It  was  held  that  the 
term  "  criminal  offence  "  in  the  constitution  included  both  felonies 
and  misdemeanors,  and  embraced  the  offence  (which  was  such 
both  at  common  law  and  by  the  statute  of  the  state)  of  keeping 
a  house  of  ill-fame  ;  and  therefore  an  ordinance  of  the  common 
council  prescribing  the  punishment  for  keeping  such  a  house 
within  the  city  and  providing  for  the  trial  and  conviction  of  the 
offenders  in  the  municipal  court  without  indictment,  was  uncon- 
stitutional, the  judgment  of  the  court  resting  upon  the  principle 
that,  under  the  constitutional  provision  quoted,  there  could  be  no 
summary  conviction  under  an  ordinance  for  that  which  is  a  crimi- 
nal offence  by  the  general  laws  of  the  state.^ 

§  437.  (365)  So,  by  the  constitution  of  Texas,  it  is  provided 
that  "  in  all  cases  in  which  justices  of  the  peace  or  inferior  tribu- 
nals shall  have  jurisdiction  of  causes  where  the  penalty  is  fine 
and  imprisonment  (except  in  cases  of  contempt),  the  accused 
shall  have  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,"  and  under  this  it  was  held 
that  the  mayor's  court  could  not  constitutionally  be  invested  with 
power  to  try  summarily,  and  without  a  jury,  a  person  for  assault 
and  battery,  in  violation  of  the  ordinances  of  the  corporation, 
where  the  mayor  was  authorized  to  impose  a  fine.^ 

§  438.  (366)  In  Zylstra  v.  The  Corporation  of  Charleston,  it 
appeared  that  the  organic  act  of  the  city  gave  to  the  common 
council  power  to  affix  and  levy  fines  for  all  offences  against  their 

1  People  V.  Slaughter,  2  Dougj.  (IMich.)  them  by  fine,  although  the  offence,  as  in 
334,  1842,  note  ;  and  see  Welch  v.  People,  the  case  before  the  court  (an  assault  and 
lb.  332,  184G.  But  in  Kentucky,  tlie  con-  battery),  is  indictable  under  the  laws  of 
stitution  of  which  provides  that  "  no  per-  the  state.  The  court  regarded  the  pro- 
son  shall,  for  any  indictable  oflfence,  be  coeding  in  the  name  of  the  corporation  as 
proceeded  against  criminally  by  informa-  of  a  rjuasi  civil  or  penal  nature,  and  not 
tion,"  and  that  "all  prosecutions  shall  be  as  criminal.  Williamson  v.  Common- 
carried  on  in  the  name  and  by  the  au-  wealth,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  146,  1843; 
thorityofthe  commonwealth,"  the  legis-  an<e,  sees.  88,  411,  436. 
lature  may  authorize  a  city  corporation  -  Burns  v.  La  Grange,  17  Texas,  415, 
to  proceed  in  its  name  against  offenders  1856;  S.  P.  Smith  v.  San  Antonio,  lb. 
for  violating  its  ordinances,  and  punish  643. 


430 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIII. 


by-laws,  and  there  was  no  limitation  of  the  amount  of  the  fines. 
In  this  respect  tlic  charter  was  silent.  The  "  Court  of  Wardens" 
(the  corporation  tribunal)  had  the  power  expressly  given  to  it  to 
commit  for  fines  and  penalties.  Under  these  circumstances  the 
corporation  of  Charleston  passed  an  ordinance  prohibiting  the 
exercise  of  the  trade  of  candle  and  soap  making  within  the  limits 
of  the  city,  under  a  penalty  of  .£100.  Zylstra  was  prosecuted  in 
the  Court  of  Wardens  —  composed  of  members  of  the  city  coun- 
cil—  for  a  violation  of  this  by-law,  and  fined  by  this  court  £100. 
On  his  motion  to  obtain  a  prohibition  it  was  held,  under  the 
constitution  of  that  state,  that  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  of 
Wardens  were  void,  not  being  according  to  the  lex  terrce  recog- 
nized by  Magna  Charta,  and  expressly  adopted  by  the  state  con- 
stitution. And  the  judges  who  expressed  themselves  on  that 
point  were  of  opinion,  under  the  state  constitution,  that  that  tri- 
bunal could  not  be  invested  with  a  jurisdiction  greater  than  that 
exercised  by  justices  of  the  peace,  unless  there  was  provision  for 
securing  a  trial  by  jury,  which  in  the  instance  before  the  court 
had  not  been  made.^ 


1  Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  1  Bay  (So. 
Car.),  382,  1794. 

In  holding  that  the  charter  of  the  city 
of  Lancaster  did  not  confer  upon  the 
councils  the  riglit  to  vest  in  the  mayor 
and  aldermen  jurisdiction  to  convict  sum- 
marily, and  imprison  in  default  of  pay- 
ment of  tlie  penalty  affixed  to  an  ordi- 
nance, Gibson,  C.  J.,  remarked  :  "  Now,  if 
the  charter  even  purported  to  confer  a 
power  to  imprison  on  summary  conviction 
(for  a  misdemeanor)  and  without  appeal  to 
a  jury,  it  would  be  so  far  unconstitutional 
and  void."  Barter  v.  Commonwealth, 
3  Pa.  (Pen.  &  W.)  2.53,  1831. 

A  statute  providing  for  sununarj/  con- 
viction for  a  new  offence  before  inferior 
jurisdictions,  without  a  jury,  does  not 
violate  the  provision  of  the  constitution 
that  "  trial  by  jury  shall  be  as  heretofore, 
and  the  right  thereof  remain  inviolate." 
Van  Swartow  v.  Commonwealth,  24  Pa. 
St.  131,  18-54.  See,  also.  Boring  v.  Wil- 
liams, 17  Ala.  510 ;  Times  v.  The  State, 
26  Ala.  165 ;  Powers,  in  re,  25  Vt.  261 ; 
Murphy  v.  People,  2  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  815 ; 
Shirley  v.  Lunenburg,  11  Mass.  379 ; 
Rhines  v.  Clark,  51  Pa.  St.  96;  supra, 
sec.  432. 


As  to  the  right,  under  particular  con- 
stitutional and  statutory  provisions,  to  a 
jury  trial,  for  violations  of  nmnicipal  by- 
laws. Thomas  v.  Ashland,  12  Ohio  St, 
124 ;  Work  r.  State,  2  lb.  296 ;  Gray  v. 
State,  2  Harring.  (Del.)  76,1836;  Low 
V.  Commissioners  of  Pilotage,  R.  M. 
Charlt.  (Ga.)  302;  Green  v.  Mayor,  Ih. 
368,  371;  Williams  v.  Augusta,  4  Ga. 
509.  Approved,  Floyd  v.  Commissioners, 
14  Ga.  354,  1853;  State  v.  Guttierrez,  15 
La.  An.  190;  Trigally  v.  Memphis,  6 
Coldw.  (Tcnn.)  382,  1869. 

Jurisdiction  of  mayor's,  recorder's,  and 
police  courts  under  statutes  or  special  char- 
ters. Commonwealth  v.  Pindar,  11  Met. 
(Mass.)  539 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Roark, 
8  Cush.  (Mass.)  210;  Same  v.  Emery,  11 
Cusli.  (Mass.)  406;  Elder  v.  Dwight 
Manufacturing  Co.,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  201 ; 
State  V.  Ricker,  32  N.  H.  179;  Meyers  v. 
People,  26  111.  173 ;  Rice  v.  State,  3  Kan. 
141;  Stater.  Young,  3  Kan.  445;  Malone 
V.  Murphy,  2  Kan.  2.50;  Gray  v.  State,  2 
Harring.  (Del.)  76;  Hutchings  r. Scott,  4 
Halst.  (N.  .J.)  218  ;  Cincinnati  v.  Gwynne, 
10  Ohio,  192;  14  lb.  250,  603;  Markle  v. 
Akron,  14  Ohio,  586  ;  Weeks  v.  Foreman, 
1  Harris.  (N.  J.)  237;  Truchelut  v.  City 


§  440.]  MUNICIPAL   COUKTS.  431 

Sufficient  if  the  Rigid  of  a  Jury  Trial  is  given  by  Appeal, 

§  439.  (367)  It  is,  however,  the  prevailing  doctrine,  that  al- 
though the  charge  or  matter  in  the  municipal  or  local  courts  be 
one  in  respect  of  which  the  party  is  entitled  to  a  trial  by  jury, 
yet  if  by  an  appeal,  clogged  with  no  unreasonable  restrictions,  he 
can  have  such  a  trial  as  a  matter  of  right  in  the  appellate  court, 
this  is  sufficient,  and  his  constitutional  right  to  a  jury  trial  is  not 
invaded  by  the  summary  proceeding  in  the  first  instance.^ 

Revieiv  of  Proceedings  by  Superior  Tribunals. 
§  440.  (368)  With  respect  to  inferior  jurisdictions,  the  right 
to  review  their  proceedings  by  the  superior  tribunals  will  not  be 
taken  away  unless  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  this  effect  is 
expressed  with  unequivocal  clearness.  The  authorities  cited  in 
the  note  will  show  the  great  length  to  which  the  courts  go  in 
preserving  the  right  to  review  the  proceedings  of  subordinate  tri- 
bunals, administered  frequently  by  men  without  professional  or 
judicial  knowledge  or  experience.  A  declaration  by  the  statute 
concerning  an  inferior  tribunal,  that  its  proceedings  "shall  be 
final  and  conclusive^'"  or  '•'•  without  appeal"  etc.,  will  not  deprive  a 
party  of  the  right  of  review  by  certiorari^  error,  or  the  proper 
proceeding.2     But  where  it  is  declared  with  respect  to  a  court  of 

Council,  1  Nott  &  McC.  227  ;  Thornton  Lim.  410.   Text  cited  and  followed.    Em- 

V.  Smith,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  R.  100;  McMul-  poria  v.  Vollmer,  12  Kan.  622,  631,  1874. 

len  V.  City  Council,  1  Bay  (South  Car.),  post,  sec.  813. 

46  ;  Zylstra  v.  Charleston,  lb.  382  ;  Willis  -  Rex  v.  Commissioners,  2  Keeble,  43; 

V.  Booneville,  28   Mo.   543 ;    Fayette   v.  Rex  v.  Moreley,  2  Burr.  1040 ;  Lawton  v. 

Shafroth,  25  Mo.  445 ;  Sill  y.  Corning,  15  Commissioners,   2   Caines    (N.    Y.),  179, 

N.  Y.  297  ;  Landers  v.  Staten  Island  Rail-  181 ;  Starr  v.  Trustees,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

road  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  450,  1873 ;  Goodrich  v.  564  ;  People  v.  Mayor,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  9  ; 

Brown,  30  la.  291,  1870.    Penna,   Hall  Tierney  v.  Dodge,  9  Minn.  166 ;  Heath, 

in  re,  5  Pa.  St.  204,   1847  ;  Alexander  v.  in  re,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  42,  52,  and  cases 

Bennett,  60  N.   Y.  204,  1875.  cited  and  reviewed  by  Cowen,  J. 

Extent    of      jurisdiction     territorially.  A  kindred   subject   is   treated  in  the 

State  V.  Clegg,  27  Conn.  593 ;  Covill  v.  chapter  on   Municipal   Officers,  — "  Spe- 

Phy    (process),    26    III.    432;    State    v.  cial  Tribunal  to  determine  Election  Con- 

McArthur,  13  Wis.  383;  Hoag  y.  Lamont,  tests  for  Municipal  Offices,"  —  ante,  sec. 

60  N.  Y.  96,  1875.  200,  and  it  is  there  shown  that  the  ordi- 

1  Stewart  v.  Mayor,  7  Md.  501;  Mor-  nary  constitutional  provision  that  the  judi- 

ford  V.  Barnes,  8   Yerger  (Tenn.),444;  cial  power  shall  be  vested  in  certain  courts 

McDonald  y.  Schcll,  6  Serg.&Rawle  (Pa.),  does    not   disable    the    legislature    from 

240;  Beers  v.  Beers,  4  Conn.  535  ;  Jones  providing  that  thecouncil  of  municipal  cor- 

V.  Robbins,  8  Gray  (Mass.),  329  ;  Dorgan  porations  ma}"  finally  determine  the  valid- 

y.  Boston,  12  Allen  (Mass.),  223;  Sedg.  ity  of  the  election  of  corporation  officers. 

Stand  Const.  Law,  549 ;  Cooley  Const.  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Morgan,  7  Martin  (La.), 


432 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIII. 


o-eneral  and  superior  jurisdiction,  as  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Neio 
Yorlc,  that  its  action  (for  example,  in  confirming  appraisements 
for  opening  streets,  or  under  a  raihoad  act)  "shall  he  final  and 
conclusive  upon  the  parties  interested  and  upon  all  other  persons," 
the  right  of  appeal,  which  would  otherwise  exist  from  the  deci- 
sion of  such  court  to  a  still  higher  tribunal,  as  to  the  Court  of 
Appeals,  is  destroyed. ^  A  charter  provision  to  the  effect  that 
appeals  and  writs  of  error  from  judgments  of  the  mayor,  in  cases 
arising  under  the  charter,  should  only  be  allowed  in  cases  where 
the  fine  was  over  five  dollars,  was  considered  as  evincing  the 


1  ;  9  76.  (N.  S.)  381,  1828;  State  v.  Fitz- 
gerald, 44  Mo.  425,  1869:  Ewing  v.  Fil- 
ley,  43  Pa.  St.  384  ;  State  v.  Jolinson,  17 
Ark.  407.  But  the  supervisory  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  superior  courts  will  not  be 
held  to  be  taken  away  by  mere  negative 
words.  Grier  v.  Shaokleford,  Const.  Kep. 
642;  Stater.  Fitzgerald,  s»/jra;  Common- 
wealth f.  McCloskey,  2  Kawle  (Pa.),  309; 
Strahl,  in  re,  16  la.  369;  State  v.  Funck, 
17  la.  365 ;  Bateman  v.  Megowan,  1  Met. 
(Ky.)  533;  Wammacks  v.  Holloway,  2 
Ala.  31 ;  Hummer  v.  Hummer,  3  G. 
Greene  (Iowa),  42;  State  v.  Marlow,  15 
Ohio  St.  114  ;  Attorney  General  y.  Corpo- 
ration of  Poole,  4  Mylne  &  Cr.  17  ;  At- 
torney General  v.  Aspinwall,  2  lb.  013 ; 
Parr  v.  Attorney  General,  8  CI.  &  F. 
409;  Taylor  v.  Americus,  39  Ga.  59. 
post,  chs.  XX.  xxi.  xxii. ;  post,  sec.  920. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  ilicliir/un,  in 
reviewing,  on  certiorari,  the  legality  of  a 
conviction  of  a  defendant  in  the  record- 
er's court  on  a  complaint  for  violating 
a  municipal  ordinance,  speaking  of  tlie 
extent  of  the  revisonj  power  of  the  superior 
tribunals,  and  the  nature  and  purposes 
of  the  municipal  tribunals,  says :  "  The 
power  of  reviewing  upon  certiorari  judi- 
cial proceedings  of  inferior  tribunals  and 
bodies  not  according  to  the  course  of  the 
common  law  has  been  long  exercised 
in  England,  as  well  as  in  this  country. 
The  power  has  been  jealously  main- 
tained, and  has  been  deemed  necessary 
to  prevent  oppression.  There  are  certain 
classes  of  questions  which,  by  common 
understanding,  from  time  immemorial 
belong  to  the  course  of  the  judicial  in- 
quiry under  the  laws  of  the  land.  The 
common  law  and  the  various  charters 
and  bills  of  rights  recognized  and  assured 


the  right  to  such  an  inquiry  ;  and  the 
constitution,  in  apportioning  the  judicial 
power,  as  well  as  in  affirming  the  immu- 
nity of  life,  liberty,  and  property,  has 
always  been  understood  to  guarantee  to 
each  citizen  the  riglit  to  have  his  title  to 
property,  and  other  legal  privileges,  de- 
termined by  the  general  tribunals  of  the 
state.  These  municipal  courts,  so  far  as 
they  act  under  city  by-laws,  are  not  de- 
signed to  decide  between  man  and  man, 
or  to  administer  general  laws.  They  are 
ordained  to  prevent  disorder  in  matters  of 
local  convenience,  and  to  regulate  the  use 
of  public  and  quasi  public  easements,  so 
as  to  prevent  confusion.  If  in  exercising 
this  power  they  can  incidentally  decide 
upon  the  rights  of  private  property  so  as 
to  determine  its  enjoyment  without  re- 
view, tliere  would  seem  to  be  a  practical 
annihilation  of  the  right  to  resort  to  the 
general  tribunals  and  the  conmion  law." 
Per  Campbell,  J.,  Jackson  v.  People,  9 
Mich.  Ill,  117,  1860.  Further  see  ch. 
xxii.  post,  sec.  925,  et  seq. 

An  appeal  from  inferior  tribunals  does 
not  exist  unless  plainly  given.  People 
V.  Police  Justice,  7  Mich.  456;  Conboy 
V.  Iowa  City,  2  Iowa,  90;  Muscatine  v. 
Steck,  7  Iowa,  505;  Dubuque  v.  Rebraan, 
1  Iowa,  444.  Certiorari,  on  the  other 
hand,  will  lie  unless  plainly  denied,  or 
other  specific  remedy  be  given.  Cun- 
ningham V.  Squires,  2  West  Va.  422, 
1865 ;  post,  sec.  Oil,  and  chapter  on 
Remedies  against  Illegal  Corporate  Acts, 
post. 

1  Canal  and  Walker  Streets,  in  re, 
12  N.  Y.  (2  Kern.)  406,  1855;  New  York, 
etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Marvin,  11  lb.  (1 
Kern.)  276. 


§441.] 


MUNICIPAL  COURTS. 


433 


legislative  intention  that  in  cases  where  the  fine  was  under  that 
sum  the  judgment  should  be  final,  and  hence  a  writ  of  prohibit 
tion  will  not  lie  to  restrain  its  collection,  nor  can  it  be  reviewed 
on  certiorari.^ 


§  441.  (369)  In  Virginia  it  is  decided  that  in  a  proceeding 
before  the  mayor  or  a  justice  to  impose  a  penalty  on  a  party  for 
obstructing  a  street,  the  mayor  or  justice  cannot,  if  the  defendant 
bona  fide  sets  up  title  to  the  land  claimed  as  a  street,  inquire  into 
the  validity  of  the  claim,  the  court  holding  that  by  the  principles 
of  the  common  law  (which  are  not  changed  by  the  Statutes),  a 
bona  fide  assertion  of  title  to  property  or  to  an  incorporeal  her- 
editament or  real  franchise,  ousted  the  jurisdiction  of  these 
inferior  magistrates  or  tribunals.  ^ 


^  Wertheimer  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  29  Mo. 
254,  1860. 

2  Warwick  v.  Mayo,  15  Gratt.  (Va.) 
528,  1860.  To  the  same  effect,  see  Jack- 
son V.  People,  9  Mich.  Ill,  1860;  Grand 
Rapids  V.  Hughes,  15  Mich.  54,  1866. 
See  chapter  on  Streets.  What  record  of 
conviction  before  corporation  officers  or 
courts  should  show.  Keeler  v.  Milledge, 
4Zabr.  (24  N.J.  L.)  142;  Muscatine  v. 
Steck,   7   Iowa,   505;    Buck  v.  Danzen- 


backer,  8  Vroom  (37  N.  J.  L.),  359;  St. 
Peter  v.  Bauer,  19  Minn.  327,  1872;  Gold- 
thwaite  v.  Montgomery,  50  Ala.  486, 
1874.     See  ch.  xxii.,  post. 

A  town  officer  who  holds  in  custody  a 
person  committed  by  a  verbal  order  of  a 
police  magistrate  for  non-payment  of  a 
fine  imposed  for  the  breach  of  a  town 
ordinance,  acts  not  only  without  authority 
but  in  violation  of  law.  Board  of  Trus- 
tees, etc.  r..Schroeder,  58  111.  353,  1871. 


VOL.  I. 


28 


434  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

CONTRACTS. 

§  442.  (3T0)  The  mode  of  enforcing  the  contracts  of  muni- 
cipal corporations  will  be  considered  hereafter.^  In  this  chapter 
we  will  treat,  in  the  order  below  indicated,  of  the  power  of  such 
corporations  to  make  contracts  of  different  kinds,  the  mode  of 
exercising  the  power,  and  the  effect  of  transcending  it. 

1.  Extent  of  Power  to  contract,  and  how  conferred  —  sees. 
443-447. 

2.  Mode  of  exercising  the  Power  —  sec.  449. 

3.  Seal  not  necessary  unless  required  —  May  be  concluded  by 
Vote  or  Ordinance  —  sees.  450,  451. 

4.  When  bound  by  Contracts  made  by  Agents  —  Mode  of 
Execution  —  sees.  452-456. 

6.   Contracts  beyond  Corporate  Powers  void  —  Ultra  Vires  a 
Defence  — sees.  457,  458. 

6.  Implied  Contracts  — When  Deducible  — sees.  459,  460. 

7.  Ratification  of  Unauthorized  Contract  —  sees.  463-465. 

8.  Provision  requiring  Letting  to  Lowest  Bidder— sees.  466- 
470. 

9.  Contract  of  Suretyship  —  sec.  471. 

10.  Rights  and  Liabilities  as  respects  Authorized  Contracts  — 
Illustrations  —  Cases  mentioned  —  Power  to  settle  Disputed 
Claims  — To  give  Extra  Compensation  —  To  employ  Attorneys 
—  sees.  472-479. 

11.  Contracts  for  Public  Works  — Rights  of  Contractors  — 
sees.  480-483. 

12.  Same  —  Corporate  Control  under  Stipulation  —  sees.  480- 

483. 

13.  Evidences   of    Indebtedness  — Negotiable   Bonds  — sees. 

484,  485. 

1  See  post,  chs.  xx.,  xxii.,  xxiii.  Legislative  power  over  contracts  made  by  mu- 
nicipal corporations.    See  ch.  iv.,  ante. 


§  443.]  CONTRACTS.  435 

14.  Ordinary  Warrants  or  Orders  —  Their  Legal  Nature  — 
sees.  487,  488. 

15.  Liability  of  Indorsers  thereof — sec.  489. 

16.  Payment  and  Cancellation  of  Orders  and  Warrants,  — 
sec.  500. 

17.  Rights  and  Remedies  of  Holders  thereof — sees.  501,  502. 

18.  Defences  thereto  —  Ultra  Vires  —  Fraud  —  Want  of  Con- 
sideration —  sec.  504. 

19.  Orders  payable  out  of  a  Particular  Fund  —  sec.  505. 

20.  Interest  on  Corporate  Indebtedness — sec.  506. 

21.  Railroad  Aid  Bonds  —  Course  of  Decision  in  U.  S.  Su- 
preme Court  —  sees.  511-515. 

22.  Leading  Cases  in  National  Supreme  Court  on  the  Subject 
noticed  —  sees.  521-534. 

28.  Decisions  in  State  Courts  referred  to  —  Conclusion  stated 
—  sees.  550-554. 

§  443.  (371)  Exte.nt  of  Power,  and  how  conferred.  —  In  de- 
termining the  extent  of  the  poiver  of  a  municipal  corporation  to 
make  contracts,  and  in  ascertaining  the  mode  in  which  the  power 
is  to  be  exercised,  the  importance  of  a  careful  study  of  the  char- 
ter or  incorporating  act,  and  the  general  legislation  of  the  state  on 
the  subject,  if  there  be  any,  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized. 
Where  there  are  express  provisions  on  the  subject,  these  will,  of 
course,  measure,  as  far  as  they  extend,  the  authority  of  the  cor- 
poration. The  power  to  make  contracts,  and  sue  and  be  sued 
thereon,  is  usually  conferred,  in  general  terms,  in  the  incorporat- 
ing act.  But  where  the  power  is  conferred  in  this  manner  it  is 
not  to  be  construed  as  authorizing  the  making  of  contracts  of  all 
descriptions,  but  only  such  as  are  necessary  and  usual,  fit  and 
proper,  to  enable  the  corporation  to  secure  or  carry  into  effect  the 
purposes  for  which  it  was  created ;  and  the  extent  of  the  power 
will  depend  upon  the  other  provisions  of  the  charter  defining  the 
matters  in  respect  of  which  the  corporation  is  authorized  to  act. 
To  the  extent  necessary  to  execute  the  special  powers  and  func- 
tions with  which  it  is  endowed  by  its  charter,  there  is,  indeed,  an 
implied  or  incidental  authority  to  contract  obligations,  and  to  sue 
and  be  sued  in  the  corporate  name.^ 

1  1  Kyd,  69,70;  2  Kent  Com.  224;  Corwith,  48  111.  423,  18G8;  Straus  v, 
Angell  &  Ames,  sees.  110,  271  ;  Galena  y.     Insurance    Co.,    5    Olilo    St.    69,    1855; 


436 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  444.  Contracts  with  Municipal  Officers.  —  It  is  a 
well  established  luid  salutmy  rule  in  equity  that  he  who  is  en- 
trusted with  the  business  of  others  cannot  be  allowed  to  make 
such  business  an  object  of  pecuniary  profit  to  himself.  This  rule 
does  not  depend  on  reasoning  technical  in  its  character  and  is  not 


Chaffee  r.  Granger,  6  Mich.  51  ;  Douglas 
V.  Virginia  City,  5  Nev.  147, 186'J ;  Good- 
rich V.  Detroit,  12  Mich.  2Td ;  Bank  of 
Columbia  v.  Patterson,  7  Crunch,  299, 
1813;  Siebrccht  r.  New  Orleans,  12  La. 
An.  496,  1857 ;  Batenian  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  3 
Hurl.  &  Nor.  322,  1858;  Nowell  v.  Wor- 
cester, 9  Wil.  H.  &  G.  456,  1854.  In  In- 
dianapolis V.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66 
Ind.  396,  approving  text;  Montgomery 
Co.  V.  Barber,  45  Ala.  237,  1871. 

Under  general  autliority  to  make  all 
contracts  necessary  for  its  welfare,  a  city 
may  contract  for  water-icurks.  Cabot  v. 
Rome,  28  Ga.  50;  see  Wells  y.  Atlanta, 
43  Ga.  67.  Duty  and  power  as  owner  of 
water-works.  McKnight  v.  New  Orleans, 
24  La.  An.  412,  1872 ;  Grant  v.  Daven- 
port, 36  Iowa,  396,  1873  ;  Hall  v.  Hough- 
ton, 8  Mich.  458.  May  contract  for  light- 
ing streets,  etc.  Indianapolis  v.  Indianap- 
olis Gas.  Co.,  66  Ind.  396.  For  grading 
streets.  Sturtevant  v.  Alton,  3  McLean, 
393.  To  build  sidewalks.  Wyandotte  v. 
Zeitz,  21  Kan.  649;  Lawrence  v.  Killam, 
11  Kan.  512,  approving  text.  For  "  break- 
water "  to  protect  streets  of  a  city  on  the 
lake.  Miller  v.  Milwaukee,  14  Wis.  642 ; 
approved,  arguendo,  by  Cole,  J.,  in  Clason 
V.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  316,  321,  1872. 
Supra,  sec.  261,  note.  Legislative  power  over 
mvnicipal  contracts.  Ante,  ch.  iv.  Grant  v. 
Davenport,  36  Iowa,  396,  1873. 

The  city  of  Richmond  possessed,  un- 
der its  charter,  all  the  powers  of  munici- 
pal corporations,  including  the  power  "  to 
contract  and  be  contracted  with,"  and 
its  council  was  specially  empowered  "  to 
pass  all  by-laws  which  they  shall  deem 
necessary  for  tlie  peace,  comfort,  conven- 
ience, good  order,  good  morals,  health, 
or  safety  of  the  city,  or  of  the  people  or 
property  therein."  In  April,  1865,  in 
anticipation  of  the  evacuation  of  the 
city  by  the  confederate  army  and  the  en- 
try of  the  national  forces,  the  city  council 
ordered  the  destruction  of  all  the  liquor  in  the 
city,  and  pledged  the  faith  of  tlie  city  for 


tlie  payment  of  its  value,  and  it  was  de- 
cided by  the  Court  of  Appeals  that  under 
the  provision  of  the  charter  above  men- 
tioned the  council  had  authority  to  make 
the  order  and  pledge,  and  hence  the  city 
was  responsible  for  the  value  of  liquor 
destroyed  under  the  order  of  the  council. 
Jones  I'.  Richmond,  18  Graft.  (Va.)  517, 
1868.  The  same  question  upon  the  same 
resolutions  of  the  city  council  was  pre- 
sented to  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  Riclunond  v.  Smith,  15  Wall. 
429,  1872;  and  it  followed,  without  exam- 
ination into  its  correctness,  the  exposi- 
tion of  the  charter  given  by  the  State 
Court  in  Jones  v.  Richmond,  supra.  Up- 
on the  general  principles  of  construction, 
the  author  doubts  whether  the  order  for 
the  destruction  of  the  liquors  was  within 
tlie  scope  of  the  corporate  powers  of  the 
city.  Ante,  sec.  89.  Contract  made  by 
city  under  government  therein  set  up  by 
the  United  States  military  authority  held 
valid.  Prather  v.  New  Orleans,  24  La. 
An.  41.  Special  prohibition  in  a  city 
charter  construed  to  extend  to  all  con- 
tracts of  sale  to  the  city.  Gregory  v. 
Jersey  City,  5  Vroom  (34  N.  J.  L.),  390. 
Where  an  executory  contract  with  a 
municipal  corporation  is  not  in  its  nature 
necessarily  personal,  as,  for  example,  a 
contract  for  cleaning  streets,  it  may  cer- 
tainly with  the  assent,  express  or  im- 
plied, of  the  city,  he  assigned,  if  there  be 
no  restriction  on  the  right,  and  the  city 
retains  the  personal  obligation  of  the 
original  contractor  and  his  sureties.  Dev- 
lin V.  New  York,  63  N.  Y.  8,  1875. 

No  corporation  can  make  a  valid  con- 
tract not  to  exercise  part  of  the  fran- 
chise committed  to  it  by  the  state  for 
pubhc  purposes.  St.  Louis  v.  St.  Louis 
Gaslight  Co.,  5  Mo.  App.  484,  529.  See 
opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri 
on  Appeal,  in  the  case  last  cited ;  and  see 
also  Index,  Title,  —  Delegation  of  Public 
Powers. 


§  444.]  CONTRACTS.  437 

local  in  its  application.  It  is  based  upon  principles  of  reason, 
of  morality,  and  of  public  policy.  It  has  its  foundation  in  the  very 
constitution  of  our  nature,  for  it  has  authoritatively  been  declared 
that  a  man  cannot  serve  two  masters,  and  is  recognized  and  en- 
forced wherever  a  well-regulated  system  of  jurisprudence  prevails.^ 
One  who  has  power,  owing  to  the  frailty  of  human  nature,  will 
be  too  readily  seized  with  the  inclination  to  use  the  opportunity 
for  securing  his  own  interest  at  the  expense  of  that  for  which  he  is 
entrusted.  It  has,  therefore,  been  said  that  the  wise  policy  of  the 
law  has  put  the  sting  of  disability  into  the  temptation  as  a  defen- 
sive weapon  against  the  strength  of  the  danger  which  lies  in  the  sit- 
uation. This  conflict  of  interest  is  the  rock,  for  shunning  which  the 
disability  under  consideration  has  obtained  its  force,  by  making 
that  person  who  has  the  one  part  entrusted  to  him  incapable  of  act- 
ing on  the  other  side,  that  he  may  not  be  seduced  by  temptation 
and  opportunity  from  the  duty  of  his  trust.  The  law  will  in  no  case 
permit  persons  who  have  undertaken  a  character  or  a  charge  to 
change  or  invert  that  character  by  leaving  it  and  acting  for  them- 
selves in  a  business  in  which  their  character  binds  them  to  act  for 
others.  The  application  of  the  rule  may  in  some  instances  ap- 
pear to  bear  hard  upon  individuals  who  had  committed  no  moral 
■wrong ;  but  it  is  essential  to  the  keeping  of  all  parties  filling  a 
fiduciar}?^  character  to  their  duty  to  preserve  the  rule  in  its  integ- 
rity, and  to  apply  it  to  e%ery  case  which  justly  falls  within 
its  principle.^     The  principle  generally  applicable  to  all  officers 

^  City  of  Toronto  v.  Bowes,  4  Grant  swamp  lands  before  the  department  at 

(Canada),  504.  Washington,  through  ]\Ir.  S.,  wlio  acted 

2  Port  V.  Russell,  36  Ind.  60;  s.  c.  10  as    her    agent.      A    short    time    before 

Am.  Rep.  5 ;  Board  of  Commrs.  v.  Rus-  this    contract    was    made    Mr.    S.     in- 

sell,  44  Ind.  500  ;  s.  c.  15  Am.  Rep.  245  ;  formed  the  authorities  of  tlie  county  that 

Macon  v.  Huff,  GO  Ga.  221 ;  York  Build-  their  claim  had  been  rejected,  and  that 

ing's   Co.  V.  Mackenzie,  8  Brown,  P.  C.  this   rejection   was  accompanied   by  the 

42 ;  Liquidators,  etc.  v.  Coleman,  L.  R.  announcement  of  a   rule  which  left  but 

6  H.  L.  C.  189 ;  x\berdeen   Railroad  Co.  little   to    hope   for  on   the  part  of    the 

V.   Blaikee,    1     Macq.   App.    Cases,    461.  county.     Very    shortly    after    this    Mr. 

See  full  review  of  authorities  in  Gard-  C,  as  the  agent  of    the  emigrant  com- 

ner    v.  Ogden,    22    N.    Y.    332 ;     Butts  pany,  made   his   appearance   in  Wright 

V.    Wood,    37     N.    Y.    317,    and    cases  Count}^   and   procured   the    contract   we 

cited;     Emigrant    Co.   v.    Wright     Co.,  have  mentioned.     As   soon   as  tliis  was 

99   U.   S.   339,  1877.      In  this   case  the  done,  Mr.  S.,  as  the    agent  of  the  emi- 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  by  grant    company,  by    the    assistance,    as 

Mr.  Justice  Miller,  in  declaring  a  contract  he  says,  of  able  lawyers,  and  in  the  cases 

void,  say:    "It  appears  that  for  some-  of  other  counties  with  whom  the    com- 

time  before  this  contract  was  made  the  pany  had  similar  contracts,  inaugurated 

county  had    been  urging  her  claim  to  proceedings  to  procure  the  reversal  of 


438  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

and  directors  of  a  corporation  is  that  they  cannot  enter  into  con- 
tracts with  such  corporation  to  do  any  work  for  it,  nor  can  they 
subsequently  derive  any  benefit  personally  from  such  contract.^ 
To  deny  the  application  of  the  rule  to  municipal  bodies  would, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  Canadian  chancery  court,  be  to  deprive  it 
of  much  of  its  value ;  for  the  well  working  of  the  municipal  sys- 
tem, through  which  a  large  portion  of  the  affairs  of  the  country 
are  administered,  must  depend  very  much  upon  the  freedom  from 
abuse  with  which  tliey  are  conducted.  It  is  obvious  that  nothing 
can  more  tend  to  correct  the  tendency  to  abuse  than  to  make 
abuses  unprofitable  to  those  who  engage  in  them,  and  to  have 
them  stamped  as  abuses  in  courts  of  justice.  The  tendency  to 
abuse  may  indeed  be  in  part  corrected  by  public  opinion ;  but 
public  opinion  itself  is  acted  upon  by  the  mode  in  which  courts 
deal  with  such  abuses  as  are  brought  within  their  cognizance. 
It  has  been  well  observed  that  the  view  taken  by  courts  of  equity 
with  respect  to  morality  of  conduct  among  all  parties  is  one  of  the 
highest  morality ;  and  this  cannot  fail  to  have  a  salutary  effect 
upon  public  opinion  itself.  Just  as,  on  the  other  hand,  if  a  low 
standard  of  morality  were  presented  by  the  courts,  its  inevitable 
tendency  would  be  the  demoralization  of  the  public  feeling  in  re- 
gard to  transactions  of  a  questionable  character.  Thus,  where  the 
mayor  of  a  city  secretly  contracted  to  purchase,  at  a  discount,  a 
large  amount  of  the  debentures  of  the  city,  which  were  expected 

the  rule  announced  by  the  department,  of  the  county  were  in  gross  ignorance  of 
Succeeding  in  this  he  presented  the  re-  the  nature  and  value  of  wliat  they  were 
newed  claim  of  Wright  County,  and  se-  selhng  ;  that  the  emigrant  company,  on 
cured  tlie  allowance  of  several  hundred  the  other  hand,  were  well  informed  in  re- 
acres  still  unsold  in  tlie  county,  and  gard  to  both,  and  withheld  this  informa- 
money  and  scrip  for  six  thousand  acres  tion  unfairly  from  the  officers  of  the 
to  be  located  elsewhere  in  lieu  of  swamp  county.  That  the  sudden  change  of  the 
lands  sold  by  the  government.  It  is  not  a  relationship  of  Mr.  S.  from  an  unsitc- 
violent  presumption,  under  all  the  circum-  ccssful  agent  of  the  county  to  a  successful 
stances  of  this  case,  that  when,  just  after  agent  of  the  company  requires  an  explanation 
Mr.  S.  had  made  the  impression  on  u-hich  has  not  been  satisfactorili/  given.  That 
the  supervisors  of  Wright  County  that  the  fact  that  all  parties  knew  the;/  were  deal- 
their  case  was  hopeless,  Mr.  C.  ap-  ing  ivith  a  ti-ust  fund  devoted  by  the  donor  to 
appeared  in  Wright  County,  he  had  some  a  specific  purpose  demanded  the  utmost  good 
information  of  a  diiferent  character  on  faith  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser.  That  so 
■which  he  acted,  and  which  was  not  com-  far  from  tliis  there  is  a  provision  for  a  di- 
municated  to  the  supervisors.  We  are  version  of  the  fund  to  other  purposes,  a 
not  convinced  that  any  false  representa-  gross  inadequacy  of  consideration,  and  a 
tions  were  made  by  the  agents  or  officers  successful  speculation  at  the  expense  of 
of  the  emigrant  company.  But  the  im-  the  rights  of  the  public." 
pression  made  upon  us  by  the  whole  ^  Cases,  supra,  note  2. 
testimony  is  that  the  officers  and  citizens 


§  445.]  CONTRACTS.  439 

to  be  issued  under  a  future  by-law  of  the  city  council,  and  was 
himself  afterwards  an  active  party  in  procuring  and  giving 
effect  to  the  by-law  which  was  subsequently  passed,  the  court  of 
chancery  held  him  to  be  a  trustee  for  the  city  of  the  profit  he  de- 
rived from  the  transaction.^  So,  where  a  member  of  a  municipal 
corporation  agreed  with  another  party  to  take  a  contract  from 
the  corporation  for  the  execution  of  certain  works  in  his  name,  the 
profits  whereof  were  to  be  divided  between  the  parties,  it  was  held 
that  such  a  contract  was  in  contravention  of  the  municipal  law, 
and  the  court  of  chancery  refused  to  enforce  the  agreement  for  a 
partnership.^  An  action  at  law  on  a  contract  for  the  sale  of 
goods  by  a  trading  partnership,  of  which  a  member  is  also  a  mem- 
ber of  the  municipal  council,  may,  where  the  contract  is  not  exe- 
cuted, be  resisted  on  the  ground  that  one  of  the  plaintiffs  is  a 
member  of  the  municipal  council.^ 

§  445.  Public  corporations  may  by  their  officers  and  properly 
authorized  agents  make  contracts  the  same  as  individuals  and  other 
corporations,  in  matters  that  wecessan'Z?/ appertain  to  the  corpora- 
tion :  being  artificial  persons,  they  cannot  contract  in  any  other 
way.  They  have  no  power  to  limit  their  legislative  discretion  by 
covenant.     They  may  contract  as  individuals,  but  their  legisla- 

1  City  of  Toronto  v.  Bowes,  4  Grant  mon  law,  which,  on  grounds  of  public 
(Canada),  504.  policy,  prohibits  a  trustee  from  contract- 

2  Collins  V.  Swindle,  6  Grant  (Canada),  ing  with  himself.  Accordingly  where  the 
282;  Cummings  v.  Saux,  30  La.  An.  207.  plaintiff,  a  member  of  the  council,  voted 

3  Brown  v.  Lindsay,  35  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  for  a  resolution  to  appropriate  money  to 
509.  A  contract  made  by  a  mayor,  while  celebrate  the  Fourth  of  July,  under  which 
in  office,  with  the  city  council,  to  lease  a  resolution  a  committee  of  the  members 
city  park  for  live  years,  and  for  an  employed  the  plaintiff  to  furnish  horses 
annual  sum  paid  him  to  keep  the  park  in  and  carriages  for  the  celebration,  it  was 
repair,— //eW,  to  be  against  public  policy  held  (assuming  the  appropriation  of 
and  void.  Macon  v.  Huff,  60  Ga.  22L  money  for  this  purpose  to  be  valid  under 
But  after  such  contract  had  been  ratified  the  charter)  that  the  plaintiff's  employ- 
by  a  subsequent  mayor  and  council,  and  ment  was  against  public  policy  and  void, 
large  sums  expended  by  the  contractor  and  that  he  could  not  recover  against  the 
in  fencing,  draining,  and  ornamenting  the  city  for  the  fair  value  of  the  use  of  the 
park,  a  court  of  chancery  would  not  set  horses  and  carriages  furnished  by  him. 
aside  the  contract  without  compelling  the  Smith  v.  Albany,  61 N.  Y.  444, 1875.  But  a 
city  to  do  equity,  lb.  The  New  York  contract  entered  into  with  an  officer  of 
Commission  of  Appeals  regarded  an  act  the  corporation,  whereby  such  officer 
of  the  legislature  making  it  unlawful  for  agreed  to  keep  the  streets  in  repair,  was 
a  member  of  the  common  council  to  be-  held  vahd.  Albright  v.  Town  Council,  9 
come  a  contractor  under  any  contract  Rich.  (South  Car.)  Law,  399.  See,  also, 
authorized  by  the  council,  and  declaring  Railroad  Co.  v.  Claggett,Speers  Eq.  562; 
such  contract  to  be  void  at  the  instance  ante,  sec.  288,  note ;  sec.  292 ;  Lawrence 
of  the  city,  as  but  declaratory  of  the  com-  r.  Killam,  11  Kan.  499,  1873. 


440  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

live  enactments  must  of  necessity  have  the  same  effect  upon  their 
individual  contract  as  upon  those  of  other  persons,  artificial  or 
natural,  or  of  the  general  public.^  Public  officers  or  agents  are 
held  more  strictly  within  their  prescribed  powers  than  private 
general  agents ;  and  a  contract  made  by  a  public  agent  within 
the  general  scope  of  his  powers  does  not  bind  his  principal  in  the 
absence  of  specific  authority. ^  There  is  a  broad  distinction  be- 
tween the  acts  of  an  officer  or  agent  of  a  public  municipal  corpor- 
ation and  those  of  an  agent  for  a  private  individual.  In  cases  of 
public  agents  the  public  corporation  is  not  bound  unless  it  mani- 
festly appears  that  the  agent  is  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  au- 
thority, or  he  is  held  out  as  having  authority  to  do  the  act,  or  is 
employed  in  his  capacity  as  a  public  agent  to  make  the  declaration 
or  representation  for  the  government.^ 

§  446.  Although  the  general  doctrine  is  that  a  municipal  cor- 
poration cannot  usually  exercise  its  powers  beyond  its  limits,  yet 
this  right  may  be  given  either  expressly  or  by  implication  ;  and  a 
city  with  express  authority  to  provide  drainage  was  held,  in  the 
absence  of  any  restriction  to  possess  the  implied  power,  in  order 
to  find  an  outlet  for  sewage  beyond  its  limits,  to  make  a  contract 
with  an  adjoining  landowner  giving  it  such  an  outlet.* 

§  447.  (372)  If  a  municipal  corporation  is  authorized  to  erect 
markets,  it  may  contract  to  buy,  or  may  receive  a  grant  of  land, 
on  which  to  place  market-buildings,  and  it  may  make  contracts 
for  the  erection  of  market-houses.  As  it  is  the  general  practice 
in  granting  municipal  charters  and  in  general  acts  for  the  incor- 
poration of  towns  and  cities,  to  enumerate  their  powers  and  define 
their  duties,  it  will  suffice  in  this  place  to  remark  generally  that 
the  authority  to  enter  into  contracts  necessary  and  proper  to  carry 
into  effect  their  powers  and  discharge  their  duties  is  impliedly 
given  to  every  such  corporation.  But  this  implied  authority  is 
only  co-extensive  with  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  corporation ; 
and  if  any  greater  authority  is  claimed  it  must  be  sought  for  in 
an  express  or  special  grant  from  the  legislature.  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  observe  that  no  contract  can  be  made  by  a  corpora- 

i  L.  City  Railway  Co.  v.  City  of  Louis-  '  Mayor  v.  Musgrove,  48  Md.  272. 

ville,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  415,  1871.  *  Coldwater  v.  Tucker,  36  Mich.  474, 

2  Parcel  v.  Barnes,  25  Ark.  261 ;   Wil-  1877  ;  s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep.  601. 
liams  V.  Payton's  Lessee,  4  Wheat.  77. 


§447.] 


CONTRACTS. 


441 


tion  which  is  proTiiUted  by  its  charter  or  by  the  statute  law  of  the 
state. ^  And  it  is  a  general  and  fundamental  principle  of  law  that 
all  persons  contracting  with  a  municipal  corporation  must,  at  their 
perils  inquire  into  the  power  of  the  corporation  or  its  officers  to 
make  the  contract ;  and  a  contract  beyond  the  scope  of  the  cor- 
porate power  is  void,  although  it  be  under  the  seal  of  the  corpor- 
ation.2  gQ^  also,  those  dealing  with  the  agent  of  a  municipal 
corporation  are  likewise  bound  to  ascertain  the  nature  and  extent 
of  his  authority.  This  is  certainly  so  in  all  cases  where  this 
authority  is  special  and  of  record,  or  conferred  by  statute.  The 
fact  in  such  a  case  that  the  agent  made  false  representations  in 
relation  to  his  authority  and  what  he  had  already  done  will  not 
aid  those  who  trusted  to  such  representations  to  establish  a 
liability  on  the  part  of  his  corporate  principal.^ 


1  Jackson  v.  Bowman,  39  Miss.  671, 
1861 ;  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas 
Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  citing  text.  Contracts 
to  violate  the  charter,  or  to  bargain  away 
or  restrict  the  free  exercise  of  legislative 
discretion,  vested  in  a  municipality  or  its 
oflBcers,  in  reference  to  public  trusts,  are 
void.  Ih.  Thomas  i'.  Richmond,  12  Wall. 
349,  1870,  in  which  notes  issued  by  the 
city  to  circulate  as  money  in  contraven- 
tion of  law  were  adjudged  void,  and  the 
city  held  not  to  be  liable  either  in  special 
or  general  assumpsit.  Ante,  sec.  97,  and 
cases  there  cited  ;  post,  sec.  487,  and  cases 
cited. 

^  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall. 
676,  1870 ;  ante,  sec.  89  ;  infra,  sec.  4-56 ; 
Leavenworth  v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  357, 1864 ; 
Wyandotte  v.  Zeitz,  21  Kan.  649  ;  Horn  v. 
Baltimore,  30  Md.  218,  1868;  Bridgeport 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  1-5  Conn.  47-5,  493,  1843 ; 
Haynes  i\  Covington,  13  Sm.  &  Mar.  (21 
Miss.)  408,  18.50;  Taft  v.  Pittsford,  28  Vt. 
(2  Wms.)  286,  1856;  City  Council  v. 
Plank  Road  Co.,  31  Ala.  76, 1857  ;  Steam 
Navigation  Co.  v.  Dandridge,  8  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  248,  319;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2 
Denio  (N.  Y.),  110 ;  Baltimore  v.  Esch- 
bach,  18  Md.  276,  282,  1861 ;  Baltimore  v. 
Reynolds,  20  Md.  1  ;  Dill  v.  Inhabitants, 
etc.,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  438,  1844  ;  Branham 
V.  San  Jose,  24  Cal.  585,  602;  McCoy  v. 
Brant,  53  Cal.  247,  approving  text ;  Stur- 
tevant  v.  Alton,  3  McLean,  39-3,  1844; 
Wallace  v.  San  .Jose,  29  Cal.  180 ;  State 
V.  Mayor,  29  Md.  85,  111,  1868;  Bateman 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  8  Hurl.  &  Nor.  323 ;  State  v. 


Haskell,  20  Iowa,  276 ;  Baltimore  v.  Mus- 
grave,  48  Md.  472 ;  People  v.  Baraga,  39 
Mich.  554;  Neely  v.  Yorkville,  10  So. 
Car.  141,  approving  text ;  Bryan  v.  Page, 
51  Tex.  532 ;  Baby  v.  Baby,  5  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  510 ;  Richmond  v.  Municipality,  8 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  567  ;  Campbell  v.  Elma, 
13  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  296;  Stanley  v. 
Perry,  23  Grant,  507 ;  Craycraft,  etc.  v. 
Selvage,  etc.,  10  Bush  (Ky.),'690,  1874; 
Treadway  v.  Schnauber,  1  Dak.  Ter.  236. 
Within  the  scope  of  its  power  a  corpora- 
tion may  contract  to  do  an  act  at  anij  place 
other  than  the  one  where  it  is  located. 
Bank  of  Utica  v.  Smedes,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
662;  Maddox  v.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  56. 
Or  prospective  in  its  terms.  Davenport  v. 
Hallowell,  10  Me.  317.  As  to  corporate 
seal.  Ante,  sec.  190.  Where  a  public  cor- 
poration, transcending  its  legal  power, 
assumes  to  direct  its  officers  —  for  exam- 
ple, commissioners  of  highwaj's  —  to 
bring  an  action  in  their  own  names,  or  in 
their  name  of  office,  against  third  persons 
for  trespasses  upon  the  highways,  and  the 
action  is  accordingly  brought  and  the 
officers  are  defeated,  they  cannot  sustain 
an  action  against  the  corporation  to  be 
reimbursed  their  costs  and  expenses  ;  and 
the  reason  is,  that  the  action  of  a  corpo- 
ration directing  such  a  suit  to  be  brought, 
being  in  excess  of  its  lawful  power,  is 
void,  and  cannot  be  the  foundation  of  any 
contract,  express  or  implied.  Cornell  v. 
Guilford,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  510;  ante,  sec. 
147. 

a  Baltimore  v.  Eschbach,  18  Md.  276, 


442 


MUNICIPAL   COKPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  448.  Although  it  is  true,  as  stated  in  the  last  section,  that  a 
contract  made  by  a  mnnicipalit}^  in  violation  of  an  express  legis- 
lative prohibition  is  void,  3'et,  in  the  absence  of  special  legislative 
restriction,  the  municipal  authorities  possess  the  same  power  as 
other  debtors  to  make  a  new  contract,  in  anj^  proper  form,  purging 
the  former  contract  of  its  illegality.  This  principle  is  distinctly 
affirmed  and  well  illustrated  in  a  recent  judgment  by  a  court  of 
the  highest  authority,  A  cit}'',  in  violation  of  local  statutes  for- 
bidding the  issue^  circulation,  or  receipt  of  scrip  or  currency  in- 
tended to  circulate  as  money,  issued  such  currency,  engraved 
in  the  similitude  of  bank-paper,  and  by  means  thereof  paid  valid 
debts  against  itself ;  subsequently  the  holders  of  this  illegal  cur- 
rency, at  the  instance  of  the  city,  surrendered  the  same,  and 
received  therefor  new  obligations  of  the  city  in  the  form  of  bonds, 
to  which  there  was  no  legal  objection  except  that  the  consider- 
ation was  illegal ;  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  that  the  city  was  liable  on  the  new  bonds.^ 


282 ;  Baltimore  v.  Reynolds,  20  Md.  1, 
1862 ;  Delafield  v.  State  of  Illinois,  2 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  159,  174;  26  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
192, 1841 ;  affirming  s.  c,  8  Paige,  531,  re- 
straining unauthorized  sale  of  bonds. 
Hodges  V.  Buffalo  2  Denio  (N.  Y.),  110; 
3  Conist.  430  ;  2  Barb.  104  ;  Supervisors, 
etc.  V.  Bates,  17  N.  Y.  242,  1858.  This 
case  also  determines  how  far,  in  such  a 
case,  the  sureties  of  such  an  agent  or 
officer  are  liable  for  his  acts.  And  see 
cases  cited  lb.  p.  245.  Chemung  Canal 
Bank  v.  Supervisors,  5  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
517,  1848;  Overseers,  etc.  v.  Same,  15 
(N.  Y.)  341  ;  2  Comst.  178,  per  Strong, 
J. ;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676, 
1870;  Miners'  Ditch  Co.  v.  Zellerbacli, 
37  Cal.  543,  I860;  Swift  ;;.  Williams- 
burg, 24  Barb.  (N.  Y.),  427;  Hague 
V.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527;  State  v. 
Mayor,  etc.  29  Md.  85.  Ill ;  Horn  v.  Bal- 
timore, 30  Md.  218,  1868;  Thomas  v. 
Ricbmond,  12  Wall.  349,  1870,  per  Brad- 
ley, J. :  Ford  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
63  N.  Y.  640,  1875  ;  Stoneburgh  v.  Brigh- 
ton, 5  Up.  Can.  L.  J.  38. 

Special  and  limited  autbority  to  bor- 
row monoii  conferred  upon  the  town  treas- 
urer, when  exercised  is  exhausted,  and 
the  town  is  not  liable  for  money  he  sub- 
sequently borrows  and    converts  to   his 


own  use,  although  he  assumed  to  act, 
and  was,  by  the  lender,  supposed  to  be 
acting  under  the  authority  conferred 
upon  him.  Savings  Bank  v.  Winchester, 
8  Allen  (Mass.),  109,  1864  ;  ante,  sec.  117. 

So  in  Upper  Canada  it  is  held  that  an 
individual,  dealing  with  a  corporation 
through  its  council  or  the  members  of  the 
governing  body,  is  bound  to  notice  the 
objects  and  limits  of  their  powers  and 
the  manner  in  which  those  powers  are  to 
be  exercised ;  and  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  their  acts,  when  beyond  the 
scope  of  their  authority  or  done  in  a 
manner  unauthorized,  are  in  general  nu- 
gatory and  not  binding  on  the  corpora- 
tion. Ramsay  et  al.  v.  The  Western 
District  Council,  4  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
874  ;  Harr.  Manual,  2  ed.  p.  20. 

1  Little  Rock  (city  of)  v.  National 
Bank,  98  U.  S.  808,  1878 ;  s.  c.  below, 
5  Dillon,  299.  The  statement  of  the 
text  as  to  the  substance  of  the  statutes 
of  Arkansas  in  this  regard  is  correct. 
Mr.  Justice  Hunt  supported  the  judg- 
ment of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  by  the  following  argument :  — 

"  It  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  who- 
ever is  capable  of  entering  into  an  ordi- 
nary contract  to  obtain  or  receive  the 
means   with    which  to  build    houses  or 


CONTRACTS. 


443 


§  449.] 

§  449.  (373)  Mode  of  exercising  <Ag  PoM'^r.  —  Respecting  the 
mode  in  which  contracts  by  corporations  should  be  made,  it  is  im- 
portant to  observe  that  when,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  the  mode 
of  contracting  is  specially  and  plainly  prescribed  and  limited, 
that  mode  is  exclusive,  and  must  be  pursued,  or  the  contract  will 
not  bind  the  corporation  ;i  but  the  courts  have  sometimes  regarded 


wharves  or  the  like  may,  as  a  general 
rule,  bind   himself    by    an   admission  of 
his    obligation.     The   capacity   to    make 
contracts  is  at  the  basis  of  the  liability. 
The   first  liability   of  the  city   was  dis- 
puted by  it.     It    had  gone   beyond    its 
power,  as  it  said,  in  making  a  debt  in  the 
form  of  bank-notes.    If  it  had  not  denied 
its   power,  judgment    and  an   execution 
might  have  gone  against  it,  and  the  cred- 
itor would   have    obtained    his  money. 
This   privilege   of    non-resistance    every 
person  retains,  and   continues  to  retain. 
He  can  reconsider  at  any  time,  and  con- 
fess and  admit  what  the  moment  before 
he   denied.     In  1874  the  city   of  Little 
Rock  did  reconsider.     It  said,  '  We  will 
purge  the   transaction   of    its   illegality. 
We  had  the  authority  to  accept  from  you 
in  satisfaction   of  amounts   received   by 
us   for   legitimate  purposes  the  sums  in 
question.     We  did   so    receive    and    ex- 
pend for  legitimate  purposes.     We  erred 
in  making  the  payment  to  you  in  an  ob- 
jectionable form.     We  now  pay  our  just 
and  lawful  debt  by  cancelling  the  bank- 
notes issued  by  us,  and  delivering  to  you 
obligations  in  the  form  of  bonds,  to  which 
form  there  is  no  legal  objection.'     Hitch- 
cock V.  Galveston,  96  U.  S.  350;  Mayor 
V.   Ray,  19   Wall.   468;  Police  Jury     v. 
Britton,  15  Wall.  570;  Muliaky  v.  Cedar 
Falls,    19   Iowa,   24;    Sykes    v.  Laffery, 
27  Ark.  407  ;  Wright  v.  Hughes,  13  Md. 
113,   are   authorities  to  the  point.     See 
also   the   numerous    cases    cited  in  sec. 
487,  n.  post.     If  the  city  had  borrowed 
§1,000  of  the  bank  upon   its  note   at  an 
usurious  interest,  but  the  bank  had  sub- 
sequently cancelled  the  illegal  note,  had 
refunded  the  excessive  interest,  and  re- 
ceived a  new  note  for  a  lawful  amount, 
the  new  note  would  be  valid  and  collect- 
able.     Miller  v.  Hull,  4  Denio   (N.  Y.), 
144;  Kent  v.  Walton,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
256.     So  where  the  consideration  of  aeon- 
tract  declared  void  by  statute  is  morally 


good,  a  repeal  of  the  statute  will  validate 
the  contract.  Washburn  v.  Franklin,  35 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  597;  13  Abb.  P.  R.  140, 
same  case. " 

>  People  V.  Weber,  89  III.  347 ;  Bryan 
V.  Page,  51  Tex.   532,  approving  text; 
Francis  v.  Troy,  74  N.  Y.  338 ;  State  v. 
Passaic,  41  N.  J.  L.  90 ;  Perrine  v.  Farr, 
2  Zab.  (22  N.  J.  L.)  356;  Canon  v.  Mar- 
tin, 2  Dutch.  (N.J.)  594 ;  State  v.  Hudson,  5 
Dutch.  (N.J.)  104 ;  State  f.Marion  County, 
21  Kan.  419 ;  Garvey,  in  re,  11  N.  Y.  523  ; 
Smith  V.  Newburgh,  77  N.  Y.  130;  Allen 
V.  Galveston,  51  Tex.  302;  Dore  v.  Mil- 
waukee, 42  Wis.  18 ;  Butler  v.  Nevin,  88 
III.  575 ;  Kansas  City  v.  Flanagan,  69  Mo. 
22;  Bently  f.  County  Commrs.,  25  Minn. 
259  ;  Fulton  v.  Lincoln,  9  Neb.  358;  Hur- 
ford  V.  Omaha,  4  Neb.  350;  Reis  v.  Graff, 
51  Cal.  86 ;  Addis  v.  Pittsburgh,  85  Pa. 
St.  389 ;  McDonald  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  08  N.  Y.  23,  1876 ;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep. 
144  ;  Leavenworth  v.  Rankin,  2  Kan.  357; 
McCoy  V.  Brant,  63  Cal.  247,  approving 
text ;  Murphy  v.  Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.), 
189,    1872;  post,   sec.    481,   note;    Mont- 
gomery  County  V.  Barber,  45  Ala.  237; 
Terre  Haute  v.  Lake,  43  Ind.  480 ;  Head 
V.  Insurance  Co.,  2  Cranch  (U.  S.),  127, 
1804 ;  White  v.  New  Orleans,  15  La.  An. 
667 ;  infra,  sec.  466 ;  Dey  v.  Jersey  City, 
19  N.  J.  Eq.  412,  1869 ;  Baltimore  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 20  Md.  1.     Speaking  of  this  sub- 
ject in  the  case  first  cited,  Marshall,  C.  J., 
says :  "  The   act   of    incorporation  is   to 
them  an  enabling  act ;  it  gives  them  all 
the  power  they  possess ;  it  enables  them 
to  contract,  and  lohen  it  prescribes  to  them  a 
mode  of  contract inr/,  they  must  observe  that 
mode,  or  the  instrument  no  more  creates 
a  contract   than  if  tlie  body  had   never 
been  incorporated."     Approved,  Bank  of 
United   States  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat. 
64,  68,  1827;  see,  also,  Angell  &  Ames 
Corp.  sec.  253;  Diggle  i'.  Railway  Co.,  5 
Exch.  442;  Ilomersham  i;.  Wol.  etc.  Co., 
4  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  426 ;  Frend  v.  Dennett, 


444  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

provisions  on  this  subject  as  directory.  Thus,  where  the  charter 
directed  the  mode  in  which  moneys  should  be  drawn  from  the 
treasury  to  be  by  an  order  of  the  council,  signed  by  the  mayor, 
such  an  order,  issued  upon  a  memorandum  in  the  minutes  of  the 
corporation,  without  a  formal  order  being  entered,  was  adjudged 
a  sufficient  compliance  with  the  charter.^  But  unless  the  mode  be 
prescribed  and  limited,  valid  contracts  within  the  scope  of  the 
corporate  powers  may  be  made,  as  we  shall  see,  otherwise  than 
under  seal  or  in  writing.  A  contract  with  a  municipal  corpor- 
ation, which  by  its  terms  is  not  to  be  performed  within  one  year 
from  the  making  thereof  is  within  the  statute  of  frauds ;  but  an 
entry  in  the  official  minutes  of  the  corporation  of  a  resolution 
passed  by  the  governing  body  expressing  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract, signed  by  the  clerk,  constitutes  a  note  or  memorandum  in 
writing  sufficient  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute  and  to  bind 
the  corporation.  2 

§  450.  (374)  Seal  not  Necessary  —  How  concluded.  —  Modern 
decisions  have  established  the  law  to  be,  that  the  contracts  of  mu- 
nicipal corporations  need  not  be  under  seal  unless  the  charter  so 
requires.  The  authorized  body  of  a  municipal  corporation  may 
bind  it  by  an  ordinance.,  which  in  favor  of  private  persons  in- 

4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  576;  Butler  v.  Charles-  such  contract,  nor  would  the  law  imply 

town,   7   Gray   (Mass.),  12;  Trustees  v.  any  such  contract :  the  law  never  implies 

Cherry  8  Oliio   St.  564,  1858;  Bladen  v.  an   obligation  to  do  that  which  it  forbids 

Philadelphia,  60  Pa.  St.  464 ;  McCracken  the  party  to  agree  to  do.    Bryan  i'.  Page, 

V.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591  ;  Piemental  51  Tex.  532 ;  s.  p.  Francis  v.  Troy,  74 

V.  San  Francisco,  21  Cal.  351  ;  Zottnian  v.  N.  Y.  338. 

San   Francisco,   20   Cal.   96;  Argenti   v.  ^  Kelly  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Brooklyn,  4 

San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  255,  282,  opinion  Hill  (N.  Y.),  263,  1843;    see   Neiffer  v. 

of  Field,  C.J. ;  ;ios^  chapter  on  Taxation  Bank,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  162;  Penrose  v. 

and  Local  Assessments.     If  a  corporation  Taniere,  12   Queen's   B.  1011;  Maddox 

sue  upon  a  contract,  though  it  be  execu-  v.  Graham,  2   Met.  (Ky.)  50;   ante,  sec. 

tory  on  their  part,  and  not  executed,  this  291.     Under  charter  executory  contracts 

amounts  to  a  conclusive  admission  that  for   grading,   etc.,   must    be   in   writing, 

tlie  contract  was   duly  entered  into   by  Starkey  i'.  MinneapoHs,   19    Minn.   203, 

them.     Grant  on  Corp.   63;   5   Man.   &  1872. 

Granger,  192.     A  contract  by  a  city  with  2  Argus  Co.  v.  Albany,  55  N.  Y.  495, 

a  street  railway  company  held  not  con-  1874,  Grover  and  Rapallo,  JJ.  dissenting, 

eluded,  something  remaining  to  be  done.  Municipal  corporations  may  contract  by 

People's  Bailroad  v.  Memphis  Railroad,  parol     tlirough     their     duly    authorized 

10  Wall.  38.     Where  a  charter  limits  the  agents,   and    such    contracts    cannot  be 

exercise  of  power  tlie  mayor  and  council  changed  without  the  consent  of  the  par- 

cannot,  in  a  different  mode,  make  a  valid  ties  to  be  affected  thereby.     Buncombe 

contract,  nor  can  they,  by  any  subsequent  v.  The  City  of  Fort  Dodge,  38  Iowa,  281, 

approval  or  conduct,  impart  validity  to  1874. 


§  451.] 


CONTRACTS. 


445 


terested  therein  may,  if  so  intended,  operate  as  a  contract;  or 
they  may  bind  it  by  a  resolution,  or  by  vote  clothe  its  officers, 
agents,  or  committees,  with  power  to  act  for  it ;  and  a  contract 
made  by  persons  thus  appointed  by  the  corporation,  though  by 
parol  (unless  it  be  one  which  the  law  requires  to  be  in  writing), 
will  bind  it.^ 

§  451.  (375)    The  assent  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  the  vari- 
ation or  modification  of  a  contract  need  not  necessarily  be  expressed 


1  Fanning  v.  Gregoire,  16  How.  (U.  S.) 
524,  1853;  ante,  see.  192;  Abbey  v.  Bil- 
lups,  35  Miss.  618;  Alton  v.  MuUedy, 
21  111.  76,  1859 ;  Western,  etc.  Society  v. 
Philadelphia,  31  Pa.  St.  175 ;  lb.  185  ; 
Clark  V.  Washington,  12  Wheat.  40,  1827  ; 
Hamilton  v.  Railroad  Co.,  9  Ind.  359, 
1857;  Ross  v.  Madison,  1  Ind.  (Cart.) 
281,  1848 ;  Bellmyer  v.  Marshalltown,  44 
Iowa,  564,  1876.  Not  essential  that  vote 
of  directors  appear  on  the  record.  Story 
Agency,  sec.  52,  where  it  is  said  that,  "  as 
the  appointment  of  an  agent  of  a  corpora- 
tion may  not  always  be  evidenced  by 
written  vote,  it  is  now  the  settled  doctrine 
—  at  least  in  America — that  it  may  be 
inferred  and  implied  from  the  adoption 
or  recognition  of  the  acts  of  the  agent  by 
the  corporation."  Infra,  sec.  459.  And 
when  this  is  the  case  an  action  of  assump- 
sit lies  against  such  corporation  upon  an 
express  or  implied  promise.  Parol  con- 
tract by  council  with  city  physician. 
Selnia  i-.  Mullen,  46  Ala.  411,  1871.  See, 
also,  Broom  Cora,  on  Com.  Law,  561-570; 
Montgomery  Co.  v.  Barber,  45  Ala.  237, 
1877. 

In  Fleckner  v.  United  States  Bank, 
8  Wheat.  (U.  S  )  338,  357,  1823,  it  was 
urged  that  a  corporation  could  not  autlior- 
ize  any  act  to  be  done  by  an  agent  by  a 
mere  vote  of  the  directors,  but  only  by  an 
appointment  under  its  corporate  seal.  But 
the  court  declared  that  such  a  doctrine, 
whatever  may  have  been  its  original  cor- 
rectness as  applied  to  common-law  corpo- 
rations, had  "  no  application  to  modern 
corporations  created  by  statute,  whose 
charters  contemplate  the  business  of  the 
corporation  to  be  transacted  by  a  special 
body  or  board  of  directors.  And  the  acts 
of  sucli  a  body  or  board,  evidenced  by  a 
written  vote,  are  as  completely  binding 


upon  the  corporation,  and  as  complete 
authority  to  their  agents,  as  the  utmost 
solemn  acts  done  under  the  corporate 
seal."  Per  Story,  J.  Further,  as  to  com- 
mon seal,  see  ante,  sec.  190.  Authority 
of  agent,  in  absence  of  special  restriction, 
may  be  given  by  parol  or  inferred  from 
acts.  Detroit  v.  Jackson,  1  Doug.  (Mich.) 
106.     See  ante,  sec.  190;  infra,  sec.  459. 

A  provision  in  the  organic  act  of  a 
city,  that  "  on  the  passage  of  every  by- 
law or  order  to  enter  into  a  contract  by 
the  council,  the  ayes  and  nays  shall  be 
called  and  recorded,"  prescribes  how  the 
order  to  contract  shall  be  made  and  evi- 
denced when  directed  by  the  council,  but 
it  is  not  a  Hmitation  on  the  power  of  au- 
thorized agents  to  make  a  contract  by 
parol.  Indianola  v.  Jones,  29  Iowa,  282, 
1870 ;  ante,  sec.  291 ;  Baker  v.  Johnson 
Co.  (parol  contract),  33  Iowa,  151. 

Contract  may  be  concluded  by  ordinance 
or  action  of  the  council  (accepting  pro- 
posals), without  signature  by  parties. 
People  V.  San  Francisco,  27  Cal.  655, 
1865 ;  Sacramento  v.  Kirk,  7  Cal.  419  ; 
Logansport  v.  Blakemore,  17  Ind.  318. 
How  shown.  San  Antonio  v.  Lewis, 
9  Texas,  69.  In  Indianopolis  v.  Skeen, 
17  Ind.  628,  1861,  it  was  held  that  third 
persons  dealing  with  an  agent  of  the  city 
appointed  by  the  council  "  to  negotiute  its 
bonds  at  not  less  than  "  a  specified  rate, 
were  not  obliged  to  look  to  the  records  of 
the  council  for  either  his  appointment  or 
his  instructions,  since  they  were  not  ne- 
cessarily of  record  there ;  but  persons  deal- 
ing with  such  an  agent  are,  of  course, 
bound  to  ascertain  the  fact  of  his  appoint- 
ment and  the  extent  of  his  authority,  but 
not  his  private  instructions.  Authority 
of  agent  to  negotiate  sales  of  bonds.  Cady 
V.  Watertown,  18  Wis.  322. 


446 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


by  the  formal  action  or  resolution  of  the  common  council ;  but 
it  may  be  implied  from  acts  relating  to  the  contract  work  subse- 
quent to  the  date  of  the  contract ;  ^  but  where  the  contract  is 
made  by  ordinance  in  the  statutory  mode,  it  can  only  be  repealed 
or  annulled  in  the  same  manner.^ 

§  452.  (376)  Co7itracts  made  ly  Agents  —  Mode  of  Execution. 
"Where  officers  or  agents  of  a  corporation,  duly  appointed,  and 
acting  within  the  scope  of  their  authority  in  executing  an  instru- 
ment in  behalf  of  the  corporation,  sign  their  own  names  and  affix 
their  own  seals,  such  seals  are  simply  nugatory,  and  the  instru- 
ment, according  to  the  weight  of  modern  judicial  opinion,  is  to 
be  regarded  as  the  si^nple  contract  of  the  corporation,  and  will  bind 
the  corporation  and  not  the  individuals  executing  it,  where  the 
purpose  to  act  for  the  corporation  is  manifest  from  the  whole 
paper,  and  where  there  are  no  words  evincing  an  intention  to 
assume  a  personal  liability.^ 


1  Messenger  v.  Buffalo,  21  N.  Y.  196, 
1860.  Where  certain  work  is  stipulated 
to  be  clone  under  the  direction  of  a  street 
commissioner  of  a  city,  this  officer  has 
authority,  without  a  vote  of  tlie  council, 
to  authorize  extra  work  to  be  done,  or  ma- 
terials to  be  furnished,  where  these  are 
rendered  necessary  by  the  action  of  the 
city  authorities  subsequent  to  tiie  making 
of  the  contract,  and  where,  without  such 
extra  work  or  materials,  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the 
contract.  lb.  Modification  of  contracts 
by  unauthorized  officers  not  binding  upon 
the  corporation.  Bonesteel  v.  Mayor,  etc. 
of  New  York,  22  N.  Y.  162,  1860 ;  Hague 
V.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527 ;  O'Hara 
r.  New  Orleans,  30  La.  An.  pt.  1,  152. 
As  to  changes  in  contracts  by  parol,  see 
Hasbrouck  v.  Milwaukee,  21  Wis.  217, 
1866 ;  compare  Sacramento  v.  Kirk,  7 
Cal.  419 ;  infra,  sec.  459.  Acceptance  by 
city  of  proposals  to  it,  see  Springfield  v. 
Harris,  107  Mass.  532,  1871. 

Defendant's  council  passed  a  resolu- 
tion ordering  the  public  square  to  be 
graded,  and  plaintiff,  under  an  agreement 
with  defendant's  officers,  advanced  the 
money  for  the  work,  which  was  done  in 
a  satisfactory  manner.  Hfld,  that  a  sub- 
sequent resolution,  of  which  plaintiff  had 


no  notice,  limiting  the  expenditure,  would 
not  defeat  recovery  of  an  amount  ex- 
pended in  excess  of  that  limit.  Dun- 
combe  V.  Fort  Dodge,  38  Iowa,  281,  1874. 

-  Terre  Haute  v.  Lake,  43  Ind.  480, 
1873. 

■<  Regents,  etc.  v.  Detroit,  etc.,  12  Mich. 
138  ;  Sweetzer  v.  Mead,  6  Mich.  107 ; 
Bank  of  Metropolis  v.  Gottschalk,  14  Pet. 
19;  Story  Agency,  sees.  154,  260,276, 
277 ;  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Patterson,  7 
Cranch,  299,  307  ;  Hatch  v.  Barr,  1  Ham. 
(Ohio)  390;  Baker  v.  Chambles,  4  G. 
Greene  (Iowa),  428 ;  Lyon  v.  Adamson, 
7  Iowa,  509;  1  Am.  Lead.  Cas.  602  ;  Mott 
V.  Hicks,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  513,  534;  Blan- 
chard  v.  Blackstone,  102  Mass.  343 ;  Stan- 
ton V.  Camp  (contract  signed  individually 
with  addition  of  "committee"),  4  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  274;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Bank 
of  Columbia,  5  Wheat.  326  ;  Hopkins  v. 
Mehatfy,  11  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  126; 
Angell  &  Ames,  sees.  293,  295;  Gale  v. 
Kalamazoo,  23  Mich.  344, 1871 ;  Burrilli;. 
Boston,  2  Clifford  C.  C.  500, 1867.  Where 
a  town  clothes  its  agent,  or  its  committee, 
with  full  power  to  make  a  contract,  and 
it  is  accordingly  made,  it  is  valid  and 
binding,  notwithstanding  there  has  been 
no  formal  acceptance  by  a  vote,  or  even  if 
it  be   afterwards   rejected  by  the  corpo- 


§  453.] 


CONTRACTS. 


447 


§  453.  (877)  A  few  cases  will  be  referred  to,  illustrating  the 
rule  just  stated.  A  contract  in  relation  to  the  survey  of  a  city,  a 
subject  exclusively  appertaining  to  the  corporation,  was  entered 
into  "  between  T.  Van  V.,  J.  W.,  C.  D.  C,  a  committee  appointed 
by  the  corporation  of  the  city  of  Albany  for  that  purpose,  of  the 
first  part,  and  John  R.  Jr.,  of  the  second  part."  The  parties  of 
the  first  part  agreed  to  pay  for  the  work  to  be  done,  and  signed 
their  individual  names  and  affixed  their  individual  seals  to  the 
agreement.  The  authority  of  the  committee  to  act  for  the  cor- 
poration and  to  make  the  contract  being  conceded,  it  was  ruled 
that  they  were  not  personally  liable,  and  that  it  must  be  enforced 
by  and  against  the  corporation.^     In  another  case,  a  contract  for 


ration.  Davenport  v.  Hallowell,  10  Me. 
317  ;  Junkins  v.  School  District,  39  Me. 
220,  185-5;  Willard  v.  Newburyport,  12 
Pick.  (Mass.)  227;  Kingsbury  v.  School 
District,  12  :\Iet.  (Mass.)  99,  1846. 

Where  school  directors  gave  an  au- 
thorized bond  for  borrowed  money,  in 
their  individual  names,  as  school  direct- 
ors, though  signed  and  sealed  in  their  in- 
dividual names,  the  corporation,  and  not 
the  individuals,  are  liable  thereon.  Heid- 
elberg School  Dist.  V.  Horst,  62  Pa.  St. 
301,  1869. 

The  power  of  a  committee,  appointed  by 
a  vote  of  a  town,  "  to  let  out  and  super- 
intend the  making  "  of  a  highway,  is  com- 
pletely executed  by  the  making  of  a 
contract  with  a  third  person  embracing 
the  whole  subject-matter  of  the  vote  and 
by  the  superintending  of  the  construc- 
tion of  the  highway.  And  therefore,  if 
the  person  contracted  with  fails  to  com- 
plete the  road  according  to  his  contract, 
this  is  a  matter  for  the  toicn  to  deal  witii, 
and  the  committee  have  no  power,  with- 
out new  authority  from  the  town,  to  enter 
into  a  contract  with  another  person  for 
its  completion.  If  they  do  so,  and  pay 
money  in  pursuance  thereof,  the  town  is 
not  liable  to  them  therefor.  Nor  is  it  liable 
if  they  transcend  their  power,  and  make 
a  contract  for  a  more  expensive  road  than 
they  were  authorized  to  do.  Keyes  v. 
Westford.  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  273,  1835. 

Power  to  a  town  committee  "  to  superin- 
tend tlie  building  of  a  iiouse  for  tiie  town," 
was  adjudged  to  include  the  power  to 
make  the  necessary  contracts,  it  not  ap- 
pearing  that   any  other  or  special  com- 


mittee or  agent  was  appointed  for  that 
purpose,  the  court  being  of  opinion  that 
the  making  of  contracts  was  essential  to 
the  building  of  the  house.  Damon  v. 
Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  34.5,  1824;  ante, 
chs.  ix.,  X.  Majority  of  committee  must 
sign  contract.  So  held,  Curtis  v.  Portland, 
59  Me.  483,  1871 ;  ante,  sec.  283  and  note. 

It  has  been  held  in  Upper  Canada, 
where  work  was  done  under  a  contract 
not  made  with  the  corporation,  or  any  of 
its  known  oflScers,  but  merely  with  per- 
sons assuming  to  act  as  a  duly  appointed 
committee,  that  no  action  would  lie 
against  the  corporation.  Stoneburgh  v. 
The  Municipality  of  Brighton,  5  Upper 
Can.  Law  J.  38.  No  action  can  be  sus- 
tained for  a  breach  of  duty  against  the 
head  of  a  corporation  in  not  applying  the 
seal  to  make  a  contract  between  a  corpo- 
ration and  an  individual,  founded  on  a 
refusal  which,  if  there  had  been  a  pre- 
vious A'alid  contract,  would  have  consti- 
tuted a  breach  of  it ;  in  other  words,  there 
cannot  be  a  remedy  against  the  head  of  a 
corporation,  equivalent  to  a  remedy  on 
the  contract  against  the  corporation,  had 
the  contract  been  duly  made  so  as  to 
create  a  valid  and  binding  agreement. 
Fair  r.  Moore,  3  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  484  ; 
Harrison  Munic.  Manual  for  Upper  Can. 
p.  20. 

1  Randall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  60, 1821  ;  compare,  however,  Ful- 
1am  V.  Brookfield,  9  Allen  (Mass.),  1, 
1864,  where  the  court  denies  the  doctrine 
of  Kandall  v.  Van  Vechten  ;  Bank,  etc.  v. 
Patterson,  7  Cranch,  299,  and  certain  dicta 
in  Damon  v.  Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  345. 


448  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

the  repair  of  an  engine  honse  of  a  city  was  entered  into  by  the 
inspector  of  the  fire  department  in  his  own  name,  describing  him- 
self as  "  G.  N.  S.,  inspector,  etc.,  of  the  first  part,"  and  signed  in 
the  same  way.  It  was,  in  fact,  made  for  and  on  account  of  the 
city,  and  it  was  held  that  the  city  was  liable  thereon,  although 
its  agent  did  not  use  its  name  in  contracting,  the  court  being  of 
opinion,  however,  that  the  contract  on  its  face  showed  it  was 
made  for  the  city.^ 

§  454.  (378)  So,  where  on  a  sale  of  real  property  by  a  corpo- 
ration, a  memorandum  of  the  sale  was  signed  by  the  parties,  on 
which  it  was  stated  that  the  sale  was  made  to  A.  B.,  the  pur- 
chaser, and  that  he,  C.  D.,  "mayor  of  the  corporation,  in  behalf 
of  himself  and  the  rest  of  the  burgesses  and  commonalty  of  the 
borough  of  Caermarthen,  do  mutually  agree  to  perform  and  fulfil, 
on  each  of  their  parts  respectively,  the  conditions  of  the  sale," 
and  then  came  the  signature  of  the  purchaser,  and  of  "  C.  D., 
Mayor,"  it  was  held  that  the  agreement  was  that  of  the  corpora- 
tion, and  not  that  of  the  mayor  personally  ;  and  that,  conse- 
quently, the  mayor  could  not  sue  thereon.^ 

But  the  text  states  the  prevailing  Ameri-  board  to  advertise  for  proposals  for  grad- 
can  rule.  See  also  Dubois  v.  Canal  Co.,  ing  and  paving  any  sidewalk,  and  to 
4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  285  ;  Worrell  <;.  Munn,  award  any  contract  therefor  to  the  lowest 
1  Seld.  (5  N.  Y.)  220;  Ford  v.  Williams,  bidder.  In  an  action  by  P.  for  labor  and 
3  Kern.  (13  N.  Y.)  577,  585;  Richardson  materials,  in  pursuance  of  the  resolution, 
V.  Scott,  etc.  Co.,  22  Cal.  150.  etc.  —  Held,  1.  That  no  abandonment  of 
1  Robinson  i;.  St.  Louis,  28  Mo.  488,  the  contract  was  established.  2.  That 
1859.  Where  the  corporate  name  of  a  the  contract  was  not  affected  by  the  sub- 
Tillage  was  "  the  president  and  trustees  sequent  amendment.  3.  That  the  reso- 
of  the  village  of  G.,"  a  contract  reciting  lution  was  illegal,  and  no  recovery  could 
that  it  was  made  by  the  president  and  be  had  by  P.  for  the  gravel  and  grading 
trustees  of  the  "  corporation  "  of  G  — ,  either  upon  contract  or  upon  the  (/Manfuw 
Held,  to  warrant  a  finding  that  the  con-  meruit.  lb.  Where  A.,  B.,  and  C,  a 
tract  was  made  by  the  board  officially,  committee  appointed  by  a  meeting  of 
Parr  r.  Greenbush,  72  N.  Y.  4G3.  In  1870  citizens,  make  a  contract  with  D.,  signing 
a  village  board,  without  advertising  for  the  contract  as  a  committee,  and  affixing 
proposals,  contracted  with  P.  to  lay  a  side-  their  seals  thereto,  they  make  themselves 
■walk  in  May,  1871 ;  the  work,  however,  personally  liable  under  the  contract.  The 
did  not  proceed,  owing  to  the  failure  of  only  effect  of  the  word  "  committee  "  is 
the  board  to  furnish  the  gravel  and  grad-  like  that  of  "  executor  "  in  a  personal 
ing  as  required  by  the  contract  and  P.'s  obligation,  to  identify  the  transaction,  not 
notification.  In  1873  the  board  passed  a  to  qualify  the  act.  Ulam  v.  Boyd,  87  Pa. 
resolution  requiring  P.  to  go  on,  and  if  the  St.  477. 

necessary  gravel  and  grading  be  not  fur-  ^  Bowen  v.  Morris,  2  Taunt.  374,  387. 

nished,    to    furnish  the    same    himself;  The  case  of  Burrill  u.  Boston,  2   Clifford 

whereupon  he  furnished  the  materials  and  C  R.  R.  590,  1867,  presents  also  an   in- 

did  the  work.     In   1871  the  village  char-  stance  in  which  it  was  considered  that  a 

ter  was  so  amended  as  to  require   the  contract  signed  by  the  mayor  was  one  in- 


§  456.]  CONTRACTS.  449 

§  455,  (379)  But  the  action  or  contract  of  the  officers  of  a 
public  corporation  in  their  individual  capacity  is  not  binding 
upon  the  corporate  bod3^l  For  example  :  If  the  selectmen  of  a 
town  in  New  England^  as  individuals,  request  a  citizen  to  furnish 
supplies  to  a  public  enemy,  to  prevent  violence  to  the  town,  this 
gives  no  legal  right  of  recovery  against  the  town ;  and  as  the 
transaction  was  wholly  beyond  the  official  duty  of  selectmen,  or 
the  duty  of  the  town  as  a  corporation,  it  was  doubted  whether  a 
regular  vote  to  pay  the  plaintiff  would  have  been  legal,  though 
it  was  admitted  that  a  voluntary  agreement  among  the  inhabi- 
tants to  this  effect  would  have  been  binding,  being  founded  on  a 
meritorious  consideration,  as  it  was  their  property,  and  not  that 
of  the  town,  which  was  in  danger,^ 

§  456.  (380)  While  the  agent  of  a  public  corporation,  who  by 
its  vote  or  authority  contracts  for  its  use,  cannot  bind  the  cor- 
poration by  making  a  contract  by  deed,  yet  if  such  agent  had 
authority  to  make  the  contract,  it  is  binding  upon  the  corpora- 
tion as  evidence  of  such  contract.  It  follows  that  a  contract  of  an 
agent  or  committee  of  a  town,  under  his  or  their  own  seals,  can- 
not be  declared  on,  in  covenant  or  debt,  as  the  deed  of  the  town. 


tended  to  be  made  on  behalf  of  the   cor-  proof  that  another  selectman  authorized 

poration.     But   in  Providence   v.  Miller,  hira  so  to  sign  the  contract,  or  by  proof 

11   Rh.  Is.  272,  1876;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  that  such  was  the  practice   in  the  town. 

453,  a  contract  under  seal  between  cer-  If  the  corporate  name  had  been  affixed  by 

tain  persons  of  the   first  part   and   one  one,  such    proof  might  have  been  suffi- 

Doyle  "in  behalf  of  the  city,"  party  of  cient.     Andover  v.  Grafton,  7  N.  H.  298, 

the  second  part,"  Doyle  being  the  mayor,  305  ;  Mason  v.  Bristol,  10  N.  H.  36  ;  Han- 

and  the   contract  relating   to   municipal  over    v.  Eaton,  3   N.  H.  38.     Powers  of 

matters,  was  held  upon  its  face  to  be  the  towns  in  New  England.     Ante,  sees.    29, 

contract  of    Doyle   personally    and  not  30. 
that  of  the  city.  Contracts   made   by  a  majoriti/  of  the 

1  Haliburton  v.  Frankford,  14  Mass.  board  of  aldermen,  without  any  official  ac- 
214,1817;  Butler  w.  Charlestown,  7  Gray  tion  of  the  city  council,  are  not  binding 
(Mass.),  12,  1856.  upon  the  city;  so  decided  where  counsel 

2  Haliburton  v.  Frankford,  s»pra ;  were  thus  employed  who  rendered  legal 
Stetson  V.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272,  1816  ;  services  beneficial  to  the  corporation. 
Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  CUffbrd  C.  C.  R.  590,  Butler  v.  Charlestown,  7  Gray  (Mass.), 
1867 ;  ante,  sec.  30.  A  majority  of  se-  12,  1856  ;  see,  also,  Sikes  v.  Hatfield,  13 
lectmen  may,  by  statute,  bind  a  town  in  Gray  (Mass.),  347,  1859;  see  chapter  on 
New  I/amps/iire  by  their  written  con-  Corporate  Meetings,  ante.  A  contract 
tract  when  acting  within  the  limits  of  entered  into  by  a  board  of  supervisors, 
their  authority.  But  a  contract  signed  for  and  on  behalf  of  the  county,  and 
by  one  only  of  the  selectmen  in  his  own  signed  by  the  chairman  of  the  board,  is 
name,  "  for  the  selectmen,"  does  not  l)ind  the  contract  of  the  county.  Babcock  v. 
the  town,  nor  will  it  be  rendered  valid  by  Goodrich,  47  Cal.  488,  1874. 

VOL.  I.  29 


450  MUNICIPAL  COEPORATIONS.  [CH.  XTV. 

The  form  of  the  remedy  against  the  town  ^  is  for  damages,  or  in 
assumpsit.  Although  in  Damon  v.  Granby^  it  was  left  an  open 
question  whether  a  vote  of  a  town  having  no  corporate  seal, 
expressly  authorizing  an  agent  to  make  a  deed  of  land,  or  other 
contract,  vnder  seal,  would,  if  executed  according  to  the  power, 
become  technically  the  deed  of  the  town,  no  substantial  reason 
is  perceived  why  such  an  instrument,  thus  executed,  should  not 
be  treated  as  having  all  the  attributes  and  qualities  of  a  sealed 
instrument.  If  the  corporation,  however,  has  a  common  seal, 
which  is  the  case  with  towns  in  many  of  the  states,  and  with 
cities  generally,  and  it  is  affixed  to  an  instrument  in  pursuance 
of  the  vote  of  the  corporation,  or  by  the  proper  officer,  such  an 
instrument  is,  beyond  doubt,  technically  the  deed  of  the  corpo- 
ration.^ 

§  457.  (381)  Contracts  in  Excess  of  Corporate  Power —  Ultra 
Vires  as  a  Defence.  —  The  general  principle  of  law  is  settled 
beyond  controversy,  that  the  agents,  officers,  or  even  city  council 
of  a  municipal  corporation,  cannot  bind  the  corporation  by  any 
contract  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  its  powers,  or  entirely 
foreign  to  the  purposes  of  the  corporation,  or  which  (not  being 
in  terms  authorized)  is  against  public  policy.  This  doctrine 
grows  out  of  the  nature  of-  such  institutions,  and  rests  upon  rea- 
sonable and  solid  grounds.  The  inhabitants  are  the  corporators : 
the  officers  are  but  the  public  agents  of  the  corporation.  The 
duties  and  powers  of  the  officers  or  public  agents  of  the  corpora- 
tion are  prescribed  by  statute  or  charter,  which  all  persons  not 
only  may  know,  but  are  bound  to  know.  The  opposite  doctrine 
would  be  fraught  with  such  danger  and  accompanied  with  such 

1  Eandall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns.  Keeney  v.  Hudson,    3    Dutch.    (N.  J.) 

(N.  Y.)  60,  65,   1821  ;   Damon  v.  Granhy,  362;  arite,  sec.  192;  Providence  v.  Miller, 

2  Pick.  (xMass.)  345,  1824 ;  compare  Ful-  11  Rh.  Is.  272  ;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  453. 
lam  v.  Brookfield,   9  Allen    (Mass.),   1;  -  Damon  v.  Granby,  2  Pick.  (Mass.) 

Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Patterson's  Admin-  345,  352,  1824. 

istrator,  7  Cranch,  299,  and  rule  as  stated  ^  lb;  'Randall    v.    Van    Vechten,    19 

by  Story,  J.,  306,  1813;  Clark  i-.   Cuck-  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  60,  65,  1821.     ButseeFul- 

field   Union,  11  Eng.  Law  and  Eq.  442 ;  lam    v.    Brookfield,  9  Allen   (Mass.),  1. 

Pennington    v.  Taniere,    12    Queen's  B.  Corporate  seal.  Ante,  sees.  IdO,  122;  Neely 

1011.     Covenant    cannot    be    maintained  v.  Yorkville,  10  So.  Car.  141,  approving 

against  a  city  on  a    contract   with    the  text.     So  an  agreement   in    writing  by 

water  commissioners  of  the  city  although  an  attorney  to  refer  a  certain  cause  acted 

the  statute  declares  that  their  contracts  on  by  the  court  held  to  bind  his  client, 

should  be  binding  upon  and    be  consid-  Brooks  v.  New  Durham,  55   N.  H.   559, 

ered  as  done  by  the  mayor  and  council  1875. 


457.] 


CONTRACTS. 


451 


abuse  that  it  would  soon  end  in  the  ruin  of  municipalities,  or  be 
legislatively  overthrown.  These  considerations  vindicate  both 
the  reasonableness  and  necessity  of  the  rule  that  the  corporation 
is  bound  only  when  its  agents  or  officers,  by  whom  it  can  alone 
act,  if  it  acts  at  all,  keejj  within  the  limits  of  the  chartered  au- 
thority of  the  corporation.  The  history  of  the  workings  of  muni- 
cipal bodies  has  demonstrated  the  salutary  nature  of  this  principle, 
and  that  it  is  the  part  of  true  wisdom  to  keep  the  corporate  wings 
clipped  down  to  the  lawful  standard.^  It  results  from  this  doc- 
trine that  unauthorized  contracts  are  void,  and  in  actions  thereon 
the  corporation  may  successfully  interpose  the  plea  of  ultra  vires, 
setting  up  as  a  defence  its  own  Avant  of  power  under  its  charter 
or  constituent  statute  to  enter  into  the  contract.^     In  favor  of 


1  This  subject  is  touched  upon  in  the 
concluding  portion  of  ch.  i,  arjte. 

2  Post,  ch.  xxiii,  sec.  935;  and  see  also 
the  following  cases  :  Cheeney  r.Brookfiekl, 
60  Mo.  53,  1875,  citing  text ;  Marsh  v.  Ful- 
ton County,  10  Wall.  67G,  1870;  Thomas 
V.  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349,  1870 ;  Bridge- 
port V.  Housatonic  Railroad  Co.,  15  Conn. 
475,  493,  1843 ;  Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  Clif- 
ford C.  C.  500,  1867 ;  Martin  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  545,  1841 ;  Overseers, 
etc.  V.  Same,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  382  ;  Don- 
ovan V.  New  York,  33  N.  Y.  291 ;  Sie- 
brecht  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An.  496, 
1857 ;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199, 
209,  1865 ;  Loker  v.  Brookline,  13  Pick. 
(Mass.)  343,  348;  Philadelphia  i-.  Flani- 
gen,  47  Pa.  St.  21 ;  Trustees  v.  Clierry, 
8  Ohio  St.  504 ;  Hague  v.  Philadelphia, 
48  Pa.  St.  527;  Albany  v.  Cunliff,  2 
Comst.  (2  N.  Y.)  165,  1849,  reversing  s. 
c.  2  Barb.  190 ;  Cuyler  v.  Rochester,  12 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  165.'l834  ;  Hodges  ^^  Buf- 
falo, 2  Denio  (N.Y.),  110, 1846  ;  Halsted  v. 
Mayor,  3  Comst.  (3  N.  Y.)  480, 1850 ;  Mar- 
tin V.  Mayor,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  545  ;  Boom  v. 
Utica,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  lOi;  Cornell?;. 
Guilford,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  510;  Boyland 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  1  Sandf.  (N. 
Y.)  27,  1847;  Dill  v.  Wareham,  7  Mete. 
(Mass.)  438,  1844;  Vincent  r.  Nantucket, 
12  Cush.  (Mass.)  103.  105,  18-58,  per  Mer- 
rick, J. ;  Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass. 
272 ;  Parsons  v.  Inhabitants  of  Goshen, 
11  Pick.  (Mass.)  396;  Wood  v.  Lynn,  1 
Allen  (Mass.),  108,  1861;  Spalding  r. 
Lowell,  23  Pick.  (Mass.)  71;  Mitchell  r. 


Rockland,  45  Me.  496,  1858 ;  s.  c.  41  lb. 
363 ;  Anthony  v.  Cleveland,  12  Oliio,  375, 
1861 ;  Commrs.  v.  Cox,  6  Ind.  403,  1855 ; 
Inhabitants  v.  Weir,  9  lb.  224,  1857; 
Smead  v.  Railroad  Co.,  11  lb.  104,  1858 ; 
Brady  v.  Mayor,  20  N.  Y.  (6  Smith)  312; 
Appleby  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  15  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  428;  Estep  v.  Keokuk  County,  18 
Iowa,  199,  and  cases  cited  by  Cole,  J. ; 
Clark  V.  Polk  County,  19  Iowa,  248, 1865  ; 
supra,  sec.  447 ;  post,  sec.  935 ;  Perry  v. 
Superior  City,  23  Wis.  64,  1870  ;  McDon- 
ald V.  New  York,  68  N.  Y.  23,  1876 ;  s.  c. 
23  Am.  Rep.  144 ;  ]\Iaupin  v.  Franklin 
Co.,  67  Mo.  .327. 

Corporation  may  defend  against  un- 
authorized contract,  although  its  seal  is 
attached  to  it.  Leavenworth  v.  Rankin, 
2  Kan.  358.  1864;  ante,  sec.  192. 

Mr.  Justice  Coulter,  in  delivering  the 
opinion  in  Alleghany  City  v.  McClurkin, 
14  Pa.  St.  81,  expresses  the  opinion  that 
a  municipal  corporation  may  be  liable  for 
the  contracts  ultra  vires  of  its  officers, 
when  these  are  publicly  entered  into  with 
the  knowledge  of  the  people,  and  not  ob- 
jected to  until  after  the  rights  of  third 
persons  have  attached.  Such  a  principle 
is  believed  to  be  both  unsafe  and  unsound  ; 
the  only  true  and  safe  view  being  that  all 
persons  are  bound  to  take  notice  of  the 
powers  and  authority  which  the  law  con- 
fers upon  the  officers  of  such  corporations. 
See  Loker  v.  Brookline,  13  Pick.  (Mass.) 
343.  Auditing  and  paying  part  of  a  claim 
presented,  accompanied  with  a  denial  of 
liability  for  the  residue,  does  not  estop 


452 


MUNICirAL   COEPOEATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


bona  fide  holders  of  negotiable  securities,  the  corporation  may  be 
estopped  to  avail  itself  of  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  power 
conferred  ;  but  it  may  always  show  that  under  no  circumstances 
had  the  corporation  power  to  make  a  contract  of  the  character  in 
question.  This  subject  has,  however,  been  already  referred  to, 
and  ^^•ill  be  considered  in  a  subsequent  portion  of  the  present 
chapter.^ 

the  debtor  corporation  from  contesting  the 
resiiUie,  even  though  it  be  upon  grounds 
wliich  show  the  former  allovvanco  to  have 
been   improper.      People  v.  Supervisors, 

1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  36'2,  1841.  In  an  action  on 
a  contract  for  doing  work  which  a  muni- 
cipal corporation  liad  the  power  to  make, 
it  is  no  defence  that  the  city  ouglit  to 
have  adopted  some  less  expensive  means 
of  accomplishing  the  purpose  in  view. 
Livingston  v.  Pippin,  31  Ala.  542,  1858. 

The  case  of   The   State   v.    Buffalo, 

2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  434,  determines  an  interest- 
ing point.  Arms  belonging  to  the  state 
were  loaned  to  the  city  authorities  to 
suppress  disorderly  assemblages.  The 
keeper  of  the  arsenal  had  no  right  to 
make  the  loan,  but  it  was  made  in  good 
faith,  and  the  bond  of  the  city  taken  for 
their  return  on  demand.  The  city  being 
sued  on  this  bond  made  the  point  that  it 
was  void  for  illegality;  but  the  court  re- 
garded it  rather  as  a  bona  fide  excess  of 
authority  simply,  and  hold  that  though 
the  loan  was  unauthorized  the  state  might 
waive  the  tort  committed  on  the  property 
and  seek  a  remedy  upon  the  bond. 

The  power  of  public  building  commis- 
sioners to  discharge  at  their  discretion  the 
building  superintendent  whom  they  em- 
ploy is  vested  in  them  for  the  public  bene- 
fit, and  they  cannot  be  divested  of  that 
power  by  any  contract  entered  into  by 
them  with  the  person  so  employed,  where 
sucli  contract  is  not  ra«(^efZ  by  the  legisla- 
ture. If  the  legislature, with  full  knowledge 
of  the  contract  entered  into  by  the  commis- 
sioners with  the  plaintiff,  and  of  all  the 
facts  relating  thereto,  recognizes  and  acts 
upon  it,  making  appropriations  to  com- 
plete the  building  in  question  upon  its 
assumed  validity,  that  will  constitute  a 
ratification  of  the  contract ;  but  such  rati- 
fication can  be  shown  only  by  some  action 
of  both  houses  by  statute  or  resolution. 
Shipman  v  The  State,  43  Wis.  381,  1877. 


1  Anle,SGQ.  163;  ivfra,  sees.  511-553; 
Moore  v.  Mayor,  78  N.  Y.  238,  approving 
text. 

In  Hitchcock  v.  Galveston,  96  U.  S. 
341,  1877,  the  city  made  a  contract  with 
the  plaintiffs  to  pave  streets.  It  liad  the 
power  to  make  a  valid  contract  for  this 
purpose :  but  the  city  having  in  the  con- 
tract agreed  to  make  payment  for  the 
work  in  negotiable  city  bonds  payable  at 
a  future  day,  it  was  objected  that,  since 
no  express  power  was  given  to  issue 
bonds  for  this  purpose,  the  whole  contract 
was  therefore  inopeialive  and  void ;  and 
the  lower  court  so  decided,  and  its  ruling 
was  supposed  to  be  supported  by  the 
cases  of  The  Police  Jury  v.  Britton, 
15  Wall.  570,  and  The  Mayor  of  Mem- 
phis V.  Ray,  19  Wall.  468.  But  the 
Supreme  Court  held  otherwise,  and 
in  giving  its  judgment  on  this  point, 
Mr.  Justice  Strong  observed:  "In 
the  view  which  we  shall  take  of  the 
present  case,  it  is  perhaps  not  necessary 
to  inquire  wiiether  those  cases  justify  the 
court's  conclusion ;  for  if  it  were  conceded 
that  the  city  had  no  lawful  authority  to 
issue  the  bonds  described  in  the  ordi- 
nance and  mentioned  in  the  contract,  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  contract  was 
wholly  illegal  and  void,  or  that  the  plain- 
tiffs have  no  rights  under  it.  They  are 
not  suing  upon  the  bonds,  and  it  is  not 
necessary  to  their  success  that  they 
should  assert  the  validity  of  those  instru- 
ments. It  is  enough  for  them  that  the 
city  council  have  power  to  enter  into  a 
contract  for  the  improvement  of  the  side- 
walks ;  that  such  a  contract  was  made 
with  them  ;  that  under  it  they  have  pro- 
ceeded to  furnish  materials  and  do  work, 
as  well  as  to  assume  liabilities  ;  that  the 
city  has  received  and  now  enjoys  the 
benefit  of  what  they  have  done  and  fur- 
nished; that  for  these  things  the  city 
promised  to  pay,  and  that  after  having 


§  458.] 


CONTRACTS. 


45^ 


§  458.  (382)  Agreeably  to  the  foregoing  principles,  a  corpora- 
tion cannot  maintain  an  action  on  a  bond  or  a  contract  which  is 
invalid^  as  where  a  cit}^  without  authority,  loaned  its  bonds  to  a 
private  company,  and  took  from  it  a  penal  bond,  conditioned  for 
the  faithful  application  of  the  city  bonds  to  works  which  the  city 
had  no  power  to  construct  or  assist  in  constructing.^  So,  a  con- 
tract by  a  city  to  Avaive  its  right  to  go  on  with  the  laying  out  of 
a  street  or  not,  as  it  might  choose,  is,  it  seems,  against  public 
'policy,  and  it  is  void  if  it  amounts  to  a  surrender  of  its  legislative 
discretion.^  So,  a  promise  to  pay  a  public  corporation,  or  their 
agents,  a  premium  for  doing  their  duty  is  illegal  mid  void  ;  and  a 


received  the  benefit  of  the  contract  the 
city  has  broken  it.  It  matters  not  that 
the  promise  was  to  pay  in  a  manner  not 
authorized  by  law.  If  payments  cannot 
be  made  in  bonds  because  tlieir  issue  is 
ultra  vires,  it  would  be  sanctioning  rank 
injustice  to  hold  that  payment  need  not 
be  made  at  all.  Such  is  not  the  law. 
The  contract  between  the  parties  is  in 
force  so  far  as  it  is  lawful.  There  may 
be  a  difference  between  the  case  of  an 
engagement  made  by  a  corporation  to  do 
an  act  cxpress!3'  prohibited  by  its  charter, 
or  some  otlier  law,  and  a  case  of  where 
legislative  power  to  do  the  act  has  not 
been  granted.  Such  a  distinction  is  as- 
serted in  some  decisions.  But  the  present 
is  not  a  case  in  wliicii  the  issue  of  the 
bonds  was  prohibited  by  any  statute.  At 
most,  the  issue  was  unauthorized ;  at 
most,  there  was  a  defect  of  power.  The 
promise  to  give  bonds  to  the  plaintiffs  in 
payment  of  what  they  undertook  to  do 
was,  therefore,  at  farthest,  only  ultra  vires  ; 
and  in  such  a  case,  though  specific  per- 
formance of  an  engagement  to  do  a  thing 
transgressive  of  its  corporate  power  may 
not  be  enforced,  the  corporation  can  be 
held  liable  on  its  contract.  Having  re- 
ceived benefits  at  the  expense  of  the  otlier 
contracting  party,  it  cannot  object  that  it 
was  not  empowered  to  perform  what  it 
promised  in  return,  in  the  mode  in  which 
it  promised  to  perform.  This  was  directly 
ruled  in  The  State  Board  of  Agriculture 
V.  The  Citizens'  Street  Railway  Co.,  47 
Ind.  407.  There  it  was  helil  that "  although 
there  may  be  a  defect  of  power  in  a  cor- 
poration to  make  a  contract,  yet  if  a  con- 
tract made  by  it  is  not  in  violation  of  its 


charter,  or  of  any  statute  prohibiting  it, 
and  the  corporation  has  by  its  promise 
induced  a  party  relying  on  the  promise 
and  in  execution  of  the  contract  to  ex- 
pend money,  and  perform  his  part  thereof, 
the  corporation  is  liable  on  the  contract." 
See,  also,  substantially  to  the  siime  effect, 
Alleghany  City  v.  McClurkin,  14  Pa.  St. 
81 ;  and,  more  or  less  in  point,  jMalier  v. 
Chicago,  .38  111.  266 ;  Oneida  Bank  v.  On- 
tario Bank,  21  N.  Y.  495 ;  Argenti  v.  San 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  256  ;  Silver  Lake  Bank 
V.  North,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.),  Ch.  373." 

A  charter  provision  that  after  a  pave- 
ment has  been  laid  at  the  expense  of  the 
abutter,  "  the  city  shall  take  charge  of 
and  keep  the  same  in  repair,  without 
further  assessment,"  is  not  a  contract  ex- 
empting the  owners  from  future  assess- 
ments. State  V.  Newark,  8  Vroom,  415 
(37  N.  J.  L.),  reversing  s.  c.  6  lb.  168. 

1  City  Council  v.  Plank  Road  Co.,  31 
Ala.  76,  1857.  See  Mayor,  etc.  v.  Winter, 
29  //;.  051;  Halstead  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  3 
Comst.  (3  N.  Y.)  430  ;  s.  c.  5  Barb.  218  ; 
Bridgeport  v.  Housatonic  Railroad  Co., 
15  Conn.  475,  493. 

2  Martin  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
545,  1841  ;  ante,  sec.  97.  As  to  puhlic 
]>olici/,  see  Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Merchants, 
etc.  Co.,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  1  ;  ante, 
ch.  xii ;  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis,  etc. 
Co.,  6G  Ind.  .396,  citing  text. 

Corrujit  ntjreements  with  aldermen,  to  in- 
fluence tliem  to  a  j)articular  course  in  the 
discharge  of  official  duties,  are,  of  course, 
void,  no  matter  to  whom  executed.  Cook 
V.  Shipman.  24  111.  614. 

Contracts  with  municipal  officers.  Ante, 
sees.  283,  292,  444. 


454 


MUNICIPAL  COEPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


contract  will  not  be  sustained  which  tends  to  restrain  or  control 
the  unbiased  judgment  of  public  officers.  But  a  promise  by  indi- 
viduals to  pay  a  portion  of  the  expenses  of  public  improvements 
does  not  necessarily  fall  within  this  principle,  and  such  a  promise 
is  not  void  as  being  against  public  jDolicy  ;  and  if  the  promisors 
have  a  peculiar  and  local  interest  in  the  improvement,  their 
promise  is  not  void  for  want  of  consideration,  and  may  be  en- 
forced against  them.^  So,  on  the  other  hand,  a  part}^  making 
with  a  city  a  contract  which  is  ultra  vires,  is  not  eatopped,  when 
sued  thereon  by  the  corporation  for  damages,  to  set  up  its  want 
of  authority  to  make  it.^ 


1  Townsend  v.  Hoyle,  20  Conn.  1, 1840. 
This  case  holds  that  a  promise  by  the  de- 
fendants to  pay  the  citj'  the  expense  of 
laying  a  certain  street  was  binding ;  and 
Ellsworth,  J.,  in  deUvering  the  opinion, 
said  :  "  We  cannot  assent  to  the  proposi- 
tion that  a  promise  by  individuals  to  pay 
a  part  of  tlie  expenses  of  public  improve- 
ments, ordered  by  public  authority,  is,  of 
course,  illegal  and  void.  The  amount  or 
cost  may  properly  enough  enter  into  the 
question  of  expediency  or  necessity.  If 
made  in  one  way  or  in  one  place,  it  will 
be  much  better  for  the  public,  though 
more  expensive ;  but  individuals  specially 
benefited  stand  ready,  by  giving  their 
land,  their  money,  or  tlieir  labor,  to  meet 
the  extra  expense.  "Will  tliese  promises 
be  void,  as  being  witliout  consideration  or 
against  public  policy '?  We  think  not." 
See  chapter  on  Streets,  post ;  Springfield 
V.  Harris,  107  Mass.  532.  Any  arrange- 
ment or  combination  among  the  parties 
applying,  whereby  a  few  individuals,  de- 
sirous of  causing  paving  and  grading  to 
be  done,  procured  the  signatures  of  others 
to  the  application  by  paying  them  a  con- 
sideration therefor,  directly  or  indirectly, 
is  a  fraud  in  law  and  contrary  to  public 
policy.  Howard  v.  The  Church,  18  Md. 
451.  If  executory  such  an  agreement  can- 
not be  enforced.  Maguire  v.  Smock,  42 
Ind.  1,  1873;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep.  353.  A 
written  promise  to  pay  into  the  county 
treasury  a  certain  sum  of  money,  upon  the 
condition  that  the  county  commissioners, 
who  had  removed  the  county  court-house 
from  the  public  square,  and  were  build- 


ing a  new  court-house  elsewhere,  would 
remove  it  back  to  said  square,  which 
offer  was  accepted  by  said  commission- 
ers, who  entered  on  their  records  an  order 
for  such  relocation,  was  not  void  as  against 
public  policy,  though  the  commissioners 
were  not  expressly  authorized  by  statute 
to  receive  such  donations.  Stilson  v.  Law- 
rence Co.,  52  Ind.  213, 1870  ;  State  v.  John- 
son's Admr.,  62  Ind.  197,  1876;  post,  sec. 
596. 

2  City  Council  v.  Plank  Road  Co.,  31 
Ala.  76,  1857 ;  Steam  Navigation  Co.  v. 
Dandridge,  8  Gill  &  J.  ( Md. )  248,  319,  320 ; 
Hodges  V.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.),  110. 
If  a  corporation  has  received  money  in 
advance,  on  a  contract  void  on  account 
of  want  of  authority  to  make  it,  and  after- 
wards refuses  to  fulfil  the  contract,  the 
party  advancing  the  money  may,  without 
demand,  recover  it  back  in  an  action  for 
money  had  and  received.  Dill  v.  Ware- 
ham,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  438,  1844.  In  this 
case  the  corporate  defendant  undertook, 
without  authority,  to  transfer  to  the  plain- 
tiff the  right  of  taking  oysters  within  its 
limits ;  contract  held  wholly  void.  See, 
also,  McCracken  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal. 
591 ;  infra,  sees.  459,  460;  compare  Herzo 
I'.  San  Francisco,  33  Cal.  134.  That  the 
contract  of  agents  within  the  scope  of  cor- 
porate power  may  be  ratified,  or  a  con- 
tract implied  from  the  enjoyment  of  the 
benefit  of  the  consideration.  San  Fran- 
cisco Gas  Co.  V.  San  Francisco,  9  Cal.  453, 
1858,  opinion  of  Field,  J. ;  Backman  i\ 
Charlestown,  42  N.  H.  125;  see  Bissell  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  22  N.  Y.  258 ;  yost,  sec.  936. 


§  459.] 


CONTRACTS. 


455 


§  459.  (383)  Implied  Contracts.  —  The  present  state  of  the 
authorities  clearly  justifies  the  opinion  of  Chancellor  Kent.,  that 
corporations  may  be  bound  by  implied  contracts  within  the  scope 
of  their  powers,  to  be  deduced  by  inference  from  authorized  cor- 
porate acts,  without  either  a  vote,  or  deed,  or  writing. ^  This 
doctrine  is  applicable  equally  to  public  and  private  corporations, 
but  in  applying  it,  however,  care  must  be  taken  not  to  violate 
other  principles  of  law.^     Thus  it  is  obvious  that   an  implied 


1  2  Kent  Com.  291 ;  Bank  of  Colum- 
bia V.  Patterson,  7  Cranch,  299,  1813  (a 
leading  American  case) ;   Mott  v.  Hicks, 

1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  513;  Dunn  v.  Rector,  etc., 
14  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  118 ;  Bank  i-.  Dandridge, 
12  Wheat.  74 ;  Perkins  v.  Insurance  Co., 
4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  645;  Davenport  v.  Peoria 
Insurance  Co.,  17  Iowa,  276,  and  cases 
cited  by  Cole,  J. ;  American  Insurance  Co. 
V.  Oakley,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.),  496 ;  Magill  v. 
Kauffman,  4  Serg.  &  Rawle  (Pa.),  317; 
Pvandall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
60;  Wayne  County  y.  Detroit,  17  Mich. 
390;  Lesley  v.  White,  1  Spears  (So.  Car.) 
Law,  31 ;  Canaan  v.  Derush,  47  N.  H. 
211 ;  Lebanon  v.  Heath,  lb.  353  ;  Adams 
V.  Farnsworth,  15  Gray  (Mass.),  423; 
Shrewsbury  v.  Brown,  25  Vt.  197 ;  Gas- 
sett  V.  Andover,  lb.  342 ;  Peterson  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  of  Xew  York,  17  N.  Y.  449, 
453,  1858;  Danforth  v.  Schoharie  Turn- 
pike Co.,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  227  ;  Angell  & 
Ames,  sec.  237 ;  :Malier  v.  Chicago,  38  111. 
266 ;  Frankfort  Bridge  Co.  v.  Frankfort, 
18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  41  ;  Bryan  v.  Page, 
51  Tex.  532;  State  Board  v.  Aberdeen, 
56  Miss.  518,  approving  text;  supra,  sec. 
450  ;  Broom  Com.  on  Com.  Law.  561-570, 
where  the  English  cases  are  collected. 
The  reader  will  be  interested  in  tlie  letter 
of  Mr.  Justice  Slory  to  Mr.  Justice  Cole- 
ridge on  tlie  subject  of  corporate  liability 
for  the  parol  contracts,  intra  vires,  of  the 
authorized    agents    of    the    corporation. 

2  Story's  Life  and  Letters,  335,  337.  He 
there  adds,  what  is  now  settled  law,  "  That 
all  duties,  imposed  upon  a  corporation  by 
law,  and  all  services  performed  at  its  re- 
quest, raise  implied  promises  binding  on 
the  corporation  if,  of  course,  no  statute 
be  thereby  infringed."     lb. 

2  Petersen  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
17  N.  Y.  449,  453 ;  "Poultney  v.  Wells,  1 
Aiken  (Vt.),  180.   Where  a  city  contracted 


with  a  railroad  company  to  do  certain 
work,  and  the  company  employed  per- 
sons to  do  it,  there  is  no  implied  contract 
on  the  part  of  the  city  to  pay  them, 
although  the  city  saw  them  at  work. 
Alton  V.  Mulledy,  21  111.  76,  1859.  When 
contracts  can  only  be  proved  by  the 
record  ;  and  when  there  is  no  implica- 
tion as  to  contracts ;  and  when  they  must 
appear  by  the  records  of  the  corporate 
proceedings.  See  Crump  i;.  Supervisors, 
52  Miss.  107  ;  Board  v.  Boyle,  9  Ind.  296  ; 
Warwick  v.  Butterworth,  17  Ind.  129 ; 
St.  Louis  V.  Cleland,  4  Mo.  84 ;  Alton  v. 
Mulledy,  21  111.  76,  1859;  San  Antonio  v. 
Gould,  34  Tex.  76;  People  v.  Fulton  Co., 
14  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  56;  Bryan  v.  Page,  51 
Tex.  532  ;  Gilbert  v.  New  Haven,  40  Conn. 
102,  1873. 

Must  be  an  authorized  request.  "  No  per- 
son can  make  himself  a  creditor  of  another 
by  voluntarily  discharging  a  duty  wliich 
belongs  to  that  other."  Strong,  J.,  in 
Salsbury  v.  Philadelphia,  44  Pa.  St.  303; 
Baltimore  i:  Poultney,  25  Md.  18 ;  Jeffer- 
sonville  v.  Ferry  Boat,  35  Ind.  19,  1870. 
In  Seibrecht  i'.  New  Orleans,  12  La.  An. 
496,  1857,  carpets  were  furnished  for  cer- 
tain corporation  courts,  by  order  of  the 
clerks  or  judges,  but  without  any  author- 
ity of  the  common  council,  and  were  worn 
out  before  the  plaintiff  presented  his  bill. 
It  was  contended  that  the  city  was  liable 
ex  equo  et  bono,  having  used,  and  not  re- 
turned the  carpets ;  but  it  did  not  appear 
that  the  council  knew  that  they  had  been 
purchased  for  the  city,  and  were  being 
used  in  its  buildings.  The  court  denied 
the  liability,  saying  that  "the  only  safe 
rule  is  to  liold  that  the  city  cannot  be 
bound  for  any  contract  made  without  its 
authorization,  exjjressed  by  a  resolution 
of  the  conmion  council."  That  an  unau- 
thorized contract,  however  advantageous, 


456 


MUNICIPAL   COHrOllATIONS. 


[ClI.  XIV. 


promise  cannot  be  raised  against  a  corporation,  where  by  its 
charter  it  can  only  contract  in  a  prescribed  way,  except  it  be  a 
promise  for  money  received  or  property  appropriated  under  the 
contract.^  So,  where  the  corporation  orders  local  street  improve- 
ments to  be  made,  for  which  the  abutters  are  the  parties  ulti- 
mately liable,  and  which,  by  the  charter,  must  be  made  in  a 
prescribed  mode  ;  if  made  without  any  contract  or  a  valid  one, 
the  doctrine  of  implied  liability  does  not  apply  in  favor  of  the 
contractor,  unless,  indeed,  the  corporation  has  collected  the 
amount  from  the  adjoining  owners  and  has  it  in  its  treasury.^ 


does  not  bind  the  corporation,  see  Loker 
V.  Brooklinc,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  34o ;  Jones 
V.  Lancaster,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  149;  Wood  v, 
Waterville,  5  Mass.  294. 

A  contract  was  implied  on  the  part  of 
a  city,  which  was  bound  to  support  its 
paupers  and  which  had  refused  to  paj'  a 
person  who  liad  furnished  a  pauper  with 
necessaries.  Seagraves  ».  Alton,  13  111. 
371.  Here  it  will  be  noticed  that  there 
was  an  express  refusal  on  the  part  of  the 
city  to  support  the  pauper,  and  yet  a 
promise  was  implied.  This  implication  is 
a  pure  fiction  to  support  wliat  the  court 
regarded  as  a  just  claim.  A  contract 
made  by  one  member  of  a  committee  or 
county  board  for  services  which  are  au- 
thorized to  be  obtained  is  not  obligatory 
on  the  municipality.  The  power  is  vested 
in  the  whole  body,  and  no  one  member 
can  bind  the  corporation.  Bentley  v. 
County  Commrs.,''2o  Minn.  259. 

1  McSpedon  r.  Mayor  of  New  York,  7 
Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  601;  McCracken  v.  San 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  591 ;  Piemental  v.  San 
Francisco,  21  Cal.  351 ;  Dickinson  v. 
Poughkeepsie,  74  N.  Y.  65. 

2  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal. 
255,  opinion  of  Field,  C.  J.  A  municipal 
corporation  was  holden  liable,  under  its 
charter,  upon  an  implied  assumpsit  to 
collect  and  pay  over  assessments  awarded 
to  property  owners  for  the  opening  of  a 
street.  Wheeler  v.  Chicago,  24  III.  105, 
1860 ;  see  infra,  sees.  46G,  480,  483 ;  San- 
gamon Co.  V.  Springfield,  63  III.  66,  1872. 
Where  a  contractor  has  entered  into  a 
contract  in  good  faith,  relying  upon  the 
regularity  of  the  proceedings  of  the  com- 
mon council,  the  city,  having  received  the 
benefit  of  the  performance,  is  estopped 


from  questioning  the  regularity  in  that 
regard.  Moore  v.  New  York,  73  N.  Y. 
238. 

The  charter  of  a  city  declared  that  it 
sliould  not  be  liable  in  any  manner  for 
local  improvements  which  are  made  a 
charge  upon  the  adjacent  property ;  the 
council  by  a  resolution  which  was  a 
nullity,  because  of  the  non-concurrence 
of  the  mayor,  ordered  a  certain  local  im- 
provement to  be  made,  and  the  work  let 
to  the  plaintiff,  who  did  it  and  failed  to 
collect  tlie  same  (by  reason  of  the  nullity 
of  the  resolution)  from  the  adjoining  own- 
ers (Sexton  V.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488,  1872); 
and  having  expended  a  considerable  sum 
in  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  charge  the 
abutting  property,  he  brought  suit  against 
the  city  to  recover  the  sum  so  expended 
in  testing  the  validity  of  the  resolution  of 
the  council.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Mis- 
souri held  that  the  city  was  not  liable, 
distinguishing  Clayburgh  v.  Chicago,  25 
111.  535,  and  Fisher  v.  St.  Louis,  44  Mo. 
482;  Sexton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153, 
1875.  In  Kentucky  there  is  no  liability 
unless  the  city  has  the  right  to  proceed 
to  make  property  holders  liable.  But  if 
the  nature  or  ownership  of  the  adjacent 
property  is  such  that  no  steps  which 
could  have  been  taken  would  have  ren- 
dered it  or  its  owner  liable,  then  the  city 
must  pay  for  the  improvement,  or  it  will 
have  as  to  such  work  no  means  of  exe- 
cuting its  general  power  to  improve  all 
streets.  Caldwell  ;;.  Rupert,  10  Bush 
(Ky.),  179;  City  of  Louisville  v.  Nevin, 
10  Bush  (Ky.),  549;  Craycraft,  etc.  v. 
Selvage,  etc.,  10  Bush  (Ky.),  696,  1874. 

Where  a  city,  organized  and  acting 
under  a  general  law,  —  which  provides. 


§  4G0.]  CONTRACTS.  457 

§  460.  (384)  "  The  doctrine  of  implied  municijml  liability,'"  says 
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Field,  in  a  case  where  the  subject  underwent 
yevj  thorough  examination,  "  applies  to  cases  where  money  or 
other  propert}'  of  a  party  is  received  under  such  circumstances 
that  the  general  law,  independent  of  express  contract,  imposes 
the  obligation  upon  the  city  to  do  justice  with  respect  to  the 
same.  If  the  city  obtain  money  of  another  by  mistake,  or  without 
authority  of  law,  it  is  her  duty  to  refund  it  —  not  from  any  con- 
tract entered  into  by  her  on  the  subject,  but  from  the  general 
obligation  to  do  justice  which  binds  all  persons,  whether  natural 
or  artificial.  If  the  city  obtain  other  property  which  does  not 
belong  to  her,  it  is  her  duty  to  restore  it ;  or  if  used  by  her,  to 
render  an  equivalent  to  the  true  owner,  from  the  like  general  ob- 
ligation :  the  law,  which  always  intends  justice,  implies  a  promise. 
In  reference  to  money  or  other  property,  it  is  not  difficult  to  deter- 
mine in  any  particular  case  whether  a  liabiUty  with  respect  to  the 
same  has  attached  to  the  city.  The  money  must  have  gone  into 
her  treasury,  or  been  appropriated  by  her ;  and  when  it  is  prop- 
erty other  than  money,  it  must  have  been  used  by  her,  or  be 
under  her  control.  But  with  reference  to  services  rendered,  the 
case  is  different.  Their  acceptance  must  be  evidenced  by  ordi- 
nance [or  express  corporate  action]  to  that  effect.     If  not  origi- 

"  Tlie  city   shall  be   liable  to   the   con-  contractor  having  like  knowledge  with 

tractors  for  so  much  thereof  only  as  is  the  members  of  the  council,  they  cannot 

occupied  by  public  grounds  of  the  city  be  held  liable  for  the  cost  of  such  im- 

bordering  thereon,  and   the   crossings  of  provement,  though  the  place  where  the 

streets  and  allej's,"  —  makes  a  contract  same  is  made  is  not  within  the  corporate 

for  the  improvement  of  a  street  at  the  limits.      Newman   v.   Sylvester,   42  Ind. 

expense  of  the  property  holders,  and  the  106,  1873. 

contractor  does  the  work  in  whole  or  in  It  is  the  general  doctrine  that  corpora- 
part,  and  tlie  engineer  refuses  to  make  an  tions  possess  the  powers  expressly  con- 
estimate,  and  tlie  council  refuses  to  issue  ferred  by  law,  and  such  implied  powers 
precepts  upon  the  proper  application  as  are  necessary  to  enable  them  to  exer- 
against  the  property  hohlers,  a  suit  can-  cise  the  powers  expressly  granted,  and  no 
not  be  maintained  by  the  contractor  others ;  j'et,  although  there  may  be  a 
against  tlie  city  for  damages.  The  defect  of  power  in  a  corporation  to  make 
remedy  in  such  case  is  by  mandate  to  a  contract,  if  a  contract  made  by  it  is  not 
compel  the  engineer  and  council  to  per-  in  violation  of  the  cliarter  of  the  corpora- 
form  their  duties.  Greencastle  r.  Allen,  tion  or  any  statute  prohibiting  it,  and  the 
4o  Ind.  347,  1873.  If  the  members  of  the  corporation  by  its  promise  induced  a  party, 
common  council  of  a  city,  in  passing  an  relying  upon  such  promise  and  in  execu- 
ordinance  and  letting  a  contract  for  tlie  tion  of  the  contract,  to  expend  money  and 
ini[)rovement  of  a  street,  act  in  good  faith,  perform  his  part  of  the  contract,  the  cor- 
uiuler  a  misapprehension,  they  and  the  poration  is  liable  on  the  contract.  The 
contractor,  as  well  as  the  adjacent  owner  State  Board  of  Agriculture  v.  Tlie  Citi- 
of  real  estate,  believing  the  street  to  be  zens'  Street  Kailway  Co.,  47  Ind.  407, 
within  the  corporate  limits  of  the  city,  the  1874. 


458 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOKATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


nally  authorized,  no  liability  can  attach  upon  any  ground  of 
implied  contract.  The  acceptance,  upon  which  alone  the  obliga- 
tion to  pay  could  arise,  would  be  wanting. 

§  461.  As  a  general  rule,  undoubtedly,  a  city  corporation  is 
only  liable  upon  express  contracts,  authorized  by  ordinance  [or 
other  due  corporate  proceedings].  The  exceptions  relate  to  lia- 
bilities from  the  use  of  money  or  other  property  which  does  not 
belong  to  her,  or  to  liabilities  springing  from  the  neglect  of  duties 
imposed  by  the  charter,  from  which  injuries  to  parties  are  pro- 
duced. There  are'  limitations  even  to  these  exceptions  in  many 
instances,  as  where  property  or  money  is  received  in  disregard  of 
positive  prohibitions ;  as,  for  example,  the  city  would  not  be  lia- 
ble for  moneys  received  upon  the  issuance  of  bills  of  credit,  — 
as  this  would  be,  in  effect,  to  support  a  proceeding  in  direct 
contravention  of  the  inhibition  of  the  charter."  ^  Nor  for  money 
received  for  notes  issued  by  it  to  circulate  as  money,  in  violation 
of  an  express  statute  and  the  public  policy  of  the  state.^ 


1  Per  Field,  C.  J.,  in  Argenti  v,  San 
Francisco,  16  Cal.  255,  282, 18G0.  Wiiere 
statute  provisions  enacted  to  prevent  tlie 
making  of  certain  contracts  are  disre- 
garded, and  a  contract  made  without 
observing  them,  tlie  contractor  cannot  re- 
cover the  value  of  articles  supplied  under 
the  contract  upon  an  implied  liability  in 
such  a  case  no  liability  can  be  implied. 
McDonald  v.  New  York,  68  N.  Y.  23; 
s  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  144,  commenting  on 
Nelson  v.  Mayor,  63  N.  Y.  535;  and 
Argenti  v.  San  Francisco,  supra. 

"The  law,"  says  an  eminent  judge, 
"never  implies  a  promise  to  pay  unless 
some  duty  creates  such  an  obligation,  and 
more  especially  it  never  implies  a  promise 
to  do  an  act  contrary  to  duty  or  contrary 
to  law.  Assumpsit  may  be  maintained 
against  a  municipal  corporation  in  cer- 
tain cases  upon  an  implied  promise,  but 
the  better  opinion  is  that  a  promise  to 
pay  can  never  be  implied  in  a  case  where 
the  corporation  possesses  no  power  to 
contract."  Per  CUffurd,  J.,  in  Burrill  v. 
Boston,  2  Clifford *C.  C.  590,  596,  1867. 
The  subject  is  further  expounded  by  the 
same  learned  justice  in  his  opinion  in  Tlie 
Collector  v.  Hubbard,  12  Wall.  1, 12, 1870. 
See.   also,   Curtis     v.   Fiedler,   2   Black. 


(U.  S.)  478 ;  Murphy  v.  Louisville,  9  Bush 
(Ky.),  189,  1872. 

See  on  subject  of  implied  liability,  tbe  late 
judgment  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  City  of  Louisiana  v.  Wood,  Octo- 
ber Term,  1880. 

2  Thomas  v.  Richmond,  12  Wall.  349, 
1870.  The  principles  upon  which  the 
decision  rests  are  admirably  stated  in  the 
opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Bradley.  Cheeney 
V.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53, 1875,  citing  text ; 
State  Board  v.  Aberdeen,  56  Miss.  518 
(approving  text) ;  Brown  v.  Belleville,  30 
Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  373 ;  Wentworth  v. 
Hamilton,  34  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  585; 
Brown  v.  Lindsey,  35  Upper  Can.  Q.  B. 
509;  Parsons  v.  Monmouth,  70  Me.  262, 
1879,  approving  text. 

In  Cheeney  v.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53, 
1875,  it  was  held  that  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration is  not  liable  upon  a  warrant  issued 
to  a  bank-note  company  in  payment  of  a 
debt  to  the  company  for  engraving  and 
printing  on  bank-note  paper,  notes  paya- 
ble to  bearer,  to  be  put  into  circulation 
by  the  corporation  as  money  without  au- 
thority of  law.  Tlie  court  held  that  there 
could  be  no  implied  assumpsit  in  such  a 
case,  and  distinguished  it  from  Alleghany 
City  V.  McClurkan,  14  Pa.  St.  81,  and 


§  462.] 


CONTRACTS. 


459 


§  462.  Contracts  —  Ultra  Vires  —  Assumpsit.  —  Where  a  city, 
without  authority  of  law,  issued  its  bonds  in  exchange  for  the 
bonds  of  a  raih'oad  company,  which  remain  wholly  unpaid,  the 
city  is  not  liable  on  its  bonds.  If  in  such  case  value  has  been 
received  by  the  city,  the  remedy  is  for  the  money  or  property 
received  without  consideration.^ 


denied  Underwood  v.  Newport  Lyceum,  5 
B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  130. 

Illustrations  of  implied  liabiUtij.  —  City 
is  liable  for  gas  furnished  to  it  with  knowl- 
edge of  the  council,  though  no  ordinance 
or  resolution  was  passed  authorizing  it  to 
be  furnished.  Gas  Co.  i'.  San  Francisco, 
9  Cal.  453,  466,  1858,  opinion  of  Field, 
J.  If  a  city  sells  its  void  bonds,  there  is 
an  implied  assumpsit  to  repay  the  pur- 
chase-money. Paul  V.  Kenosha,  22  Wis. 
266,  1867.  "Where  a  bridge  corporation 
was  requested  by  the  city  authorities  to 
communicate  to  them  the  terms  upon 
■wliich  the  city  might  attach  its  water- 
pipes  to  the  bridge,  to  carry  the  water 
from  one  side  of  the  river  to  the  other, 
•which  the  bridge  company  answered,  fi.x- 
ing  a  sum,  upon  which  the  city  council 
took  no  action,  but  proceeded  to  extend 
the  water-works  and  used  the  bridge,  the 
court  held  the  city  was  liable.  Bridge 
Co.  V.  Frankfort,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  41, 
1857.  Broom  Com.  on  Com.  Law,  567, 
where  the  English  cases  are  cited  in 
which  corporations  have  been  held  liable 
by  reason  of  enjmjinr]  tlie  benefits  resulting 
from  particular  contracts.  See  McDon- 
ald V.  Mayor,  68  N.  Y.  23,  1876 ;  s.  c.  23 
Am.  Kep.  144,  Folger,  J.,  suggests  in- 
stances of  implied  liability;  post,  sec8. 
838,  9.39. 

Mr.  Harrison,  in  his  e.xcellent  "  Muni- 
cipal Manual  for  Upper  Canada,"  has 
digested  tlie  decisions  in  the  province  on 
the  subject  of  the  power  of  corporations 
to  contract.  He  says  (2d  ed.  p.  19),  "It 
is  a  principle  applicable  to  all  corpora- 
tions that  they  must  contract  under  seal. 
To  this  principle  there  are  some  excep- 
tions. One  of  some  moment  has  been 
created  with  regard  to  municipal  corpo- 
rations. It  is  that  such  a  corporation  is 
liable  to  bo  sued  in  .an  action  of  debt  on 
simple  contract  for  the  price  of  goods 
furnished,  or  labor  done  at  their  request 
and  accepteil  by  them.     Fcttcrly  v.  The 


Municipality  of  Russell  and  Cambridge, 
14  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  438.  Tliough  in 
such  a  case  tliere  be  no  contract  under 
seal,  the  law  implies  an  undertaking  by  a 
corporation  to  pay  for  labor  and  materials 
employed  in  their  service,  and  of  which 
they  have  accepted  and  are  enjoying  the 
benefit,  provided  the  purpose  for  which 
the  labor  and  materials  have  been  applied 
is  one  clearly  within  the  legitimate  object 
of  their  character.  Bartlett  v.  The  Muni- 
cipality of  Amherstburgh,  14  Upper  Can. 
Q.  B.  152;  Fetterly  v.  The  Municipality  of 
Russell  and  Cambridge,  14  Upper  Can.  Q. 
B.  483 ;  Pirn  v.  The  Municipal  Council  of 
Ontario,  9  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  304 ;  Perry 
t'.  The  Corporation  of  Ontario,  23  Upper 
Can.  Q.  B.  391 ;  Nicholson  v.  The  Guard- 
ians of  the  Bradford  Union,  1  L.  R.  Q. 
B.  620.  The  exception,  however,  does 
not  extend  to  executory  contracts,  such 
as  work,  etc.,  to  be  done,  but  is  confined 
to  work  in  fact  done  and  accepted.  Mc- 
Lean V.  The  Town  Council  of  the  Town 
of  Brantford,  16  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  347; 
Wingate  v.  The  Enniskillen  Oil  Refining 
Co.,  14  Upper  Can.  C.  P.  379."  Mayor, 
etc.  I'.  Hardwicke,  L.  R.  9  Exchq.  13 ; 
Austin  V.  Guardians,  etc.,  L.  R.  9  C.  P. 
91;  Houck  v.  Whitty,  14  Grant  (Can.), 
671. 

1  Thomas  v.  Port  Hudson,  27  Mich. 
320,  1873.  In  this  case  Cooky,  J.,  ob- 
serves :  "  A  municipal  corporation  has  no 
general  authority  to  exchange  promises 
with  other  corporations  or  persons  ;  its 
contracts,  to  be  valid,  must  be  within  the 
scope  of  the  authority  conferred  upon  it 
by  law,  and  for  municipal  purposes.  And 
if,  under  pretence  of  law,  its  officers  in  its 
name  obtain  money,  property,  or  rights 
in  action  which  equitably  belong  to  an- 
other, the  fact  may  entitle  the  party  to 
the  proper  remedy,  but  it  cannot  make 
good  bonds  issued  in  violation  of  law, 
unless  it  is  to  be  held  [which  is  not  the 
law]  that  the  power  of  municipal  corpora- 


460 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  463.  (385)  Ratification  of  Unauthorized  Contract.  —  A  muni- 
cipal corporation  may  rafif//  the  unauthorized  acts  and  contracts 
of  its  agents  or  oflicers,  wliich  are  within  the  corporate  poivers,  hut 
not  otlierwise.  Ratificalion  may  frequently  be  inferred  from 
acquiescence  after  knowledge  of  all  the  material  facts,  or  from 
acts  inconsistent  with  any  other  supposition.  The  same  prin- 
ciple is  applicable  to  corporations  as  to  individuals.^  But  a  subse- 
quent ratification  cannot  make  valid  an  unlawful  act  without  the 
scope  of  corporate  authority.  An  absolute  excess  of  authority 
by  the  officers  of  a  corporation,  in  violation  of  law,  cannot  be 
upheld  ;  and  where  the  officers  of  such  a  body  fail  to  pursue 
the  requirements  of  a  statutory  enactment  under  which  they  are 
acting,  the  corporation  is  not  bound.  In  such  cases  the  statute 
must  be  strictly  followed ;  and  a  person  who  deals  with  a  muni- 
cipal body  is  obliged  to  see  that  its  charter  has  been  fully  com- 
plied with :  when  this  is  not  done,  no  subsequent  act  can  make 
the  contract  effective.^     The  employment,  however,  by  a  muni- 


tions to  make  legal  promises  is  co-exten- 
sive with  that  of  individuals,  .and  that 
any  contracts  tliey  may  make  are  valid 
where  it  can  be  said  that  anything  of 
value  was  given  or  inconvenience  sub- 
mitted to  in  excliange." 

1  People  V.  Swift,  31  Cal.  20,  18G6 ; 
Bleu  V.  Bear  Biver  Co.,  20  Cal.  G02, 1862  ; 
Peterson  v.  Mayor,  17  N.  Y.  449,  453, 
1858,  and  authorities  cited,  reversing  s. 
C.  4  E.  D.  Smith,  413;  San  Francisco 
Gas  Co.  V.  San  Francisco,  9  Cal.  453 ; 
Hoyt  V.  Thompson,  19  N.  Y.  207,  218, 
1859;  Clarke  v.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181, 
1873 ;  Howe  v.  Keeler,  27  Conn.  538 ; 
Emerson  v.  Newberr^^  13  Pick.  (Mass.) 
377;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
110, 1840  ;  5  lb.  567  ;  People  r.  Flagg,  17 
N.  Y.  584;  s.  c.  16  How.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  36; 
Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  20  N.Y. 
312,  affirming  s.  c.  2  Bosw.  173  ;  Delafield 
V.  State  of  Illinois,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  159, 
176,  1841  ;  s.  c.  8  Paige,  531,  and  26 
Wend.  192;  Mills  v.  Gleason,  11  Wis. 
470,  1860;  s.  c.  8  Am.  Law  Reg.  693; 
Dubuque,  etc.  College  v.  Townsliip,  etc., 
13  Iowa,  55  ;  Merrick  v.  Plank  Road  Co., 
11  Iowa,  74,  per  Wright,  J. ;  Detroit  v. 
Jackson,  1  Doug.  (Mich.)  106  ;  Craw- 
shaw  V.  Roxbury,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  374; 
Burrill  v.  Boston,  2  Clifford  C.  C.  590, 
1867  ;  post,  sec.  779,  note. 


A  municipal  corporation  may  ratify 
unauthorized  expenditures,  not  ultra  vires, 
whicii  they  deem  beneficial  to  it,  and  such 
ratification,  as  in  the  case  of  natural  per- 
sons, is  equivalent  to  previous  authority. 
Backman  v.  Charlestown,  42  N.  H.  125  ; 
Harris  v.  School  District,  8  Fost.  (28  N. 
H.)  65;  Wilson  v.  School  District,  32  N. 
H.  118  ;  Keyser  v.  School  District,  35  N. 
H.  477  ;  Episcopal  Society  v.  Episcopal 
Church,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  372;  Bank  v. 
Patterson,  7  Cranch.  299;  Randall  v. 
Van  Vechten,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  60; 
Trotti;.  Warren,  2  Fairf.  ( 11  Me.)  227; 
Topsham  v.  Rogers,  42  Vt.  199 ;  People 
V.  Swift,  31  Cal.  26.  In  DeGrave  v.  Mon- 
mouth, 19  Eng.  C.  L.  300,  it  was  held  that 
the  examination  of  weights  and  measures, 
whicli  had  been  ordered  by  a  mayor  cle 
facto,  and  which  were  the  subject  of  the 
controverted  contract,  at  a  meeting  of  the 
corporation,  and  the  subsequent  use  of 
some  of  them,  recognized  the  contract  for 
their  purchase  and  made  the  corporation 
li.able  to  pay  for  them.  As  to  ratification 
of  contracts  for  local  improvements  when 
not  primarily  a  charge  on  the  city.  See 
Murphy  v.  Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  189, 
1872  ;  pout,  sec.  481,  note  ;  infra,  sees.  465, 
813  ;  4  Broom  Com.  on  Com  Law,  507. 
2  Sault  Ste.  Marie  Co.  v.  Van  Duzen, 
40  Mich.  429 ;  Jefferson  Co.  v.  Arrighi,  54 


§  464] 


CONTRACTS. 


4G1 


cipal  council,  of  an  attorney  to  defend  a  policeman  charged  wiili 
an  assault,  does  not  adopt  his  act  so  as  to  render  the  city  liable 
for  the  damages  recovered  against  him.^ 

§  464.  (386)  Where  work  done  for  a  corporation,  -without 
complete  legal  authorization,  is  beneficial  to  it,  and  the  price 
reasonable,  strong  evidence  of  the  assent  of  the  corporation  is  not 
required  ;  hut  such  assent  must  be  shown.  Ratification  of  the  acts 
of  a  committee  in  building  upon  the  land  of  the  district  a  more 
expensive  house  than  they  were  authorized  to  do  by  the  vote  of 
the  corporation  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  mere  fact  that  the 
school  is  kept  in  it  for  a  few  weeks,  there  being  no  evidence 
that  the  corporation  had  knowledge  of  the  over-expenditure,  or 
had  taken  any  action  on  the  subject.^ 


Miss.  668  ;  Nash  v.  St.  Paul,  11  Minn.  174  ; 
Hague  I'.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  528 ; 
Brady  i'.  Mayor,  20  N.  Y.  312;  Bryan  v. 
Page,  51  Tex.  332;  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  17 
N.  Y.  449 ;  Co  wen  v.  West  Troy,  43  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  48  ;  Brown  v.  Mayor,  63  N.  Y. 
239 ;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.), 
110;  McDonald  (^  Mayor,  68  N.  Y.  23 ; 
Smith  V.  Newburgh,  77  N.  Y.  130; 
Green  v.  Cape  May,  41  N.  J.  L.  45,  ap- 
proving text.  Taymouth  v.  Koehler,  35 
Mich.  22;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall. 
676  ;  Horton  v.  Thompson,  71  N.  Y.  513  ; 
McCracken  v.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  591  ; 
Ashbury,  etc.  Co.  v.  Koche,  L.  R.  7  H. 
L.  C.  653. 

1  Buttrick  ij.  Lowell,  1  Allen  (Mass.), 
172,  1861  ;  post,  sees.  479,  975  ;  Moore  v. 
Mayor,  73  N.  Y.  238,  approving  text; 
Bryan  v.  Page,  51  Tex.  352  ;  Wilhelm  v. 
Cedar  Co.,  50  Iowa,  254,  approving  text. 

2  Wilson  V.  School  District,  32  N.  II. 
118,  1855.  See,  further,  as  to  effect  of 
use  as  a  ratljication,  Kingman  v.  School 
District,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  425;  Davis  v. 
School  District,  24  Me.  349;  Lane  v. 
School  District,  10  Met.  (Mass.)  462; 
Chaplin  t;.  Hill,  24  Vt.  (1  Dean)  628; 
Fisher  v.  School  District, 4  Cush.  (Mass.) 
494;  Taft  v.  Montague,  14  Mass.  285; 
Keyser  v.  School  District,  35  N.  H.  477 ; 
Pratt  V.  Swanton,  15  Vt.  147  (use  of 
bridge  by  public). 

In  Wilson  v.  School  District,  above 
cited,  Mr.  Justice  Bell  well  remarks  :  "  In 
most  cases  where  work  and  labor  is  per- 


formed upon  real  estate  by  contract,  the 
7nere  fact  that  the  owner  ma/ces  use  of  the 
building  or  structure  built  upon  his  land 
furnishes  no  evidence  of  approval  or  ac- 
ceptance, because  lie  has  no  choice  to 
reject  it.  Alone,  the  use  of  such  build- 
ings gives  no  evidence  of  acceptance. 
Accompanied  by  silence,  and  absence  of 
complaint,  where  to  complain  would  be 
natural  and  suitable,  or  by  any  circum- 
stance indicating  acquiescence,  it  would 
be  sufficient."  32  N.  H.  125.  As  to  ef- 
J'ect  of  acceptance  of  public  icork  by  the 
agents  of  the  town,  see  Wadleigh  v.  Sut- 
ton, 6  N.  H.  15,  1832.  Of  school-house 
built  upon  a  quantum  meruit  employment 
by  a  committee,  but  without  a  legal  con- 
tract. Kimball  v.  School  District,  28  Vt. 
8,  1855.  See,  also,  Corwin  v.  Wallace,  17 
Iowa,  334  ;  Zottman  v.  San  Francisco,  20 
Cal.  96  (valuable  discussion);  approved. 
Murphy  v.  Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.).  189, 
1872 ;  Jordan  v.  School  District,  38  Me. 
164, 1854  ;  Reichard  v.  Warren  County,  31 
Iowa,  381,  1871.  Surveyor  of  highways 
cannot  recover  of  the  town  for  work 
voluntarily  performed,  there  being  no 
contract,  not  even  if  beneficial.  Sikes  v. 
Hatfield,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  347,  1859; 
infra,  sees.  400,  466. 

A  public  corporation  is  not  liable  for 
work  done  against,  or  even  without,  its 
direction  or  authority  (such  as  building  a 
bridge,  road,  school-house,  etc.),  although 
these  are  afterwards  used  by  the  public 
or  the  district.     Loker  v.  Brookline,  13 


462 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XIV. 


§  405.  (887)  The  ratification^  whatever  its  form,  must  be  by 
the  principal  or  authorized  agents.  This  is  well  illustrated  by 
a  case  where,  by  statute,  certain  agents  or  officers  of  a  state  were 
authorized  to  borrow  money  for  public  use,  and  for  that  purpose 
to  sell  its  bonds  at  not  less  than  their  par  value.  They  exceeded 
their  power  by  selling  for  less  tlian  par,  and  on  credit.  It  was 
contended  that  this  contract  was  ratified,  because  the  governor, 
after  he  knew  of  the  contract,  signed  the  bonds  and  caused  them 
to  be  delivered,  and  because  the  auditor  and  some  of  the  other 
state  officers  acted  under  the  contracts,  drawing  money  and  re- 
ceiving payments.  But  it  was  held  that  these  officials  were  like- 
wise agents  of  limited  authority ;  that,  as  they  would  have  had 
no  power  to  make  the  contracts  originally,  they  could  not  ratify 
them  ;  that  ratification  must  come  from  the  principal,  —  the  state, 
represented  by  its  legislature. ^ 


Pick.  (Mass.)  343,  1832;  Knowlton  v.  In- 
habitants, etc.  14  Me.  (2  Sliep.)  25,  where 
note  critique  on,  and  remarks  of  Mellen, 
C.  J.,  as  to  Hayden  v.  Madison,  7  Greenl. 
(Me.),  79;  Morrell  v.  Di.xfieUl,  30  Me.  (IB 
Shep.)  157,  IGO;  Davis  v.  Scliool  Dis- 
trict, 24  ]\Ie.  (10  Shep.)  349;  Hay  ward  v. 
School  District,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  419, 
1848  ;  Th.  426 ;  Moor  v.  Cornville,  13  Me. 
293,  1836  (where  the  action  was  brought 
by  the  surve3'or  or  supervisor  of  liigh- 
ways,  who  built  a  bridge  without  pur- 
suing the  course  pointed  out  by  law) ; 
Allen  V.  Cooper,  22  Me.  133  (deciding 
that  the  power  of  a  committee  witli  au- 
thority to  contract  to  make  a  road,  docs 
not  embrace  power  to  accept  the  work  or 
waive  performance).  But  if  the  work  be 
done  under  belief  of  authority,  as  where 
it  was  performed  under  a  contract  with  a 
committee  wbo  assumed  to  have  au- 
thority, but  who,  in  fact,  had  none,  then 
if  the  corporation  accept  it,  or  even  know- 
ingly avail  itself  of  it,  it  will  be  liable  to 
pay  a  reasonable  compensation ;  and  a 
promise  thus  to  pay  may  be  implied  on 
the  part  of  a  corporation  from  the  acts  of 
its  general  agent,  or  an  agent  with  pow- 
ers of  a  general  character  [?].  Abbot  r. 
Herman,  7  Me.  (Greenl.)  118;  Hayden 
V.  Madison,  lb.  79.  "Perhaps  these  two 
cases  carry  the  doctrine  of  the  implied 
responsibility  of  corporations  as  far  as  it 
ought  to  be  carried."     Per  Ernerij,  J.,  iu 


Ruby  V.  Abysm.  Society,  15  Me.  306,  308, 
1839.     As  to   extent  of  powers  of  New 
England    towns,   see  ante,   sees.   29,   30. 
And   see,  particularly,  Jordan  v.  School 
District,   and   other    cases   cited,   supra 
Baltimore  v.  Keynolds,  20  Md.  1,  1862 
Hague  V.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527 
Moore  v.  Mayor,  73  N.  Y.  238,  approving 
text. 

1  Dclafield  v.  State  of  Illinois,  2  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  159,  175,  Avhere  difference  be- 
tween ratification  by  a  shtte  and  by  other 
corporations  and  individuals  is  clearly 
set  forth  by  Branson,  J. ;  affirming  s.  c.  8 
Paige,  531  ;  s.  c.  further,  26  Wend.  192. 
In  further  illustration  of  the  text,  see 
Hague  V.  Pliiladelphia,  48  Pa.  St.  527 ; 
Hotchin  v.  Kent,  8  Mich.  526;  Murphy  u. 
Louisville,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  189,  1872; 
Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  676, 
1870  ;  Dubuque,  etc..  College  i^.  Dubuque, 
13  Iowa,  555;  Estey  v.  Inhabitants  of 
Westminster,  97  Mass.  324;  Branham  v. 
San  Jose,  24  Cal.  585 ;  Attorney-General 
V.  Lathrop,  24  Mich.  235,  1872 ;  Wilhelm 
V.  Cedar  County,  50  Iowa,  254.  The  case 
of  the  City  [of  St.  Louis]  v.  Armstrong, 
5(5  Mo.  298,  1874,  is  a  strong  instance  in 
which  the  city  was  held  to  ratify  the  acts 
of  its  officers  by  availing  itself  of  the 
benefit  of  their  acts.  The  case  was  this : 
The  city  wished  to  build  a  sewer  through 
the  defendant's  lot ;  it  was  necessary  to 
condemn  or  get  his  consent ;  he  consented 


§  466.]  CONTRACTS.  463 

§  466.  (388)  Letting  to  the  Loivest  Bidder.  —  Where  the  charter 
or  incorporating  act  requires  the  officers  of  the  city  to  award 
contracts  to  the  lowest  bidder,  a  contract  made  in  violation  of  its 
requirements  is  illegal ;  and  in  an  action  brought  on  such  con- 
tract for  the  work,  the  city  may  plead  its  illegality  in  defence  ;  ^ 


on  condition  that  he  could  have  three 
years  in  which  to  pay  his  proportion  of 
the  cost  of  the  sewer ;  the  officers  of  the 
city,  without  any  express  authority,  so 
agreed.  The  sewer  was  built,  and  before 
the  three  years  expired  the  city  sued  the 
defendant  for  his  portion  of  the  cost  of 
the  sewer,  and  it  was  held  that  the  suit 
was  prematurely  brought,  and  that  the 
city,  by  using  the  defendant's  land  under 
the  agreement  of  its  officers,  was  bound 
by  that  agreement.  What  would  have 
been  the  rights  if  the  city  had  put  the 
defendant  in  statu  quo,  by  condemning  the 
right  of  way,  and  tendering  the  amount 
before  bringing  suit  for  the  cost  of  the 
sewer,  was  a  question  not  involved,  and 
not  decided. 

In  applying  the  doctrine  that  unauthor- 
ized corporate  acts  may  be  ratified,  other 
principles  of  law  must  be  borne  in  mind. 
The  care  which,  in  this  respect,  should 
be  observed,  is  very  clearly  set  forth  by 
Denio,  J.,  in  giving  judgment  in  Peterson 
V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  17  N.  Y.  449, 
454, 1858.  "  For  instance,  no  sort  of  ratifica- 
tion can  make  good  an  act  without  the 
scope  of  the  corporate  authority.  So  where 
the  charter  or  a  statute  binding  upon  the 
corporation  has  committed  a  class  of  acts 
to  particular  officers  or  agents,  other  than 
tjie  governing  body,  or  where  it  has  pre- 
scribed certain  formalities  as  conditions 
to  the  performance  of  any  description  of 
corporate  business,  the  proper  functiona- 
ries must  act,  and  the  designated  forms 
must  be  observed,  and  generally  no  act  of 
recognition  can  supply  a  defect  in  these 
respects."  Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  20  N. 
Y.  312;  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N. 
Y.),  110;  17  N.  Y.  584;  Gates  r.  Han- 
cock, 45  N.  IT.  528;  Reilly  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 60  Pa.  St.  467  ;  supra,  sees.  463,  464  ; 
Wilhelm  v.  Cedar  County,  50  Iowa,  254. 

"Where  the  corporation  can  onl}'  act  by 
ordinance,  the  ratification  must  be  by  or- 
dinance. McCracken  v.  San  Francisco, 
IG  Cal.  591, 18G0  ;  Piemental  v.  San  Fran- 


cisco, 21  Cal.  351 ;  Cross  v.  Morristown, 
18  N.  J.  Eq.  305,  1867  ;  ante,  ch.  xii. 

Legislature  may,  within  constitutional 
limits,  ratify  or  authorize  ratification.  Camp- 
bell V.  Kenosha,  5  Wall.  194  ;  Supervi- 
sors V.  Sclienck,  lb.  1T2. ;  Keithsburg  v. 
Frick,  34  111.  405 ;  Mills  v.  Gleason,  11 
Wis.  470 ;  Winn  v.  Macon,  21  Ga.  275 ; 
Grogan  v.  San  Francisco,  18  Cal.  590, 
1861 ;  Hasbrouck  v.  Milwaukee,  21  Wis. 
217,  1806;  Mills  v.  Charleton,  29  Wis. 
400,  1872  ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Kep.  578  and  note ; 
ante,  sec.  79  ;  sec.  161,  note.  In  Shawnee 
County  V.  Carter,  2  Kan.  115,  1863,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Kansas  held  invalid,  as 
not  being  within  the  rightful  scope  of 
legislative  power,  an  act  of  the  legislature 
which  declared  valid  and  binding  bonds 
which  had  been  issued  by  the  county  offi- 
cers on  account  of  the  county  court-house, 
and  which  bonds  were  not  enforceable 
against  the  county  because  differing  in 
form  and  substance  from  tlie  warrants 
authorized  by  the  statute.  Such  a  strict 
limitation  on  legislative  power  is  not  gen- 
erally asserted.  See,  on  this  point,  ch. 
iv.  ante. 

1  Brady  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
30  N.  Y.  (6  Smith)  312,  1859.  It  is  inti- 
mated that  it  is  not  essential  to  the  de- 
fence tliat  the  city  should  show  a  fraudu- 
lent collusion  between  the  bidder  and  the 
officers  awanling  tlie  contract.  Whether 
the  city  is  liable  on  a  quantum  meruit  to 
one  who  has  bona  fide  performed  labor  un- 
der a  void  contract  where  the  work  has 
been  accepted  and  used,  was  not  deter- 
mined. 76.  s.  c.  2  Bosw.  173;  7  Abb. 
Pr.  R.  234;  16  lb.  432.  As  further  illus- 
trating the  text,  see  People  v.  Flagg,  17 
N.  Y.  584  ;  Peterson  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  17  N. 
Y.  457,  referring  to  but  expressing  no 
opinion  upon  Christopher  v.  Mayor,  etc., 
13  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  567;  Appleby  v.  Mayor, 
etc.,  15  How.  (N.  Y.)  Pr.  428;  Harlem 
Gas  Co.  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  33 
N.  Y.  389 ;  Macey  v.  Titcombe,  19  Ind. 
153,  1862;  Bonesteel  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  22 


464 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


And  neither  the  municipality  nor  its  subordinate  officers  can  make 
a  binding  contract  for  such  work  except  in  compliance  with  the 
requirements  of  the  law.^  So  where  the  charter  requires  any 
sale  or  lease  of  the  real  estate  of  a  city  to  be  made  at  public 
auction  to  the  highest  bidder,  an  ordinance  of  the  council  of  the 
city  making  a  lease  of  a  portion  of  its  realty,  upon  the  payment 
of  a  rent  reserved,  is  void.^ 


N.  Y.  162 ;  Smith  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  21  How. 
(N.  Y.)  Tr.  1  ;  Greene  v.  Mayor,  00  N.  Y. 
303,  1875;  reversing  s.  c.  1  Hun,  29; 
YarnoUl  v.  Lawrence,  15  Kan.  126,  1875; 
Dickinson  i\  Pouglikeepsie,  74  N.  Y.  05, 
citing  text ;  Eager,  in  re,  40  N.  Y.  100 ; 
Nash  V.  St.  Paul,  8  Minn.  172, 1803 ;  s.  c. 
11  Minn.  174;  White  i".  New  Orleans,  15 
La.  An.  667  ;  State  v.  Barlow,  48  Mo.  17, 
1871 ;  post,  sec.  832,  note  ;  Brcevort  v. 
Detroit,  24  Mich.  322,  1872  ;  May  v.  De- 
troit, 2  Mich.  Cir.  C.  Rep.  235,  1871. 
There  can  be  no  recovery  against  a  mu- 
nicipal corporation  for  extra  work  where 
the  officers  wjio  rcquesterl  it  to  be  clone 
had  no  authority.  Hague  v.  Philatlelphia, 
48  Pa.  St.  527;"  O'Hara  v.  New  Orleans, 
30  La.  An.  152  ;  Addis  v.  Pittsburg,  85  Pa. 
St.  379,  1877  ;  Bonesteel  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
New  York,  22  N.  Y.  162.  Thus  a  contract 
by  S.  to  erect  a  building  for  a  city  stipu- 
lated that  the  vvork  should  be  done  ac- 
cording to  certain  plans  and  specifications ; 
that  a  certain  committee,  or  the  architect, 
might  direct  in  writing  any  deviations 
therefrom,  in  which  case  such  sums  of 
money  should  be  added  to  or  deducted 
from  the  agreed  price  as  the  parties 
should  judge  the  increase  or  diminution 
to  be  worth,  and  that  no  alterations  should 
be  paid  for  unless  directed  in  writing.  In 
excavating,  the  soil  was  found  by  the 
architect  to  reijuire  piles  to  be  driven  to 
secure  a  firm  foundation ;  whereupon  he 
furnished  piling  plans,  directed  S.  to  do 
the  work,  and  orally  promised  him  that 
he  should  be  paid  for  it:  Held,  that  the 
city  was  not  bound  by  tlie  architect's  oral 
promise.  Stuart  v.  Cambridge,  125  Mass. 
102. 

If  the  lowest  bidder  is  required  to  give 
security  and  the  law  requires  public  notice 
of  proposals,  any  contract  without  a  com- 
pliance with  the  law  is  unauthorized  and 
void.    Dickinson  v.  Poughkeepsie,  74  N.  Y. 


65;  Eager,  jKre,  40N.  Y.  100;  Maxwells. 
Stanislaus,  53  Cal.  389. 

A  provision  that  the  "  commissioners 
shall  in  no  case  proceed  with  the  con- 
struction of  any  sewer  except  upon  ad- 
vertisement "  to  be  let  to  the  lowest 
bidder,  applies  only  to  a  contract  for 
original  construction.  If  the  original  con- 
tractor abandons  the  work,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  re-advertise  and  let  to  the  lowest 
bidder,  the  original  contractor  being  lia- 
ble for  the  excess  of  cost  over  his  contract 
price.     Leeds,  in  re,  53  N.  Y.  400,  1873. 

Where  contracts  for  public  work  are 
required  by  law  to  be  made  by  advertis- 
ing proposals  and  specifications  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  competitive  bidding, 
such  specifications  must  be  definite  as  to 
the  quantity  as  well  as  the  quality  of 
materials  required,  or  the  contract  will 
be  void.  Bigler  v.  New  York,  5  Abb. 
(N.  Y.)  N.  Cas.  51.  A  bid  for  street-pav- 
ing is  not  defective  in  not  distinguishing 
between  the  portions  of  the  improvement 
chargeal)le  to  the  lots  fronting  on  the 
street,  and  the  portion  chargeable  to  the 
city,  where  the  relative  proportions  liave 
already  been  fixed.  Beniteau  v.  Detroit, 
41  Mich.  116.  Remedy  of  tax-payer.  FoU- 
mer  v.  Nuckolls,  6  Neb.  204,  1878;  com- 
pare Clark  V.  Dayton,  lb.  192. 

1  Addis  V.  Pittsburg,  85  Pa.  St.  379, 
1877. 

"  S.  F.  &  D.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Oakland, 
43  Cal.  503,  1872. 

Where  the  charter  requires  that  all 
work  for  the  city  shall  be  let  to  the  lowest 
bidder,  after  a  prescribed  notice  of  the 
time  and  place  of  letting  shall  have  been 
given,  and  requires  that  similar  notice 
shall  be  given  where  work  is  re-let,  an 
assessment  upon  a  lot  for  work  done  is 
void  if  tlie  contract  was  let  or  re-let 
without  notice.  Mitchell  v.  Milwaukee, 
18  Wis.  92,  1864 ;  seo,  also,  Wells  v.  Burn- 


§  4G8.]  CONTRACTS.  465 

§  467.  (389)  The  Supreme  Court  of  3Iichigan  has  affirmed, 
while  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin  and  of  other  states  have 
denied,  the  proposition  that  where  a  city  charter  provides  that 
no  contracts  shall  be  made  by  the  city  except  with  the  loivest 
Udder,  after  advertisement  of  proposals,  it  does  not  prohibit  the 
corporation  from  contracting  to  lay  Nicholson  pavement,  though 
the  right  to  lay  it  is  patented  and  owned  by  a  single  firm.  The 
question  is  close,  but  there  seems,  so  far,  to  be  a  tendency  in  the 
courts  to  adopt  the  Wisconsin  view.^ 

§  468.  (390)  Where  the  municipal  authorities  were  required 
by  law  to  advertise  for  sealed  proposals  for  making  local  improve- 
ments, and  award  the  work  to  the  loivest  responsible  Udder,  to 
publish  a  notice  of  the  award,  and  to  allow  the  owners  of  the 
major  part  of  the  frontage  to  take  the  contract  upon  the  same 
terras  if  they  should  desire,  the  court  were  of  opinion  that  the 
city  authorities  had  no  power  to  do  work  which  could  not  be 
contracted  for  in  this  mode,  or  which  the  abutters  could  not 
themselves  perform,  and  that  the  award  of  a  contract  for 
a  patented  pavement  to  the  assignee  of   the  patentee,  who  had 

in  re,  50  N.  Y.  513,  1873.  The  subject 
is  discussed  by  Breiver,  J.,  in  Yarnold  v. 
Lawrence,  15  Kan.  126,  1875,  who  in- 
clined to  the  Michir/an  view,  but  the  ques- 
tion was  not  decided  by  the  court.  Fur- 
ther, as  to  riglits  of  lowest  bidders,  see 
Attorney-General  v.  Detroit,  41  Mich. 
224  ;  s.  c.  12  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  149  ; 
post,  sees.  468,  870,  n.,  909,  791,  n.  Sequel 
to  Dean  v.  Charlton,  supra,  see  Mills  v. 
Charleston,  29  Wis.  400,  and  Dean  v. 
Borchenius,  30  Wis.  236,  the  legislature 
having  validated  the  assessment.  Post, 
sec.  814  and  note.  See,  also,  Eager,  in 
re,  40  N.  Y.  100,  1871.  Liability  of  city 
to  patentee  to  pay  him  "royalty."  Bige- 
low  V.  Louisville.  3  Fish.  Pat.  Cas.  602, 
1869  ;  post,  sec.  906,  where  a  charter  does 
not  require  a  contract  to  be  let  to  the  low- 
est bidder  after  advertising  for  proposals 
at  the  expense  of  abutters.  Although 
such  contracts  may  be  made  by  private 
agreement  with  the  city,  they  must  be 
fairly  made  at  reasonable  prices,  with 
due  rcga'-d  to  the  lot  owners'  interests,  or 
equity  will  relieve  against  them.  Cook 
i».  Racine,  5  N.  W.  Rep.  352. 


ham,  20  Wis.  112  ;  Hasbrouck  v.  Milwau- 
kee, 21  Wis.  217,  1866.  Owner  may,  in 
such  case,  restrain  the  sale.  lb.  The  con- 
tract must  be  the  same  that  was  adver- 
tised.    Nash  V.  St.  Paul,  11  Minn.  174. 

1  Dean  v.  Charlton,  23  Wis.  590, 1869; 
Nicholson  Pavement  Co.  v.  Painter,  35  Cal. 
699;  Hobart  v.  Detroit,  17  Mich.  246,  1868. 
Dean  v.  Charlton,  supra,  was  approved  by 
Sutherland,  J.,  in  Dolan  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
New  York,  4  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  397,  1868, 
and  followed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Louisiana  in  Burgess  v.  Jefferson,  21  La. 
An.  143,  1869,  in  which  it  appeared  that 
the  contractors  with  the  city  had  the  e.x- 
clusive  riglit  to  lay  the  patented  pave- 
ment in  the  state.  But  under  provisions 
of  law  relating  to  the  city  of  New  York, 
which  require  all  work  to  be  done  and 
supplies  to  be  furnished  to  be  by  con- 
tract, where  the  expenditure  will  exceed 
§1,000,  and  which  direct  all  contracts  to 
be  made  or  let,  after  advertisement,  to 
the  lowest  bidder,  the  city  council  is  not, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  court  of  appeals, 
prohibited  from  making  or  paving  a  street 
in  the  manner  or  with  materials  which 
do  not  admit  of  competitive  bids.    Dugro, 

VOL.  I.  30 


4C6  MUNICIPAL  COErORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

the  exclusive  right  to  lay  the  same,  was  unauthorized,  and  the 
contract  void.i 

As  the  purpose  of  such  a  provision  in  the  charter  is  to  secure, 
through  competition,  the  most  advantageous  terms,  something  is 
necessarily  left  to  the  discretion,  to  be  fairly  exercised,  of  course, 
of  the  council,  in  the  adoption  of  the  course  which  will  best 
attain  the  end  ;  and  it  does  not  contravene  this  restriction  to  call 
for  bids  putting  down  various  kinds  of  wood  and  stone  pave- 
ments, some  patented  and  some  not,  and  afterwards,  when  all 
the  proposals  are  in,  selecting  the  one  which  is  relatively  the 
lowest  or  the  most  satisfactory,  all  things  considered  ;  but  when 
the  kind  is  thus  selected,  the  lowest  responsible  bidder,  who  has 
the  lawful  power  to  perform  his  undertaking,  has  the  absolute 
legal  right  to  have  the  contract  awarded  to  him.^ 

§  469.  (391)  In  an  action  on  a  contract  for  lighting  certain 
streets  in  New  York  City  with  gas,  it  appeared  that  the  company 
had,  by  law,  the  exclusive  right  to  furnish  that  part  of  the  city 
with  gas.  The  charter  of  the  city,  however,  required  all  contracts 
for  wants  and  supplies  beyond  a  certain  value,  which  the  con- 
tract in  suit  exceeded,  to  be  let  to  the  loivest  bidder,  and  the 
contract  not  being  so  let,  it  was  claimed  to  be  void.  It  was  held 
that  since  the  company  had  the  exclusive  right  to  furnish  the 
gas  (which  prevented  competition),  the  provision  of  the  charter 
requiring  contracts  to  be  let  to  the  lowest  bidder  (with  a  view 
to  secure  competition)  was  inapplicable,  and  the  contract  was 
sustained  under  the  general  corporate  power  of  the  city  to  con- 
tract for  the  lighting  of  its  streets.^ 

1  Nicholson  Pavement  Company  v.  The  council  of  a  city  held  to  have  no 
Painter,  35  Cal.  699,  1868.  This  case  power  to  contract  for  the  grading  of  a 
was  decided  before  Dean  v.  Charlton,  street  until  they  first  shall  have  enacted 
supra,  and  the  opinion  of  Sanderson,  J.,  an  ordinance  fur  tiie  said  improvement, 
in  its  general  scope,  sustains  the  view  of  nor  except  such  contract  be  let  to  the 
the  Wisconsin  court ;  and  approving  of  lowest  bidder,  after  publication  of  notice 
the  language  of  Field,  C.  J.,  in  Zottman's  and  fair  competition.  Fulton  v.  Lincoln, 
Case,  20  Cal.  102,  treats  "  the  mode  as  9  Neb.  358. 

constituting  the  measure  of  the  power."  ^  Harlem  Gas  Co.  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  33  N. 

Post,   ch.  xi.x. ;   ante,  sec.   98 ;  post,  sec.  Y.  .309.     Where  a  city  has  authority  to 

669.  contract  therefor,  it  cannot  resist  payment 

2  Attorney-General  v.  Detroit,  41  Mich,  for  gaslight  furnished,  because  of  illegal 
224;  3.  c.  12  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  March,  promises  as  to  the  particular  fund  from 
1873,  p.  149.  Remedy  of  lowest  bidder  which  payment  would  be  made.  The 
when  contract  is  awarded  to  another,  consideration  of  such  promises  being 
III. ;  Kelly  I'.  Chicago,  62  111.  279,  1871 ;  legal,  the  price  would  be  payable,  if  not 
post,  ch.  xxii.  sec.  917.  otlierwise,  out  of  the  general  fund;  and 


§  470.] 


CONTRACTS. 


467 


§  470.  (392)  Although  notice  has  been  published  inviting 
jjroposals  to  do  public  work,  yet  the  contract  is  incomplete  until 
the  proposal  is  actually  accepted,  and  the  corporation  inviting 
the  proposal  is  not,  it  seems,  liable  to  damages  for  refusing  to 
accept  an  offer,  even  though  it  be  the  lowest  regular  offer  made. 
It  is  certainly  not  thus  liable  where  the  notice  and  the  proposals, 
with  respect  to  the  amount  and  form  of  the  security,  do  not  com- 
ply with  the  requirements  of  the  ordinances  of  the  city,  and 
where  these  provided  that  contracts  should  not  be  executed  until 
laid  before  the  common  council.^  The  rule  against  combinations 
to  prevent  bidding  at  auction  sales  applies  to  proposals  for  gov- 
ernment work,  in  response  to  a  call  therefor,  aiming  at  a  contract 
with  the  lowest  bidder  ;  and  a  combination  of  contractors  whereby 
the  privilege  of  bidding  is  secured  by  one,  without  competition, 
is  against  public  policy  and  illegal ;  and  if  it  results  in  a  letting 


the  objectionable  provisions  may  be  re- 
jected, and  the  rest  of  the  contract  per- 
mitted to  stand.  Nebraska  City  v. 
Nebraska  Gas  Co.,  9  Neb.  339. 

1  Smith  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
10  N.  Y.  (6  Seld.)  504,  1853,  affirming 
8.  c.  4  Sandf.  S.  C.  R.  221.  "  The  notice 
inviting  proposals  to  do  the  work,"  says 
Willard,  J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court  of  appeals  (10  N.  Y.  501),  "did 
not,  in  my  judgment,  bind  the  street 
commissioner  of  the  corporation  to  ac- 
cept, at  all  events,  the  lowest  bid,  even 
though  in  all  respects  formal.  Until 
the  bid  is  accepted  by  some  act  on  the 
part  of  the  corporation,  no  obligatory 
contract  was  created."  See,  also,  People  v. 
Croton  Aqueduct  Board,  26  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
240  ;  Greene  i'.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York, 
60  N.  Y.  303,  1875 ;  State  v.  Directors, 
etc.,  5  Ohio  St.  234,  1855;  Altemus  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.),  446;  Ar- 
genti  V.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  255 ; 
Wiggins  V.  Philadelphia,  2  Brews.  (Pa.) 
444 ;  lb.  443. 

A  board  of  commissioners  charged 
with  the  duty  of  contracting  for  a  public 
work  need  not  call  for  bids  or  proposals 
unless  expressly  required.  But  if  they 
choose  to  invite  competition,  they  may, 
after  accepting  a  bid,  alter  the  specifica- 
tions furnished  by  the  bidder  before  exe- 
cuting the  contract ;  and  this  without 
the    knowledge    of   competing    bidders. 


Kingsley  v.  Brooklyn,  5  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  N. 
Cas.  1.  The  duties  and  liabihties  of  a  city 
and  its  officers  under  a  contract  for  the 
building  of  extensive  water-works,  consid- 
ered. A  provision  in  the  act  authorizing 
the  work,  for  the  preliminary  adoption  of 
a  "plan"  therefor  by  the  city,  does  not 
prevent  subsequent  changes  in  the  details 
of  the  work.  And  where,  after  altera- 
tions had  been  made  and  extra  work 
directed  during  the  progress  of  tiie  un- 
dertaking, the  contractors  were  stopped 
by  tlie  city  before  completing  it,  —  Held, 
that  they  could  recover  for  work  done 
up  to  the  limits  of  the  appropriation 
authorized  by  the  act,  though  the  work 
was  incomplete,  the  legislature  having 
recognized  the  necessity  of  further  outlay 
bj'^an  act  authorizing  an  additional  appro- 
priation. Where  a  public  work  is,  under  a 
statute,  to  be  contracted  for  by  city  officers 
according  to  a  plan  to  be  adopted  by  the 
city,  with  a  proviso  that  the  whole  ex- 
pense shall  not  exceed  a  certain  sum,  to 
be  raised  by  issuing  cit}-  bonds,  a  con- 
tract for  doing  the  work  for  a  sum  within 
that  amount  is  valid,  although  it  re- 
serves authority  to  the  officers  directing 
the  work  to  make  such  changes  of  detail 
as  may  be  necessary,  and  fix  the  price  of 
whatever  extra  work  may  be  required. 
76. 

Further  as  to  lowest  bidder,  see  chapter 
on  Mandamus,  post,  sees.  870,  n.,  ch.  xxiii. 


468  MUNICIPAL   COErORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

at  unreasonable  prices,  authorizes  a  rejection  of  the  proposal  or  a 
repudiation  of  the  contract.^ 

§471.  (393)  Coniracts  of  Suretyship. —  A  municipal  corpora- 
tion cannot,  without  legislative  authority,  become  suretij  for  an- 
other corporation  or  individual ;  cannot  gnarant}^  the  bonds  or 
obligations  of  another,  or  make  accommodation  indorsements. 
Such  an  authority  cannot  be  implied  oi-  deduced  from  the  gen- 
eral and  usual  powers  conferred  upon  such  corporations.  Al- 
though such  a  corporation  may  have  power  directly  to  accomplish 
a  certain  object,  and  itself  expend  its  revenues  or  money  therefor, 
yet  this  does  not  give  or  include  the  power  to  lend  its  credit  to 
another  who  may  be  empowered  to  effect  the  same  object.  Ex- 
pending money  by  a  city  council,  as  agents  or  administrators  of 
their  constituents,  is  a  very  different  thing  from  binding  their 
constituents  by  a  contract  of  suretyship,  —  "a  contract  which 
carries  with  it  a  lesion  by  its  very  nature."  Thus,  the  indorse- 
ment of  the  bonds  of  a  street  railroad  in  a  city,  by  the  city 
authorities,  is  not  within  the  ordinary  administrative  powers  of 
the  corporation,  and  requires  express  legislative  grant.^ 

1  People  V.  Stephens,  71  N.  Y.  527.  the  credit  of  the  city,  a  private  corpora- 

2  Louisiana  State  Bank  v.  Orleans  tion  to  build  it,  and  to  take  the  profits  of 
Navigation  Co.,  3  La.  An.  294,  1848.  In  it.  We  do  not  think  this  is  within  the 
this  case  the  municipal  corporation  was  ordinary  scope  of  municipal  authorities, 
sought  to  be  made  liable  upon  its  guar-  nor  can  any  authorities,  as  we  believe,  be 
anty  of  bonds  issued  by  the  Navigation  found  carrying  the  objects  of  a  corpora- 
Company,  which  the  mayor,  in  the  name  tion  that  far.  We  are  clear  that  the  pro- 
of the  municipality,  was  authorized,  by  posed  indorsement  is  ultra  vires." 
certain  resolutions  of  the  council,  to  in-  A  municipal  corporation  has  no  implied 
dorse.  It  was  held  that  the  council  trans-  power  to  lend  its  credit  or  make  accommo- 
cended  its  powers,  and  the  guaranty  did  dation  paper  for  the  benefit  of  citizens,  to 
not  impose  any  legal  obligation  upon  the  enable  them  to  execute  private  enter- 
municipality.  The  disability  of  such  cor-  prises.  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa, 
porations,  without  express  power,  to  enter  199,  224,  1865 ;  1  Parsons  N.  &  B.  1G6  ; 
into  contracts  of  suretyship  is  shown  in  Smcad  v.  Railroad  Co.,  11  Ind.  105. 

the  masterly  and  exhaustive  opinion  de-  The  power  to /wrow  wio»e(/ for  any  pub- 

livered  by  Eustes,  C.  J.     See,  also,  Blake  lie  purpose  does  not  authorize  the  loan  of 

V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Macon,  53  Ga.  172,  1874.  the  credit  of  the   city.     Chamberlain  v. 

In  this  case  McCay,   J.,  says:  "Tiie  ob-  Burlington,  19  Iowa,  395;  contra,  Rogers 

jects  of  a  municipal  corporation    are,  in  v.  Burlington,  3  Wall.  654,  four  judges 

the  main,  the  preservation  of  order,  and  dissenting.     And  see  Meyer  y.  Muscatine, 

the  doing  of  such  acts  for  the  public  good  1    Wall.  384.      The  author  cannot   but 

as  cannot  well  be  done  by  private  enter-  think  that  power  to  a  corporation  to  bor- 

prise.     But  here  is  a  private  enterprise,  row  money  should  not  be  construed   to 

and  it  is  insisted   that  it  is  within  the  give  the  power  to  loan  its  credit,  but  only 

scope  of  municipal  power  not  to  build  a  to    borrow    money    for    legitimate    and 

street  road,  but  to  aid,  by  a  donation  of  proper  municipal  objects,  as  shown   by 


§  473.]  CONTRACTS.  .  469 

§  472.  (394)  Authorized  Contracts. — Rights  and  Liabilities. — 
But  with  respect  to  authoiizecl  contracts  a  municipal  corporation 
lias  the  same  rights  and  remedies,  and  is  hound  thereby,  and  may 
be  sued  thereon  in  the  same  manner  as  individuals.^  Thus,  if 
such  a  corporation,  dirly  empowered,  enters  into  a  partnership 
relation  with  private  individuals  with  respect  to  the  profits  to  be 
derived  from  a  market-house,  its  rights,  especially  as  regards  the 
copartners  and  the  financial  administration  of  the  partnership 
property,  are  not  different  from  those  of  an  ordinary  partner.^ 

§  473.  A  cit}^  incorporated  under  the  general  law  of  Indiana  has 
power,  with  respect  to  the  lighting  of  its  streets  and  public  build- 
ings, etc.,  to  contract  with  a  gas  company  on  that  subject,  and  may 
exercise  such  power  within  the  limits  of  its  franchise  according 
to  its  own  discretion.  Such  a  contract,  when  made,  must  be  re- 
garded as  made  by  such  city  in  the  exercise  of  its  power  to  con- 
tract and  not  in  its  power  to  legislate,  although  the  power  to 
make  the  contract  be  authorized  by  an  ordinance.  And  when,  by 
the  terms  of  such  contract,  the  city  is  not  restricted  from  the 
legitimate  exercise  of  its  public  power  touching  the  subject  mat- 
ter thereof,  but  expressly  reserves  its  administrative  authority  to 
keep  the  posts,  lamps,  and  burners  in  good  repair  if  the  company 
should  fail  to  do  so,  and  also  reserves  the  right  to  test  the  quality  of 

the  charter  or  constituent  act  of  the  cor-  Co.  i'.  Applewhite,  62  Ind.  464 ;  Jennings 

poration.     See  Payne  v.  Brecon,  3  Hurl.  Co.  v.  Verbarg,  63  Ind.  107;  Indianapolis 

&  Nor.  572;  ante,  sec.  117;  Bateman  v.  ?;.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  cit- 

Mid- Wales  Railway  Co.,  Law  Rep.  1  C.  ing  and  approving  text. 
P.  510.     Power  to  guarantee  payment  of  ^  j^p^  Orleans  ;;.  Guillotte,  12  La.  An. 

authorized  contracts.    Memphis  v.  Brown,  818,  1857.     In  New  Orleans  i'.  St.  Louis 

20  Wall.  289,  1873.  Church,  11  La.  An.  244,  1856,  it  was  con- 

1  Corporations   may   make    contracts  tended  by  the  counsel  for  the  city  that 

within  the  powers  expressly  granted  by  even  if  certain  resolutions  in  favor  of  the 

the  acts  of  tlieir  creation  and  to  the  im-  defendants,  allowing  them  to  establish  a 

plied  powers  incidental  and  necessary  to  cemetery  within  the  city,  amounted  to  a 

the  execution  of  such  expressed  powers  contract,  and  though  their  repeal  be  not 

and  the  performance  of  the  duties  enjoined  justified  by  the  facts,  and  a  violation  of 

upon  tiiem.    For  these  purposes  it  will  be  the  contract  by  the  city,  yet  that  the  lat- 

bound  to  perform  tiiem  the  same  as  indi-  ter  has  the  power  to  violate  its  contracts, 

viduals.     Hight   v.  Monroe  Co.,  68  Ind.  and  the  defendants  have  no  redress  ex- 

676;    Seibrecht  v.   New  Orleans,  12   La.  cept  in  an  action  for  damages.     But  this 

An.  496;   Strauss  v.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Ohio  St.  doctrine  was  rejected  by  the  court,  which 

59;   Douglass    v.   Virginia   City,  5   Nev.  declared   it   to  be  as  "unsound  as  it  is 

147;  Hay  ward  u.  Davidson,  41  Ind.  212;  novel,"  since  a  liability  for   damages  is 

McCabe    v.    Fountain    Co.,  46   Ind.    380;  "  the  very  opposite  of  a  recognition  of  a 

Burnett  v.  Abbott,  51   Ind.  254;  Gordon  right  to  violate  the  contract."     Per  Bu- 

V.   Dearborn    Co.,  52   Ind.  322;   Jackson  clianan,J. 


470  ,  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

the  o-as  furnished  by  said  company,  and  the  capacity  of  the  burners 
at  all  times,  and  is  not  restricted  from  extending  its  streets,  estab- 
lishin'-"-  an  additional  number  of  lamps,  obtaining  gas  from  other 
sources,  or  establishing  its  own  gas-works  as  the  public  interests 
may  require,  such  contract,  not  being  a  restriction  upon  its  legis- 
lative power  nor  fraudulent  nor  against  public  policy,  is  valid  and 
binding  upon  such  city,  and  may  be  enforced  in  the  same  manner 
as  the  contract  of  a  person  or  business  corporation,  and  cannot  be 
repealed,  impaired,  or  changed  by  the  city,  by  ordinance  or  other- 
wise.^ 

§  474.  (395)  So  where  a  municipal  corporation,  acting  within 
the  scope  of  its  powers,  in  order  to  secure  the  erection  of  gas- 
works, passed  an  ordinance  whereby  the  gas-works  and  their  in- 
come were  placed  in  the  hands  of  trustees  for  the  benefit  of  those 
who  loaned  money  to  execute  the  undertaking,  such  ordinance  is 
a  contract,  and  cannot  be  violated  by  the  city,  although  it  may 
deem  it  for  the  interest  of  its  citizens  to  do  so  ;  nor  is  it  in  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  its  violation.^ 

475.  (396)  So  where  the  mayor  and  council  have,  by  the 
charter,  power  to  make,  in  their  corporate  capacity,  all  such  con- 
tracts as  they  may  deem  necessary  for  the  welfare  of  the  corpor- 
ation, they  may  contract  to  sell  stock  owned  by  the  city  in  a 
private  corporation,  to  enable  the  city  to  pay  its  debts  ;  and  the 
discretionary  power  with  which  the  mayor  and  council  are  in- 
vested cannot,  when  bona  fide  exercised,  be  controlled  by  a  court 
of  equity,  at  the  instance  of  property  owners  and  tax-payers.^ 

§  476.  (397)  Power  to  a  city  corporation  to  pave  streets  at 
the  expense  of  the  owners  and  recover  the  amount  from  them  if 
they  fail  themselves  to  pay  when  required  by  ordinance,  gives  the 
corporation  the  power  to  purchase  paving  materials  and  incur  a 
debt   for   that   purpose  ;  and   in  a  suit  by  the  vendor  of  such 

1  Indianapolis  v.  Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  3  Semmes  v.  Columbus,  19  Ga.  471, 
66Ind.  390.  1850;  followed  and  text  approved,  Shan- 

2  Western  Savings  Fund  Society  v  non  v.  O'Boyle,  51  Ind.  565,  1876;  ante, 
Philadelphia,  31  Fa.  St.  175,  1854;  Same  sec.  94;  post,  chapter  on  Corporate  Prop- 
V.  Same,  lb.  185,  1858  ;  Indianapolis  v.  erty,  sec.  575 ;  post,  ch.  xx. ;  Bush  v.  Car- 
Indianapolis  Gas  Co.,  66  Ind.  396,  citing  bondale,  78  111.  74,  1875. 

and  approving  text ;  ante,  ch.  iv.  sec.  69. 


§  478.]  CONTRACTS.  471 

materials  against  the  corporation,  it  is  no  defence  that  the  council 
had  not  passed  an  ordinance  before  they  purchased  the  materials, 
requiring  the  owners  to  pave :  this  is  a  matter  to  which  a  creditor 
is  not  bound  to  look.  The  question  would  be  different  if  the  city 
had  sought  to  make  the  lot  owner  liable  for  the  cost  of  paving  ; 
in  such  case,  it  must  show  a  strict  compliance  with  the  require- 
ments of  its  charter.^ 

§  477.  (398)  Settlement  of  Disputed  Claims,  etc.  —  Growing 
out  of  its  authority  to  create  debts  and  to  incur  liabilities,  a 
municipal  corporation  has  power  to  settle  disputed  claims  against 
it,  and  an  agreement  to  pay  these  is  not  void  for  want  of  consid- 
eration.2  jf  \^  j^^s  obtained  a  contract  which,  by  mistake  or  a 
change  of  circumstances,  it  deems  to  operate  oppressively  upon 
the  other  party,  an  agreement  to  make  an  additional  compensation., 
or  to  modify  or  annul  it,  is  not  invalid  for  want  of  consideration.^ 
A  town  may  make  a  contract  with  a  creditor  whereby  the  latter 
agrees  to  discount  or  throw  off  a  portion  of  his  debt,  and  such  an 
agreement,  if  founded  on  a  sufficient  consideration,  will  be  en- 
forced.^ 

§  478.  Power  to  arbitrate  Claims.  —  As  a  general  proposi- 
tion, municipal  corporations  have  the  same  powers  to  liquidate 

1  Bigelow  V.  Perth  Amboy,  1  Dutch,  be  taken,  the  council  may,  if  done  in  good 
(N.  J.)  "297,  1855;  post,  ch.  xix.  faith,  cancel  the  judgment  on  tlie  pay- 

2  Augusta  V.  Leadbetter,  16  Me.  45,  meat  of  costs ;  and  such  an  agreement, 
1839  ;  Be^n  v.  Jay,  23  Me.  117,  121,  1813;  when  executed,  is  binding  upon  tlie  cor- 
People  V.  Supervisors,  27  Cal.  655;  Peo-  poration.  Petersburg  v.  Mappin,  14  111. 
pie  I'.  Coon,  25  Cal.  G48.  It  may  annex  193,  1852;  Supervisors  v.  Bowen,  4  Lans- 
conditions  to  a  proposal  of  settlement,  and  ing  (N.  Y.)  24,  1871. 

is  not  liable  unless  the  conditions  are  met.  ^  Baileyville  v.  Lowell,   20   Me.   178, 

Merrill  v.  Uixfield,  30  Me.  157,  1849.     A  1841.      In   this   case,   the   town,   against 

municipality  n)ay,  without  special  grant,  wliich  the  creditor  had  an  execution,  had 

issue  new  bonds  in  tlie  place  of  old  bonds  the  option,  and  was  authorized,  to  raise 

which  had  been  issued  according  to  law.  the  money   by  loan   or  by  assessment ; 

Rogan  V.  Watertown,  30  Wis.  259,  1879 ;  and  if  in  tlie  latter  mode,  either  at  once 

infra,  sec.  504,  note.  or  by  instalments.    If  not  raised  and  paid, 

3  Bean  v.  Jay,  23  Me.  117, 121 ;  Meech  the  creditor  was  authorized  to  cause  the 
V.  Buffalo,  29  N.  Y.  198,  1864.  Further,  property  of  the  inhabitants  to  be  dis- 
as  to  consideration,  Baileyville  v.  Lowell,  trained  upon  his  writ.  It  was  held,  under 
20  Me.  178,  1841 ;  Nelson  v.  Milford,  7  these  circumstances,  that  an  agreement 
Pick.  (Mass.)  18,  1828,  valuable  opinion  by  the  creditor,  which  was  accepted  and 
oi  Parker,  C.  J. ;  see  People  v.  Stout,  23  complied  with  by  the  town,  that  if  the 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  349;  ante,  ch.  iv.  sec.  75.  town  would  «<  o«ce  assess  the  amount  re- 
The  power  to  sue  and  be  sued  gives  to  a  quired,  and  collect  the  same,  he  would 
corporation  the  riglit  to  settle  or  compro-  abate  a  portion  of  his  debt,  was  founded 
mise  claims.  Wiiere  a  city  has  a  judg-  upon  a  sufficient  consideration,  and  wa? 
ment,  from  which  an  apijoal  is  about  to  binding  upon  him. 


472  JIUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

claims  and  indebtedness  tliat  natural  persons  have,  and  from  that 
source  proceeds  power  to  adjust  all  disputed  claims,  and  when 
the  amount  is  ascertained  to  pay  the  same  as  other  indebtedness. 
It  would  seem  to  follow  therefrom  that  a  municipal  corporation, 
unless  disabled  by  positive  law,  could  submit  to  arbitration  all 
unsettled  claims  with  the  same  liability  to  perform  the  award  as 
would  rest  upon  a  natural  person,  provided,  of  course,  that  such 
power  be  exercised  b}^  ordinance  or  resolution  of  the  corporate 
authorities.  It  is  no  objection  to  the  validity  of  such  ordinance 
that  it  was  passed  at  a  meeting  of  the  city  council  at  which  all 
members  were  not  notified  to  be  present,  provided  that  the  ordi- 
nance be  approved  at  a  subsequent  regular  meeting.  Nor  is  the 
ordinance  an  act  ultra  vires  the  corporation,  although  the  work  for 
which  damages  are  claimed  was  done  outside  of  the  city  limits, 
provided  it  is  a  part  of  a  work  which  the  corporation  has  power 
to  perform. 1  In  some  cases  it  is  held  that  a  city  has  no  power  to 
submit  to  arbitration  claims  for  damages  arising  under  the  power 
of  eminent  domain.^ 

§  479.  (399)  Contracts  ivith  Attorneys.  —  Resulting  also  from 
the  power  to  make  contracts,  to  own  property,  and  to  incur 
liabilities,  is  the  authority  in  a  municipal  corporation,  in  the 
absence  of  express  or  implied  restriction,  to  employ  an  attorney^  ^ 

1  City  of  Shawneetown  v.  Baker,  85  if  not  absolutely,  an  implied  restriction 
111.  563  ;  Dlx  v.  Dummerston,  19  Vt.  upon  city  and  county  corporations  to  em- 
263  ;  Grigwold  v.  Stonington,  5  Conn,  ploy  otlier  attorneys  to  perform  tiie  pre- 
367;  Canal  Co.  v.  Swann,  5  How.  (U.  S.)  cise  duties,  as  prescribed  by  law,  of  the 
83.  Power  exists  unless  the  corporation  city  and  county  attorneys  elected  by  the 
be  disabled.  Corporation,  etc.,  in  re,  6  people  or  provided  for  by  incorporating 
Upper  Can.  Law  Jour.  207  ;  Corporation,  statutes.  Compare  Thaclier  v.  Jeff.  Co., 
etc.,  in  re,  19  Upper  Can.  Q.  B.  450.  13  Kan.  182,  and  cases  cited;  Hugg  v. 
'  Post,  ch.  xvi.  Camden  (right  to  employ  counsel  in  ad- 
s' Smith  V.  Sacramento,  13  Cal.  531 ;  dition  to  the  city  solicitor),  29  N.  J.  Eq. 
State  V.  Paterson,  40  N.  J.  L.  180.  May  (2  Stewart)  6,  1878.  A  municipal  cor- 
employ,  unless  specially  restricted,  an  poration  which  has  employed  an  attorney 
attorney  in  addition  to  the  city  attorney,  to  file  a  bill  seeking  to  destroy  by  suit 
Ih.  The  employment  of  outside  counsel  the  existence  of  the  corporation  itself, 
must,  of  course,  be  duly  authorized  by  cannot  apph'  the  corporate  funds  in  pay- 
tlie  municipality.  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  ment  of  such  services.  Daniel  i:  Mayor, 
Wall.  289,  321, 1873;  Memphis  v.  Adams,  etc.,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  582,  1851 ;  post, 
9  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  518,  1872;  s.  c.  24  Am.  sec.  910,  note. 

Eep.  331 ;  Clark  v.  Lyon  Co.,  8  Nev.  181,  Unless  there  is  some  special  restriction 
1872  ;  Ellis  v.  Washoe  Co.,  7  Nev.  291 ;  the  corporation  may  incur  liability  to  com- 
see  Hornblower  v.  Dunden,  35  Cal.  644;  pensate  an  attorney  employed  by  it  to  con- 
compare  Clough  V.  Hart,  8  Kan.  487.  duct  or  defend  suits  which  relate  to  the 
This  case  holds  that  there  is  prima  facie,  due  performance  of  the  duties  or  trusts 


§  479.] 


CONTKACTS. 


473 


to  conduct  or  defend  suits  in  which  the  corporation  is  interested 
in  its  corporate  capacit}-,  and  tlie  corporation  is  bound  to  pay  for 
services  rendered  by  him  on  due  employment,  without  an  express 
vote  to  that  effect.^  If  a  corporation  attorney,  after  liis  terra  of 
office  has  expired,  contiiuies  in  the  management  of  suits  in  which 
the  corporation  is  interested,  witliout  objection  from,  and  with  the 
knowledge  of,  the  corporation  and  of  his  successor,  he  may,  it  has 
been  held,  recover  for  such  services.^  An  attorney  was  employed 
upon  a  quantum  meruit  by  the  city  to  conduct  a  case  to  a  final 
termination,  and  pending  the  litigation  was  appointed  city  coun- 
sellor, when  it  became  his  official  duty  to  act  for  the  city  ;  and 
it  was  held  that,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  contract,  he  could 
not  recover  for  the  value  of  such  services  as  were  rendered  after 
his  appointment.  It  might  be  otherwise  if  the  original  employ- 
ment had  been  to  carry  the  suit  through  for  an  agreed  sum.^ 


with  which,  in  its  corporate  capacity,  it 
is  charged  by  law.  Attorney-General  v. 
Mayor,  etc.  of  Norwich,  2  Myl.  &  Cr.  406 ; 
Lewis  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Rochester,  9  Com. 
B.  (N.  S.)  40i,  1860;  ante,  sec.  147.  A  city 
owning  stock  in  a  railroad  company  in 
another  state  may,  in  virtue  of  such  own- 
ership, unless  specially  restricted,  emploj- 
counsel  to  attend  to  its  interests  in  such 
state.  Memphis  v.  Adams,  supra.  Tlie 
Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin  hold  that  no 
action  will  lie  against  a  city  having  "  the 
general  powers  of  municipal  corporations 
at  common  law  "  to  recover  compensation 
for  services  of  counsel  to  aid  in  criminal 
prosecutions  against  persons  who  had  lately 
been  officers  of  the  city  for  offences  com- 
mitted under  color  of  their  official  duties, 
resulting  in  pecuniary  injury  to  the  city. 
Butler  V.  Milwaukee,  15  Wis.  493.  In 
Indiana  a  county  board  has  no  power  to 
employ  counsel  to  conduct  criminal  prose- 
cutions, and  cannot  be  compelled  to  pay 
for  services  rendered.  Higlit  v.  Board, 
etc.  Monroe  Co.  N.  W.  Rep.,  1  Ind.  Supp. 
20 ;  Riley  Co.  ;;.  Ward,  lb.  In  Iowa  the 
board  of  supervisors  may  employ  sjiecial 
agent  or  attorney  to  assist  in  the  collec- 
tion of  taxes  not  collectible  by  county 
treasurer  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty. 
Withelm  v.  Cedar  Co.,  50  Iowa,  524. 
Compare  ante,  sec.  39,  and  cases  there 
cited,  as  to  power  to  offer  rewards  for 
offenders.      Buttrick  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen 


(Mass.),  172.  Cannot  recover  for  defend- 
ing pauper  criminals  in  Alabama.  Posey 
V.  Mobile  Co.,  50  Ala.  6,  1873. 

1  Langdon  v.  Castleton,  80  Vt.  285, 
1858. 

^  lb. ;  see  Harrington  v.  School  Dis- 
trict, 30  Vt.  155  ;  supra,  sec.  459,  as  to  im- 
plied contracts.  Compare  Clough  v.  Hart, 
8  Kan.  487.  Compensation  of  citij  atto7-ney. 
See  Carroll  v.  St.  Louis,  12  Mo.  444 ;  Orton 
I'.  State,  12  Wis.  509 ;  also,  chapter  on 
Corporate  Officers,  ante.  Liability  for 
attorney's  fee  under  charter  or  special 
statutes,  see  Brady  v.  Supervisors,  2 
Sandf.  S.  C.  R.  460,  affirmed  10  N.  Y. 
((3  Seld.)  260,  1851,  for  reasons  given  by 
OaLleij,  C.  J.,  in  2  Sandf.  460;  Halstead  v. 
IMayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  3  Comst.  (3  N. 
Y.)  4.30;  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall. 
289,  1873;  State  v.  New  Orleans,  20  La. 
An.  172;  Brigiit  v.  Hewes,  19  La.  An. 
666;  Parker  v.  Williamsburg,  13  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  250;  Clough  v.  H Art,  supra, 
and  cases  cited  by  Valentine,  J.  Proof  of 
employment.  Butler  v.  Charlestown,  7 
Gray  (Mass.),  14  ;  Memphis  v.  Brown,  20 
Wall,  289,  321;  Memphis  v.  Adams,  9 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  518;  s.  c.  24  Am.  Rep. 
331 ;  Cass  Co.  v.  Ross,  46  Ind.  404,  1874; 
McCabe  v.  Fountain  Co.,  46  Ind.  380. 

3  Detroit  v.  Whittemore,  27  Mich.  281, 
1873.  Construction  of  power  to  employ 
private  counsel.  lb.  In  employing  coun- 
sel  the  board   of  county  commissioners 


47-1 


MUNICIPAL   COEPOKATIONS. 


[CII.  XIV. 


§  4S0.  (400)  Contracts  for  Local  Improvements.  —  A  municipal 
corporation  contracted  with  a  paver  to  do  certain  work  at  a  fixed 
price,  of  which  it  was  to  pay  one  third,  and  the  owners  two 
thirds.  It  was  judicially  determined  that  the  proprietors  were, 
in  law,  liable  to  pay  only  one  third  ;  and  it  was  held,  in  an  action 
by  the  paver  against  the  corporation,  tliat  it  was  a  warrantor 
for  the  remaining  one  third  ;  and  it  was  held  liable  accordingly.^ 
But  where  the  charter  or  constituent  act  in  reference  to  improv- 
ing streets  provides  that  the  city  shall  be  liable  to  the  contractor 
for  so  much  only  of  the  improvement  as  is  occupied  by  streets 
and  alleys  crossing  the  same,  and  that  the  owners  of  adjacent  lots 
shall  be  liable  for  the  rest,  the  city  is  not  liable  for  the  deficiency 
m  case  the  adjacent  property  does  not  sell  for  enough  to  pay  the 
assessment,  and  though  the  owner  be  a  non-resident.^ 


acts  as  a  corporation,  and,  like  other 
corporations,  may,  unless  tlie  statute 
otlierwise  requires,  employ  agents  and 
attorneys  without  maliing  such  employ- 
ment a  matter  of  record,  but  this  must  be 
done  by  tlie  concurrent  act  of  a  majority 
of  the  board  at  a  legal  session.  Such 
attorney  may  recover  compensation  for 
his  services.  McCabe  v.  Board,  etc. 
Fountain  Co.,  46  Ind.  380,  1874.  The 
city  council,  under  the  laws  of  Iowa, 
while  actuig  as  a  board  of  equalization,  is 
discharging  a  corporate  function  and  act- 
ing as  a  representative  of  the  city,  and  if 
its  action  is  appealed  from,  the  city  so- 
licitor is  justified  in  defending  it  in  the 
Appellate  Court,  for  whicli  service  he  is 
entitled  to  reasonable  compensation,  even 
though  the  service  or  the  compensation 
be  not  provided  for  by  city  ordinance. 
Kinnie  v.  Wavcrly,  42  Iowa,  437,  1876. 
Extra  compensation.     Ante,  sec.  233. 

1  Tounier  v.  Municipality,  5  La.  An. 
298.  See  also  Cronan  v.  Same,  lb.  537, 
■where,  by  the  construction  of  the  con- 
tract, the  city  was  held  liable  for  the 
whole  e.xpense,  the  proprietors  having 
refused  to  make  payment.  A  contractor 
failing,  for  icant  of  power  in  a  city,  to  be 
able  to  get  his  pay  from  special  assess- 
ments, the  city  was  held  liable  to  him,  it 
being  regarded  as  guaranteeing  that  it 
possessed  the  specific  powers  relied  on  by 
the  contractor  for  liis  compensation. 
Maher  v.  Chicago,  38  111.  266,  1865.  But 
see  Chicago  v.  Teople,  48  111.  416,  where 


the  first  case  is  explained  and  distin- 
guished. See  also  Reilly  v.  riiiladelphia, 
60  Pa.  St.  467  ;  Sleeper  v.  Bulien,  6  Kan. 
300,  1870  ;  Chicago  v.  People,  50  111.  327 ; 
Lowden  v.  Cincinnati,  2  Disney  (0.),  203. 
Right  of  contractor  to  sue  the  corporation 
where,  in  consequence  of  its  neglect,  it 
would  be  nugatory  to  proceed  against  the 
owners  of  tlie  property.  See  Michel  v. 
Police  Jury,  9  La.  An.  67 ;  Newcomb  v. 
Same,  4  lb.  233 ;  Michel  v.  Same,  3  lb. 
123 ;  Leavenworth  v.  Mills,  G  Kan.  288, 
1870 ;  distinguished,  Casey  v.  Leaven- 
worth, 17  Kan.  189.  Compare  Reock  v. 
Newark,  33  N.  J.  L.  129.  Further,  as 
to  local  improvements,  see  ch.  xix. ;  post, 
sec.  810;  supra,  sees.  459,  467.  In  Mem- 
phis V.  Brown,  20  Wall.  289,  1873,  it  was 
held  that  under  its  charter  the  city  had 
full  power  to  make  paving  contracts,  and 
to  pay  either  in  cash  or  in  bonds,  or  both, 
and  to  guarantee  payment  of  the  assess- 
ment bills  against  abutters.  Sexton  v. 
St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153,  1875. 

2  New  Albany  i".  Sweeney  (construing 
General  Towns  and  Cities  Act),  13  Ind. 
245,  1859 ;  Lucas  v.  San  Francisco,  7 
Cal.  463 ;  Lovell  v.  St.  Paul,  10  Minn. 
290.  Contracts  with  municipal  corpora- 
tions are  construed  with  reference  to  the 
chartered  or  corporate  powers  of  the  city. 
13  Ind.  245,  supra. 

If  the  municipal  corporation  agrees  with 
the  contractor  to  collect  the  assessments 
from  the  abutting  owners,  a  failure  to 
do  so  will  render  it  liable.      JMorgan  v. 


§  481.] 


CONTRACTS. 


475 


§  481.  (401)  A  city  charter  required  the  consent  of  a  major- 
ity of  j)roperty-o\vners  to  make  certain  improvements,  which, 
when  made,  were  chargeable  upon  the  adjacent  2^roperty.  An 
ordinance  provided  that  contractors  doing  such  work  should  look 
to  the  adjacent  property,  and  not  to  the  city,  for  their  pay.  Un- 
der these  circumstances,  the  city  entered  into  a  contract  with  the 
plaintiff  to  grade  a  certain  street,  the  plaintiff  agreeing  that  he 
would  receive  his  pay  from  the  adjoining  property.  The  plaintiff 
performed  the  work,  and,  inasmuch  as  the  adjacent  owners  had 
never  given  their  consent  to  the  making  of  the  improvement,  he 
sued  the  city  on  the  contract^  to  recover  for  the  work  done ;  and 
it  was  held  that  the  action  could  not  be  maintained.^ 


Dubuque,  28  Iowa,  575,  1870.  See,  how- 
ever. Beard  v.  Brooklyn,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
142 ;  Sexton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153, 
1873  ;  Sexton  v.  Beach,  50  xMo.  488,  1872. 
Acreditorof  a  municipahty  is  not  obhged 
to  wait,  before  he  sues,  until  tlie  money 
can  be  collected  from  the  land-owners 
benefited,  and  on  whom  the  charter  im- 
poses the  expense  of  the  improvement 
whence  his  claim  accrued.  Little  v.  Union 
Townsliip  Committee,  40  N.  J.  L.  397. 

1  Leavenworth  v.  Rankin,  2  Kan. 
357,  1864;  Swift  v.  Williamsburg,  24 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  427;  Goodrich  v.  Detroit, 
12  Mich.  279  ;  Johnson  i-.  Common  Coun- 
cil, 10  Ind.  227  ;  New  Albany  v.  Sweeney, 
13Ind.  24.5. 

Where  the  contractor  has  agreed  to  look 
for  payment  to  the  lot  benefited,  or  to  the 
owner,  he  cannot  hold  the  city,  unless  it 
may  be  in  cases  where  the  whole  proceed- 
ing is  void,  or  the  city  neglects  its  duty. 
Kearney  v.  Covington,  1  Met.  (Ky.) 
339.  The  subject  is  very  fully  discussed 
and  the  previous  cases  in  the  state  com- 
mented on  in  Craycraft  v.  Selvage,  10 
Busli  (Ky.),  696,  1874;  Casey  v.  Leaven- 
worth, 17  Kan.  189,  1876;  Memphis 
I'.  Brown  (an  important  case),  20  Wall. 
289,  1873  ;  Smith  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis. 
63,  1864;  Finney  v.  Oshkosh,  Ih.  220; 
Chicago  I'.  People,  48  111.  41 G  ;  Ruppert  v. 
Baltimore,  23  Md.  184;  Louisville  v. 
Henderson,  5  Bush  (Ky.),  515,  1809. 

A  city  advertised  for  proposals  to  do 
certain  public  work,  and  the  plaintiff  made 
proposals,  which  were  accei)ted,  without 
qualification,  by  an  entry  on  city  records  ; 


and  it  was  decided  that  the  statement  in 
the  published  notice,  "  the  expense  of 
the  work  to  be  assessed,"  etc.,  was  part 
of  the  contract,  no  other  provision  for 
payment  having  been  made,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  could  not  maintain  an  action 
against  the  city  until  after  the  assess- 
ment and  collection  of  his  compensation, 
or  until  it  or  its  oSicers  failed  to  proceed 
with  reasonable  diligence,  after  the  ex- 
pense of  the  work  was  ascertained,  to 
make  and  collect  an  assessment,  and  to 
pay  over  money  thus  collected.  Hunt  v. 
Utica,  18  N.  Y.  442,  1858. 

Extent  of  recovery  by  contractor  against 
abutter  where  the  work  is  done  in  a 
manner  inferior  to  that  stipulated  for  in 
the  contract.  Creamer  v.  Bates,  49  Mo. 
523,  1872. 

Further,  as  to  the  rights  and  remedits  of 
the  contractor,  of  the  property-owner,  and 
the  liabilities  of  the  municipal  corpora- 
tion. Memphis  v.  Brown,  20  Wall.  289, 
1874 ;  Smith  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  63 ; 
Foote  V.  Same,  Jb.  270 ;  Bond  v.  Newark, 
19  N.  J  Eq.  376  ;  Fletcher  v.  Oshkosh,  18 
Wis.  228,  2.32  ;  Palmer  v.  Stump,  29  Ind. 
329;  McSpedon  v.  New  York,  7  Bosw. 
(N.  Y.)  601  ;  Reilly  v.  Philadelphia,  60 
Pa.  St.  467 ;  Whalen  v.  La  Crosse,  16 
Wis.  271 ;  Flournoy  v.  Jeffersonvillc,  17 
Ind.  1(59;  Creighton  v.  Toledo,  18  Ohio 
St.  447;  Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  12  Mich. 
279;  Buffalo  v.  Halloway,  7  N.  Y  (3 
Seld.)  493  ;  Storrs  v.  Utica,  17  N.  Y.  104; 
Leavenworth  v.  Mills,  6  Kan.  288,  1870  ; 
followed,  Leavenworth  r>.  Stille,  13  Kan. 
539,  1874.   and   distinguished    Casey   v. 


476 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  482.  (402)  It  lias  been  asserted  tluit  where  the  expense  of 
mukiiio"  a  local  improvement  is  not  to  be  raised  by  a  general  tax, 
bnt  solel}'  upon  the  pro[)erty  benefited,  that  a  faihire  of  the  cor- 
poration^ though  it  is  only  the  agent  of  the  owners  to  be  assessed, 
to  discharge  its  duty,  by  making  the  necessary  assessment,  or  its 
unreasonable  delay  in  collecting  and  paying  over  the  money, 
gives  the  contractor  a  right  to  recover  his  compensation  in  an 
action  against  the  corporation. ^    The  right  to  a  general  judgment 


Lcavenwortli,  17  Kan.  189,  1876;  Sleeper 
V.  Biilk-n,  6  Kan.  300 ;  Lansing  o.  "Van 
Gorder,  24  Mich.  450,1872  ;  jiost,  chapter 
on  Taxation  and  Local  Improvements ; 
supra,  sec.  460;  in/nt,  sec.  810;  Hen- 
drick  V.  West  Springfield,  107  Mass.  541 ; 
Mayer  r.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  63 
N.  Y.  455,  1875 ;  Tone  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
New  York,  70  N.  Y.  157,  1877.  Assign- 
ment of  contract.  McCubbiny.  Atchison, 
12  Kan.  166;  McGlue  v.  Philadclpliia,  10 
Phila.  (Pa.)  348  ;  Perkinson  v.  St.  Louis, 
4  Mo.  App.  322. 

An  ordinance  of  the  city  of  Louisville 
ordained  "  that  no  contract  should  be 
binding  on  the  city  until  it  is  approved 
by  bol/t  boards  of  the  general  council,  and 
this  shall  be  necessary  to  make  a  contract 
complete  and  binding  upon  the  city."  A 
contract  was  made  for  a  certain  street  im- 
provement, which  was  signed  by  the 
mayor,  but  was  never  approved  by  both 
boards,  but  by  one  of  them  only.  If  the 
contract  had  been  executed  as  required 
by  tiie  ordinance  the  contractor  would 
have  been  entitled  to  recover  against  the 
adjacent  property-holders  the  agreed 
price.  It  was  conceded  that  he  could  not 
recover  against  them  because  the  contract 
had  not  been  thus  executed.  He  there- 
upon sought  to  make  the  city  liable  for 
the  work  done,  but  the  Court  of  Appeals, 
distinguishing  the  case  from  Kearney  v. 
Covington,  1  Met.  (Ky.)  345,  held  that  no 
contract  binding  on  the  city  was  ever 
made  and  that  he  could  not  recover,  there 
having  been  no  ratification  of  the  con- 
tract. Murphy  v.  Louisville,  9  Bush 
(Ky.),  189,  1872.  Qnanlum  meruit  will  not 
lie  against  a  city  for  materials  furni.shed 
for  a  public  work  under  a  contract  which 
is  void  as  not  in  conformity  with  statutes 
requiring  such  contracts  to  be  made  in  a 
particular  manner.     Bigler  v.  New  York, 


5  Abb.  (N.  Y.)  N.  Cas.  51.  When  city  not 
liable  on  contracts  of  police  and  school 
boards,  see  Swift  v.  New  York,  12  Ilun 
(N.  Y.),  518  ;  Utica  v.  Miller,  62  Ind.  230 ; 
Jarvis  v.  Siielby,  G2  Ind.  257 ;  Crane  v. 
Urbana,  2  111.  App.  550. 

As  to  implied  mimici/ial  liabilitj/,  see  the 
recent  important  opinion  of  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court  in  City  of  Louis- 
iana V.  Wood,  October  Term,  1880. 

1  Beard  v.  Brooklyn,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
142,  1860.  See  Goodrich  v.  Detroit,  12 
Mich.  279,  1864  ;  Camming  v.  Mayor,  etc. 
of  Brooklyn,  11  Paige  (N.  Y.)  Ch.  596, 
1845;  Baker  v.  Utica,  19  N.  Y.  (5  Smith) 
320,  1859  ;  Green  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  503.  See,  gener- 
ally, as  to  assessments  for  public  works, 
Doughty  V.  Hope,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.),  249; 
Manice  v.  Mayor,  8  N.  Y.  120 ;  People  v. 
Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  5  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)43;  8  Barb.  95;  23  Barb.  390.  Where 
a  city  fails  to  levy  a  tax,  or  refuses  to 
issue  tax  warrants  in  payment  of  a  con- 
tract for  grading  and  improving  streets, 
and  otherwise  neglects  to  provide  means, 
the  city  is  liable,  and  the  contractor 
may,  in  an  action,  recover  the  amount 
due.  Atchison  v.  Byrnes,  22  Kan.  65. 
Craycraft  v.  Selvage,  10  Bush  (Ky.),  696, 
1874.  In  principle  sustaining  the  view 
suggested  in  the  text:  Keock  v.  New- 
ark, 33  N.  J.  L.  129 ;  post,  ch.  xxiii.,  note. 
And  see  opinion  of  Field,  C.  J.,  in  Ar- 
genti  V.  San  Francisco,  16  Cal.  255, 
282,  1860;  post,  ch.  xx.  on  Mandamus. 
Where  the  city  council  can  only  legis- 
late in  conjunction  with  the  mayor  as 
part  of  the  law-making  power,  if  the 
council  order  local  improvements  by  a 
resolution  without  the  signature  or  con- 
currence of  the  mayor,  and  the  work  is 
done  by  a  contractor  under  such  au- 
thority, he  cannot  recover  of  the  abutter 


§  483.] 


CONTKACTS. 


477 


should,  in  our  opinion,  be  limited,  in  any  event,  to  cases  where 
the  corporation  can  afterwards  reimburse  itself  by  an  assessment. 
For  why  should  all  be  taxed  for  the  failure  of  the  council  to  do 
its  duty  in  a  case  where  the  contractor  has  a  plain  remedy,  by 
mandamus,  to  compel  the  council  to  make  the  necessary  assess- 
ment and  proceed  in  the  collection  thereof  with  the  requisite 
diligence  ? 

§  483.  (403)  Same. — Corporate  Control  by  Stipulation.  —  An 
agreement  by  a  contractor  to  execute  a  public  improvement, 
under  the  general  direction  and  supervision  of  a  committee  of  a 
cit}^  makes  such  committee  —  acting  reasonably  and  honestly, 
not  arbitrarily  and  capriciously  —  exclusively  the  judge,  not  only 
as  to  materials  and  manner,  but  also  as  to  the  time  of  doing  the 
work.i  But  where  a  written  contract  has  been  entered  into 
between  a  municipal  corporation  and  a  contractor,  a  general 
provision  of  an  ordinance  that  the  work  shall  be  done  under  the 
directions  of  certain  officers  confers  no  authority  upon  them 
essentially  to  change  or  modify  the  provisions  of  the  contract.^ 

(Sexton  V.  Beach,  50  Mo.  488,  1872),  nor 
from  th,e  citj-,  it  seems,  where  the  charter 
declares  tliat  the  city  sliall  in  no  manner 
be  liable  for  local  improvements.  Sex- 
ton V.  St.  Joseph,  60  Mo.  153,  1875. 

1  Chapman  v.  Lowell,  4  Cash.  (Mass.) 
378,  1849,  relating  to  drains  in  the  streets 
of  the  city.  Certain  wells  were,  by  con- 
tract, to  be  constructed  under  the  super- 
vision and  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  specific 
city  officer;  they  were  so  constructed  and 
approved,  and  it  was  held  that  the  city 
was  concluded  by  the  action  of  the  offi- 
cer. Omaha  v.  Hammond,  94  U.  S.  98, 
1876.  As  to  power  of  chancery  to  cor- 
rect mistake  of  the  engineer  or  other 
person  whose  decision  both  parties  to  the 
contract  have  agreed  to  abide  by.  See 
liailroad  Co.  v.  Veeder,  17  Oliio,  385. 
Where  tiicre  is  a  condition  precedent  that 
contractor  shall  have  certificate  of  per- 
formance by  corporation.  See  Bowery 
Jvational  Bank  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  03  N.  Y.  336, 1875 ;  Cameron,  in  re, 
50  N.  Y.  502,  1872.  Condition  precedent 
that  payment  was  not  to  be  made  to 
contractor  until  confirmation  of  the  as- 
sessment, and  whose  duty  to  have  con- 
firmation made  construed.  Tone  v.  Mayor, 


etc.  70  N.  Y.  157,  1877.  The  contract 
between  the  contractor  and  the  city  pro- 
vided that  the  contractor  should  be 
entitled  to  payment  when  the  work  was 
accepted  by  the  board  of  public  works, 
and  it  was  held  that  the  contractor,  who 
had,  in  fact,  completed  his  work,  might 
recover  of  the  abutter,  although  a  ma- 
jority of  the  board  refused  or  neglected 
to  examine  or  accept  the  work.  Neenan 
V.  Donoghue,  50  Mo.  493,  1872.  It  is 
held  that  the  acceptance  by  the  city  au- 
thorities of  work  done  under  a  contract 
for  a  street  improvement  is  only  prima 
facie  evidence  that  tlie  work  has  been  done 
in  substantial  compliance  with  the  terms 
of  the  contract.  Gulick  v.  Connely,  42 
Ind.  184,  1873;  but  see  Omaha  v.  Ham- 
mond, supra. 

2  Bonesteel  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New 
York,  22  N.  Y.  162,  1860  ;  Bond  v.  New- 
ark, 4  C.  E.  Green  (19  N.  J.  Eq.),  376; 
compare  Omaha  v.  Hammond,  94  U.  S. 
98,  1876.  But  the  authority  of  the  cor- 
poration may  be  implied  from  (V.s  having 
l)y  its  own  act  rendered  extra  materials 
necessary  to  conform  the  work  to  the 
conditions  of  the  contract.  Messenger 
V.  Buffalo,  21  N.  Y.  196,  1860;  see,  also, 


478  MUXICirAL   CORrORAXIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

If,  in  a  contract  for  a  public  work,  the  corporation  employer 
reserves  the  right  to  make  alterations  in  the  form,  dimensions, 
or  materials  of  the  work,  the  contractor  is  bound  by  an}^  such 
alterations  made  in  good  faith  ;  but  such  a  clause  does  not  au- 
thorize the  employer  to  annul  the  agreement,  or  to  stop  the  worl? 
in  an  unfinished  state. ^ 

§  484.  (404)  Evidences  of  Indebtedness,  —  Negotiable  Bonds. — 
We  have  elsewhere  discussed  the  power  of  the  legislature  to 
authorize  the  issue  of  municipal  bonds  in  aid  of  railway  and  other 
like  enterprises,^  and  have  also  considered  the  express  and  implied 
power  of  municipal  corporations  to  borrow  money  and  issue 
obligations  therefor.^  It  appropriately  belongs  to  this  place, 
however,  to  notice  more  at  length  the  different  kinds  of  corporate 
evidences  of  debt,,  and  the  rights  and  remedies  of  the  holders 
thereof,  and  to  this  general  subject  will  the  remainder  of  the 
present  chapter  be  devoted. 

§  485.  Tivo  Great  Classes  of  Municipal  Securities :  1.  Ordinary/ 
Warrants;  2.  Negotiable  Bonds.  —  Form,  Execution,  and  Attributes 
of  each.  —  It  is  material  to  bear  in  mind  the  different  kinds  of 
corporate  evidences  of  debt.  These  are  of  two  general  classes. 
First,  there  is  the  usual  municipal  or  county  warrant  or  order. 
These  are  commonl}^  drawn  by  one  or  more  of  the  officers  upon 
the  treasurer,  directing  him  to  pay  to  the  person  named,  or  bearer, 
a  given  sum  of  money.  The  power  to  issue  them,  and  the 
mode  in  which  it  is  to  be  exercised,  are  usually  prescribed  by 
charter  or  statute.  They  are  vouchers  or  "  necessary  instruments 
for  carrying  on  the  machinery  of  municipal  administration  and 

Stuartt'.Canibridge,  125  Mass.  102.  Effect  build  a  road  cannot   proceed  with  his 

of  certificate  of  approval  of  a  city  officer  contract  after  notice  of  an   appeal,  and 

where,  by  the  contract,  the  work  is  to  be  recover  of  a  town  therefor.     This  deci- 

done  to  his  approval.     Bond  r.  Newark,  sion  is  based  upon  a  construction  of  the 

4  C.  E.  Green  (19  N.  J.  Eq.),  376.  statute  of  tliat  state  by  which  the  appeal 

As  to  reserved  right  to  discontinue  work  is  intended  to  stay  or   suspend  all   pro- 

and  annul  contract.     Bietry   v.  New  Or-  ceedings  toward  building  the  road,  and 

leans,  24  La.  An.  21,  1872.  the  contractor  was  bound  to  take  his  con- 

1  Clark  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  New  York,  tract  subject  to  the  contingency  of  the 

4  Comst.  (N.  Y.)  338,   1850.     Remedy  of  appeal  allowed  by  law.   Taft  v.  Pittsford, 

contractor,  and  measure   of  damages  in  28  Vt.  (Wms.)  286,  1856. 
such  a  case,  considered.     lb.     It  is  held,  ^  Ante,  &ec.  Wd  et  seq. 

in  Vermont,  that  a  person    who  has  con-  ^  Ante,  sec  117  et  seq. ;  supra,  sec.  470, 

tracted  with  the  proper  town   officers  to  note. 


§  486.]  CONTRACTS.  479 

for  anticipating  the  collection  of  taxes,"  ^  out  of  which  they  must 
be  paid.  The  power  to  issue  such  warrants  or  orders  may,  where 
not  expressly  conferred  or  denied,  be  implied  as  incidental  to 
carrying  out  the  objects  of  a  municipal  or  public  corporation. 
Second,  there  is  the  municipal  bond,  negotiable  inform,  payable  at 
a  future  day,  intended  for  sale  in  the  market,  issued  under  ex- 
press  authority  of  the  legislature. 

§  486.  3Iunicipal  Bonds,  notwithstanding  they  are  under  seal, 
are  clothed  with  all  the  attributes  of  negotiable  or  commercial 
paper,  pass  by  delivery  or  indorsement,  and  are  not  subject  to 
equities  (w^here  the  power  to  issue  them  exists)  in  the  hands 
of  holders  for  value,  before  due,  without  notice.  Such  bonds 
usually  have  coupons  attached,  which  partake  of  the  nature 
of  the  bond,  are  likewise  negotiable,  may  be  detached  and  held 
separately  from  the  bond,  and  the  holder  may  sue  thereon  in  his 
own  name,  without  producing  or  being  interested  in  the  bonds  to 
•which  they  were  originally  attached.  Such  securities  are  made 
to  raise  money  by  their  sale,  and  this  object  would  be  defeated  if 
they  were  subject  to  equities  ("where  the  power  to  issue  exists) 
in  the  hands  of  bona  fide  holders.^ 

1  Per  Bradley,  J.,  in  The  Mayor  of  93 ;  Barrett  v.  Schuyler  County,  44  Mo. 
Nashville  v.  Ray,  19  Wall.  468,  477,  197;  DeVoss  v.  Richmond,  18  Gratt.  338; 
1873.  s.  c.  7  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  589  ;  State 

2  Mercer  County  v.  Racket,  1  Wall.  v.  Madison,  7  Wis.  088 ;  Clark  v.  Janes- 
83.  1863  (denying  Diamond  v.  Lawrence  ville,  10  Wis.  136,  18-59;  Maddox  v.  Gra- 
County,  37  Pa.  St.  353)  ;  Meyer  v.  Musca-  ham,  2  Met.  (Ivy.)  56,  1859. 

tine,  1  Wall.  384 ;    Gelpccke  v.  Dubuque,  Coupons  attached  to  such  bonds  are  ne- 

Ib.  175  ;  Moran  v.  Miami  County,  2  Black,  rjotiahle,  and  the  holder  maij  sue  thereon  in 

733,   1862 ;    Clapp    v.   Cedar  County,    5  his  own  name  without  being  interested 

Iowa,  15;  Morris   Canal  Co.  v.  Fisher,  1  in  or  producing  the  bonds  to  which  they 

Stockt,    Ch.   (N.  J.)   667,  1855  ;  Craig  v.  were  originally  attached.     Thompson  v. 

Vicksburg,    31    Miss.    216 ;    Jackson   i-.  Lee  County,  3  Wall.  327,  1865  ;  Murray 

Railroad  Co.,  48  Me.  147;  s.  c.  2  Am.  v.   Lardner,   2    Wall.    110,    1864;    Knox 

Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  585;   s.  c.  lb.  748,  and  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539,  1858  ; 

note  of  Judge  Redjield ;   Chapin   v.  Rail-  Johnson  v.  Stark  County,  24  III.  75;  City 

road  Co.,  8  Gray  (Mass.),  575;  Lynde  v.  v.  Lamson,  9  Wall.  478,  1869;  Railroad 

Winnebago    County  (Iowa    court-house  Co.  v.  Otoe  Count}',  1  Dillon  C.  C.    R. 

bonds),  16  Wall.  6,  1872  ;  Clark  v.  Janes-  338.     An  action  on  a  coupon  is  not  barred 

ville,  10  Wis.  136  ;  Gould  v.  Sterling,  23  in  less  time  than  the  bond  to  which  it  was 

N.  Y.  464;  s.  c.  1  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  originally    attached.      City  v.    Lamson, 

290  and  note  ;  Clark  v.  Des  :\Ioines,  19  supra ;  Lexington  v.  Butler,  14  Wall.  282, 

Iowa,   199,  213,   1805,  and   cases  cited;  1871.      Explained,   Clark  v.   Iowa   City, 

White    V.    Railroad   Co.,   21   How.   575;  20   Wall.   583,    1874.      Hoio   declared  on. 

Bank  I'.  Railroad  Co.,  3  Kern.  (13  N.  Y.)  Ring  v.  County,  6  Iowa,  265;   Railroad 

599  ;  8.  c.  4  Duer,  480 ;  Aurora  v.  West,  Co.    v.   Otoe  County,  supra ;    Wiley   v. 

22Ind.  88;   Commrs.  v.  Bright,  18  Ind.  Board,  etc.,  11  Minn.  371.      The  better 


480 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOKATIONS. 


[CII.  XIV. 


§  487.  (400)  Ordinary  Corjwration  Orders  or  War7'ants.  —  But 
ordinary  city,  county,  and  town  orders  or  warrants  are  in  some  re- 
spects different  from  bonds  of  the  character  just  mentioned,  and, 
in  the  author's  judgment,  the  better  opinion,  as  well  as  decided 
Aveight  of  authorit}^  is  that  there  is  no  implied  power  in  the 
officers  of  a  town,  county,  or  city  corporation  to  issue  warrants 
or  orders  which  shall  be  free  from  equities  in  the  hands  of  hold- 
ers J  that  the  existence  of  such  a  power  is  not  necessary  as  an 
incident  to  those  ordinarily  granted  or  to  carry  out  the  purposes 
of  the  corporation,  and  would  be  attended  with  abuse  and  fraught 
with  danger.  Ordinar}^  warrants  or  orders,  negotiable  in  form, 
may  be  made  by  the  proper  officers ;  and  in  many  of  the  states 
such  instruments  may  be  transferred  by  delivery  or  indorsement, 
and  the  holder  sue  thereon  in  his  own  name,  yet  they  are  not 
commercial  or  negotiable  paper  in  the  hands  of  holders,  so  as  to 
exclude  inquiry  into  the  legality  of  their  issue,  or  preclude 
defences  thereto.^      Ordinary  warrants  drawn  by  one  officer  on 


practice,  in  the  author's  judgment,  is  to 
set  out  in  the  declaration  the  bond  to 
which  the  coupon  in  suit  was  attaclied, 
or  its  legal  effect  and  recitals.  Effect  of 
judgment  for  interest  as  an  estoppel  in  a 
subsequent  suit  for  interest  or  principal. 
Bank  v.  Navigation  Company,  3  La.  An. 
294 ;  Beloit  v.  Morgan,  7  Wall.  619.  As 
to  interest,  infra,  sec.  506. 

Municijial  corporations  may  plead  the 
statute  of  limitations  in  actions  against 
them  on  their  bonds  payable  at  a  fixed 
time.  De  Cordova  v.  Galveston,  4  Texas, 
470,  1749 ;  see  Underbill  v.  Trustees, 
17  Cal.  172 ;  Baker  v.  Johnson  Co.,  33 
Iowa,  151 ;  post,  sec.  668,  et  serj. 

Tlie  statute  of  limitations  commences  to 
run  on  coupons  detached  from  the  bonds 
and  negotiated  separately,  from  the  time 
the  coupons  mature,  and  the  operation  of 
the  statute,  in  such  a  case,  is  not  deferred 
until  the  maturity  of  the  bonds  to  which 
the  coupons  belonged.  This  point  has 
been  expressly  adjudged  by  the  Supreme 
Court  in  Clark  v.  Iowa  City,  20  Wall. 
583,  1874,  and  the  prior  decisions,  which 
had  been  supposed  to  hold  otherwise,  ex- 
plained to  mean  only  that  when  tlie  bonds 
were  specialties,  the  coupons,  though  de- 
tached, partook  of  the  same  nature,  and 
therefore  the  same  statute  of  limitations 
Applied    to  both   the  coupons    and    the 


bonds ;  that  is,  if  the  bonds  were  special- 
ties, so  were  the  coupons,  and  the  statute 
of  limitations  as  to  sealed  instruments,  and 
not  the  more  restricted  statute  applicable 
to  simple  contracts,  applied.  Kenosha  v. 
Lamson,  9  Wall.  477.  Lexington  v.  Butler, 
14  Wall.  282.  The  statute  also  begins  to 
run  on  coupons  from  tlie  time  they  re- 
spectively mature,  althom/Ii  llieij  remain  at- 
taclied to  the  bond  which  represents  tlie  prin- 
cipal debt.  Amy  v.  Dubuque,  98  U.  S.  470. 
1  Emery  v.  Mariaville,  50  Me.  315; 
Shirk  V.  Pulaski  Co.,  4  Dillon,  "209,  213, 
1877,  and  cases  cited ;  Clark  v.  Des 
Moines,  19  Iowa,  199,  211-214,  1865,  and 
cases  cited  ;  Clark  v.  Polk  County,  76. 
248;  Mathes  v.  Cameron,  G8  Mo.  504, 
1876  ;  People  v.  County,  11  Cal.  170, 1858 ; 
Sturtevant  v.  Liberty,  46  Me.  457; 
Smith  V.  Cheshire,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  318, 
1859  ;  Andover  v.  Grafton,  7  N.  II.  2r8, 
1834;  compare,  however,  Bank  v.  Farm- 
ington,  41  N.  H.  32  ;  Dalrymple  o.  Whit- 
tingham,  26  Vt.  345;  Inhabitants  v. 
Weir,  9  Ind.  224,  1857;  School  District 
V.  Thompson,  5  Minn.  280,  1861;  s.  p. 
Goodnow  V.  Commissioners,  11  lb.  31, 
1865;  Hyde  v.  Franklin,  27  Vt.  185. 
1855 ;  approved,  Taft  v.  Pittsford,  28  //). 
286 ;  Halstead  v.  Mayor,  3  Comst.  (3  N.  Y.), 
430;  s.  c.  5  Barb.  218;  Tlie  Floyd  Ac- 
ceptances, 7  Wall.  666,  and  reasoning  of 


§  487.] 


CONTRACTS. 


481 


another  officer  of  the  same  corporation  are  not  bills  of  exchange, 
as  such  bills  involve  the  idea  of  two  parties ;  but  are  orders  by 
the  corporation  on  itself,  —  mere  directions  to  the  treasurer  to 
pay  the  amount  to  the  bearer.^ 


Mr.  Justice  Miller;  People  v.  Gray,  23 
Cal.  125;  76.  447;  Hubbard  v.  Lyndon, 
28  Wis.  674,  1871.  Warrants,  duly  signed 
and  sealed,  are  prima  facie  valid,  but 
open  to  defences.  Commissioners  v.  Kel- 
ler, 6  Kan.  510 ;  Commissioners  v.  Day, 
19  Ind.  540,  18G2 ;  infra,  sec.  502. 

Transferee  or  holder  may  sue  in  his  onm 
name.  Emery  v.  Mariaville,  56  Me. 
315;  Crawford  County  v.  Wilson,  2  Eng. 
(7  Ark.)  214;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19 
Iowa,  199;  Campbell  v.  Polk  County,  3 
Iowa,  467  ;  Clark  v.  Polk  County,  19  Iowa, 
248 ;  Int.  Bank  v.  Franklin  Co.  65  Mo. 
105,  1877.  Otherwise  in  Massachusetts. 
Smith  V.  Cheshire,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  318, 
treating  a  town  order,  payable  to  bearer, 
as  a  mere  chose  in  action,  which  could 
not  be  enforced  in  the  name  of  an  as- 
signee, s.  p.  O'Donnell  v.  City,  7  Phil. 
(Pa.)  234.  In  many  of  the  states,  "the 
real  pftrty  in  interest "  may  sue  in  liis 
own  name.  In  Vermont,  as  to  right  of 
holder  of  town  and  county  orders  to  sue 
in  his  own  name,  see  Dalrymple  v.  Whit- 
tingham,  26  Vt.  345 ;  compare  Taft  v. 
Pittsford,  28  Vt.  286,  289;  Hyde  v. 
Franklin,  27  Vt.  185.  Right  of  indorsee 
to  site  or  enforce  bt/  mandamus  in  his  own 
name.  Kelly  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  4  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  263;  Clark  v.  School  District, 
3  Rh.  Is.  199;  Moss  v.  Oakley,  2  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  265;  Commissioners  v.  Day,  19 
Ind.  450 ;  Dively  v.  Cedar  Falls,  21  Iowa, 
565 ;  Justices  v.  Orr,  12  Ga.  137.  Stat- 
utory form  of  assignment  must  be  ob- 
served. Int.  Bank  v.  Franklin  Co.,  65 
Mo.  105,  1877 ;  post,  ch.  xx.  sec.  849. 

1  Miller  v.  Thompson,  3  Man.  &  Gr. 
576  ;  Fairchild  v.  Railroad  Co.,  15  N.  Y. 
337;  Bull  v.  Sims,  23  N.  Y.  570,  572; 
Clark  V.  Polk  County,  19  Iowa,  247; 
Harvey  v.  W.  P.  S.  Co.,  1  Doug.  (Mich.) 
193 ;  Dana  v.  San  Francisco,  19  Cal.  486 ; 
Justices  V.  Orr,  12  Ga.  137.  Municipal 
certificates  of  indebtedness  are  not  "  hills 
of  credit "  whh'in  the  meaning  of  tlie  pro- 
liibition  (art.  1,  sec.  10)  of  the  National 
Constitution  (Baltimore  v.  Board  of  Po- 
lice, 15  Md.  376,  1859),  and  possess  no 
elements  of  commercial  paper.    Chandler 

VOL.  I.  31 


V.  Bay  St.  Louis,  57  Miss.  327.  As  a  county 
warrant  is  an  instrument  by  which  the 
money,  property,  or  rights  of  a  county 
may  be  affected,  it  is  such  an  one  as  may 
be  forged.  State  v.  Fenley,  18  Mo.  445, 
1853.  Requisites  of  indictment  in  such 
a  case.  lb.  Without  the  sanction  of  the 
county  board  the  clerk  has  no  author- 
ity to  issue,  or  the  treasurer  to  pay  or 
countersign,  any  warrant.  People  v. 
Klopke,  92  111.  134. 

Bonds  issued  by  the  city  of  Little 
Rock  on  bank-note  paper,  engraved  with 
vignettes,  in  the  similitude  of  bank-bills, 
intended  to  circulate  as  money,  were  held 
to  be  illegal  and  void  under  the  legisla- 
tion of  Arkansas,  both  by  the  State  and 
Federal  courts.  Lindsey  v.  Rottaken,  32 
Ark.  619,  1878 ;  Jones  v.  Little  Rock,  25 
Ark.  301,  1868 ;  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Little  Rock,  5  Dillon,  299,  1878 ;  s.  c.  98 
U.  S.  308.  In  the  last-named  case  it  was 
decided  that  tliis  illegal  money  having 
been  paid  out  by  the  city  to  bona  fide 
creditors  for  valid  claims,  and  the  city 
having  afterwards  called  it  in,  and  by  the 
action  of  the  municipal  council  acknowl- 
edged an  indebtedness  for  the  amount  to 
the  holders  and  promised  to  pay  the  same, 
it  was  liable  on  such  acknowledgment  and 
new  promise.  In  Jones  v.  Little  Rock, 
supra,  the  court  refused  to  interfere  by 
injunction  at  the  instance  of  a  tax-payer 
to  prevent  that  city  from  issuing  paper  of 
this  character. 

Liability  as  respects  scrip  issued  to  cir- 
culate as  money.  Thomas  v.  Richmond, 
12  Wall.  349,  1870,  and  in  which  the  city 
was  held  not  to  be  liable.  See  on  this 
subject,  Alleghany  City  v.  McClurkan, 
14  Pa.  St.  81, 1850  ;  Jones  v.  Little  Rock, 
25  Ark.  301;  Miller  v.  Lynchburg,  20 
Gratt.  (Va.)  330,  1871  ;  Smith  v.  New 
Orleans,  23  La.  An.  5,  1871;  Clark  v. 
Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199,  1865;  Dively 
V.  Cedar  Falls,  21  Iowa,  565;  s.  c.  27  lb. 
227  ;  Black  v.  Cohen,  52  Ga.  621, 1874  ; 
Cheeney  v.  Brookfiold,  60  Mo.  53,  1874 ; 
Hackettstown  ads.  Swackhamer,  37  N. 
J.  L.  191, 1874 ;  Lucas  v.  Pitney,  3  Dutch. 
(N.  J.)  221. 


482 


MUNICIPAL  CORPOKATIONS. 


|;ch.  XIV. 


§  488.  (407)  Banhlng  and  trading  corporations  Iiave  implied  or 
incidental  power  to  make  negotiable  paper  ;^  and  the  same  rule 
has,  in  some  cases,  been  applied  to  municipal  corporations.  The 
ordinary  warrants  of  such  corporations,  it  is  clear,  do  not  cut  off 
equities,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  they  have  an  incidental 
power  to  make  paper  which  shall  have  this  effect.^  The  subject 
has  been  discussed  in  a  previous  chapter.^ 


1  McCuUougli  I'.  Moss,  6  Denio  (N. 
Y.),  5(57;  Straus  v.  Eagle  Insurance  Co., 
5  Ohio  St.  59;  Mott  v.  Hicks,  1  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  513 ;  Attorney-General  v.  Insurance 
Co.,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.),  Cli.  470 ;  2  Kent  Com. 
299 ;  1  Parsons  N.  &  B.  165 ;  Clark  v.  Des 
Moines,  19  Iowa,  212;  ante,  sees.  117, 
118  ;  Lucas  v.  Pitney,  3  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
221. 

2  Kelly  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
263 ;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199, 
213;  Came  ;;.  Brigham,  39  Me.  39; 
Clarke  v.  School  District,  3  Rh.  Is.  199  ; 
Goodnow  V.  Comnirs.,  11  Minn.  81  ;  Lit- 
tle Rock  V.  Nat.  Bank,  98  U.  S.  308,  citing 
and  approving  text;  ante,  sees.  117-127. 
In  Indiana  the  common-law  doctrine  that 
a  corporation  could  not  make  a  promis- 
sory note  is  exploded,  and  corporations 
can  now  make  contracts  intra  vires  in  writ- 
ing not  under  seal.  Municipal  and  quasi 
corporations  can  make  in  a  proper  case  a 
promissory  note  (citing  Ketchum  v.  Buf- 
falo, 14  N.  Y.  356  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Evans- 
ville,  15  Ind.  395)  ;  a  promissory  note  of 
a  school  township  in  payment  for  build- 
ing a  school-house  hold  valid.  Sheffield 
V.  Township,  etc.,  Andress,  5G  Ind.  157, 
1877.  An  action  cannot  be  maintained 
against  a  city  on  a  demand  payable  out  of 
a  fund  over  which  its  charter  gives  a  board 
of  education  control  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  municipal  officers.  Crane  v.  Urbana, 
2  111.  App.  559.  That  municipal  corpora- 
tions have  no  authority  to  make  and  place 
in  market  commercial  paper  without  ex- 
press power.  See  Hewitt  v.  School  Dist, 
94  111.  528;  Supervisors  v.  Farwell,  25 
111.  181 ;  Clark  v.  Hancock  Co.,  27  111. 
305 ;  Marshall  Co.  v.  Cook,  38  111.  44 ; 
Wiley  V.  Silliman,  62  111.  170 ;  Harding  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  65  III.  90 ;  McWhorter  v. 
People,  65  111.  290 ;  Big  Grove  v.  Wells, 
65111.  263;  ante,  sec.  117. 

3  The  author's  views  are  expressed 
and  the  cases  on  the  subject  are  referred 


to,  ante,  sec.  117  et  srq.,  and  approved  in 
Parsons  v.  Monnmuth,  70  Me.  202,  1879. 

Statutory  power  "  to  issue  county  orders  " 
gives  no  authority  to  issue  negotiable 
bonds  payable  at  a  future  day,  with  in- 
terest coupons  attached.  The  difference 
is  substiintial.  Goodnow  v.  Commrs.,  11 
Minn.  31,  1865;  County  Commrs.  v.  Car- 
ter, 2  Kan.  115, 1800;  Hull  i--.  County,  12 
Iowa,  142.  Statutory  form  of  county 
warrants  held  to  be  directory,  and  a  mere 
departure  from  this  form  is  no  defence  to 
an  action  on  the  warrant.  Young  v. 
Camden  County,  19  Mo.  309,  1854.  A 
contract  made  by  a  county  with  another 
party,  in  which  the  county  agrees  to  pay 
for  services  rendered  in  connty  warrants, 
is  in  effect  a  contract  payable  in  money, 
and  is  not  void.  Babcock  v.  Goodrich, 
47  Cal.  488,  1874. 

Authority  to  a  city  to  subscribe  for 
stock,  to  be  paid  for  by  "  certijicates  of 
loan,"  authorizes  it  to  issue  negotiable 
bonds  with  coupons  attached,  such  "  cer- 
tificates of  loan"  and  "bonds"  being 
considered  identical.  Aniey  v.  Alleghany 
City,  24  How.  (U.  S.)  3G4,  1860;  see 
Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh  (power  "  to 
borrow  money"),  34  Pa.  St.  496,  511; 
Same  v.  Same,  41  Pa.  St.  278.  Power  by 
public  corporations  to  issue  negotiable 
Ijonds  may  be  inferred  from  the  power  to 
subscribe  for  stock,  and  to  make  payment 
for  it  in  bonds.  Curtis  v.  Butler  County, 
24  How.  (U.  S.)  435  ;  Bushnell  i'.  Beloit, 
10  Wis.  195.  Express  legislative  au- 
thority to  a  city  to  subscribe  for  stock  in 
a  railroad  "  as  fully  as  any  individual," 
authorizes  the  issue,  by  the  city,  of  nego- 
tiable bonds  in  payment  therefor.  Sey- 
bert  V.  Pittsburgh,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.)  272, 
18G3 ;  approving.  Commonwealth  v.  Same, 
41  Pa.  St.  278;  Rogers  v.  Burlington 
(power  to  "borrow  money  for  any  public 
purpose"),  3  Wall.  654,  1865;  Meyer  v. 
Muscatine,  1  Wall.  385 ;  Mitchell  v.  Bur- 


§  500.] 


CONTRACTS. 


483 


§  489-499.  (408)  Liahilifi/  of  Indorser  of  Warrants.— WaTmnta 
or  orders  of  a  municipal  corporation  for  the  unconditional  payment 
of  money  to  a  person  named,  or  order,  or  bearer,  have  the  char- 
acter of  negotiable  paper,  so  far,  at  least,  as  to  render  parties 
indorsing  them  liable  as  indorsers} 

§  500.  (409)  Payment  and  Cancellation  of  Warrants.  —  Pay- 
ment by  the  treasurer  or  proper  officer  of  a  municipal  corpora- 

lington,  4  Wall.  270.  By  resolution,  the  has  been  implied,  Mr.  Justice  Bradley  ob- 
council'  authorized  the  mayor  to  borrow  serves  :  "  But  in  our  judgment  these 
money  of  a  bank,  and  execute  the  note  of  implications  should  not  be  encouraged  or 
the  corporation  therefor,  instead  of  which 
he  executed  the  bond  of  the  corporation 


under  the  seal  of  the  corporation.  In  an 
action  on  this  bond  by  the  payee,  it  was 
held  that  the  corporation  could  plead  non 
est  factum,  since  the  act  of  the  mayor  in 
executing  a  writing  obligatory  instead  of 
a  note  did  not  bind  the  corporation.  Lit- 
tle Rock  V.  State  Bank,  3  Eng.  (8  Ark.) 
227;  see  Damon  r.  Granby,2  Tick.  (Mass.) 
345;  Ea-ndall  v.  Van  Vechten,  19  Johns. 
(N,  Y.)  GO;  Bank  v.  Paterson,  7  Cranch, 
299;  Head  v.  Insurance  Co.,  2  lb.  127. 
Where  towns  were  required  "  to  pur- 
chase "  liquors,  and  the  selectmen  were 
indictable  if  they  failed  to  make  provision 
for  executing  the  law,  it  was  held  that  a 
town  might  give  a  negotiable  note  for 
liquors  actually  purchased,  and  that  the 
town  could  not  defend  against  it  in  the 
hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder,  on  the  groimd 
that  the  liquors  were  sold  in  violation  of 
the  law  of  tlie  state.  Bank  v.  Farming- 
ton,  41  N.  H.  32, 1860.  What  an  indorsee 
is  bound  to  inquire  about,  stated.  lb.  42. 
The  general  doctrinef:  of  lite  text  in  sec- 
tions 485-488  are  coincident  with  the 
views  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  in  the  recent  case  of  the  Police 
Jury  V.  Britton,  15  Wall.  506,  1872,  where 
it  was  held  that  county  officers  in  Louis- 
iana, with  the  usual  powers  of  such  offi- 
cers, have  no  implied  author iti/  to  issue  nego- 
tiable paper  (bonds  with  coupons),  payable 
in  the  future,  to  raise  money  or  to  fund 
an  existing  debt.which  will  cut  off  equities 
in  the  hands  o^  bona  fide  holders.  Such  a 
power  is  not  necessarily  incident  to  the 
power  to  make  specified  expenditures  or 
improvements,  though  it  may  be  implied 
from  certain  express  powers,  as,  for  exani- 
ple,  the  power  to  borrow  money.  After 
stating  other  instances  in  which  the  power 


extended  beyond  the  fair  inferences  to  be 
gathered  from  the  circumstances  of  each 
case.  It  would  be  an  anomaly,  justly  to 
be  deprecated,  for  all  our  limited  territo- 
rial boards,  charged  with  certain  objects 
of  necessary  local  administration,  to  be- 
come fountains  of  commercial  issues, 
capable  of  floating  about  in  the  financial 
whirlpools  of  our  large  cities."  15  Wall. 
572.  But  see  on  this  point  of  the  inci- 
dental power  of  municipal  corporations 
to  borrow  money,  and  to  issue  commercial 
paper,  the  later  case  of  Mayor  of  Nash- 
ville V.  Ray,  19  Wall.  468, 1873 ;  ante,  sec. 
117  et  seq.,  and  notes;  Sterling  v.  West 
Feliciana,  26  La.  An.  59,  1874. 

1  Bull  V.  Sims,  23  N.  Y.  570, 1861.  In 
this  case  the  action  was  by  an  indorsee 
against  the  defendant  as  indorser  of  the 
following  instrument :  — 

"Milwaukee,  Aug.  1,  1859. 
"  The  treasurer  will,  on  or  before  the 
1st  dny  of  February  next,  pay  to  the 
order  of  E.  Sims,  fifty  dollars,  out  of  any 
funds  belonging  to  the  city  not  before  specially 
appropriated,  the  same  having  been  this 
day  allowed  for  dredging,  and  chargeable 
to  the  general  city  fund. 

"  H.  L.  Page,  Mayor. 
"  R.  R.  Lynch,  Cleric." 
It  was  held  that  the  defendant  in- 
curred the  responsibility  of  an  indorser  of 
negotiable  paper,  and  that  the  plaintiff 
was  not  bound  to  show  the  existence  of 
sufficient  funds  in  the  city  treasury  to 
pay  the  warrants,  and  not  specially  ap- 
propriated at  the  time  of  its  maturity. 
Campbell  v.  Polk  County,  3  Iowa,  467  ; 
Hodges  ('.  Shuler,  22  N.  Y.  114  ;  Faircliild 
V.  Ogdensburgh,  etc.  Railroad  Co.,  15  N. 
Y.  337.  Compare  as  to  liabilit}'  of  in- 
dorser, Keller  v.  Ilicks,  22  Cal.  457. 


484 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS, 


[CII.  XIV. 


tion  of  its  orders  or  Avarrants  ipso  facto  extinguishes  them.  If 
lent,  reissued,  or  put  into  circulation  again  by  the  officer,  after 
he  had  once  obtained  credit  therefor,  they  are  not  valid  securities, 
not  even,  it  seems,  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  holder.^ 


§  501.  (410)  Rights  and  Remedies  of  Holder  of  Warrants. — 
A  creditor  of  a  town  is  not  bound  to  receive  an  order  on  the 
treasurei",  but  ma}"  sue  upon  his  original  cause  of  action. ^  But  if 
he  does  receive  it  he  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  presenting  it  to 
the  treasurer,  upon  wliom  it  is  drawn,  or  of  alleging  facts  which 
excuse  presentment,  before  he  can  maintain  an  action  upon  it. 
As  such  an  order  is,  in  effect,  an  order  by  the  debtor  on  himself, 
if  presented  and  payment  be  refused,  the  town  is  liable  instantly, 
and  without  notice  of  non-payment.^ 

§  502.  (411)  Presumption  of  Liability.  —  County  and  city 
orders  signed  by  the  proper  officers  are  prima  facie  hinding  and 


1  Canal  Bank  v.  Supervisors,  5  Denio 
(N.  Y.),  517,  1848.  In  this  case  it  was 
held  that  where,  without  any  fraudulent 
intent,  the  holder  of  valid  county  orders 
exchanged  them  with  the  treasurer  for 
others  which  were  in  fact  paid,  but  which 
had  never  been  allowed  him  in  his  ac- 
counts, the  debt  represented  by  the  valid 
orders  was  not  extinguished,  and  was  a 
suflBcient  consideration  to  support  a  set- 
tlement with  the  county  allowing  it.  As 
to  illegal  orders  in  hands  of  bona  fide 
holder.  Halstead  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.  of 
New  York,  3  Coaist.  (N.  Y.)  430,  affirm- 
ing s.  c.  5  Barb.  218 ;  Mayor  of  Nasli- 
ville  V.  Ray  (important  case),  19  "Wall. 
4G8,  1873.  A  municipal  corporation  is 
not  liable  for  the  increased  face  value  of 
warrants  which  the  clerk  has  fraudulently 
raised  after  issuance.  Chandler  v.  Bay 
St.  Louis,  57  Miss.  327.  Payment  to 
bearer  in  good  faith  exonerates  the  cor- 
poration. Sweet  V.  Carver  Co.,  16  Minn. 
106,  1871. 

2  Benson  v.  Carmel,  8  Greenl.  (8  Me.) 
112;  Willey  v.  Greenfield,  30  Me.  452; 
1849.  No  misapplication  of  a  special 
fund  by  the  officers  of  a  municipal  cor- 
poration can  defeat  the  rights  of  creditors 
entitled  to  be  paid  therefrom.  State  v. 
Pilebury,  30  La.  An.  705. 

3  Varner  v.  Nobleborough,  2  Greenl 


(2  Me.)  121,  where  Mellen,  C.  J.,  says  : 
"  No  sound  reason  can  be  given  wliy  a 
town  should  be  subjected  to  the  perplex- 
ity of  costs  of  an  action  before  the  payee 
of  an  order  will  do  his  duty  and  request 
the  payment.  .  .  .  Tiiere  is  an  implied 
engagement  to  conform  to  established 
usage,  and  present  the  order  for  pay- 
ment." Benson  v.  Carmel,  sujn-a  ;  Pease 
V.  Cornish,  19  Me.  (1  Appl.)  191,  1841. 
An  action  cannot  be  maintained  on  war- 
rants drawn  on  a  municipal  treasurer, 
witliout  allegation  and  proof  of  their  pre- 
sentation to  him,  or  of  facts  wliich  will 
excuse  the  presentation.  Central  v.  Wil- 
coxen,  3  Col.  566 ;  East  Union  v.  Ryan, 
86  Pa.  St.  459.  As  to  mode  of  present- 
ment. Steel  V.  Davis  County,  2  G.  Greene 
(Iowa),  469;  Campbell  v.  Polk  County, 
3  Iowa,  467.  Where  the  paj'ee  has  ac- 
cepted county  orders  for  a  debt  against 
the  county,  and  has  parted  with  such 
orders,  he  cannot  sue  the  county  for  the 
original  debt.  Crawford  County  v.  Wil- 
son, 2  Eng.  (7  Ark.)  214,  1846.  See 
AUison  V.  Juniata  County,  50  Pa.  St.  351. 
An  unpaid  and  dishonored  warrant  on 
the  corporation  treasurer  is  not,  prima 
fitcie  at  least,  an  extinguishment  or  nova- 
tion of  the  original  debt.  Goldschmidt  v. 
New  Orleans,  5  La.  An.  430 ;  Short  v 
New  Orleans,  4  lb.  281. 


§  503.]  CONTEACTS.  485 

legal.  These  officers  will  be  presumed  to  have  done  their  duty. 
Such  orders  make  a  prima  facie  cause  of  action.  Impeachment 
must  come  from  the  defendant.^ 

§  503.  Such  warrants  or  orders  drawn  for  ordinary  municipal 
expenses  are  not  intended  to  have  the  qualities  of  negotiable 
paper,  but  are  instruments  authorized  for  convenient  use  in  con- 
ducting the  current  and  ordinary  business  of  the  corporation  and 
as  a  means  of  anticipating  its  ordinary  revenue.  It  would  over- 
whelm municipalities  with  ruin  to  hold  that  such  warrants  or 
orders  had  the  qualities  of  negotiable  paper,  especially  that  qual- 
ity which  protects  an  innocent  holder  for  value  from  defences  of 
which  he  has  no  notice,  actual  or  constructive.  All  holders  of 
such  warrants  or  orders,  even  when  payable  to  order  or  bearer, 
stand  in  the  shoes  of  the  payee,  and  the  rights  and  remedies  are 
essentially  different  from  those  of  the  holders  of  authorized  nego- 
tiable municipal  bonds.  Such  is  the  sound  doctrine  and  such 
the  authorities  almost  without  exception.^ 

Without  express  authority  from  the  legislature  a  municipality 
cannot  discount  its  warrants  to  its  creditors  so  as  to  make  them 
equivalent  to  cash,  or  issue  warrants  for  more  than  the  sum  act- 
ually due  the  claimant;  and  as  to  the  excess  they  are  void,  and 
the  holder  will  be  treated  only  as  the  equitable  assignee  of  the 
valid  legal  claim  of  the  payee.^ 

1  Commrs.  v.  Day,  19  Ind.  450,  1862;  312;  Hague  v.  Philadelphia,  48  Pa.  528. 

9  lb.  .359  ;  Commrs.  v.  Keller,  G  Kan.  510,  A  law  creating  the  liability  of  a  county  is 

1870;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  211,  a  condition  precedent  to  the  exaction  of 

1865;  Cheeney  y.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53,  payment  from  the  county.     Hess  y.  Pegg, 

1875.     Such  debts  "do  not  stand  on  the  7  Nev.  23,  1871. 

footing  of  those  contracted  under  a  special  ^  Supervisors  v.  United  States  (nature 

conditional  grant,  of  power."     19  Ind.  450 ;  of  warrants   and   remedy),  18  Wall.  71; 

People  V.  Mead,  24  N.  Y.  114;  ante,  ch.  Shirk  v.  Pulaski   County,  4  Dillon,  209. 

ix.   sec.   213;    supra,  sec.   487.      County  213,  1877,  and  cases  cited;  Clark  ?'.  Des 

warrants  are  valid  instruments  only  when  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199  ;  Mayor  of  Nash- 

the  board  of  supervisors   had  legal  au-  viHe  v.  Ray,  19  Wall.  408;  United  States 

tliority  to   issue   them,  or    contract   the  v.  Miller  County,  4  Dillon,  233,  1878. 
obligation  on  which  they  were  founded,  ^  Sliirk  v.  Pulaski   County,  4  Dillon, 

and  are  not  binding  when  issued  in  viola-  209,   1877;  Goync  i\  Ashley  County,  31 

tion  of  law  or  in  fulfilment  of  a  contract  Ark.  5-52, 1876;  Bauer  r.  Franklin  County, 

that    the    board    was     prohibited    from  51  Mo.  205, 1873.    "  The  flagrant  abuses," 

making.    Th. ;  Sault    Ste.   Marie  v.  Van  which,  as  Wagmr,  J.,  says,  in   the  case 

Dusan,  40   Mich.  420;  Jefferson  County  lastcitcd,  would  follow  any  other  doctrine, 

V.   Arrighi,    54   Miss.   668;    Nash   v.    St.  are  well  exemplified  in  Shirk  y.  Pulaski 

Paul,  11   Minn.  174  ;  People  y.  Flagg,  17  County      Foster  i-.  Coleman,  10  Cal.  278  ; 

N.  Y.  589;  Brady  v.  New  York,  20  N.  Y.  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa,  199. 


486 


MUNICIPAL  CORPOKATIONS. 


[CII.  XIV. 


§  504.  (412)  Defences.  —  A  municipal  corporation  is  not  estopped^ 
after  a  wammt  upon  its  treasury  has  been  issued,  to  set  up  the 
defence  of  ultra  vires,  or  fraud,  or  loant  or  failure  of  consideration.^ 
And  it  may  maintain  a  bill  in  equity  to  cancel  A\arrants  illegally 
issued.^  Tax-payers  may  enjoin  the  issue  of  illegal  warrants  or 
scrip.  3 

§  505.  (413)  Payable  out  of  a  Particular  Fund.  —  If  by  law  a 
particular  claim  is  to  be  paid  out  of  a  special  fund,  a  warrant  or 
order  issued  therefor  should  be  made  payable  out  of  such  fund ; 
if  made  payable  from  the  treasury  generally  by  the  officers  issu- 
ing it,  the  corporation  is  not  bound  by  their  act.*  An  order  or 
warrant,  concluding  with  the  words  "  and  charge  the  same  to  the 


1  Thomas  v.  Richmond  (scrip  to  cir- 
culate as  money),  12  Wall.  349,  1870; 
Webster  County  v.  Taylor,  19  Iowa,  117, 
1865;  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  lb.  199; 
Clark  V.  Polk  County,  lb.  248 ;  Hodges  v. 
Buffalo,  2  Denio  (N.  Y.),  110;  Halstead 
V.  Mayor,  etc.,  3  N.  Y.  430;  Brown  v. 
Utica,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  104;  Antliony  v. 
Inhabitants,  etc.,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  286.  The 
allowance  of  a  claim  by  a  county  board 
is  not  final  and  conclusive.  Such  allow- 
ance is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the 
correctness  of  the  claim,  "  but,"  says 
Kingman,  C.  J.,  "  the  settlement  of  an 
account  by  the  county  board  is  not  more 
sacred  than  a  settlement  made  by  in- 
dividuals." The  court  therefore  held, 
and  properly  so,  that  the  allowance  of  a 
claim  by  the  county  was  not  an  adjudica- 
tion in  the  sense  that  it  would  conclude 
the  county  as  to  the  amount  allowed 
when  sued  upon  the  warrant  drawn  in 
pursuance  of  such  allowance.  Commrs. 
V.  Keller,  6  Kan.  510,  1870;  Mayor  v. 
Ray,  19  Wall.  468,  1873;  Shirk  v.  Pu- 
laski County,  4  Dillon,  209,  1877  ;  Chee- 
ney  v.  Brookfield,  60  Mo.  53,  1875;  post, 
ch.  xxiii.  Warrants  may,  it  seems,  be 
usurious.  Clark  v.  Des  Moines,  supra; 
jiost,  sec.  506,  note. 

'^  Pulaski  County  v.  Lincoln,  4  Eng. 
(9  Ark.)  320,  1849;  Webster  County  v. 
Taylor,  19  Iowa,  117,  1865 ;  Trustees  v. 
Clierry,  8  Oliio  St.  564,  1858;  Glasten- 
bury  V.  McDonald,  44  Vt.  450,  1872.  In 
Mississippi  a  board  known  as  the  board 
of  police  are  authorized  by  law  to  audit 


and  allow,  upon  due  proof,  all  claims 
against  the  county,  and  counties  in  that 
state  cannot  be  sued  directly.  The  action 
of  the  board  in  allowing  claims  for  mat- 
ters of  county  charge,  and  in  ordering 
warrants  to  issue  therefor,  is  final  and 
conclusive  on  the  county,  in  the  absence 
of  fraud,  until  it  is  reversed  or  vacated. 
Carroll  v.  Board,  etc.  28  Miss.  (6  Cush.) 
38,  1854.  But  the  weight  of  authority  is 
otherwise.  Shirk  v.  Pulaski  County,  4 
Dillon,  209,  1877.  Issuing  new  orders  for 
old.  Effect  of,  see  Clark  v.  Des  Moines, 
19  Iowa,  199;  Canal  Bank  v.  Supervisors, 
5  Denio  (N.  Y.),  517;  Lake  v.  Trustees, 
4  lb.  520;  Sliirk  v.  Pulaski  County,  4  Dil- 
lon, 209,  1877.  On  warrants  or  orders 
the  statute  of  limitations  does  not  begin  to 
run  until  payment  is  denied.  Justices  v. 
Orr,  12  Ga.  137,  1852.  See  Carroll  v. 
Board,  etc.,  28  Miss.  88;  De  Cordova 
V.  Galveston  (bonds),  4  Tex.  470  ;  City  i;. 
Lamson  (coupons),  9  Wall.  478;  supra, 
sec.  487,  note;  Baker  v.  Johnson  County, 
33  Iowa,  151.  In  iVebraska,  county  war- 
rants are  not  within  the  limitation  stat- 
utes. Brewer  v.  Otoe  County,  1  Neb. 
373. 

3  Colburn  v.  Chattanooga,  Tenn. ;  s.  c. 
17  Am.  Law  Reg.  N.  S.  191 ;  post,  sees. 
914,  921,  923. 

*  County  Commissioners  v.  Cox,  6  Ind. 
403,  1855 ;  Campbell  v.  Polk  County,  49 
Mo.  214,  1872;  Boro  v.  Phillips  County, 
4  Dillon,  216,  223,  1877,  citing  text,  post, 
ch.  XX. 


§  506.] 


CONTRACTS. 


487 


account  of  Union  Avenue,"  is  payable  out  of  the  particular  fund 
indicated,  and  is  not  a  claim  against  the  corporation. ^  But  the 
distinction  must  be  observed  between  orders  payable  out  of  a 
particular  fund,  and  those  which  evidence  a  general  corporate 
liability,  but  are  directed  to  be  charged  to  a  particular  account.^ 

§  506.  (414)  Interest  on  Corporate  Indebtedness.  —  The  rule  in 
respect  to  interest  on  debts  against  municipal  corporations  does 
not  ordinarily  differ  from  that  which  applies  to  individuals.^ 
Under  the  Missouri  statute,  providing  generally  that  creditors 
shall  be  allowed  interest  at  the  rate  of  six  per  cent  per  annum, 
etc.,  it  is  held  that  county  warrants  draw  interest  after  present- 
ment to  the  treasury  and  refusal  of  payment  by  the  treasurer, 
the  court  regarding  the  general  statute  as  to  interest  broad  enough 
to  embrace  all  debtors,  counties  as  well  as  individuals.*     But  in 

county  order  payable  out  of  the  three 
per  cent  fund,  "  as  fast  as  the  same  shall 
accrue  to  the  county,"  it  must  be  alleged 
that  the  county  has  received  money  from 
tlie  specific  fund  named  applicable  to 
the  order  in  suit,  or  that  the  order  was 
fraudulently  drawn  upon  a  fund  in  which 
the  county  had  no  assets.  Commission- 
ers V.  Mason,  9  Ind.  97,  1857.  See  chap- 
ter on    Mandamus,  post. 

3  Langdon  v.  Castleton,  30  Vt.  285 
(action  on  book  account). 

^  Robbins  v.  County  Court,  3  Mo.  57, 
1831  ;  State  v.  Trustees,  61  Mo.  155/ 
1875.  In  Iowa,  coupons  on  county  and 
city  bonds  are  held  to  drata  iriterest. 
Rogers  v.  Lee  County,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  R. 
529.  See  Railroad  Company  v.  Evans- 
ville,  15  Ind.  395 ;  HoUingsworth  v.  De- 
troit, 3  McLean,  472 ;  Pruyn  v  Milwaukee, 

18  Wis.  367.  If  under  authority  to  issue 
bonds  with  eight  per  cent  interest,  bonds 
be  issued  drawing  twelve  per  cent,  they 
are  valid  and  bear  interest  at  the  statu- 
tory rate.  Quincy  v.  Warfield,  25  111. 
317.  Usury.  Whether  usury  can  be 
predicated  of  a  sale  or  issue  by  a  cor- 
poration of  its  securities.  So  held,  Dan- 
ville V.  Sutherlin,  20  Gratt.  (Va.)  555, 
1871 ;  Lynchburg  v.  Norvell,  20  Gratt. 
(Va.)   601,  1871;   Clark  v.   Des  Moines, 

19  Iowa,  199.  May  be  made  payable  out 
of  the  state.  Meyer  v.  Muscatine,  1  Wall. 
381;  Maddox  v.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.) 
50. 


1  Laker.  Trustees, etc., 4  Denio(X.  Y.) 
520,  1847,  remedy  of  holder  discussed ; 
distinguished  from  Kelly  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
Brooklyn,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  263;  and  see  Mc- 
Cullough  V.  Mayor,  etc.,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
458;  Cuyler  v.  Rochester,  12  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  165;  Argenti  v.  San  Francisco, 
16  Cal.  255,  and  note  remarks  of  Field, 
C.  J. ;  Martin  v.  San  Francisco,  lb.  285 ; 
Kingsberry  v.  Pettis  Co.,  48  Mo.  207, 1871. 
An  instrument  in  this  form  :  — 

"  December  31,  1836. 
"  City   of  Brooklyn,  ss.     To   the    City 
Treasurer.     Pay  A.    L.  or   order  $1500 
for  award  No.  7,  and  charge  to  Bedford 
road  assessment,  etc. 

"  J.  T.,   Mai/or. 

"A.  G.  S.,  Clerk." 
Held,  1st.  Negotiable,  and  not  paj'able 
out  of  any  special  fund.  2d.  Corporation 
was  not  discharged  by  failure  to  present 
and  give  notice,  no  damage  or  injury 
being  sustained  in  consequence  of  the 
omission.  Kelly  v.  Mayor,  etc.,  4  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  263,  1843;  Steely.  Davis  County, 
2  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  460;  Campbell  v. 
Polk  County,  3  Iowa,  467. 

2  Clark  V.  Des  Moines,  19  Iowa, 
199,  222 ;  Edwards  on  Bills,  143 ;  Pease 
V.  Cornish,  19  Me.  191 ;  Campbell  v. 
Polk  County,  3  Iowa,  467  ;  Commission- 
ers V.  Mason,  9  Ind.  97 ;  Baycrgue  v. 
San  Francisco,  1  McAll.  C.  C.  R.  175 ; 
Bull  V.  Sims,  23  N.  Y.  570 ;  Montague  v. 
Koran,  12  Wis.  599.     In  an  action  on  a 


488  MUNICIPAL   COEPOEATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

Illinois  it  is  held  that  the  debts  of  municipal  corporations  are 
payable  at  the  treasury  of  the  body  ;  that  interest  on  coupons  — 
that  is,  interest  on  interest  —  cannot  be  recovered,  unless  there 
be  a  special  agreement  to  that  effect,  since  such  corporations  are 
not  named  in  the  act  regulating  interest.  The  court  remarks : 
"  Whatever  power  these  corporations  may  possess  to  contract  for 
the  payment  of  interest,  in  the  absence  of  any  express  legislation 
on  the  subject,  we  are  of  opinion  that  their  indebtedness,  in  the 
absence  of  such  agreement,  does  not  bear  interest.^  If  such  in- 
struments (coupons)  could  in  any  event  draw  interest  without 
an  express  agreement,  it  could  only  be  after  a  proper  demand  of 
payment.  Until  a  demand  is  made,  such  a  body  is  not  in  default. 
They  are  not  like  individuals,  bound  to  seek  their  creditors  to 
make  payments  of  their  indebtedness."  ^ 

§  507.  As  to  the  implied  power  to  horroiv  money  and  issue  commer- 
cial or  negotiable  paper.  —  Much  conflict  of  opinion  has  existed  in 
the  American  courts  touching  the  implied  power  of  public  and 
municipal  corporation  to  issue  commercial  or  negotiable  instruments^ 
that  is,  instruments  free  from  equities  in  the  hands  of  innocent 
holders  for  value.  In  respect  of  public  or  quasi  corporations, 
such  as  counties,  etc.,  as  distinguished  from  municipal  corpora- 

1  South  Park  Commissioners  v.  Dun-  A  city  issued  warrants  or  orders  on 

levy,  91   111.  49 ;  Pekiii  v.  Reynolds,  31  its   treasurer,   payable  when   funds   had 

111.    529;   People  t'.  Salomon,  51  111.  52;  been  collected  therefor  from  certain  tax 

Chicago   V.    People,   56    111.   327,   1870 ;  sales,   with    interest.     The   funds   being 

Chicago  V.  Allcock,  80  111.  384  ;  Cook  v.  collected,   the   common   council    ordered 

South  Park  Commissioners,  61  111.  115.  the   treasurer   to  notify  holders  of   war- 

'^  Pekin  v.  Reynolds,  31  III.  529,  1863  ;  rants,  by  publication  in  the  official  paper, 
s.  p.  Chicago  v.  People,  56  111.  327  to  present  the  same  for  payment,  and 
1870 ;  People  v.  Tazewell  County,  22  111.  that  interest  would  cease  after  a  certain 
147  ;  Johnson  v.  Stark  County,  24  111.  75.  day.  It  did  not  appear  that  plaintiff 
But  if  made  payable  at  a  place  other  knew  of  such  publication,  though  duly 
than  the  treasury,  the  bonds  are  not  void,  made.  Held,  that  the  city  was  liable  for 
but  only  this  provision  in  them.  Sher-  interest  on  tiie  warrants  held  by  plain- 
lock  V.  Winnetka,  68  III.  530,  1873.  In  tiff  to  the  time  of  their  presentation. 
Madison  County  v.  Bartlett,  1  Scam.  Read  v.  Buffalo,  74  N.  Y.  436.  Nor  can 
(2  111.)  67,  it  was  held  that  counties  were  it  set  up  in  bar  of  an  action  to  recover  a 
not  liable  to  pay  interest  on  their  orders  debt  due  from  it,  that  it  was  once  willing 
or  warrants,  not  being  named  in  the  stat-  and  offered  to  pay  it ;  nor  can  it  stop  in- 
ute  regulating  interest,  and  the  common-  terest  upon  its  obligations  by  publishing 
law  not  allowing  it  to  be  recovered.  So  a  notice  in  a  newspaper  that  it  will  cease 
in  Petmsylvania.  Allison  v.  County,  50  after  a  certain  date  when  the  warrants 
Pa.  St.  351.  In  that  state  a  county  is  not  bear  interest,  lb. ;  see,  also,  Hummel  v. 
suable  on  its  warrants,  but  suit  must  be  Brown,  24  Pa.  St.  311. 
on  original  claim.     lb. ;  post,  ch.  xx. 


§  507.]  CONTEACTS.  489 

tions  proper,  the  general  current  of  authority  is  against  the  propo- 
sition that,  as  ordinarily  organized,  they  possess  any  such  implied 
power.  And  the  power  is  not  incident  to  the  authority  to  make 
specified  expenditures  or  improvements,  but  it  may  be  implied, 
where  there  is  notliing  to  rebut  it,  from  other  powers,  such  as  the 
express  power  to  borrow  money. ^ 

But  in  view  of  the  more  complex  and  diversified  powers  usually 
conferred  upon  chartered  or  municipal  corporations  proper,  there 
has  been  a  stronger  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  courts  to 
hold  that  such  corporations,  as  usually  existing  in  this  country, 
have  an  incidental  or  implied  power  to  issue  commercial  securi- 
ties. The  line  of  argument  is  substantially  this:  Trading  and 
commercial  corporations  have  this  power  as  an  incidental  means 
of  effecting  their  objects,  why  not  municipal  corporations  as 
well?  Municipal  corporations  are  clothed  with  large  powers, 
which  necessarily  oblige  them  to  use  credit  or  to  create  debts : 
therefore,  if  they  may  create  debts,  they  may  borrow  the  money 
to  pay  them  ;  and  if  they  may  borrow  money,  they  have  the  inci- 
dental power  to  do  like  other  borrowers,  namely,  give  a  negotiable 
bill,  note,  or  bond  therefor.  The  whole  argument,  in  our  judg- 
ment, is  unsound.  It  is  true  that  in  this  country  private  busi- 
ness corporations  are  usually  considered  to  have  the  incidental 
power  to  borrow  money  or  give  negotiable  paper  as  an  evidence 
of  their  indebtedness,  but  in  England  it  is  held  that  express 
power  is  necessary  to  enable  even  railway  corporations  to  draw, 
indorse,  or  accept  bills  of  exchange.^  But  admit  that  the  Ameri- 
can doctrine  is  otherwise  ^  and  that  it  is  rightly  so,  still  there  is 
no  resemblance  between  private  and  public  or  municipal  corpora- 
tions in  this  regard  The  latter  are  simply  agencies  of  govern- 
ment. They  are  not  organized  for  trading,  commercial,  or  business 
purposes.  They  have,  in  general,  but  one  mode  of  meeting  their 
liabilities,  and  that  is  by  taxation,  and  it  is  upon  this  resource 

1  Tolice  Jury  v.  Britton,  15  Wall.  5G6,  ^  gee  observations  of  Bi/les,  J.,  in  Bate- 

1872.     The  ordinary  powers  possessed  by  man  v  Mid- Wales  Railway  Co.,  Law  Rep. 

counties,  as  agencies  of  the  state  in  the  1  C.  P.  510,  18G6. 

administration   of  public   affairs,  do   not  3  Stratton  v.  Allen,  16  N.  J.  Eq.  229; 

give  the  incidental  power  to  issue  nego-  McCulIough  v.  Moss,  5  Denio    (N.  Y.), 

tiable  bonds  and  coupons.     See  Lyndc  v.  567 ;  Straus  v.  Eagle  Ins.  Co.,  5  Ohio  St. 

County,  16  Wall.  6.  59 ;  2  Kent's  Com.  229;  1  Parsous'  Notes 

Distinction  between  public  and  munici-  and  Bills,  165. 
pal  corporations,  in  the  sense  referred  to 
in  the  text,  see  ante,  sees.  22,  54,  58,  66. 


400  MUNICIPAL   COKPORATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

that  creditors  must  be  taken  to  rely.     For  hundreds  of  years  in 
England,  such  corporations  have  existed,  without  it  ever  being 
contended  that  they  could,  without  express  authority,  issue  com- 
mercial paper.     Private  corporations  are  much  more  vigilant  and 
watchful  of  their  interests  than  it  is  possible  for  public  or  muni- 
cipal corporations  to  be.     The  frauds  which  unscrupulous  officers 
will  be  enabled  successfully  to  practise,  if  an  implied  and  un- 
guarded power  to  issue  negotiable  securities  is  recognized,  and 
which  the  corporation  or  the  citizen  will  be  helpless  to  prevent, 
is  a  strong  argument  against  the  judicial  establishment  of  any 
such  power.     And  the  argument  is  unanswerable,  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  in  ascertaining  the  extent  of  corporate  powers 
there  is  no  rule  of  safety,  but  the  rule  of  strict  construction,  and 
that  such  an  implied  power  is  not  necessary,  however  convenient 
it  may  be  at  times,  to  enable  the  corporation  to  exercise  its  ordi- 
nary and  usual  express  powers,  or  to  carry  into  effect  the  purposes 
for  which  the  corporation  is  created.     We  regard  as  alike  un- 
sound and  dangerous  the  doctrine  that  a  public  or  municipal  cor- 
poration  possesses  the  implied  poiver  to   borrow  money  for  its 
ordinary  purposes,  and  as  incidental  to  that,  the  power  to  issue 
commercial  securities.     The  cases  on  this  subject  are  conflicting, 
but  the  tendency  is  towards  the  view  above  indicated.    The  opin- 
ion of  Mr.  Justice  Bradley^  in  a  case  before  referred  to,^  evinces 
a  thorough  comprehension  of  the  whole  question,  and,  in  our  judg- 
ment, is  sound  in  every  proposition  it  advances,  and  must  become 
the  law  of  this  country.     This  view  is  confirmed  by  the  almost 
invariable  legislative  practice  in  the  states  to  confer,  when  it  is 
deemed  expedient,  upon  municipalities  and  public  corporations, 
in  express  terms,  the  power  to  borrow  money  or  to  issue  negotiable 
bonds  or  securities,  and  it  is  of  instruments  thus  authorized  that 
we  design  principally  to  treat.     It  is  an  admitted  and  undisputed 
doctrine  that  the  power  of  public  and  municipal  corporations  to 
subscribe  to   the  stock  of  railway  companies   and  issue   bonds 
therefor  must  be  expressly  conferred.^ 

1  The  Mayor  v.  Ray,  19  Wall.  478,  of  the  nature  of  commercial  paper,  ex 
1873.  It  is  clifficiilt  to  understancl  on  cept  that  by  usage  and  custom,  and  some- 
what ground  the  dissenting  judges  in  this  times  by  legislative  enactment,  they  pass 
case  regarded   the   corporation   irarrnnts  by  delivery. 

as  "  negotiable  securities  of  a  commercial  "  The  cases  on  this  point  are  collected 

character."     The  cases  are  almost  uni-  in  sec.  161,  note.     See   further  on   this 

form  that  such  instruments  do  not  partake  subject,  ante,  sec.  117  et  seq. 


§  508.]  CONTRACTS.  491 

§  508.  Taxation  limited  to  Public  Purposes.  —  What  are  Such. 
—  Aid  to  Railways.  —  Bonds  to  he  paid  hy  Taxation  for  What  Pur- 
poses authorized.  —  After  the  numerous  decisions  by  courts  of  the 
highest  authority,  it  may  now  be  regarded  as  a  settled  doctrine  of 
American  hiw  that  no  tax  can  be  authorized  by  the  legislature  for 
any  purpose  which  is  essentiaWy  private,  or,  to  state  the  proposition 
in  other  words,  for  any  but  a  public  purpose.^  What  is  a  public  pur- 
pose may  not  always  be  easy  to  determine  ;  but  when  determined, 
it  constitutes  the  boundary  of  the  power  of  taxation.  Whether 
taxation  to  aid  in  the  building  of  railways  owned  by  private  cor- 
porations is  taxation  for  a  public  purpose  is  a  question  which  has 
been  discussed  and  decided  by  the  courts  of  last  resort  in  almost 
every  state  in  the  Union,  and  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.2  Although  the  doctrine  of  the  constitutionality  of  such 
taxation  has  been  vigorously  resisted  and  combated,  still  it  must 
be  admitted  that  the  great  preponderance  of  the  judicial  judg- 
ments has  been  on  the  side  of  the  competency  of  such  legislation, 
in  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  restraint.^  And  there- 
fore the  legislature  may  authorize  subscriptions  by  municipalities 
to  the  stock  of  railway  corporations,  or  donations  to  them,  and 
provide  for  the  payment  of  such  subscriptions  or  donations  by 
the  issue  and  sale  of  the  negotiable  bonds  of  the  municipality. 
But  a  statute  which  authorizes  the  issue  of  bonds  to  be  paid  by 
taxation  to  aid  certain  individuals  or  classes,  or  in  aid  of  the  man- 
ufacturing enterprise  of  individuals  or  private  corporations,  is  void, 

1  Loan   Assoc,   v.   Topeka,   20   Wall.  Otoe  Co.,  16  Wall.  667;  Loan  Assoc,  v. 

655;    Curtis   v.    Whipple,   24   Wis.    350;  Topeka,  sw/o-a  ,•  Township  of  Pine  Grove 

Whiting  V.  Fond  du  Lac,  25  Wis.  167 ;  v.  Talcott,  19  Wall.  666,  1873. 

Allen  V.  Lihab.  of  Jay,  60  Me.  124;  Jenk-  3  !„  pjng  Grove  Townsliip  v.  Talcott, 

ing  t;.  Andover,  103  Mass.  94;  Lowell  v.  19   Wall.  666,  677,  Mr.  Justice   Swayne 

Boston,  111  Mass.  454;  Pray  i'.  Northern  says  that  such  legislation  has  been  sus- 

Liberties,  31  Penn.  St.  69  ;  Mayor  of  New  taincd  in    nineteen    out    of   twenty-one 

York,  m  ?e,  11  Jolins.  (N.  Y.)  77  ;  Camden  states.     As    respects    legislative    power, 

V.  Allen,  2  Dutch.  (N.J.)  .398 ;  Sharpless  v.  donations  and  subscriptions  for  stock  stand 

Mayor  of  Phila.,  21  Penn.  St.  147;  Hanson  on  the  same  ground.     Town  of  Queens- 

V.  Vernon,  27   Iowa,  47 ;   Cooley  Const,  bury  v.  Culver,  19  Wall.  83,  1873. 

Lim.,  129,  175,  48 ;  post,  sec.  736,  and  cases  If  it  be  allowable  to  judge  of  a  legal 

cited;  Cooley  on  Taxation,  ch.  iv.,  "  wliere  principle  by  its  fruits,  the  dissenting  and 

the   purposes   for   wliich    taxes   may   be  minority  judges  on  tliis  question  will  find 

laid"  are  enumerated,  and  illustrated  by  much  to  confirm  the  conviction  that  their 

the  adjudicated  cases.  views  were  sound.     But  it  is  useless  to 

'■^  Ante,  sees.  1.53,  157;  Rogers  v.  Bur-  fight  that  battle  over  again;  it  has  been 

lington,    3    Wall.    654 ;    Supervisors    v.  fought  and  lost.     All   that  is  left  is  the 

Schenek,  5  Wall.  772,  779;  Olcott  v.  Su-  contemplation  and  contrast  of  what  might 

pervisors,  16  Wall.  678 ;  Railroad  Co.  r.  have  been  and  what  is. 


492  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

this  being,  within  the  moaning  of  the  rnle,  «i  private,  as  distin- 
guished from  a  public  purpose,  although  in  a  remote  or  collateral 
way  the  local  public  might  be  benefited  thereby. 

The  execution  of  the  powers  ordinarily  conferred  upon  municipal 
corporations,  such  as  improving  highways  and  streets,  construct- 
ing water-works,  gas-works,  markets,  preserving  the  public 
health,  and  the  like,  are  of  course  public  purposes ;  and  upon  leg- 
islative authority  being  given,  negotiable  bonds  may  be  issued 
therefor.  What  will  constitute  sufficient  authority  for  the  issue 
of  such  bonds  will  be  considered  further  on. 

§  509.  Different  Classes  of  Bonds. — Implied  and  Express  Power 
to  issue.  —  Recitals.  —  3Iode  of  Pleading.  —  Negotiable  securities 
of  the  kind  here  referred  to  have  been  issued  by  municipal  corpor- 
ations prop)er  (generally  under  an  express  power  to  aid  railways, 
or  for  gas-works,  water-works,  or  specified  local  improvements, 
but  sometimes  under  an  implied  power),  and  bt/  counties,  usually 
under  express  power  (generally  to  aid  railways,  or  for  public 
buildings,  bridges,  or  improvements^)  and  bt/  organized  townships 
which  are  parts  of  counties,  under  express  authority,  and  usually 
as  a  means  of  aiding  the  construction  of  railways,  and  bg  school 

^  In  several  of  the  states  power  is  given  missioners  or  city  council  shall  first  sub- 
to  municipalities  or  counties  to  issue  mit  tlie  question  of  issuing  bonds  to  a 
bonds  to  aid  works  of  "  internal  improve-  vote  of  the  legal  voters  of  said  county  or 
ment."  And  under  this  generic  term,  the  city,  in  the  manner  provided  by  ch. 
question  has  arisen,  AVhat  are  works  of  ix.  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  state 
internal  improvement  ?  The  Supreme  of  Nebraska  for  submitting  to  the  people 
Court  of  Alabama,  in  defining  the  phrase  of  a  county  the  question  of  borrowing 
"  internal  improvements,"  says  :  "  Wiiere  money."  Session  Laws  of  1869,  page  92. 
internal  improvements  under  state  au-  Under  this  act,  a  county  and  a  precinct 
thority  are  spoken  of,  it  is  universally  issued  bonds  to  build  a  bridge  across  the 
understood  that  works  within  the  state,  Platte  River,  and  on  an  application  by  a 
by  wliicli  the  public  are  supposed  to  be  tax-payer  to  restrain  the  collection  of 
benefited,  are  intended ;  such  as  the  im-  taxes  levied  to  pay  interest  on  such 
provements  of  higiiways  and  channels  bonds,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska 
of  travel  and  commerce."  Mayor  et  al.  construing  the  above  act  in  tlie  light  of 
of  Watumpka  v.  Newton,  2.3  Ala.  6(i0.  the  legislation  of  the  state,  held  that  a 

The  legislature  of  Nebraska  passed  an  bridge  was  a  work  of  "  internal  improve- 

act  "  That  any  county  or  city  in  the  state  ment"  within  the  meaning  of  the  stat- 

of  Nebraska  is  liereby  authorized  to  issue  ute,  and  that  under  the  power  to  aid,  the 

bonds  to   aid  in  the  construction  of  any  county  might  itself  construct  the  bridge, 

railroad  or  other  work  of  internal  improve-  Union    Pacific   Railroad    Co.    v.    Colfax 

men^,  to  an  amount  to  be  determined  by  County,  4  Nebraska,  450,  1876;   s.  c.  3 

the  county  commissioners  of  such  county,  Cent.  Law  Jour.  287. 

or  the  city  council  of  such  city,  not  ex-  In  Montana  it  is  held  that  the  legisla- 

ceeding     ten   per   cent   of  the    assessed  ture  may  authorize  the  creation  of  county 

valuation  of  all  taxable  property  in  said  indebtedness  for  public  roads.    Wilcox  v. 

county  or  city,  poi-i'c?cc?  the  county  com-  Deer  Lodge  Co.,  2  Mont.  T.  574. 


§  509.]  CONTRACTS.  493 

districts,  under  express  power,  to  raise  money  to  erect  school- 
houses.     In  some  of  the  Western  states,  counties  have  been  legis- 
latively made  the  agents  for  the  inhabitants  of  non-incorporated 
townships,  and   in   Missouri  for  "strips  of  territory"   to   issue 
bonds  in  the  name  of  the  county,  but  to  be  paid  out  of  the  prop- 
erty within  the  specified  township  or  designated  territorial  limits 
or  strip  of  country. ^     Reference  is  made  to  this  subject  here  in 
order  to  observe  that  where  the  bonds  or  securities  are  issued 
under  an  express  power,  the  legislative  act,  being  the  source  of 
the  authority,  measures  and  limits  the  power  it  confers,  and  the 
same  principles  apply  to  the  instruments  issued  under  it  by  awj 
of  these  classes  of  corporations,  or  quasi  corporations.     But  in 
respect  to  all  these  corporations  and  quasi  corporations,  except, 
possibly,  municipal  or  chartered  corporations  proper,  we  suppose 
that  there  is  no  soUd  ground  to  contend  that  they  have  any  in- 
herent or  general  power  to  issue  commercial  securities,  and  can 
only  do  so  by  virtue  of  express  legislative  authority,  which  inust 
exist  in  fact  and  which  ought  regularly  to  be  recited  in  the  bond. 
And  in  respect  to  municipal  or  chartered  corporations,  our  opinion, 
as  indicated  in  a  preceding  section,  is  that  they  also  have  no  such 
inherent  power,  and  no   power  whatever  except  so  far  as  con- 
ferred expressly  or   by  fair  impUcation.     This  is  an  important 
principle,  and  it  results  from  it  that  there  is  no  presumption  in 
favor  of  the  power  to  issue  such  securities,  especially  on  the  part 
of  quasi  corporations  ;  and  it  would  seem  to  follow  from  it  that  if 
the  bonds  of  such  corporations  contain  no  recital  as  to  the  au- 
thority for  their  issue  or  their  purpose,  there  would  be  no  pre- 
sumption in  favor  of  their  validity,  and  it  would  devolve  on  the 
holder  to  aver  and  show  by  evidence  aliunde  that  the  bonds  were 
issued  for  some  purpose  authorized  by  statute.     And  hence  also, 
as  a  matter  of  pleading,  the  authority  or  power  to  issue  the  bonds 
in  suit  ought  to  appear  on  the  face  of  the  declaration,  or  by  some 
recital  in  the  bonds  made  part  thereof ;  that  is,  it  should  tluis 
appear  that  they  were  issued  for  some  purpose  authorized   by 
statute.2 

1  Construction    of   tlie   Missouri  town-  Bates  County,  Id.  150;  92  U.  S.  569, 1875  ; 

ship  railway  aid  act  of  March  23, 1868,  and  8.  c.  3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  367,  referred  to  at 

the   riglits   and    remedies  of    the   bond-  large,  nj/Ja.   Construction  of  A'a?isas  legis- 

holder.     Jordan  v.  Cass  Co.,  3  Dillon  C.  lation,  Thayer  v.  Montgomery  Co.,  3  Dil- 

C.  R.  185  ;  Same  r.  Same,  Id.  245  ;  Wash-  Ion  C.  C.  1?.  381)  and  note. 
burn  V.  Cass  Co.,  /(/.  251 ;  Ilarshman  v.  2  Thayer  v.  Montgomery  Co.,  3  Dillon 


494  MUNICirAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIY. 

§  510.  Bridges  as  Works  of  Internal  Improvement.  —  Validity  of 
Bonds  issued  therefor. — In  many  states  negotiable  securities  have 
been  issued  under  provisions  authorizing  the  making  of  internal 
improvements.  In  a  late  case  in  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court  ^  the 
question  arose  as  to  whether  a  toll-bridge  was  a  work  of  internal 
improvement  for  which  bonds  might  legally  be  issued  to  aid  in 
building.  The  court  held  that  "  all  bridges  intended  and  used  as 
thoroughfares  are  public  highways,  whether  subject  to  toll  or  not, 
and  that  county  bonds  which  have  been  issued  under  a  statute 
authorizing  the  issue  of  such  bonds  in  aid  of  an  internal  improve- 
ment are  valid  when  given  for  the  building  a  bridge  which  is 
a  thoroughfare,  though  tolls  are  charged  thereon  by  the  county. 
Whether  the  county  have  the  right  to  demand  tolls  over  a  bridge 
which  is  a  thoroughfare  will  not  affect  the  validity  of  county  bonds 
issued  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  bridge."  In  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  it  was  said:  "  In  approaching  the  solution  of  these  ques- 
tions, the  first  inquiry  that  naturally  presents  itself  is,  whether  a 
toll-bridge,  like  that  referred  to,  is  a  public  bridge,  and  hence  a 
work  of  internal  improvement.  And  we  can  hardly  refrain  from 
expressing  surprise  that  there  should  be  any  doubt  on  the  subject. 
What  was  the  bridge  built  for,  if  not  fit  for  public  use  ?  Cer- 
tainly not  for  the  mere  purpose  of  spanning  the  Platte  River  as  an 

C.  C.  II.  389  and  note ;  Kennard  v.  Cass  oivner,  holder,  or  hearer  of  the  coupons  in 

County,  Ih.  147 ;   Nashville   v.  Ray,    19  suit  good  on  general  demurrer.    Pendle- 

"Wall.  468.  ton  County  v.  Amy,  13  Wall.  297. 

Mode  of  declaring  on  bonds  and  coupons.  Proof  of  execution  of  bond  when  denied 

Kennard  v.  Cass  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  under  oath.     Under  the  legislation  of  Al- 

R.  147,  and  cases  cited  in  note  on  p.  150;  abama,  non  assumpsit  does  not  involve  the 

Tliayer  v.  Montgomery  County,  supra.  factum  of  tl-.e  bonds.     Chambers  County 

Mode  of  pleading  defences.     The  plea  of  v.  Clews,  21  Wall.  317,  1874. 

the  general   issue   in   assumpsit    in    states  Corporation  may  plead  nil  debet  and 

where  that  mode  of  pleading  is  yet  al-  non  est  factum.     Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar, 

lowed,  puts  in  issue  the  question  of  the  15  Wall.  355,  1872. 

authority  of  the  officers  to  issue  tlie  bonds  Remedij  at  law.     Corporation  cannot  be 

and  the  ;)OHa,/jf/es  of  the  plaintiff,  but  pre-  relieved   against  bond   in  equity  if   the 

sumptively  the  plaintiff  is  a  holder  for  ground  for  relief  shows  complete  defence 

value   before   maturity,  without  notice;  or  an  adequate  remedy  at  law.      Grand 

the  contrary  must  be  shown  by  the  de-  Chute   v.  Winegar    (case   in  equity),  15 

fendant.     Chambers  County  v.  Clews,  21  Wall.  373. 

Wall.    317,    1874;   Pendleton    County   v.  ^  County  Commrs.  j;.  Chandler,  96  U. 

Amy,  13  Wall.  297.     Special  plea  errone-  S.  205,  1877.    Works  of  internal  improve- 

ously  held  bad,  considered  as  amounting  ment  defined.     Fremont  Building  Assoc, 

to  the  general  issue;  and  as  the  erroneous  v.  Sherwin,  6  Neb.  48,  1877;  Township  of 

ruling  was  harmless,  the  judgment  was  Burlington    v.   Beaslcy,   94  U.   S.   310; 

not  reversed.     Ih.  Guernsey  v.  Burlington,  4  Dillon,   372, 

Answer  denying  that  plaintiff  is  the  1877. 


§  510.]  CONTRACTS.  495 

architectural  ornament,  however  beautiful  it  may  be  as  a  work  of 
art;  nor  for  the  private  use  of  the  common  council  and  their 
families ;  nor  even  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the  citizens  of  Fre- 
mont. All  persons,  of  whatever  place,  condition,  or  quality,  are 
entitled  to  use  it  as  a  public  thoroughfare  for  crossing  the  river. 
The  fact  that  they  are  required  to  pay  toll  for  its  use  does  not 
affect  the  question  in  the  slightest  degree.  Turnpikes  are  public 
highways,  notwithstanding  the  exaction  of  toll  for  passing  on 
them.  Railroads  are  public  highways,  and  are  the  only  works  of 
internal  improvement  specially  named  in  the  act ;  yet  no  one 
can  travel  on  them  without  paying  toll.  Railroads,  turnpikes, 
bridges,  ferries,  are  all  things  of  public  concern,  and  the  right  to 
erect  them  is  a  public  right.  If  it  be  conceded  to  a  private  indi- 
vidual or  corporation,  it  is  conceded  as  a  public  franchise ;  and 
the  right  to  take  toll  is  granted  as  a  compensation  for  erecting  the 
work,  and  relieving  the  public  treasury  from  the  burden  thereof. 
Those  who  have  such  franchises  are  agents  of  the  public.  They 
have,  it  is  true,  a  private  interest  in  the  tolls ;  but  the  works  are 
public  and  subject  to  public  regulation,  and  the  entire  public  has 
the  right  to  use  them.  These  principles  are  so  elementary  in  the 
common  law  that  we  can  hardly  open  our  books  without  seeing 
them  recognized  or  illustrated.  ^ 

"  Of  course  there  may  be  private  bridges  as  there  may  be  private 
ways,  and  they  are  put  in  the  same  category  by  the  text-writers ;  ^ 
but  all  bridges  intended  and  used  as  thoroughfares  are  public 
highways,  whether  subject  to  toll  or  not.  Regularly,  all  public 
bridges  are  a  county  charge,  and  the  county  is  bound  to  erect 
and  maintain  them  ;  ^  but  others  may  be  charged  with  this  duty, 
and  a  toll  is  the  commonest  of  means  for  obtaining  compensation 
for  its  performance.  In  Angell  on  Highways  it  is  said  that 
public  bridges  may  be  divided  into  three  classes :  '  First,  those 
which  belong  to  the  public,  as  state,  county,  or  township  bridges, 

1  The   court  in   County   Commrs.   v.  Or,  of  tlie  repair  of  a  sea-wall,  bridge, 

Chandler,  s!/;9ra,  quotes  the  following: —  etc.:  —  Cleansing  of  a  river,  etc.:  —  But 

"Coinyn's  Digest,  title  'Toll-thorough,'  toll-thorough  cannot  be  claimed,  simply, 

commences    thus :    '  ToU-thorougli    is    a  witlinut  any  consideration.'     These    few 

sum    demanded    for  a   passage  through  sentences  indicate  conclusively  that   tlie 

an  highway  :  —  Or,  for  a  passage  over  a  existence  of  a  toll  is  not  inconsistent  with 

ferry,  bridge,  etc. :  —  Or,  for  goods  which  the  public  character  of  the  work  on  which 

pass  by  sucli  a  port  in  a  river:  —  And  it  it  is  exacted." 
may  be  demanded  in  consideration  of  the  ^  Woolr.  Ways,  195. 

repair  of  the  pavement  in  a  high  street :  —  ^  1  Blacks.  357. 


496  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

over  which  all  people  have  a  right  to  pass  without  or  with  paying 
toll :  these  are  built  by  public  authority  at  the  public  expense, 
either  of  the  state  itself  or  of  a  district  or  portion  of  the  state. 
Secondly,  those  which  have  been  built  by  companies  (like  turn- 
pike and  railroad  companies),  or  at  the  expense  of  private  individ- 
uals over  wliiili  all  persons  have  a  right  to  pass  on  th*e  payment 
of  a  toll  fixed  by  law.  Thirdly,  those  which  have  been  built  by 
private  individuals,  and  which  have  been  surrendered  or  dedicated 
to  the  use  of  the  public'  ^  Chancellor  Kent  says,  '  The  privilege 
of  making  a  road  or  establishing  a  ferry,  and  taking  tolls  for  the 
use  of  the  same,  is  a  franchise,  and  the  public  have  an  interest  in 
the  same  ;  and  the  owners  of  the  franchise  are  answerable  in 
damages  if  they  should  refuse  to  transport  an  individual  without 
any  reasonable  excuse,  upon  being  paid  or  tendered  the  usual  rate 
of  fare.'  In  the  same  connection  he  enumerates  in  this  class  of 
franchises,  ferries,  bridges,  turnpikes,  and  railroads.^ 

"  In  our  judgment  the  bridge  in  question  is  a  public  bridge 
and  a  work  of  internal  improvement  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute." 

§  511.  The  Lmv  of  Railroad  Aid  Bonds. — The  Laiv  as  de- 
veloped in  the  Federal  Courts.  —  The  policy  of  burdening  the 
future  has  been  sanctioned  by  the  legislature,  and  the  courts 
have  to  deal  with  the  legal  rights  of  the  municipahty  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  holders  of  its  obligations  on  the  other.  The  de- 
termination of  their  legal  rights  involves  inquiries  as  complicated 
as  they  are  important.  The  law  on  this  subject  is  substantially 
the  growth  of  the  last  twenty-five  years.  The  decisions  in  the 
various  state  and  federal  courts  are  very  numerous,  and  on 
some  points  conflicting.^     It  is  impossible,  were  it  even  desirable, 

1  Ang  Hicrliways,  sec.  38.  Board   of    Salem,  20  Mich.  452;  s.  c.  9 

2  3  Kent,  458,  459.  See  ante,  sees.  117  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  487,  before  men- 
et  spq    157  et  seq.  tioned  (ante,  sec.  157),  the  question  arose 

In  Dawson  Co.  v.  McNamar,  4   N.  W.  in  the  United   States    Circuit    Court  for 

R.  991,  holding  that  under  the  statute  of  the  western  district  of  Michigan,  in  an 

Nehraslca  a  court  house  is  not  an  inter-  action  on  municipal   railway  aid  bonds, 

nal  improvement,  but  that   a  recital  in  whether  the  Federal  Court  was  concluded 

the   bonds   referring   to   such    statute  is  by  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme   Court 

no  ground  for  declaring  such   bonds  in-  of    tlie   state,    and    if  not    whether   the 

yalid.     lb.  holder  of  bonds,  issued  in  full  compliance 

'  3  Ante,  ch.  vi.  sec.  153,  et  seq.     Since  with  the  statute,  could  recover  thereon, 

the  decision   of  the    Supreme  Court   of  Emmons,   Circuit  Judge,  in  an  elaborate 

Michigan,  in   the    People     v.    Township  opinion,  holds,  as  to  bonds  issued  be/ore 


§  511.]  CONTRACTS.  497 

to  compass  within  the  limits  of  a  single  chapter  all  the  learning, 
and  to  refer  to  all  the  cases,  upon  the  subject  of  municipal  secur- 
ities. It  will  not  be  attempted.  By  reason  of  the  greater  favor 
with  which  the  rights  of  the  holders  of  such  securities  have  been 
regarded  b^  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  the  volume 
of  municipal  bond  litigation  has  of  late  years  taken  place  in  the 
federal  courts.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  consider  the  law 
on  this  subject  as  determined  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States ;  and  our  object  will  be  to  show  exactly  the  doc- 
trines and  principles  which  have  received  the  sanction  of  that 
tribunal,  and  to  illustrate,  as  far  as  needful,  their  application  in 
particular  instances,  referring  incidentally  or  for  further  illus- 
tration to  the  decisions  of  the  state  courts  on  the  subjects  or 
topics  discussed. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  upheld  the  rights 
of  the  holders  of  municipal  securities  with  a  strong  hand,  and  has 
set  a  face  of  flint  against  repudiation,  even  when  made  on  legal 
grounds  deemed  solid  by  the  state  courts,  by  municipaUties 
which  had  been  deceived  and  defrauded.  That  such  securities 
have  any  general  value  left  is  largely  due  to  the  course  of  adjudi- 

the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  binding  upon  or  should  be  followed  by  the 

state,  that  the  federal  courts  are  not  con-  federal  courts.     But  the    Supreme  Court 

eluded  thereby,  and  that  the  constitution-  of  the  United  States  was  of  the  opinion 

al  power  of  the  legislature  to  authorize  that,    inasmuch    as   the   decision    of   the 

their  issue,  in  the  absence  of  special  limi-  state  Supreme  Court  was  not  based  upon 

tations,  must  be   regarded  as   settled,  at  any  special  and  peculiar  provision  of  the 

least  as  respects  the   federal   tribunals,  state  constitution,  but  upon  general  prin- 

The  opinion  displays   great  research  and  ciples  of  law,  and  related  to  contracts,  the 

learning,  and  will  be  found  reported  un-  case  was  not  one  in  which  the  decision  of 

der  the  name  of  Talcott  v.   Township  of  the  State  Court  had    any   other  tlian   a 

Pine  Grove,  vol.  I,  Bench  and  Bar  (N.  persuasive   force  ;    and   it    reversed   the 

S.),   50,  1872.     The   Supreme    Court   of  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court,  and  held 

Michiqan  adheres  to  its  opinion   on   this  that  the  bonds  could  be  enforced.     Post, 

subject  in  the  latter  case  of  the  People  v.  sec.  517. 

State  Treasurer,  ante,  sec.  157.  The  In  Gilchrist  y.  Little  Rock,  1  Dillon  C. 
course  of  reasoning  of  Emmons,  J.,  in  this  C.  R.  261,  and  in  Ranletty.  Leavenworth, 
case  is  coincident  with  that  of  the  Su-  lb.  263,  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United 
preme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  States  for  the  eightli  circuit,  prior  to  any 
case  of  Olcott  v.  The  Supervisors,  16  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Courts  of  the 
Wall.  678,  1872.  In  the  case  just  men-  states  of  Arkansas  and  Kansas  as  to  the 
tioned  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  constitutional  validity  of  municipal  rail- 
States,  sitting  in  Wisconsin,  decided  that  way  aid  bonds,  declined  to  pronounce 
since  the  Supreme  Court  of  tliat  state  such  bonds  in  the  hands  of  iona^r/fi  hold- 
had  held  a  certain  act  under  wliich  the  ers  to  be  void  for  the  want  of  authority 
bonds  in  question  were  issued  to  be  un-  in  the  state  legislature  to  authorize  their 
constitutional,  and  had  never  holden  oth-  issue.  History  of  the  loica  municipal 
erwise,  that  this  construction,  though  bond  cases.  King  v.  Wilson,  1  Dillon  C. 
given  after  the  bonds  were  issued,  was  C.  R.  555. 

VOL.  I.  32 


498  MUNICIPAL   COEPORATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

cation  in  respect  thereto  by  the  Supreme  Court,  and  the  reliance 
which  is  felt  by  the  public  that  it  will  stand  firmly  by  the  doc- 
trines it  has  so  frequently  asserted. 

§  512.  Form  of  Bond. — Condition.  —  Municipal  bonds,  in  the 
usual  form,  containing  words  of  negotiability,  with  coupons 
attached,  are  absolute,  and  not  conditional,  promises  to  pay,  and 
hence  are  negotiable  with  all  the  incidents  of  negotiability,  not- 
withstanding they  contain  such  a  recital  as  the  following  :  "  This 
bond  is  issued  for  the  purpose  of  subscribing  to  the  capital  stock  of 
the  Fort  Scott  and  Allen  County  Railroad,  and  for  the  construc- 
tion of  the  same  through  the  said  township,  in  pursuance  of  and  in 
accordance  with  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  the  state  of  Kansas, 
entitled  '  An  Act  to  enable  municipal  townships  to  subscribe  for 
stock  in  any  railroad,  and  to  provide  for  the  payment  of  the  same, 
approved  February  25, 1870 ' ;  and  for  the  payment  of  the  said  sum 
of  money  and  accruing  interest  thereon,  in  manner  aforesaid, 
upon  the  performance  of  the  said  condition,  the  faith  of  the  afore- 
said Humboldt  Township,  as  also  its  property,  revenue,  and 
resources,  is  pledged  ";  the  court  holding  that  the  construction 
of  the  road  through  the  township  was  not  a  condition  upon  which 
payment  was  to  be  made.^ 

In  giving  its  judgment,  the  court  says:  "Relying  upon  this 
clause  of  the  certificate,  the  township  contends  that  the  construc- 
tion of  the  railroad  through  the  township  was  a  condition  upon 
which  the  payment  was  agreed  to  be  made.  We  think,  however, 
this  is  not  the  true  construction  of  the  contract.  The  construc- 
tion of  the  road  as  well  as  the  subscription  for  stock  was  men- 
tioned in  the  recital  as  the  reasons  why  the  township  entered 
into  the  contract,  not  as  conditions  upon  which  its  performance 
was  made  to  depend.  It  was  for  the  purpose  of  subscribing,  and 
to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  road,  that  the  bond  was  given. 
The  words,  '  upon  the  performance  of  the  said  condition,'  cannot, 
then,  refer  to  anything  mentioned  in  the  recital,  for  there  is  no 
condition  there.  A  much  more  reasonable  construction  is,  that 
they  refer  to  a  former  part  of  the  bond,  where  the  annual  interest 
is  stipulated  to  be  payable  at  a  banker's, '  on  the  presentation  and 
surrender  of  the  respective  interest  coupons.'  Such  presentation 
and  surrender  is  the  only  condition  mentioned  in  the  instrument. 

1  Hiimboldt  Township  v.  Long,  92  U.  S.  637, 1875;  3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  494. 


§  513.] 


CONTRACTS, 


499 


But  that  stipulation  presents  no  such  contingency  as  destroys  the 
negotiability  of  the  instrument.  It  is  what  is  always  implied  in 
every  promissory  note  or  bill  of  exchange,  that  it  is  to  be  pre- 
sented, and  surrendered  when  paid.  As  well  might  it  be  said  that 
a  note  payable  on  demand  is  payable  upon  a  contiDgency,  and 
therefore  non-negotiable,  as  to  affirm  that  one  payable  on  its 
presentation  and  surrender  is,  for  that  reason,  destitute  of  nego- 
tiability." 1 

§  513.  Such  Bonds  are  Negotiable  Securities.  —  The  following 
doctrines  are  too  well  settled  to  be  any  longer  open  to  question. 
A  hona  fide  purchaser  of  negotiable  paper  for  value,  before  ma- 
turity, takes  it  freed  from  all  infirmities  in  its  origin,  unless  it 
is  absolutely  void  for  want  of  power  in  the  maker  to  issue  it, 
or  its  circulation  is  by  law  prohibited.  Municipal  bonds,  paya- 
ble to  bearer,  are  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  other  negotiable 
paper.2  A  purchaser  of  a  municipal  bond  from  a  hona  fide  holder, 
who  obtained  it  for  value  before  maturity,  takes  it  free  from 


See  also,  Hotchkiss  v.  Nat.  Bank, 
21  Wall.  354,  1874.  As  to  form  of  bonds, 
seal,  place  of  payment  and  deliver ij,  see  cas- 
es cited  Daniel  on  Neg.  Instr.,  sees.  1492- 
1499.  Cannot  be  issued  in  blank  as  to 
date.  Jackson  Co.  v.  Brush,  77  111.  59, 
1875. 

Power  to  substitute  other  bonds.  L.vnde 
V.  County,  16  Wall.  6  ;  McKee  o.  Vernon, 
3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  210. 

Coupons. —  Form  of  Instrument. —  Maker 
suable  thereon  in  assumpsit,  where  the 
bonds  are  made  by  the  defendant  corpor- 
ation and  refer  to  the  coupon,  though  the 
latter,  signed  by  the  agents  of  the  cor- 
poration, is  in  the  form  of  an  order  or 
check  on  a  bank  named  therein.  Town 
of  Queensbury  v.  Culver,  19  Wall.  83, 
1873.  Cases  as  to  the  form  of  coupons, 
see  Daniel  on  Neg.  Instr.,  sees.  1492- 
1496.  May  be  made  payable  beijond  lim- 
its of  the  state,  unless  specially  restrained 
by  statute.   Lynde  v.  County,  16  Wall.  G. 

IIow  signed.  —  The  coupons,  where  the 
bonds  are  properly  signed  and  sealed,  may 
be  signed  by  a  printed  facsimile  of  the 
maker's  autograph,  adopted  for  the  pur- 
pose, although  tliere  is  no  statute  author- 
izing it.     Pennington  v.  Baehr,  48  Cal. 


565;  s.  c.  2  Cent.  Law  Jour.  92;  see 
McKee  v.  Vernon  Co.,  3  Dillon  C.  C. 
R  210;  Lynde  v.  County,  16  Wall.  6; 
State  V.  Terrebonne  Parish  Police  Jury, 
30  La.  An.  287 ;  Neeley  v.  Yorkville,  10 
So.  Car.  141. 

2  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  96  U.  S.  51, 1877  ; 
Baes  I'.  Hewitt,  20  Wis.  460  ;  Gorgier  v. 
Mierville,  3  B.  &  C.  45  ;  Brooks  v.  Mitch- 
ell, 9  M.  &  W.  15 ;  Goodwin  v.  Roberts, 
L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  476;  Goodman  v. 
Harvey,  4  A.  &  E.  870  ;  Burnham  v. 
Brown,  23  Me.  400  ;  Judge  v.  Sherborne, 
11  M.  &  W.  374  ;  United  States  v.  Union 
Pacific  Railroad,  91  U.S.  72 ;  Miller  t;.Race, 
1  Burr.  452 ;  White  v.  Vermont,  etc.  Co., 
21  How.  575  ;  Moran  v.  Miami  County,  2 
Black.  722, 1862  ;  Mercer  County  v.  Hack- 
ett,  1  Wall.  83 ;  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  1 
Wall.  175;  San  Antonio  i-.  Lane,  32  Tex. 
405;  Lexington  ij.  Butler,  14  Wall.  2^2  ; 
St.  Joseph  V.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  644,  1872  ; 
Humboldt  v.  Long,  92  U.  S.  642  ;  Macon 
Co.  V.  Shores,  97  U.  S.  272 ;  Supervisors 
V.  Galbraith,  99  IJ.  S.  214 ;  Commrs.  v. 
Block,  99  U.  S.  686 ;  Block  v.  Commrs. 
99  U.  S.  686 ;  Supervisors  v.  Schenck,  5 
WaU.  784. 


500  MUNICIPAL   CORPOEATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

equities,  though  he  himself  may  have  had  notice  thereof.^  An 
overdue  and  unpaid  coupon  for  interest,  attached  to  a  municipal 
bond  which  has  several  years  to  run,  does  not  render  the  bond 
and  the  subsequently  maturing  coupons  dishonored  paper,  so  as 
to  subject  them,  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  purchaser  for  value, 
to  defences  good  against  the  original  holder.^  A  bona  fide 
purchaser  for  value  of  negotiable  securities  before  their  matu- 
rity may  recover  against  the  maker  the  full  amount  of  them, 
though  he  may  have  paid  for  them  less  than  their  par  value.^ 

§  514.  Lis  Pendens  not  applicable.  —  Another  doctrine  estab- 
lished in  reference  to  such  securities  is  that  the  principle  of  lis 
pendens  is  not  applicable  thereto.  There  may  be  actions  pend- 
ing regarding  the  bonds,  but  this  will  not  affect  the  purchaser 
with  constructive  notice. 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  all  persons  dealing  with  real  property 
are  bound  to  take  notice  of  a  suit  pending  with  regard  to  the 
title  thereof,  and  will,  at  their  peril,  purchase  the  same  from  any 
of  the  parties  to  the  suit.  But  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  ne- 
gotiable securities  purchased  before  maturity.^ 

§  515.  Course  of  Decision  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States.  —  In  municipal  bond  cases  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  does  not  hold  itself  concluded  by  decisions  of  the 
state  courts  made  after  the  bonds  have  been  negotiated,  unless 
possibly  where  the  question  is  one  exclusively  depending  upon  the 
construction  of  local  and  peculiar  provisions  of  the  state  consti- 

1  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  96  U.  S.  51,  bonds  or  obligations  for  less  than  their 
1877.  par  value.     Memphis   i'.  Brown,  20  Wall. 

2  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  96  U.  S.  51,  289,  1873  ;  Shirk  v.  Pulaski  County,  4 
1877 ;  Goodman  v.  Simonds,  20  How.  343 ;  Dillon,  209,  1877  ;  Mayor  of  Nashville 
Murray  v.   Lardner,  2  Wall.    110 ;    Nat.  v.  Ray,    19  Wall.  468,  1873. 

Bank  v.  Kirby,  108  Mass.  497.  *  Leitch  v.  Wells,  48  N.  Y.  586  ;  Stone 

3  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  96  U.  S.  51,  v.  Elliott,  11  Ohio  St.  252;  Kiefifer  v. 
1877 ;  Lay  v.  Wissman,  36  Iowa,  305  ;  Ehler,  18  Pa.  St.  388 ;  Durant  v.  Iowa 
National  Bank  v.  Green,  33  Iowa,  140  ;  Co.,  1  Woolw.  69 ;  Winston  v.  Westfeldt, 
Park  Bank  v.  Watson,  42  N.  Y.  490  ;  Fow-  22  Ala.  760 ;  Olcott  v.  Supervisors,  16 
ler  r.  Strickland,  107  Mass.  5-52;  Stoddard  Wall.  678;  National  Bank  v.  Texas,  20 
V.  Kimball,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  469;  Allaire  i'.  Wall.  72;  Minns  i;.  West,  38  Ga.  18;War- 
Ha^tshorne,  1  Zab.  (21  N.  J.  L.)  665;  Wil-  ren  v.  Marcy,  97  U.  S.  96;  Warren  v. 
Hams  V.  Smith,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  301 ;  Chic-  Post,  97  U.S.  110;  Warren  v.  Portsmouth, 
opee  Bank  v.  Chapin,  8  Met.  (Mass.)  40.  97  U.  S.  110;  Orleans  v.  Piatt,  99  U.  S. 
As  to  power  of  a  city  or  municipality  to  676  ;  Cass  Co.  v.  Gillette,  100  U.  S.  586. 
sell,  or  to  agree  to  sell,  or  dispose  of  its 


§  515.] 


CONTRACTS. 


501 


tution  or  enactments.'^  It  has  adopted,  when  necessary  to  protect 
the  bona  fide  holders  of  such  securities,  liberal  constructions  of 
statutes  and  charters  authorizing  the  creation  of  such  debts.^ 
Against  such  holders  it  has  given  no  favor  to  defences  based  upon 
mere  irregularities  in  the  issue  of  the  bonds  or  non-compliance 
with  preliminary  requirements,  not  going  to  the  question  of 
power  to  issue  them ;  ^  and  has  held  that  the  circuit  courts  of 
the  United  States  were  clothed  with  full  authority,  by  mandamus 
or  otherwise,  to  enforce  the  collection  of  judgments  rendered 
therein  on  such  bonds,  and  that  this  authority  could  not  in  the 


1  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175, 
1865;  Haveraeyer  v.  Iowa  County,  3  lb. 
294  ;  Tliompson  v.  Lee  County,  lb.  327  ; 
Lee  County  v.  Rogers,  7  lb.  181. 
See  particularly  on  this  point,  01- 
cott  r.  Supervisors,  16  Wall.  678,  1872 ; 
Butz  V.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575,  explained ; 
Supervisors  v.  United  States,  18  Wall.  71 ; 
Chicago  r.  Sheldon,  9  Wall.  50;  Pine 
Grove  Township  r.  Talcott,  19  Wall. 
666;  Town  of  Elm  wood  v.  Marcy,  92 
U.  S.  289,  1875;  Foote  v.  Johnson  Co., 
5  Dill.  208,  1878;  Cass  Co.  i-.  Johnson, 
95  U.  S.  360 ;  Cutler  i-.  Board,  etc.,  56 
Miss.  115;  Vicksburg  v.  Lombard,  51 
Miss.  126;  post,  sec.  517;  City  v.  Lara- 
son,  9  Wall.  477 ;  Campbell  v.  Kenosha, 
5  Wall.  194,  1866.  Read  last  two  cases 
in  connection  with  Foster  v.  Kenosha, 
12  Wis.  616,  which,  in  effect,  is  over- 
ruled or  disregarded.  See  on  this  point 
Steincs  v.  Franklin  County,  48  Mo.  167  ; 
Columbia  County  v.  King,  13  Fla.  451. 

In  speaking  of  the  force  of  the  slate 
court  decisions  in  the  federal  courts  in  this 
class  of  cases,  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  in  Ven- 
ice V.  Murdock,  92  U.  S.  494,  1875,  holds 
this  language  :  "  It  is  argued,  however, 
that  the  New  York  decisions  (Starin  v. 
Genoa ;  Gould  i-.  Sterling,  23  N.  Y.  439, 
45G)  are  judicial  constructions  of  a  statute 
of  that  state,  and,  therefore,  that  they 
furnish  a  rule  by  which  we  must  be 
guided.  The  argument  would  have  force 
if  the  decisions,  in  fact,  presented  a  clear 
case  of  statutory  construction.  But  they 
do  not.  Tliey  arc  not  attempts  at  inter- 
pretation. They  would  apply  as  well  to 
the  execution  of  powers  or  authorities 
granted  by  private  persons  as  they  do  to 
the  issue  of  bonds  under  the  statute  of 
April  16,  1852.    They  assert  general  prin- 


ciples, to  wit,  that  persons  empowered  to 
borrow  money  and  give  bonds  therefor, 
for  the  purpose  of  paying  it  to  an  im- 
provement company,  are  not  authorized 
to  deliver  the  bonds  directly  to' the  com- 
pany, —  a  doctrine  denied  in  this. court,  in 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
even  in  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New 
York.  People  v.  Mead,  24  N.  Y.  124 ; 
The  Town  of  Venice  v.  Breed,  65  Barb. 
597.  They  assert,  also,  that  where  an 
authority  is  given  to  an  officer  to  execute 
and  issue  bonds  (on  the  assent/  of  two 
thirds  of  the  voters  of  a  town,  the  assent 
to  be  obtained  by  the  officer,  and  filed  in 
a  public  office,  with  an  affidavit  verifying 
the  assent),  the  verification  amounts  to 
nothing,  subserves  no  purpose,  and  that 
a  bonajide  holder  of  the  bonds  is  bound  to 
prove  that  the  requisite  number  of  voters 
did  actually  assent.  They  assert  this  as 
a  general  proposition.  They  do  not  as- 
sert that  the  statute  so  declares,  or  that 
such  is  even  its  implied  requisition.  There 
is,  therefore,  before  \is  no  such  case  of 
the  construction  of  a  state  statute  by 
state  courts  as  requires  us  to  yield  our 
own  convictions  of  the  right,  and  blindly 
follow  the  lead  of  others,  eminent  as  we 
freely  concede  they  are." 

-  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  supra;  Meyer 
17.  Muscatine  (charter  authorizing  borrow- 
in;]  of  money),  1  Wall.  384  ;  Rogers  v.  Bur- 
lington, 3  lb.  654 ;  Van  Hostrup  v. 
Madison  City,  1  Wall.  291;  Seybert 
V.  Pittsburg,  1  Wall.  272. 

^  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How. 
539;  Moran  v.  Commrs.  2  Black,  722; 
Bissell  V.  Jeffersonville,  24  How.  287; 
Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  676. 
1870. 


502  MUNICIPAL   COKPOEATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

least  be  interfered  with,  either  by  the  legishiture  or  the  judiciary 
of  the  states.^  It  has  upheld  aud  protected  the  rights  of  such 
creditors  with  a  firm  hand,  disregarding,  at  times,  it  would  seem, 
principles  which  it  applied  in  other  cases,  and  asserting  the  juris- 
diction and  authority  of  the  federal  courts  with  sucli  striking 
energy  and  vigor  as  apparently,  if  not  actually,  to  trench  upon 
the  lawful  rights  of  the  states  and  the  acknowledged  powers  of 
the  state  tribunals ;  yet,  upon  the  whole,  there  is  little  doubt 
that  its  course  has  had  the  approval  of  the  profession  in  general 
and  of  the  public,  and  it  ought  to  teach  municipalities  the  lesson 
that  if,  having  the  power  to  do  so  conferred  upon  them,  they 
issue  negotiable  securities,  they  cannot  escape  payment  if  these 
find  their  way  into  the  hands  of  innocent  purchasers.  Unfortu- 
nately, as  will  presently  appear,  the  decisions  upon  this  im- 
portant subject  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  ^he  nation  and  in 
some  of  the  state  courts  are  not  in  all  respects  harmonious.^ 

§  516.  (416  a.)  Under  the  line  of  decision  in  the  several  states 
heretofore  adverted  to,  sustaining  the  constitutionality  of  muni- 
cipal railway  aid  bonds,^  millions  upon  millions  of  these  securi- 
ties have  been  issued  by  townships,  counties,  and  cities  in  tlje 
different  states,  and  sooner  or  later  their  issue  has  been  quite 
generally,  though  not  always,  followed  by  attempts  to  escape 
payment.  The  misrepresentations  which  have  oftentimes  in- 
duced the  issue  of  the  bonds,  and  the  disappointment  arising 
from  the  over-estimated  benefits  of  the  roads  to  the  localities 
which  aided  their  construction,  make  the  attempts  to  avoid  pay- 
ment of  the  bonds  not  unnatural,  and  more  excusable  than  they 
would  otherwise  be.  The  judicial  history  of  these  attempts  is 
found  in  the  law  reports  of  the  different  states  and  in  those  of 
the  federal  tribunals ;  and  a  comparison  of  their  judgments 
shows  such  a  diversity  of  opinion  upon  some  important  questions 
connected  with  such  securities  as  to  render  it  most  expedient  to 
refer  separately  to  the  decisions  of  the  two  classes  of  courts.  It 
is  particularly  important  to  notice  with  some  fulness  and  care 
the  opinions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  since, 

1  Von  Hoffman  v.  Quincy ,  4  Wall.  535 ;  '■^  The  general  questions  relating  to  the 

"  Galena  v.  Amy,  5  lb.  705  ;  Kiggs  v.  John-  power  to  aid  railways  are  considered  in  a 

son  County,  6  lb.  166;  Butz  w.  Muscatine,  previous  chapter.      Ante,  ch.  vi.  sec.  153 

8  lb.  bib.     See,  also,  post,  ch.  xx.  on  Man-  et  seq. 

damns,  and  cases  there  cited.  ^  Ante,  sec.  153  et  seq. 


§  517.]  CONTKACTS.  503 

for  the  reasons  above  mentioned,  the  course  of  this  tribunal  and 
of  the  state  tribunals  has  been  such  as  to  draw  to  the  Federal 
courts,  in  most  of  the  states,  all,  or  nearly  all,  of  the  litigation 
arising  from  this  source.  Wherein  the  state  courts  and  the  fed- 
eral courts  differ,  and  wherein  they  agree,  will  best  appear  by 
referring  to  some  of  the  principal  adjudications. 

§  517.  (416J)  In  the  well-known  loiva  municipal  railivay  aid 
bond  cases^  the  bonds  were  issued  after  the  state  Supreme  Court 
had  affirmed  the  constitutional  power  of  the  legislature  to  author- 
ize their  issue,  and  before  the  same  court  had  reversed  its  holding 
in  this  respect ;  and  in  these  cases  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  held  it  was  at  liberty  to  take,  and  it  did  take,  the 
view  which  obtained  in  the  highest  judicial  tribunal  of  the  state 
at  the  time  the  bonds  were  issued;  and  hence  it  adjudged  that 
the  bonds  were  binding  upon  and  enforceable  against  the  muni- 
cipalities and  counties,  although  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state 
was  at  the  same  time  holding  that,  under  the  constitution  and 
laws  of  Iowa,  the  bonds  were  utterly  void.  Subsequently,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  went  further,  and  held 
that  such  bonds  in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders  are  valid, 
although  the  state  Supreme  Court  had  held  otherwise,  the  lat- 
ter basing  its  judgment,  however,  upon  the  general  principles  of 
the  law  and  not  upon  anj^  special  and  peculiar  provision  of  the  con- 
stitution of  the  state.2  It  seems  quite  clearly  to  be  the  doctrine 
of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  upon  this  subject,  that  it  is 
not  concluded  by  the  decisions  of  the  state  courts  in  any  case 
where  they  are  made  after  the  bonds  are  issued  and  have  been 
sold  in  the  markets  ;  and  such  is  undoubtedly  its  doctrine  in  all 
cases  relating  to  this  class  of  securities,  where  the  questions  in- 
volved do  not  turn  upon  the  construction  of  peculiar  provisions 
of  the  state  constitution  and  laws.     It  has  not  decided  that  it 

*  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175,  courts    upon   the   subject   of   municipal 

1865 ;  Thompson  v.  Lee  Co.,  3  "Wall.  327,  railway  aid  bonds  in  Iowa.     That  obliga- 

1865;    Ilavemeyer    v.   Iowa    County,   3  tions  of  contracts  cannot  be  impaired  by 

Wall.  294;  Rogers  y.  Burlington,  3  Wall,  subsequent  decisions  see,  also,  Chicago  v. 

654,1865;  Mitchell  y.  Burlington,  4  Wall.  Slieldon.  0  Wall.  50;  City  v.  Lamson,  9 

270;  ante,  sec.  516;  Lee  County  v.  Rog-  Wall.  477,  1869;  Parmlee  v.  Chicago,  60 

era,  7  Wall.  181,  1868;  Butz  v.  Musca-  111.267,1871. 

tine,   8   Wall.   575;    King  v.   Wilson,   1  2  Olcott  v.  Supervisors,  etc.,  16  Wall. 

Dillon  C.   C.  555,  1871,  gives  a  view  of  678,  1872;  an<e,  sec.  611,  note, 
the   decisions   of  the  state  and    federal 


50-4  MUNICIPAL   COKPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

would  hold  valid  bonds  issued  after  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
state  had  held  them  to  be  invalid,  and  it  would  not  probably  so 
hold,  since  such  a  doctrine  is  not  necessary  to  protect  the  inno- 
cent owners  of  such  securities,  and  would  involve  the  consequence 
of  the  federal  courts  setting  up  a  policy  in  a  state  contrary  to  its 
constitution  and  laws  as  expounded  by  its  authorized  and  right- 
ful tribunals.^ 

§  518.  (416c)  General  Result  stated.  —  As  preliminary  to  a 
more  immediate  view  of  some  of  the  leading  cases  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  upon  municipal  railwa}'-  aid 
securities,  it  may  be  observed  that  the  general  result  of  its  de- 
cisions have  been  very  clearly  summarized  in  one  of  its  judgments 
relating  to  bonds  of  this  character.  "  Bonds,  payable  to  bearer," 
says  the  learned  justice  who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
"  issued  by  a  municipal  corporation  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a 
railroad,  if  issued  in  pursuance  of  a  power  conferred  by  the  legis- 
lature, are  valid  commercial  instruments  ;  but  if  issued  by  such  a 
corporation,  which  possessed  no  power  from  the  legislature  to 
grant  such  aid,  they  are  invalid,  even  in  the  hands  of  innocent 
holders.  Such  a  power  is  frequently  conferred  to  be  exercised  in 
a  special  manner,  or  subject  to  certain  regulations,  conditions,  or 
qualifications ;  but  if  it  appears  that  the  bonds  issued  show  by 
their  recitals  that  the  power  was  exercised  in  the  manner  required 
by  the  legislature,  and  that  the  bonds  were  issued  in  conformity 
with  those  regulations  and  pursuant  to  those  conditions  and  qual- 
ifications, proof  that  any  or  all  of  those  recitals  are  incorrect  will 
not  constitute  a  defence  to  the  corporation  in  a  suit  on  the  bonds 
or  coupons,  if  it  appears  that  it  was  the  sole  province  of  the  mu- 
nicipal ofiicers  who  executed  the  bonds  to  decide  whether  or  not 
there  had  been  an  antecedent  compliance  with  the  regulation, 
condition,  or  qualification  which  it  is  alleged  was  not  fulfilled."  ^ 

It  is  definitely  settled  by  this  court  that  mere  irregularities  in 
the  exercise  of  the  power  will  not  avail  as  a  defence  against  an 

1  King  V.  Wilson,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  555,  In  general  throughout  this  work  the 

1871 ;  Commercial  Bank  v.  Ida,  2  Dillon  author  has  not  referred  at  length  in  the 

C.C.R.  353, 1873.  See,  however,  on  this  text  to  particular  cases,  but  the  inipor- 

subject,  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall.  575,  tance  of  this  subject  has  induced  him  to 

1869;    Olcott    v.   Supervisors,   16   Wall,  depart  to   some  extent  from  his  usual 

578.  course. 

^  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers,  16 
Wall.  644,  1872,  opinion  by  Clifford,  J. 


§  519.]  CONTRACTS.  505 

innocent?  holder  for  value,  and  that  the  only  defence  open  against 
such  a  holder  is  the  want  of  power  to  issue  the  ho7ids.  Obviously, 
then,  the  most  important  inquiries  to  be  considered  are  those 
which  relate  to  the  question,  tvhen  the  power  exists  or  arises ; 
who  is  to  decide  whether  it  existed  or  had  arisen  when  the  bonds 
were  issued  ;  and  what  will  cstoj)  the  corporation  which  issued 
them  to  set  up  in  defence  a  non-compliance  with  antecedent  or 
preliminary  conditions  :  and  it  is  these  inquiries  that  we  shall 
seek  to  illustrate  by  a  reference  to  the  decisions  of  the  courts  in 
cases  which  have  arisen  for  judgment. 

§  519.  Condition  precedent  to  Exercise  of  Power.  —  Popular 
Vote.  —  Non-cowpliance  ivith  Condition  Precedent.  —  Recital.  — 
Restraining  Issue  of  Bonds.  —  Generally,  the  power  of  the  muni- 
cipality, county,  or  other  local  civil  subdivision  of  the  state,  to  sub- 
scribe for  the  stock  of  railway  companies,  and  issue  bonds  in 
payment,  is  conferred  upon  certain  officers,  not  absolutely  but  on 
the  condition  of  a  previous  approving  popular  vote,  or  the  assent 
of  a  majority  or  of  some  greater  proportion  of  the  resident  tax- 
payers. If  this  sanction  is  given,  then  the  officers,  by  the  usual 
legislation,  are  authorized  to  make  the  subscription  and  to  issue 
bonds  in  payment  therefor.  A  very  common  defence  to  such 
bonds  consists  in  a  denial  that  the  condition  precedent,  i.  e.,  the 
approving  vote,  the  assent  of  the  tax-payers,  or  whatever  else  it 
may  be,  has,  in  fact,  been  complied  with  ;  and  hence,  as  contended, 
the  power  to  issue  the  bonds  did  not  exist,  or  never  arose. 

Where  the  legislation  is  of  this  character,  —  namely,  requiring 
compliance  with  some  such  condition  before  issuing  the  bonds, — 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  does  not  hold,  as  we 
understand  their  decisions,  that  the  power  can  be  rightfully  exer- 
cised unless  the  condition  precedent  has  been  performed.  As 
between  the  immediate  parties,  the  municipality  and  the  railroad 
company,  doubtless,  the  inquiry  is  open,  and  fully  open,  whether 
the  condition  on  which  the  rightful  exercise  of  the  power  depends 
has  been  complied  with ;  and  if  it  has  not  been,  on  due  applica- 
tion, the  issue  of  the  bonds  will  be  enjoined,^  or  if  they  are  in 
the  hands  of  the  original  party  or  of  holders  with  notice,  an  action 
to  enforce  the  bonds  may,  if  no  estoppel  exists,  be  successfully 

I  As  to  tlieduty  of  enjoining  the  issue  set  up  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  the 
of  bonds  on  the  pain  of  being  estopped  to     power,  see  post,  sec.  536  et  seq. 


506  MUNICIPAL  CORrORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

defended.^  Want  of  poAver  is  a  good  defence  against  a  railroad 
company,  endeavoring  to  enforce  by  iiia>ida7)ius  the  execution  and 
delivery  to  it  of  sucli  bonds  l)y  the  municipality .^ 

In  a  suit  by  the  payee,  or  by  a  person  not  an  innocent  holder, 
there  is  no  legal  ground  for  maintaining  that  the  action  of  the 
local  officers  in  issuing  the  bonds,  or  any  recital  they  may  make 
therein,  will  conclude  the  question  whether  the  condition  pre- 
cedent has  been  performed  ;  and  there  is  no  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  conflict  with  this  state- 
ment of  the  law,  but  several  which  support  it.^ 

§  520.  Estoppel  hy  Recital  to  show  Non-compliance  with  Condi- 
tions Precedent.  —  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall.  —  When  the  bonds 
have  been  issued  and  sold  in  the  market,  and  before  maturity 
have  come  for  value,  and  without  notice,  into  the  hands  of  inno- 
cent holders,  another  element  of  great  importance  may,  according 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court,  be  introduced  into  the  trans- 
action, as  respects  compliance  with  conditions  precedent,  —  the 
element  of  estoppel.  This  is  so  important  in  its  practical  relations 
to  the  subject  as  to  require  careful  and  minute  consideration. 
Conceding  that  the  rightful  exercise  of  the  power  to  issue  the 
bonds  depends  upon  a  condition  precedent,  for  example,  a  popu- 
lar vote  in  favor  of  the  proposition,  when^  how,  and  by  ivhom  is  it 
to  be  ascertained  whether  the  conditioji  precedent  has  been  per- 
formed ? 

Is  it  to  be  ascertained,  once  for  all,  before  the  bonds  are  issued? 
Or  is  it  open  to  inquiry  and  contestation  in  every  action  upon  a 
coupon  or  bond?  Is  the  municipality  estopped,  in  favor  of  a  bona 
fide  holder  of  the  bonds,  from  setting  up  this  defence  ?  and  in 
what  cases  will  the  estoppel  be  available  in  favor  of  the  holder  ? 
These  are  grave  questions,  and  cases  involving  them  have  been 

^  Chambers  County  v.  Clews,  21  Wall,  a  material  departure  from  the  statute. 

317,  321,  1874.  Union   Pacific   Railroad    Co.   v.   Lincoln 

2  Lamoille,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Fair-  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  300, 1873;  Same 

field,  51  Vt.  2-57.  v-  Merrick,  lb.  3.59 ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hart- 

»  Ciiambers   County  v.   Clews,  supra,  ford,  58  Me.  23 ;  ante,  sec.  163,  and  cases 

That  court  has  several  times  adverted  to  cited.    "  In  cases  arising  before  the  issue  of 

the  duty  of  the  corporation  or  tax-payer  the  bonds,  estoppel  has  no  place,  and  tlie 

to  interfere  by  injunction  to  restrain  the  sound  doctrine  is,  tliat  compliance  with 

issue  of  bonds  wliere  the  statute  has  not  all  sul)stantial  or   material   conditions  is 

been  complied  with.     Injunction  lies  to  re-  essential."     lb. 
strain  issue  of  bonds  where  there  has  been 


§  521.]  CONTRACTS.  507 

frequently  before  the  Supreme  Court,  —  the  first  and  leading  case 
being  The  Commissioners  of  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall.^ 

§  521.  (417)  Tlie  Case  of  The  Commissioners  of  Knox  County 
V.  Aspimvall,^  respecting  the  liability  of  municipal  and  public 
corporations  on  their  negotiable  railway  aid  bonds,  deserves  to 
be  particularly  noticed,  as  it  is  a  leading  case  on  this  subject. 
The  action  was  by  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value  of  certain  cou- 
pons attached  to  bonds  issued  by  Knox  County,  Indiana,  in 
payment  of  a  subscription  to  railroad  stock.  The  defence  was 
that  the  bonds  were  not  binding  upon  the  county  because  the 
county  commissioners  possessed  no  power  to  execute  them.  By 
statute,  the  county  commissioners  were  authorized  "  to  take  stock 
in  the  railroad,  payable  in  county  bonds,  j^rovided  a  ^najority  of 
the  qualified  voters  of  said  county,  at  a  designated  election,  shall 
vote  for  the  same.'"  The  ground  upon  which  the  want  of  authority 
to  execute  the  bonds  was  placed  by  the  county  was  the  omission 
to  comply  with  the  requisition  of  the  statute  in  respect  to  the 
notices  for  the  election  (which  the  statute  provided  should  be 
held  on  a  fixed  day),  at  which  a  vote  was  to  be  taken  for  and 
against  a  subscription  to  the  stock  of  the  railroad  company.  It 
was  admitted  in  the  case  that  the  required  notices  were  not 
given ;  and  the  court  seemed  to  concede  "  that  this  would  be 
decisive  against  the  authority  of  the  county  to  issue  the  bonds, 
were  it  not  for  the  question  which  underlaid  it ;  and  that  is,  Who 
is  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  election  has  been  properly 
held,  and  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  favor  of  the  subscrip- 
tion ?  ...  Is  it,"  the  court  inquires,  "  to  be  determined  by  the 
court,  in  this  collateral  way,  in  every  suit  upon  the  bond,  or 
coupon  attached,  or  by  the  board  of  commissioners,  as  a  duty 
imposed  upon  it  before  making  the  subscription  ?  "  The  court 
were  of  the  opinion,  and  so  decided,  that  the  county  commis- 
sioners were  the  proper  judges  whether  or  not  a  majority  of  the 
votes  in  the  county  had  been  cast  in  favor  of  the  subscription  to 
the  stock,  and  whether  or  not  the  election  had  been  properly 
held,  and  that  these  questions  cannot  be  determined  collaterally 
in  actions  upon  the  bonds'  or  coupons.  The  court,  in  assigning 
the  reasons  for  this  holding,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Nelson, 

1  Commissioners  of  Knox  County  v.         ^  21  How,  539,  1858. 
Aspinwall,  21  How.  539,  1858. 


508  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

say:  "The  right  of  the  boavd  [of  county  commissioners]  to  act 
in  execution  of  the  authority  [conferred  by  the  statute]  is  phiced 
upon  tlie  fact  that  a  majority  of  the  votes  had  been  cast  in  favor 
of  the  subscription ;  and  to  have  acted  without  first  ascertaining 
it,  would  have  been  a  clear  violation  of  duty ;  and  the  ascertain- 
ment of  the  fact  was  necessarily  left  to  the  inquiry  and  judgment 
of  the  board  itself,  as  no  other  tribunal  was  provided  for  the  pur- 
pose. The  board  was  one,  from  its  organization  and  general 
duties,  fit  and  competent  to  be  the  depository  of  the  trust  thus 
confided  to  it.  The  persons  composing  it  were  elected  by  the 
county,  and  it  was  already  invested  with  the  highest  functions 
concerning  its  general  police  and  fiscal  interests.  .  .  .  We  do  not 
say,"  he  adds,  "  that  the  decision  of  the  board  would  be  conclu- 
sive in  a  direct  proceeding  to  inquire  into  the  facts  previously  to 
the  execution  of  the  power,  and  before  the  rights  and  interests 
of  third  parties  had  attached ;  but  after  the  authority  has  been 
executed,  the  stock  subscribed,  and  the  bonds  issued  and  in  the 
hands-  of  innocent  holders,  it  Avould  be  too  late,  even  in  a  direct 
proceeding,  to  call  it  in  question.  Mucli  less  can  it  be  called  in 
question  to  the  prejudice  of  a  bona  fide  holder  of  the  bonds  in 
this  collateral  way,"  ^ 

§  522.  (418)  The  author  ventures  to  remark  that  he  believes 
the  decision  to  be  right,  and  for  the  reasons  thus  clearly  stated 
by  this  able  and  experienced  judge.  But  as  sustaining  the  deci- 
sion, a  further  position  by  way  of  argument  is  taken,  which, 
unless  it  is  to  be  understood  in  the  limited  sense  herein  suggested, 
he  considers  to  be  untenable,  of  a  most  dangerous  nature,  and 
subversive  of  an  important  principle  in  the  law  of  agency  appli- 
cable both  to  private  and  public  agents.  That  position  is  this : 
that  a  purchaser  of  the  bonds  had  a  right  to  assume,  from  the 
mere  fact  that  they  were  issued,  that  the  condition  on  which  the 
county  was  authorized  to  issue  them  had  been  complied  with, 
and  that  a  recital  in  the  bonds  that  the  requirements  of  the  law 
had  been  met  amounts  to  an  estoppel  in  pais  upon  the  corpora- 
tion, of  which  the  officers  issuing  the  bonds  were  the  public 
agents.  That  this  is  the  position  assumed  by  the  court  will 
appear  by  the  following  extract :  "  Another  answer,"  continues 
Mr.  Justice  Nelson,  "  to  this  ground  of  defence  is,  that  the  pur- 
1  Commissioners  of  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539,  544 ;  infra,  sec.  524,  n. 


§  522.] 


CONTRACTS. 


509 


chaser  of  the  bonds  had  a  right  to  assume  that  the  vote  of  the 
county,  which  was  made  a  condition  to  the  grant  of  the  power, 
had  been  obtained,  from  the  fact  of  the  subscription  by  the  board 
to  the  stock  of  the  railroad  company,  and  the  issuing  of  the  bonds. 
The  bonds,  on  their  face,  import  a  compliance  with  the  law  under 
which  they  were  issued.  'This  bond,'  we  quote,  'is  issued  in 
part  payment  of  a  subscription  of  $200,000,  by  the  said  Knox 
County,  to  the  capital  stock,  etc.,  by  order  of  the  board  of  com- 
missioners, in  pursuance  of  the  third  section  of  the  act,  etc.,  passed 
by  the  general  assembly  of  the  state  of  Indiana^  and  approved 
Jan.  15,  1849.'  The  purchaser  was  not  hound  to  look  further  for 
evidence  of  a  compliance  with  the  conditio7is  to  the  grant  of  the 
poiver.'" '^  This  principle  has  been  reiterated  and  this  case  fre- 
quently referred  to  and  followed,  and  one  of  the  two  grounds  on 
which  it  rests,  if  not  indeed  both  of  them,  still  has  the  approval 
of  the  court,  as  will  be  seen  by  its  most  recent  judgments.^ 


1  lb.  545.  If  by  tliis  it  is  meant  tliat 
where  the  power  to  issue  bonds  is  given 
upon  the  condition  of  a  previous  majority 
vote  in  favor  of  the  proposition,  the  pub- 
lic or  municipal  officers  can,  where  no  vote 
has  been  taken  or  the  proposition  has  been  voted 
down,Vmd  the  county  by  the  issue  of  bonds 
and  false  recitals  therein,  the  author  feels 
bound  respectfully  to  insist  that,  in  his 
judgment,  the  principle  is  unsound,  and 
certainly  it  is  one  which  will  entail  need- 
less and  incalculable  injury  upon  public 
and  municipal  corporations.  These  secu- 
rities, it  is  true,  are  intended  to  be  sold  in 
distant  markets,  and  therefore  it  cannot 
reasonably  be  required  that  purchasers 
shall  be  affected  with  irregularities,  but 
they  ought  to  be  held  to  ascertain  whether 
the  substantial  precedent  conditions  of 
the  power  have  been,  in  fact,  complied 
with,  and  it  ought  not  to  be  in  the  power 
of  public  officers,  unless  the  decision  of 
this  question  is  plainly  committed  to  them, 
to  bind  the  corporation  for  which  they  act 
by  their  mere  statements  of  what  is  in 
point  of  fact  untrue. 

On  grounds  similar  to  those  here  sug- 
gested it  has  been  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri  that  bonds  issued  where 
an  election  is  required,  but  none  ever  held 
and  no  vote  taken,  are  void,  because  of 
want  of  power  to  issue  them,  —  void  in 
the  hands  of  all  persons ;  but  they  may 


be  validated  by  the  legislature.  Steines 
V.  Franklin  County,  48  Mo.  167,  1871. 
Wagner,  J.,  in  this  case  reviews  the  prior 
adjudications  of  the  United  States  Su- 
preme Court  and  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  state  of  Missouri,  and  limits  the 
language  used  by  the  judges  to  the  facts 
before  them,  and  distinguishes  between 
the  case  of  irregularities  in  an  election 
and  no  election  wiiatever.  See,  also,  Car- 
penter V.  Inhabitants  of  Lathrop,  51  Mo. 
483,  1873.  But  see  text,  sec.  524,  and 
cases  cited  in  the  next  note 

^  The  cases  in  which  Knox  County  i>. 
Aspinwall  has  been  cited  and  followed  or 
applied,  are  :  Moran  v.  Miami  County, 
2  Black,  722,  724,  1802  ;  Supervisors  v. 
Sclienck,  5  Wall.  772, 186G ;  Rogers  v.  Bur- 
lington, 3  Wall.  654  ;  Woods  v.  Lawrence 
County,  1  Black,  386 ;  Mercer  County  v. 
Racket,  1  Wall.  83 ;  Meyer  v.  Muscatine, 
1  Wall.  385,  393 ;  Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison 
City,  1  Wah.  291 ;  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville, 
24  How.  287  ;  Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  1 
Wall.  175, 203  ;  Pendleton  County  v.  Amy, 
18  Wall.  297,  1871 ;  St.  Joseph  Township 
V.  Rogers,  10  Wall.  644,  1872;  Lexington 
V.  Butler,  14  Wall.  284;  Grand  Chute  v. 
Winegar,  15  Wall.  371,  1872;  Town  of 
Coloma  V.  Eaves,  92  U.  S.  484,  491; 
County  of  Randolph  v.  Post,  93  U.  8. 
502 ;  County  of  Leavenworth  v.  Barnes, 
94  U.  S.  70 ;  Coninirs.  of  Douglass  Co.  v. 


510 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  523.  Notwithstanding  the  broad  hmguage  in  some  of  the 
opinions  to  the  effect  that  where  under  any  circumstances  the 
power  exists  in  the  corporation  to  issue  negotiable  securities, 
the  bona  fide  holder  has  the  right  to  presume  that  they  were  duly 
issued,  yet  when  the  facts  of  the  cases  are  considered  in  which 
such  language  is  used,  we  are  unable,  after  a  careful  review  of  the 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  to  say  that  they  lay  down  the 
doctrine  that  merehj  by  recital  in  the  bonds  the  corporation  will, 
under  all  circumstances  in  favor  of  an  innocent  holder,  be  es- 
topped from  showing  that  in  point  of  fact  no  election  whatever 
was  holden,  or  that  any  other  condition  precedent  to  the  exercise 
of  the  power  has  not  been  complied  with.  If  upon  a  true  con- 
struction of  the  legislative  enactment  conferring  the  authority, 
the  corporation  or  certain  officers,  or  a  given  body  or  tribunal,  are 
invested  Avith  power  to  decide  whether  the  condition  precedent 
has  been  complied  with,  then  it  may  well  be  that  their  recital  of 


Bolles,  94  U.  S.  104 ;  Commrs.  of  Johnson 
Co.  V.  Thayer,  94  U.  S.  631 ;  County  of  Cass 
V.  Johnson,  95  U.  S.  360 ;  City  of  St.  Louis 
r.  Shields,  62  Mo.  247  ;  Smith  v.  Clark 
County,  54  Mo.  58,  81 ;  Daviess  Co.  v. 
Huidekoper,  98  U.  S.  98,  1878 ;  Nauvoo 
V.  Ritter,  97  U.  S.  389,  1878 ;  Venice  v. 
Murdock,  92  U.  S.  494  ;  Anthony  v.  Jasper 
Co.,  101  U.  S.  693, 1879 ;  Warren  v.  Marcy, 
97  U.  S.  96 ;  Mealey  v.  St.  Clair  Co.,  3 
Dill.  163 ;  Allen  v.  Cameron,  3  Dill.  175 ; 
Wyatt  V.  Green  Bay,  1  Diss.  292 ;  Hackett 
V.  Ottawa,  99  U.  S.  86;  San  Antonio  v. 
Mehaffy,  96  U.  S.  312,  1877 ;  Commrs.  v. 
January,  94  U.  S.  202;  East  Lincoln 
V.  Davenport,  94  -U.  S.  801 ;  Moultrie  v. 
Savings  Bank,  92  U.  S.  631 ;  Cincinnati  v. 
Morgan,  3  Wall.  275;  Lynde  v.  Winne- 
bago, 16  Wall.  0;  Kennicott  v.  Super- 
visors, 16  Wall.  452 ;  Marcy  v.  Oswego, 
92  U.  S.  637 ;  Humboldt  v.  Long,  92  U.  S. 
642 ;  Calloway  Co.  v.  Foster,  93  U.  S.  567  ; 
Commrs.  v.  Thayer,  94  U.  S.  631 ;  San 
Antonio  v.  Barnes,  96  U.  S.  315,  1877; 
Wilkinson  v.  Peru,  61  Ind.  1 ;  Webb  v. 
Hern  Bay,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B.  642 ;  Imperial 
Land  Co.,  in  re,  L.  R.  11  Eq.  478;  Black 
V.  Cohen,  52  Ga.  621,  1874;  Shorter  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  52  Ga.  621,  1874 ;  Lyons  v. 
Munson,  99  U.  S.  684;  Weyauwega  v. 
Ayling,  99  U.  S.  112  ;  Supervisors  v.  Gal- 
braith,  99  U.  S.  212;  Bargate  v.  Short- 
ridge,   5    Clark,   H.   L.   297;   Wilson  v. 


Salamanca,  99  U.  S.  499,  affirming  Or- 
leans V.  Piatt,  99  U.  S.  676,  1878,  citing 
among  other  cases  Royal  British  Bank  v. 
Turquand,  6  El.  &  Bl.  325;  Menasha  ;•.  Haz- 
ard, 101  U.  S  1879;  Pompton  y.  Cooper 
Union,  101  U.  S.  196 ;  Marcy  v.  Oswego, 
92  U.  S.  638 ;  Scotland  v.  Thomas,  94  U. 
S.  682  ;  Schuyler  Co.  v.  Thomas,  98  U.  S. 
169,  affirming  Calloway  Co.  v.  Foster,  93 
U.  S.  567 ;  Scotland  Co.  v.  Thomas,  94  U.  S. 
682 ;  Cass  Co.  v.  Johnson,  95  U.  S.  360, 
affirmed  in  Douglass  v.  Pike  Co.,  101  U. 
S.  677;  Darlington  v.  Jackson  Co.,  101 
U.  S.  688 ;  Foote  v.  Pike  Co.,  101  U.  S. 
688;  Roberts  v.  Bolles,  101  U.  S.  119, 
affirming  Scotland  v.  Thomas,  supra; 
Macon  Co.  v.  Shores,  97  U.  S.  272;  and 
a  certificate  of  the  proper  officer  that 
the  bonds  have  been  duly  issued  and  the 
signatures  are  genuine,  and  that  the  same 
have  been  duly  registered  in  his  office  ac- 
cording to  law,  cannot  be  contradicted  by 
evidence  that  there  was  actually  no  regis- 
tration in  his  office.  Rock  Creek  v.  Strong, 
96  U.  S.  271. 

Estoppel  to  set  up  irregularities  in 
issue  of  bonds  bj'  reason  of  the  subse- 
quent pajjinent  of  interest.  Supervisors  v. 
Schenck,  5  Wall.  772;  compare  Marsh  v. 
Fulton  Co.,  10  Wall.  676. 

Estoppel  by  retaining  procept/s  of  bonds. 
Pendleton  County  v.  Amy,  13  Wall.  297, 
1871. 


§  524.]  CONTRACTS.  511 

their  determination  of  a  matter  in  pais  which  they  are  authorized 
to  decide  Avill,  in  favor  of  the  bondholder  for  value,  bind  the 
corporation.^ 

§  524.  "  This,"  says  Mr.  Justice  Strong^  referring  to  the  lan- 
guage of  the  author  in  the  last  preceding  section,  "  is  a  very 
cautious  statement  of  the  doctrine  "  of  the  Supreme  Court.  And 
he  adds,  "  It  may  be  re-stated  in  a  slightly  different  form.  Where 
legislative  authority  has  been  given  to  a  municipality,  or  to  its 
officers,  to  subscribe  for  the  stock  of  a  railroad  company,  and  to 
issue  municipal  bonds  in  payment,  but  only  on  some  precedent 
condition,  such  as  a  popular  vote  favoring  the  subscription,  and 
where  it  maj'  be  gathered  from  the  legislative  enactment  that  the 
officers  of  the  municipality  were  invested  with  power  to  decide 
whether  the  condition  precedent  has  been  complied  with,  their 
recital  that  it  has  been,  made  in  the  bonds  issued  by  them  and 
held  by  a  hona  fide  purchaser,  is  conclusive  of  the  fact  and  binding 
upon  the  municipality,  for  the  recital  is  itself  a  decision  of  the 
fact  by  the  appointed  tribunal.  In  Bissell  v.  Jeffersonville,  it 
appeared  that  the  common  council  of  the  city  were  authorized  by 
the  legislature  to  subscribe  for  stock  in  a  railroad  company,  and 
to  issue  bonds  for  the  subscription,  on  the  petition  of  three 
fourths  of  the  legal  voters  of  the  city.  The  council  adopted  a 
resolution  to  subscribe,  reciting  in  the  preamble  that  more  than 
three  fourths  of  the  legal  voters  had  petitioned  for  it,  and  au- 
thorized the  mayor  and  city  clerk  to  sign  and  deliver  bonds  for 
the  sum  subscribed.  The  bonds  recited  that  they  were  issued  by 
authority  of  the  common  council,  and  that  three  fourths  of  the 
legal  voters  had  petitioned  for  the  same,  as  required  bj''  the 
charter.  In  a  suit  subsequenth^  brought  by  an  innocent  holder 
for  value,  to  recover  the  amount  of  unpaid  coupons  for  interest, 
it  was  held  inadmissible  for  the  defendants  to  show  that  three 
fourths  of  the  legal  voters  of  the  city  had  not  signed  the  petition 
for  the  stock  subscription.  A  similar  ruling  was  made  in  Van 
Hostrup  V.  Madison  City,  and  in  Mercer  County  v.  Hacket.  The 
same  principle  has  recently  been  asserted  in  this  court,  after  very 
grave  consideration,  and  it  must  be  considered  as  settled.     In 

1  The  language  in  this  section  stands  as    judgment  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
in  the  last  edition,  but  it  must  now  be  re-    United  States,  referred  to  in  section  524. 
garded  as  authoritatively  qualified  by  the 


512  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XTV. 

St.  Joseph  Township  r.  Rogers,  it  is  stated  thus:  'Power  to  issue 
bonds  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  a  raih'oad  is  frequently  con- 
ferred upon  a  municipality  in  a  special  manner,  or  subject  to  certain 
regulations,  conditions,  or  qualifications  ;  hut  if  it  ap})ears  by  their 
recitals  that  the  bonds  were  issued  in  conformity  with  such  regu- 
lations and  pursuant  to  such  conditions  and  qualifications,  proof 
that  an}'  or  all  these  recitals  were  incorrect  will  not  constitute  a 
defence  for  the  corporation  in  a  suit  on  the  bonds  or  coupons,  if  it 
appears  that  it  was  the  sole  province  of  the  municipal  officers  who 
executed  the  bonds  to  decide  Avhether  or  not  there  had  been  an 
antecedent  compliance  with  the  regulation,  condition,  or  qualifi- 
cation, which  it  is  alleged  was  not  fulfilled.'  There  is  nothing 
in  the  case  of  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County  at  all  inconsistent  with 
the  rule  thus  asserted.  In  that  case  there  were  no  recitals  in 
the  bonds,  and  there  was  no  decision  that  the  conditions  pre- 
cedent to  a  subscription,  or  to  the  gift  of  authority  to  subscribe, 
had  been  performed.  The  question  was,  therefore,  open.  What 
■we  have  said  disposes  of  the  present  case  without  the  necessity  of 
particular  consideration  of  the  matters  urged  in  the  argument  of 
the  defendant  below.  It  was  inadmissible  to  show  what  was 
attempted  to  be  shown ;  and  even  if  it  liad  been  admissible,  the 
effort  to  assimilate  the  case  to  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County  would  fail. 
There  the  subscription  was  for  the  stock  of  a  different  corporation 
from  that  for  which  the  people  had  voted."  ^ 

1  Townof  Colomaj'.Eaves,  92U.  S.484.  "I  dissent  from  the  opinion  of  the 
In  tliis  case,  legishxtive  authority  was  court  in  this  case,  so  far  as  it  may  be  con- 
given  to  the  town  to  make  the  subscrip-  strned  to  reaffirm  the  first  point  asserted 
-  tion  and  issue  the  bonds  on  the  previous  in  the  case  of  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 
sanction  of  a  popular  vote,  to  be  ascer-  to  wit,  that  the  mere  execution  of  a  bond 
tained,  as  tlie  court  construed  the  enact-  by  officers  charged  with  the  dutyof  ascer- 
ment,  by  the  officers  of  the  town,  who  taining  whether  a  condition  precedent  lias 
were  empowered  to  execute  the  bonds,  been  performed  is  conclusive  proof  of  its 
The  bonds  were  executed  in  due  form  bj'  performance.  If,  when  tlie  law  requires 
the  proper  officers,  and  duly  registered  a  vote  of  tax-payers  before  bonds  can  be 
with  tlie  auditor  of  state,  and  contained  issued,  the  supervisor  of  a  township,  or 
the  rrcital  that  they  "  are  issued  under  and  the  judge  of  probate  of  a  county,  or  other 
by  virtue  of  tlie  act  incorporating  the  railroad  officer  or  magistrate,  is  the  officer  desig- 
compani/,"  approved  March  24,  1869,  nated  to  ascertain  whether  such  vote  has 
"  and  in  accordance  ^fith  the  vote  of  the  elect-  been  given,  and  is  also  the  proper  officer 
ors  of  said  township  of  Coloma,  at  a  regular  to  execute  and  who  does  execute  the 
election  held  July  28,  1869,  m  accordance  bonds  ;  and  if  the  bonds  themselves  con- 
with  said  law."  tain  a  statement  or  recital  that  such  vote 
The  scope  and  effect  of  the  doctrine  of  has  been  given,  then  the  bona  fide  pur- 
the  court  are  illustrated  by  the  following  chaser  of  the  bonds  need  go  back  no  fur- 
brief  separate  opinion  in  the  case,  given  tlier.  He  has  a  right  to  rely  on  the 
by  Mr.  Justice  Bradhy,  who  says  :  —  statement  as  a  determination  of  the  ques- 


§  525.] 


CONTEACTS. 


513 


§  525.  Estoppel  hy  Recital.  —  Failure  to  give  Notice  of  Election^ 
or  Notice  for  the  Required  Time.  —  As  showing  the  application  and 
effect  of  the  doctrine  stated  in  the  preceding  sections  as  to  compli- 


tion.  But  a  mere  execution  and  issue  of 
the  bonds  without  such  recital  is  not,  in 
my  judgment,  conclusive.  It  may  be 
prima  facie  sufficient ;  but  the  contrary 
may  be  shown.  This  seems  to  me  to  be 
the  true  distinction  to  be  taken  on  this 
subject,  and  I  do  not  think  that  the  con- 
trary has  ever  been  decided  by  this  court. 
There  have  been  various  dicta  to  the 
contrary,  but  tiie  cases,  when  carefully 
examined,  will  be  found  to  have  had  all 
the  prerequisites  necessary  to  sustain  the 
bonds,  according  to  my  view  of  the  case. 
This  view  was  distinctly  announced  by 
this  court  in  the  case  of  Lynde  v.  The 
County  of  Winnebago,  16  Wall.  6.  In 
the  case  now  under  consideration,  there 
is  a  sufficient  recital  in  the  bond  to  show 
that  the  proper  election  was  held  and  the 
proper  vote  given  ;  and  tlie  bond  was  exe- 
cuted by  the  officers  whose  duty  it  was 
to  ascertain  these  facts.  On  this  ground, 
and  this  alone,  I  concur  in  the  judgment 
of  the  court." 

In  the  same  case  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  in 
the  main  opinion,  after  resting  the  judg- 
ment on  the  principle  stated  in  the  text, 
makes  this  reference  to  the  case  of  Knox 
County  V.  Aspinwall :  — 

"  Indeed,  some  of  our  decisions  have 
gone  farther.  In  the  leading  case  of 
Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  544, 
the  decision  was  rested  upon  two  grounds. 
One  of  them  was  that  the  mere  issue  of 
the  bonds,  containing  a  recital  that  they 
were  issued  under  and  in  pursuance  of 
the  legislative  act,  was  a  sufficient  basis 
for  an  assumption  by  the  purchaser  that 
the  conditions  on  which  the  county  (in 
that  case)  was  authorized  to  issue  them 
had  been  complied  witli,  and  it  was  said 
the  purchaser  was  not  bound  to  look  far- 
ther fof  evidence  of  such  compliance, 
though  the  recital  did  not  affirm  it.  This 
position  was  supported  by  reference  to 
the  Royal  British  Bank  v.  Turquand, 
6  Ellis  &  Blackburn,  327,  a  case  in  the 
Exchequer  Chamber  which  fully  sustains 
it,  and  the  decision  in  which  was  con- 
curred in  by  all  the  judges.  This  posi- 
tion taken  in  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall 

VOL.  I.  33 


has  been  more  than  once  reaffirmed  in 
this  court.  It  was  in  Moran  v.  Miami 
County,  2  Black,  732;  in  Mercer  County 
V.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83 ;  in  Supervisors  v. 
Schenck,  5  Wall.  784,  and  in  Meyer  v. 
Muscatine,  1  Wall.  384.  It  has  never 
been  overruled,  and  whatever  doubts 
may  have  been  suggested  respecting  its 
correctness  to  the  full  extent  ta  which  it 
has  sometimes  been  announced,  there 
should  be  no  doubt  of  the  entire  correct- 
ness of  the  other  rule  asserted  in  Knox 
County  V.  Aspinwall.  That,  we  think, 
has  been  so  firmly  seated  in  reason  and 
authority  that  it  cannot  be  shaken." 

In  further  explanation  we  may  remark 
that  the  recital  in  Knox  County  v.  Aspin- 
wall was  in  these  words :  "  This  bond  is 
issued  in  part  payment  of  a  subscription  of 
."$200,000,  by  the  said  Knox  County,  to  the 
capital  stock,  etc.,  by  order  of  the  board 
of  commissioners  in  pursuance  of  the  third 
section  of  the  act,  etc.,  approved  January 
15, 1849."  The  act  required  the  previous 
saqction  of  a  majority  of  the  qualified 
voters  of  the  county,  and  the  defence  was 
failure  to  comply  with  the  statute  in  re- 
spect to  the  notices  for  the  election.  And 
the  proposition  which  has  been  doubted 
elsewhere,  and  from  which  Mr.  Justice 
Bradlei/  dissents,  is  contained  in  the  fol- 
lowing sentence,  extracted  from  the  opin- 
ion of  Mr.  Justice  Nelson  in  that  case, 
who,  after  quoting  the  foregoing  recital 
in  the  bond  (which  it  will  be  seen  does 
not  expressly  state  that  there  was  an  elec- 
tion), says  :  "  Tiie  purchaser  was  not 
bound  to  look  furtlier  for  evidence  of  a 
compliance  with  the  conditions  to  the 
grant  of  the  power."  In  Moran  v.  Miami 
County,  2  Black,  722,  732,  the  court  say  : 
"We  tliink  and  adjudge  that  the  recitals 
in  the  bonds  are  conclusive  [of  compliance 
with  the  precedent  condition],  constitut- 
ing an  estoppel  in  pais  upon  the  defend- 
ants in  this  suit."  Other  cases  to  the 
same  effect  in  the  Supreme  Court  will  be 
adverted  to  as  we  proceed.  In  Marcy  v. 
Oswego  Township,  92  U.  S.  638, 1876,  the 
doctrine  as  contained  in  the  text  was  re- 
asserted almost  in  the  same  language. 


514  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

ance  with  conditions  precedent  —  particularly  in  respect  of  the 
very  common  one  of  a  previous  election  or  the  assent  of  a  given 
proportion  of  the  tax-payers  —  a  brief  reference  may  be  made 
to  some  of  the  most  recent  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  in 
which  it  is  evident  that  the  whole  subject  again  underwent  thor- 
ough consideration.  In  Humboldt  Township  v.  Long,  bonds 
issued  under  legislative  authority,  requiring  a  popular  vote,  at  an 
election  of  which  thirty  days'  notice  Avas  to  be  given,  and  which 
contained  a  recital  (made  by  the  officers  having  the  power,  as 
construed,  to  determine  whether  the  conditions  of  fact  had  been 
complied  with  and  to  issue  the  bonds)  to  the  effect  that  they 
were  "  issued  in  pursumice  of  and  in  accordance  with  the  act  of 
the  legislature,"  stating  it,  were  held  not  invalid  in  the  hands  of 
a  holder  for  value,  before  due,  without  notice,  because  the  election 
was  held  within  less  than  thirty  days  after  the  date  of  the  order 
providing  for  it.^ 

The  principle  adopted,  and  the  reasoning  of  the  court  by  which 
it  is  sustained,  lead,  it  would  seem,  logically  to  the  conclusion 
(although  there  is,  perhaps,  no  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  where 
the  facts  required  a  direct  decision  of  the  point)  that  where  the 
power  to  issue  the  bonds  is  given  upon  the  condition  of  a  previous 

1  Humboldt  Township  v.  Long,  92  U.  confer  the  power.  Whether  that  step 
S.  G42.  Tlie  court  thus  states  the  ground  had  been  taken  or  not,  and  whether  the 
of  its  decision  :  "  The  board  of  county  election  had  been  regularly  conducted, 
commissioners,  who  caused  the  bonds  to  with  sufficient  notice,  and  whetlier  the 
be  issued,  were  constituted  the  authority  requisite  majority  of  votes  had  been  cast 
to  determine  whether  the  conditions  of  in  favor  of  a  subscription,  and  conse- 
fact,  made  by  the  statute  precedent  to  quent  bond  issue,  were  questions  which 
the  exercise  of  the  authority  granted  to  the  law  submitted  to  the  board  of  county 
execute  and  issue  the  bonds,  had  been  commissioners  and  which  it  was  necessary 
performed,  and  their  recital  in  the  bonds  for  them  to  answer  before  they  could  act. 
issued  by  them  is  conclusive  in  a  suit  In  the  present  case  the  board  passed  upon 
against  the  township  brouglit  by  a  bona  them  and  issued  the  bonds,  asserting  by 
fide  holder."  (So  held  in  Marcy  v.  Town-  the  recitals  that  they  were  issued  '  in  pur- 
ship  of  Oswego,  02  U.  S.  638.)  "  In  so  suance  of  and  in  accordance  with  the  act 
ruling  we  but  decided  what  had  often  be-  of  the  legislature.'  Thus  the  plaintiff 
fore  been  decided,  and  what  ought  to  be  below  took  them,  without  knowledge  of 
regarded  as  a  fixed  rule.  Applying  it  to  any  irregularities  in  the  process  through 
the  solution  of  the  question  now  before  which  the  legislative  authority  was  exer- 
us,  it  is  plain  that  the  bonds  are  not  in-  cised,  and  relying  upon  the  assurance 
valid  because  a«  the  notice  of  the  popular  given  by  the  board  that  the  bonds  had 
election  was  not  given  which  the  legisla-  been  issued  in  accordance  with  the  law. 
tive  act  directed.  The  election  was  a  In  his  hands,  therefore,  they  are  valid 
step  in  the  process  of  execution  of  the  instruments."  See  Town  of  Elmwood 
power  granted  to  issue  bonds  in  payment  r.  Marcy,  92  U.  S.  289,  1875 ;  St.  Jo- 
of  a  municipal  subscription  to  the  stock  seph  Township  v.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  644, 
of  a  railroad  company.     It  did  not  itself  1872. 


§  525.]  CONTRACTS.  515 

vote  in  favor  of  the  proposition  that  the  public  or  municipal 
officers  can,  tvhere  no  vote  tvhatever  has  been  taken,  or  the  proposi- 
tion has  been  voted  doivn,  bind  the  county  or  municipality  by  the 
false  recitals  in  such  unauthorized  bonds,  provided  they  are  issued 
by  the  officers  entrusted  by  the  statute  with  the  power.  Under 
this  doctrine,  limitations  upon  the  exercise  of  the  power  intended 
to  prevent  fraud,  and  to  secure  a  compliance  with  the  conditions 
upon  which  the  bonds  are  authorized,  are  of  little  practical  value, 
and  generally  prove  illusory. 

So,  in  Coloma  v.  Eaves,  supra,  —  a  case  from  Illinois,  —  the 
local  officers  of  the  town  were  empowered  by  the  statute  to  issue 
bonds,  provided  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  town  voted  for 
the  subscription ;  which  fact,  the  statute  provided,  shall  appear 
by  the  statement  of  the  town  clerk,  filed  with  the  county  clerk, 
showing  the  vote  given,  the  amount  voted,  and  the  rate  of  inter- 
est :  it  was  held  in  favor  of  a  bona  fide  owner  of  the  bonds  issued 
containing  a  recital  of  an  election,  that  such  an  owner  need  not 
look  beyond  the  recitals  made  in  the  bonds  by  the  local  officers 
authorized  to  issue  them  for  evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  facts 
in  pais  thus  recited,  the  decision  and  declaration  of  that  decision 
in  the  bonds  being  conclusive  upon  the  town.  The  court  said : 
"  After  all,  this  is  not  an  open  question,  as  between  a  bona  iide 
holder  of  the  bonds  and  the  township,  whether  all  the  prerequi- 
sites to  their  issue  have  been  complied  with.  Apart  from  and 
beyond  the  reasonable  presumption  that  the  officers  of  the  law, 
the  township  officers,  discharged  their  duty,  the  matter  has  passed 
into  judgment.  The  persons  appointed  to  decide  whether  the 
necessary  prerequisites  to  their  issue  had  been  completed  have 
decided  and  certified  their  decision.  They  have  declared  the 
contingency  to  have  happened  on  the  occurrence  of  which  the 
authority  to  issue  the  bonds  was  complete.  Their  recitals  are 
such  a  decision,  and  beyond  those  a  bona  fide  purchaser  is  not 
bound  to  look  for  evidence  of  the  existence  of  things  in  pais.  He  is 
bound  to  know  the  law  conferring  upon  the  municipality  power 
to  give  the  bonds  on  the  happening  of  a  contingency,  but  whether 
that  has  happened  or  not  is  a  question  of  fact,  the  decision  of 
which  is  by  the  law  confided  to  others,  to  those  most  competent 
to  decide  it,  and  which  the  purchaser  is,  in  general,  in  no  condi- 
tion to  decide  for  himself." 


516 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XIV. 


§  526.  ConcUtion  Precedent.  —  Onus  Prohandi.  —  Estoppel  hy 
Recital.  —  In  another  important  case,  it  appeared  that  legis- 
lative authority  was  given  to  certain  officers  of  a  town  to  borrow 
money  to  aid  the  building  of  a  railway,  and  to  issue  bonds  there- 
for, provided  the  written  assent  of  two  thirds  of  the  resident 
tax-payers  should  be  previously  obtained  by  said  town  officers 
and  filed  in  the  county  clerk's  office,  with  an  affidavit  of  such 
officers  verifying  such  assent.  A  list  of  assenting  tax-payers  was 
filed  in  the  clerk's  office,  and  also  the  required  affidavit ;  bonds 
were  issued,  and  were  in  the  hands  of  a  holder  for  value :  on  the 
trial  the  question  arose  whether  the  plaintiff  must  prove  the  sig- 
natures to  the  assent  to  be  genuine,  and  it  was  held  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  denying  Starin  v.  Genoa,  and 
Gould  V.  Sterling,  cited  in  the  note,  that  no  such  onus  rested  on 
him ;  that  the  town  officers  were  created  a  tribunal  to  determine 
whether  two  thirds  of  the  resident  tax-payers  had  assented,  and 
that  on  their  decision  the  purchaser  might  rely,  without  looking 
further ;  and  that  the  town  was  concluded,  in  favor  of  an  inno- 
cent holder,  from  denying  that  the  condition  precedent  had  been 
perform  ed.i 


1  Town  of  Venice  v.  Murdock,  92  U. 
S.  Sup.  Court,  494,  1875 ;  Rock  Creek  v. 
Strong,  96  U.  S.  271.  In  the  People  v. 
Mead,  36  N.  Y.  224,  1867,  the  decision  in 
Starin  v.  Genoa  and  Gould  v.  Sterling 
was  adhered  to  by  the  Court  of  Appeals 
of  New  York,  although  the  court  admitted 
it  was  contrary  to  the  decisions  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as 
to  the  evidence  of  the  assent  of  the 
tax-payers.  In  Venice  v.  Murdock,  supra, 
Mr.  Justice  Sfronrj,  speaking  of  Starin 
V.  Genoa  and  Gould  v.  Sterling,  says  ; 
"  These  decisions  are  in  conflict  with 
the  rulings  of  this  court  in  Bissell  v. 
Jeffersonville,  24  How.  287  ;  Knox 
County  V.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539 ; 
Mercer  County  v.  Ilackett,  1  Wall.  83, 
and  other  cases  whicli  we  have  cited. 
They  are  in  conflict  also  with  decisions 
in  other  state  courts.  Society  for  Sav- 
ings V.  New  London,  29  Conn.  174  ;  Rail- 
road Company  v.  Evansville,  15  Ind.  395 ; 
Commissioners  v.  Nichols,  14  Ohio  St. 
260.  We  have  carefully  considered  the 
reasons  given  for  the  judgments  in  the 
New  York  cases,  without  being  convinced 


by  them.  They  ignore  tlie  paramount 
purpose  for  which  the  bonds  were  author- 
ized by  the  legislature,  and  they  treat  the 
written  assent  of  the  taxables  as  the 
authority  to  the  township  officers,  when, 
in  fact,  the  power  was  given  by  the  legis- 
lature, and  it  was  only  left  to  the  town  to 
determine  by  the  action  of  two  thirds  of 
the  resident  taxables  whether  the  super- 
visors and  commissioners  might  act  under 
the  power.  In  Gould  v.  Sterling  the 
legislative  act  required  no  afiidavit  to  be 
filed  with  a  statement  of  the  assenting  tax- 
payers, and  in  Starin  v.  Genoa  the  affi- 
davit filed  was  regarded  as  merely  verify- 
ing that  the  persons  whose  names  ap- 
peared on  the  assents  comprised  two 
thirds  of  all  the  resident  tax-payers.  But 
it  is  obvious  that  if  no  more  than  this  was 
meant  by  the  required  affidavit,  it  was 
wholly  useless,  for  the  assessment  rolls 
of  the  township  would  have  shown  as 
much."  The  case,  Venice  v.  Murdock, 
is  so  important  in  overturning,  so  far 
as  the  federal  courts  are  concerned, 
the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals 
of  New  York,  and  as  respects  the  propo- 


§  527.] 


CONTRACTS. 


517 


§  527.  Estojjpel  hy  Recital  to  set  up  Defence  of  an  Over-issue 
contrarij  to  the  Enahling  Act.  —  Among  the  limitations,  or  at- 
tempted limitations,  upon  the  exercise  of  the  power  to  issue 
bonds,  one  not  unfrequently  provided  is,  that  the  amount  voted 
or  issued  shall  not  exceed  a  specified  proportion  of  the  taxable 
property  of  the  municipality,  or  such  a  sum  as  will  require  a 
greater  lev}'  of  taxes  than  a  specified  rate  on  the  taxable  property 
to  pay  the  annual  interest  on  the  bonds.  The  effect  of  a  disre- 
gard of  this  limitation  by  the  officers  entrusted  by  the  statute 
with  the  exercise  of  the  power  came,  for  the  first  time,  before  the 
Supreme  Court  at  the  October  term,  1875,  in  a  case  arising  under 
the  les;islation  of  Kansas} 


sition  it  establishes,  that  we  reproduce 
the  additional  reasons  given  by  the 
Supreme  Court  in  support  of  its  judg- 
ment. "  It  is  very  obvious,"  says  Strong, 
J.,  "  that  if  the  act  of  the  legislature 
which  authorized  an  issue  of  bonds  in  aid 
of  the  construction  of  the  railroad  on  the 
written  assent  of  two  thirds  of  the  res- 
ident tax-payers  of  the  town  intended 
that  the  holder  of  the  bonds  should  be 
under  obligation  to  prove  by  parol  evi- 
dence that  each  case  of  the  two  hundred 
and  fifty-nine  names  signed  to  the  written 
assent  was  a  genuine  signature  of  the 
person  wlio  bore  the  name,  the  proffered 
aid  to  the  railroad  company  was  a  delu- 
sion. No  sane  person  would  have  bought 
a  bond  with  such  an  obligation  resting 
upon  him  whenever  he  called  for  pay- 
ment of  principal  or  interest.  If  such 
was  the  duty  of  the  holder,  it  was  always 
his  duty.  It  could  not  be  performed 
once  for  all.  The  bonds  retained  in  the 
hands  of  the  company  would  have  been 
no  help  in  the  construction  of  the  road. 
It  was  only  because  they  could  be  sold 
that  they  were  valuable.  Only  thus 
could  they  be  applied  to  the  construction. 
Yet  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  the  legislature 
liad  in  view  and  intended  to  give  sub- 
stantial aid  to  tlie  railroad  company,  if  a 
sufficient  number  of  the  tax-payers  as- 
sented. They  must  liave  contemplated 
that  the  bonds  would  be  offered  for  sale, 
and  it  is  not  to  be  believed  they  intended 
to  impose  such  a  clog  upon  tlieir  salable- 
ness  as  would  rest  upon  it  if  every  person 
proposing  to  purchase  was   required   to 


inquire  of  each  one  whose  name  ap- 
peared to  the  assent  whether  he  had  in 
fact  signed  it." 

1  Marcy  v.  Township  of  Oswego,  92 
U.  S.  G37.  The  legislative  provision  is 
essential  to  an  accurate  understanding  of 
the  judgment  and  view  of  the  court.  The 
act  of  the  legislature,  under  which  the 
bonds  purported  to  have  been  issued,  was 
passed  February  2.5,  1870.  Laws  of  Kan. 
1870,  p.  189.  The  first  section  enacted 
that  whenever  fifty  of  the  qualified 
voters,  being  freeholders,  of  any  muni- 
cipal township  in  any  county  should 
petition  the  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners of  such  county  to  submit  to  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  township  a  propo- 
sition to  take  stock  in  the  name  of  such 
township,  in  any  railroad  proposed  to  be 
constructed  into  or  through  the  township, 
designating  in  the  petition,  among  other 
things,  the  amount  of  stock  proposed  to 
be  taken,  it  should  be  the  duty  of  the 
board  to  cause  an  election  to  be  held  in 
the  township  to  determine  whether  such 
subscription  should  be  made  ;  provided 
that  the  amount  of  bonds  voted  by  any 
township  should  not  be  above  such  a  sum 
as  would  require  a  levy  of  more  than  one 
per  cent  per  annum  on  the  taxable 
property  of  such  township  to  pay  the 
ye-irly  interest.  The  second  section  di- 
rected tlie  board  of  county  commissioners 
to  make  an  order  for  holding  the  election 
contemplated  in  the  preceding  section, 
and  to  specify  tlierein  the  amount  of 
stock  proposed  to  be  subscribed,  and  also 
to  prescribe  tiie  form  of  the  ballots  to  be 


518 


MUXICIP.VL   COKrOHATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  528.  In  the  last  case  the  bonds  were  duly  executed,  and  con- 
tained a  recital  of  the  act,  and  that  they  were  issued  "  in  virtue 
of  and  in  accordance''''  with  it,  and  "  in  pursuance  of  and  in  accord- 
ance tvith  the  vote  of  three  fifths  of  the  legal  voters  of  the  town- 
ship, at  an  election  to  be  held  on  "  a  specified  day.  The  plaintiff 
was  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value,  without  notice.  The  defence 
was  that  they  were  voted  and  issued  at  one  time,  as  one  act,  and 
in  payment  of  one  subscription  in  excess  of  the  amount  authorized 
by  the  statute.  The  circuit  justice  of  the  United  States  for  the 
circuit  distinguished  the  case  from  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 
before  referred  to,  on  the  ground  that  the  statute  imposing  the 


used.  The  fiftli  section  enacted  that  if 
three  fiftlis  of  the  electors  voting  at  sucli 
election  sliould  vote  for  the  subscription, 
the  board  of  county  commissioners  should 
order  the  county  clerk  to  make  it  in  the 
name  of  the  township,  and  should  cause 
such  bonds  as  might  be  required  by  the 
terms  of  the  vote  and  subscription  to  be 
issued  in  the  name  of  such  township,  to 
be  signed  by  the  chairman  of  the  board, 
and  attested  by  the  clerk  under  the  seal 
of  the  county. 

In  Marcy  v.  Township  of  Oswego, 
supra,  bonds  to  which  the  coupons  were 
attached  contained  the  following  recital: 
"  This  bond  is  executed  and  issued  by 
virtue  of,  and  in  accordance  with,  an  act 
of  the  legislature  of  the  said  state  of 
Kansas,  entitled  '  An  act  to  enable  mu- 
nicipal townships  to  subscribe  for  stock 
in  any  railroad,  and  to  provide  for  the 
payment  of  the  same,  approved  February 
25,  1870,'  and  in  pursuance  of  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  vote  of  tliree  fifths  of 
the  legal  voters  of  said  townsliip  of 
Oswego,  at  a  special  election  duly  held 
on  the  17th  day  of  May,  A.  D.  1870." 
Each  bond  also  declared  that  the  board 
of  county  commissioners  of  the  county  of 
Labette,  of  which  county  the  township 
of  Oswego  is  a  part,  had  caused  it  to  be 
issued  in  the  name  and  in  behalf  of  said 
township,  and  to  be  signed  b^'  the  chair- 
man of  the  said  board  of  county  commis- 
sioners and  attested  by  the  county  clerk 
of  the  said  county,  under  its  seal.  Ac- 
cordingly, each  bond  was  thus  signed, 
attested,  and  sealed.  The  bonds  were 
registered  in  tlie  office  of  the  state  au- 
ditor, and  certified  by  him  in  accordance 


with  the  provisions  of  an  act  of  the  legis- 
lature. His  certificate  on  the  back  of 
eacli  bond  declared  that  it  had  been  reg- 
ularly and  legally  issued ;  that  the  sig- 
natures thereto  were  genuine,  and  that  it 
had  been  duly  registered  in  accordance 
with  the  act  of  the  legislature. 

The  defence  to  the  bonds  was  that 
there  had  been  an  over-issue,  contrary  to 
the  statute.  The  bond,  it  will  be  ob- 
served, contains  no  statement  on  this 
point,  but  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court  that  the  recital  in  the  bonds 
estopped  the  township  from  making  this 
defence  against  a  honajide  holder. 

The  case  of  Marcy  v.  Township  of 
Oswego  was  cited  and  approved  in  Hum- 
boldt Township  v.  Long,  92  U.  S.  642,  the 
court  observing : — 

"  There  is  no  essential  difference  be- 
tween this  case  and  that.  The  assessment 
rolls  of  the  township  may  have  been 
proper  evidence  for  the  consideration  of 
the  board  of  county  commissioners  when 
they  were  inquiring  what  the  value  of 
the  taxable  property  of  the  township,  was, 
but  the  bonds  are  not  invalid  in  the  hands 
of  a  bona  fide  holder  by  reason  of  their 
having  been  voted  and  issued  in  excess  of 
the  statutory  limit,  as  shown  by  the  rolls. 
Whatever  may  be  the  right  of  the  town- 
ship, as  against  those  who  issued  the 
bonds,  it  cannot  be  set  up  against  a  bona 
fide  holder  of  the  bonds  that  the  amount 
issued  was  too  large,  in  the  face  of  the 
decision  of  the  board,  and  their  recital 
that  tiie  bonds  were  issued  pursuant  to 
and  in  accordance  with  the  act  of  1870." 
See  supra,  sec.  525,  and  note. 


§  528.]  CONTRACTS.  519 

limitation,  the  order  for  the  election,  the  proposition  submitted, 
the  order  for  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  and  the  latest  assessment  roll 
were  not,  properly,  matters  in  pais,  but  were  all  public,  all  open, 
and  all  accessible,  and  all  of  record,  and  if  consulted  by  the  pur- 
chaser Avould  have  shown  the  bonds  to  have  been  voted  and 
issued  in  violation  of  the  express  limitation  upon  the  power  con- 
tained in  the  statute.  But  the  judgment  of  the  circuit  court  was 
reversed,  three  judges  dissenting,  and  the  defence  held  unavail- 
ing. The  case  was  considered  to  fall  within  the  principle  of  the 
previous  decisions.  Mr.  Justice  Strong,  speaking  for  the  court, 
after  stating  the  facts  as  we  have  given  them,  observed :  "  In 
view  of  these  facts,  and  of  the  decisions  heretofore  made  by  this 
court,  the  question  cannot  be  considered  an  open  one.  We 
have  recently  reviewed  the  subject  in  the  case  of  The  Town  of 
Coloma  V.  Eaves  (^siipra),  and  reasserted  what  had  been  decided 
before,  namely,  that  where  legislative  authority  has  been  given 
to  a  municipality  to  subscribe  for  the  stock  of  a  railroad  company, 
and  to  issue  municipal  bonds  in  payment  of  the  subscription,  on 
the  happening  of  some  precedent  contingency  of  fact,  and  where 
it  may  be  gathered  from  the  legislative  enactment  that  the  offi- 
cers or  persons  designated  to  execute  the  bonds  were  invested 
with  power  to  decide  whether  the  contingency  had  happened, 
or  whether  the  fact  existed  which  was  a  necessary''  condition  pre- 
cedent to  any  subscription  or  issue  of  the  bonds,  their  decision 
is  final  in  a  suit  by  the  hona  fide  holder  of  the  bonds  against  the 
municipality,  and  a  recital  in  the  bonds  that  the  requirements  of 
the  legishitive  act  have  been  complied  with  is  conclusive.  And 
this  is  more  emphatically  true  when  the  fact  is  one  peculiarly 
within  the  knowledge  of  the  persons  to  whom  the  power  to  issue 
the  bonds  has  been  conditionally  granted."  ^ 

1  In  the  dissenting  opinion  of  Mr.  Jus-  ness,  but  I  do  know  that  in  some  of  the 

tice  3////er  (with  wiiora  concurred  Davis  cases  tried  before  me  last  summer  in  A««- 

and  Field,  JJ.),  the  view  of  the  court  is  sas  it  was  shown  tliat  the  first  and   only 

strongly  combated.     A  few  extracts  will  issue  of  such  bonds  exceeded  in  amount 

show  the  opinion  of  the  dissentients,  and  the  entire  value  of  the  taxable  property  of 

bring  into  clearer  relief  the  views  of   the  the  town,  as  shown  by  the  tax  list  of  the 

court :  —  year    preceding   the    issue.     This   court 

"  In   the  cases  under  consideration,"  holds  that  such  a  showing  is  no  defence 

says  Miller,   J.,    "this   provision  of   the  to  the  bonds,  notwithstanding  the  express 

statute   was  wholly  disregarded.     I   am  prohibition  of  the  legislature.     Itisthere- 

not  sure  that  the  relative  amount  of  the  fore  clear  that,  so  long  as  this  doctrine  is 

bonds,  and  of  the  taxable  property  of  the  upheld,  it  is  not  in  the  power  of  the  legis- 

towns,  is  given  in  tliese  cases  with  exact-  lature  to  authorize  these   corporations  to 


520 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[on.  XIV. 


§  529.   These  cases  afford,  perhaps,  a  more  striking  illustration 
than  any  previously  decided  by  that  court,  that  the  purchaser 


issue  bonds  under  any  special  circum- 
stances, or  with  iinj'  limitation  in  tiie  use 
of  the  jiower,  which  may  not  be  disre- 
garded with  impunity.  It  may  be  the 
wisest  policy  to  prevent  the  issue  of  such 
bonds  altogether.  But  it  is  not  for  this 
court  to  dictate  a  policy  for  the  states  on 
that  subject.  The  result  of  the  decision 
is  a  most  extraordinary  one.  It  stands 
alone  in  the  construction  of  powers  spe- 
cifically granted,  whether  the  source  of 
the  power  be  a  state  constitution,  an  act 
of  the  legislature,  a  resolution  of  a  corpor- 
ate body,  or  a  written  authority  given  by 

an   individual No   such  principle 

has  ever  been  applied  by  this  court,  or  by 
any  other  court,  to  a  state,  to  the  United 
States,  to  private  corporations  or  to  indi- 
viduals. I  challenge  the  production  of  a 
case  in  which  it  has  been  so  applied.  In 
the  Floyd  Acceptance  Cases,  7  Wall.  G66, 
in  which  the  secretary  of  war  had  ac- 
cepted time  drafts  drawn  on  him  by  a 
contractor,  whicli,  being  negotiable,  came 
into  the  hands  of  honafide  purchasers  be- 
fore due,  we  held  that  they  were  void  for 
want  of  authority  to  accept  them.  And 
this  case  has  been  cited  b}'-  this  court  more 
than  once  without  question.  No  one 
would  think  for  a  moment  of  holding  that 
a  power  of  attorney  made  by  an  individ- 
ual cannot  be  so  limited  as  to  make  any 
one  dealing  with  tlie  agent  bound  by  the 
limitation,  or  that  the  agent's  construc- 
tion of  his  power  bound  the  principal. 
Nor  has  it  ever  been  contended  that  an 
officer  of  a  private  corporation  can,  by 
exceeding  his  authority,  when  that  au- 
thority is  express,  is  open  and  notorious, 
bind  the  corporation  which  he  professes 
to  represent.  The  simplicity  of  the  de- 
vice by  which  this  doctrine  is  upheld  as 
to  municipal  bonds  is  wortliy  the  admira- 
tion of  all  who  wish  to  profit  by  the 
frauds  of  municipal  officers.  It  is  that, 
whenever  a  condition  or  limitation  is  im- 
posed upon  the  power  of  those  officers  in 
issuing  bonds,  they  are  the  sole  and  final 
judges  of  the  extent  of  those  powers.  If 
they  decide  to  issue  tliem,  the  law  pre- 
sumes tliat  the  conditions  on  which  their 
powers  depended  existed,  or  that  the  lim- 
itation upon  the  exercise  of  the  power  has 


been  complied  with ;  and  especially  and 
particularly  if  they  make  a  false  recital  of 
the  fact  on  which  the  i)ower  depends  in 
the  pii])er  they  issue,  this  false  recital  has 
the  effect  of  creating  a  power  which  had 
no  existence  without  it.  This  remarkable 
result  is  always  defended  on  the  ground 
that  the  paper  is  negotiable,  and  tiie  pur- 
chaser is  ignorant  of  the  falsehood.  But 
in  the  Floyd  Acceptance  Cases,  this  court 
held,  and  it  was  necessary  to  hold  so 
there,  that  the  inquiry  into  the  authority 
by  which  negotiable  paper  was  issued 
was  just  the  same  as  if  it  were  not  nego- 
tiable, and  that  if  no  such  authority  ex- 
isted, it  could  not  be  aided  by  giving  the 
paper  that  form.  In  county  bonds  it 
seems  to  be  otherwise.  In  that  case  the 
court  held  that  the  party  taking  such 
paper  was  bound  to  know  the  law  as  it 
affected  the  authority  of  the  officer  who 
issued  it.  In  county  bond  cases,  while 
this  principle  of  law  is  not  expressly  con- 
tradicted, it  is  held  that  the  paper,  though 
issued  without  authority  of  law,  and  in 
opposition  to  its  express  provisions,  is  still 
valid.  There  is  no  reason  in  the  nature 
of  the  condition  on  which  the  power  de- 
pends in  these  cases  why  any  purchaser 
should  not  take  notice  of  its  existence  be- 
fore he  buys.  The  'bonds  in  this  case 
were  issued  at  one  time,  as  one  act,  of  one 
date,  and  in  payment  of  one  subscription. 
All  this  was  a  matter  of  record  in  the 
town  where  it  was  done. 

"  So,  also,  the  valuation  of  all  the 
property  of  the  town  for  the  taxation  of 
the  year  before  the  bonds  were  issued, 
is  of  record  both  in  that  town  and  in  the 
office  of  the  clerk  of  the  county  in  which 
the  town  is  located.  A  purchaser  had 
but  to  write  to  the  township  clerk  or  the 
county  clerk  to  know  precisely  the 
amount  of  the  issue  of  bonds  and  the 
value  of  the  taxable  property  within  the 
township.  In  the  matter  of  a  power  de- 
pending on  these  facts,  in  any  other  class 
of  cases,  it  would  be  held  that  before 
buying  these  bonds  the  purchaser  must 
look  to  those  matters  on  which  their 
validity  depended.  They  are  all  public, 
all  open,  all  accessible,  — the  statute,  the 
ordinance  for  their  issue,  the  latest  assess- 


§  530.]  CONTRACTS.  521 

may  implicitly  rely  upon  the  recitals  in  the  bonds  made  by  the 
proper  officers,  that  the  authority  to  issue  tliem  has  arisen,  and 
that  he  is  under  no  obligation  to  consult  the  records  of  the  muni- 
cipality, and  is  not  charged  with  constructive  notice  of  their  con- 
tents ;  and  this,  too,  it  will  be  observed,  where  the  recital  in  the 
bond  was  general  and  not  specific  in  its  nature,  and  where  the 
facts  which  would  have  shown  the  issue  of  the  bonds  to  have 
been  illegal  were  matters  appearing  upon  the  public  records  of 
the  township. 

§  530.  Estop])el  by  Recital  of  Matter  of  Fact,  e.  g..  Date  of  Sub- 
scription. —  The  effect  of  recitals  in  the  bonds,  and  of  statements 
in  the  records  of  the  county  which  issued  the  bonds,  is  considered 
in  The  Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank.^  A  con- 
trolling question  in  the  case  was  whether  the  power  to  subscribe 
for  stock  and  issue  bonds  therefor,  given  by  the  act  March  26, 
1869,  was  annulled  by  the  new  constitution  of  the  state  (which 
took  effect  July  2,  1870)  before  the  subscription  was  made  or  a 
valid  contract  to  subscribe  was  completed.  The  court  held  that, 
in  point  of  fact  a  legal  and  binding  subscription  was  made,  or 
agreed  to  be  made,  in  December,  1869,  and  hence  the  defence  of 
want  of  legal  power  failed  ;  and  it  then  proceeded  to  view  the 
case  as  affected  by  estoppel,  the  plaintiff  being  a  bona  fide  holder 

ment  roll.     But  in  favor  of  a  purchaser  open  violation  of  law  issues  these  bonds, 

of  municipal  bonds,  all  tliis  is  to  be  dis-  the  owner  of  property  lying  within  the 

regarded  ;  and  a  debt  contracted  without  corporation  must  pay   them,  though   he 

authority  and  in  violation  of  express  stat-  had  no  part  whatever  in  their  issue  and 

ute  is  to  be  collected  out  of  the  property  no  power  to   prevent  it.     This  latter  is 

of  the  helpless  man    who   owns  any   in  the   true   view   of  the  matter.     As    the 

that  district.     I  say  '  helpless  '  advisedly,  corporation   could    only     exercise    such 

because  these  are  not  Ids  agents.     They  power  as  the  law  conferred,  the  issuing 

are  the  officers  of  the  law,  appointed  or  of  the  bonds  was  not  the  act  of  the  cor- 

elected  without  his  consent,  acting  con-  poration.     It  is  a  false  assumption  to  say 

trary,  perhaps,  to  his  wishes.     Surely  if  that   the   corporation   put  them    on   the 

the  acts  of  any  class  of  officers  should  be  market.     If  one  of  two  innocent  persons 

valid  only  when   done  in   conformity  to  must   suffer  for  tlie  unauthorized  act  of 

law,  it   is  those  who  manage  the  affairs  the  township  or  county  officers,  it  is  clear 

of  towns,  counties,  and  villages,  in  creat-  tliat  he  who  could,   before  parting  with 

ing     debts   which    not    they,     but     the  his  money,  have  easily  ascertained  that 

property-owners,     must    pay.  ...  It    is  thej'    were    unauthorized,    should    lose, 

easy  to   say,   and   looks  plausible    when  rather   than    the    property-holder,    who 

said,  that  if  municipal  corporations  put  might  not  know  anything  of  the  matter, 

bonds   on   the    market,  they   must    pay  or  if  he  did,  had  no  power  to  prevent  the 

tliem  when  they  become  due.     But  it  is  wrong." 

another  tiling  to  say  that  when  an  officer  ^  Concord     v.     Portsmouth     Savings 

created  by  the  law  exceeds  the  authority  Bank,  U2  U.  S.  625,  1875. 
wiiich  that  law  confers  upon  him,  and  in 


MUNICIPAL  COKPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


for  value  without  notice  of  any  defence.  The  court  held  that  a 
recital  in  the  bonds  that  the  subscription  was  made  in  December, 
1809,  being  the  recital  of  a  matter  of  fact,  and  a  fact,  too,  pecu- 
liarly, if  not  exclusively,  witliin  the  knowledge  of  the  board  of 
supervisors,  estopped  the  county  to  set  up  that  the  subscription 
was  not  made  until  after  July  2,  1870,  when  their  authority  to 
subscribe  had  expired.^ 


*  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings 
Bank,  92  U.  S.  025,  1875.  The  point  is 
so  material  that  we  subjoin  the  opinion 
delivered  by  Strong,  J.,  on  tiiis  jjoint. 
He  says :  "  Tliere  is,  liowever,  anotiier 
consideration  tiiat  is  wortliy  of  notice. 
The  findings  of  tiie  court  are  tliat  the 
plaintitf  below  is  a  purchaser  of  the  bonds 
for  a  vahiable  consideration,  liaving  pur- 
chased them  before  tlieir  maturity  and 
without  notice  of  any  defence.  Tliey 
were  executed  by  the  president  of  the 
board  of  supervisors  and  tlie  county  clerk. 
Tliey  recite  tliat  tliey  are  issued  by  the 
county  of  Moultrie,  '  in  pursuance  of  tlie 
subscription  of  the  sum  of  eighty  thou- 
sand dollars  to  tiie  capital  stock  of  the 
Decatur,  Sullivan,  and  Mattoon  Railroad 
Company,  made  by  the  board  of  super- 
visors of  said  county  of  Moultrie,  in  De- 
cember, A.  D.  18G9,  in  conformity  to  the  pro- 
visions of  an  act  of  tlie  general  assembly 
of  the  state  of  Illinois,  approved  March 
26,  A.  D.  1869.'  Now,  if  it  be  supposed 
that  the  purchaser  of  bonds  witli  such 
recitals  was  bound  to  look  further  and 
inquire  what  was  the  authority  for  the 
issue,  where  was  he  to  look?  Had  he 
looked  to  the  act  of  the  general  assembly 
of  March  26,  1869,  he  would  have  found 
plenary  authority  for  a  stock  subscrip- 
tion and  for  the  issue  of  bonds  in  pay- 
ment thereof  If  he  was  bound  to  know 
that  the  constitutional  provision  termi- 
nated that  authority  after  July  2,  1870, 
he  knew  that  any  subscription  made 
before  tliat  time  continued  binding  not- 
withstanding the  constitution,  and  that 
bonds  issued  in  payment  of  it  were,  tiiere- 
fore,  lawful.  If,  then,  he  had  inquired 
whether  a  subscription  had  been  made 
before  July  2,  1870,  at  the  only  place 
where  inquiry  sliould  have  been  made, 
namely,  at  the  records  of  the  board,  he 
would  have  found  an  order  to  subscribe, 


equivalent  to  a  subscription  made,  in 
December,  1869,  corresponding  with  the 
assertions  of  the  recitals,  and  declared 
by  them  to  have  been  a  subscription. 
He  could  have  made  inquiry  nowliere 
else  with  any  prospect  of  learning  the 
truth.  Every  step  he  could  have  taken 
assured  him  that  tlie  recitals  were  true. 
How,  then,  can  the  county  be  permitted 
to  set  up  against  a  bona  Jide  holder  of  the 
bonds  that  the  authority  to  make  a 
subscription,  with  all  its  legitimate  conse- 
quences, had  expired  before  the  subscrip- 
tion was  made,  in  the  face  of  the  recitals 
and  of  the  county  records'?  Whether  it 
had  expired  was  a  matter  of  fact,  not  of 
law,  and  it  was  peculiarly,  if  not  exclu- 
sively, within  the  knowledge  of  the  board 
of  supervisors.  After  having  assured  a 
purchaser  that  their  subscription  was 
made  in  December,  1809,  when  tliey  had 
power  to  make  it,  it  would  be  tolerating 
a  fraud  to  permit  the  county  to  set  up, 
when  called  upon  for  payment,  that  it 
was  not  made  until  after  July  2,  1870, 
when  their  authority  expired." 

Purchaser  not  affected  by  statements 
in  county  records  contrary  to  recitals  in 
the  bonds  issued  by  the  county.  Nico- 
lay  V.  St.  Clair  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R. 
103,  1874.  In  Aller  v.  Cameron,  lb.  198, 
the  defendant  town  was  held  estopped  to 
set  up  against  a  holder  of  its  bonds  for 
value  that  it  was  not  legally  incorporated. 

Effect  of  recital  by  authorized  officers. 
See  also  Chambers  County  v.  Clews,  21 
Wall.  317,  321  ;  Grand  Chute  v.  W^in- 
egar,  15  Wall.  355;  Lynde  v.  County  of 
Winnebago,  16  Wall.  0 ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Otoe  County,  10  Wall.  067 ;  Mercer 
County  V.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83  ;  Woods  v. 
Lawrence  County,  1  Black,  380 ;  Gelpecke 
V.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175 ;  Meyer  v.  Mus- 
catine, lb.  384 ;  Kennicott  v.  Supervisors, 
16  Wall.  404. 


§  532.]  CONTRACTS.  523 

§  531.  (419)  A  correct  view  of  this  subject  would  seem  to  be 
this :  Officers  are  the  agents  of  the  corporate  body  ;  and  the  ordi- 
nary rules  and  principles  of  the  law  of  agency  are  applicable  to 
their  acts.  Their  unauthorized  acts  are  not  binding  upon  the 
corporate  body  of  which  they  are  the  public  agents.  Ordinarily, 
their  unauthorized  representation  that  they  have  power  to  do  an 
act  is  not  binding  upon  the  corporation ;  that  is,  the  question  is 
as  to  their  power,  in  fact  and  in  law,  not  what  they  have  repre- 
sented it  to  be.  The  only  exception  to  this  rule  in  addition  to 
the  one  hereinbefore  treated  of,  to  wit,  where  it  is  the  sole  province 
of  the  officers  who  issued  the  bonds  to  decide  whether  conditions 
precedent  have  been  complied  with,  is  where  both  parties  have 
not  equal  means  of  knowledge  as  to  the  extent  and  scope  of  their 
powers,  and  where  the  particular  character  of  their  commission 
and  authority  is,  from  its  nature  and  circumstances,  peculiarly 
known  to  the  officer  or  agent ;  in  which  case  the  principal  will  or 
may  be  bound  by  the  false  representations  of  the  agent  respecting 
his  authority  and  its  extent  and  scope  ;  but  where  the  authority 
to  act  is  solely  conferred  by  statute,  which,  in  effect,  is  the  letter 
of  attorney  of  the  officer,  all  persons  must,  at  their  peril,  see  that 
the  act  of  the  agent  on  which  he  relies  is  within  the  power  under 
which  the  agent  acts ;  and  this  doctrine  is  recognized  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  Slates  in  some  of  its  judgments.^ 
Accordingl}',  bonds  issued  in  violation  of  an  express  statute  or 
constitution  are  void,  though  in  the  hands  of  innocent  holders 
for  value.2 

§  532.  (420)  So  in  a  subsequent  case,  similar  in  character,  the 
common  council  of  a  city  were,  by  virtue  of  various  statutes, 
authorized  to  subscribe  for  stock  in  a  railroad  company*,  and  to 
issue  bonds  in  payment  therefor  07i  the  petition  of  three  fourths  of 

1  The  Floyd  Acceptances,  7  Wall.  666,  of   Columbus,  21   How.  356,  1858,  is  a 

1868;  Marsh  i>.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall,  very  striking  illustration  of  the  general 

676,    1870.       See,   also,    Clark     v.    Des  principle  that  a  corporate  officer  cannot 

Moines,  19  Iowa,  199,  210,  1865 ;  Tread-  bind  the  corporation  by  his  unauthorized 

well  V.  Conuuissioners,  11  Ohio  St.  183,  acts   or  representations   concerning    the 

1860,    reviewing    and    criticising    Knox  authority  of  himself  or  others.     De  Voss 

County  V.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539.     See,  v.  Richmond,  18  Gratt.  (Va.)  339,  1868; 

also,  Gould  V.  Sterling  (action  on  bonds),  s.  c.  7  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  589. 
23  N.  Y.  404;  s.  c.  1  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  ^  Aspinwall  v.  County  of  Daviess,  22 

S.)  290,  and  note  of  Prof.  L'w/V/A/;  Starin  How.   304;    Marsh    v.    Fulton    County, 

V.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  452;  People  i-.  Mead,  supra;  Moore  v.  Mayor,  73  N.  Y.  238,  ap- 

36  N.  Y.  224.    United  States  v.  City  Bank  proving  text. 


524 


MUNICIP.Ui   CORPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


the  legal  voters  of  the  city.  Before  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  the 
council  decided  that  three  fourtlis  of  the  citizens  had  petitioned, 
and  the  bonds  themselves  thus  recited.  The  Supreme  Court  of 
the  United  States  held  that  the  council  was  the  tribunal  to  decide 
whether  the  requisite  number  had  petitioned ;  that  it  was  con- 
templated that  this  quesstion,  which  was  one  of  fact,  should  be 
ascertained  and  conclusively  settled  prior  to  the  issue  of  the 
bonds  ;  and  that  when  sued  upon  the  bonds  by  innocent  holders 
for  value,  parol  testimony  was  inadmissible  to  show  that  the  peti- 
tioners did  not  constitute  three  fourths  of  the  legal  voters  of  the 
city.i 


1  Moran  v.  Miami  County,  2  Black, 
722,  724,  18G2  ;  Bisscll  v.  Jeffersonville,  24 
How.  (U.  S.)  287,  1860,  approving  Knox 
County  V.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539;  s.  p. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Evansville,  15  Ind.  395, 
1860 ;  Supervisors  v.  Schenck,  5  Wall. 
772,  18GG;  Rogers  v.  Burlington,  3  Wall. 
651 ;  Cincinnati  v.  Morgan,  lb.  275 ;  Mer- 
cer County  V.  Hacket,  1  lb.  83 ;  Meyer  v. 
Muscatine,  lb.  385,  393,  per  Swai/ne,  J. ; 
Bissell  V.  Jeffersonville,  2'4  How.  287; 
Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175,  203; 
Pendleton  Co.  v.  Amy,  13  Wall.  297, 
1871 ;  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers,  16 
Wall.  644,  1872.  In  the  case  last  cited  it 
was  insisted  that  the  bonds  were  invalid 
for  want  of  the  required  vote.  One  of  the 
answers  of  the  court  to  this  objection  was 
that  "  the  act  of  the  legislature  made  it 
the  duty  of  the  supervisor  who  executed 
the  bonds  to  determine  the  question 
■whether  an  election  was  held,  and  wheth- 
er a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  were  in 
favor  of  the  subscription,  and  inasmuch 
as  he  passed  upon  that  question  and  sub- 
scribed for  the  stock,  and  subsequently 
executed  and  delivered  the  bonds,  it  was 
clearly  too  late  to  question  their  validity, 
where  it  appears,  as  in  this  case,  that  they 
are  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  holder." 
Tliis  is  clearly  right,  for  the  reason  that 
the  council  were  the  body  to  decide  the 
preliminary  fact,  and  because,  also,  ac- 
cording to  the  rule  before  stated,  the  fact 
was  one  not  of  a  nature  to  be  ascertained 
by  purchasers  in  the  market  to  whom  the 
bonds  were  designed  to  be  sold. 

As  to  proceeding  preliminartj  to  issuimj  of 
bonds.  Ante,  sec.  163;  Commissioners  v. 
Nichols,  14  Ohio   St.   2G0;   Atchison   v. 


Butcher,  8  Kan.  104,  1865;  Mercer  Coun- 
ty V.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83;  Rogers  v.  Bur- 
lington, 3  lb.  654;  Moran  v  Miami  Co.,  2 
Black,  722;  Flagg  v.  Palmyra,  33  Mo. 
440;  Commonwealth  v.  Commissioners, 
etc.,  37  Pa.  St.  237  ;  compare  Marsh  i-. 
Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  676,  1870; 
Treadwell  v.  Commissioners,  11  Ohio  St. 
183,  1860;  post,  sec.  550;  Pendleton  Coun- 
ty V.  Amy,  13  Wall.  297 ;  City  of  Lexing- 
ton V.  Butler.  14  Wall.  284;  St.  Joseph 
Townsliip  V.  Rogers,  16  Wall.  644,  1872 ; 
Grand  Chute  v.  Winegar,  5  Wall.  372, 
1872 ;  New  Haven,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Chatham,  42  Conn.  465. 

A  city  was  authorized  to  take  stock  in 
a  railroad  company  "on  the  petition  of 
two  thirds  of  the  citizens,  who  are  free- 
holders," etc.  Bonds  of  the  city  were 
duly  issued,  signed  by  the  proper  oflBcers 
and  attested  by  the  seal  of  the  city,  and 
on  their  face  recited  that  they  were  issued 
by  virtue  of  an  ordinance  of  the  city  mak- 
ing the  subscription.  The  minutes  of  the 
city  council  simply  stated  that  "  the  free- 
holders of  the  city,  ivith  great  unanimity, 
had  petitioned,"  etc.  It  was  held  that 
the  city  council  were  the  proper  judges 
whether  or  not  the  required  number  had 
petitioned,  and  that  the  city,  as  against 
bona  fide  holders  for  value,  was  "  con- 
cluded" by  the  ordinance  "as  to  any 
irregularities  that  may  have  existed  in 
carrying  into  execution  the  power  granted 
to  subscribe  the  stock  and  issue  the 
bonds."  Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison  City,  1 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  291,  1863;  s.  p.  Meyer  v. 
Muscatine  (where  charter  required  "a 
majority  of  two  thirds  of  the  votes  giv- 
en ")  lb.  384,  393;   Aurora   v.  West.  22 


CONTRACTS. 


525 


§  533.] 

§  533.  (421)  In  another  case,^  the  action  was  upon  coupons 
payable  to  bearer  belonging  to  negotiable  bonds  issued  by  a 
county  in  payment  of  stock  subscribed  in  a  railroad  company. 
By  ail  act  of  assembly,  the  county  commissioners  were  authorized 
to  subscribe  the  stock  and  iss-ue  the  bonds  only  upon  the  follow- 
ing "restrictions,  limitations,  and  conditions,  and  in  no  other 
manner  or  way  whatever:"  1.  ''After,  and  not  before,  the 
amount  of  such  subscription  shall  have  been  designated,  advised, 
and  recommended  by  a  grand  jury  of  the  county."  2.  Said 
"  bonds  shall,  in  no  case,  be  sold  by  the  railroad  company  less 
than  par:'  3.  That  the  acceptance  of  this  act  shall  be  deemed 
the  acceptance  of  another  act  fixing  the  gauges  of  railroads  in 
the  county  of  Erie.  The  plaintiff  was  a  bona  fide  holder  for 
value,  of  a  number  of  the  bonds  issued  by  the  county.  To  defeat 
a  recovery,  the  county  on  the  trial  offered  to  show,  not  that  no 
recommendation  by  a  grand  jury  was  ever  made,  but  that  no  such 
recommendation  was  made  as  the  act  required.  The  following 
was  the  recommendation  :  The  grand  jury  "  would  recommend 
(omitting  the  words  '  designate   and  advise ')  the  commission- 


Ind.  88,  1864 ;  contra,  People  v.  Mead,  36 
N.  Y.  224. 

Wliere  the  act  autliorizing  a  munici- 
pality to  issue  bonds  was  not  to  take  ef- 
fect until  "  approved  by  two  thirds  of  the 
electors  present  at  a  city  meeting  held  for 
that  purpose,  and  a  copy  of  its  doings 
lodged  in  the  office  of  the  secretary  of  state," 
bonajide  purchasers  of  sucli  bonds  are  not 
bound  to  look  beyond  tlie  certificate  thus 
lodged,  and  are  not  affected  by  the  action 
of  the  city,  refusing  at  prior  meetings  to 
approve  the  act.  Society  for  Savings  v. 
Kew  London,  29  Conn.  174,  1800. 

Fraud  in  the  election  authorizing  the 
subscription  must  be  set  up  before  rights 
have  accrued.  Butler  v.  Dnnham,  27 
III.  474;  People  v.  Supervisors,  27  Cal. 
655.  Further  as  to  the  construction  of 
powers  to  aid  in  the  building  of  railways,  see 
ante,  eh.  vi.  sec.  153  et  ser/. 

1  Mercer  County  v.  Ilackct,  1  "Wall. 
83,  1803.  This  case,  and  the  case  of 
Woods  V.  Lawrence  County,  1  Black, 
386,  are  cited  by  Mr.  Justice  Hunt  in 
the  case  of  Grand  Clnite  v.  "Winegar, 
15  Wall.  a72,  1872.  The  learned  jus- 
tice says :    "  The   same   principles   were 


announced  in  Gelpecke  v.  The  City  of 
Dubuque,  1  Wall.  175,  and  in  Meyer  v. 
The  City  of  Muscatine,  lb.  384.  In  the 
latter  case  the  court  said  that  if  the  legal 
authority  was  sufficiently  comprehensive, 
a  bona  fide  holder  for  value  has  a  right  to 
presume  that  all  precedent  requirements 
liave  been  complied  with.  By  the  act  of 
February  10,  1854,  the  legislature  of  Wis- 
consin authorized  the  supervisors  of  the 
town  of  Grand  Chute  to  make  a  plank- 
road  subscription  to  the  amount  of  ten 
tliousand  dollars.  The  bonds  in  ques- 
tion were  signed  by  the  chairman  of  the 
board  of  supervisors  of  that  town,  and 
recited  that  the  subscription  had  been 
made  by  the  supervisors  of  the  town,  and 
that  these  bonds  were  issued  in  pursu- 
ance thereof  for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
out  the  provisions  of  that  act.  The  plain- 
tiff was  the  bona  fide  holder  for  value  of 
the  bonds  in  suit,  and  his  title  accrued 
before  their  maturity.  Tlie  cases  cited  are 
an  answer  to  the  numerous  offers  to  sliow 
want  of  compliance  with  the  forms  of 
law,  or  to  show  fraud  in  their  own 
agents." 


526  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

ers  of  Mercer  County  to  subscribe  an  amount  not  exceeding 
8150,000,"  —  but  not  otherwise  designating  the  amount.  The 
bonds  referred  on  their  face  to  the  act  of  assembly  and  its  date 
which  authorized  their  issue,  and  recited  that  they  were  issued  in 
piirsnance  thereof.  This  was  regarded  by  the  court  not  as  an 
offer  to  show  "  that  no  hiw  exists  to  authorize  their  issue,  but  as 
one  to  show  that  the  recitals  in  the  bonds  are  not  true,  and  to 
show  that  they  were  not  made  '  in  pursuance  of  the  acts  of 
assembly'  authorizing  them";  and  following  Knox  County  v. 
Aspinwall,^  it  was  adjudged  that  the  matters  thus  offered  to  be 
shown  constituted  no  defence  against  a  bona  fide  holder,  on  the 
principle  that  "  where  bonds  on  their  face  import  a  compliance 
with  the  law  under  which  they  were  issued,  the  purchaser  is  not 
bound  to  look  further."  And  following  Woods  v.  Lawrence 
County ,2  it  was  also  ruled  that  it  was  no  defence  against  such  a 
holder  that  the  bonds  were  sold  by  the  railroad  company  less 
than  par,  they  being  negotiable  and  the  plaintiff  innocent.  And 
it  was  also  decided  that  the  acceptance  by  the  railroad  company 
of  the  bonds  authorized  by  the  act  operated  per  se  as  an  accept- 
ance of  the  gauge  law. 

§  534.  (422)  In  another  case,  authority  to  a  city  "  to  take 
stock  in  any  chartered  company  for  making  a  road,  or  roads,  to 
the  said  city,"  was  held,  in  favor  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  its 
bonds,  to  authorize  it  to  subscribe  to  a  railroad  which,  by  the 
terms  of  its  charter,  and  in  fact,  did  not  terminate  at  said  city, 
but  whose  nearest  terminus  was  forty-six  miles  distant,  it  appear- 
ing that  there  was,  at  the  time  of  said  subscription,  another  rail- 
road leading  from  that  terminus  to    the  city.^     Authority  was 

1  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  recover  the  arrears  of  interest  on  such 
539.  bonds,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  holder 

2  "Woods  y.  Lawrence  County,  1  Black,  to  show  that  the  grand  jury  fixed  the 
386.  In  Woods  I'.  Lawrence  County,  just  manner  and  terms  of  paying  for  the 
cited,  it  was  also  held  that  wliere  the  stock;  nor  is  it  a  defence  for  the  county 
statute  requires  the  grand  jury  to  fix  to  show  that  the  grand  jury  omitted  to 
the  amount  of  a  subscription  to  railroad  do  so.  It  is  enough  that  the  manner  and 
stock,  and  to  approve  of  it,  and  upon  terms  of  payment  were  agreed  upon  be- 
their  report  being  filed  empowers  com-  tween  the  company  and  the  commission- 
missioners  to  carry  the  same  into  effect  ers.  This  case,  among  others,  was  cited 
by  making  its  subscription  in  the  name  of  and  approved  in  Grand  Chute  v.  Wine- 
the  count}",  and  if  these  things  be  done  gar,  15  Wall.  372,  1872;  8.  c.  5  Chicago 
agreeably  to  the  law  the  county  cannot  Legal  News,  337. 

afterwards  deny  its  obligation  to  pay  the  ^  Van  Hostrup  v.  Madison  City,  1  Wall, 

amount  subscribed.    In  a  suit  brought  to    291,  1863;  see  Aurora  v.  West,  9  Ind.  74 


§  536.]  CONTRACTS.  527 

given  by  the  legislature  to  the  city  of  Milwaukee  to  issue  bonds 
in  aid  of  a  railroad  company  specially  named,  "  and  any  other 
railroad  company  duly  incorporated  and  organized  for  the  pur- 
pose of  constructing  railroads  leading  from  the  city  of  Mil- 
waukee," etc.,  and  it  was  held,  such  having  been  the  construction 
put  upon  it  by  the  city  authorities  at  the  time,  that  the  power  to 
issue  bonds  was  not  confined  to  companies  then  in  existence,  but 
extended  to  companies  afterwards  created.^ 

§  535.  (422rt.)  In  another  case,^  the  city  was  held  liable  upon 
bonds  issued  to  a  railway  company  under  the  following  circum- 
stances, viz.,  the  legislature  authorized  the  city  to  subscribe  on 
the  condition  of  a  majority  vote  ;  the  city  embodied  three  condi- 
tions in  the  proposition  submitted  to  the  voters,  one  of  which 
was  that  81,000,000  should  be  subscribed  by  other  parties ;  the 
vote  carried  ;  other  parties  did  not  subscribe  the  $1,000,000;  the 
city  refused  to  subscribe  and  issue  bonds,  but  was  compelled  to 
do  so  by  a  mandamus  of  an  inferior  court,  whose  judgment  was 
afterwards  reversed  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  the  state,  which 
held  that  the  city  had  no  authority  to  take  the  stock  or  issue  the 
bonds  until  the  $1,000,000  had  been  subscribed  by  other  parties. 
Meanwhile,  however,  bonds  were  issued  by  the  city,  bearing  its 
seal  and  signed  by  its  mayor  and  clerk,  reciting  that  they  were 
duly  issued  under  a  specified  act  of  the  general  assembly. 

§  536.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  held  in  the 
case  last  cited  that  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value  of  these  bonds, 
who  had  no  actual  notice  of  the  facts  relied  on  for  a  defence, 

8.  c.  22  Ind.  88,  96,  503.     The  decision  in  money  to  build  a  court-house.     The  case 

Van   Hostrup  v.  Madison   City  was  un-  also  holds  that  it  was  competent  for  the 

doubtedly  influenced  by  the  natural  de-  proper  county  officiRl  (the  county  judge) 

sire  to  protect  the  holders  of  the  bonds,  to  visit  Neto  York  for  purposes  connected 

Doubts  cannot  but  be  entertained  that  the  with   the  disposition  of  the  bonds,  and 

Columbus  and  Shelby  Road,  distant  and  while  there,  and  out  of  his  jurisdiction,  to 

between  different  points,  was  a  road  lead-  issue  and  seal  tiew  bonds  with  a  new  seal  pro- 

ing  to  Madison.      See  remarks  of  Nel-  cured  at  the  time,  in  excliange  for  bonds 

son,  J.  already  issued,  but  not  yet  put  on  the 

1  James   v.   Milwaukee,  16  Wall.  159,  market,  and  it  was  so  held  although  the 

1872.  statute   of   the    state    provided    that   in 

In  Lynde  v.  Winnebago   County,   16  the  case  of  the  nhsonce  of  tliat  officer  the 

Wall.  6,  1872,  a  special  submission,  under  county  clerk  should  take  his  place, 
the  laws  of  Iowa,  to  a  popular  vote,  was  ^  City  of  Lexington  >;.  Butler,  14  Wall, 

construed  to  give  the  requisite  authority  282,  1871. 
to  issue  the  bonds  of  the  county  to  raise 


528  MUNICIPAL   CORPOIIATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

could  recoTer  thereon.  INIr.  Justice  Clifford^  delivering  the  opin- 
ion of  the  court,  makes  use  of  this  languge  in  stating  the  ground 
of  the  iudgment :  "  Admitted,  as  it  is,  that  the  corporation  defen- 
dants possessed  the  power  to  subscribe  for  the  stock  and  issue 
the  bonds,  it  is  clear  that  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover  upon 
the  merits,  as  the  repeated  decisions  of  this  court  have  established 
the  rule  that  when  a  corporation  has  power  under  any  circum- 
stances to  issue  negotiable  securities,  the  hona  fide  holder  has  a 
right  to  presume  that  they  were  issued  under  the  circumstances 
which  give  the  requisite  authority,  and  that  they  are  no  more  lia- 
ble to  be  impeached  in  the  hands  of  such  a  holder  than  any  other 
commercial  paper."  By  the  expression  that  it  is  admitted  that 
tlie  cit}'  "  possessed  the  power  to  subscribe  for  the  stock  and  to 
issue  the  bonds,"  reference  is  undoubtedly  made  to  the  act  of  the 
legislature  which  gave  this  power  on  condition  of  a  majority  vote, 
and  possibly  to  the  fact  that  it  was  admitted  in  the  plea  that  the 
vote  was  cast  in  favor  of  the  subscription,  for  otherwise  it  seems 
to  have  been  denied  that  the  power  existed ;  and  that  it  did  not 
exist  as  between  the  city  and  the  railroad  corporation  was  de- 
cided by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  the  state.  The  substance  of 
the  decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  in  this  case 
would  seem  to  be  that  a  hona  fide  purchaser  of  the  bonds  had  a 
right  to  presume  that  the  condition  annexed  by  the  city  as  to 
the  81,000,000  of  other  subscriptions  had  been  complied  with ; 
and  thus  viewed,  the  judgment  of  the  court  rests  upon  grounds 
whose  soundness  cannot  admit  of  question.  It  is  not  an  author- 
ity upon  its  essential  facts  in  favor  of  the  proposition  that  if  the 
bonds  had  been  issued  without  any  vote,  or  attempt  at  a  vote, 
they  would  have  been  binding  in  the  absence  of  estoppel  other 
than  by  recitals  or  other  ground  of  liability. 

§  537.  (4225.)  In  another  case,  ^  the  authority  to  subscribe  to 
the  stock  of  the  company  was  given  on  condition  that  the  county 
should  so  vote  by  a  majority  of  real-estate  holders  residing 
therein.  A  subscription  was  made  in  1853,  and  a  certificate  oi 
stock  issued  to  the  county,  which  was  received  by  it,  and  still 
owned  by  it  in  1869,  when  suit  was  brought.  It  did  not  appear 
that  the  bonds  contained  any  recitals  that  conditions  precedent 

1  Pendleton   v.   Amy,  13  Wall.   297,  1871. 


§  538.]  CONTRACTS.  529 

had  been  complied  with,  or  that  the  county  had  subsequently 
levied  taxes  to  pay  interest  on  the  bonds.  The  county  set  up  as 
a  defence  that  there  was  no  power  to  issue  the  bonds,  because  no 
vote  of  the  people  had  ever  been  taken.  The  plaintiff  being  a 
bona  fide  holder,  it  was  held  that  he  was  entitled  to  recover,  and 
that  the  county  was  entopped  to  set  up  that  no  vote  was  had. 
The  ground  of  the  estoppel  is  thus  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Stro7ig : 
"  The  county  received  in  exchange  for  the  bonds  a  certificate  of 
the  stock  of  the  railroad  company,  which  it  held  about  seventeen 
years  before  the  present  suit  was  brought,  and  which  it  still  holds. 
Having  exchanged  the  bonds  for  the  stock,  we  think  the  county 
cannot  retain  the  proceeds  of  the  exchange,  and  assert  against  a 
purchaser  of  the  bonds  for  value  that  though  the  legislature  em- 
powered it  to  make  them,  and  put  them  upon  the  market,  upon 
certain  conditions,  they  were  issued  in  disregard  of  the  con- 
ditions." 

It  will  be  observed  that  if  the  court  had  been  of  opinion  that 
the  bonds  were  enforceable  in  the  hands  of  a  holder  for  value 
though  no  election  had  in  fact  ever  been  held,  the  case  would 
naturally  have  been  put  upon  that  ground. 

§  538.  What  constitutes  Completed  Subscription  or  Co7itract  to 
subscribe.  —  Interesting  questions  have  arisen  as  to  what  consti- 
tutes a  subscription  on  the  part  of  a  municipality  or  other  pubHc 
corporation,  or  a  valid  contract  to  subscribe,  to  the  stock  of  a 
railroad  company,  and  when  rights  are  vested  thereunder  which 
cannot  be  legislatively  impaired  without  the  consent  of  the  parties 
in  interest.  Where  a  precedent  popular  vote  is  required,  and 
upon  such  vote  authority  is  given  to  subscribe  for  the  stock,  the 
vote  without  more  does  not  constitute  a  contract  between  the 
municipality  thus  authorized  to  subscribe  and  the  railroad  com- 
pany.i 

1  Aspinwall  v.  County  of  Jo  Daviess,  the  municipality,  are  no  greater  than  the 

22  How.  .304 ;  Town  of  Concord  v.  Ports-  riglits  of  other  stockholders  ;  and  unless 

mouth  Savings  Bank,  92  U.  S.  625 ;  Harsh-  specially  authorized  by  the  legislature,  tiie 

man  v.  Bates  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  railroad  company  has  no  power,  when  re- 

150,  162,  note ;  s.  c.  affirmed  in  Supreme  ceiving  the  subscription    and   bonds,  to 

Court,  92   U.  S.  569,  1875;  ante,  sec.  70,  agree  to  put  tlie  municipality  in  a  better 

and  cases  cited.  position  than  other  stockholders,  as,  for 

The  rifjhfs  of  n  mitmcipalifi/  as  a  stock-  example,  by  agreeing  to  pay  a  fixed  rate 

holder  in  a  railroad  company,  and  whose  of  interest  on  such   stock,  equivalent  in 

Btock  has  been  paid  for  by  tlie  bonds  of  amount  to  the  interest  on  the  municipal 

VOL.  I.  34 


530  MUNICIPAL   COKrOKATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

§  539.  Same.  —  Poioermay  he  annulled  hy  Constitutional  Provi- 
sion or  Lcgidative  Action  before  Rights  become  vested.  —  As  il- 
lustrating tlie  necessity  of  a  continued  existence  of  the  power  to 
issue  the  bonds,  and  as  showing  what  did  not  amount  to  a  com- 
pleted contract  before  the  power  was  repealed  by  a  constitutional 
provision,  the  case  of  the  Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth 
Savings  Bank  may  usefully  be  referred  to.^  Chronologically 
stated,  the  facts  were  these  :  The  bonds  were  issued  under  the 
act  of  jNIarch  7,  1867,  and  so  recited.  The  act  enacted  that  cer- 
tain incorporated  towns  and  cities,  and  towns  acting  under  the 
township  organization  law  (among  which  it  was  conceded  the 
town  of  Concord  was  one),  should  be  and  were  severally  au- 
thorized to  appropriate  such  sum  of  money  as  they  might  deem 
proper  to  the  Chicago,  Danville  and  Vincennes  Railroad  Com- 
pany, to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  road  of  said  company  ;  to 
be  paid  to  the  company  as  soon  as  the  track  of  said  road  should  have 
been  located  and  constructed  through  said  city,  town,  or  township 
respectively.  To  this  was  attached  the  following  proviso  :  "  Pro- 
vided, however,  that  the  proposition  to  appropriate  moneys  to 
said  company  shall  be  first  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  legal  voters 
of  said  respective  townships, 'towns,  or  cities,  at  a  regular  annual 
or  special  meeting,  by  giving  at  least  ten  days'  notice  thereof; 
and  a  vote  shall  be  taken  thereon  by  ballot  at  the  usual  place  of 
election,  and  if  the  majority  of  votes  cast  shall  be  in  favor  of  the 
appropriation,  then  the  same  shall  be  made  ;  otherwise  not." 
The  second  section  empowered  and  required  the  authorities  of 
said  municipalities  to  levy  and  collect  a  tax,  and  make  such  pro- 
visions as  might  be  necessary  for  the  prompt  payment  of  the  ap- 
propriation under  the  provisions  of  the  law. 

The  town  voted  on  the  20th  day  of  November,  1869,  that  it 
would  make  a  donation,  provided  the  company  would  run  its 
railroad  through  the  town.  On  the  20th  of  June,  1870,  the 
company  gave  notice  of  its  acceptance  of  the  donation. 

On  the  2d  of  July,  1870,  the  new  constitution  of  the  state  went 
into  operation,  by  w^iich  it  was  ordained  that  "  no  city,  town, 

bonds  issued  in  payment  therefor.    Pitts-  Connelsville  Railroad  Co.,  63  Pa.  St.  126. 

burgh,  etc.    Railroad    Co.    ?'.    Alleghany  When  contract  to  subscribe  stock  is  com- 

County,  Sup.  Court  Penn.  Nov.  15,  1874,  pleted.    Shelby  County  Court  v.  Cumber- 

3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  204.    Instance  in  which  land,  etc.  Railroad  Co.,  8  Bush  (Ky.),  300. 
there  was  legislative  authority  for  such  a         ^  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank, 

contract,  see  case  of  the  Pittsburgh  and  92  U.  S.  625,  1875;  see  infra,  sec.  540. 


§  539.]  CONTRACTS.  531 

township,  or  other  municipality  shall  ever  become  suhscrihers  to 
the  capital  stock  of  any  railroad  or  private  corporation,  or  make 
donation  to,  or  loan  its  credit  in  aid  of,  such  corporation.  Pro- 
vided, however,  that  the  adoption  of  this  article  shall  not  be 
construed  as  affecting  the  right  of  any  such  municipality  to  make 
such  subsc7'i2:>tions,  where  the  same  have  been  authorized  under 
existing  laws  by  a  vote  of  the  people  of  such  municipalities  prior 
to  such  adoption." 

On  the  9th  day  of  October,  1871,  the  bonds  in  suit  were  exe- 
cuted and  delivered  as  a  donation  to  the  railroad  company,  and 
the  question  was  whether  there  was  any  existing  authority  to 
make  the  donation  and  issue  the  bonds.  Tlie  Supreme  Court, 
after  pointing  out  that  the  authority  given  to  the  town  of  Concord 
by  the  act  of  March  7,  1867  {supra},  was,  not  to  subscribe  for 
stock,  but  to  make  an  appropriation  or  donation,  which  distinction 
is  also  taken  in  the  provision  of  the  constitution  above  quoted, 
held  that  no  donation  could  be  made,  under  the  act  of  1867,  until 
after  the  completion  of  the  location  and  construction  of  the  road 
through  the  town ;  that  the  vote  of  November  20,  1869,  in  favor 
of  an  appropriation,  was  not  an  appropriation  or  donation ;  that 
the  power  to  make  such  donation  was  annulled  by  the  constitution 
on  July  2,  1870,  and  that  there  was  at  that  date  no  contract  in 
esse  between  the  town  and  the  railroad  company  which  stood  in 
the  way  of  the  operation  of  the  constitutional  prohibition.  As  to 
the  effect  of  the  vote  of  the  town,  of  November  20,  1869,  and  the 
acceptance  of  the  railroad  company,  of  June  20,  1870  (both  of 
which,  it  will  be  observed,  were  before  the  constitution  went  into 
operation),  the  court  observed  :  "  But  the  court  was  not  em- 
powered to  make  the  donation  until  the  road  was  located  and 
constructed  through  the  town.  It  had  no  authority  to  make  a 
contract  to  give.  And  the  acceptance  was  an  undertaking  to  do 
nothing  which  the  company  was  not  bound  to  do  before  the 
authority  of  the  town  to  make  a  donation,  or  to  engage  to  make  a 
donation,  came  into  existence.  What  is  called  the  acceptance  of 
the  railroad  company  cannot  be  construed  as  an  engagement  to 
locate  and  build  the  railroad  through  the  town.  It  amounted  to 
no  more  than  saying,  '  If  we  build  our  road  through  your  town,  we 
will  receive  your  gift.'  There  was,  therefore,  no  consideration 
for  the  town's  promise  to  give,  even  if  the  popular  vote  can  be 
considered  a  promise.     There  was  no  contract  to  be  impaired.     A 


532  MUNICIPAL   COEPOEATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

contract  should  be  clearly  proved  before  it  invokes  the  protection 
of  the  federal  constitution.  We  conclude,  then,  that  at  the  time 
the  donation  was  made,  there  was  no  authority  in  the  municipality 
to  make  a  donation  to  the  railroad  company,  and  consequently  no 
authority  to  issue  the  bonds.  It  follows  that  the  bonds  and  cou- 
pons are  void." 

§  540.  Same.  —  Mode  of  Suhscriptlon.  —  When  Subscription  Com- 
plete. —  Power  by  legislative  act  to  the  board  of  supervisors  of  a 
county  to  subscribe  an  amount  not  exceeding  a  given  sum  to  the 
stock  of  a  specified  railroad  company,  and  to  issue  bonds  in  pay- 
ment therefor,  without  requiring  the  sanction  of  a  popular  vote, 
but  with  a  proviso  that  the  bonds  shall  not  be  issued  until  the 
road  is  open  for  traffic,  gives  complete  authority  to  the  county  to 
subscribe  for  the  stock,  or  to  make  a  binding  agreement  to  subscrilje 
therefor  preparatory  to  a  final  subscription.  The  proviso  that 
the  payment  of  the  subscription  should  be  postponed  until  tlie 
railroad  should  be  opened  does  not  limit  the  power  to  subscribe, 
or  to  enter  into  an  agreement  to  make  the  subscription,  before  the 
road  is  completed. 

And  it  was  held  that  a  resolution  of  the  board  of  supervisors, 
made  when  the  power  to  subscribe  existed  or  had  arisen,  that  the 
county  subscribe  a  given  sum  to  aid  in  the  construction  of  the  road 
of  the  company,  without  any  subscription  on  the  books  of  the 
company,  amounted  to  a  subscription,  or,  at  all  events,  to  a  legal 
undertaking  to  subscribe,  which,  when  assented  to  or  accepted 
by  the  company,  became  a  binding  contract,  which  the  county 
could  not  revoke,  and  which  could  not  be  impaired  by  any  subse- 
quent prohibition  of  the  constitution  or  the  legislature,  without 
the  assent  of  the  railroad  company.^ 

But  before  any  subscription  is  made,  or  before  any  contract 
to  subscribe  is  completed,  the  authority  to  subscribe  may  be 
repealed  or  taken  away  by  legislative  or  constitutional  provi- 
sion. And  if  the  authority  to  subscribe  depends  upon  a  precedent 
vote  of  the  people,  the  vote,  without  a  subscription  or  an  agree- 
ment to  subscribe,  does  not  create  a  contract,  nor  preclude  the 
repeal  of  the  authority  to  make  the  subscription :  2  it  is  executory 

1  Town  of  Concord  v.  Portsmouth  Sav-  ^  Aspinwall  r.  County  of  Jo  Daviess, 

ings  Bank,  92  U.  S.  625,  1875.     Compare     22  How.  364,  1859;    U.  P.  R.  R^Co.  v. 
supra,  sec.  539.  Davis  Co.,  6  Kan.  256,  1870 ;  Jeffries  v. 


540.] 


CONTRACTS. 


533 


until  the  subscription  is  actually  made.^     But  an  actual  manual 
subscription  on  the  books  of  the  company  is  not  necessary  to 


Lawrence,  42  Iowa,  498,  1876;  Bound 
V.  Railroad  Co.,  45  Wis.  543 ;  ante,  sec.  70 ; 
post,  sec.  8(3tD,  note,  and  cases  there  cited  ; 
Harsliman  y.  Bates  County,  3  Dillon  C.  C. 
R.  162.  note ;  affirmed  92"u.  S.  579.  The 
law  on  this  subject  is  tiius  stated  and  the 
cases  referred  to  and  distinguished,  by  Mr. 
Justice  Strong,  in  The  Town  of  Concord 
V.  Portsmouth  Savings  Bank,  supra. 

"  This  case  [although  between  the  same 
parties]  differs  very  materially  from  tiie 
case  of  The  Town  of  Concord  i:  The 
Portsmouth  Savings  Bank,  No.  43,  of  this 
term.  [Supra,  sec.  539.]  In  that,  we  held 
that  the  bonds  were  void  because  the  legis- 
lative authority  to  issue  them  as  a  dona- 
tion to  the  railroad  company  had  been 
annulled  by  the  constitution  of  the  state 
before  the  donation  was  made.  .  .  .  But 
a  subscription  on  the  books  of  the  com- 
pany was  unnecessary,  for  that  which 
amounted  to  a  subscription  had  been 
made  in  December,  1869.  The  author- 
ized body  of  a  municipal  corporation  may 
bind  it  by  an  ordinance,  which,  in  favor  of 
private  persons  interested  therein,  may,  if 
so  intended,  operate  as  a  contract,  or  they 
may  bind  it  by  a  resolution,  or  by  vote 
clothe  its  officers  with  power  to  act  for  it. 
The  former  was  the  clear  intention  in  this 
case.  The  board  clothed  no  officer  with 
power  to  act  for  it.  The  resolution  to 
subscribe  was  its  own  act,  its  immediate 
subscription.  Western  Saving  Fund  So- 
ciety V.  The  City  of  Philadelphia,  31  Penn. 
St.  174;  Sacramento  v.  Kirk,  7  Cal.  419; 
Logansport  v.  Blakemore,  17  Ind.  318.  In 
The  Justices  of  Clarke  Count}'  Court  i'. 
The  Paris,  Winchester  and  Kentucky 
River  Turnpike  Co.,  11  Ben.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
143,  it  was  ruleil  that  an  ordcrof  thecounty 
court,  by  which  it  was  said  the  court  sub- 
scribed, on  behalf  of  Clarke  County,  for 
fifty  shares  of  stock  in  the  turnpike  com- 
pany, if  concurred  in  by  a  competent 
majority  of  the  magistrates,  was  itself 
a  subscription,  and  bound  the  county. 
There  was  no  subscription  on  the  books 
of  the  company,  but  the  Court  of  Appeals 
said,  "  We  cannot,  therefore,  regard  this 

•  C.  &  0.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Barren  Co.,  10 
Bush  (Ky.),  e04,  1874;  Shelby  Co.  Court 


order  as  a  mere  offer  or  pledge  to  sub- 
scribe the  fifty  shares  in  this  particular 
road,  but  as  actually  taking,  and  in  sub- 
stance and  legal  effect  subscribing  for 
that  number  of  shares.  So  in  Nugent  v. 
The  Supervisors  of  Putnam  County,  19 
Wall.  241,  it  was  said  that  to  constitute  a 
subscription  by  a  county  to  stock  in  a  rail- 
road company,  it  is  not  necessary  that 
there  be  an  act  of  manual  subscribing  on 
the  books  of  the  company.  These  cases 
lead  directly  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
action  of  the  board  of  supervisors  in 
December,  1869,  was  in  substance  and  in 
legal  effect  a  subscription.  And  if  this 
conclusion  could  not  be  reached,  it  would 
make  but  little  difference  to  the  present 
case,  for  it  could  not  be  doubted  that  the 
action  of  the  board  was  at  least  an  under- 
taking to  subscribe,  and  this  was  assented 
to  or  accepted  by  the  railroad  company. 
The  resolutions  were  entered  of  record 
by  the  clerk  and  president  of  the  railroad 
company,  and  the  company  made  an  ap- 
propriation of  the  bonds  to  be  received  in 
payment  of  the  subscription,  by  a  con- 
tract made  on  the  15th  of  April,  1870.  In 
either  aspect  of  the  case,  therefore,  there 
was  an  authorized  contract  existing  be- 
tween the  county  and  the  railroad  com- 
pany when  the  new  constitution  came 
into  operation.  No  matter  whether  the 
contract  was  a  subscription  or  an  agree- 
ment to  subscribe,  it  was  not  annulled  or 
impaired  by  the  prohibitions  of  the  con- 
stitution. The  delivery  of  the  bonds  was 
no  more  than  performance  of  the  contract. 
For  these  reasons,  it  is  in  vain  to  appeal 
to  the  decisions  made  in  Aspinwall  v.  The 
County  of  Jo.  Daviess,  22  How.  364,  and 
The  Town  of  Concord  v.  The  Savings 
Bank,  decided  this  term.  In  neither  of 
those  cases  was  there  any  contract  made 
before  the  authority  to  make  one  was  an- 
nulled. We  do  not  assert  that  the  consti- 
tutional provision  did  not  abrogate  the 
authority  of  the  board  of  supervisors  to 
make  a  subscription  for  railroad  stock. 
On  the  contrary,  we  think  it  did.  But 
we  hold  that  contracts  made  under  the 


i:  Cumberland,  etc., 
300. 


Co,  8  Bush  (Ky.), 


534  MUNICIPAL   CORrOKATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

entitle  the  county  to  the  stock,  or  to  bind  it  as  a  subscriber 
thereto.^ 

§541.  Sa77ie. — Cojnpleted  Suhscription.  —  Effect  of  Consolida- 
tion of  liailway  Companies  on  Validity  of  /Subscription.  —  The 
authority  to  make  a  subscription  and  to  issue  bonds  in  payment 
therefor  may,  if  it  has  never  been  executed,  be  revoked  by  any 
event  which  has  the  legal  effect  to  extinguish  the  power.  Thus, 
where  the  power  to  subscribe  depends  upon  a  precedent  popular 
vote  and  the  vote  is  had  in  favor  of  Company  A,  which  under  a 
general  law  of  the  state  consolidated  with  Company  B,  and  formed 
thereby  a  new  company,  C,  which  consolidation  was  effected 
before  any  subscription  or  contract  for  subscription  was  made, 
and  the  only  subscription  made  was  to  the  consolidated  company, 
without  any  new  election,  it  was  held  that  the  subscription  was  un- 
authorized, and  that  the  bonds  which  recited  these  facts  were  void, 
even  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value.  The  ground 
of  the  decision  was  that  the  authority  to  make  the  subscrip- 
tion ceased  by  the  extinction  of  the  company  in  whose  favor  the 
vote  was  had,  such  extinction  being  the  legal  consequence  of  the 
consolidation.^    This  case  differs  from  Nugent  v.  The  Supervisors 

power  while  it  was  in  existence  were  valid  given  in  tliis  case  is,  tliat  tlie  township 

contracts,   and   tliat   the   obligations   as-  voted  a  subscription  to  one  company  and 

sumedby  them  continued  after  tlie  power  the  county  court  subscribed   to  another, 

to  enter   into   such   contracts   was  with-  This    is    sought   to  be  justified   on    the 

drawn.    The  operation  of  the  constitution  ground  that  the  former  company  became 

was  only  prospective.     Indeed,  it  is  ex-  consolidated  with  another,  thereby  form- 

pressly  ordained  in  its  schedule  that  'all  ing  a  third,  to  whose  stock  the  subscrip- 

rights,  actions,  prosecutions,  claims,  and  tion  was  made.     This  consolidation  was 

contracts   of   the    state,    individuals,    or  effected  under  a  law  of  Missouri  authoriz- 

bodies  corporate,  shall  continue  to  be  as  ing  consolidations,  and  declaring  that  the 

valid  as  if  this  constitution  had  not  been  company    formed    from    two    companies 

adopted.'     It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  should    be    entitled    to    all    the    powers, 

that,  under  the  act  of  the  general  assem-  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  which 

bly,  the  authority  to  make  a  subscription  belong  to  either  ;  and  it  is  contended  that 

was  coupled  with  an  authority  and  a  duty  this   provision  of  the   law    justified  the 

to  issue  county  bonds  for  the  sum  sub-  county  court  in  making  the  subscription 

scribed.    No  action  of  the  board  was  need-  without  further  authority  from  the  peo- 

ed  after  the  subscription  was  made."  pie  of  the  township.     But   did   not   the 

1  County  of  Cass  ;;.  Gillette,  100  U.  S.  authority  cease  by  the  extinction  of  the 
585.  company    voted    for  f     No   subscription 

2  Harshman  v.  Bates  County.  92  U.S.  had  been  made.  No  vested  right  had 
569,1875.  The  grounds  of  t!ie  judgment  accrued  to  the  company.  The  case  of 
of  the  court  on  this  point  are  thus  sue-  the  State  w.  Linn  County  Court,  44  Mo. 
cinctly  stated  by  Bmdlei/,  J. : —  50  only  decides  that  if  the  county  court 

"  Another  objection  to  the  validity  of  refuses  to  issue  bonds  after  making  a 
the  subscription  for  which  the  bonds  were     subscription,  a  mandamus  will  lie  to  com- 


§  541.] 


CONTRACTS. 


535 


of  Putnam  County  i  in  the  material  circumstance  that  in  that 
case  the  subscription  to  one  of  the  constituent  companies  was 
before  the  consohdation,  while  in  this  one  it  was  afterwards.  In 
this  case  there  Avas  nothing  but  a  bare  vote  before  the  consolida- 
tion, which,  without  more,  creates  no  contract  between  the  mu- 
nicipality and  the  railroad  company  ;  while  in  the  Putnam  County 
case  there  was  a  subscription  in  addition  to  the  vote,  before  the 
consolidation ;  and  the  right,  having  become  vested  in  the  railroad 
company,  may  be  transferred  to  another  on  an  authorized  consol- 
idation being  effected.  And  where  the  consolidation  is  provided 
for  or  contemplated  by  the  legislation  of  the  state  in  force  when 
the  subscription  is  made,  a  subsequent  consolidation,  in  pursu- 
ance of  the  enactment,  does  not  have  the  effect  to  invalidate  the 
subscription.  This  principle  was  distinctly  settled  in  the  Putnam 
County  case  just  cited; 2  and  such  existing  legislative  authority 
to  change  the  organization  controlled  the  decision  and  constituted, 


pel  it  to  issue  them.  There  the  autliori- 
ty  had  heen  executed  and  a  right  had 
become  vested.  But  so  long  as  it  re- 
mains unexecuted,  the  occurrence  of  any 
event  wliich  creates  a  revocation  in  law 
will  extinguish  the  power.  The  extinc- 
tion of  the  company  in  whose  favor  the 
suhscription  was  authorized  worked  sucli 
a  revocation.  The  law  autliorizing  the 
consolidation  of  railroad  companies  does 
not  change  tlie  law  of  attorney  and  con- 
stituent. It  ma}'  transfer  tlie  vested  rights 
of  one  railroad  company  to  another, 
upon  a  consohdation  being  effected ;  l)ut 
it  does  not  continue  in  existence  powers 
to  subscribe  for  stock  given  by  one  per- 
son to  another,  which,  by  the  general 
law,  are  extinguished  by  such  a  change. 
It  does  not  profess  to  do  so,  and  we  think 
it  does  not  do  so  by  implication.  As  suf- 
ficient notice  of  these  objections  is  con- 
tained in  the  recitals  of  the  bonds  them- 
selves to  put  the  holder  on  inquiry,  we 
think  that  tliere  was  no  error  in  the  judg- 
ment of  the  circuit  court ;  and  it  is,  there- 
fore, affirmed." 

Same  case  in  circuit  court,  3  Dillon 
C.  C.  R.  150 ;  s.  p.  McCline  v.  Oxford, 
94  U.  S.  429 ;  Bates  Co.  v.  Winters,  97  U. 
S.  83,  1877  ;  State  v.  Garroutc,  07  Mo. 
445,  where  tlie  court  say  tlie  consolidation 
docs  not  operate  to  transfer  to  the  latter 


the  franchises  and  unexecuted  rights  of 
former  companies  so  as  to  authorize  a 
subscription  to  be  made  to  the  Hannibal 
&  St.  Joseph  Railroad  Co.  without  a  pop- 
ular vote  ;  and  such  subscription  is  void. 
The  consolidation  operated  an  extinction 
of  the  original  company,  and  the  power 
to  subscribe  thereto  perished  with  the 
company.  In  such  case  there  could  be 
no  innocent  purchasers  of  the  bonds.     lb. 

1  Nugent  V.  The  Supervisors  of  Put- 
nam County,  19  Wall.  241.  See  Ray  Co. 
V.  Van  Sycie,  96  U.  S.  675,  where  a  sub- 
scription by  the  county  authorities  to 
another  company  was  sustained  and  the 
doctrine  of  estoppel  applied.  See  also, 
Cass  Co.  I'.  Gillette,  100  U.  S.  585.  One 
subscription  does  not  exhaust  the  power. 
People  V.  WaynesviUe,  88  111.  469.  Ir- 
regularities no  defence.  Roberts  v.  Bolles, 
101  U.  S.  119  ;  Empire  v.  Darlington,  101 
U.  S.  87. 

2  19  Wall.  241.  The  principle  was 
followed  and  applied  in  Thomas  v.  Scot- 
land County,  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  7,  and  in 
Washburn  v.  Cass  County,  3  Dillon  C. 
C.  R.  251,  and  the  bonds  held  valid  not- 
withstanding the  consolidation  A  change 
in  the  name  of  the  company  will  not  in- 
validate the  subscription.  Reading  v. 
Wedder,  06  111.  80. 


536 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[CII.  XIV. 


in  the  judgment  of  the  court,  the  ground  of  distinction  between 
that  case  and  the  oft-cited  case  of  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County.^ 

§  542.  3Ii(st  be  a  Valid  Act  as  the  Basis  of  the  Poiver.  — Con- 
struction of  Special  Powers^  see  note.  —  A  purchaser  of  municipal 
bonds  is  bound,  as  has  already  been  incidentally  shown,  to  take 
notice  of  any  provisions  of  the  constitution  or  legislation  of  the 
state  relating  to  the  power  of  the  municipality  to  issue  them ; 
and  if  the  act  conferring  the  power  is  in  conflict  with  the  consti- 
tution, the  bonds  are  void,  even  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder 
for  value.^ 

And  the  purchaser  must  also  notice  the  provisions  and  extent 


1  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall. 
676. 

2  Harshman  v.  Bates  County,  92  U.  S. 
569,  1875;  Lamoille,  etc.  Co.  v.  Fair- 
field, 51  Vt.  257.  As  the  decision  in  the 
first  case  is  supposed  to  invalidate  all  the 
bonds  issued  under  the  Township  Aid 
Act  oi  Missouri,  of  March  23,  18G8,  said 
to  amount  to  nearly  $3,000,000,  the  point 
on  wiiich  the  act  was  decided  to  be 
unconstitutional  will  be  stated.  Tlie  con- 
stitution of  1805,  Art.  II.  sec.  14,  prohib- 
ited such  subscriptions  "  unless  two  thirds 
of  the  qualified  voters  of  the"  municipality 
issuing  the  bonds  "shall  assent  thereto." 
The  Township  Aid  Act  authorized  the 
issue  of  bonds  "  if  two  thirds  of  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  township  voting  at 
such  election  are  in  favor  of  the  subscrip- 
tion." The  Supreme  Court  hold  tliat 
there  is  a  broad  difference  between  the 
constitution  and  the  act,  —  the  former  re- 
quiring the  assent  of  two  thirds  of  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  municipality,  while 
the  latter  only  requires  the  assent  of  two 
thirds  of  the  qualified  voters  who  vote  at 
the  election.  Same  case,  in  the  court 
below,  decided  on  another  ground  ;  the 
constitutional  question,  being  made  for 
the  first  time  in  tlie  Supreme  Court,  is 
reported  in  3  Dillon  C.  C.  R.  150. 

Effect  of  constitutional  provision  adopted 
in  1870  on  existing  powers  to  aid  rail- 
ways in  Mississippi.  Supervisors  v.  Gal- 
braith,  99  U.  S.  212;  Woodward  v. 
Calhoun  County  (district  court  of  U.  S. 
for  Mississippi,  Hill,  J.),  2  Cent.  Law. 
Jour.  396.  In  Ohio,  Cass  v.  Dillon,  2  Ohio 
St.  607 ;  State  v.  Union  Township,  8  Oliio, 


94.    In  Afissouri,  State  v.  Sullivan  County, 
51  Mo.  531 ;  Kansas  City,  etc.  Kailroad 
Co.  V.  Aldermen,  etc.,  47  Mo.  349 ;  State 
V.  County  Court,  etc.,  48  Mo.  339  ;  State 
V.  Macon   County,  41   Mo.  453;  Smithy. 
Clark  County,  54  Mo.  58;  State  v.  Green 
County,  54  Mo.  540  ;  Thomas  v.  Scotland 
County,  3  Dillon   C.  C.  R.  7 ;  Nicolay  v. 
St.   Clair  County,   lb.   163;  Huidekoper 
V.  Dallas  County,  lb.  171 ;  Jordan  v.  Cass 
County,    lb.    185;   Foster    v.    Callaway 
County,   lb.   201 ;    County   of    Henry  v. 
Nicolay,   95  U.   S.  619;   The  County  of 
Callaway  v.  Foster,  93  Jb.  567 ;  County 
of    Scotland    v.   Thomas,   94     lb.    682; 
County  of  Macon  v.  Shores,  97  U.  S.  272. 
See,   also,  The    State   v.  Macon  County 
Court,  41  Mo.  453;  State  f.  Greene  County, 
54  Mo.  540 ;  Cass   v.  Dillon,  2  Ohio  St. 
607 ;  Cass  County  v.  Gillette,  100  U.  S. 
585,  affirming  County  of  Henry  v.  Nico- 
lay, 95  U.  S.  019;  Jarrett  v.  Moberly,  5 
Dill.  253.     The  provisions  of  the  consti- 
tution which  require  the  assent  of   two 
thirds  of  the  qualified  voters  of  a  county 
to  a  subscription  on  its  behalf  for  stock  in 
a  corporation,  do  not  apply  to  cases  where 
such  subscription  is  made  for  stock  in  a 
railroad  company  pursuant  to  the  power 
conferred  by  its  charter  granted   prior  to 
the    adoption    of    that  constitution,  not- 
withstanding the  contemplated  road  is  a 
branch  road,  the  construction  of  which, 
although  authorized  by  such   charter,  is 
undertaken  as  an  independent  enterprise 
under   the  act   of   March   21,    1868,  en- 
titled "  An  act  to  aid  in  the  building  of 
branch  railroads  in  the  state  of  Missouri." 
County  of  Cass  v.  Gillette,  100  U.  S.  585. 


§  542.] 


CONTRACTS. 


537 


of  the  legislative  enactments  on  the  subject.^  Thus  where  au- 
thority was  given  to  certain  counties  lying  north  of  the  ^Missouri 
River,  a  subscription  made  and  bonds  issued  under  such  authority 
by  a  county  south  of  the  river  are  void  in  the  hands  of  every- 
body .^ 


1  Infra,  sec.  543. 

2  Slierrard  v.  Lafayette  County,  3  Dil- 
lon C.  C.  R.  236,  1875.  The  case  was 
briefly  this  :  By  an  act  of  the  legislature  of 
Missouri,  a  company  was  incorporated 
witli  power  to  construct  a  railroad  from 
the  town  of  Louisiana,  which  is  situated 
on  the  Mississippi  River,  north  of  tlie  Mis- 
souri River,  to  a  point  on  tlie  Missouri 
River,  and  tlie  county  court  of  any  county 
in  whicli  ani/  part  of  the  route  of  said  road 
should  lie  was  autliorized  to  subscribe 
stock  to  the  company,  without  a  vote  of 
the  people.  Afterwards  the  new  consti- 
tution of  Missouri  went  into  effect,  pro- 
hibiting the  general  assembly  (1)  from 
creating  corporations  by  special  act,  ex- 
cept for  municipal  purposes ;  (2)  from 
authorizing  any  county,  etc.,  to  become  a 
stockholder  in,  or  loaning  its  credit  to, 
any  company,  association,  or  corporation, 
unless  two  thinls  of  the  fjualifed  voters  should 
assent  thereto.  Subsequently  to  this  the 
legislature  passed  an  act  purporting  to 
amend  the  charter  of  the  said  railroad 
company,  wliicli  provided  tliat  tlie  county 
court  of  any  county  in  wliich  any  part  of 
the  line  of  said  railroad  miglit  be  located 
might  subscribe  to  tlie  stock  of  said  com- 
pany and  issue  bonds,  etc.  Under  this 
act,  the  county  court  of  Lafayette  County, 
a  county  lying  wholly  south  of  the  ]Mis- 
souri  River,  issued,  without  a  vote  of  the 
peojile,  tlie  bonds  from  whicli  the  coupons 
here  sued  on  were  detached,  and  several 
instalments  of  interest  had  been  paid  on 
them.  Held,  1.  That  the  amendatory  act 
from  vvhicJi  autliority  to  issue  tliese  bonds 
is  claimed  is  a  special  act,  in  effect  cre- 
ating a  new  corporation,  and  is  hence 
inhibited  by  the  state  constitution.  2. 
That  it  was  not  competent  for  the  legis- 
lature, by  e.xtending  the  route  of  tlie 
proposed  road  bejond  the  point  desig- 
nated in  the  original  charter,  to  authorize 
a  county  sontli  of  the  Missouri  River  to 
incur  indebtedness  in  aid  of  the  road, 
without  a  two-tiiirds  vote  as  required  by 
the    constitution.     3.  That,    since    there 


was  an  entire  want  of  power  to  issue  the 
bonds,  they  were  void  even  in  the  hands 
of  innocent  purchasers.  4.  That  the  fact 
that  the  county  court  had  paid  interest 
on  these  bonds  did  not  estop  it  from  after- 
wards setting  up  their  invalidity. 

Construction  of  special  power.  The  act 
which  authorized  tlie  issuing  of  the  bonds 
to  pay  the  county  subscriptions  to  a  rail- 
way company  directed  tliat  tlie  bonds  so 
issued  should  be  made  payable  to  "  tiie 
president  and  directors  of  the  railroad 
company,  and  their  successors  and  as- 
signs." The  bonds  issued  were  made 
payable  to  "the  railroad  company  or 
bearer."  Held,  that  the  power  granted 
was  sufficiently  pursued,  and  that  the 
bonds  so  issued  were  valid.  Woodward 
r.  Calhoun  County  (U.  S.  Dist.  Court  for 
Mississippi,  Hill,  J.),  2  Cent.  Law  Jour. 
396,  1874.  Special  act  held  to  control 
general  act.  Railroad  Co.  v.  Otoe  County, 
16  Wall.  667, 1872. 

Power  to  donate  bonds  in  lieu  of  lands  and 
right  of  way.  By  various  provisions  of  a 
city  charter,  tlie  mayor  and  city  council 
were  autliorized  to  make  donations  of  land 
for  the  right  of  way  and  other  privileges 
to  a  railroad  companj',  and  to  expend 
money  for  the  purpose  of  acquiring  land 
to  be  given,  and  were  authorized  to  bor- 
row money  to  an  unlimited  extent,  when 
instructed  so  to  do  by  a  popular  vote,  and 
further,  to  issue  bonds  to  fund  any  in- 
debtedness of  the  city,  existing  or  to  be 
created.  Under  this  authority,  a  railroad 
company,  by  reason  of  complying  with 
certain  conditions,  became  entitled  to  de- 
mand from  the  city  the  right  of  way  and 
depot  grounds.  The  company  agreed  with 
the  city  to  accept  the  bonds  voted  to  pro- 
cure the  riglit  of  way  and  grounds  in  lieu 
ofthe  right  of  way  and  grounds,  and  it 
was  held  that  the  city  had  the  power  thus 
to  agree,  and  that  the  bonds  were  valid. 
Converse  v.  Fort  Scott,  92  U.  S.  503, 1875; 
s.  c.  3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  449. 

A  proposition  once  voted  down  may  be 
subsequently  re-submitted  and  adopted, 


538  MUNICIPAL  CORPOEATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

§  543.  I\cijistra(io)i  of  Bonds.  —  Effect  of  Fraudulent  Anlcdat- 
iihj.  — The  history  of  the  issue  of  munieipal  bonds  in  this  country 
shows  that  conditions  imposed  by  law  requiring  a  popular  vote, 
or  conditions  in  the  propositions  submitted  to  the  voters,  intended 
to  prevent  fraud  and  to  secure  the  actual  building  and  completion 
of  the  roads,  have  been  often  evaded,  and  the  bonds  issued  with- 
out compliance  therewith.  Such  bonds,  wlien  negotiated  for 
value,  the  courts,  as  we  have  seen,  have  held  to  be  binding.  To 
prevent  such  improper  or  improvident  issue  of  bonds  in  the  future, 
the  legislatures  of  some  of  the  states  have  passed  acts  requiring  all 
bonds  to  be  registered  with  some  of  the  executive  departments  of 
the  state  before  they  are  issued  or  negotiated.  Thus  in  1872  ^  the 
legislature  of  Missouri,  a  state  in  which  many  fraudulent  bonds  had 
been  issued,  passed  an  act  which  provided  that  "  before  any  bond, 
hereafter  issued  by  any  county  .  .  .  shall  ohtccin  validity  or  be  nego- 
tiated" it  must  be  first  registered  by  the  state  auditor,  who  shall 
certify  thereon  that  all  conditions  precedent  required  by  law,  and 
by  the  contract  under  which  the  bonds  were  ordered  to  be  issued, 
have  been  complied  with.  In  the  case  of  Anthony  v.  Jasper 
County,-  it  appeared  that  bonds  weve  signed,  sealed,  and  issued  in 

unless  the  act  evinces  a  contrary  inten-  innocent  purchaser.    Upon  the  best  con- 

tion.     Society,   etc.  v.  New  London,  29  sideralion  we  have  been  able  to  give,  our 

Conn.  174 ;  Smith   v.    Clark   County,  54  conclusion  is  that  the  bonds   cannot  be 

Mo.  58;  Woodward  y.  Calhoun  County,  2  enforced.     The    case   comes    within   the 

Cent.  Law  Jour.  396.     In  Kentucky  \i  is  doctrine,  which  is  well  settled,  that  where 

held  that  municipal  corporations  are  not  a  stalute  declares  absolutely  and  without 

restricted  to   one   subscription.     Tyler's  exception  that  a  contract  or  bond  or  note 

Ex'rs  V.  E.  &  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  9  Bush  (Ky.),  is  void,  it  is  void  into  wliosesoever  hands 

510,1872.      Second  subscription  held  val-  it  may  come.     This  statute  declares  that 

i(j     jfy  no  unregistered  bond  shall  be  valid  or  be 

Issue  of  bonds  before  law  authorizing  negotiated.  Bonds  musty?ns(  be  registered, 

it  took  effect.     Phelps  r.  Bank,  13  ^Vis.  Without  registration  they  '  oi<um  ?ioi-a/(c?- 

432 ;  Berliner  v.  Waterloo,  14  Wis.  378.  ity.'     Such  is  the  statute.     A  declaration 

1  Act   of    March   30,   1872  (Laws  of  that  bonds  shall  have  no  validity  is  equiv- 

Missouri,  1872,  p.  56).  alent  to  declaring  them   to   be   void.     Is 

-  Anthony  v.  Jasper  County,  U.  S.  Cir-  the  county  estopped  to  set  up   this   de- 

cuit  Court,  AVest.  Dist.  Mo.,  April  Term,  fence  ?  We  think  not.     The  case  is  to  be 

1876;    3  Cent.  Law  Jour.  321;  affirmed  distinguished,  we  think,  from  those  de- 

101  U.  S.  693.    In  delivering  its  judgment,  cided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Unit- 

the   circuit   court   said  :    "  If  the   bonds  ed  States,  in   which  it   is   held  that  the 

bore  date  after  the  act  of  March  30,  1872,  frauds  of   tlie  officers   cannot  be  visited 

and  had  not  been  registered,  it  is  plain,  upon  the  innocent  bondholder,  and  falls 

we  think,  that  they  would  liave  no  '  valid-  within  the  principle  of  Baylcy  v.  Taber,  5 

ity,'  and  hence  could  not  support  an  action  Mass.    28G.     In   that    case   it   was   held, 

in  the  hands   of  any  person.     But  they  where  a  statute  enacted  that  promissory 

are  antedated,  and  the  question  is,  wheth-  notes  of  a  certain   description,  '  made  or 

er  they  have  validity  in  the  hands  of  the  issued '  after  a  specified  day,  should  be 


§  543.]  CONTRACTS.  539 

the  manner  above  appearing,  after  this  statute  went  into  effect,  and 
were  antedated  to  a  date  prior  to  the  passage  of  that  enactment. 
In  point  of  fact,  the  conditions  on  which  the  bonds  had  been  voted 
had  not  been  fully  complied  with  ;  and  hence  they  could  not  have 
been,  and  were  not,  certified  by  the  auditor  as  registered  bonds. 
The  bonds  found  their  way  into  the  hands  of  an  innocent  holder 
for  value,  who  did  not  know  that  the  bonds  bore  a  false  date. 
The  Circuit  Court  held  that  the  bonds  could  not  be  enforced, 
and  that  the  county  was  not  estopped  to  set  up  the  defence, 
—  a  decision  which  necessarily  implied  a  distinction  between  such 
a  case  and  those  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  had  held  that  the  county  or  municipality  could  not  visit 
the  frauds  of  their  officers  upon  the  innocent  holders  of  the  bonds. 
The  case  was  taken  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  distinction  taken  below  was  adjudged  to  be  sound. ^ 

A  municipal  corporation  issued  bonds  valid  on  their  face,  hut  in 
fact  void,  because  they  icere  antedated  to  evade  the  registration  act, 
and  were  not  registered  ;  the  corporation  had  power  to  borrow 
money,  and  the  proceeds  of  the  bonds  passed  into  tjie  city  treas- 
ury and  were  used  for  lawful  purposes  ;  it  was  held  that  the 
corporation  was  liable  in  an  action  for  money  had  and  received  to 
the  purchaser  of  the  bonds  or  his  assignee,  not  for  the  amount 
of  the  bonds,  but  for  the  amount  of  money  actually  paid  for  the 
bonds  to  the  corporation,  with  simple  interest  thereon.^ 

'  utterly  void,  and  no  action   should  be  sue  such  bonds.     This   power  has  been 

sustained  thereon,'  tliat  it  was  competent  taken    away    by  the    new  constitution, 

to  the  makers  of  such   notes,  when  sued  Can  the  protective  provisions  of  that  in- 

upon  notes  bearing  date    before  tlie   day  strument  be  evaded  and  rendered  useless 

fixed  by  the  statute,  to  prove  that  they  by  the  mere  fraudulent  act  of  the  officers 

were,  in  fact,  made  and  issued  afler  such  of  the  county  in  antedating  the  bonds  ? 

day.     Tlie  principle  of  that  case   is  the  If  so,  the   power  to  defraud  is  endowed 

same  as  in  the  case  at  the  bar,  and  if  that  with  a  fearful  vitality,  which  survives  the 

is  a  sound  principle  when  applied   to  the  prohibitions    of    the     constitution,     and 

individual  maker  of  prohibited  paper,  it  threatens  to  become  immortal." 
should  apply  with  at  least  equal  force  in         Construction  of  Kansas  Bond  Registra- 

fiivor  of  pui)lic  bodies,  where  one  or  two  tion  Act.    January  v.  Johnson  County,  3 

officers,  without  the  consent   of  the  oth-  Dillon,  C.  C.  R.  3U2. 
ers,  may,  as  in  this  case,  combine  to  evade  ^  Anthony  v.  Jasper  County,  101  U.  S. 

the  law,  the  other  officers  being  innocent  G93,  1879. 

of  wrongful  participation.     Tiie  principle  ^  Wood  r.  Louisiana,  5  Dillon  C.  C.  R. 

involved   is   one   of    great   consequence.  122, 1878,  affirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court 

For  illustration  :  Loose  and  general  pow-  Oct.  Term,  1880.     The  general  subject  of 

ers  have  been  heretofore   given   in   this  implied  liuhility  of  municipal  corporations 

state  to  municipalities  and  counties  to  is-  has  been  treated  in  another  connection. 


640 


MUNICIPAL   COErORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  544.  Retrospective  Statutes  validat'uig  Irregular  Subscriptions 
and  Bonds.  —  lu  the  absence  of  special  constitutional  restrictions, 
the  competency  of  the  legislature  to  enact  retrospective  statutes 
to  validate  an  irreguhir  or  defective  execution  of  a  power  by  a 
municipal  or  public  corporation  is  undoubted.^      And,  the  power 


1  Keithsburg  i-.  Frick,  34  111.  405 ; 
Copes  V.  Charleston,  10  Rich.  (So.  Car.) 
Law,  491 ;  McMUIlmi  v.  Boyles,  0  Iowa, 
304 ;  lb.  394 ;  Gelpeckc  v.  Dubuciue,  1 
Wall.  220  (note  statute  there  con- 
strued) ;  People  v.  Mitchell,  35  N.  Y. 
551  ;  Thompson  v.  Lee  County,  3  Wall. 
327;  Bass  v.  Columbus,  30  Ga.  845,  1860; 
Bissell  r.  Jetrersonville,  24  How.  287, 1860; 
Campbell  v.  Kenosha,  5  Wall.  194,  1806 ; 
(^ty  V.  Lamson,9  Wall.  477, 1809 ;  Steines 
1'.  Franklin  County,  48  Mo.  107,  1871 ; 
Knapp  V.  Grant,  27  Wis.  147, 1870;  Black 
V.  Cohen,  52  Ga.  621,1874;  Duanesburgh 
V.  Jenkins,  57  N.  Y.  177,  1874,  overruling 
6.  c.  40  Barb.  294,  ami  distinguishing  Peo- 
ple V.  Batchellor,  53  N.  Y.  128 ;  Kimball 
V.  Rosendale,  42  Wis.  407,  1877  ;  s.  c.  24 
Am.  Rep.  421 ;  Ritchie  v.  Franklin  Co., 
22  Wall.  67;  Bradley  v.  Franklin  Co.,  65 
Mo.  638,  1877;  Lewis  v.  Shreveport,  3 
Woods  C.  C.  205 ;  Cooley  on  Const.  Lim. 
371,  and  cases  there  cited;  «n/e,  sees.  70,75, 
79,  419  ;  Ritchie  v.  Franklin  Co.,  22  Wall. 
67,  1874;  Cooley  on  Ta.xation,  223,  232. 
In  Mississippi  it  is  held  that  "  where  tiie 
state  constitution  prohibits  the  legisla- 
ture from  autliorizing  the  issue  of  muni- 
cipal obligations  in  aid  of  corporations,  or 
lending  of  credit  therefor,  except  on  con- 
dition that  two-thirds  of  the  qualified 
voters  assent  thereto  at  an  election,  the 
legislature  cannot,  by  a  mere  retrospec- 
tive act,  validate  nmnicipal  bonds  wliich 
were  issued  without  legislative  authority 
before  the  constitution  became  operative. 
Sykes  v.  Columbus,  55  Miss.,115  ;  see, 
also,  Cairo,  etc.  Railroad  Co.  v.  City  of 
Sparta,  77  111.  505, 1875. 

In  St.  Joseph  Township  v.  Rogers,  16 
Wall.  666,  where  it  appeared  that  the 
election  at  which  the  subscription  was 
approved  was  held  before  the  passage  of 
the  law  authorizing  the  subscription,  the 
court  said  :  "Argument  to  siiow  that  de- 
fective subscriptions  of  the  kind  may,  in 
all  cases,  be  ratified  wliere  the  legislature 
could    have     originally     conferred     the 


power  is  certainly  unnecessary,  as  the 
question  is  authoritatively  settled  by  the 
decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state 
{Illinois),  and  of  this  court  in  repeated 
instances."  And  again  :  "  Mistakes  and 
irregularities  are  of  frequent  occurrence 
in  municipal  elections,  and  the  state 
legislatures  have  often  had  occasion  to 
pass  laws  to  obviate  such  difficulties. 
Such  laws,  when  they  do  not  impair 
any  contract,  or  injuriously  affect  the 
rights  of  third  persons,  are  never  re- 
garded as  objectionable,  and  certainly 
are  within  the  competency  of  legislative 
authority." 

The  constitution  of  Illinois  of  1848,  Art. 
ix,  sec.  5,  declared  "  that  the  corporate 
authorities  of  counties,  townships,  school 
districts,  cities,  towns,  and  villages  may 
be  vested  with  power  to  assess  and  col- 
lect taxes  for  corporate  purposes,  such 
taxes  to  be  uniform  in  respect  to  persons 
and  property  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  body  imposing  the  same,"  The 
Supreme  Court  of  the  state  (Marshall  v. 
Siliman,  61  III.  218  ;  Wiley  i-.  Silliman, 
62  III.  170  ;  see  ante,  sees.  70, 419)  decided 
that,  this  section  having  been  intended  as 
a  limitation  upon  the  law-making  power, 
the  legislature  could  not  grant  the  right  of 
corporate  taxation  to  any  but  the  corporate 
authorities,  nor  coerce  a  municipal  corpora- 
tion to  incur  a  debt  by  the  issue  of  its 
bonds  for  corporate  purposes.  And  the 
court  held  that  an  act  validating  an  elec- 
tion, irregularly  called  and  notified,  to 
vote  upon  the  question  of  township  sub- 
scription, and  declaring  the  same  legal  and 
binding,  was  void.  In  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  the  act  was  an  effort  to  confer  the 
power  of  municipal  taxation  upon  per- 
sons who  were  not,  by  themselves,  the 
corporate  authorities  in  the  sense  of  the 
constitution,  and  to  compel  the  town  to  is- 
sue its  bonds  for  railroad  stock,  by  declar- 
ing a  void  proceeding  to  be  a  valid  sub- 
scription. Theliability  of  the  township  on 
the  same  bonds  afterwards  came  before 


§  545.]  CONTRACTS.  541 

to  cure  defective  subscriptions  to  the  stock  of  railway  companies 
and  validate  bonds  issued  therefor  has  been  frequently  exercised 
and  judicially  sustained.  Subsequent  legislative  sanction  is 
equivalent  to  original  authority.^ 

§  545.  Want  of  Poiver  always  a  Defence.  —  Question  of  Poiver  is 
the  One  of  Chief  Interest  and  Importance.  —  Touching  the  rights 
of  the  holder  of  authorized  negotiable  municipal  securities,  it  may 
again  be  observed  that  such  instruments  are  commercial  paper^ 
and  governed  by  the  rules  of  the  law  merchant  concerning 
such  paper,  and  that  as  respects  a  holder  for  value,  before 
due,  without  notice  of  facts  constituting  a  defence  thereto, 
the  only  defence  which  is  available  is,  that  there  was  no  power 
in  the  defendant  corporation  to  issue  the  bonds  or  instru- 
ments in  question.  This  principle  is  thus  expressed  in  one 
of  the  judgments  of  the  Supreme  Court :  "  Bonds  payable  to 
bearer,  issued  by  a  municipal  corporation,  ...  if  issued  in  pursu- 
ance of  a  power  conferred  by  the  legislature,  are  valid  commer- 
cial instruments  ;  but  if  issued  by  such  a  corporation  which  pos- 
sessed no  power  from  the  legislature.,  they  are  invalid,  even  in  the 

the  Supreme  Court  of  tlie  United  States  v.  Jolinson,  95  U.  S.  860),  it  was  the  duty 

in  The  Town  of  Elmwood  v.  Marcy,  02  U.  of  the  Circuit  Court  to  follow  that  judg- 

S.  289,  1875,  and  a  majority  of  the  court  ment,  notwithstanding  the  later  decision 

not  vindicating,  nor,  it  would  seem,  ap-  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  in  the 

proving,   the   decision    of    the  Supreme  State  n.  Brassfield,  A.  D.  1878;  and  that 

Court  of /////(o;'s,  nevertheless,  as  there  had  where   negotiahle    commercial  securities 

been,   in    their   view,   no   conflicting  de-  are  issued  and  negotiated  before  there  is 

cisions  of  that  tribunal  on  the  point,  and  any  decision  by  the  courts  of  the  state 

as   it  involved    the     construction    of   a  against  the  validity  of  the  act  authorizing 

"  peculiar  provision  of  the  constitution  of  their  issue,  the    Supreme    Court   of  the 

Illinois,"  they  felt  bound  to  follow  it,  al-  United    States   does   not    consider   itself 

though    it    was  made    after    the    bonds  bound  to  follow  a  siihseqneM  decision  of 

in   question    had   been  issued.     Clifford,  the  local  courts  invalidating  such  secu- 

Swaifne,    and    Strong,  JJ.,  dissented,    on  rities,  but  will  decide  for  itself  whether, 

grounds  which  would  seem  to  be  strongly  under  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the 

supported   in   the   previous   decisions  of  state,  such  securities   are  valid  or  void, 

the     court.       Supervisors    of     Marshall  s.  p.  Douglas  v.  County  of  Pike,  101  U. 

County  V.  Schcnck,  5  Wall.  772  ;  Town-  S.  G77,  1870. 

ship  of  Pine  Grove  v.  Talcott,   19  Wall.  i  Wilson  v.  Ilardesty,   1   Md.   Ch.  66; 

GOG,   677;     Railroad    Co.   v.   County   of  Shaw    v.    Norwalk,    etc.    Co.,    5    Gray 

Otoe,  IG   Wall.  667;    Olcott    v.    Super-  (Mass.),    ISO;   Satterlee  v.  Mathewson, 

visors,  lb.  678.  2  Pet.  380  ;  W^ilkinson  v.   Leland,  2  Pet. 

In  Footc  I'.  Johnson  County,  5  Dillon  027  ;  Watson  v.  Mercer,  8  Pet.  88;  Charles 

C.  C.  R.  281,  1878,  it  was  ruled  that  the  R.  Bridge  v.  Warren  Bridge,  11  Pet.  420; 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  hav-  Stanley  y.  Colt,  5  Wall.    119;  Croxall  v. 

ing  held  the  "  township  railroad  aid  act  "  Sheerd,  5  Wall.  2G8  ;  Keithsburg  v.  Frick, 

of  Missouri  constitutional  (Cass  County  34  111.  405. 


542  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

hands  of  innocent  holders."  ^  Irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  the 
power,  as  against  a  holder  for  value,  without  notice  of  snch  irreg- 
ularities, constitute  no  defence.  Since,  therefore,  ivant  of  power 
is  the  onlij  defence  open  to  the  corporate  maker  of  snch  instru- 
ments, when  they  have  been  negotiated  (as  almost  invariably  is 
the  case  for  value  to  innocent  holders),  the  question  of  power  is 
the  one  around  which  the  principal  interest  centres,  and  to  which, 
in  its  various  phases,  we  have  given  our  main  attention. 

§  546.  Bonds  void  against  Bona  Fide  Holders.  —  Where  there 
is  an  entire  absence  of  power,  as  distinguished  from  a  defective 
execution  of  the  power,  then  the  recitals  of  those  invested  with 
the  ministerial  duty  of  issuing  them  will  afford  no  protection  to 
even  bona  fide  holders  for  value  of  such  bonds.^  If  such  bonds 
are  issued  without  legislative  authority  they  are  void,  and  the 
levy  of  taxes  and  payment  of  interest  will  not  render  them  valid.^ 
So  where  there  is  want  of  power  the  mere  silence  of  the  tax-payer 
in  permitting  the  issue  of  bonds  will  not  create  an  estoppel  even 
in  favor  of  an  innocent  holder  for  value*  It  is  the  duty  of  pur- 
chasers of  such  securities  to  examine  into  the  power  of  the  mu- 
nicipality to  issue  such  bonds,  and  if  no  power  exists  there  can 
be  no  recital  which  will  protect  even  hona  fide  holders  for  value. 

§  547.  Laches,  Acquiescence,  Payment  of  Interest,  and  retaining 
the  Consideration  as  Grrounds  of  Estoppel.  —  The  cases  we  have 

1  Per  Clifford,  J.,  in  St.  Joseph  Town-  655 ;  Schuyler  v.  Farwell,  25  III.  81 ;  Mar- 
ship  V.  Kogers,  16  Wall.  644,  659,  1872.  sliall  Co.  v.  Cook,  38  111.  48 ;  Lippincott 
As  nearly  all  the  cases  in  tlie  Supreme  v.  Pana,  92  III.  24.  In  Loan  Association 
Court  have  turned  on  the  question  of  v.  Topeka,  the  court  says  :  "  We  do  not 
power,  it  is  not  deemed  material  again  to  attach  any  importance  to  the  fact  that  the 
cite  tiiem  in  tliis  connection,  as  the  propo-  town  authorities  paid  one  instalment  of 
sitions  in  the  text  are  no  longer  the  sub-  interest  on  tliese  bonds.  Such  a  payment 
ject  of  judicial  controversy.  See  post,  works  no  estoppel.  If  the  legislature  was 
chapter  on  Mandamus.  without  power  to  authorize  the  issue  of 

2  Force  v.  Batavia,  61  111.  100 ;  Wil-  these  bonds,  and  its  statute  attempting 
Hams  V.  Roberts,  88  111.  13 ;  Lippincott  v.  to  confer  sucli  authority  is  void,  the  mere 
Pana,  92  111.  24 ;  Sykes  v.  Columbus,  55  payment  of  interest,  which  was  equally 
Miss.  115;  Williamsons.  Keokuk, 44 Iowa,  unauthorized,  cannot  create  of  itself  a 
88,  1876 ;  Aspinwall  v.  Co.  of  Daviess,  power  to  levy  taxes,  resting  on  no  other 
22  How.  364 ;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  Co.  10  foundation  than  the  fact  that  they  have 
Wall.  676  ;  Loan  Association  v.  Topeka,  once  been  illegally  levied  for  that  pur- 
20    Wall.    655;    St.   Joseph    v.    Rogers,  pose." 

16  Wall.  614,  1872.     See,  also,  Avery  i'.  *  McPherson  v.  Foster,  43  Iowa,  48, 

Springport,  14  Blatchf.  272.  1874. 

3  Loan  Association  v.  Topeka,  20  Wall. 


§  548.]  CONTRACTS.  543 

heretofore  considered  were  mainly  those  in  which  the  municipality 
has  been  held  estopped  by  the  recitals  in  tlie  bonds  to  show  that 
conditions  precedent  had  not  been  complied  with.  We  will  now 
advert  to  other  grounds  of  estoppel,  arising  from  the  acquiescence 
or  acts  of  the  municipal  authorities.  It  is  undoubtedly  a  sound 
proposition  that  a  municipal  corporation,  as  well  as  a  private  cor- 
poration, may  confirm  acts,  not  ultra  vires,  which  it  may  deem 
beneficial  to  it. 

§  548.  As  experience  shows  that  the  officers  of  public  and 
municipal  corporations  do  not  guard  the  interest  confided  to  them 
with  the  same  vigilance  and  fidelity  that  characterize  the  officers 
of  private  corporations,  the  principle  of  ratification  by  laches  or 
delay  should  be  more  cautiously  applied  to  the  former  than  to 
the  latter.  But  the  principle  applies  to  both  classes  of  corpora- 
tions, as  well  as  to  natural  persons.  The  general  doctrine  is  un- 
doubted, —  that  there  is  ordinarily  no  estoppel  in  respect  to  acts 
which  are  in  violation  of  the  constitution  or  of  an  act  of  the  leg- 
islature, or  which  are  obviously  ultra  vires.  The  history  of  the 
doctrine  of  ultra  vires  in  Great  Britain  and  in  this  country  makes 
it  difficult  to  affirm  that  the  rule  is  without  exceptions  ;  and  it  is 
the  part  of  prudence  and  wisdom  to  keep  close  to  the  adjudications 
without  undertaking  to  formulate  in  advance  rules  of  universal 
application.  As  to  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  an  express 
power  to  issue  bonds,  and  particularly  in  respect  to  steps  connect- 
ed with  preliminary  conditions,  the  failure  of  the  municipality 
or  tax-payer  to  enjoin  the  issue,  followed  by  long  acquiescence, 
especially  when  this  is  accompanied  by  affirmative  acts  which 
recognize  the  validity  of  the  bonds,  such  as  receiving  and  holding 
the  stock  or  consideration  for  the  bonds,  or  paying  interest  on 
them  for  a  series  of  years,  has  been  held  to  estop  the  munici- 
pality from  defending,  on  the  ground  of  non-compliance  with  con- 
ditions precedent,  especially  when  the  bonds,  as  is  usually  the 
case,  have  been  negotiated  for  value.  But  there  is  no  case  yet 
decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  which  holds  the  corporation  es- 
topped from  setting  up  a  total  want  of  power  to  issue  the  bonds. 
The  leading  cases  on  this  point  in  the  Supreme  Court  are  re- 
ferred to  in  the  note.^ 

1  As  to  the  eScct  of  failure  to  enjoin  the  the  irregular  exercise  of  the  power,  see 
issue  of  the  bonds  and  of  acquiescence  in     Rogers  i'.  Burlington,  3  AVall.  G54,  6G7. 


544 


MUNICIPAL   COEPORATIONS. 


[CH.  XIV. 


§  549.    General  Summary  of  Doctrine  of  the  Supreme  Court  as 
to  estoppel   hi/  Becitals.  —  In  passing  from  this  portion  of  our  sub- 


Compare  dissent  on  tliis  point,  76.  p.  072; 
Bissell  V.  .JetlersonviUo,  2i  How.  300; 
Cooloy  on  T;i.\;ition,  548,  541) ;  Butler  r. 
Diinliam,  27  111.  477;  Steines  v.  Franklin 
County,  48  Mo.  170,  185;  State  i\  Van 
Ilonie,  7  Ohio  St.  ."Jol ;  Barrett  v.  County 
Court,  44  JMo.  201  ;  Siiocniaker  v.  Goshen 
Township,  14  Ohio  St.  587. 

In  Supervisors  i>.  Schenek,  5  Wall.  781, 
—  from  Illinois, — which  is  an  important 
case  on  this  subject,  it  appeared  that  in 
ll/iiiois  counties  were  authorized,  upon  a 
popular  vote,  to  subscribe  for  stock  and 
ir,\y  therefor  in  bonds ;  an  election  was 
ordered  by  the  rountij  court  in  a  certain 
county,  when  it  should  have  been  ordered 
(by  reason  of  a  change  in  the  law)  by  the 
hoard  of  superviaors ;  it  was  duly  held  ;  the 
proposition  was  carried  ;  the  supervisors 
made  the  subscription,  issued  the  bonds, 
received  the  stock,  and  ordered  the  levy 
of  taxes  and  paid  the  coupons  for  nine  or 
ten  years  ;  and  it  was  held  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States,  in  con- 
formity with  the  doctrine  of  the  state 
Supreme  Court,  as  first  announced  but 
subsequently  overruled,  that  the  acquies- 
cence, conduct,  and  acts  of  the  county  au- 
thorities were  a  ratification  of  the  bonds, 
at  least  when  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent 
holder,  and  estopped  the  county  to  make 
the  defence  that  the  election  had  been 
ordered  by  the  county  court  instead  of 
the  board  of  supervisors.  In  view  of  the 
facts  as  stated,  the  judgment  of  the  court 
■would  appear  to  be  sound  and  open  to  no 
criticism,  as  the  objection  to  the  bonds 
was  an  irregular  exercise  of  an  admitted 
power  in  the  county,  and  not  a  want  of 
power.  The  recital  in  the  bonds  is  not 
given,  but  it  would  appear  from  the  opin- 
ion that  the  plaintiff's  case  also  fell  within 
the  doctrine  of  Knox  County  v.  Aspin- 
wall. 

In  Pendleton  County  v.  Amy,  13  Wall. 
297,  1871,  decided  on  demurrer,  it  did  not 
appear  that  there  was  any  estoppel  by 
reason  of  recitals  in  the  bond,  nor  from 
subsequent  payment  of  interest ;  but  the 
])leadings  showed  that  the  county  had 
received  in  exchange  for  the  bonds  a  cer- 
tificate of  the  stock  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany, which  it  had  held  for  seventeen 
years  before  the  suit  was  brought,  and 


still  held.  The  county  was  authorized  to 
purchase  the  stock,  but  only  on  condition 
of  a  popular  vote.  It  was  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Court  that  purchasing  and  hold- 
ing the  stock  under  these  circumstances 
estopped  the  county  to  assert  against  an 
innocent  holder  of  the  bonds  that  they 
were  issued  in  disregard  of  the  condition 
of  a  popular  election,  required  by  the  act 
of  the  legislature  conferring  the  power. 
Three  of  the  judges  dissented,  probably 
on  this  point ;  and  certainly  the  case 
seems  to  be  an  extreme  application  of  the 
doctrine  of  estoppel.  The  bonds  (so  far  as 
appeared)  were  without  recitals  ;  no  pay- 
ment of  interest  had  been  made  ;  a  popu- 
lar vote  was  made  necessary,  and  the 
plea  alleged  that  no  such  vote  had  ever 
been  had,  and  that  the  question  of  sub- 
scription had  never  been  submitted  to  or 
voted  upon  by  the  people;  and  the  mere 
receipt  and  holding  of  the  stock  were 
held  sufficient  to  estop  the  county  to 
make  the  defence.  We  have  not  been 
able  to  reconcile  the  case,  on  this  point, 
with  Marsh  v.  Fulton  Countj',  referred 
to  in  a  subsequent  portion  of  this  note. 

The  case  of  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County, 
10  Wall.  670,  1870,  decides  this  principle, 
viz.,  that  where,  under  the  legislation  of 
the  state,  the  county  authorities  had  no 
power  to  subscribe  for  stock  and  issue 
bonds  therefor,  and  where  (as  held)  they 
made  the  subscription  and  issued  the 
bonds  without  the  sanction  of  a  popular 
vote,  the  bonds  containing  no  recital,  such 
bonds  are  void,  and  are  not  ratified  by 
acts  of  the  county  authorities,  such  as 
appointing  agents  to  participate  in  the 
corporate  meetings  of  the  railway  com- 
pany, nor  by  the  payment  of  part  of  the 
bonds  and  the  interest  on  the  others  for 
a  series  of  j-ears  ;  and  the  reason  given  by 
the  court  was  that  no  ratification  could 
be  made  itnless  it  was  authorized  by  the 
people,  the  defect  being  one  of  power. 
Field,  J.,  observed  :  "  They  [the  supervi- 
sors] could  not,  therefore,  ratify  a  sub- 
scription without  a  vote  of  the  county 
because  they  could  not  make  a  subscrip- 
tion in  the  first  instance  without  such  au- 
thorization." Compare  Pendleton  County 
V.  Amy,  supra. 


§  549.]  CONTKACTS.  545 

ject,  we  may  observe  that  if  we  liave  not  mistaken  the  meaning 
and  effect  of  the  leading  judgments  of  the  Supreme  Court  which 
we  have  passed  in  review,  they  estabhsh  the  following  principles : 
The  purchaser  is  bound  to  see  that  there  exists  legislative  au- 
thority not  in  conflict  with  the  state  constitution  for  the  issue  of 
the  bonds  or  commercial  securities  of  the  municipal,  public,  or 
quasi  corporation,  and  is  bound  to  notice  the  contents  and  recit- 
als contained  in  the  instruments;  but  if  such  bonds  are  duly 
executed  by  the  proper  officers,  and  if  these  officers  are  invested, 
by  the  true  construction  of  the  legislative  enactment  in  that  re- 
gard, with  the  power  to  decide  whether  conditions  precedent 
have  been  performed,  and  the  bonds  contain  a  recital  that  such 
conditions  have  been  complied  with,  or  a  recital  which  implies 
such  compliance,  whether  the  preliminary  conditions  consist  of 
facts  in  pais  or  facts  of  record,  —  the  issue  of  the  bonds,  under 
such  circumstances,  with  such  a  recital,  is  conclusive  against  the 
municipality  as  to  the  fact  or  facts  recited  or  implied  in  the  reci- 
tal, and  estops  it,  in  an  action  by  an  innocent  holder  for  value, 
before  due,  to  show  the  contrary.  This  is  the  doctrine  of  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States ;  and  the  point  in  which  it 
differs  from  the  general  line  of  decisions  in  the  state  courts  is  in 
regard  to  the  evidence  of  compliance  with  conditions  precedent. 
In  all  the  cases  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  that 
tribunal  has  held  that  the  municipal  or  local  officers  were  consti' 
tuted  the  judges  to  decide  whether  antecedent  or  preliminary 
steps  or  conditions  had  been  complied  with,  and  that  their  de- 
cision, stated  or  implied  in  the  recital,  was  conclusive  against  the 
corporate  maker  when  the  bonds  have  found  their  way  into  the 
hands  of  innocent  holders.  The  view  which  holds  the  local 
officers  a  tribunal  as  being  authorized  to  make  so  important  a  de- 
cision rests  not  upon  any  express  declaration  of  the  legislature 
to  that  effect,  but  is  "gathered,"  by  construction,  from  the 
supposed  intent  and  purpose  of  the  legislature.  Many  of  the 
state  courts,  but  not  all  of  them,  have  taken  a  somewhat  dif- 
ferent view.  They  agree  that  mere  irregularities^  not  relating 
to  the  essence  of  the  power,  will  not  affect  a  hona  fide  holder ; 
but  inasmuch  as  there  exists  no  general  power  to  issue  such  se- 
curities, and  as  the  fact  of  compliance  or  non-compliance  with 
conditions  precedent  is  usually  a  matter  of  which  there  is  a  record, 
the  purchaser  of  such  securities  is  bound  to  ascertain  whether 
VOL.  I.  35 


546  MUNICIPAL   CORrORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

the  power  to  issue  them  existed  or  had  arisen,  especially  where 
this  depends  upon  matters  of  which  a  record  is  required  to  be 
made.  The  subject  is  one  full  of  diflSculties.  If  the  latter  view 
is  sustained,  it  has  the  effect  to  impair  the  ready  salability  and 
market  value  of  the  securities.  If  the  former,  it  has  the  effect 
of  enabling  the  local  officers  in  power  for  the  time  being  to  per- 
petrate, without  any  effectual  preventive  in  many  cases,  the  most 
outrageous  frauds.  On  principle,  it  would  seem  that  the  legisla- 
tive intent  to  invest  local  officers,  by  means  of  a  false  recital,  with 
a  power  so  tremendous  ought  not  to  be  held  to  exist,  unless  it  is 
plainly  declared  or  implied,  and  that  more  caution  in  the  pur- 
chase of  these  securities  than  is  required  by  the  doctrine  of  the 
Supreme  Court  would  promote  the  interests  both  of  the  maker 
and  the  purchaser. 

§  550.  (423)  State  Court  Decisions  referred  to.  —  The  author- 
ity to  subscribe  to  the  stock  of  a  railroad  corporation  may  be 
made  conditional  on  certain  previous  steps  being  taken,  as,  for 
example,  a  prior  authorization  of  the  act  by  a  majority  of  the 
qualified  voters  of  the  municipality  or  district  to  be  affected,  or  a 
recommendation  in  its  favor  and  a  designation  of  the  amount  by 
a  grand  jury,  and  the  statute  may  be  so  framed  as  to  evince  the 
legislative  intention  to  be  that  no  power  to  subscribe  or  issue 
bonds  shall  exist  unless  this  be  done.^     Thus,  where  the  act 

1  Mercer  County  v.  Pittsburg  &  Erie  be    remarked,  however,   that   the    case 

Railroad  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  389,  1856  ;  Mer-  above  referred  to  (State  v.  Saline  County, 

cer  County  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83 ;  Au-  45  Mo.  242,  1870)  was  mandamus  to  coni- 

rora  v.  West,  22  Ind.  88,  503,  1864 ;  ante,  pel  the  relator  to  deliver  the  bonds,  and 

sec.  153  et  seq. ;    City  and  County  of  St.  to  assess  taxes  to  pay  interest  on  bonds 

Louis  V.  Alexander,  23  Mo.  483,  1856.    In  which  had  been  issued,  and  the  writ  was 

this  last  case   the  provision  requiring  a  denied  because  the  amount  of  bonds  to 

submission  of  the  question  to  the  voters  be  issued  was  not  specified ;  but  subse- 

"  before  the  subscription  hereby  author-  quently,  in  The  State  v.  Saline  County, 

ized  shall  be  made,"  was  held  not  merely  48  Mo.  890,  1871,  it  was  held    that  such 

directory,   but  mandatory.      Where   the  bonds,  when  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent 

enabling  act  requires  the  amount  to  be  holder    for    value,    could    be    collected, 

specified,  a  vote  not  specifying  definitely  What,   in   the  opinion   of    the  Supreme 

the  amount  is,  as  to  the  immediate  parties,  Court    of  Missouri,  such  a  holder  must 

void.      State  v.  Saline    County,  45   Mo.  show  in  the  way  of  compliance  with  pre- 

242,  1870,    following  Mercer  County   v.  cedent   conditions,  in   order  to   recover, 

Pittsburg,  etc.  Railroad  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  see    the    case^   of    Carpenter    v.   Inhabi- 

389,  and  Starin  v.  Genoa,  23  N.  Y.  439  tants  of  Lathrop,  51  Mo.  483,  1873.    This 

(see    infra),    and     distinguishing     Knox  case   seems  in  spirit,  if  not  in  effect,  to 

County  V.  Aspinwall,  21  How.  539,  and  depart  from  the  earlier  cases  in  that  court 

Flagg  ?'.  Palmyra,  33  Mo.  440.     It  should  upon  this  subject.     See  Railroad  Co.  v. 


S  550.]  CONTRACTS.  547 

authorizing  a  town  to  borrow  money  to  pay  for  the  stock  sub- 
scribed expressly  provided  that  the  officers  thereof  should  "  have 
no  poiver  "  to  do  so  until  the  written  assent  of  two  thirds  of  the 
resident  tax-payers  had  been  obtained,  this  was  held  a  condition 
precedent,  without  Avhich  the  power  did  not  exist.^ 


Platte  County,  42  Mo.  171,  where  per- 
missive words  respecting  an  election  to 
authorize  subscriptions  were  held  to  be 
imperative.  In  the  Railroad  Co.  v.  Bu- 
chanan County,  39  Mo.  485,  the  words 
that  the  county  court,  after  an  affirma- 
tive vote  by  the  people,  "  shall  have  power 
to  subscribe,"  were  held  to  leave  it  dis- 
cretionary with  the  court  whether  to  sub- 
scribe or  nut.  In  tiie  case  of  the  People 
ex  rel.  v.  Tazewell  County,  22  111.  147,  it 
was  held,  under  the  general  law  of  the 
state,  that  it  was  discretionary  whether 
the  county  should  subscribe  all  or  but  a 
portion  of  the  amount  voted  by  the  citi- 
zens, and  that  county  authorities  might 
impose  any  proper  conditions  thej'  might 
choose.  So  where  the  legislature,  without 
conditions,  provides  for  submitting  the 
question  of  subscription  to  the  voters  of 
a  township,  the  electors  have  the  power 
to  vote  to  subscribe  on  any  conditions 
they  may  see  proper  to  annex.  People 
V.  Butcher,  56  111.  144,  1871  ;  see  also 
People  V.  Logan  County,  45  111.  139 ; 
Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280,  1865 ;  post, 

1  Starin  v.  Genoa,  2-3  N.  Y.  439,  1861 ; 
Gould  V.  Sterling,  lb.  4-39,  456 ;  distin- 
guished on  this  point  from  Bank  of  Rome 
V.  Village  of  Rome,  19  N.  Y.  20.  Under 
the  act  it  was  held  that  the  oiius  was  on 
the  plaintiff  to  show  affirmatively  the 
written  assent  of  the  requisite  number  of 
tax-payers ;  and  the  manner  in  which 
this  must  be  shown  is  considered  at 
length.  But  see  Bissell  v.  Jefferson ville, 
24  IIow.  287  ;  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall, 
21  How.  539 ;  Mercer  County  v.  Hacket, 
1  Wall.  83,  heretofore  referred  to.  In  the 
People  V.  Mead,  .30  N.  Y.  224,  1867,  the 
decision  in  Starin  v.  Genoa,  and  Gould  v. 
Sterling,  above  cited,  was  adhered  to  by 
the  Court  of  Appeals,  though  it  was  ad- 
mitted that  a  contrary  ruling  as  to  the 
evidence  of  the  assent  of  the  tax-payers 
had  been  made  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
the    United   States    in   favor  of  similar 


bonds  in  the  hands  of  bona  Jide  holders, 
and  the  case  was  distinguished  from 
Murdock  v.  Aiken,  and  Ross  v.  Curtis,  31 
N.  Y.  606;  Starin  v.  Genoa  and  Gould 
V.  Sterling  have  been  expressly  disap- 
proved, as  we  have  seen,  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  as  respects  the 
bona  fide  holders  of  bonds.  Venice  v.  Mur- 
dock, 92  U.  S.  494,  1875.  Illustrating 
text,  see  Benson  v.  Mayor,  etc.  of  Albany, 
24  Barb.  248. 

Where  the  statute  gives  the  power  to 
issue  bonds  when  a  majority  of  the  tax- 
payers whose  names  appear  upon  the  last 
preceding  tax  list,  or  assessment  roll,  as 
owning  a  majority  of  the  taxable  property 
in  the  corporate  limits,  make  application 
to  the  county  judge,  by  petition,  etc., 
such  a  petition  is  essential  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  county  judge,  and  the  authority 
conferred  by  the  act  will,  on  certiorari,  be 
required  to  be  exercised  in  strict  confor- 
mity with  the  act  in  its  letter  and  spirit. 
The  petition,  it  was  held,  must  be  that  of 
the  tax-payers,  and  it  is  erroneous  to 
count  as  petitioners  those  whose  names 
are  affixed,  in  their  absence,  under  previ- 
ous verbal  authority.  In  such  proceed- 
ings, where  there  are  no  provisions  to  the 
contrary,  competent  common  law  evi- 
dence of  the  facts  to  be  established  should 
be  produced  before  the  county  judge,  and 
this  officer  cannot  act  upon  his  personal 
knowledge.  The  People  v.  Smith,  45  N. 
Y.  772,  1871. 

By  its  charter  a  city  was  authorized 
to  take  stock  in  railroads,  "provided,  that 
no  stock  shall  be  subscribed  or  taken  by 
the  common  council,  unless  upon  the  pe- 
tition of  two  thirds  of  the  residents  of 
said  city  who  are  freeholders  of  said 
city."  It  was  held,  in  an  action  by  the 
railroad  company  against  the  city  on  the 
contract  of  subscription,  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  common  council  to  determine 
whether  the  requisite  number  of  the  free- 
liolders  of  the  city  had  petitioned  for  the 
subscription,   no    other   tribunal   having 


548 


MUNICIPAL   CORPOKATIONS. 


[CII.  XIV. 


§  551.  (424)  So,  under  an  act  providing  "  that  no  subscription 
or  purchase  of  stock  shall  be  made,  or  bonds  issued,  by  any 
county  or  cit}^  creating  a  debt  for  the  payment  of  such  subscrip- 
tion, unless  a  majority  of  the  qualified  voters  of  the  county  or  city 
shall  vote  for  the  same,"  it  was  held  that  bonds  issued  without 
an  election,  or  where  the  election  was  called  by  the  wrong 
authority  (as  by  the  county  court  instead  of  the  county  board  of 
supervisors),  are  void, /or  ivant  of  power  to  issue  them,  in  whose 
hands  soever  they  may  be,  and  are  not  validated  by  the  levy  of 
taxes  and  the  payment  of  interest  thereon.^  But  this  view  was 
denied  to  be  sound  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States, 
which  decided  that  an  innocent  holder  for  value  of  such  bonds  was 


been  provided  for  that  purpose  ;  and  hav- 
ing passed  upon  tliat  question  tiieir  deter- 
mination is  conclusive,  unless  it  may  be 
set  aside  in  some  direct  proceeding  for 
that  purpose.  Railroad  Company  v.  Kvans- 
ville,  15  Ind.  3!)5,  1860,  following  and 
applying  Knox  County  v.  Aspinwall,  21 
How.  539;  see  also  Bissell  v.  JefFerson- 
ville,  21  How.  287,  1860  ;  Mercer  County 
V.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83 ;  compare,  however, 
Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280,  1865;  Du- 
anesburg  i'.  Jenkins,  40  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  574  ; 
Society,etc.  y.  New  London,  29  Conn.  174; 
State  V.  Saline  County,  45  Mo.  242,  1870. 
Subscriptions  to  turnpike  roads  by  the 
county  judge,  under  acts  of  the  legisla- 
ture, were  held  unauthorized  and  void,  it 
being  admitted  that  an  amount  of  stock 
sufficient,  with  tlie  aid  of  county  sub- 
scriptions, to  complete  each  mile  of  road, 
had  not  been  taken  by  private  subscrtplion, 
as  required  by  tlie  statutes.  Clay  v. 
County,  4  Bush  (Ky.),  154.  Where  there 
is  a  danger  of  a  misapplication  of  funds 
subscribed,  a  court  of  equity,  and  it  seems 
a  court  of  law,  should  refuse  to  enforce  a 
subscription  until  tlie  corporation  properly 
secures  the  appropriation  of  the  bonds,  or 
their  proceeds,  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  subscription.  C.  &  0.  Railroad 
Co.  V.  Washington  County,  10  Bush 
(Ky.),  564,  1874. 

1  Marshall  County  v.  Cook,  88  111.  44, 
1865,  commenting  on  and  distinguishing 
Mercer  County  v.  Hacket,  1  Wall.  83,  and 
Gelpecke  v.  Dubuque,  lb.  175.  See,  also. 
Shoemaker  v.  Gosiien,  14  Ohio  St.  569; 
Berliner  v.  Waterloo,  14  Wis.  378;  Veeder 


r.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280,  1865;  Dnnnovan  .;. 
Green,  57  111.  63 ;  St.  Joseph  Township  v. 
Rogers,  16  Wall.  644,  1872;  s.  p.  as  to 
ratification.  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10 
Wall.  670,  1870;  Hancock  i'.  Chicot  Co., 
32  Ark.  575,  1877.  The  corporation  is 
estopped  —  where  the  power  to  issue 
existed  —  from  setting  up  irreyidarities  in 
the  issue  of  the  bonds,  after  repeated  pay- 
ments of  interest  thereon.  Kcithsburg  v. 
Frick,  34  111.  405 ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Marion 
County,  30  Mo.  294;  Mercer  County  v. 
Hubbard,  45  111.  139 ;  Beloit  v.  Morgan,  7 
Wall.  019, 18G8 ;  Schenck  c.  Supervisors,  5 
Wall.  772,  1866;  Herman  on  Estoppel, 
chapter  on  Corporations;  compare  Marsh 
r.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall.  670.  The  muni- 
cipal authorities,  on  imuulamus  or  other 
proceedings  to  compel  them  to  make  sub- 
scription to  the  railroad  company,  may 
show  that  the  election  was  influenced  by 
it  and  its  employes,  by  bribery  and  cor- 
ruption. People  V.  Supervisors,  27  Cal. 
655,  1865 ;  Butler  v.  Dunham,  27  111.  474 ; 
post,  ch.  XX.  What  is  a  majority  of  votes. 
People  V.  Chapman,  CO  111.  137,  1873; 
Decker  v.  Hughes,  68  111.  33,  1873.  Sub- 
scription cannot  be  made  witliout  an 
affirmative  vote.  People  v.  Cass  Co.,  77 
111.  438,  1875.  The  presumption  is  that 
the  vote,  cast  at  an  election  held  accord- 
ing to  law,  is  the  vote  of  the  whole  num- 
ber of  legal  voters,  and  this  presumption 
cannot  be  rebutted  by  proof  of  tlie  num- 
ber of  votes  cast  at  an  election  held  in  the 
preceding  year.  St.  Josepli  v.  Rogers,  16 
Wall.  664 ;  Melvin  v.  Lisenby,  111. 


§  552.]  CONTRACTS.  549 

entitled  to  recover  upon  them.  The  only  defect  in  the  execution 
of  the  power  was  that  the  election  was  ordered  by  the  wrong 
authority,  but  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  conduct  of  the 
county  in  retaining  the  stock,  and  in  levying  taxes  and  paying 
interest  for  a  series  of  years,  estopped  it  to  set  up  as  a  defence 
that  the  bonds  were  illegal,  and  it  refused  to  follow  the  judgment 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State,  which  had  held  the  same  issue 
of  bonds  to  be  void.^ 

§  552.  (425)  In  a  case  in  Ohio^  where  the  legislature  author- 
ized "  the  county  commissioners  of  any  county  through  or  in 
which  a  railroad  might  be  located,  to  subscribe  to  the  capital 
stock  of  the  said  company,"  and,  for  the  purpose  of  paying  there- 
for, "to  borrow  the  necessary  amount  of  money,  for  which  they 
shall  issue  their  negotiable  bonds,"  etc.,  it  was  decided  to  be  a 
defence  to  an  action  on  the  bonds  (though  by  a  bona  fide  holder) 
that  the  railroad  was  "  never  made  or  located  through  or  in  the 
county  "  ;  that  it  was  "  located  and  completed  so  as  not  to  touch 
tlie  county."  The  defence  was  held  good,  upon  the  ground  that 
the  authority  to  issue  the  bonds  never  existed.^  It  is  the  general 
doctrine  of  the  state  courts  that  not  only  is  express  authority 
requisite,  but  that  the  substantial  requirements  of  the  law  must 
be  observed ;  ^  while  in  the  federal  courts  the  failure  to  comply 

1  Super\isors  of  Marshall  County  v.  expression,  in  the  trustees  to  subscribe 
Schenck,  5  Wall.  772,  18G6;  Redd  v.  6u-  for  the  stock,  or  estop  the  quasi  corpora- 
pervisors,  31  Gratt.  (Va.)  G85,  approving  tion  from  making  the  defence  of  ultra 
text.  vires,  if  it  existed. 

2  Treadwell  (;.  Commissioners,  11  Ohio  Under  a  charter  authorizing  counties 
St.  183,  1860,  reviewing  and  criticising  "  through  which  "  a  given  railroad  "  may 
Aspinwall  v.  Commissioners  of  Knox  pass"  to  subscribe  to  its  stock,  it  was 
County,  21  How.  (U.  S.)  539,  approved  held  that  a  county  between  tlie  termini  of 
in  Bissell  y.  Jeffersonville,  24  How.  (U.  the  road  miglit  subscribe  without  waiting 
S.)  287,  1860.  In  Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  until  the  route  was  h)cated,  or  built  with- 
Wis.  280,  1865,  Treadwell  v.  Commission-  in  the  county.  Woods  v.  Lawrence  Coun- 
ers  and  Gould  v.  Sterling,  before  cited,  ty,  1  Black  (U.  S.),  386,  1861.  In  Minnesota 
are  approved,  and  Aspinwall  v.  Commis-  the  agreement  to  issue  the  bonds  must  be 
sioners  and  Moran  v.  Miami  County  are  perfected  before  the  construction  of  the 
criticised.  Compare  State,  etc.  v.  Van  road  intended  to  be  aided.  State,  etc.  v. 
Home,  7  Ohio  St.  .327 ;  re-affirmed.  State  Highland,  25  Minn.  355. 

Trustees,  etc.,  8  Ohio  St.  394,  401.     The  3  lamoille,  etc.  Co.  v.  Fairfield,  51  Vt. 

two  cases  last  cited  (7  Ohio  St.  327,  8  Ih.  257;   People  v.  Waynesville,  88  111.  469; 

3&4)   do  not   intend,  probably,  to  assert  Sykes  v.  Columbus,  55  Miss.  115;  Dela- 

the  principle  that  the  non-action  of  the  ware    Co.   v.   McCiintock,   51    Ind.   325, 

tax-payers  or  inliabitants  will  supply  a  1875;  Harding  v.  R.  R.  I.  &  St.  L.  Rail- 

rvant  of  power,  in  the  just  sense  of  that  road  Co.,  65  111.  90,  1872. 


550  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CII.  XIV. 

with  tlie  requirements  is,  as  we  have  seen,  no  defence  against  the 
bona  Jide  holders  of  such  bonds. 

§  553.  (420)  It  may  be  remarked,  in  conclusion,  that  this 
general  survey  of  the  adjudications  shows  some  difference  of 
judicial  opinion  (chiefly  in  cases  involving  the  rights  of  innocent 
holders  of  negotiable  municipal  securities)  respecting  the  evi- 
dence of  the  compliance  with  conditions  precedent,  and  as  to 
■what  will  estop  the  municipality  from  showing  a  non-compliance 
in  fact  w^ith  such  conditions,  Yet,  aside  from  these  differences, 
the  courts  all  agree  that  such  a  corporation  may  successfully 
defend  against  the  bonds  in  whosesoever  hands  they  may  be,  if 
its  officers  or  agents,  who  assume  to  issue  them,  had  no  legislative 
power  to  do  so.^  The  officers  of  such  corporations  possess  no  gen- 
eral power  to  bind  them,  and  have  no  authority  except  such  as 
the  legislature  confers.  If  the  statute  authorizes  such  a  corpora- 
tion to  issue  its  bonds  ohIt/  when  the  measure  is  sanctioned  by 
a  majority  of  the  voters,  bonds  issued  without  such  a  sanction 
(either  in  fact  or  according  to  the  decision  of  authorized  officers 
or  some  authorized  body  or  tribunal),  or  when  voted  to  one 
corporation  and  issued  to  another,  are  void,  into  whosesoever 
hands  they  may  come.^  This  is  the  sound  and  true  rule  of  law 
on  this  subject,  and  the  one  which  has  had  the  uniform  approval  of 
the  state  courts  in  this  country,  and  it  has  also  received  the  high 
sanction  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.^     The  dis- 

1  Ante,  ch.  vi.  sec.  163.     The  provis-  holders  for  value.    Aspinwall  v.  County 

ions  of  a  railroad  charter  made  it  lawful  of  Jo  Daviess,  22  How.  (U.  g.)  864, 1859; 

for  certain  counties  to  subscribe  stock  on  ante,  sec.  70 ;  Marsh  v.  Fulton  County,  10 

a  majority  vote,  and,  on  such  vote  being  Wall.  676. 

had,  made  it  the  duty  of  the  county  com-  ^  Aiite,  ch.  vi.  sec.  163. 

mlssioners    to   subscribe   for    stock   and  3  Marsh   v.  Fulton  County,  10  Wall, 

issue  bonds  therefor.     Accordingly  a  vote  676,  1870.     Speaking  of  this  subject,  Mr. 

was  had,  resulting  in  favor  of  a  subscrip-  Justice  Field,  in  the  case  just  cited,  deliv- 

tion ;   after  the  vote,  but  before  the  sub-  ering    the   opinion   of    the   court,   says : 

scription    was    actually   made    and    the  "But  it  is  earnestly  contended  that  the 

bonds  issued,  counties  were  prohibited  by  plaintiff  was  an  innocent  purchaser  of  the 

law  from   subscribing  for   stock,  unless  bonds,  without  notice  of  their  invalidity, 

paid  for  in  cash.     Held,  that  the  power  to  If  such  were  the  fact,  we  do  not  perceive 

subscribe  and  the  vote  did  not  constitute  how  it  could  affect   the  liability  of    the 

a  contract   within   the   meaning   of    the  county  of  Fulton.     This  is   not   a  case 

clause   of  the   constitution  making   con-  where   the  party   executing    the   instru- 

tracts  inviolable  ;  tliat  until  the  subscrip-  ments   possessed   a    general   capacity  to 

tion  was  actually  made  the  contract  was  contract,    and     where    the    instruments 

unexecuted ;  and  tliat  bonds  thus  issued  might,  for  such  reason,  be  taken  without 

were  void,  even  in  the  hands  of  innocent  special  inquiry  into  their  validity.     It  is 


§  554.] 


CONTRACTS. 


551 


tinction,  however,  must  be  remembered,  between  want  of  power 
to  issue  the  bonds  and  irregularities  in  the  exercise  of  the  power, 
which  are  unavailing  against  the  bona  fide  holder,  without  notice 
of  the  irregularity. 


§  554.  Defences  grounded  on  corporate  neglect,  or  technical 
in  their  nature,  are  not  favored  when  the  bonds  are  in  innocent 
hands.i  The  issue  of  the  bonds  proves  that  conditions  precedent, 
imposed  by  ordinance^  have  been  complied  with  or  waived.^ 


a  case  where  the  power  to  contract  never 
existed;    where   the   instruments  might, 
with  equal  authority,  liave  been  issued 
by  any  other  citizen  of  the  county.     It  is 
a  case,  too,  where  the  holder  was  bound 
to  look  to  the  action  of  the  ofBcers  of  the 
county  and   ascertain   whether  the   law 
had  been  so  far  followed  by  them  as  to 
justify  tlie  issue  of  the  bonds.     The  au- 
thority to  contract  must  exist  before  any 
protection  as  innocent  purchaser  can  be 
claimed  by  the  holder.     This  is  the  law 
even   as  respects   commercial  paper,  al- 
leged to  have  been  issued  under  a  dele- 
gated authority,  and  is  stated  in  the  case 
of  Floyd  Acceptances,  7  Wall.  666.     In 
speaking  of  notes  and  bills  issued  or  ac- 
cepted by  an  agent,  acting  under  a  gen- 
eral or  special  power,  the  court  says:  'In 
e^ch  case   the  person  dealing  with  the 
agent,  knowing  that  he  acts  only  by  virtue 
of  a  delegated  power,  must,  at  his  peril, 
see   that   the  paper  on  which  he  relies 
comes  within  the  power  under  which  the 
agent  acts.    And   this  applies   to  every 
person  who  takes  the  paper  afterwards ; 
for  it  is  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  pro- 
tection wliich  commercial  usage  throws 
around  negotiable  paper  cannot  be  used 
to  establish  the  authority  by  wliich  it  was 
originally  issued.'"     And  in  this  case  tlie 
bonds  of  the  county  of  Fulton,  tliough 
negotiable  in  form,  and  not  disclosing  or 
reciting  tlieir  purpose  or  origin,  were  held 
void,  in  tlie  hands  of  bonajide  holders,  for 
want  of  authority  in  the  county  to  issue 
them,  having  been  voted   to  one  corpo- 
ration   and  delivered  (according   to  tiie 
view  of  tiie  court)  to  another  and  distinct 
corporation.    Supra,  sec  624.  See  Society, 
etc.  r.  New  London,  29  Conn.  174 ;  com- 
pare People  V.  Mead,  36  N.  Y.  224 ;  Adams 


V.  Railroad  Co.,  2  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  645; 
Lynde  v.  Winnebago  County,  16  Wall. 
6,  1872;  Steines  v.  Franklin  County,  48 
Mo.  167,  1871 ;  Super,  v.  Weider,  64  III. 
427;  s.  c.  5  Chicago  Legal  News,  265; 
Burr  V.  Carbondale,  76  111.  455,  1875. 

1  Maddox  v.  Graham,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  56; 
Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  43  Pa.  St. 
391 ;  San  Antonio  v.  Lane,  32  Tex.  405. 

2  Commonwealth  v.  Pittsburgh,  supra; 
Gilchrist  r.  Little  Rock,  1  Dillon  C.  C. 
261;  Danielly  v.  Cabaniss,  52  Ga.  211, 
1874 ;  Black  v.  Cohen,  76.  621. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  held,  in  an  action  on  nego- 
tiable bonds  issued  by  a  public  cor- 
poration, that  where  the  defendant  has 
shown  fraud  in  the  origin  or  inception  of 
the  instruments,  this  will  throw  upon 
the  holder  the  burden  of  showing  that 
he  gave  value  for  them  before  maturitj'. 
Smith  V.  Sac  County,  11  Wall.  139, 1870, 
Clifford,  .J.,  dissenting. 

Wlien  special  authority  to  borrow  money 
or  to  subscribe  to  the  stock  of  a  railroad 
company  will  impliedly  repeal  existing  char- 
ter limitations  upon  the  amount  of  indebt- 
edness that  may  be  contracted  by  a  mu- 
nicipality, or  upon  the  rate  of  taxation. 
See  Amey  v.  Alleghany  City,  24  How. 
364,  1860;  Butz  v.  Muscatine,  8  Wall. 
575,  1869 ;  ante,  sec.  162,  and  cases  there 
cited. 

Mode  of  enforcing  payment  of  municipal 
bonds.  See  chapter  on  ^fandamus,  post. 
The  authority  to  levy  and  collect  special 
taxes  to  pay  bonds  authorized  to  be  issued 
cannot  be  witlidrawn  or  repealed  by  the 
legislature  to  the  prejudice  of  the  holders 
of  such  bonds.  Von  Hoffman  r.  Quincy, 
4  Wall.  535,  1800;  ante,  ch.  iv. ;  post,  ch. 
XX.     Where  bonds  of  a  county  are  legally 


552  MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.  [CH.  XIV. 

§  555.  Having  stated  the  law  of  municipal  bonds,  it  may  be 
useful  to  give  a  synopsis  of  the  principles  aj^plicable  to  nego- 
tiable securities  when  lost  or  stolen. 

A  negotiable  bond  stolen  and  its  number  altered  by  the  thief 
is  good  in  tlie  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder,  who  purchased  it  for 
value.^  Such  bonds  or  coupons,  although  stolen,  are  collectable 
in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder  who  took  them  for  value  in  the 
usual  course  of  business,  before  maturity  and  without  notice.^ 
If,  however,  the  instrument  is  incomplete,  as  if  any  essential  part 
is  left  in  blank,  and  is  afterwards  filled  up  by  the  thief,  or  holder 
under  the  thief,  no  recovery  can  be  had,  as,  where  the  place  of 
payment  was  left  in  blank,  and  before  it  was  filled  up  by  the 
authorized  officer,  the  bonds  were  stolen.^  A  bona  fide  holder 
cannot,  by  inserting  the  name  of  a  place  in  the  blank,  recover 
its  value.^  Where  the  corporate  seal  of  the  obligor  and  the  in- 
dorsement of  the  trustees  were  both  wanting  when  the  bonds 
were  stolen,  and  these  were  subsequently  forged,  and  in  that 
condition  came  into  the  plaintiff's  hands,  the  company  was  not 
liable.^  As  a  bond  takes  effect  from  its  delivery,  it  is  presumed 
that  a  blank  as  to  the  date  would  not  affect  a  recovery.^  The 
insertion  by  the  thief  of  the  name  of  the  payee  in  the  blank 
left  for  that  purpose  when  the   bond  was   issued,  is   not  such 

authorized  to  be  issued  by  a  vote  of  the  law  of  New  York  attempting  to  legal- 
people,  and,  by  the  law  authorizing  the  ize  the  acts  of  commissioners  to  aid 
vote,  it  is  provided  that  the  bonds  shall  railways  was  declared  unconstitutional. 
be  executed  hy  certain  officers,  and  coun-  Horton  v.  Thompson,  71  N.  Y.  513. 
tersigned  by  the  treasurer  of  the  county,  ^  Elizabeth  v.  Force,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  587  ; 
it  was  held,  that  the  omission  of  the  trcas-  Berdsell  v.  Russell,  29  N.  Y.  220 ;  Com- 
urer  to  countersign  the  bonds  is  a  mere  monwealtli  v.  Savings  Bank,  98  Mass.  12  ; 
defect  in  the  execution  of  them,  which  a  A  contrary  doctrine  is  held  in  some  oases, 
court  of  equity  would,  in  the  absence  of  a  See,  Diamond  v.  Lawrence  Co.,  37  Pa.  St. 
remedy  at  law,  ordinarily  supply,  and  353 ;  Crosby  v.  New  London  R.  R.  25 
that  an  injunction  restraining  tlie  coliec-  Conn.  121 ;  Myles  v.  York  R.  R.  43  Me. 
tion  of  taxes  for  the  payment  of  such  362  ;  Clark  v.  Janesville,  1  Biss,  98. 
bonds  sliould  not  be  allowed.  Breese,  C.  2  Evertson  v.  National  Bank  of  New- 
J.,  and  .l/cJ/Z/.-ito-,  J.,  dissenting.  Melvin  port,  66  N.  Y.  14;  California  v.  Wells, 
V.  Lisenby,  111.  not  reported.  15  Cal.  336  ;  Spooner  v.  Holmes,  102  Mass. 

TownshipRailroad  Aid  Act  of  Missouri  503. 

held  unconstitutional.    Webb  u.  Lafayette  ^  Ledwich  v.  McKim,  53  N.  Y.   307; 

Co.,  67  Mo.  353;  Ranney  v.  Bader,  67  Mo.  Jackson  v.  Vicksburg  Co.,  2  Woods,  141. 

476 ;  State  v.  Brassfield,  67  Mo.  331.    But  *  lb. 

the  federal  courts,  as  to  bonds  previously  ^  Maas  v.  Missouri  R.  R.  11  Hun  (N. 

issued,  refused  to  follow  the  state  court  Y.),  8. 

decisions.     Foote  v.  Johnson  County,  5  ^  Pierce  v.  Richardson,  37  N.  H.  306  ; 

Dillon  C.  C.  R.  281,  1878 ;  Douglass  v.  Bills  v.  Stanton,  69  111.  51. 
Pike  County,  101  U.  S.  677,  1879.    The 


§  555.]  CONTRACTS.  553 

an  alteration  as  will  avoid  the  bond.^  The  fact  of  the  bond, 
otherwise  negotiable,  not  being  payable  to  a  particular  person, 
does  not  render  it  non-negotiable  .^  If  overdue  bonds  or  coupons 
are  stolen  and  then  come  into  a  bona  fide  holder's  hands,  he  can- 
not collect  their  amount.^  Coupons  are  held  to  be  entitled  to 
three  days'  grace,  so  that  a  purchaser,  after  the  time  specified 
for  payment,  but  before  the  expiration  of  the  days  of  grace,  is 
deemed  a  purchaser  before  maturity .*  Giving  immediate  notice 
of  the  theft  by  publication  will  not  of  itself  deprive  the  holder 
of  his  right  to  recover.^  After  actual  service  of  such  notice, 
bankers  and  brokers  should  retain  a  memorandum  in  order  to 
identify  stolen  bonds  if  presented.^ 

1  Boyd  V.  Kennedy,  9  Vroom  (38  N.  &  Seybel  v.  Neat.  etc.  Bank,  54  N.  Y. 
J.    L.),    146;   Dutchess    Co.  Ins.    Co.   v.  288 ;  Murray  ?;.  Lardner,  2  Wall.  110. 
Hachfield,  1  Hun  (N.  Y.),  675.  «  Vermilye  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  21  Wall. 

2  Smith  V.  County,  54  Mo.  58.  138.     Mere   omission    to   look   for   such 

3  Arents  v.  Commonwealth,  18  Gratt.  notice  several  months  after  publication 
(Va.)  750;  Vermilye  y.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  21  is  no  proof  of  mala  Jides.  Raphael  v. 
Wall.  138.  Bank  of  England,   17  C.  B.   161.      See 

*  Evertson  v.  National  Bank  of  New-  Preston  v.  Hall,  2-3  Gratt.  (Va.)  600;  s.  c. 

port,  66  N.   Y.  14;   Arents  v.  Common-  21  Am.  Rep.  699;  also  see  elaborate  note 

wealth,  18  Gratt.  (Va.)  750.     (^oWs  that  by  Mr.  Stewart  in  29  N.  J.  Eq.  587. 
there  is  no  grace.) 


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